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JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
OF
WORDS AND PHRASES
SECOND SERIES
COLLECTED. EDITED, AND COMPILED
BY TBB
EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE NATIONAL REPORTER SYSTEM
VOLUME 3
LAND — PTOSIS ABDOMINALIS
ST. PAUL
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
1914
COPTBIOHT, 1914
BY
WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY
(3WD8AP.?pSBB.)t
252001
JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY DEFINITIONS
OF
WORDS AND PHRASES
SECOND SERIES
VOLUME 3
LAND
See Arable Land; Cemetery Land; Claim
Against Land; Claim upon Land ; Coal
Lands; Common Lands; Contract
Made Touching the Land; Crown
Lands; Cultivated Lands; Drainage of
Land; Earned Land; Qranted Lands;
Improved Land; Inclosed Land; Iron
Land; Lots, Blocks, Tracts, and Par-
cels of Land; Mainland; Marsh
Land; Mineral Land; Overflowed
Lands; Public Land; Respecting Ti-
tle to Land; School Land; Shore
Land; Suit for Land; Sunk Land;
Swamp and Overflowed Lands; Tide
Land; Timber Land; Uninclosed
Lands; Unplatted Lands; Vacant
Land; Wild and Forest Lands.
Adjacent lands, see Adjacent.
All my lands, see AIL
Contract for sale of land, see Contract
of Salfe
Improvement of land, see Improvement
Interest in land, see Interest (In Prop-
erty).
My land, see My.
Other lands, see Other.
Raw prairie land, see Raw.
Right of way as land Itself, see Right of
Way.
See, also. Real Property.
"Land" is a term used to designate all
real estate, Just as money is used to desig-
nate the whole volume of the medium of ex-
change. Montgomery County v. Cochran, 121
Fed. 17, 21, 57 C. C. A. 261.
'The word *land* • • • comprehends
ground, soil, or earth, pastures, woods,
springs, wells, lakes, ponds, and all things
that have become a fixed part of the soU."
Orchard v. Wrlght-Dalton-Bell-Anchor Store
Co., 125 S. W. 486, 4H 225 Mo. 414, 20 Ann.
Cas. 1072.
3 WnaA P.2d See.— 1
The primary meaning of the word
"land," at common law, is "any ground, soil,
or earth whatsoever; as meadows, pastures,
woods, waters, marshes, furzes and heath."
In a more limited sense the term denotes
the quantity and character of the interest or
estate which the tenant may own In the
lands. Kemp ▼. Ooodnight, 80 N. B. 160, 161,
168 Ind. 174.
''Land," in its legal signlflcation, has an
indefinite extent upwards, so that by a con-
veyance of land all buildings, growing tim-
ber, and water erected and being thereupon
shall likewise pass. Trustees of the Free-
holders & Commonalty of Town of Brook-
haven V. Smith, 90 N. Y. Supp. 646, 660, 98
App. Div. 212.
It is elementary that the word "land"
in its legal signification has an indefinite
extent upwards as well as downwards, and
therefore if it were possible for a man to
live in a state of nature, unconnected with
other individuals, the proprietor of land
would own not only the face of the earth
within the boundaries of his proprietorship,
but also everything under it and over it. An
imaginary person living in such a state of
nature would be at liberty to use his land as
he pleased to build on It to any height and to
dig into it to any depth without restraint.
But as man was formed for society and is
Incapable of living alone, organized society
is essential to his well-being and happiness,
and every person who enters society must
give up a part of his so-called natural rights
and liberty for the benefit of the communi-
ty. Cochran v. Preston, 70 Atl. 113, 114, 108
Md. 220, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 11C3, 129 Am.
St Rep. 482, 15 Ann. Cas. 1048 (citing 1
BL Comm. p. 125).
Land In its broadest signification in-
cludes not only the surface of the earth but
the mines, quarries, and everything under it;
LAND
LAND
and whoever has the fee in the surface pre-
sumptively owns everything of a permanent
nature under or over it Notwithstanding it
is competent for the owner to convey the
mines or quarries by a separate grant vest-
ing in one person a freehold in the soil and
in another a freehold in the mines or quar-
ries and to sever the ownership of the sur-
face from the ownership from that which is
under it, there may exist a double owners
ship or two freeholds in the same parcel of
land. Louisville & N. R. Go. v. Boykln, 76
Ala. 660, 663 (citing 2 Washb. Real Prop.
876).
The word "land" includes not only the
soil, but everything attached to it, whether
attached by the course of nature, as trees,
herbage, and water, or by the hand of man,
as buildings aud fences. Crawford Ck). v.
Hathaway, 93 N. W. 781, 788, 67 Neb. 325, 60
L. R. A. 889, 108 Am. St. Rep. 647 (ciUng
McGee Irrigating Ditch Go. v. Hudson [Tex.]
22 S. W. 967).
Anderson's Law Diet says that the
word "land" comprehends all things of a
permanent and substantial nature, being a
word of very comprehensive significance.
Act Feb. 22, 1851, pp. 64, 65, is entitied "An
act for the benefit of William Jewell College.
Certain lands owned by William Jewell Col-
lege exempted from tax." And section 1
provides that ''all the land and improvements
thereon now owned by the William Jewell
College • • • and all the lands that may
hereafter be granted or devised to said col-
lege, or any other institution of learning in
this state, for the benefit of education, be,
and the same are hereby, exempted from all
taxes * * * 80 long as said lands may be
owned by said college." Section 2 releases
from delinquent taxes the "land" belonging
to the college in the counties named, and
section 3 makes it a misdemeanor to willfully
injure or destroy timber, etc., from any of
the lands belonging to the college. The en-
tire endowment fund of the college was in
lands when the act was passed, the colleges
of that time being generally endowed in land
alone, and the charters of a number of col-
leges perpetually relieved them from taxa-
tion on all kinds of property. Held, that the
word "land" as used in the act will be con-
strued to include personalty, so that the col-
lege cannot be taxed on its endowment fund,
consisting of personalty. State ex rel. Wall-
er V. Trustees of William Jewell College, 136
S. W. 397, 399, 401, 402, 234 Mo. 299.
The term "land" in statutes conferring
power to condemn is to be taken in the legal
sense, and includes both the soil and build-
ings and other structures on it and all inter-
ests therein. White v. Cincinnati, R, & M.
R. R., 71 N. E. 276, 278, 34 Ind. App. 287
(quoting and adopting definition in Lewis,
Em. Dom. [2d Ed.] § 285).
"The term *land,' in statutes conferring
power to condemn, is to be taken in the legal
sense, and includes both the soil and build-
ings and other structures on it, and an^' and
all interests therein." In assessment of dam-
ages in proceedings for condemnation of laud,
the appraisers should value the land taken
with the buildings on it, and it will be pre-
sumed that the buildings were included in
the award. Stauffer v. Cincinnati, R. & M.
R. R., 70 N. E. 543, 644, 33 Ind. App. 356
(quoting Lewis, Em. Dom. [2d Ed.] | 285;
citing Brocket v. Ohio & P. R. Co., 14 Pa.
241, 53 Am. Dec. 534 ; State v. Reed, 88 N.
H. 59; Mills, Em. Dom. ff 49, 223).
The word "land" comprehends ground,
soil, or earth, pastures, woods, spring, wells,
lakes, ponds, and all things which have be-
come a fixed part of the soil. The word
"tenement," in its ordinary meaning, means
a "house," which is the subject of tenure,
and includes, not only corporeal heredita-
ments, which are or may be held, but also all
lnhei*itances issuing out of any of these in-
heritances, or concerning or annexed to or
exercised within the same, though they lie
not in tenure. "Tenement" is a word of
greater scope than "lands," and though, in
its vulgar acceptation, is only applied to
houses and other buildings, yet, in its orig-
inal, proper, and legal sense, it signifies any-
thing that may be holden, provided it be of a
permanent nature, whether of a substantial
and sensible, or of an unsubstantial, ideal,
kind. The term "hereditaments" Includes
rights unconnected with land, but generally
used as the widest expression for real prop-
erty of all kinds, being divided into real her-
editaments, which are lands and tenements,
and personal hereditaments, which are rights
concerning neither lands nor tenements. As
so defined, neither the term "tenement" nor
"hereditament" includes in law a lease of
lands for years. Orchard v. Wright-Dalton-
Bell-Anchor Store Co., 125 S. W. 486, 494,
225 Mo. 414, 20 Ann. Gas. 1072.
In common speech the nonmlneral portion
of land, the portion which covers and en-
velopes the minerals, is called the "surface"
of the land, and the proprietor of land who
devests himself of title to the minerals which
it contains is still spoken of as the owner of
the fee or of the surface or of the land.
Kansas Natural Gas Go. v. Board of Com'rs
of Neosho County, 89 Pac 750, 751, 75 Kan.
335.
The word "land," as a conveyance, car-
ries every kind of property, right, and aw)ur-
tenance which is legally embraced in that
word, but what rights go to a patentee of
land depend, not upon any supposed adjudi-
cation contained in the patent, but upon the
general law of the state where the land is
situated. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles
Farming & Milling Co., 93 Pac. 869, 871, 152
Gal. 645.
A win whereby testator devised farm
lands to his daughters for life, remainder in
fee simple to their children, and whereby he
L.AND
a
LAND
proTided tbat tbey mli^t sell their respectilTe
lands, proceeds to be reinvested in "lands'*
to be held for the same use, and that por-
idiaser must see that the reinvestment was
made before acquiring title to land devised,
did not require reinvestment in farm lands,
but reinvestment could be made in city real
estate; the word "lands" including every
form of real estate. Clay v. Bogie (Ky.) 119
S. W. 737. 738.
Statutory deflsltloifts
"Gen. St 1901, | 7342, defines the word
land' in the phrases 'real estate* and 'real
property* as including lands, tenements, and
hereditaments and all rights thereto and in-
terest therein, equitable as well as legal."
Clarke v. lAwience, 88 Pac. 786, 738, 75 Kan.
26.
The word "land" or "lands," as used in
Code 1899, c. 13, | 17, eh 16, relating to taxa-
tion, expressly includes lands, tenements, and
hereditaments, and all rights thereto and in-
terests therein, except chattel interests and
chattels real. Harvey Coal, etc., Co. v. Dil-
lon, 53 S. E. 928, 936, 59 W. Va. 605.
Under Ky. St 1909, | 458, providing that
the words "real estate" or "land" shall be
construed to mean any interest other than a
chattel interest, and section 470, providing
that no action shall be brought upon a con-
tract relating to real estate unless in writing,
a parol contract to board and care for the
owner of a life estate In land in consideration
of the use of the land is void, though board
was furnished in reliance on the contract
Hampton v. Glass <Ky.) 116 S. W. 243. 244.
Tnder the statutes declaring that the
word "land," and the phrases "real estate,"
and "real property," shall include lands, ten-
ements, hereditaments and all rights thereto
and interests therein equitable as well as le-
gal, and providing that lands not exempt by
law shall be liable to be taken on execution,
laud held by an equitable title may be levied
upon and sold by virtue of an execution.
Poole V. French, 80 Pac 997, 1000, 71 Kan.
391.
Laws 1903, p. 376, relating to street open-
ings, requires by section 15 that each lot,
piece, or parcel of land be designated upon
a diagram as a basis for assessments. Sec-
tion 17 requires the amount of assessment to
be set opposite each lot, piece, or parcel of
land which under section 20 is made a lien
upon the property assessed. These sections
and sections 23 and 26, use the terms "prop-
erty," "lands," and "ea<di lot, piece or parcel
of land," interchangeably. Held that, in re-
quiring the superintendent of streets to as-
sess the b^ieflts from street improvements on
the property of any street railroad within the
assessment district, the word "property" was
used in a limited sense and as referring to
that species of property designated as "land,"
which as defined by Civ. Code, | 669, is "the
solid material of the earth," and hoice there
was no authority for an assessment against
the 'ties, tracks, poles, rails and switches"
as such or apart from the franchise. Los
Angeles Pac. Co. v. Hubbard, 121 Pac. 806,
308, 17 Cal. App. 646.
The vendee's right to specific perform-
ance of a contract to convey land is "lands"
and "real estate" within the statute defini-
tion (Bev. St I 4971, sut>d. 9), as including
"lands, tenements and hereditaments and all
rights thereto and interests therein." The
lands, on the vendee's death, descend at once,
by operation of law to his children (Rev. St
I 2270, subd. 1). An administrator cannot
sue to compel specific performance of a con-
tract to convey land to his decedent, the
price for which has been paid, where it does
not appear that the administrator is in pos-
session, or that the personal assets of the es-
tate are Insufllclent to pay the debts. Car-
penter V. Fopper, 68 N. W. 874, 94 Wis. 146.
As agxionltiurAl or srasiiis land
"Lands of the state," as used in the tiUe
of act to promote public health, etc., by drain-
ing such lands, included agricultural lands.
Sisson V. Board of Sup'rs of Buena Vista
County, 104 N. W. 454, 458, 128 Iowa, 442,
70 L. B. A. 440.
In Bev. av. St 1897, | 4218fff, prescrib-
ing the classified free school, asylum, and
public lands subject to sale to actual settlers,
the terms "land" and "other lands" are used
in the popular sense "as not embracing town
lots, but meaning agricultural or grazing
lands." Conn v. Terrell, 80 S. W. 608, 609,
97 Tex. 67a
BvUdlsc or otkmr strnetwre
According to Blackstone, "land" legally
includes all castles, houses, and other build-
ings, for they consist of two thing»— land,
which is the foundation, and the structure
thereupon. Where defendant in trespass to
try title disclaimed any title or interest in
the land, but claimed title to a house stand-
ing thereon, the plea of the three-year stat-
ute of limitations was without application;
the land legally including all houses. Fidel-
ity Cotton on & Fertilizer Co. v. Martin
(Tex.) 136 S, W. 533.
An assessment under Pub. St 1901, c. 79,
II 4, 8, authorizing an assessment on lands
receiving special benefits from the construc-
tion of a sewer, for their Just share for the
cost of construction and maintenance, etc.,
recognizes the ownership of buildings on lands
of another, and buildings so situate are real
estate for the purposes of assessment, and
are properly assessed to the owner thereof;
such buildings being "lands." Granite State
Land Co. v. Town of Hampton, 79 AtL 25,
29, 76 N. H. 1.
"Under the general tax law, and by the
general understanding, the term 'lands,* when
used with reference to assessments for pur-
poses of taxation, includes with the land
above or under water all constructions which
have been erected upon or afllxed thereto."
LAND
LAND
In re City of New York, 76 N. E. 18, 19, 183
N. Y. 246.
Where one making an excavation in a lot
negligently left it exposed to inclement
weather for an unreasonable length of time
without putting in foundation walls, thereby
causing injury to a building on an adjoin-
ing lot by the caving in of the ground, he 1b
liable to the adjoining owner for the injury
to the building, though Bev. Civ. Code, §
291, providing that each coterminous owner
is entitled to the lateral support which his
land received from the adjoining land, sub-
ject to the right of the adjoining owner to
make proper excavations on using ordinary
care, and taking reasonable precautions to
sustain the land, and giving previous reason-
able notice to the other of his intention to
make the excavations, and section 187, defin-
ing "land" as the solid material of the earth,
whatever may be its ingredients, give only
the right to damages for injuries to the land
itself, and not to buildings placed thereon.
Hannlcker v. Lepper, 107 N. W, 202, 203, 20
S. D. 371, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243, 129 Am. St
Rep. 938.
Easeuents aad Inoorporeal lieredlta-
ments
The word "land,** as used in Code 1904, f
1105f (3-6), authorizing the condemnation of
lands or any interest or estate therein, in-
cludes easements, and other incorporeal her-
editaments, and all rights thereto and inter-
est therein, and is synonymous with the
terms "real estate** and "real property.**
Swann v. Washington Southern R. Co., 61 S.
E. 750, 751, 108 Ya. 282 (quoting 2 Bouv. Law
Diet. 306),
In an eminent domain statute which au-
thorizes certain classes of public service cor-
porations to condemn land for their use, the
word "land** is comprehensive, and includes
any interest in land, and under it an ease-
ment or right of way may be condemned.
Pacific Postal-Telegraph-Cable Co. ▼• Oregon
& C. R. Co., 163 Fed. 967, 969.
The term "lands,** as used in the con-
demnation statute, embraces all rights and
easements growing thereout South Bound
R. R. V. Burton, 46 S. E. 340, 342, 67 S. 0.
615.
The word "land," as used in the Eminent
Domain Act, is capable of Including ease-
ments in its signification. McEwan v. Penn-
sylvania, N. J. & N. Y. R. Co., 60 Atl. 1130.
1131, 72 N. J. Law, 419.
The word "lands" is not coextensive with
the words "tenements and hereditaments,**
and does not comprehend incorporeal heredi-
taments. In re Handley's Estate, 57 Atl.
755, 757, 208 Pa. 388 (citing 2 Jarm. Wills,
382).
Under Laws 1896, p. 796, c. 908, | 2, as
amended by Laws 1899, p. 1689, c. 712, pro-
viding that the term "land" shall include,
not only the land itself, but all buildings and
other articles and structures and superstruc-
tures erected on or under the same, where
a turnpike company did not own the fee in
the land, but owned a continuing easement
therein for the maintenance of the pike dur-
ing the life of the company's franchise, such
easement, together with the corporation's
tangible property, consisting of bridges, cul-
verts, ditches, prepared roadbeds, and struc-
tures on the soil, were taxable to it as land.
In re President, etc., of Albany & B. Turn-
pike Road, 87 N. Y. Supp. 1104, 1105, 94 App.
Div. 509.
Franoliise of corporation
Under Tax Law, | 2, subd. 3, defining the
terms "land,** "real estate,** and "real prop-
erty** to include land, underground railroads.
Including the valuation of franchises to con-
struct and operate the same, and defining a
"special franchise** to include the value of
the tangible property of a corporation situat-
ed in or under or above any street, a cor-
poration owning special franchises to operate
an underground railroad under city streets
owns special franchises subject to taxation,
though only so small a part of the railroad
is constructed and in operation as is insuffi-
cient to meet operating expenses, taxes, and
interest, and the franchises, if possessing a
value, are taxable, though they are not used.
People ex rel. Hudson & M. R. Co. v. State
Board of Tax Com'rs, 127 N. Y. Supp. 918,
143 App. Div. 26.
Laws 1896, p. 796, c 908, as amended by
Laws 1899, p. 1589, c. 712, § 2, subd. 3, de-
fines the terms "lands,** "real property," and
"real estate** as including, besides the tan-
gible property enumerated, the value of all
franchises, rights, authority or permission to
construct, maintain, or operate in, under,
above, upon, or through any streets, high-
ways, or public places, mains, pipes, etc.
The term "real property*' for the purposes
of taxation seems to be limited to such in-
tangible rights or fifanchises as relate to
public streets or highways and to exclude by
interference such as relate to public waters.
People ex rel. Edison Electric Illuminating
Co. V. Commissioners of Taxes & Assess-
ments, 110 N. Y. Supp. 833, 58 Misc. Rep. 249.
The tax law (Laws 1881, c. 293), din-
ing the terms, "land,** "real estate," and
"real property" as including "all surface, un-
derground or elevated railroads,*' and the
value of all franchises to construct or oper-
ate railroads, in, under, above or through
streets, is not limited to street surface rail-
roads only, but Includes long distance surface
steam railroads, and hence a franchise grant-
ed by the state to a steam surface railroad
for its road in, under, above, or through
streets is property, and a special franchise,
and taxable. People ex rel. New York Cent
& H. R. R. Co. V. Woodbury, 133 N, Y. Supp.
135, 139, 74 Misc. Rep. 130, 145.
LAND
LAND
Growing crops of grain are fmctns in-
dustriales, and av. Code, U 18©-188, defin-
ing ''land" as the solid material of the earth,
whether soil, rock, or other substance, ex-
clude growing grain, and only include such
growing things as are annexed to the earth
by roots, such as are deemed fructus natu-
rales. BJomson v. Rostad (S. D.) 1S7 N. W.
«5e7. 670.
Htffliwmy, street, or Hsht •f way
Rem. A Bal. Code, | 8739, authorises any
railroad corporation to enter upon any of the
state school lands to locate its road. Section
8740 authorizes every railroad corporation to
"appropriate" by condemnation any land or
interest therein, and any rights of way for
tunnels beneath the surface, including state
school lands, tide lands, etc., necessary for the
line of the road, provided that, if the bed of
such railway is upon a state or county road,
the corporation shall be responsible for the
cost of relocating the road appropriated. Sec-
tion 8738 permits any corporation to change
the grade or location of its "road or canal'* in
order to avoid dangerous or deficient curves,
eta Section 5717, provides that "when it
shall be necessary in the location of any road
herein mentioned to appropriate any part of
any public road, street or alley," etc., the
county court may, except within the limits of
a municipal corporation, agree with the cor-
poraUon upon the conditions upon which it
may be appropriated, and, if the parties can-
not agree, the corporation may appropriate
so much thereof as may be necessary in the
location of the road. Section 5718 provides
that whenever a private corporation is au-
thorized to appropriate any public highway,
etc., as mentioned in the last section, if it be
within any town, incorporated or not, the
corporation shall locate its road upon the
particular street, etc., designated by the local
authorities ; but if they refuse to make such
designation the corporation may make such
appropriation without reference thereto. Sec-
tion 5719 provides that when a public high-
way, etc, is taken by agreement, the corpora-
tion may place toUgates thereon with the
consent of the local authorities, but shall not
when the highway is appropriated without
agreement. Section 8737 authorizes every
railroad corporation to construct its railway
across, along, or upon any stream, plank
road, turnpike, etc., paying any damages caus-
ed thereby. Held, that a railway company
could not acquire by eminent domain as
against the public the exclusive right to use
one-half of a street for a double- track rail-
way; the term "land," as used in sections
8739 and 8740, not including land already de-
voted to a public use, such as a street. State
ex rel. B. Schade Brewing Co, v. Superior
Court of Spokane County, 113 Pac 576^ 578,
e2 Wash. 9&
The word "lands," as used in a statute
governing descent and distribution, which
provides that a surviving spouse shall be en-
titled to an estate for life in the lands of an
intestate leaving issue, remainder to such is-
sue, includes a mine open at the time of the
vesting of the life estate, and such mine is,
under the statute, inherited as lands by the
life tenant Lone Acre Oil Co. v. Swayne
(Tex.) 78 S. W. 380, 383.
The term "land," as used in statutory
enactments, means and includes mines and
mining claims. Bradford v. Morrison, 29
Sup. CL 349, 351, 212 U. S. 389, 53 U Bd.
564 (quoting and adopting definitions in Rev.
St Ariz. pars. 2708, 2948).
"Land" Includes coal and minerals in
place. Huss v. Jacobs, 59 Atl. 991, 994, 210
Pa. 145.
Under Code, c. 2, f 5, subsec 10, provid-
ing that "land" includes lands, tenements,
and hereditaments and all rights thereto and
interest therein other than a chattel inter-
est therein, where on a bill filed by a vendor
for a specific performance, it was decreed
that the land be sold, and the entire acreage
was sold and conveyed without restriction or
reservation, the conveyance carried title to
the coal and minerals beneath the surface of
the land. Steinman v. Vicars, 39 S. B. 227,
229, 99 Va. 695.
A bill may be maintained to quiet the ti-
tle to coal and other minerals under and on
a tract of land; the minerals being "laud"
within Code 1896, | 809, providing that when
any person is in peaceable possession of lands,
whether actual or constructive, claiming to
own the same, and his title thereto or to any
part thereof is denied or disputed, he may
maintain a suit in equity to settle the title
and to clear up all doubts and disputes con-
cerning it Gulf Coal A Coke Co. v. Alabama
Coal & Coke Ck)., 40 South. 397, 398, 145 Ala.
228.
Petroleum, oil, and natural gas are in-
duded in the comprehensive idea which the
law attaches to the word "land" and are a part
of the soil In which they are found. A lease
of land for the purpose of mining coal or ex-
tracting oil or natural gas from the soil or
rock is in effect a grant of the corpus of the
land. Haskell v. Sutton, 44 S. B. 533, 536,.
53 W. Va. 206,
" 'Oil,' before its extraction, is a mineral,
and is a part of the land.* " Swayne v. Lone
Acre Oil Co., 86 S. W. 740, 742, 98 Tex. 597.
69 L. R. A, 986, 8 Ann. Cas. 1117 ; Isom v.
Hex Crude Oil Co., 82 Pac 317, 318, 147 CaL
659.
Pontooa
A pontoon floating upon the water of a
navigable stream, between high and low wa-
ter mark, though fastened to the shore by a
LAND
«
liAKD
cable, l8 not "land/' and an action for an In-
jury to a person thereon by a moving vessel
is within the admiralty jurisdiction. The
Mackinaw, 165 Fed. 361, 852.
Premises synonymous
Premises as including land, see Premises.
The Liquor Tax Law (Laws 1807. p. 225,
c 812, I 24, subd. 1), prior to the amendment
made by Laws 1905, p. 145, c. 104, made it
unlawful to traffic in liquor within one-half
mile of the building and "premises," of any
state hospital, and the amendment added the
words "or lands" after the word "prem-
ises.** On a petition for the cancellation of
a liquor tax certificate, it was stipulated that
defendant, prior to the amendment, had been
legally selling liquor at the place in question.
Held, that "lands** was synonymous with
"premises," and in view of the stipulation
there could be no cancellation of the certifi-
cate, whether defendant was carrying on his
business within one-half mile of lands owned
and used by a state hospital and contiguous
to it, or within one-half mile bf the buildings,
or not The terms "premises** and "lands'*
are synonymous, and, if there is any distinc-
tion between the words, it is that the word
'^premises*' is more inclusive. According to
Bouv. Law Diet and Worcest. Diet the word
"premises" is defined as "lands and tene-
mtots.*' According to Gent Diet, it is de-
fined as "lands and houses or tenements."
According to Stand. Diet., it is defined as
"land or lands; land with its appurtenances."
In re Oullinan, 99 N. Y. Supp. 874, 875, 118
App. Div. 485.
As property
See Private Property ; Property.
Proeeeds of sale
Act of Separation from Massachusetts
(Rev. St 1883, p. 1005) S 1, par. 7, exempt-
ing from taxation "lands** theretofore grant-
ed to any religious society, etc., while the
same continue to be owned by such society,
does not exempt a fund created from the pro-
ceeds of a sale of such lands. Inhabitants of
Gorham v. Trustees of Ministerial Fund in
First Parish in Gorham in Cumberland Coun-
ty, 82 Ati. 290, 292, 109 Me. 22.
Real estate and real property synony-
mous
The word "land," as used in Code 1904,
S 1105 (8-6), authorizing the condemnation of
lands or any in trust or estate therein, is
synonymous with "real estate** and "real
property.'* Swan v. Washington Southern R.
Co., 61 S. E. 750. 761, 108 Va. 282.
As security
See Security.
Sniimersed land
The word "lands** includes the beds of
nonnavfgable lakes and streams, and lands
are none the less land for being covered with
water. State v. Jones^ 122 N. W. 241, 248,
148 Iowa, 39a
'T«and" covered by water within the pub-
lic domain of the United States Is as much
a part thereof as the dry land. Eean v. Cal-
umet Canal & Improvement Co., 28 Sup. Ct
651, 659, 190 U. S. 452, 47 L. Ed. 1134.
The owner of the bank of a navigable
stream owns to the center of the stream, un-
less the ownership of the bank and the bed
of the stream has been separated, subject
only to governmental and public rights ; and
the bed of a navigable stream is "land."
Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. v. Telu-
lah Paper Co., 122 N. W. 1062. 1065, 140 Wis,
417.
Timber
The word "lands," in Const 1890. f 211,
prohibiting the sale of school lands. Includes
the soil only, and not timber growing there-
on ; and hence Code 1906, f 4702, is not un-
constitutional because it authorizes a sale of
such timber. L. N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v.
State, 53 South. 1, 2. 97 Miss. 355.
Town lots or blooks
Where a party contracts for the pur-
chase of a threshing outfit, unless he shall go
to Oklahoma and buy land, the word "land*'
is broad enough to include a piece of real
property described as a block in a town site.
J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Mlckley, 88
Pac. 970, 72 Kan. 872.
Trees
At common law,, "land** embraces, not
only the soil, but its natural products, such
as trees, growing upon and afiixed to It L.
N. Dantzler Lumber Co. v. State, 58 South.
1, 2, 97 Miss. 855.
Trees standing on land are a part of the
"land," the title to which can be passed by
a statutory deed. Morgan v. Pott, 101 S. W.
717, 719, 124 Mo. App. 371.
Water and water power
"Land** includes the water upon it, and,
when the fee to land is acquired by condem-
nation, everything which is comprehended In
the term "land,** including water, vests in the
expropriator. Philadelphia Trust, Safe De-
posit & Ins. dk). V. Borough of Merchant-
vlUe, 69 Ati. 729, 780, 74 N. J. Bq. 330.
Under Gen. St 1902, f 2321, which pro-
vides for the taxation of land owned or tak-
en by a municipal corporation for the crea-
tion or furnishing of a supply of water, if
the inhabitants of the town in which it is
situated do not have the use and do actually
use sucn water supply on the same terms as
the inhabitants of the municipal corpora-
tion, in which case the property shall be ex-
empt, a dam located on such land is not an
item subject to taxation separate from the
land, and should have been included in an
item of the assessment denominated "land
used in connection with reservoir.** City of
Norwalk v. Town of New Canaan, 81 AtL
1027, 1029, 85 Conn. 119.
LAND
LAND TO LAND
The Flowage Act (Laws 1868, c. 20, f 1;
Pub. St 1901, c. 142, f 12) proTldes that any
corporation authorized by charter may erect
and maintain on its land a water mill or dam
to back the flowage of water for the develop-
ment of power and section 13 provides that if
land is overflowed or otherwise injured by
the use of SQdx dam, and such injury is not
within 30 days after due notice satisfactorily
adjusted, petition may be brought to the su-
perior court to have the damage assessed.
Held, upon petition to assess damages for
the flowing out or taking of the head or falls
of a stream located upon petitioner's land,
which had been neither utilized nor developed,
that the term "land" In the act was not used
in a narrow or restricted sense to apply only
to land as distinguished from water, but to
land with all the incidents of full ownership ;
that the damage or "injury" intended by the
act was such as resulted from depriving the
landowner of the ability to use his land to
the best advantage in view of its location
and natural adaptability; and that a limi-
tation of the use of undeveloped water pow-
er was an injury to land, for which compen-
sation must be made. Swain v. Pemlgewas-
set Power Ck>., 85 Ati. 288, 289, 76 N. H. 498.
LAHB AGT0AIXT USED
See Actually Used.
LAHB OiatTIFZOATE
As chattel, see Chattel
As personal property, see Personal Prop-
erty.
A "land certificate" is the obligation of
the government entitling the owner to secure
the designated quantity of land by following
the requirements of the law. Waterman v.
Charlton, 120 S. W. 171, 172, 102 Tex. 610.
liAHB DAMAGES
Compensation for land taken under the
power of eminent domain, and for the build-
ings on it, is technically "land damages."
The building is technically not only a part of
the land, but Is technically land ; and an ac-
tion for compensation for land taken under
the power of eminent domain, and buildings
which are upon that land, is as matter of
technical law and ordinary parlance, spoken
of as an action for "land damages." In an
award of special commissioners to assess
damages for land taken to widen a street
under a railroad's track directing that the
town should pay the entire expense of land
damage occasioned by the taking of land and
property, the term "land damages" was not
limited to the value of the land taken apart
from the erection thereon, and hence, where
the land taken supported one of the abut-
ments of the railroad bridge, the railroad was
entitled to damages for the taking of the
abutment as well aa the land. New York,
N. H. & H. R. Co. V. Blackstone, 60 N. £.
315, 816, 184 MasB. 40L
LARB FOB HOZ.DIHO WATER '
The words "land for holding such wa-
ter," hi St 1883, p. 460, c. 177, creating a
water company to supply the inhabitants of
a town with water, and authorizing the com-
pany to take and hold water of designated
streams and all lands ''necessary for hold-
ing and preserving such water," mean land
for a reservoir. Dorr v. Inhabitants of Shar-
on, 84 N. B. 446, 449, 198 Mass. 240.
lOLXm JOBBER
A man who occasionally buys and sells
land cannot be said to be a land jobber o^
a dealer in lands; but, if a man makes a
particular business of buying and selling
land to obtain profit, he is properly designat-
ed as a "land jobber" or dealer in land.
Vanderbilt University v. Cheney, 94 S. W. 90,
92, 116 Tenn. 259.
ZiAKD MUTTASLE FOR OULTIVATIOE
See Suitable for Cultivation.
XiABB, TIMBEB, AED TIMBER
RXOHT8
The term "land, timber and timber
rights," as used in a lease of a railroad, etc.,
specifying that plaintiff demised, let, etc., to
defendant for 91 years, all land, timber, and
timber rights, etc., included all the standing
timber. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co. v. Atlantic &
N. C. R. Co.. 61 S. B. 186, 190, 147 N. C.
368, 23 L. B. A. (N. S.) 223, 126 Am. St Rep.
650, 16 Ann. Cas. 363.
laAND TITIiEB
Const art. 14, i 2, provides that all gen-
eral land certificates shall be located, sur- •
▼eyed, or patented only on vacant and un-
appropriated public domain, and not on any
"land titled" or equitably owned under color
of title from the sovereignty of the state,
evidence of the appropriation of which is on
the county record or in the general land
office, or when the appropriation is evidenced
by the occupation of the owner or of some
person holding for him. Held, that where it
was not claimed that certificates by which
land was surveyed under a railroad grant
were improperly issued, and the descriptions
in the patents in express terms covered the
land described in a subsequent patent to K.,
it being necessary to resort to evidence ali-
unde to show that the railroad patents did
not convey the state's title to the land in .
controversy, it was "land titled," within such
constitutional provision. McLennan v. Fish-
er (Tex.) 180 S. W. 698, 699.
liANB TO UUfB
Fishing for menhaden with purse or
drag seines, in a bay on our coast not having
an entrance over three nautical miles in
width between headlands on the main, or
between the mainland and an island, or be-
tween islands, is prohibited by chapter 261,
Pub. Laws 1886, defining the width of such
LAND VALUABLE FOR MINERALS 8
LANDED PROPERTY
entranbe» or any part thereof, to such pro-
hibited waters, measured from "land to
land." McOlain y. TiUson, 19 AtL 467, 458,
82 Me. 28L
LAHD VALUABLE FOB MINEBAL8
*'Land8 valuable for minerals" in the
law means all lands chiefly valuable for any
of the mineral deposits treated in the legis-
lation relating to mining claims, rather than
lands (diiefly valuable for agricultural pur-
poses. Webb V. American Asphaltum Mln.
Co., 157 Fed. 208, 205, 84 C. C. A. 651.
Under Rev. St U. 8. If 2318, 2819, re-
serving from sale lands valuable for miner-
als, and opening for exploration and pur-
chase all valuable mineral deposits in the
lands of the United States, to render lands
valuable for minerals there must be miner-
als in such quantities as to Justify effort to
•extract them; but it is not necessary that
minerals of sufficient amount to allow im-
mediate profitable working be shown to ex-
ist, but it is enough if the vein or deposit has
a present or prospective commercial value.
Madison v. Octave Oil Co., 99 Pac. 178, 178,
154 CaL 768.
ItAKBED
Plaintiff, cotton company, delivered cot-
ton to a compress company and subsequently
delivered the warehouse receipts of that com-
pany to a railway company and received in
exchange bills of lading. The cotton com-
pany shipped the cotton over the railway line
to a purchaser under a contract requiring
that the cotton should be delivered in good
. condition to the purchaser's mills ''landed/'
and drafts for the purchase price with bills
of lading attached were drawn by the cotton
company on the purchaser and honored be-
fore the cotton was delivered at its destina-
Uou. Held, that "landed" meant that the
cotton company was responsible for the en-
tire shipment of cotton and for damages to
it until delivered at the point of destination,
and therefore the right of recovery for dam-
ages to the cotton resulting from exposure
to the weather while in the possession of the
compress company was in the cotton company,
although it had not been called on to repay
any of the purchase price. Southern Ry. Co.
V. Jones Cotton Co., 52 South. 899, 900, 167
,575.
LANDED PBOPEBTT
In an act annexing certain territory to
a city, providing that the rates of taxation
on all "landed property*' so annexed shall
not exceed a certain rate, the phrase "landed
property," as used in the act, meant rural,
unimproved land, as distinguished from real
estate compactly built on, as in a city.
Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore v. Rosen-
thal, 62 Ati. 579, 581, 102 Md. 298 (citing
Sindall V. City of Baltimore, 49 AtL 647, 93
Md. 533).
f The term "landed property" is defined
by Acts 1902, p. 199, c 130, as "real estate,
whether in fee simple or leasehold, and
whether improved or unimproved." JoesUng
V. Mayor, etc., of Baltimore, 55 Atl. 456, 457,
97 Md. 589.
Annexation Act, | 19 (Acts 1888, p. 127,
c. 98), declared that until 1900 the rate of
taxation on all 'landed property" in certain
territory annexed to Baltimore should not
exceed the rate for Baltimore coimty, and
that after 1900 the county rate should not be
increased for dty purposes on "landed prop-
erty" within the territory until avenues,
streets, or alleys shall have been opened or
constructed through the same, nor until there
shall be on every block of ground so to be
formed six dwellings or storehouses ready
for occupation. Acts 1902, p. 199, c. 130, i
4a, defined "landed property** to mean real
estate, whether improved or unimproved
and until avenues, streets, or alleys shall
have been opened, constructed, and improved,
shall be construed to mean until avenues,
streets, or alleys shall have been opened,
graded, curbed, and otherwise improved to
full width by some substantial materiaL
Held, that property within the territory an-
nexed to the city by the act of 1888 situated
in a block bounded by improved streets,
though not containing six dwellings or store-
houses, was not "landed property*' within
such act Hiss v. City of Baltimore, 64 AtL
52, 103 Md. 620.
Acts 1888, p. 127, c. 98, f 19, relating to
the annexation of a certain tract to Balti-
more, provided that until 19(X) the tax rate
upon all "landed property'* and taxable per-
sonal property in the tract should not exceed
the rate of Baltimore county for 1887, and
that after 1900 the rate should be the same as
for the rest of the city of Baltimore, provided
that the increased rate should not take effect
until avenues, streets, or alleys should be
opened through the property, and at least six
dwellings or storehouses be ready for occupa-
tion upon each block of ground so to be
formed. Acts 1902» p. 199, c. 130, provided
that the term "landed property'* in the act
of 1888 should mean real estate whether in
fee simple or leasehold; that the provision
as to the opening of avenues, etc, should
mean avenues, etc, opened, graded, curbed,
and otherwise improved from curb to curb
by pavement or other substantial material,
and that the term "block of ground" should
mean an area not exceeding 200,000 superfi-
cial square feet bounded on all sides by in-
tersecting avenues, streets, or alleys, graded,
curbed and otherwise improved from curb to
curb, by pavement or other substantial ma-
teriaL A triangular block, being part of the
tract annexed by the act of 1888, contained
1,000,000 superficial square feet, bounded on
one side by 3034 feet of a road, part of which
was curbed and macadamized, the rest co^
LANDED PROPERTY
9
liANDINO PLACE
ered with an Inch of stone, but nncnrbed.
On another side was a common road not
graded, cnrbed, or payed, and on the third
Bide was a private toll road, cnrbed and
paved In the middle. There were abont 47
dwellings and storehouses on the block.
Held, that a leasehold Interest In the block
was taxable under the county, and not the
dty, tax rate. City of Baltimore v. Schafer,
68 AtL 138, 140, 107 Md. 88.
Acts 1888, p. 127, c. 98, § 19, provides
after the year 1900 the Baltimore county rate
of taxation at the time of the passage of the
act shall not be increased for dty purposes
on any landed property within the annex
until avenues, streets, or alleys shall have
beoi opened or constructed through the same,
nor until there shall be on every blodk of
ground so to be formed at least six dwellings
or warehouses ready for occupation. Acts
1902, p. 199, c. 120, defines 'landed property"
to mean real estate, whether In fee simple or
leasehold, and whether Improved or unim-
proved. Held, that a wholly unimproved lot
bound by a street or alley on two of Its four
sides and contiguous to a 28-acre tract of
land with no visible boundary separating it
from such tract was "landed property" with-
in the meaning of the acts, and hence not
subject to the Baltimore dty rate of taxation
until it had reached the standard of devel-
opment required by the act to make it urban
property. City of Baltimore v. Gail, 68 AtL
282, 285, 106 Md. 684.
LANDHOI.DEB
Acts 1903, p. 266, c. 146, relating to im-
provement of gravel and macadamized roads,
contemplates as resident "landholders" of
the county, whose lands abut upon the pro-
posed improvements, who are entitled to sign
a petition for the improvements, only the
holders of a title in fee, and not mere life
tenantflL Kemp v. Goodnight, 80 N. E. 160,
162, 168 Ind. 174.
LAHDIHO
See Public Landing.
According to the accepted meaning, the
act of "landing" is setting on shore, or com-
ing on shore. Taylor v. United States, 152
Fed. 1, 10, 81 C. C. A. 197 (dissenting opinion).
"Landing from such vessel" takes place
and is complete the moment the vessel is left
and the shore reached within Immigration
Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, i 18, 82 Stat 1213,
1217, making it the duty of any officer in
charge of any vessel bringing an alien to the
United States to adopt precautions to prevent
the landing from such vessel of such alien
at any time or place other than that desig-
nated by the immigration officers. Taylor v.
United States, 28 Sup. Ct 58, 54, 207 U. S.
120, 52 L. Ed. 130.
The transfer of a Chinese person from
the vessel In which he was brought to the
United States to a detention shed maintained
by the owners of the vessel on their dock,
where he was detained under guard pending
determination of his right to enter the Unit-
ed States, did not constitute a "landing** of
such person within Act Cong. May 6, 1882,
c. 126, I 2, 22 Stat. 59, as amended by Act
July 5, 1884. c. 220, 23 Stat 115, prohibiting
the master of any vessel from knowingly
landing or permitting to be landed any Chi-
nese laborer, etc. United States v. Seabury,
133 Fed. 983, 985.
Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, f 18, 82 Stat.
1217, declares that it shall be the duty of the
owners, officers, and agents of any vessel
bringing an alien to the United States to
adopt due precautions to prevent the "land-
ing** of any such alien "from such vessel** at
any time or place other than that designated
by the immigration officers, and any such
owner, etc., who shall land or permit to land
any alien at any other place shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor. Held, that the words
"landing from vessel" as so used mean "to
go ashore,*' the landing being complete the
moment the vessel is left and the shore la
reached. Nlven v. United States, 169 Fed.
782, 785, 95 a O. A. 24a
The word "landing" tn Hurd*s Rev. St
1908, c. 93, I 28, par. "b,** providing that
there must be maintained at the "landing"
at which miners take or leave the cage suffl-
dent light to show the "landing" and sur-
rounding objects, when considered in con-
nection with section 16, par. "e,** requiring
the mine superintendent to see that suffldent
lights are maintained at the top and botton^
landings when the men are hoisted and low-
ered, and section 2, par. ••b,'* providing that
at the bottom of every shaft and at every
caging place therein a suffldent passageway-
must be cut around the landing place. Is
broad enough to cover the place at the bot-
tom or at the top of the shaft where miners
enter or leave the cage and the mine operator
must keep each of those places lighted. Rob-
ertson V. Donk Bros. Coal ft Coke Co., 87
N. E. 373, 374, 238 IlL 844.
As wKarf or plaoo for loading and «n-
loadlaK
"A 'landing* is a space adjacent to a
navigable water where vessels may approach
and land to unload and receive passengers
and freight, and where articles of freight
may be left for loading on the vessel^ or
after they have been unloaded until they can
be taken away.** Chicago, R. I. ft P. Ry. Co.
v. People ex rel. Dalley, 78 N. E. 790, 793,
222 111. 427 (quoting and adopting definition
in Farnham, Water ft Water Rights, i 145a).
liAUDXKO PliACE
Land abutting upon water, from which
water shipments can be made, and leased for
that purpose, with privileges of piling lum-
ber, is a landing place, within Rev. St c. 9. .
LANDING PliAOE
LO
IjAlSfDJX>KD
f 18, sabsec. 1, authorizing taxation of per-
sonalty employed in trade where the owner
occupies a landing place. Inhabitants of
Georgetown y. William E. Hanscome & Co.,
79 AU. 879, 880, 108 Me. 181.
Rev. St. c 9, § 12, provides that all per-
sonal property within or without the state
shall be assessed to the owner in the town
where he is an inhabitant on the 1st day of
each April. Section 22 provides that part-
ners in business whether residing in the
same or different towns, may be jointly
taxed under their partnership name in the
town where their business is carried on for
all personal property enumerated in section
13, par. 1, employed in such business, except
that, if any portion of suc^ property is
placed or situated in a town other than
where their place of business is under speci-
fied circumstances, they shall be taxed there-
for in such other town. Section 18, par. 1,
provides that all personal property employed
in trade shall be taxed in the town where so
employed on the 1st day of each April, pro-
vided that the owner, his servant, subcon-
tractor, or agent so employing it occupies
any ''landing place," etc., therein for the pur-
pose of such employment Held that, to sus-
tain an assessment of taxes on lumber be-
longing to a firm in a certain town, it must ap-
pear that the firm were at the time of the as-
sessment carrying on business in the town,
and that the property assessed was employed
in that business, or if their place of business
was in another town that the property so em-
ployed was placed or situated in the town
where sought to be assessed and the proper-
ty must be employed in trade, etc., and, if
their place of business is in another town
than that in which the property is deposited,
it must appear that the firm or their serv-
ants or agents so employing the property oc-
cupied for purposes of the employment a
"landing place," eta, in the town where the
assessment is sought to be made, and where
members of a firm resided in other towns
and cut logs in other towns, which were
hauled to a town where they were sought to
be assessed for taxation, there sawed by a
portable sawmill, and "stuck up" to season
in a field within the town with the intent to
leave it there until sold, when it was to be
hauled to a railroad siding, half a mile
distant also in the town, for shipment, and
all the work done on the lot was done under
contract of another person, the firm, how-
ever, supervising the work so far as to de-
termine the size and shape of the manufac-
tured product, the firm having no office any-
where, thoir books being kept in another
town at a dwelling house from where the
correspondence of the firm was carried on
and prospective purchasers taken by the firm
to the sticking grounds to examine the lum-
ber, the business of the firm was being car-
ried on in another town, and the lumber was
not subject to taxation in the town where
deposited, since the field where the lumber
was "stuck up" was not a 'landing place"
within the statute, the term "landing*' first
incorporated into the statute in Laws 1869, c.
53, then meaning a place on a river or other
navigable water for landing and unlandlng
goods, or for taking on or letting off passen-
gers or a place where any kind of craft
lands or for storing logs for winter. Mc-
Cann v. Inhabitants of Town of Minot, 78
AtL 466, 467, 107 Me. 393.
LAin>I.OB]>
A man to be a "landlord*' must sustain
some relation to the land, such as owner, or
quasi owner, and, while a landlord may as-
sign the rent, the assignee is not a "landlord"
within the meaning of the statute giving a
landlord's lien. State y. Blmore, 46 S. B.
939, 941, 68 S. C. 140.
''A 'landlord' is a person whose lands
are occupied." Hence, when a petitioner
said htf was a landlord, he, in effect, said he
was the person whose lands were occupied.
Loft V. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228, 230.
Under General Milwaukee Ordinance, c.
20, 1 36, inhibiting all persons from leasing or
letting either as landlord or agent, any
room, house, or other premises to be used for
the purpose of prostitution or lewdness, the
term "landlord" is not restricted in its mean-
ing to the owner of an estate in lands, but
refers to lessees who let' particular rooms.
City of miwaukee v. Beatty, 135 N. W. 873.
874, 149 Wis. 349.
Under a statute enacted in the reign of
George II, a landlord was permitted to ap-
pear and defend in ejectment, and the word
"landlord" was interpreted to include all
persons claiming title consistent with the
persons sued as tenants in possession. Bow*
er V. Cohen, 54 S. E. 918, 919, 126 Ga. 35.
Premises were leased for one year, and
before the expiration of that term the land-
lord leased to another the premises for a
term to begin at the expiration of the first
term. The first tenant held over, and the
Landlord brought summary proceedings to
dispossess him. Section 2231, Code Civ. Proc.
provides that a tenant holding over at the
expiration of his lease may be removed and
section 2235 provides that the application
may be made by the "landlord or lessor."
Held that the lessor of both tenants was the
"landlord or lessor" within the statute, and
could maintain an action to dispossess the
first tenant, if there had been no election by
the landlord to continue the lease. Bells v.
Morse, 127 N. Y. Supp. 438, 440, 142 App.
Div. 592.
A petition in summary proceedings for
the possession of land, alleging that the peti-
tioner is the lessee and "landlord" thereof,
is not a sufficient oompliance with Code Giv.
LANDLORD
11
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Proc. I 2235, requiring the petition to state
the Interest of the petitioner In the premises.
The statement that the petitioner was the
'aessee" and 'landlord" is the assertion mere-
ly of an Interest and not a description of
snch Interest Ferber y. Apfel, 99 N. Y.
Sopp. 215. 216, 113 App. Wv. T20 (dtlng
Kazls ▼. Loft, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1015, 81 App.
Dlv. 036; Loft v. Kazlz, 84 N.*Y. Supp. 228;
Engel-Heller Co. v^ Henry Ellas Brewing CJo.,
75 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 37 Misc. Rep. 480; Po^
ter ▼. New York Baptist Mission Soc, 52
N. Y. Supp. 294, 23 Misc. Rep. 671 ; Ross ▼.
Same, 52 N. Y. Supp. 303, 23 Misc. Rep. 683;
Cram v. Dietrich, 78 N. Y. Supp. 948, 38
Misc. Rep. 790.
Owner not •qplYal«At
A description of the petitioner as the
"landlord pf the premises hereinafter de-
scribed" Is insufficient to confer Jurisdiction
of summary proceedings, for that does not
state that he Is the owner, but merely alleg-
es the relation of the parties without stating
petitioner's Interest In the premises. Under-
hiU T. Cohen, 114 N. Y. Supp. 115, 117, 61
Misc. Rep. 627.
liAHBIfOBD AHD OBOFPER
A verbal contract between a cropper, who
owed a large supply account for which his
landlord was security and also, owed his
landlord for supplies, and his landlord,
whereby It was agreed that, If the cropper
should desire to work elsewhere the follow-
ing year, he should settle up his supply ac-
count and notify the landlord before a time
fixed, so that he might have time to get some
one else, and that, If the cropper did not set-
tle up and notify the landlord before the
time fixed, then he was to be a cropper for
the landlord for the following year, does not
create the relation of landlord and cropper
within Act Dec. 17, 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 63).
as amended by Act Aug. 7, 1903 (Acts 1903,
p. 91), providing that, where the relation of
landlord and cropper has been created. It
shall be unlawful for any person during the
contract to employ the cropper or to disturb
in any way snch relation; that act contem-
plating a complete contract and not a con-
tract whereby the relation will be created in
the future on the happening or nonhappenlng
of a given contingency, dependent on the will
of one of the parties. Polk v. Thomason, 61
S. E. 123, 124, 130 Qa. 542.
LAHDI.OBD AKD TEKAKT
The relation of ''landlord and tenant" is
that which subsists by virtue of a contract
for the possession of lands at will, for a
definite period, or for life. Foss v. Stanton,
57 AtL 942, 76 Vt 365.
The relation of landlord and tenant aris-
es under contract, express or implied, for
possession of lands or tenements in consid-
eration of certain rent to be paid therefor;
possession being an essential element.
Whiteside v. Oasis Club, 142 S. W. 752, 758,
162 Mo. App. 502.
The words "landlord and tenant" signify
not only the immediate parties to a lease,
but also their respective successors in inter-
est Where a landlord assigns his lease with
his right to the control, occupancy, and pos-
session of the premises for more than four
years beyond the expiration of the term, and
the tenant holds over, the assignee may elect
to treat the holding over as a tenancy for
another year. United Merchants' Realty -ft
Improvement Co. v. Roth. 103 N. Y. Supp.
1112, 1113, 53 Misc. Rep. 92.
Under the direct provisions of Code 1896,
I 2711, where one party furnishes land for
raising a crop and another furnishes the
labor and the team to cultivate It, with a
stipulation for a division of the crop between
them, the relation of landlord and tenant ex-
ists between them; the status, fixed by the
statute, being contractual. Kennedy v. Mc-
Dlarmld, 47 South. 792, 793, 157 Ala. 496.
Where one enters into possession of land
under a deed claiming it in good faith as
owner, and does not recognize any interest in
the grantor, the relation of "landlord and ten-
ant" does not exist, and he cannot be sum-
marily dispossessed as a tenant at suffer-
ance. Shatpe V. Mathews, 51 S. E. 706, 707,
123 Oa. 794 (citing Watson v. Toliver, 29 8.
E. 614, 103 Ga. 123).
The reservation of rent in some form
and allegiance to the title are distinguishing
characteristics of a contract by which the
relation of landlord and tenant exists. An-
drews V. Erwin (Ky.) 78 S. W. 902, 903.
Reservation of rent is not essential to
the creation ot the relation of "landlord and
tenant" PlaintifTs conveyed to defendant
by deed all the timber and trees on the tract
of land described; the deed providing that
the grantee should have all the rights of way
and privileges over and upon the land
usually extended to lumbermen, provided
that the timber should be removed within
three years, and that all refuse, tbnber,
bams, houses, cabins, sheds, etc., remaining
on the premises at that time should revert to
and become the property of plaintiffs. Held,
that such deed was not a mere license, but
was sufficient to create the relation of "land-
lord and tenant" Alexander v. Gardner, 96
S. W. 818, 819, 123 Ky. 552, 124 Am. St Rep.
378.
Plaintiff, who resided on a farm, con-
tracted to allow defendant to occupy free of
rent one of the houses on the farm and carry
on the same for a term of years. Each party
was to furnish certain things for the farm,
and the crops were to be sold and proceeds
divided. Held, that the relaUon of "land-
lord and tenant" did not exist between the
parties as to the bouse, but that defendant's
LANDOWNER
12
LARCEJJY
■occupancy was a mere Incident of his carry-
ing on the farm, and an action wonld not lie
against htm to recover possession of the
house under V. S. 1660, providing that,
when a lessee holds possession without right,
the person entitled to possession may have
a writ to restore him thereto. Mead v.
Owen, 67 Aa 722, 724, 80 Vt 273, 13 Ann.
Gas. 231.
IiANDOWNEB
The county named in the preliminary
report of the surveyor as a landowner affect-
ed by a proposed drainage is not a "land-
owner" within the provision of the drainage
■act requiring the dismissal of the petition
upon remonstrance of two-thirds of the
^'landowners" affected. Honnold v. Endlcott,
«3 N. E. 502, 170 Ind. 16.
The word "landowner," In the statute
giving a company power to condenm land,
and providing that it shall be liable for all
such damages as may be established by any
landowner, embraces not only the owner of
the fee, but a lessee for years and any other
person who has an Interest in the property
affected by the condemnation. Woodstock
Hardwood & Spool Mfg. Co. v. Charleston
Light & Water Co., 66 S. B. 104, 196, 84 S.
C. 306.
LANGUAGE
See Doubtful Language; Ordinary Lan-
guage.
English language, see English.
'Obscene language, see Obscene — Obscen-
ity.
Profane language, see Profane — Profan-
ity.
"Language" is the expression of thought
'by means of spoken or written words which
are but signs of ideas. United States v. One
Car Load of Corno Horse and Mule Feed,
188 Fed. 453, 462.
"Language" is a generic term, and in-
cludes any words or speech by which thought
may be conveyed, and language may be ob-
scene and vulgar when used in the presence
•of a female without the use of a single word
which could be intrinsically classified as be-
ing obscene and vulgar. Morris v. State, 65
S. B. 58, 59, 6 Ga. App. 895.
" 'Language* is the offspring of the past,
but its life is in and for the ever opening and
progressive future. Its principal mission is
to convey from one mind to another the new
thoughts as they arise; for the old is con-
tinually dying, while the new is being bom.
If each word had a single fixed and un-
changing meaning, and if there simply were
certain established collocations of words,
«ach with one signification, the powers of
language would be very limited, and it could
never express a new idea." State v. Stuart,
^ S. W. 818, S8U 104 Mo. 845» 112 Am. St
Rep. 629, 5 Ann. Cas. 063 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition from Bishop).
LAP
Where one grant conflicts in part with
another, occasioning what is called a "lap"
or "interlock," the elder patentee under his
grant acquires at once constructive seisin in
deed of all the land embraced within its
boundaries, although he has taken no actu-
al possession of any part thereot The Jun-
ior grantee under his grant acquires similar
constructive seisin in deed of all the land
embraced by his boundaries, except that por-
tion within the interlock, the s^sln of which
had already vested in the senior grantee.
Green v. Pennington, 64 S. B. 877, 878. 105
Va. 801 (citing Koiner y. Rankin's Heirs
[Va.] 11 Grat 427).
I.AP POSITION
In the railway automatic quick action
brake system, the position known as the "lap
position" was, where the engineer thought
that the train pipe pressure had been suffi-
ciently reduced by the resultant brake appli-
cation, he moved the handle back a short dis-
tance so as to close all the ports and hold
the brakes at the point at which they had
been set. Westlnghouse Air Brake Co. v.
New York Air Brake Co., 110 Fed. 874, 875,
56 C. C. A. 404.
LAPPINGS
"Lappings" consist of a woven fabric
composed of a flax warp and a wool filling
and is dutiable under paragraph 346 of the
Tariff Act of 1897. United States v. B. De
F. Wilkinson Co., 154 Fed. 751, 752.
LAPSE
ULPSE OF TIME
The phrase "lapse of time," as used In
a constitutional provision giving the Legisla-
ture power to revive any remedy which may
have been barred by "lapse of time" or "by
any statute of limitations," means a period
of time limiting the action, and relates alone
either to an express statute of limitations or
to a "lapse of time" dealt with either under
the statute or the general law, as a limita-
tion of time. North British & Mercantile
Ins. Co. of London & Eidinburgh t. EJdwards,
37 South. 748, 85 Miss. 822.
LARCENY
See Compound Larceny; Grand Lar-
ceny; Petit Larceny; Simple Lar-
ceny ; Taking (In Larceny).
Hog stealing, see Hog.
Property subject of larceny, see Person-
al Property; Property.
Stealth as element, see Stealth.
See, also. Fraud,; Fraudulent Taking;
Horsestealing; Theft
LARCENY
13
IiARCENT
•*Larceny" Is taking personal property by
stenltncr; by theft Cox v. Territory, 104
Pac. 378, 379, 2 OU, Or. 66&
**Larceny" is predicated on the wrongful
taking of property with intent to convert it.
Axtell V. State, 91 N. B. 8M. 865, 178 Ind.
TLL
"Larceny" is the felonious taking of the
property of another. State ▼. Wasson, 101
N. W. 1125, 1126, 126 Iowa, 320.
"Larceny" is the taking of another's per-
sonal property without the owner's consent,
accompanied by an intent to wholly deprive
him of its \*alue. State v. Hinton, 109 Pac.
24, 27. 56 Or. 42a
"Larceny" is the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal property of
another, with the intent to convert it to the
use of the taker without the consent of the
owner. State v. De Luca (Del.) 77 AtL 742,
743, 2 Boyce, 158; State v. Stewart (DeL) 67
Aa 786, 788, 6 Pennewill, 435.
"Larceny" is the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal goods of an-
other, with IntS^t to deprive the owner of
his property therein, and to appropriate the
same to the use of the taker. State v. Spen-
cer (DeL) 53 Ati. 337, 338, 4 Pennewill, . 92.
"Larceny" is the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal property of
another, with intent to convert it to the
taker's use, and to deprive tlie owner of the
same, without the owner's consent. State y.
Palmer (Del.) 53 Atl. 359, 4 Pennewill, 126.
"Larceny" is the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal property of
another, with intent to convert it to the tak-
er's use and deprive the owner of its use
without his consent. State v. Dredden, 73
Atl. 1042, 1043, 6 Pennewill, 446.
"Larceny" is the wrongful or fraudulent
taking and carrying away by any person of
the personal goods of another without the
owner's consent, with a felonious Intent to
convert them to the. taker's U8& State v.
James, 113 S. W. 232, 233, 183 Mo. App. 800.
"Larceny" is the wrongful or fraudulent
taking and carrying away of the personal
goods or property of another, with the feloni-
ous intent to convert it to his own use and
make It his own property without the con-
sent of the owner. State v. Wolf (Del.) 66
AtL 739, 741, 6 Pennewill, 323.
At common law, as well as by statute,
*1arceny" is the wrongful taking and carry-
ing away of the personalty of another, with
a felonious intent to convert it to the taker's
use without the owner's consent. State v.
Brewington (Del.) 78 Atl. 402, 403, 2 Boyce,
71.
"•Larceny* is defined as the wrongful
or fraudulent taking and carrying away of
the personal property of another, from any
Pilaoe, with a felonious Intent to convert the
same to the taker's use, and make it his own,
without the consent of the owner.' " State v.
Weatherman, 100 S. W. 482, 483, 202 Mo. 6
(quoting and adopting d^nition in State r.
Gray, 87 Mo. 468).
"Larceny" Is a felonious taking and car-
rying away of the personal goods or chattels
of another with intent to deprive the owner
of his property therein and to appropriate
the same to the use of the taker. Asporta-
tion, nonconsent of the owner, and a feloni-
ous intent to thereby convert the stolen prop-
erty to the defendant's own use are necessary
elements of larceny. Ladeauz v. State, 103
N. W. 1048, 1049, 74 Neb. 19.
A "larceny" has been defined as . a fe-
lonious taking of the property of another,
without his consent and against his will, with
intent to convert it to the use of the taker, or
"the wrongful or fraudulent taking or carry-
ing away by any person of the personal goods
of another with a felonious intoit to convert
them to his (the taker's) own use and make
them his own property without the consent
of the owner." Bassett v. Spoflord, 45 N. Y.
387, 391, 6 Am. Rep. 101 (citing 2 Russ.
Crimes, 1; Mowrey v. Walsh [N. Y.] 8 Cow.
238).
The phrase "deemed guilty of larceny,"
as used in B. & C Comp. | 1805, providing
that, if any person shall embezzle or fraudu-
lently convert any money belonging to anoth-
er in his possession, he shall "be deemed guil-
ty of larceny," and on conviction shall be
punished accordingly, refers to statutory
larceny and not larceny at conunon law.
State V. Browning, 82 Pac. 955, 966, 47 Or.
470.
Where one collects money for another
and neglects or refuses to turn it over but
uses the money himself, he commits a "lar-
ceny." Specifically, it Is embezzlement and
is punishable as "larceny." State v. Oonklin,
84 Pac. 482, 484, 47 Or. 509.
If the general bookkeeper of a bank,
having no general or special custody or pos-
session of the funds of the bank, secretly
takes from the safe or drawer of the receiv-
ing or paying teller moneys of the bank, with
the intent to appropriate the same to his
own use, he commits an act of "larceny."
United States v. Breese, 131 Fed. 915, 920.
In a prosecution for larceny, the state
must prove that the property taken was per-
sonal property of some value belonging to the
owner named in the Indictment and that it
was taken feloniously by the defendant with
intent to convert it to his own use within
two years prior to the finding of the indict-
ment, and In the county in which the case
was being prosecuted. State v. De Luca
(Del.) 77 Atl. 742, 743, 2 Boyce, 158.
A bill of particulars, filed with an indict-
ment for "larceny" of a receipt, which alleged
that accused told prosecutor that he would
LABCENT
14
LARCENY
loan proBecotor money and take from Mm
as collateral a negotiable receipt of a third
person for certain bonds, that accused false-
ly represented to prosecutor that he intended
either to keep the certificate in his posses-
sion or to place the same as collateral with
a bank for a loan, that accused loaned to
prosecutor money and received as collateral
the receipt, that accused sold the receipt, that
after the maturity of the debt prosecutor
made demands on accused for the return of
the receipt and tendered the amount of the
debt, that accused declined to deliver the re-
ceipt or any receipt of the same amount, and
that accused never intended to retain posses-
sion of the receipt, but at the time of making
the representation and receiving the receipt
he intended to dispose of the same, etc., per-
mitted the commonwealth to prove common
larceny, embezzlement, obtaining property by
false pretenses, or larceny, defined by Rev.
Laws, c. 208, § 26, making one who, with in-
tent to defraud, obtains property by false pre-
tense guilty of "larceny." Commonwealth v.
Althause, 93 N. E. 202, 205, 207 Mass. 32, 31
L. R. A. (N. S.) 999.
In a trial for "larceny," the gist of the
o^Tense is the unlawful taking and appropri-
ating by the accused of the property of an-
other, the name of the owner being a matter
of secondary importance or consideration.
Where the name of the owner is not known,
it is sufficient to allege that fact State v.
afcDuflPy, 60 South. 80. 81, 131 La. 695 (citing
State V. Hanks, 1 South. 458, 39 La. Ann.
234 ; State v. Dominique, 1 South. 665, 39 La.
Ann. 323; State v. Harris, 8 South. 530, 42
La. Ann. 980; State v. Southern, 19 South.
668, 48 La. Ann. 628).
Statutory deflaitloiis
"Larceny'' is the felonious stealing or
carrying away the personal property of an-
other. People V. Devlin, 76 Pac. 900, 143
Cai. 128 (citing Pen. Oode..§ 484).
Pen. Code, f 441, defines "larceny" as
the felonious stealing, taking, carrying, lead-
ing, or driving away of the personal property
of another. Buffehr v. Territory, 89 Pac.
415, 11 Ariz. 165.
"Larceny" is Gie felonious stealing, tak-
ing, carrying, leading, or driving away the
personal property of another. State v. Da-
vis, 76 Pac. 705, 706, 28 Utah, 10 (citing Rev.
St. 1898, t 4355).
"Larceny" is to take, steal, and carry
away. An instruction thus defining larceny
in the words of the statute Was sufladent,
since the words employed are daily in com-
mon use and such as the jury were presumed
to understand. State v. Clarter, 121 N. W.
694, 695, 697, 144 Iowa, 280.
Ann. St. 1899, Ind. T. f 965, defines 'lar-
ceny" as follows: " 'Larceny' is the felonious
stealing, taking, carrying, riding or driving
away the personal property of another." It
was not error for the trial court to give the
jury the following definition of "larceny," to
wit: "'Larceny' is the felonious stealing,
taking, carrying, riding or driving away the
property of another." It is the felonious
taking; that is, wrongful and corrupt taking.
Hendrix v. United States, 101 Pac, 125, 128,
2 Okl. O. 240.
Hurd's Rev. St 1905, c. 38, | 167, pro-
vides that larceny may be committed by fe-
loniously taking and carrying away any bond,
bill, receipt, or any instrument of writing of
value to the owner. So an indictment charg-
ing the larceny of a bill of exchange must
aver the value thereol People v. Silbertrust,
86 N. E. 203, 204, 236 111. 144.
Hurd's Rev. St 1909, c. 38, i 75, provides
that if any agent embezzles or fraudulently
converts to his own use, or takes with intent
to do so, without the consent of the employer,
any property of the employer which has come
to his possession or to his ofllce by virtue of
such employment, is to be deemed guilty of
"larceny." So an indictment, charging in
the language of the statute that defendant
was the agent of B., and as such agent col-
lected and embezzled funds belonging to her
in the amount of $7,000, was suflScient Peo-
ple V. O'Farrell, 93 N. E. 136, 139, 247 111. 44.
Pen. Code, § 484, defines "larceny" as the
felonious stealing, taking, carrying away of
the property of another. So an information
charging that accused, from the immediate
presence of prosecutor, by means of force
and against prosecutor's will, did take, steal,
and carry away certain property of the value
of $1,026 of the personal property of prose-
cutor, was sufiiident People y. Ho Sing, 93
Pac. 204, 205. 6 CaL App. 752.
"A person who, with the intent to de-
prive or defraud the true owner of his prop-
erty, or of the use or benefit thereof, or to
appropriate the same to the use of the taker,
or of any other person, either: (1) Takes
from the possession of the true owner, or of
any other person, or obtains from such posses-
sion by color or aid of fraudulent or false rep-
resentation or pretense, or of any false token
or writing, or secretes, withholds, or appro-
priates to his own use, or that of any x>erson
other than the true owner, any money, per-
sonal property, thing in action, evidence of
debt or contract, or article of value of any
kind; or (2), having in his possession, cus-
tody, or control, as a bailee, servant, attor-
ney, agent, clerk, trustee, or oflacer or any
person, association, or corporation or public
officer, or as a person authorized by agree-
ment, or by competent authority, to hold or
take such possession, custody, or control, any
money, property, evidence of debt or con-
tract, article of value of any nature or thing
in action or possession, appropriates the same
to his own use, or that of any other person
other than the true owner or person entitied
to the benefit thereof, steals such propeiity
LARcxarr
15
LARCENY
and is guilty of larceny." People ex rel.
Perkins t. Moss, 100 N. Y. Supp. 427-429, 50
Misc. Rep. 198 (dttng Pen. Code, i 52$).
Pen. Code, | 528, makes It "larceny" for
a servant to appropriate to his own use any
money which he has in his possession as snch
servant, with intent to deprive the true own-
er of his property or the use thereof. Sec-
tion 548 provides that it is a sufficient de-
fense that the property was appropriated
openly under a claim of title preferred in
good faith, but that the section shall not ex-
cuse the retention of the property of another
to pay demands held against him. An em-
ploy6 collected over $900 for his employer,
and deducted therefrom over $400, which he
claimed was for arrears of salary and ex-
penses and a certain other item, and sent his
check to the employer for the balance, with
a statement showing how it was arrived at
Held, that where the employer owed less than
$100, and the claim of the employ^ was made
with Intent to avoid payment of certain
sums due, the employ^ was guilty of larceny
under the Code, for the appropriation was
not under a claim of title, but under a claim
of indebtedness, and was not made in good
faith. J. W. Matthews ft Co. v. Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp., Ill N. Y. Supp. 76, 77,
127 App. Wv. 195.
Penal Code, | 528, declares that a person
who, "with intent to deprive or defraud the
true owner of his property," etc., appropri-
ates the same to his own use or benefit, or
that of any other person other than the true
owner, is guilty of larceny, and section 548
declares that on an indictment for larceny
it shall be a defense that the property was
appropriated openly xakder a claim of title
made in good faith, even though such claim
is untenable. The president of a life insur-
ance company, having promised to contribute
np to $50,000 to a political campaign, request-
ed relator, a vice president, to make the pay-
ment personally, as that would make it easier
to refuse the other demands, and that the
president would see that the matter was
taken care of later. Relator made the pay-
ment, after which the president brought the
matter to the attention of the finance com-
mittee of the insurance company, and, it
being of the opinion that relator diould be re-
imbursed from the company's funds, the
president, under his authority to pay out the
company's money on executive order, caused
such r^mbursement to be made without fur-
ther action on the part of the finance com-
mittee or trustees of the company. In pro-
ceedings for relator's arrest for the larceny
of such fund, the proof showed that relator
derived no personal advantage from the mon-
ey, and that it was paid by him in the honest
belief ^t he was benefiting the insurance
company. Held, that the facts did not estab-
lish prima fade the commission of larceny;
there being no evidenoe of an attempt to de-
fraud. People ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 80
N. E. 383, 387, 187 N. Y. 410, 11 L. R. A
(N. S.) 528, 10 Ann. Gas. 309.
Under the statutes of Oklahoma a person
who takes personal property unlawfully, felo-
niously, and with Intent to deprive another
thereof, is guilty of larceny; and it is imma-
terial whether the property is taken from the
owner or another. State v. Clark, 128 Pac.
161, 103, 8 OkL Cr. 432.
"Larceny" is defined by Snyder's St |
2591, as the taking of personal property ac-
complished by fraud or stealth and with in-
tent to derive another thereof. Section
2606 punishes any person who shall steal
any stallion, mare, etc., creates a separate
and distinct offense, and to support a con-
viction under it the state must prove a felo-
nious Intent on the part of accused to deprive
the owner thereof, and to convert the same
to his own use^ which specific proof is not
necessary to support a conviction under the
general larceny statute. Crowell v. State,
117 Pac. 883, 884, 6 Okl. Cr. 148.
Pen. Code, f 528, defines "larceny" as
follows: "A person who, with the intent to
deprive or defraud the true owner of his
property, or of the use and benefit thereof, or
to appropriate the same to the use of the
taker, or of any other person, • • ♦ hav-
ing in his possession, custody or control, as a
bailee, servant, attorney, agent, clerk, trus-
tee or ofilcer of any person, assodation or
corporation, ♦ • ♦ any money, property,
evidence of debt or contract, article of value
of any nature or thing in action or posses-
sion, appropriates the same to his own use,
or that of any other person other than the
true owner or person entitled to the benefit
thereot steals such property is guilty of
•larceny.'" People ▼. Bumham, 104 N. Y.
Supp. 725, 727, 119 App. Dlv. 302.
Section 880 et seq. of the Penal Code
contains the definition of "larceny," which is,
in substance, that every person who, with
the Intent to deprive or defraud the true
owner of his property, or of the use and ben-
efit thereof, or to appropriate the same to
the use of the taker, or of any other person,
takes property from the' possession of an-
other, or, having in his possession property of
another, appropriates the same to his own
use, or that of any other person other than
the one entitled to it, is guilty of "larceny."
When the property taken is of a value ex-
ceeding $50, or when it is taken from the
person of another, it is termed grand lar-
ceny; otherwise, petit larceny. Under this
section what at common law constituted the
offenses of larceny and embezzlement are
merged in the one offense of larceny, and
thereby the distinction formerly recognized
between cases where the taking was unlaw-
ful and those where the possession had been
lawfully obtained is abolished. Property
must have an owner before it is the subject
liABCENY
id
LARCENY
of larceny, but this statute does not define
the character of that ownership — whether it
is general or special, joint or several, abso-
lute or qualified, arises from title or from
possession. The particular ownership of the
property stolen does not fall within the defi-
nition, and is not of the essence of the crime.
Neither the legal nor moral quality of the act
is affected by the fact that the property stol-
en, instead of being owned by one, or by two
or more jointly, is the several property of
different owners. The gist of the (MDFense is
the felonious taking or appropriation. The
grade of the offense is determined by the
value of the property taken. State v. Mjelde,
7^ Pac. 87, 29 Mont. 490.
Where a territorial statute defined lar-
ceny as a taking with a felonious intent to
deprive the owner of the property taken, and
with intent to appropria^ the same to the
use and benefit of the taker, an instruction
authorizing a conviction if the property was
taken by defendant with the felonious intent
to deprive the owner thereof was erroneous.
Miller v. Territory of Oklahoma, 149 Fed.
330, 339, 79 O. O. A. 268, 9 Ann. Gas. 389.
An indictment alleging that accused, do-
ing business as the L. Company, misrepre-
sented to a certain person the resources of
such company, and induced such person, re-
lying on the misrepresentations, to subscribe
and pay for stock in an Arkansas corpora-
tion, thereby fraudulently obtaining of such
person a certain amount of money, without
showing that accused or the L. Company
were in any manner connected with the Ar-
kansas corporation, and without alleging that
the L. Company was the Arkansas corpora-
tion, nor that accused owned any stock in the
Arkansas corporation, nor was an ofiAcer or
agent thereof, or authorized to represent it in
the sale of its stock, did not charge an of-
fense under Kirby's Dig. § 1689, making one
guilty of "larceny" who with intent to de-
fraud or cheat another shall designedly, by
color of any false token or writing, etc., ob-
tain from any person any money. State v.
luester, 126 S. W. 846, 847, 94 Ark. 242.
Rev. St 1899, § 1903, enacted in 1835,
provides that if a person alter the marks of
any animal the subject of larceny, being the
property of another, with intent to steal or
convert it to his own use, he shall be guilty
of larceny, and punished in the same manner
as if he had feloniously stolen such animal.
Prior to the revision of 1879, grand larceny
was the felonious stealing, taking, and carry-
ing away of goods worth $10 or more or any
horse, sheep, hog, etc., belonging to another
and by the revision the act was amended by
striking out the words "sheep" and "hog,"
and by increasing the value of the stolen
property to $30. Held, that section 1903 does
not limit the offense to the felonious mark-
ing of any animal the subject of grand lar-
ceny, but merely the subject of larceny,
which includes petit larceny, and the fact'
that the amendment of the statute excluded
hogs and sheep from the list of animals, the
stealing of which constituted grand larceny,
per se, did not operate to exclude such ani-
mals under the value of $30 from the opera-
tion of section 1903. State r. Zehnder, 128
S. W. 960, 962, 228 Mo. 310.
An employ^ of a railroad company was
required to make an independent check of
the men employed by a construction company,
which relied on the reports made by the em-
ploy^ in paying the men. The employe and
the timekeeper of the construction company
reported that a third person was entitled to
receive compensation for work done, and they
procured the presentation to the coi^struction
company of a check therefor, which it paid.
They received the proceeds. The report was
false. Held, that the employ^ was guilty of
larceny under Pen. Code, | 528, punishing one
who, with intent to defraud, obtains from
another by aid of fraudulent representations
any money, etc People v. Eaton, 107 N. Y.
Supp. 849, 853, 122 App. Div. 706.
Animiui fuimndi
Intent is a necessary element of "lar-
ceny." Sutherland v. St Lawrence County,
91 N. Y. Supp. 962, 966, 101 App. Div. 299.
To constitute "larceny" the taking must
be done with a felonious intent Bailey v.
State, 122 S. W. 497, 498, 92 Ark. 216.
Criminal intent is the principal element
of "larceny," whether of grand larceny which
is a felony, or petit larceny which is a mis-
demeanor. State v. Claybaugh, 122 S. W.
319, 321, 138 Mo. App. 360.
It is insuflElcient to constitute "larceny"
that the taking was without color of right or
authority, but it must have beon with a fe-
lonious intei.t State v. Peterson, 92 Pac.
802, 303, 36 Mont 109.
Where one has taken and converted ani-
mals to his own use, if at the time of the
taking there was a felonious intent to de-
prive the true owner of the permanent use
and benefit of his property, he is guilty of
larceny. Blackshare v. State, 128 S. W. 549,
552, 94 Ark. 548, 140 Am. St Rep. 144.
It is essential to a conviction of 'lar-
ceny" that the property be taken "animo fu-
randi," and where it clearly appears that the
taking was perfectly consistent with honest
conduct, although the party charged with the
crime may have been mistaken he cannot be
convicted of "larceny." Bird v. State, 37
South. 525, 527, 48 Ela. 3.
"Larceny" is the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal property of
another, with intent to convert it to the tak-
er's use and deprive the o\\Tier of Its use
without his consent Felonious intent is a
material element of the crime of larceny.
State V. Dredden (Del.) 73 AtL 1042, 1043, 6
Pennewill, 446.
LARCENY
17
LARCENY
Under Pen. Code, f 528, making guilty of
larceny one who takes property with intent
to deprive the owner of the same, or of the
use and benefit thereof, a taking of property
without an intent to so permanently appro-
priate the same as to deprive the owner of
the property itself, or its use and benefit, is
not 'larceny." There must be something
more than an intention to retain possession
of property, without an intent to actually ap-
propriate it People V. Kenny, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 854, 855. 135 App. Div. 380.
'•Larceny" is the wrongful and fraudu-
lent taking or carrying away of the personal
goods of another with felonious intent to
convert them to the taker's own use and
make them his property without consent of
the owner; but the felonious intent is not
necessarily an intent to gain an advantage
for the taker, it being sufficient that there
be an intention to deprive the owner of his
property; and, even in those jurisdictions
where a lucri causa is required, it is not nec-
essary that the benefit to the defendant be
of a pecuniary nature. Canton Nat Bank
V- American Bonding & Trust Co., 73 Atl.
684. 685, 111 Md. 41, 18 Ann. Gas. 820.
"•Larceny* is the unlawful taking and
carrying away the goods or property of an-
other, secretly or furtively with the feloni-
ous Intent to appropriate them to the use of
the trespasser. • * * From the foregoing
authority we deduce the rule that, under the
English common law, and consequently un-
der our statute, which is merely declaratory
thereof, one cannot commit the crime of 'lar-
ceny' or robbery without a felonious intent,
or, in other words, he cannot commit them
by inadvertence or through ignorance."
Where accused took from the possession of
the court's receiver certain cattle belonging
to him and taken from him under process In
an action against him, he was not guilty of
robbery or "larceny," in the absence of evi-
dence of felonious intent Triplett v. Com.,
01 S. W. 281, 282, 283, 122 Ky. 35.
Both at common law and under Pen.
Code, f 880, and section 883 as amended by
Sess. Laws 1897, p. 247, defining larceny as
a taking "with intent to deprive or defraud"
the true owner, an indictment charging that
defendant "feloniously and with the intent
then and there to steal," etc, sufficiently
charges a felonious intent, the phrase fol-
lowing the word "feloniously" taking noth-
ing from the effect thereof. State v. Allen,
87 Pac. 177, 178, 34 Mont 408 (citing Whar-
ton's Precedents, 415; State v. Rechnltz, 52
Pac. 264, 20 Mont 488).
In an action for slander by a daughter
against her father, where it was doubtful
whether the father meant to charge his
daughter with the crime of larceny, the court
should have charged that the crime of lar-
ceny is committed where one person takes
the property of another with Intent to con-
Tert it to his own use or that of another,
8 WDS.& PJ2d Skb.— 2
and that the crime is not committed where
the taking is done by a person innocently
and without any evil intent, and that unless
the words were intended to charge the plain-
tiff with the crime of larceny, and would
be naturally so understood by the person
hearing them, they should find for defend-
ant Beams v. Beams, 129 S. W. 298, 299,
138 Ky. 818.
Same— At time of takijis
"Larceny" at common-law was the fe-
lonious taking of the property of another
against his will, with the Intent to convert
It to the use of the taker, or, as some au-
thorities hold, the use of the taker or a
third person. In "larceny" the felonious in
tent must have existed at the time of the
taking of the property. Williams v. United
SUtes Fidelity & Guaranty Ck)., 66 AtL 495,
496^ 105 Ind. 490.
"Larceny" consists of an intent to tres-
pass on the personal property of another,
coupled with an Intent wholly to deprive the
owner thereof, and the crime is not commit-
ted unless such intents concurrently and
contemporaneously exist. State v. Teller, 78
Pac. 980, 45 Or. 671 (citing 1 Blsh. Crlm. Law
[7th Ed.] f§ 207, 342; Rapalje, Larceny, § 20;
Stote V. Hull. 54 Pac. 159, 33 Or. 56, 72 Am.
St Rep. 6W ; State v. Meldrum, 70 Pac. 526,
41 Or. 380; Johnson v. People, 113 UL 99).
A felonious intent at the time of the
taking is essential to "larceny." To make
the finder of a check guilty of larceny, he
must have had an intent or fraudulent pur-
pose to convert it to his own use at the time
he took possession thereof, and that he knew
or had reasonable means of knowing the
owner is evidence of such intent, if he after-
wards converts it to his own use. State ▼.
Jlinton, 109 Pac. 24, 27, 66 Or. 428.
In every "larceny" there must be a tres-
pass in the original taking of the property;
that is. In larceny the felonious intent must
have existed at the time of the taking. State
V. Casey, 105 S. W. 645, 647, 207 Mo. 1, 123
Am. St. Rep. 367. 13 Ann. Cas. 878 (citing
State V. Shermer, 55 Mo. 83; State v. Ware,
62 Mo. loc. clt 602).
Defendant took a bull from the range,
believing it to be his own, and later, ascer-
taining that It belonged to another, convert-
ed it. There was no willful trespass in the
taking. Held, that it was not "larc^iy," as
the felonious intent at the time of taking was
absent, and, there being no trespass, the
doctrine that a person,^ taking property by
trespass, who subsequently wrongfully con-
verts it, is guilty of larceny, had no applica-
tion here. WUson v. State, 181 S. W. 386, 96
Ark. 148, 41 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 649, Ann. Cas.
1912B, 339.
The crime of 'larceny," under the stat-
ute defining "larceny** as the taking of per-
sonal property accomplished by fraud or
stealth, with intent to deprive another there-
LABCENY
18
LARCENY
of, may be shown by proof that at the time
of the taking of the property it was taken
with the felonious intent to convert it to
the taker's own use, and to deprive the own-
er thereof, regardless of the fact as to wheth-
er the taking was accomplished by fraud or
stealth. To constitute larceny the criminal
Intent must exist at the time of the taking,
and the taking may be by stealth with such
criminal intent, or the taking may be with
the owner's knowledge through fraudulent
practice. Flohr v. Territory, 78 Pac 565,
570, 14 Okl. 477.
Asportation
Any felonious taking or asportation of
personal property may be "larceny"; there-
fore the omission of the word "away" from
a charge as to "the felonious taking and car-
rying of the personal property of another" Is
not per se error. Presley v. State, 67 South.
605, 607, 63 Fla. 37.
In a trial under an indictment charging
defendant with larceny of a suit case and its
contents from a railroad depot the court, aft-
er defining larceny as the felonious stealing,
taking and carrying away of the personal
property of another, charged that if defend-
ant actually took into his hands the prop-
erty named in the indictment and lifted it
from the place where the owner had put It,
so as to entirely remove it from the place
where it was put defendant was guilty of lar-
ceny, and that if the jury did not find that
defendant took the property from the depot,
but did find that he took and carried it away
from a place outside of any building, the ver-
dict should be guilty of larceny, fixing there-
in the value of the property stolen. Held
that, in the absence of a request by defend-
ant for instructions, the Instructions were as
specific as the case demanded. State v. Mc-
Dermet, 115 N. W. 884, 885, 138 Iowa, 86.
Asportation to now jnrisdiotion as new
offense
Where defendant induced R., who had
previously been employed by a dray company
authorized to receive goods for a consignee
of certain shoes, and who was known to the
servants of the carrier holding such goods
for delivery, to go to the freight depot of
the carrier in Illinois after his employment
by the dray company had terminated, and
procure a load of shoes from the carrier, and
R. obtained such shoes, and delivered them
to a person other than the consignee in Mis-
souri, such act constituted "larceny," and
not "false pretenses," and was therefore pun-
ishable under Rev. St 1899, § 2362, providing
that every person who shall steal the prop-
erty of another in any other state and shall
bring the same into Missouri may be convict-
ed and punished for larceny as though the
property was stolen in Missouri. State v.
Mlntz, 88 S. W. 12, 16, 189 Mo. 268.
Under section 285, Grimes Act (Gen. St
1901, § 2286), providing that every person
who shall steal or obtain by robbery the
property of another in any other state, terri-
tory, or country, and shall bring the same
into this state, may be convicted and pun-
ished for larceny in the same manner as if
such property had been feloniously stolen or
taken within this state, and section 83,
Crimes Act (Gen. St 1901, § 2076), making
the alteration of brands with intent to steal
or convert the branded animal "larceny," one
who in another state marks or brands, or al-
ters the mark or brand of, any animal, the
subject of larceny and the property of an-
other, with intent to steal it or convert it to
his own use, so that if the marking, brand-
ing, or alteration were done in this state he
would be guilty of the larceny as defined by
section 83, may be convicted and punished
for larceny under section 285, whether or
not the original taking may have been a
crime against the laws of the state or coun-
try where it was committed. State v. White,
92 Pac. 829, 831, 76 Kan. 654, 14 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 556.
Oonfldeneo same distingnisliod
See Confidence Game.
Consent of owner
As used in Cr. Code, | 114, making it
criminal to steal money or other property,
the word "steal" includes all the elements of
larceny at common law. If the original tak-
ing of the property is with the consent of
the owner, the crime of "larceny" is not com-
Oiitted. Cohoe v. State, 113 N. W. 532, 533,
79 Neb. 811.
Where the owner of personalty volun-
tarily parts with its possession for a particu-
lar purpose, and the person receiving posses-
sion for that purpose has at the time a fraud-
ulent intent to make use of such possession
as a means of converting the property to his
own use, the crime is larceny. Bivens v.
State, 120 Pac. 1033, 1036, 6 Okl. Cr. 521.
Where one by fraud, trick, or false pre-
tense induced the owner to part merely with
the possession of his property, there being
no Intent to pass title, and the party receiv-
ing takes It with Intent fraudulent to con-
vert it to his own use, the crime is "larceny."
State V. Loser, 104 N. W. 337, 340, 132 Iowa,
419 (citing State v. Edwards, 41 S. B. 429,
51 W. Va. 220, 59 L. R. A. 465; State v. Hall,
40 N. W. 107, 76 Iowa, 85, 14 Am. St Rep.
204; People v. Morse. 2 N. E. 45, 99 N. Y.
662; State v. Anderson, 47 Iowa, 142; Peo-
ple V. Rae, 6 Pac. 1, 66 Cal. 423, 56 Am.
Rep. 102; Loomls v. People, 67 N. Y. 329, 23
Am. Rep. 123; 1 Whart Cr. Law, f 1179).
Where it appeared that the whole
scheme by which a person obtained money
was a fraud from the beginning and that pos-
session obtained by mere trickery with a
present Intent to convert it to his own use
that he had no rightful possession, and that
delivery was made to him without any in-
tent to pass the title, but merely to enable
IjARCEKT
19
IjARGENT
Mm to make a apecific use of the money, his
appropriatioii of It constituted "larceny" at
common law. Commonwealth ▼. King, 88
N. E. 454, 400, 202 Mass. 879 (citing Common-
wealth ▼. Flynn, 45 N. B. 924, 167 Mass.
460, 57 Am. St Rep. 472; Commonwealth
T. Rubin, 43 N. B. 200, 165 Mass. 453 ; Com-
monwealth y. Lannan, 26 N. E. 858, 153 Mass.
287. 289, 11 L. R A. 450, 25 Am. St Rep.
629; Commonwealth t. Barry, 124 Mass. 325).
OojkwmrmUtm
There was a ''converaion," within B. &
C. Comp. I 1807, declaring guilty of larceny
one who receives money of the state and con-
verts it, where money being deposited in a
bank by the State Treasurer for safe-keep-
ing was paid out to others than such Treas-
orer. State v. Ross, 104 Pac 696, 599, 55
Or. 450, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 601.
CeaTertlns or el aiming property fowmd
Where accused, as 4gent of prosecutor,
had an interest in certain rent collected by
him, he could not be convicted of larceny
by embezzlement of such rent, under Hurd's
Rev. St 1909, c. 88, f 76, providing that, if
an agent fraudulently embezzles or oonverts
property In his hands belonging to his em-
ployer, he shall be guilty of larceny. People
y. O'Farrell, 93 N. E. 136, 189, 247 IlL 44.
On an information drawn under Comp.
lisws 1909, § 2591, defining larceny generally,
a conviction may be had under section 2592
on proof that accused found lodt property
with means of inquiry as to the owner, and
appropriated the same to his own use with-
out a reasonable effort to discover the own-
er; the latter section only prescribing a rule
of evidence. Berry v. State, 111 Pac. 676, 677,
4 Okl. Cr. 202, 31 L. E, A. (N. S.) 840.
When a delivery of goods is made for
a specific purpose, the possession is still sup-
posed to reside in the first proprietor, and,
where any person has the bare charge of
another's effects, legal possession remains In
the owner, and therefore, where the finder
of the purse told defendant's wife thereof,
and she stated that the purse looked like her
husband's and took the same telling the find-
er that, if it did not belong to her husband,
she would return it, and afterwards posses-
sion was given to him on his claim of owner-
ship, when in fact it belonged to another,
the legal possession remained in the finder,
and defendant's claim thereto constituted lar-
ceny. Williams V. State, 75 N. B. 875, 877,
165 Tnd. 472, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 248 (citing
Smith v. People, 53 N. Y. Ill, 13 Am. Repi
474; Bish. New Cr. Law, | 824).
Difforeat srades
"Larceny" is divided into two degrees,
or otherwise varied in punishment, by the
value of the thing stolen ; and an Indictment
must allege the value of the article stolen,
and the proof of value wUl be adequate if
it simply shows to which of the classes merit-
ing corresponding punishment the offense be-
longs. Woodring y. Toxitory, 78 Pac 86, 86,
14 Okl. 250, 2 Ann. Cas. 866.
Under Rev. Pen. Code, f| 606, 607, 608,
as amended by Laws 1908, p. 175, c. 151,
"larceny" is the taking of personal property
accomplished by fraud or stealth and with
intent to deprive another thereof. Larceny
is divided into two degrees, the first of which
is termed "grand larceny"; the second, *1;>etit
larceny." Grand larceny is larceny com-
mitted in either of the following cases: (1)
When the property taken Is of value exceed-
ing |20. (2) When such property, although
not of value exceeding ^, is taken fi*om
the person of another. (3) When such prop-
erty, although not of value exceeding $20, Is
a ball, steer, cow, heifer, or calf, or is a
stallion, mare, gelding, horse, or colt Lar-
ceny in other cases is petit larceny. Under
Rev. Pen. Code, t§ 605, 607, 608, as amended
by Laws 1903, p. 175, c. 151, making it grand
larceny to take property exceeding $20 in
value, or when the property, though not of
value exceeding |Q0, is a stallion, mare, geld-
ing, horse, or colt there is no variance be-
tween an information alleging larceny of a
horse and proof of the larceny of a gelding,
especially in view of Rev. Code Cr. Proc. |
569, providing that neither a departure from
the form or mode prescribed as to any
pleading nor error therein renders it invalid,
unless it has prejudiced defendant, and sec-
tion 229, providing that an indictment is
sufficient if the act charged is clearly set
out in ordinary and concise language, so as
to enable a person of common understanding
to know what is intended. State v. Matejous-
ky, 116 N. W. 96, 98, 22 S. D. SO.
To feloniously take from the person of
another the goods of that other and carry
the same away has always been a crime,
punishable as either grand or petit "larceny,"
80 that the Legislature in defining and mak-
ing punishable the specific act of felonious-
ly taking property from the person of an-
other did not create a new offense, but rec-
ognized such act as a degree of larceny in
which the grades of grand and petit larceny
are included, so that a defendant charged
with larceny from the person may properly
be convicted of any of the lesser offenses
proved. SUte v. Clem, 94 Pac. 1079, 1080,
49 ^ash. 273.
Bement of InMrglarj
See Burglary.
Under Comp. Laws 1909, § 2564, making
it burglary to break and enter any building,
etc., with Intent to steal therein, the word
"steal" involves a felonious intent on the
part of the taker to deprive the owner of
property and to convert it to the taker's use;
while any trespass involving the taking of
personal property with Intent to deprive an-
other thereof is "larceny," within .<iectlon
2557, making 'it burglary to enter any build-
ing, etc, with intent to conunit any felony.
liARCENT
20
LARGENT
larceny, or malicious mischief. SalllTan t.
State, 123 Pac. 569, 570, 7 Okl. Or. 307.
Under Rev. St 1898, | 4334, as amended
by Sees. Laws 1905, p. 16, c 19, making it
burglary for any person to break and enter
a building with Intent to commit a ''larceny"
or any other felony, an Information, charg-
ing the breaking and entering a building at
night with intent to steal goods, without
stating their value, sufficiently charges a
burglary in the first degree, as "larceny"
within such section includes both a mis-
demeanor and a felony, and the words "or
any other felony" are equivalent to "or any
felony other than that embraced within the
larceny." State v. Hows, 87 Paa 163, 31
Utah, 168.
Embeulement distlnsaisl&ed
••Larceny" and "embezzlement" are dis-
tinguishable, in that in larceny possession of
the property may be obtained by fraud, while
it cannot be so obtained in embezzlement.
People V. Grlder, 110 Pac 586, 588, 13 Gal.
App. 703.
The distinction between "larceny" and
'•embezzlement" is one fully recognized In
the criminal law. While the two offenses
have much in common, for the purpose of
prosecution they have uniformly been regard-
ed as distinct In every "larceny" there
must be a trespass in the original taking of
the property; that is, in larceny the felo-
nious intent must have existed at the time of
taking. Whereas "embezzlement" is the
fraudulent and felonious appropriation of
another's property by a person to whom it
has been intrusted, or into whose hands it
has lawfully come. State v. Casey, 105 S.
W. 645, 647, 207 Mo. 1, 123 Am. St Rep.
367, 13 Ann. Cas. 878.
The crimes of "embezzlement" and "lar-
ceny" are so different in their character that
they should be treated in an indictment as
distinct and separate offenses. State v. Fln-
negean, 103 N. W. 155, 157, 127 Iowa, 286,
4 Ann. Cas. 628.
The term "embezzle," as used in the
statute, is a broader term than "larceny,"
but not exclusive of it. State v. Sullivan,
21 South. 688, 689, 49 La. Ann. 200, 62 Am.
St Rep. 644; State v. Pellerln, 43 South.
159, 161, 118 La. 547.
To constitute "larceny" as distinguish-
ed from "embezzlement," there must be a tres-
pass to the possession, but it is larceny where
one gains possession of another's personal
property so as to constitute only a bare cus-
tody, or procures it by subterfuge; the
owner's property not being divested in such
case ; he still having constructive possession.
Boswell V. State, 56 South. 21, 22, 1 Ala. App.
178.
At common law, possession wfts a neces-
sary element of "larceny," and the distinc-
tion between "larceny" and ''embezzlement"
depends on the nature of the possession
and the manner of obtaining it, and it would
seem that a mere credit is not the subject
of "larceny" at common law. Higbee v.
State, 104 N. W. 748. 749. 74 Neb. 331.
"Embezzlement" is defined as the fraud-
ulent appropriation of property by a person
to whom such property has been intrusted
or into whose hands it has lawfully come.
It differs from "larceny" in the fact that the
original taking of the property was lawful
or with the consent of the owner, while in
"larceny" the felonious intent must have ex-
isted at the time of the taking. United
States V. Allen, 150 Fed. 152, 153 (citing
Moore V. United Stales, 16 Sup. Ct 294, 295,
160 U. S. 268, 269, 40 L. Ed. 422).
"One who obtains money or goods by
some fraudulent trick or artifice, and car-
ries them away, Is guilty of 'larceny.* " Thus
where one marries a woman in pursuance of
a scheme to procjc^ money which she has
on deposit in bank, and later procures a
check for the money on representations that
he will use the money in making an invest-
ment for her, he is guilty of "larceny" and
not "embezzlement" Hunt v. State, 79 S. W.
769, 771, 72 Ark. 241, 65 L. R. A. 71, 105 Am.
St Rep. 34, 2 Ann. Gas. 33 (citing Beasley
V. State, 38 N. S. 35, 138 Ind. 552, 46 Am. St
Rep. 418).
The crime of "embezzlement" differs in
its essential ingredients from the crime of
"larceny" in this: That in "larceny" the gra-
vamen of the offense is the unlawful and fe-
lonious taking of personal property with the
intent to convert and steal the same, while
in "embezzlement" the taking is lawful, be-
cause of the trust reposed in the agent serv-
ant, or trustee receiving it and the gist of
the offense consists of the conversion of the
property so received with a felonious and
fraudulent intent of converting the same to
the use of the agent, servant, or trustee.
State ▼. Culver, 97 N. W. 1015, 1016, 5 Neb.
(Unof.) 238.
According to Pen. Code, i 528, "larceny"
Includes every act which was larceny at com-
mon law, and in addition such acts as form-
erly constituted "false pretenses" and ••em-
bezzlement" At common law, if a person
honestly and in good faith received posses-
sion of personal property in trust and there-
after converted the same to his own use, he
was guilty of "embezzlement" If he ob-
tained possession of the property by fraud,
the owner intending nevertheless to part
with the title as well as the possession, the
offense was obtaining property under ''false
pretenses." If the possession was wrong-
fully or fraudulently obtained, without the
owner's consent, and without color of title,
and with a felonious intent of converting
the property to the use of the taker or an-
other, the offense was "larceny." People ex
rel. Perkins v. Moss, 99 N. Y. Supp. 138, 144,
145, 113 App. Div. 329 (citing People v. Mill-
LABCENT
21
LARCENY
«r, 62 N. B. 418, 169 N. Y. 800, 88 Am. 8t
Bep. 546).
'^Larceny" was a crime at common law
and consisted of a trespass, committed in ttie
taking of tbe personal goods and chattels of
another with intent to convert them to the
taker's nse, without the consent of the own-
er. "Embezzlement" cannot be committed
unless the defendant is in the lawful posses-
sion of the property at the time of the con-
version. As trespass is an injury to the
possession only, it logically and legally fol-
lows that one in the lawful possession of
goods cannot commit larceny of them, for it
were idle and absurd to talk of one commit-
ting an Injury to his own possession. "Em-
bezzlement" consists in the breach of some
trust relation by one in the lawful posses-
sion of the personal property of another who
fraudulently converts it to his own use. In
"larceny" there is no breach of any confi-
dential relation as in embezzlement, while
in the latter crime there is no trespass as in
larceny. State v. Browning, 82 Pac. 955, 956,
47 Or. 470.
"Larceny** at common law was the fe-
lonious taking of the property of another
against his will with intent to convert it to
the use of the taker, or, as some authorities
hold, the use of the taker or third person.
"Embezzlement" consists in the fraudulent
Appropriation to one's own use of money or
goods intrusted t(^ him by another. In lar-
-ceny the felonious intent must have existed
At the time of taking, whereas in embezzle-
ment the fraudulent act consists in the ap-
propriation of the property to the use of the
taker or third party, but the felonious or
fraudulent intent is of the essence of the
offense in each case. Where an insurance
agent was entitled under his contract with
the company to a credit of three months on
his monthly balances due the company, the
fact that at the end of the three months he
was unable to pay, or simply failed to pay,
with no proof of a fraudulent disposition of
the money, would not have established em-
bezzlement. The mere failure to pay a debt
without compulsion even by one having the
financial ability is neither larceny nor em-
bezzlement. Williams V. United States Fi-
deUty ft Guaranty Co., 66 Atl. 495, 496, 105
Md. 490.
The distinction between larceny by fraud
and embezzlement is determined as to the
time when a fraudulent intent to convert
arose, and in larceny the criminal intent
must exist at the time of the taking, and if
the taker received the property as a bailment
with intent to conform to the owner's wishes
and thereafter fraudulently appropriates the
property, the crime is embezzlement under
Snyder*8 Comp. Laws 1909, f I 2591 and 2609.
Bivens v. State, 120 Pac. 1033, 1036, 6 Okl.
-Or. 521.
"Where one honestly receives the pos-
session of goods upon trust, and after re-
ceiving them fraudulently converts them to
hi8 own use, it is a case of 'embezzlement
But where the possession has been obtained
through a trick or device, with the intent,
at the time the party receives it, to conv^t
the same to his own use, and the owner of
the property parts with the possession and
not with the title, the offense is •larceny.*"
Where a person gave money to another as a
stakeholder on a bet, such delivery having
been brought about by fraud and artifice of
the stakeholder, who intended to appropriate
the money in any event, and who did so,
the offense was "larceny." State v. Byan,
82 Pac 703, 706, 47 Or. 338, 1 L. B. A (N.
S.) 862 (quoting and adopting the statement
in People v. Tomlinson, 36 Pac. 506, 507, 102
Cal. 19, 28).
Where a person honestly receives the
possession of goods, chattels, or the money of
another on any trust, express or implied,
and after receiving them fraudulently con-
verts them to his own use, he may be guilty
of "embezzlement** but not of "larceny," ex-
cept as "embezziemait** is by statute made
'larceny.** State ▼. Buck, 84 S. W. 951. 952,
186 Mo. 15, 2 Ann. Oas. 1007 (citing Common-
wealth V. Barry, 124 Mass. 325).
False pretenses dUtiacsiahed
'Die distinction between the crime of
larceny and that of cheating by '^lae pre-
tenses" is this: *'If the false pretenses Induce
the owner to part with his property intend-
ing to transfer both title and possession,
the crime is cheating by 'false pretenses.* If,
on the other hand, one by fraud, trick, or
false pretense Induces the owner to part
merely with the possession of his property,
there being no intent to pass the title, and
the party who reoelveB It took it with intent
fraudulently to convert it to his own use,
the crime is 'larceny.* ** State v. Loser, KM
N. W. 337, 339, 340, 132 Iowa, 419.
Prosecutor met defendant through a
newspaper advertisement, and defendant of-
fered to sell him a half interest in the room-
ing house department of a brokerage com-
pany for $200, and represented that he (de-
fendant) needed an assistant, and that the
business netted profits of between $200 and
$300 a month. Prosecutor desired a salary,
but thereafter paid defendant $50 to be kept
by him for 30 days; defendant agreeing
to return the same to prosecutor at the ex-
piration of such time if he was dissatisfied,
which defendant failed to do. Held that
since the ownership of the money so depos-
ited remained In prosecutor, and there was
no intent on his part to deliver possession
thereof to defendant, except temporarily, the
latter*s offense, if any con^mitted, was "lar-
ceny,** and not obtaining money by ''false
pretenses.** State v. Anderson, 84 S. W. 940,
949, 186 Mo. 25 (citing State v. Vickery, 19
Tex. 326; 2 Arch. C?r. PI. 372; Loomis v.
People, 67 N. Y. 322, 23 Am. Bep. 123; Peo-
ple V. Morse, 2 N. £>. 45, 99 N. Y. 662).
LAROENT
LARCENY
"Larceny" and "false pretenseB" are dis-
tinguishable, in that in larceny the owner
does not intend to part with his property
to accused, though he may intend to part
with possession ; while In false pretenses he
does intend to part with his title. People t.
Grider, UO Pac. 586, 588, 13 Cal. App. 703.
The distinction between "false pretenses"
and "larceny" is that in the former the own-
er parts with the possession and title of
property by reason of false and fraudulent
representations knowingly and designedly
made, while in the latter the owner of the
property stolen must not have intended to
part with the title to it. People v. Proctor,
82 Pac. 551, 552, 1 Cal. App. 521.
"Where, by means of fraud, conspiracy,
or artifice, possession of the property is ob-
tained with felonious intent, and the title
still remains in the owner, 'larceny' is es-
tablished, while the crime is 'false pretenses*
if the title, as well as possession, is absolute-
ly parted with." People v. Delbos, 81 Pac.
131, 132, 146 Cal. 734 (quoting and adopting
definition in People v. Rae. 6 Pac. 1, 66 Cal.
425, 56 Am. Rep. 102).
Where possession of personal property
is obtained from the owner by fraud, trick,
or device, and the owner intends to part with
both possession and the title when he sur-
renders control of the property, the offense
is obtaining property by *'false pretenses";
but if the possession is fraudulently secured,
and the owner does not intend to part with
the title, the offense is "larceny." Beckwlth
V. Galice Mines Co., 93 Pac. 453, 455, 50 Or.
542, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 723.
"If the possession has been obtained by
fraud, trick, or device, and the owner of
it intends to part with his titie when he
gives up possession, the offense, if any, is
obtaining money by 'false pretenses.' But
where the possession has been obtained
through a trick or device, with the intent,
at the time the party receives it, to convert
the same to his own use, and the owner of
the property parts with the possession and
not with the title, the offense is *larceny.*"
Where a person gave money to another as
a stakeholder on a bet, such delivery having
been brought about by fraud and artifice of
the stakeholder, who intended to appropriate
the money in any event, and who did so,
the offense was "larceny." State v. Ryan,
82 Pac. 703, 706, 47 Or. 338, 1 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 862 (quoting and adopting the statement
in People v. TomUnson, 36 Pac. 506, 507, 102
CaL 19, 23).
If the owner of property part with not
only the possession but with the right of prop-
erty also, the offense of the party obtaining
the property will not be larceny, but will
be that of obtaining goods by "false pre-
tenses." Zink V. People, 77 N. Y. 114, 128,
33 Am. Rep. 589 (adopting definition in
Smith V. PeoiHe, 58 N. Y. Ill, 13 Am. Rep.
474).
One who went to a wholesale cigar store,
and, giving an assumed name, falsely repr^
sented that be had come to get cigars for a
retail dealer, and thereby procured the cigars
and converted them to his own use, was
guilty of "larceny," since the wholesaler in-
tended to deliver him merely the possession
of the goods for the retailer, and not to sell
them to him personally, and was not guilty
of "obtaining property by impersonating an-
other," within the meaning of Rev. St 1899,
f 1900. State v. Kosky, 90 S. W. 454, 457,
191 Mo. 1.
Where defendant induced R., who had
previously been employed by a dray company
authorized to receive goods for a consignee
of certain shoes, and who was known to the
servants of the carrier holding such goods
for delivery, to go to the freight depot of
the carrier in Illinois after his employment
by the dray company had terminated, and
procure a load of shoes from the carrier, and
R. obtained such shoes, and delivered them
to a person other than the consignee in Mis-
souri, such act constituted "larceny," and
not "false pretenses," and was therefore pun-
ishable under Rev. St 1899, i 2362, provid-
ing that every person who shall steal the
property of another In any other state and
shall bring the same into Missouri may be
convicted and punished for larceny as though
the property was stolen in Missouri. State
V. Mintz, 88 S. W. 12, 16, 189 Mo. 268.
According to Pen. Code, i 528, "larceny"
includes every act which was larceny at com-
mon law, and in addition such acts as
formerly constituted "false pretenses" and
"embezzlement" At common law, if a per-
son honestiy and in good faith received pos-
session of personal property in trust and
thereafter converted the same to his own
use, he was guilty of "embezzlement" If
he obtained possession of the property by
fraud, the owner intending nevertheless to
part with the title as well as the possession,
the offense was obtaining property under
"f^lse pretenses." If the possession was
wrongfully or fraudulently obtained, without
the owner's consent and without color of
title, and with a felonious intent of convert-
ing the property to the use of the taker or
another, the offense was "larceny." People
ex rel. Perkins v. Moss, 99 N. Y. Supp. 138,
144, 145, 113 App. Div. 329 (citing People v.
Miller, 62 N. E. 418, 169 N. Y. 350, 88 Am.
St Rep. 546).
Prosecutor applied to defendant for a
position, who introduced him to A. to ar-
range the terms of his employment A. re-
quired prosecutor to deposit $50 as a guar-
anty of his honesty, to be returned on ter-
mination of his employment; but defendant
on the next day told prosecutor that, as $400
or $500 would pass through prosecutor's
LARCENT
23
LARCENT
hands every day, be must deposit $160 more,
which he did. Defendant pretended to gire
him a reiceipt for this money, which, instead,
was a bill of sale for a one-half interest in
the rooming house business conducted by the
concern. Prosecutor worked for $16 per
week for three or four weeks, during which
time he drew $16.76, and, becoming dissatis-
fied, demanded the return of his money,
which defendant refused to pay him, and
then prosecutor discovered that his receipt
therefor was a bill of sale. Held that, prose-
cutor never having intended to part with the
title to the money so deposited, defendant,
having acquired the same by fraud, with the
felonious intent to convert it to his own
use, was guilty of "larceny," and not "false
pretenses." State v. Buck, 84 S. W. d61,
962, 186 Mo. 16, 2 Ann. Gas. 1007 (citing Com-
monwealth V. Barry, 124 Mass. 326; People
V. Morse, 2 N. £. 46, 99 N. X. 662; People
V. Dunmar, 13 N. E. 326, 106 N. Y. 602; Peo-
ple V. Miller, 62 N. E. 418, 169 N. Y. 339,
88 Am. St. Rep. 646; People v. Gottachalk,
20 N. Y. Supp. 777, 66 Hun, 64).
As felony
See Felony.
Foree and mrmm
Though an indictment charged that ac-
cused **with force and arms'* stole a horse,
those words should have been omitted from
the instructions, for, neither force nor arms
being an element of the offense, their use in
the indictment was unnecessary. Walklate
▼. Commonwealth (Ky.) 118 S. W. 314, 316.
Oambltitc distlagmished
The obtaining of money under pretext
of betting at cards and the best hand win-
ning, but where in fact prosecuting witness
had no chance to win, and was the only
player who actually risked anything, is with-
in Comp. Laws 1907, | 4366, defining "lar-
ceny" as the felonious taking of the prop-
erty of another, and such a game cannot be
held to constitute gambling merely. State v.
Donaldson, 99 Pac. 447, 449, 35 Utah, 96, 20
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1164, 136 Am. St Rep. 1041.
As Infamous erlaio
See Infamous Crime.
As misdemeanor
See Misdemeanor.
Ps^porty of another
To constitute "larceny,** the thing stolen
must be the property of another ; but either
general or special ownership may be suffi-
cient SUte V. RoBweU, 133 S. W. 99, 100,
163 Mo. App. 888.
"Larceny" consists in two essential ele-
ments: l^^rst, the misappropriation; and,
second, the accompanying Intent Evidence
of ownership is therefore admissible, even
necessary, in proving the misappropriation,
since one may not usually wrongfully ap-
propriate his own property. But it is as
mudi a crime to steal one person's property
as another's. The ownership of the property
is not an essential ingredient of the crime,
so long as it appears that the title to the
same is not in the accused. The crime is
complete when it appears that the property
feloniously taken or appropriated was not
the property of the accused. People v. Mead,
109 N. Y. Supp. 163. 164, 126 App. Dlv. 7.
" 'Larceny* Is the felonious stealing, tak-
ing, carrying, leading, or driving away the
personal property of another," and an indict-
ment charging defendant with willfully, etc.,
taking from the person and possession of
prosecutors said money, was insufficient in
not charging that the property was not that
of defendant People v. Cleary, 81 Pac. 763,
1 Cal. App. 6a
One who has taken an estray and is in
possession thereof has such property interest
therein tliat the taking of it from him may
be "larceny"; so, also, one In possession of
stolen property purchased from the thief;
so, also, a thief, in possession of property
he has stolen, as against another than the
owner. Maxwell v. Territory, 86 Pac. 116,
10 Ariz. 1.
Pen. Code. | 484, defines "larceny" as
the felonious stealing, etc., of personal prop-
erty of another. Held, that the phrase
"personal property of another,'* as so
used, means property in the possession of
another who is entitled, as bailee or other-
wise to retain possession for some benefit
or profit to himself to the exclusion of all ^
others, and not absolute ownership as de-
fined by Civ. Code, I 679, so that a taking of
a heifer by the general owner thereof from
the possession of an agister entitled to hold
the same under a lien for pasturage, with
the intent to deprive the latter thereof, con-
stituted "larceny." People v. Cain, 93 Pac.
1037, 1039, 7 Cal. App. 168.
Bobbery as inelndinc
See Robbery.
Bobbery distlnsnisbed
See Robbery.
Biot synonjmona
See Riot
Steal
See SteaL
niof t synonymons
See Theft
Trespass
"Larceny" is the fel<mious stealing and
carrying away, etc., of the personal property
of another, every larceny including a tres-
pass to the possession, which cannot exist
unless the property waa in the possession of
the person from whom it is charged to have
been stolen. People v. Iloban, 88 N. E. 806,
807, 240 111. 303, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1132, 16
Ann. Cas. 226.
LARCENY
24
LARCENY FROM THE PERSON
'To constitute 'larceny' there must be a
trespass in the taking. • • • It is not
necessary that the taking be by force or
stealth. If possession is obtained by fraud
with intent to convert the property to the
use of the taker, and it is so converted,
•larceny* may be charged." Where E. and
defendants conspired to steal the funds of a
labor union, and to that end procured the
election of Ew as recording secretary of the
union, and pursuant to his duty as such re-
cording secretary he drew money from a
bank to be forwarded to the district and
national organizations, and carried the money
on his person until late in the evening, when
pursuant to the conspiracy he pretended
to have been held up and robbed, the crime
was not "larceny" because of the absence of
a felonious taking. State ▼. Gothem, 115 K.
W. 800, 891, 138 Iowa, 236.
"At common law and under the statute,
in larceny' there must be a trespass. Where
the ownership of property is not parted with
and by a fraud or trick the possession of the
property is obtained and is converted to the
use of the taker without the consent of the
owner, and at the time of resorting to the
trick or fraud to obtain the possession it
was intended to take the property and per-
manently deprive the owner of it, this would
constitute 'larceny' at common law as well
as under the statute." State v. Copeman, 84
S. W. 942, 945, 186 Mo. 108 (citing 1 Bish.
New Cr. Law, $ 585; State v. Murphy, 90
Mo. App. 648; Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y.
'822, 23 Am. Rep. 123; State v. Vickery, 19
Tex. 326).
LARCEITT AFTER TRUST DELE-
GATED
If a person, fraudulently intending to
get possession of the money of another and
appropriate the same to his own use, by false
representations induces the owner to deliver
the money to him for the purpose of being
applied for the owner's use or benefit, and
then appropriates it in pursuance of the
original intent, he is guilty of both "larceny"
after trust delegated and simple larceny, and
may be prosecuted for, and convicted of,
either ofifeuse. Martin v. State, 51 S. B. 384,
128 Ga. 478.
LARCENY BT BAILEE
See, also, Bailee.
The language of Mills' Ann. St • 1256,
defining *'larceuy" by a bailee converting
money, etc., "he shall be deemed guilty of
larceny in the same manner as if the original
taking had been felonious, and on conviction
shall be punished accordingly," makes the con-
version by a bailee with intent to steal the
exact equivalent of a felonious stealing, tak-
ing, and carrying away. Quinn v. People,
75 Pac. 396, 897, 32 Colo. 185.
LARCEITT BT FALSE PRETENSES
See False Pretense.
LARCENY FROK THE HOTTSB
House as element of, see House.
Under Pen. Code 1895, | 178, provldlng^
that "larceny from the house" is the break-
ing or entering any house with intent to steaU
or after breaking or entering said house steal-
ing therefrom anything of value, the offense
can be committed in four different ways. It
may consist in the breaking of a house with
intent to steal, provided the offense is not
burglary ; entering any house with intent to
steal ; breaking a house and stealing there-
from, where it can be accomplished without
entry or ^terlng and stealing. Section 182
defines two classes of "larceny from the
house" and distinguishes them. It provides
that "any person breaking and entering any
house or building (other than a dwelling
house or its appurtenances) with intent to
steal, but is detected and prevented from
carrying such intent into effect or in steal-
ing any of the articles therein contained.**
The section then provides that "any person
breaking or entering any such house or
building and stealing therefrom any money,
goods, chattels, wares or merchandise or any
other article of value shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor." This second division of the
section is subdivided into thefts where there
is a breaking and entering in order to accom-
plish the theft, and where there is no break-
ing, but merely an entrance into the building^
and a theft is accomplished. But in both
cases a theft must actually be committed.
Under the first portion of section 182, as in
the first clause of section 178, where a house
other than a dwelling house and its appur-
tenances is broken and entered with intent
to steal, and the offender is detected, he ia
guilty of "larceny from the house," though
nothing be taken. Glaze v. State, 58 S. E.
1126, 1127, 2 Ga. App. 704.
liARCENT FROM THE PERSON
Included in robbery, see Robbery.
Robbery distinguished, see Robbery.
See, also, Theft from the Person.
The crime of "larceny from the person"
(B. & C. Comp. § 1800) is a compound larceny
consisting of simple larceny (section 1798)
aggravated by the drcumstanoe of taking the
property from the person of another in
which the value of the property is not an
ingredient of the offense, as in case of simple
larceny. State v. Reyner, 91 Pac. 301, 302,
50 Or. 224.
The act of pocket picking is the offense
of "larceny of the person." State y. Whit-
ten, 92 N. E. 79, 80, 82 Ohio St 174.
The two elements peculiar to **larceny"
from the person In the nighttime are that it
must be "from the person" and "in the night-
time"; and, upon information for. larceny
from the person in the nighttime, a verdict
of larceny from "a" person in the nighttime
is insuiticient State t. McG.ee, 80 S. W. 899,.
900, 181 Mo. 312.
LARD
26
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
URD
Where 'lard" compound web made
of cotton seed oil and oleostearlne, and was
generally described as lard both in trade and
among consumers, proof of the theft of such
compound was sufficient to sustain a con-
viction under an indictment charging the
theft of lard, though "lard" as defined by
the dictionaries and the pure food law means
a product of a hog. Roman v. State, 142 S.
W. 912, 913, 64 Tex. Cr. K. 515.
URGE
See At Large.
A complaint f6r Injury to a pedestrian
while passing along a sidewalk on a dark
night by running into a stone, in alleging
that the dty had permitted a '*large'* stone,
unguarded and unprotected, to remain along
the sidewalk, at the edge thereof, for a long
time prior to the accident, and that It was
the city's duty to guard against the danger
by erecting barriers, is insufficient; it not
showing the size or location of the stone, or
how long it had been there, so as to make
it clear that it was the city's duty to main-
tain barriers. The word ••large," as here
used, like "along" and "edge," is a relative
term. It does not Indicate the size or char-
acter of the stone, except in a comparative
sense. City of Vincennes v. Spees, 74 N. E.
277, 280, 35 Ind. App. 389.
IJIROE OOK SUMEB
The term "large consumer," used In a
<!ontract between a dty and a water company
providing that the cost of furnishing water
to manufacturers and large consumers was
to be estimated according to the sice of the
establishment, does not mean persons taking
water for ordinary family use, where such
persons are fuUy covered by a schedule based
on houses having a certain number of rooms
and occupied by different numbers of fami-
lies, but contemplates concerns like manu-
factories, which differ more or less from in-
stances specifically provided for. Berends
V. Bellevue Water & Fuel Gaslight Co., 82
8. W. 983. 984, 119 Ky. 8.
URRY
A "larry" is a kind of car used to haul
coal from a coal mine tipple to coke ovens,
and from which larry ovens are charged with
coal. Hairston v. United States Coal and
Coke Co., 66 S. B. 473, 66 W. Va. 324.
LASCIVIOUS
See, also, Lewdness.
Character usually cannot be characteriz-
ed as lascivious, wanton, or lewd unless it
was intentionally calculated to incite to lust
It is thus distinguished from indecency and
Impropriety, which may or may not Indicate
lust, depending upon the purposes or feelings
of the person who is guilty of such indecen-
cy or impropriety. Indecency of conduct
may tend t<f prove lasdvlousness, but when
lasciviousness Is proven an unchaste char-
acter is thereby established. State v. Hum-
mer, 104 N. W. 722, 724, 128 Iowa, 605.
Rev. St I 3893, declares every obscene,
lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, print or
other publication of an indecent character,
or notices giving Information for obtaining
such publications, to be nonmailable matter,
and prescribes a punishment for the use of
the malls to transmit or circulate the same.
Held, that the words "obscene,** "lewd," and
"lascivious," as used in such section, signify
that form of immorality which has relation
to sexual impurity, having the same meaning
as is given them at common law in prosecu-
tions for obscene libel. Hanson ▼. United
States, 157 Fed. 749, 750, 85 C. a A. 825.
'liasdvlousness" is defined as wanton-
ness or lewdness. State v. Hummer, 104 N.
W. 722, 728, 128 Iowa, 505 felting E2z parte
boran, 82 Fed. 76; United States v. Clarke,
88 Fed. 732; United States v. XJurant 46
Fed. 753; State r. Lawrence, 27 N. W. 126,
19 Neb. 307).
LAST
See Same as Last
XJkST AOJU8TED VAI.UATIOK
Under Act April 12, 1905 (P. L. 142). pro-
viding for the levy of a road tax on "the
last adjusted valuation" for county purposes,
there is no such valuation until the county
coiimissioners have corrected the assessor's
return, and the board of revision has given
the taxpayers opportunity to object H. C.
Frick Coke Co. v. Mt Pleasant Tp., 71 Atl.
930, 931. 222 Pa. 461.
LAST ABSEBSBCEHT
The "last county assessment." contem-
plated by Kirby's Dig. t 5683, providing that
no single improvement shall be undertaken
which exceeds in cost 20 per cent, of the
value of the property in the Improvement dis-
trict as shown by the "last county assess-
ment" includes the valuation added by the
county board of equalization, and where the
value is thus increased before the board of
improvement of a city reports the estimat-
ed cost of an Improvement, and before the
passage of an ordinance levying the assess-
ment to pay for the improvement such in-
creased value must be considered. Board
of Improvement Dlst No. 5 of Texarkana v.
Offenhauser, 105 S. W. 265, 268, 84 Ark. 257.
IiABT OXiEAB OKAHOE
See, also, Discovered Negligence; Dto-
covered Peril ; Humanitarian Doctrine.
The doctrine of the "last clear chance,"
generally attributed to the case of Davies v.
Mann, 10 Mees. & W. Rep. 546, In which the
LAST CLEAR CHANGE
26
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
owner of a donkey, who negligently turned
it out on the highway with its feet hobbled,
was allowed, nothwithstanding his own negli-
gence, to recover from a personMriying along
the highway who carelessly ran into and kill-
ed it, is that the contributory negligence
of the party injured will not defeat the ac-
tion if it be shown that the defendant might
by the exercise of reasonable care and pru-
dence have avoided the consequences of the
injured party's own negligence. Pilmer v.
Boise Traction Co., 94 Pac 437, 438, 14
Idaho, 327, 15 L R. A. (N. S.) 254, 125 Am.
St. Rep. 161.
^'The last clear chance doctrine'' arises
where plaintiff has been negligent in plac-
ing himself in a position of danger, but
that negligence has spent its force at the
time he received an injury owing to the neg-
ligence of defendant Scholl v. Belcher, 127
Pac. 068, 975, 03 Or. 810.
Under the **last clear chance doctrine,"
one is liable for injury negligently inflicted
upon another, though the injured person by
his own negligence put himself in the place
of danger, if the person inflicting the in-
juries saw the peril in time to have avoid-
ed the accident by using ordinary care. CJer-
rano v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co.,
126 Pac. 37, 40, 62 Or. 421.
The "last clear chance" to avoid injury is
the last opportunity to avoid the danger, by
one of the parties learning of it, and know-
ing that the safety of the other depends sole-
ly upon his conduct, and the rule does not
apply where the act of the Injured party and
the defendant are substantially concurrent
Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Bolin, 78 N. B.
210, 213, 215, 39 Ind. App. 169.
The "last clear chance" doctrine, which
is the rule that, notwithstanding the injured
person*s original negligence, the defendant
is liable if, by the exercise of ordinary care,
he might have discovered plaintiff's peril in
time to have avoided the injury, is in con-
flict with the contributory negligence rule.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Lilley, 93 N. W.
1012, 1016, 4 Neb. <Unof.) 286.
"Last clear chance" is the doctrine that
though the plaintiff may have been guilty
of negligence, and although that negligence
may in fact have contributed to the accident,
yet, if the defendant could, in the result, by
the exercise of proper care and diligence,
have avoided the mischief which happened,
the plaintiff's negligence will not excuse him.
McClanahan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co.,
35 South. 902, 906, 111 La. 781.
If the negligence of both parties co-
operate there is usually no liability, except
for the "humanitarian or *last chance* doc-
trine," which means that, though the in-
jured party may have been negligent in plac-
ing himself in a position of peril, yet if
defendant, by ordinary care, did see, or
could see, him in time to have averted injury.
defendant is liable. Matz v. Missouri Pac.
Ry. Co., 117 S. W. 584, 591, 217 Mo. 275.
The doctrine of "last clear chance" is
not limited to cases where the peril of the
person injured has been actually discovered
by those causing the injury, but extending to
cases where the peril could have been dis-
covered by the exercise of reasonable care on
their part The duty to exercise due care
to avoid the consequence of another's negli-
gence arises when the circumstances are
such that an ordinarily prudent person would
have reason to apprehend its existence.
Nichols V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 98 Pac.
808, 814, 44 Colo. 50L
The "last clear chance" doctrine is some-
what of an exception to the general rate
of law, by which an injury caused by the
joint negligence of the wrongdoer and the
person injured is not actionable. Murphy v.
Wabash R. Co. (Mo.) 128 S. W. 481, 485.
The doctrine of the "last clear chance"
does not involve the recognition of liability
in case of concurrent negligence, and does
not Involve a case of comparative negligence,
but requires one to use reasonable care not
to injure another in the condition in which
the latter has placed himself, though the lat-
ter is guilty of negligence in putting himself
in a place of danger avoidable by reasonable
precautions. Welsh v. Tri-City Ry. Co., 126
N. W. 1118, 1119, 148 Iowa, 200.
The exception to the general rule mak-
ing contributory negligence a defense, known
as the "last chance doctrine," does not ap-
ply where there is no negligence of the de-
fendant supervening subsequently to that of
the plaintiff, as where his negligence is
continuous and operative down to the moment
of the injury, or where his negligence or posi-
tion of danger is not discovered by the de-
fendant in time to avoid the injury. Denver
City Tramway Co. v. Cobb, 164 Fed. 41, 43,
90 C. C. A. 459.
The rule of "the last clear chance" im-
plies that the one charged with negligence
knew the person injured was in a place of
danger and negligently failed to avoid injur-
ing him; but his testimony that he did not
have such knowledge is not conclusive. Such
knowledge may be shown by proof that the
person Injured was in a situation of immi-
nent danger, and so situated that the one in-
juring him, if he used his senses as human
beings ordinarily do, must have known the
danger. Zltnik v. Union Pac. R. Co., 136 N.
W. 995, 997, 91 Neb. 679.
The doctrine of "last clear chance" can-
not be applied where both parties are con-
temporaneously and actively in fault, and
by their mutual carelessness an injury en-
sues to one or both of them. Rowe v. South-
ern CaUfomia Ry. Co., 87 Pac. 220, 221, 4
Cal. App. 1 (citing Holmes v. South Paa
Coast Ry., 31 Pac. 834, 97 Cal. 169).
I«AST CLEAR CHANOlfi
27
LAST CLBAR CHANOB
The "last clear chance doctrine" applies
to the facts of the particular case, and the
doctrine is applicable if it appears that
plaintiff was negligent and the defendant
was not negligent in bringing about the dan-
gerous situation, bnt saw or might have seen
plaintiff's peril in time to prevent the injury.
McGee v. Wabash R, Co., U4 8. W. 83, 35,
214 Mo. 530.
The doctrine of '^st clear chance'' is
an exception to the general rule that con-
tributory negligence of the person injured
will bar recovery without reference to the
degree of negligence, and under the doctrine,
an injured person may recover from the in-
Jury resulting from the negligence of another
though his own negligence exposed him to
the danger of injury, if the injury was more
immediately caused by want of care on the
other's part to avoid the injury after dis-
covering the peril of the person injured.
Clark V. St Louis & S. P. R. Co., 108 Pac.
961, 863, 24 Okl. 764.
The doctrine of the "last clear chance'*
rests upon the principle that there is some-
thing in the plaintiff's condition or situation
to admonish the defendant that he is not
able to protect himself. It is the doctrine of
prior and subsequent negligence, or remote
and proximate cause, and presui^poses the in-
tervention of an appreciable interval of time
between the prior negligence of the plaintiff
and the subsequent negligence of the defend-
ant It applies notwithstanding the contribu-
tory negligeiice of the plaintiff when the de-
fendant knows, or by the exercise of ordi-
nary care ought to know, of plaintiff's dan-
ger, and fails to do something which it has
power to do to avoid the injury, or when the
platotiff \B in some position of danger from
a threatened contact with some agency un-
der the control of the defendant, when the
plaintiff cannot and the defendant can pre-
vent a resulting injury. Roanoke Ry. &
EDiectric Co. v. CferroU, 72 8. E. 125, 127, 112
Va. 698.
"The party who has the last opportunity
of avoiding an accident is not excused by
the negligence of any one else. His negli-
gence> and not that of the one first in fault,
is the proximate cause of the injury." Again
it has been stated in this way: '*Where both
parties are negligent, the one that has the
last dear opportunity to avoid the accident,
notwithstanding the negligence of the other,
is solely responsible for it; his negligence
being deemed the direct and proximate cause
of it" The rule is bottomed sometimes upon
one proposition, and sometimes upon the
other, and sometimes upon both. The first
is that in such cases defendant's negligence,
Instead of being concurrent, is the sole and
proximate cause of the injury, and the other
is that plaintiff's negligence is no defense to
wanton or willful negligence. When bottom-
ed solely upon the last proposition, to wit,
wantonness or willfulness, it is apparent
that something more than the want of ordi-
nary care is necessary. The injury must
either be willful, or, as said in some cases,
be due to such gross negligence as that wan-
tonness or willfulness may be inferred.
When bottomed upon the former proposition
—that is to say, upon the doctrine that de-
fendant's negligence, being last in point of
time, is the proximate, and plaintiff's pre-
cedent negligence the remote, cause — neither
wantonness nor willfulness nor their equiva-
lent need be shown. But it must appear in
9uch cases that plaintiff's and defendant's
negligence are not concurrent in point of
time. If concurrent in this sense, then there
can be no recovery save where the rule of
comparative negligence obtaina McCormick
V. Ottumwa Ry. & light Co., 124 N. W. 889,
892, 146 Iowa, 119.
Under the 'last chance^ doctrine,
"though plaintiff negligently placed himself
in a perilous position by driving near the
track, the motorman operating the car owed
the plaintiff the duty to avoid injuring him,
and plaintiff's previous negligence did not
bar a recovery if the injury resulted from
the negligence of the motorman is not stop-
ping or checking the car." Deitring v. St
Louis Transit Co., 86 8. W. 140, 144, 109
Mo. App. 524 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion In Sepetowski v. St Louis Transit Co.,
76 8. W. 693, 102 Mo. App. 119; Morgan v.
Wabash R. Co., 60 8. W. 195, 159 Mo. 262;
Hutchinson v. St Louis & M. R. Co., 88 Mo.
App. loc. cit 383).
The theory of the last chance doctrine,
which applies only where there is negligence
of defendant subsequent to the negligence of
plaintiff, so that defendant's negligence is
the proximate cause of the injury notwith-
standing plaintiff's prior negligence, is not
submitted by instructions that plaintiff could
recover if she, in attempting to cross a street,
and while crossing it, was exerdsing ordi-
nary care to avoid injury, and defendant's
driver negligently failed to give warning of
her danger, or negligently failed to stop the
team after he could have seen by the exer-
cise of ordinary care that plaintiff was in
danger of collision with the team. Vaughn
V. Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Co. (Mo.) 132 a W.
293,297.
Wliat is termed as the "last chance doc-
trine" is the doctrine to the effect that in
cases of contributory negligence he who has
the last clear opportunity to avoid inflicting
an injury is responsible if in the exercise of
ordinary care he fails to do so. Where those
in charge of a locomotive saw plaintiff's
team slowly approaching a crossing 150 feet
away, they were not chargeable with negli-
ligence in failing to chec^ the train, but
were entitled to presume plaintiff would stop.
Lambert v. Southern Paa R. Co., 79 Pac.
873, 875, 146 CaL 231.
LAST CLEAR CHANCB
28
IJABT CLEAR CHANCE
An Instruction that If the Jury find from
the eyidence that plaintiff was negligent in
attempting to cross the street, yet if they
further find that defendant's agent or serv-
ant in charge of the car alleged to have in-
flicted the injury, either saw, or by the ex-
ercise of ordinary care could have seen, the
danger of plaintiff*8 position in time to have
avoided the collision, but failed to exercise
care and negligently allowed the car to col-
lide with plaintiff and injure her, then plain-
tiff is entitled to recover, presented what is
known as the "humanitarian" or "last
chance" doctrine. Hough v. St. Louis Car
Co., 123 S. W. 83, Se, 146 Mo. App. 58.
The doctrine of the "last chance," or
"last clear chance," makes It necessary for
the servants of a railway company, after
they see the danger of a person who has
negligently come upon the track, to avoid
injuring him. To this end, the servants of
the railway company are bound to keep a
vigilant lookout in front of advancing en-
gines or trains in order to discover persons
exposed to danger on highway crossings, or
at other places where they have a legal right
to be, and the railway company will be liable
for running over them if, by maintaining such
a lookout and by using reasonable care and
exertion to check or stop its train, It could
avoid injury to them. The doctrine applies
where the negligence of the person injured
is remote and that of the railway com-
pany proximace, for if both be negligent, and
the negligence of both be concurrent and di-
rectly contributing to produce the accident,
then the case is one of contributory negli-
gence pure and simple. If, however, the neg-
ligence of the person injured merely puts
him in the place of danger and stops there
and does not actively continue until the
moment of the accident, and the railway
company either knew of his danger, or by
the exercise of such diligence as the law im-
poses would have known it, then, if the neg-
ligence of the person injured did not concur-
rently combine with that of the railway com-
pany to produce the injury, the company's
negligence is the proximate cause, and that
of the person injured is the remote cause.
Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co., 81 N.
E. 326, 328, 76 Ohio St 284, 10 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 421, 118 Am. St Rep. 844.
The "last clear chance" doctrine is thus
^.eflned in Thompson on Negligence, 449;
"When it is said, in case where the plaintiff
has been guilty of contributory negligence,
that the company is liable if by the exercise
of ordinary care it could have prevented the
accident, it is understood that it will be so
liable if by the exercise of reasonable care,
after a discovery by defendant of the danger
in which the party stood, the accident could
have been prevented, or if the company fail-
ed to discover the danger through the reck-
lessness or carelessness of its employes, when
th'^ exercise of ordinary care would have dis-
covered the danger and averted the calam-
ity." This rule calls for "ordinary care" and
not for extraordinary care, and the use of
all possible precautions; and where plaintiff
stepped onto the track in front of some cars
moving towards him by gravity under con-
trol of the brakes alone, the mere fact that
the crew of the switching engine standing
close by, on a parallel track, did not sound
either whistle or bell, but attempted to warn
him by shouting to him, was not negligence
on th^ part which would create a liability
under the "last clear chance" doctrine, but
at most an error of Judgment in an emergen-
cy created by plaintiff's own act, especially
where plaintiff heard but did not heed the
shouts. Jones v. Sibley, L. 6. & S. R. Co.»
46 South. 61, 64, 121 La. 89 (citing Harlan
V. St Louis, K. a & N. Ry. Co., 65 Mo. 22).
In an action for injuries to a person on
the track of an electric street railway, an
instruction that the motorman must use dili-
gence to avoid danger to a person on the
track, and that the car must be stopped, if
there Is time to stop it, where the person 1m
in a dangerous position, and If there was
time, in the exercise of ordinary care, for a
motorman to have stopped the car after see-
ing, or after he was bound to see, with ordi-
nary care, the dangerous position of the
person on the track, and failed to check the
speed of the car, then the defendant was
guilty of negligence, is not objectionable in
not properly stating the theory of "the last
dear diance." Indianapolis St Ry. Co. v.
Seerley, 72 N. E. 169, 1034, 85 Ind. App. 467.
The rule that one's neglect to discover
peril of another is to be held to be the sole
proximate cause of resulting injury is not
an arbitrary but a reasonable one. The test
is: What wrongful conduct occasioning an
injury was in operation at the very moment
it occurred or became inevitable? If Just be-
fore the climax only one party had the pow-
er to prevent the catastrophe, and he neg-
lected to use it, the legal responsibility is
his alone. If, however, each had such pow-
er and each neglected to use it, then their
negligence was concurrent, and neither can
recover of the other. The doctrine of "last
clear chance" will not be extended to cases
where the plaintiff's own negligence extend-
ed up to and actually contributed to the
injury. To warrant its application there
must have been some new breach of duty
upon the part of the defendant subsequent
to the plaintiff's negligence. In an action
for damages for the death of a railroad em-
ploy6 who was run over by an engine while
at work on the track, where there was no
evidence to show whether he looked and
listened, an instruction that, if the employes
in charge of the engine could by the exercise
of reasonable diligence have seen deceased
on the track in sufficient time to have stopped
the engine and avoided the Injury, plaintiff
will be entitled to recover, notwithstandinf
LAST CLEAB CHANCE
LAST DSaCRIBBD
deceased was negligent In failing to see the
approach of a train, was erroneous. Mis-
souri Pac. R. Co. V. Bentley, 98 Pac. 150, 152,
78 Kan. 221 (quoting and adopting definition
in Dyerson t. Union Pac R. Co.. 87 Pac 680,
74 Kan. 528, 7 Ll R. A. [N. S.] 132, 11 Ann.
Oas. 207).
The engineer of a train who has given
the danger signal, commencing when a track-
man was seen on the track 600 feet away,
and, as 8o<»i as he discovers that the man is
apparently unconscious of the approach of
the train, adopts every possible means to
avert the accident, by sounding bell and
whistle and reversing the engine and putting
on the air brakes, has done his full duty,
as respects "the last clear chance." Hoifard
V. IlUnols Cent R. Co., 110 N. W. 446, 460,
138 Iowa, 543, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 797.
As applied to an action for injuries to a
traveler in a collision with a street car, the
doctrine of the "last clear chance" Is that,
even assuming the negligence of plaintiff con-
tributed to the Injury of which he com-
plains, still If, after the occurrence of such
contributory negligence, the employes of de-
fendant saw the dangerous condition in
which plaintiff was placed, and by the ex-
ercise of ordinary care could have stopped
the car, and so have avoided Injuring him,
and failed to do so, the defendant is respon-
sible. Henderson v. Los Angeles Traction
Co., 89 Pac. 976, 980, 150 Cal. 689.
The theory of the "last clear opportu-
nity," in the case of injury to one on the
track by being struck by the engine. Is that
the engineer saw the party Injured and real-
ized her perilous situation and had ample
opportunity to have avoided the accident by
the exercise of reasonable caution and care.
Zipperlen v. Southern Paa Co., 93 Pac. 1049,
1053, 7 CaL App. 206.
Under the doctrine of the "last clear
chance," where negligence of defendant ia
the proximate cause of the injury for which
suit Is brought, and that of plaintiff a remote
cause only, the plaintiff may recover. In the
case of a person injured at a street railway
creasing, if the motorman saw, or oould have
seen by the exercise of ordinary care, the
situation of the person In time to have avoid-
ed injuring him, and ftiils to do so, the rail-
road oompany Is liable for his injury, and,
notwithstanding the negligence of the person
in placing himself in a position of peril, un-
der the doctrine of the "last clear chance,"
this operates as an exception to the general
rule forbidding recovery by plaintiff guilty
of contributory negligence. It is no depar-
ture from just principles, but a wholesome
and humane doctrine, to hold that if after
the defendant knew, or in the exercise of or-
dinary care ought to have known, of plain-
tiiTs negligence, he could have avoided the
accident, but failed to do so, the plaintiff
caa recover. Qrass v. Pt. Wayne & W. VaL
Traction Co., 81 N. B. 514, 517, 42 Ind. App.
395 (citing Indianapolis Traction & Terminal
Co. V. Kidd, 79 N. E. 347, 350, 167 Ind. 402,
7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 143, 10 Ann. Cas. 942).
In an action for injuries to a person on
the track of an electilc street railway, an in-
struction that the motorman must use dili-
gence to avoid danger to a person on the
track, and that the car must be stopped, if
there is time to stop it, where the person is
in a dangerous position, and If there was
time. In the exercise of ordinary care, for a
motorman, to have stopped the car after see-
ing, or after he was bound to see, with ordi-
nary care, the dangerous position of the per-
son on the track, and failed to check the
speed of the car, then the defendant was
guilty of negligence. Is not objectionable in
not properly stating the theory of the "last
clear chance." Indianapolis St. Ry. Co. v.
Seerley, 72 N. B. 169, 170, 35 Ind. App. 467.
The doctrine of the "last clear chance"
means that notwithstanding the previous neg-
ligence of plaintiff, if at the time of the In-
jury it might have been avoided by the ex-
ercise of reasonable care on the part of de-
fendant, defendant will be liable for the fail
ure to exercise such care. Ilence, where a
passenger, a girl under 14 years of age, un-
accustomed to riding on street cars, becomes
frightened by the negligence of the defend-
ant's servants In carrying such passenger
past her known destination, and the conduc-
tor knows, or by the exercise of due care and
diligence under the circumstances should
know, of such passenger's frightened condi-
tion, and that she is about to leave the mov-
ing car, it is hlB duty to exercise the high-
est degree of care i>068ible under the circum-
stances to prevent such passenger from
alighting from the moving car. Kruger v.
Omaha & C. B. St Ry. Co., 114 N. W. 571,
573, 80 Neb. 490, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 101, 127
Am St. Rep. 786.
JiABT BEBOBZBEJD
A deed from a tax collector to the terri-
tory, which recites the assessment and levy
of taxes for the year on property described
as "Cabin and I^ot 6 of Block 60 and Cabin
and Lot 7 of Block 60" of a city and on per-
sonal property, and which states that the
taxes were delinquent, and that the property
was sold to the territory, and which conveys
to the territory "all that lot • • • of
land • • • above and last described In
this deed," conveys only lot 7. Abell v.
Swain, 100 Pac. 831, a32, 12 Ariz. 421.
The phrase "last herein described," in a
finding that a bankrupt was the owner of a
business, together with a leasehold interest
of the premises and the furniture contained
therein, and the good will of the business,
and that he had sold the property "last here-
in described," confines the sale by the bank-
rupt to a sale of the good will of his business
and the furniture used in connection there-
I«AST DESCRIBED
80
LAST SICKNESS
with, and not a sale of his leasehold interest.
Leist y. Dierssen, 88 Pac 812, 814, 4 Gal.
App. 634.
The rule that the expression, "the real
property last hereinbefore described," used
in the granting part of a tax deed, includes
only one tract of several described in the
deed, applies only where the last description
Is of a single tract which is segregated from
the others and described wholly apart from
them for some independent purpose, and
where no language intervenes between such
description and the operative words of the
grant which will extend the application . of
the word beyond that tract King v. Gibson,
113 Pac. 429, 430, 84 Kan. 29.
LAST GENERAL ELEGTIOH
See General Election.
LAST KHOWH AODBE8S
Under PoL Code, { 3650, which reauires
an assessor to state in the assessment of
property the name and post office address, if
known, of the person to whom the property
is assessed, the address shown on the last
assessment constitutes the last known post
office address so far as the tax records are
concerned, and, in the absence of other in-
formation, the tax collector must take notice
of the address so shown and mail the notice
of resale to such address. Campbell v. Mor-
an, 119 Pac. 89, 90, 161 Cal. 326.
LAST PLACE OF ABODE
A service of a writ of scire facias, in a
suit commenced in Massachusetts, by the of-
ficer's leaving a copy therefor at the "last
and usual place of abode*' of a trustee in
that state, according to the laws of the state,
was sufficient, though prior to such service
he had removed to a neighboring state.
Adams v. Rowe, 11 Me. 89, 90, 25 Am. Dec.
266.
LAST PORT OF DISO^ABOE
See Final Port of Discharge.
LAST FBECEDINO
The term "last preceding," in a statute
providing that when the common council in
any city, having at the "last preceding" state
census more than 50,000 inhabitants, shall
consider it necessary to procure grounds for
a public market, such council shall appoint a
committee, refers to the state census which
may Immediately precede in point of time the
action of the council, and the law is general.
State ex rel. Board of Education of City of
Minneapolis v. Brown, 106 N. W. 477, 480, 97
Minn. 402, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 327.
LAST PUBLICATION
In Comp. Laws N. M. 1897, |t 2966, 2967,
relating to a publication of a notice, and re^
quiring the last publication at least two
weeks before the return day, by "last publi-
cation** the last act of making the notice pub-
lic— ^the last Insertion in a newspaper pre-
scribed-^was intended, not the last day of tb%
period for which the publication was direct^
ed. Harrison v. Wallia, 90 N. T. Snpp. 44,
49, 44 Mlsa Bep. 492.
LAST SESSIOK
In a statute providing that supervisors
might, at their last session before regular
election, etc., "last session" means the last
regular session appointed by law. It has no
reference to special sessions called for some
specific purpose. The "session" includes the
entire sittings of the board, from the meeting
on the first day till the final adjournment
Tuohy V. Chase, 30 CaL 524, 527.
LAST SIOXHESS
See During Last Siekness.
The term "last sickness," as used in stat-
utes of wills, means where the testator is in
extremis, or overtaken by a sudden and vio-
lent sickness, and has not time nor opportuni-
ty to make a written wilL A nuncupative
will Is made "at the time of the last sick-
ness," as required by Ballinger's Ann. Codes
A St I 4605, though not made when testator
is in extremis, or overtaken by sudden and
violent sickness, and has not time or oppor-
tunity to make a written will, where made
when the last sickness has so progressed that
testator expects death, and is liable to die
at any time, and in view of, and as prepara-
tory to, such result, which followed, he made
the verbal will, and this without regard to
his opportunity then or afterwards to make
a written will. In re Miller's Estate, 91
Pac. 967, 47 Wash. 253, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1092, 125 Am. St Rep. 904, 14 Ann. Cas. 1163
(quoting and adopting the definition in Prince
V. Hazelton [N. Y.] 20 Johns. 502, 11 Am.
Dec 307).
Where a verbal will is made in the last
sickness, of which the testator dies, when
such sickness has progressed to such a point
that he expects death at any time, and rea-
lizes that he is liable to die therefrom at any
time, and in view of such expected death,
and as preparatory thereto, makes a will
near to the time of his death, such will la
made in the "last sickness" of the testator,
although a sufficient time may have inter-
vened between the making of the oral wiU
and the death of the testator to have per-
mitted the making of a written will. God-
frey V. Smith, 103 N. W. 450, 455, 73 Neb.
756, 10 Ann. Cas. 1128.
"Last sickness,*' as the term Is used in
statutes allowing a verbal will to be made in
the "last sickness** of the testator, does not
mean that he must be in extremis or artlculo
mortis, nor is it necessary that he be pre-
vented from making a written will by sur-
prise of sudden death. The requirement is
satisfied if the disease of which the testator
dies has progressed to such a point that he
expects death at any time and is liable to
die therefrom at any time, and in view of
such expected death and as preparatory
IJLTB
31
LATERAL
thereto snch will 1b made, and that there-
after death from such sickness does occur.
Baird ▼. Balrd, 79 Pac. 168, 166, 70 Kan.
5^, 68 L. B. A 627, 8 Ann. Gas. 812.
LATE
The word **late," as used In an oflQcer's
return of service of the summons by leaving
at defendant's '^ate place of residence"
means formerly, recently, existing not long
ago. "Late** la defined as "existing not long
ago; not long ago but not now.*' The term
**late place of residence" evidently meant the
place where the defendant had recently re-
sided but did not then reside, and hence the
return did not show compliance with the
statute requiring service by leaving at de-
fendant's usual place of residence. Minneso-
ta Thresher Mfg. Co. v. L'Heureux, 118 N. W.
566, 666, 82 Neb. 6d2 (quoting and adopting
definitions in 26 Cyc. p. 161; Webst Diet).
IiATEIiT PEHDnrO
Where an exhibit in the record recited
that certain chancery causes were "lately
pending" in a certain circuit court, such re-
cital did not show that such causes were still
on docket Scott v. Thomas, 61 S. B. 829,
831. 104 Va. 380.
An order-book entry of final judgment is
eawenttal to shpw in the record on appeal ren-
dition th^eof. Reference to the cause, in
the clerk's certificate, as one '^tely pending"
in the court below, is not enough. Ghieago
Horseshoe Go. of Indiana ▼. Ooatlin, 66 N. B.
614, 616, 80 Ind. App. 604.
LATENT
"Latent^ means not discernible by exam-
ination. Anderson ▼. Van Riper, 128 N. T.
Supp. 66, 67.
LATEXT
lOUITY
A ''latent ambiguity" is one developed
by extrinsic evidence, where the particular
words, In themselves clear, apply equally
well to two different meanings. Wolff Truck
Frame Go. v. American Steel Foundries, 105
Fed. 940, 944, 115 C. C. A 628 (citing' defini-
tion in Petrie v. Trustees of Hamilton Col-
lege, 68 N. E. 216, 158 N. T. 458).
A "latent ambiguity," as defined by Lord
Bacon, is "that which seems certain and
without ambiguity for anything that appear-
eth upon the deed or Instrument, but there
is some collateral matter, outside of the
deed, that breedeth the ambiguity." If this
double meaning is apparent on the face of
the instrument, then the ambiguity is a pat-
ent one. If the language is apparently not
of double meaning, but is shown to be so
only by the aid of collateral or extrinsic
facts, the ambiguity is "latent" OUver v.
Henderson, 49 8. E. 743, 121 Ga 836, lOi
Am. St Rep. 186 (citing 1 Jarm. Wills [Am.
Notes] top p. 743; Walker v. Wells, 26 Oa.
141, 71 Am. Dec. 164).
"Latent ambiguity" arises from some
collateral circumstance or extrinsic matter
in a case where the language of the instru-
ment is intelligible. Barrett v. Kansas &
Texas Goal Go., 79 Pac. 150, 151, 70 Kan. 649.
A "latent ambiguity" exists when, there
being no defect in the description on the
face of the instrument, it becomes necessary
to fit the description to the thing — ^in other
words, to identify it by parol evidence; and
evidence of surrounding circumstances and
inferences from such circumstances are ad-
missible to show to which thing the ambigu-
ous description applies. Sherrod t. Battle,
70 S. B. 834, 888, 154 N. G. 845.
"A latent ambiguity' in a will, which may
be removed by extrinsic evidence, may arise
(1) either when it names a person as the ob-
ject of a gift, or a thing as subject to it,
and there are two persons or things that
answer such name or description; or (2)
when the will contains a misdescription of
the object or subject, as where there is no
person or thing in existence, or, if in exist-
ence, the person Is not the one intended, or
the thing does not belong to the testator.*'
Wheaton v. Pope, 97 N. W. 1046, 1048, 91
Minn. 299 (quoting Patch v. White, 6 Sup.
Gt 617, 117 U. S. 210, 29 L Ed. 860).
A "latent ambiguity" is one where the
equivocality of expression or obscurity of in-
tention does not arise from the words them-
selves, but from the ambiguous state of ex-
trinsic circumstances to which the words of
the instrument refer, and which is suscepti-
ble of explanation by the mere development
of extraneous facts without altering or add-
ing to the written language or requiring
more to be understood thereby than will fair-
ly comport with the ordinary or legal sense
of the words and phrases used. Teague v.
Sowder, 114 S. W. 484, 488, 121 Tenn. 132.
Where there is no defect on the t&ce of
a will, but there Is an uncertainty in at-
tempting to put it into effect, the ambiguity
is "latent" Jennings t. Telbert, 68 S. E.
420-421, 77 S. G. 454.
IsATEWI BEFEOT
A "latent defect" Is one which could
not have been discovered by Inspection. L.
McManus Go. v. Drexel Furniture Go., 68 S.
E. 859, 860, 8 Oa. App. 158.
A defect in a roll of cloth sold, which
consists of holes in the cloth, is not a latent
defect, since it is easily discoverable. Strauss
V. Salzer, 109 N. T. Supp. 784, 736, 68 Misc.
Rep. 678.
LATERAL
In a statute providing that a petition to
widen, deepen, and alter a ditch "shall be
held to include any side 'lateral' spur or
LATERAL
32
LATERAL RAILROAD
branch ditch, drain or water conrse neces-
sary to secure the object of the Improyement,
whether the same is mentioned therein or
not," the word "lateral" does not quality the
words "branch ditch, drain or water course,"
and therefore, under a petition to Improve a
ditch extending in a southerly direction, it is
proper to order the construction of a branch
ditch commencing half a mile northeast of
the starting point of the main ditch and in-
tersecting the main ditch about a hundred
feet from its starting point Omaha & N. P.
R. Co. T. Sarpy CJounty, 117 N. W. 116, 117,
82 Neb. 140.
Ses& Laws 1905, c 140, p. 254, I 1, re-
quiring a "lateral passageway of at least 900
feet*' between all flsh traps, means that erery
trap must be so located that there shall be
no other trap within a distance of 900 feet
laterally therefrom; and a trap was not
properly located where a parallelogram,
formed by lines 900 feet long, projected at
right angles to the ends of the trap and lines
connecting the same drawn parallel to the
course of the trap 900 feet on either side
thereof, intersected traps previously located,
though the trap in question did not inter-
sect similar parallelograms of the prior
traps. Johansen v. Mulligan, 83 Paa 417,
418. 41 Wash. 379.
JiATEKAL RAILROAO
"A 'lateral road' is one proceeding from
some point on the main trunk between its
termini.'' Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Waters,
66 Aa 685, 688, 105 Md. 896, 12 L R. A.
(N. S.) 826 (quoting and adopting definition
in Newhall v. Galena & 0. U. R. Go., 14 lU.
273).
Within the meaning of section 1 of the
Interstate Commerce Act (Act Feb. 4, 1887,
c 104, 24 Stat 379), as amended by Act June
29, 1906, c. 3591, S 1, 34 Stat. 584, which pro-
vides that "any common carrier subject to
the provisions of this act upon application
of any lateral branch line of railroad
• • • shall construct, maintain and op-
erate upon reasonable terms, a switch con-
nection with any such lateral branch line of
railroad," etc., and further providing (as
amended by Act June 18, 1910, c. 309, § 7,
36 Stat 545) that, if it fails to make such
connection on application, the Interstate
Commerce Commission may, on complaint
and after a hearing, order it done, whether
a road is or is not a "lateral branch line of
railroad," and entitled to invoke the powers
of the commission, depends on the relation
which it bears to the line with which switch
connection is asked, and not upon its relation
to the shippers or territory. It is such a later-
al branch when it is tributary to and depend-
ent on the other line for an outlet, or in oth-
er words Is essentially a feeder, but not
when It is in effect an independent and com-
peting line, although it does not compete as
to a portion of the territory involved, and
such dependent relation is not established by
the fact that it seeks the connection at one
of Its terminals. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. R.
V. United States, 195 Fed. 962, 965.
An interurban electric railway for pas-
sengers and some freight, running under a
state charter between points in the state
through the middle of a diamond-shaped
area inclosed by two steam railways, and in
its general course parallel to and more or less
competing with the steam roads, and work-
ing on a different plan, is not a "lateral
branch line of railroad," within the meaning
of the act to regulate commerce of February
4, 1887, as amended by the act of June 18,
1910, requiring carriers subject to the act to
establish switch connections with such lines
on certain conditions, and permitting owners
of such lines as well as shippers to make
complaint to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in case of the carrier's failure upon
written application, and authorizing such
commission to hear, investigate, and deter-
mine whether such conditions exist, and to
make an order directing the carrier to com-
ply with the act United States v. Balti-
more & O. S. W. R. Co., 33 Sup. Ct 5, 6,
226 U. 8. 14, 57 L. Ed. 104.
Laws 1869, p. 2399, c. 917, || 8, 4, under
which plaintiif railroad company was organ-
ised by the consolidation of the N. and H.
Railroad Companies, provide that the con-
solidation shall not release the new corpora-
tion from any of the restrictions of duties
of the several corporations. Laws 1846, p.
272, c 216, creating the H. Company, author^
ized it to construct a single, double, or treble
track road between New York and Albany,
and section 1 further authorized it to con-
struct the branches fbr depot and station
accommodations needed for its business.
Plaintiff seeks to condemn land for 35 miles
of track from its general depot In New York
City for an "additional main track," and to
afford a more expeditious means of handling
tralBc. Held, that the charter contemplated
such tracks as would accommodate the depot
conditions for a treble-track railroad, and
the purposes of the desired track In question
came within the spirit of the additional char-
ter power to construct branches for station
accommodation needed for railroad business,
though it already had treble tracks over the
same distance. So it is true that a lateral
or branch railroad" usually contemplates one
running from some point on the main line,
intended as a connecting line or feeder, to
quote the American & English Encyclopedia
of Law (volume 18, p. 561) ; but in the pres-
ent case the statute itself defines the branch
or branches to be constructed, and these are
"for depot and station accommodations, as
may be required for the business of said
railroad." New York Cent. & H. R R. Co. v.
Untermyer, 117 N. Y. Supp. 443, 446, 183
App. Div. 146.
JS^
liATERAL RAILROAD
LAW
A «nateral railroad" built under the lat-
eral railroad law (Bums' Ann. 8t. 1908, H
68d8-G40i) is governed by the general rail*
road laws so £ar as applicable, and is sub-
ject to goTemmental regulation. A railroad,
to be built by a stone company, is not de-
prived of its character as a lateral railroad
within the lateral railroad law (Biums* Ann.
8t 1908, SI 5398-5404), because it is to con-
nect with a lateral road already existing,
where the two roads together do not exceed
the length fixed by the statutes and will be
used as one road. Westport Stone Co. ▼.
Thomas, 94 N. B. 406, 409, 175 Ind. 319, 85
U R. A. (N. 8.) 646.
The right glren to a railroad company
chartered to construct a railroad from the
dty of Baltimore to the Ohio river, to con-
struct "^teral railroads," in any direction
whatever, in connection with such railroad,
is not, in the absence of anything in the
charter to that effect, limited to construction
of branches which will be feeders for the
port of Baltimore, but authorizes the con-
struction of a branch from the main line to
connect with another branch, so as to take
around the dty of Baltimore freight going in
either direction, and not intended for that
dty. Baltimore ft O. R. Go. r. Waters, 66
AtL 685, 688, 105 Md. 396, 12 L. R. A. (N.
8.)S2a
ULTEKAh SUPPORT
The right of **lateral supports extends
DO further than to avoid negligence as to
land incumbered with buildings. Sharplees
T. Boldt, 67 AtL 602, 658, 218 Pa. 872.
UUNCH
As rigging and apparel, see Ships' Rig-
ging and AppareL
LAUNDRY
See Occupied as a Steam Laundry.
LAUREL
See Japanese LaureL
LAW
See At Law and in Equity ; Attorney at
Law; Authorized by Law; Business
Required by Law; By-Law; Ck)lor of
Law; Ck>mmerclal Law; Common
Law; Condusibn of Law; Ck)nflict
with General Law ; Contrary to Law ;
Court of Law; Criminal Law; Cus-
tody of the Law; Decision Against
Law ; Due Course of Law ; Due Pro-
cess of Law; Election Law; English
Law; Equal Protection of Law; Er-
ror of Law; Existing Law; General
Law; Ignorance of Law; Insurance
Law ; Intestate Laws ; Issue at Law ;
Issue of Law ; Knowledge ef the Law ;
8 Wns.& Pih> 8xB.— •
Learned in the Law; LtabiUtar Great*
ed by Law; Limited by Law; Local
Law; Matter of Law; Mistake of
Law; Municipal Law; Operation of
Law; Ordinary Course of Law; Or-
ganic Law; Penal Laws; Practice
(In Law) ; Practice of Law ; Prescrib-
ed by Law or Ordinance; Presump-
tion of Law; Previously Ascertained
by Law; Provided by Law ; Provisions
of Law; Remedial Law; Retrospective
Law; Returnable According to Law;
Revenue Law; Seisin in Law; Session
Laws; Special Law; Specially Prescrib-
ed by Law; Statute; Stock Law; Sub-
stantive Law; Surrender by Operation
of Law; Trial at Law; Under the
Laws; Uniform Operation of Laws.
As regulation, see Regulation.
Ex post facto law, see Ex Post Facto.
Law of necessity, see Police Power.
Otherwise iHrovided by law, see Other-
wise.
Prohibited by law, or otherwise, see Oth-
erwise.
Remedy at law, see Remedy.
Similar law, see Similar.
See, also, Act (In Legislation).
''Law,** according to an ancient maxim,
"is good sense, and what is contrary to good
sense is not good law." Burke ▼. State, 119
N. Y. Supp. 1089, 1009, 64 MiB& Rep. 668.
"Law'' is a rule of civil conduct prescrib-
ed by the supreme power, says Bladutone.
It can never properly be a law, unless noti-
fied to those who are to obey it- Ingersoll ▼.
Goal Greek Goal Co., 98 a W. 178, 186, 117
Tenn. 268, 9 L. R A. (N. 6.) 282, 119 Am.
St Rep. 1003, 10 Ann. Gas. 829 (citing Green
Bag, Oct 1906).
"Law" might be defined as the aggregate
of those rules and principles of conduct pro-
mulgated by legislative authority or estab-
lished by local custom, and our laws are the
resultant derived from a combination of the
divine or moral laws, the laws of nature
and human experience, as such resultant has
been evolved by human intellect influenced
by the virtues of the ages. State v. Central
Lumber Co., 123 N. W. 604, 608, 24 S. D.
136, 42 K R. A. (N. S.) 804.
"Law" is defined to be a rule of dvil con-
duct prescribed by the supreme power in a
state, commanding what is right and prohib-
iting what is wrong. The laws of a state
are more usually understood to mean the
rules and enactments promulgated by legis-
lative authority or long-established lo^al
customs having the force of law. Henry
V. Cherry & Webb, 73 Ati. 97. 105, 30 R. I.
13, 24 U R. A. (N. &) 991, 136 Am. St Rep.
928, 18 Ann. Gas. 1006.
"Legislative power," within Const art
4, I 1 (Ann. St 1906, p. 176), providing that
the legislative power shall be vested in the
General Assembly, is the power to make laws;
LAW
34
LAW
a "law** Is a rale of dvll condnct prescribed
by the sapreme power of a atate; a "rule" is
distinguished from whim, caprice, compact,
agreement, or discretion, and "prescribed"
means that the rale shall be manifested and
published, so as to be known as a rale of cir-
11 conduct Merchants* Bzchange of St
Loois ▼. Knott, in S. W. 666, 671, 212 BCo.
616.
"Law" is something more than mere will
exerted as an act of power. In the lan-
guage of Mr. Webster in his famous defini-
tion: "It is the general law, the law which
hears before It condemns, which proceeds up-
on inquiry to render Judgment after trial so
that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty,
property and immunities under the protec-
tion of the general rules which gorem soci-
ety." It is not every act of legislation in
form that is law. Jamison v. Wimblsh, 180
Fed. 361, 368 (quoting Hurtado v. People of
California, 4 Sup. Ct 111, 110 U. & 636, 28
L. Ed. 232).
The phrase, "which may by law be
brought before him," used in a statute de-
fining the offense of bribery, and making it
a material element thereof that the offered
bribe shall be on a question which may by
law be brought before the person sought to
be bribed in his official capacity, means a
law in force at the time of the offered bribe.
State V. Butler, 77 Sw W. 660, 672, 178 Mo.
272.
It is not every act, legislative in form,
that is "law." "Law** is something more
than mere will asserted as an act of power.
It must be not a special rule for a particular
person or a particular case, but, in the lan-
guage of Mr. Webster, "the general law, a
law which hears- before it condenms, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders Judg-
ment only after trial, so that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and im-
munities under the protection of the general
rules which govern society," and thus ex-
cluding, as not due process of law, acts of
attainder, bills of pains, and penalties, acts
of confiscation, acts reversing Judgments, and
acts directly transferring one man's estate
to another, legislative Judgments and de-
crees, and other similar special, partial, and
arbitrary exertions of power under the forms
of legislation. Arbitrary power, enforcing
its edicts to the injury of the persons and
property of its subjects, is not law, whether
manifested as the decree of a personal mon-
arch or of an impersonal multitude. In re
McNaught, 99 Pac. 241. 247, 1 Okl. Cr. 628
(qhoting with approval from Hurtado v. Cal-
ifornia, 4 Sup. Ct 111, 110 U. S. 616, 28 L.
Ed. 232).
The rule that equity will not reform a
deed on the ground of mistake where the
mistake is one of law applies only where the
word "law" is used in the sense of general
law, or law of the country, and does not ap-
ply where it is used in the sense of a private
right, for in such case the mistake is really
one of fact Marshall v. Lane, 27 App. D.
a 276,280.
To have the force of "law," a rule must
possess the quality of uniformity and uni-
versality and must operate upon all improve-
ments of the entire political community af-
fected by it alike. "Laws" are not like gar-
ments which citizen and Judge may put on
and off at wllL A law for a section of the
state is not a law of the land, and modifica-
tion of the common law to meet the condi-
tions and wants of individuals in localities
would not constitute modifications to meet
the oonditions and wants of the people.
Nothing less than the welfare of the whole
people can be considered, and the sovereign-
ty of society at large must be behind the
adoption and enforcement of any rule or it
is not law. Clark v. Allaman, 80 Paa 671,
680, 71 Kan. 206, 70 L. R. A. 971 (citing 1
Black. Com. 46).
Regulations prescribed by the Secretary
of Agriculture for the inspection, disposition,
etc., of cattle, sheep, etc, and the carcasses
and meat food products of cattle sheep, etc.,
not inconsistent with Act Cong. June 30,
1906, c. 3913, 34 Stat 674, authorizing such
regulations, had the force of "law." State
V. Peet, 68 Aa 661, 663. 80 Vt 449, 14 L. B.
A. (N. S.) 677, 130 Am. St Rep. 998.
" 'Law' is a statement of the civcum-
stanees, in which the public force will be
brought to bear upon men through the courts.
But the word commonly is confined to such
prophecies or threats when addressed to per-
sons living within the power of the courts.
A threat that depends upon the choice of the
party affected to bring himself within that
power would be called law in the ordinary
sense. We do not speak of blockade running
by neutrals as unlawful. And the usages of
speech correspond to the limit of the at-
tempts of the lawmaker, except in extraordi-
nary cases. It is true that domestic corpora-
tions remain always within the power of the
domestic law." Acts done by domestic cor-
poration outside of the United States, which
largely depend for their efficacy upon the
co-operation, in a 'conspiracy to drive a rival
out of business, of soldiers and officials in
Costa Rica, acting under governmental sanc-
tion, in territory over which that state exer-
cises a de facto sovereignty, cannot be made
the basis of the action to recover threefold
damages authorized by the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat 209, 210,
c. 647) 8 7, on behalf of those injured in their
business by reason of violations of that stat-
ute. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 29 Sup. Ct 611, 612, 213 U. S. 347, 366^
63 L Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Oas. 1047.
Under Const art 6, | 23, making the
county court a tribunal of limited Jurisdic-
tion, and after designating certain matters
of which it shall have cognizance adds and
ULW
»
ULW
court and criminal JulBdlctlan as may
be ooDferied by "law," and aectlon 28 of the
same article, requiring that all laws relating
to courts shall be general and of uniform
operation throughout the state and the or-
ganization, Jurisdiction, powers, proceedings,
and practice of all the courts of the same
class or grade so far as regulated by "law"
shall be uniform. The word "law," as that
word is used in section 23, obviously means
law which Is enacted by the leglslatiTe de-
partment of the state govemment which the
Constitution has created, and "law" found in
section 28 is of the same character. Const
art. 20, provides for the organization of the
dty and county of Denver. By section 4 of
the article the people of the new organization
are vested with the exclusive power to make
their own municipal charter, and under this
constitutional authority a charter was adopt-
ed. Section 182 of the charter provides that
all cases of contested elections shall be tried
by the county court, with certain exceptions.
Const art 6, | 23, makes of the county court
a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, not includ-
ing matters of Section contests. Section 28
provides that all laws relating to courts shall
be of uniform operation throughout the state.
Const art 7, 1 11, provides that the General
Assembly shall pass laws to secure the purity
of the elections. Section 12 that the Gen-
eral Assembly shall by general law designate
the courts by whom the election contests not
therein provided for shall be tried. Held,
that legislation relating to the Jurisdiction
and procedure of the state courts is exclu-
sively within the purview of the General As-
aembly, and that section 182 of the charter is
void. Hence the county courts did not have
Jurisdiction of a proceeding to contest an elec-
tion on the proposition of granting certain
franchises in the city streets. Williams v.
People, 88 Pac. 463, 465, 38 Colo. 497.
Const 1901, I 46, providing that no
*aaw" shall be revived, amended, or the pro-
▼laions thereof extended or conferred, by ref-
erence to its title only, but so much thereof
as is revived, amended, extended, or confer-
red shall be enacted and published at length,
reaches only those cases where the act is
strictly amendatory or revisory in its char-
acter ; and if a law is in itself complete, in-
telligible, and original in form, it does not
fall within the meaning of the Constitution.
Miller ▼. Griffith, 64 South. 660, 661, 171
Ala. 337.
"There is no merit in the contention that
section 222 of the Constitution prohibits the
passage of a single law covering the issuance
of bonds, and that it requires that more than
one law should be passed to authot^ a city
or town to issue the bonds. The authority
to the Legislature, given by this section, is to
pass general laws authorizing counties, cities,
towns, villages, districts, or other political
subdivisions of counties, to issue bonds; and
the plural word laws' was employed mani-
festly tot flie purpose of allowing the Legla-
latore to pass a different act for cities, towns,
and villages, and another act for counties
and political subdivisions of counties. If the
plural had not been used, and the Legislature
had been simply authorized to pass a gen-
eral law, then It would have been compelled
to pass one general law, applying alike to
cities and counties. Blakey v. City Council
of Montgomery, 39 South. 746, 746, 144 Ala.
481. •
As doa&estle laws
The statutes of a state have no extrater-
ritorial force, and are not "law" in another
states in the ordinary sense of the term. Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. of New York y. Prewitt
106 S. W. 463, 465, 127 Ky. 899.
Bylaws ef eorpoxatlom
That a day fixed by the by-laws of a cor-
poration for the regular monthly meeting of
the directors fell on a holiday did not war-
rant a meeting the next day, where the by-
laws made no such provision; Civ. Code, |
11, permitting an act appointed by "law or
contract" to be performed on a particular
day, which fails on a holiday, to be perform-
ed on the next business day, being inappli-
cable. Cheney ▼. Canfield, 111 Pac 02, 93,
168 CaL 842, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 16.
Oonstttutloiis and amendments
The word "law," in Const 1867, art 2,
I 17, declaring that a biU shaU, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the Governor,
etc., does not include a proposed constitu-
tional amendment authorized by article 14,
empowering the General Assembly to propose
constitutional amendments, and a proposed
constitutional amendment adopted by the
General Assembly need not be submitted to
the Governor for his approval. Warfield v.
Vandiver, 60 AtL 638, 640, 101 Md. 78, 4
Ann. Cas. 692.
The term "law," as used in Const art
6, I 31, providing that no law shall extend
the term of any public officer after his elec-
tion, does not refer to the Constitution and
the will of the people expressed at the polls
in the matter of proposed amendments to
tliat instrument, but relates to statutes enact-
ed by the Legislature. State ex rel. Teague
V. Board of Com'rs of Silver Bow County,
87 Paa 450, 461, 34 Mont 426.
The state and federal Constitutions are
•laws," within How. Ann. St c. 164, | 4, giv-
ing mutual benefit associations power to
make regulations for their own government
not contrary to the laws of the United States
or this state. Kern v. Arbeiter Unterstuet-
zungs Yerein, 102 N. W. 746, 760, 139 Mich.
233.
Beeislons
Where a statute or decfsions of the conrts
authorizes a revisal on the ground that the
verdict is contrary to the 'Taw," the 'law"
referred to means the **law" of that case as
liAW
86
liAW
giren by the court, whether right or wrong.
Lynch y. Snead Architectural Iron Works,
U6 8. W. 603, 695, 696, 132 Ky. 241, 21 U
IL A. (N. 8.) 862.
A judicial decision is not a "law." It is
merely evidence of what the law is, and a
change of decision is not the promulgation of
a new law. Hence the constitutional pro-
vision as to laws impairing the obligations
of contracts does not apply to judicial de-
cisions. Swanson t. City of Ottumwa, 106 N.
W. 9, 13, 131 Iowa, 540, 5 L. B. A. (N. S.) S60,
9Ann. Gas. 1117.
MiiaioipAl ordhuatf
Ordinance distinguished, see Ordinance.
"Ordinances** are mere rules or by-laws
of a municipal corporation. Hie word
"law" does not ordinarily include a munici-
pal ordinance. Wright y. City of Macon, 64
8. B. 807, 813, 5 Oa. App. 750.
A city ordinance may be considered a
law of the state, within the constitutional
provision prohibiting the state from passing
laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
Cumberland Telephone ft Telegraph Co. y.
City of Memphis, 198 Fed. 955, 956.
Though an ordinance of a county re-
quiring one engaged in the busineas of rais-
ing cattle to pay a license fee does not de-
nounce failure to obtain the license as a
crime, one so failing is subject to prosecution
by virtue of Pen. Code, i 435, declaring
guilty of a misdemeanor every person who
commences or carries on any business with-
out procuring a license required by "any
law of this state** for the carrying on of the
same ; an ordinance being a law within such
code provision. Ex parte Miller, 110 Pac.
139, 13 Cal. App. 564.
In Ky. St I 3096, as amended and re-
enacted by Acts 1910, c. 107, providing that
when, in any dty of the second class having
a street railway, the railway company is re-
quired by law or its franchise, or by any
contract with the dty, to pave any part of a
street or alley, the cost shall be assessed
against the company, the term "required by
law" applies where the general council pass-
es an ordinance making the requirement and
such a requirement by ordinance is authoriz-
ed by the act City of Newport v. Silva, 137
8. W. 546, 549, 144 Ky. 450.
A munidpal ordinance providing what
officer of a municipality shall sign the certifi-
cate of legality to be indorsed on munidpal
bonds issued under authority of Rev. St 1899,
If 1719-1724, is a provision of "law," with-
in the constitutional requirement that such
certificate shall be indorsed on the bond of
any county, etc, to be signed by the coun-
ty auditor or other officer "authorized by
law.*' Diefenderfer y. State, 83 Pac. 591,
093, 14 Wyo. 302.
The clause "law of this state,** as used
in Pen. Code, t 436, providing that every
person whd oommenoes or cafries on any
business, eta, for the tranaactloii or oarrylng
on of which a lioanse is required, by "any
law of this state," wlttiout taking oat a U-
cense prescribed by such law, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, indudes a "county ordinance.**
Plumas County v. Wheeler, 87 Pac 900, 913,
149 CaL 768 (dting In re Lawrence^ 11 Pac
217, 69 Cal. 60$.
A complaint by a dty ffled in the record-
er's court of the dty whidi alleges that ac-
cused committed the prohibited act within
the police jurisdiction, contrary to law and
in violation of an ordinance of the dty, charg-
es a violation of the ordinance, for the word
"law** may include an ordinance, and accused
must know that lie is prosecuted for a viola-
tion of an ordinance of the dty. Dowling y.
City of Troy, 66 South, 116, 117, 1 Ala. Appi
608.
A complaint by a dty by its attorn^
which alleges that accused did the prohibited
act "contrary to law** fails to charge a vio-
lation of a munidpal ordinance; the phrase
"contrary to law'* having been appropriated
by Code 1907, | 7353, to the definition in in-
dictments of violations of statutes, and the
word "law,*' unless otherwise qualified in a
penal proceeding, presumptively referring to
the common law, in the absence of a statute
giving it another meaning. Rosenberg v.
aty of Selma, 62 South. 742, 743, 168 Ala.
196.
Ovder of eovvt
The term "by law,** as used In Ky. St
1903, I 4129, providing that the sheriff shall
be collector of all taxes unless the payment
thereof is "by law*' directed to be made to
some officer, means a statute and does not
include an order of the fiscal court Com-
monwealth V. Wade*8 Adm'r, 104 8. W. 965,
966, 126 Ky. 791.
Speeial laws
The word ''laws," in a constitutional
provision that all laws not repugnant to the
Constitution shall be continued in force un-
til they expire by limitation, etc, applies to
all special as well as general laws. But-
ler V. City of Lewiston, 83 Pac 234, 236, U
Idaho, 396.
Statutes mnd oommon law
The expressions "required by law," "al-
lowed by law," and "limited by law,*' and the
like, employed in a statute, refer to statutory
law. People v. Knapp, 132 N. Y. Supp. 747,
750, 147 App. Div. 436.
A plea averring that arbitrators were
sworn according to the law is not subject to
the objection that it omits to aver that the
arbitrators were sworn in accordance with
av. Code 1896, | 516, since the term "Uw,** if
unqualified, except in cases involving penal
matters, embraces legislative enactments, as
well as the common law. Tennessee Coal*
LAW
37
LAW OF THS OASB
Iron ft R. Co, ▼. RoasscU, 46 South. 866» 870,
XS5 Ala. 435, 130 Am. St Bep. 66.
The term '*laws»" in Const art 8, Test-
ing the legislatiTe power in the Senate and
House of RepresentatiYes, constituting togeth-
er the General Assembly, and d^larlng
that the style of their "laws" shall he, etc.,
denotes action of the General Assembly in its
legislatiTe capacity, and their style must be
that of enactment, and they are the outcome
of a bill for an act which has been presented
to the GoTemor for his approTal. McGoTem
▼. Mitchell, 68 Aa 433, 441, 78 Conn. 686.
The word "laws," as used in the federal
statute denouncing conspiracies to commit of-
fenses against the laws of the United States,
means statutory laws. United States t.
Thomas, 145 Fed. 74, 70.
It is a general rule of eonstmction that
where an act of the G^ieral Assembly re-
fers to the *1aws" of its own state, the ex-
pression will be held to refer to statute law,
rather than to unwritten law, unless the con-
text requires a different construction; and
especially is this true of acts which are them-
selTes In derogation of the common law.
Southern Bell Telephone A Telegraph Co. ▼.
Beftch, 70 & B. 187, 188, 8 Qa. App. 720 (cit^
Ing 6 Words and Phrases, pp. 4021, 4022).
UBooBstltiitiomal aet
"An unconstitutional act Is not a law.
It confers no rights. It Imposes no duties.
It affords no protection. It creates no of-
fense. It is in legal contemplation as inop-
eratlTe as though it had neTor been passed."
Wright T. DSTis, 48 a B. 170, 172, 120 Ga.
670 (quoting Norton t. Shelby County, 6 Sup.
Ct 1121, 118 U. S. 425, 80 L. Ed. 178).
ULJXr DAT
"Foreclosure" and "law day" are synony-
mous in the sense that it is the time when
the mortgagor declares a default and sub-
mits his case to a court of competent Juris-
diction. The word "foreclosure," as used
with reference to the rule under which a
mortgage is discharged by a tender before
foreclosure, must be talien in the meaning
which is commonly and generally accepted
by the laity, as well as by the bar ; Qiat is,
the institution of a suit or the "law day,"
as contradistinguished from the *1aw day" of
the common law. Murray t. O'Brien, 106
Pac. 840, 844, 66 Wash. 361, 28 L. R. A. (N.
8.) 996.
ImAW MEBOSAirr
See, also, Commercial Law.
There is no presumption that the so-
called "law merchant," taken as a Taguely
defined portion of the common law or in its
widest interpretation of the law of European
countries hsTing the Roman and the Prankish
law for its parents, preTails in other coun-
tries. Aslanian t. Dostumian, 54 N. B. 845,
846^ 174 Mass. 328, 47 L. Ri A. 495, 75 Am. St
Rep. 348 (citing and adopting SaTage ▼•
O'Neil, 44 N. Y. 298, 300, 301 ; Owen t. Boyle,
15 Me. 147, 32 Am. Dec. 143 ; Flato t. Mul-
hall, 72 Mo. 522; 2 Starkie, Et. [4th Am.
Ed.] 568; Whart. Bt. f| 314, 315, 1292;
Smith, Merc. Law [10th Ed.] Introduction).
LAW OF THE 0A8E
The opinion dellTcred on a former ap-
peal is the "law of the case." Hooker t.
LouiSTille ft N. R. Co. (Ky.) 96 S. W. 526,
527.
"The doctrine of law of the case' extends
only to the questions squarely presented and
distinctly passed upon on the former appeaL"
Hunter t. Porter, 77 Pac 484, 439, 10 Idaho,
86.
A decision of the Supreme Court on ap-
peal, is the "law of the case" on a subse-
quent trials whether right or wrong. Neary
T. Northern Paa By. Co., 110 Pac. 226, 235,
41 Mont 480.
A decision of the Supreme Court on ap-
peal Is the "law of the case^' gOTeming the
trial court on a subsequent triaL Berger t.
Metropolitan Press Printing Co., Ill Pac. 872,
61 Wash. 85.
The phrase "law of the case," as applied
to the effect of a decision of an appellate
court in an earlier appeal in the same case,
merely expresses, in the absence of statute,
the practice of courts generally to refuse to
reopen what has been decided, and not a lim-
it to their power. Messinger t. Anderson, 32
Sup. Ct 739, 740, 225 U. S. 436, 56 L. Ed.
1152.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals Is
the "law of the case" on the subsequent trial.
South CoTington & C. St Ry. Co. t. Schilling
(Ky.) 89 S. W. 220. 221.
The "law of the case" is a rule of expedi-
ency, which should not be lightly disregard-
ed ; but it should be restricted to such ques-
tions as hsTo been presented to and decided
on the former appeal, and those necessarily
iuTolTed in such decision, and should not ap-
ply to a mere expression of opinion in regard
to matters not actually iuTolTed in the de-
cision, nor should it apply to questions re-
ferred to by intimation only, and not deter-
mined. First Nat. Bank of Hastings t.
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank of Platte Cen-
ter, 95 N. W: 1062. 1064. 2 Neb. (Unof.) 104.
The decision of certain questions by a
District Court of Appeal, with a Tiew to fur-
ther proceedings in the case, only concurred
in by two of the Justices of such court, does
not constitute '*the law of the case'* for fur-
ther proceedings. Turner t. Fidelity Loan
Concern, 83 Pac. 70, 2 Cal. App. 122.
The cTidcnce on retrial being substantial-
ly the same as on the first trial, the decision
on the questions presented on the former ap-
peal is the "law of the case" on a subsequent
appeal. Teakle t. San Pedro. L. A. & S. L.
LAW OF THE CASE
88
LAW OF THE CASE
R. Co., 102 Pac. 635, 637, 86 Utah, 29 (dtlng
5 Words and Phrases, p. 4024).
A decision on appeal that, upon the facts
in the record, plaintiff cannot recover, be-
comes the "law of the case" on a subsequent
appeal, wherein the record discloses a sub-
stantially unchanged set of fact& Thuis ▼.
City of Vincennes, 73 N. B. 1098, 85 Ind. App.
350.
On the first appeal of a suit concerning
the title to land, the qfiestion involved was:
Did a decree in a former suit to correct a
deed to the land by striking therefrom the
words *'her bodily heirs,'* inserted after the
name of the grantee, finding that the deed
should be so corrected and the master^s deed
made pursuant to that decree, to correct the
former deed, devest the plaintiffs, T. and S.,
bodily heirs of the original grantee, of the
fee-simple title thereof? And it was held
that the decree was inoperative, and that
the master's deed did not devest these plain-
tiffs of the fee-simple title, but that it still
remained in them. On a second appeal the
question presented was: Did the court prop-
erly decree upon the cross-bills filed after
the case was reinstated, on the evid^ice sub-
mitted to it, that the deed should be correct-
ed, and in correcting it and decreeing the fee-
simple title to the land to be in defendants,
the remote grantees of the original grantee?
Held, that the decision of the court on the
first appeal is not conclusive against the
rights of the defendants on the second ap-
peal, since the question presented for deter-
mination is not the same. Teel v. Dunnihoo,
82 N. E. 844, 847, 230 IlL 476, 120 Am. St
Rep. 319.
A decision on a former appeal is the
"law of the case" as to all questions then
decided, so far as the facts remain the same;
the court on a subsequent appeal being enti-
tled to look to the report of the former ap-
peal to determine to what extent the rule
applies. Gipe v. Pittsburgh, 0., C. & St. L.
Ry. Co., 82 N. B. 471, 472, 41 Ind. App. 156.
A holding on appeal that plaintiff's evi-
dence entitled him to have the issues sub-
mitted to the Jury is not conclusive that
plaintiff is entitled to go to the Jury on a
retrial, but that question depends on
the evidence introduced on retrial. Hartley
V. Chicago & A. R. Co., 73 N. E..398, 399, 214
lU. 78.
That principle of the "law of the case,"
when applicable to a subsequent appeal of
the same case, is limited to decisions on a
prior appeal on points necessary to a deter-
mination of the cause. City of RushviUe v.
Rushville Natural Gas Co., 78 N. B. 87, 89,
164 Ind. 162, 3 Ann. Gas. 86.
Where, in an action at law tried to the
court, the facts were in dispute, a submitted
proposition as the *law of the case," which
was a mixed proposition of law and fact,
was properly refused. Illinois Cent R. Co.
V. Seitz, 73 N. E. 585, 586, 214 IlL 350, 106
Am. St Rep. 108.
Where, in an action by a servant for in-
juries, the cause was reversed on appeal on
the ground that plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence, as shown by his testi-
mony that he was not looking, at the time of
the injury, at the piece of machinery which
caused the injury, but on the next trial he
testified that he was looking at it the hold-
ing on the former appeal was not the "law of
the case" on the next appeal/ Buehner
Chair Co. v. Feulner, 78 N. E. 816, 817, 164
Ind. 368.
Where the only question involved or
decided on a former appeal was the suffi-
ciency of an answer setting up the statute
of limitations as a defense, and no question
as to the sufficiency of the complaint was
disclosed, but, after the case ^as remanded,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint which
was not shown to be substantially the same
as the original, the ruling on the former ap-
peal that the answer was insufficient was no
bar to a subsequent objection to the suffi-
ciency of such amended complaint Stafford
V. St John, 73 N. B. 596. 600, 164 Ind. 277.
The decision of the Supreme Court ou
appeal on a will contest as to the insufficien-
cy of the evidence to overthrow the will 1b
the "law of the case^' on those facts. West-
fall V. Wait, 73 N. EL 1089, 1091, 165 Ind. 353,
6 Ann. Caa 78a
The ''law of the case" does not mean the
application of the recognized rules of law to
the proven facts but is a precise application
of the law as laid down by the trial Judge
and if erroneous is ground for reversal,
though given at the request of the complain-
ing party. Weeks v. Auburn & S. Electric
Ry. Co., 113 N. Y. Supp. 636, 637, 60 Misc.
Rep. 400.
Where the instructions of the court
on the second trial of a cause conform to
the opinion on appeal from the Judgment
on the first trial, it is not error to refuse
requested instructions. Where, on the fire^
trial of a cause, a peremptory instruction
was not given or requested, and that question
was not presented on appeal, the propriety
of giving a peremptory instruction on the
second trial must be determined by the evi-
dence, without reference to the opinion of
the appellate court. Miller v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. (Ky.) 89 S. W. 183, 184.
The rule of the "law of the case" has
no application to. questions of fact, so that
nothing said on a former appeal as to the
facts can bind the trial court or be conclusive
on a second ap];>eal. Where, in an action on
a policy, the Supreme Court reversed a Judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff, and remanded the
cause for new trial, holding that the policy
was void for breach of a condition, and that
LAW OV THB CASK
39
I4AWS OP THE OOUNTUT
tbe facts proved did not establish a waiver
thereof, such Jadgnient was not res Judicata
of the issue of waiver on the retrial at
which the evidence was materially different
Hartford Fire Ina Ck>. v. Bnoch, 96 S. W.
393, 394, 79 Ark. 475.
The decision of the appellate court will
be followed on a subseQuent appeal, where
the record therein supports the conclusion
reached on the prior appeal. Malone's Ck>m-
mittee v. Lebus (Ky.) 96 8. W. 519, 521.
Under Acts 1903, p. 55, c. 39, making it
the duty of the court to charge the law of
the case, "the law of the case" means the
substantial issues of the case. Gibson &
Cunningham v. Purifoy, 120 S. W. 1047, 56
Ter. Civ. App. 879.
''According to the more rigid rule, an
expression of opinion, however deliberate up-
on a question, however fully argued, if not
essential to the disposition that was made of
the case, may be regarded as a dictum ; but
it is, on the other hand, said that it is diffl-
colt to see why, in a philosophical point of
▼lew, the opinion of the court is not as per-
suasive on all the points which were so in*
volved in the cause that it was the duty of
counsel to argue them, and which were de-
liberately passed over by the court, as if
the decision had hung upon but one point"
Bouvier. Where, in an action on a contrac-
tor's bond for the construction of a high
school, the constitutionality of the Code pro-
vision providing for such bonds, and the
validity of the bond in question given there-
xuider, were directly presented and decided
by the court, to the effect that the bond was
enforceable as a common-law bond voluntari-
ly given, regardless of the validity of the
statute, such decision was not obiter, but con-
stituted the "law of the case'* and was con-
clusive on the parties on a subsequent ap-
peaL People's Lumber Co. v. Gillard, 90
Paa 556. 557, 5 Cal. App. 435.
The doctrine of the "law of the case"
presupposes error in the enunciation of a
principle of law applicable to the fact^ of a
case under review by an appellate tribunal,
but the ruling adhered to in the single case
where it arises is not carried iuto other
cases as a precedent. Allen v. Bryant, 100
Pac. 704, 705, 155 Cal 256.
"The doctrine of the 'law of the case* is
this : That where the Supreme Court, in de-
ciding an appeal, states in its opinion a prin-
ciple of law or rule necessary to the ded-
elon, that principle or rule becomes the 'law
of the case,' and must be adhered to through-
out its subsequent progress, both in the
lower opurt and upon subsequent appeal,
* * * and this, although in its subse-
qu^it consideration this court may be clear-
ly of the opinion that the former decision
is erroneous in that particular." Wester-
feld V. New York U Ins. Co., 107 Pac 699,
700, 157 Cal. 839 (quoting Tally v. Oanahl, 90
Pac. 1049, 1050, 151 Cal. 418, 421).
The rule of the *1aw of the case" is ap-
plicable only where the same matters de*
t^rmined in a previous appeal are Involved
in a subsequent appeal, and a Judgment on
appeal sustaining a demurrer to a complaint
is not conclusive on a sul^^uent appeal,
where the facts alleged are different and
present different questions of law. Flood v.
Templeton, 92 Pac. 78, 63^ 152 CaL 148, 13
U B. A. (N. S.) 579.
ULW OF OOHTRAOT
"The *law of contract* may be described
as the endeavor of the state, a more or less
imperfect one, by the nature of the case, to
establish a positive sanction for the expec-
tation of good faith which has grown up in
the mutual dealings of men of average right-
mindedness.** Viles V. Barre & M. Traction
& Power Co., 66 AtL 104, 105, 79 Vt 811
(quoting and adopting Williston's Wald's Pol.
Cont 1).
I<AW8 OF THE OOUVTBT
See Ck>nformably with the Laws.
The treaty between the United States
and the Argentine Republic of July 27, 1853
(article 9, 10 Stat 1009), provides that if any
citizen of either of the two contracting par-
ties shall die without will in any of the ter-
ritories of the other, the Consul General or
consul of the nation to which decedent be-
longed, or the representative of such Consul
Cfeneral or consul, may intervene in the pos-
session, administration, and judicial liquida-
tion of decedent's estate, conformably with
the laws of the country, for the benefit of the
creditors and legal heirs. Held, that the
phrase "laws of the country," so far as
the United States is concerned, means the
local laws of administration and procedure
of the respective states, and qualifies the
right and the method of intervention, as well
as the procedure after intervention takes
place, so that if a consul intervenes he
must do so in the manner, to the extent, and
for the purpose prescribed by the laws of the
jurisdiction where the property is situated,
and the Italian Consul General, under the
treaty of May 8, 1878, between Italy and
the United States (article 17, 20 Stat 732),
providing that the respective Consuls Gen-
eral, eta, shall enjoy in both countries all
the rights which are or may hereafter be
granted to the officers of the same grade of
the most favored nation, would not have
the right to be appointed administrator of
the estate of a subject of Italy resident in
California, leaving property there with his
heirs resident in Italy, in view of the Cali-
fornia law providing that the public admin-
istrator of the county shall officiate in such
a case. In re Ghio's EsUte, 108 Pac 516,
518, 157 CaL 552, 37 U B. A. (N. S.) 549, 137
Am. St Bep. 146,
LArW OF HIB RKSIDENOfi
40 LAW OF TfiB UNITED STATES
I.AW OF HIS BBSll>Elf€B
Code Civ. Proc. i 390, proTldes that,
where a cause of action not inroMng real
United States is entltied to priority, insol-
vency laws are "laws of the states," altfaongh
their operation is suspended by the bank-
estate within the state accrues against a non- ruptcy act In re Bennett, 153 Fed. 673, 687,
resident, an action cannot be brought there- ! 82 C. C. A. 631 (citing In re Wright, 06 Fed.
on in the state after the expiration of the
time limited by the "law of his residence^'
for bringing a like action. Held, that the
phrase "law of tils residence" means the law
of the debtor's residence at the time the
cause of action accrued, and not the time
when the action was commenced. Utah Nat the priorities must be determined by the laws
807).
The phrase "laws of the states," as used
in Bankr. Act July 1, 1808, providing for the
payment of debts owing to any person who,
by the "laws of the states," or the United
States, is entitled to priority, means that
Bank v. Jones, 06 N. Y. Supp. 338^ 330, 100
App. Div. 526.
LAW OF THE LAND
See Due Process of Law.
LAW OF HE0ES8ITT
The "law of necessity," as applied to the
of the particular state where the proceeding
is pending, and not by the laws of all the
states together. In re P. J. Potter's Sons,
143 Fed. 407, 411.
A county ordinance regulating sheep
grazing, and imposing a license tax thereon
/is a law of this state" within Pen. Code, |
power to punish for contempt. Is the law of 4^» providing that every person commencing
self-defense. People ex reL Attorney Gen- ^^ carrying on any business for wlilch a U^
eral v. News-Times Pub. Co., 84 Pac. 012, ■ ce^^se ^ required by any "law of this state,"
067, 35 Colo. 253 (adopting definition in ! without taking out or procuring the license
Thomas, Constructive Contempt). prescribed, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Plu-
LAW OF THE BOAD
The custom of the road, and the law
founded on it, to go to the right of the cen-
ter of the road in order to safely pass
mas County v. Wheeler. 87 Pac. 000, 018, 140
Cal. 768; Sierra County v. Flanigan, 87 Pae
013, 140 CaL 760 (citing In re Lawrence^ U
Paa 217, 60 CaL 608).
Municipal ordinances are "laws of the
governs the case of vehicles passing on the state," within the provisions of Pen. Code,
same side of the roads and streets so wide fi 435, making it a misdemeanor for a per-
that there is no necessity for them to turn ^ son to carry on any calling for the transac-
tion of which a license is required by any
law of the state, without taking out or pro-
curing the prescribed license. Bx parte
Sweetman, 00 Pac. 1060, 1070, 5 Cal. App.
677 ; Ex parte Bagshaw, 03 Pac 864, 865, 152
CaL 701.
to the right of the center line in order to
pass safely. Wright v. Fleischman* 86 N.
Y. Supp. 62, 41 Blisc. Rep. 533.
LAW OF THE STATE
The "laws of a state" are sudi enact-
ments as its Legislature promulgates, and
as expounded by its courts, and a state stat-
ute has such meaning as the judicial depart-
ment of the state construes it to have, though
without such judicial construction the fed-
eral courts might from its language construe
it differently. Commonwealth v. Interna-
LAW STXTDEKT
See Student
LAW OF THE UlflTEB STATES
Congressional enactments having gener-
al application throughout the United States,
^.1>"''^^^*''7®^i?'' «; ''^n^'^''^^'^ ^i^ \ll' and not the purely local laws of the District
703, 706, 131 Ky. 551, 133 Am. St Rep. 256; ! ^f (Columbia, are what are meant by the
American Tobacco Ck). v. Commonwealth
(Ky.) 115 S. W. 755, 756.
A provision in a note that the same shall !
be construed by the "laws of the state" of
Kansas means the statute of the state with '
provision of the Federal Judicial Code, |
250, for the appellate review in the Federal
Supreme CJourt of judgments and decrees of
the court of appeals of the District in cases
in which the construction of "any law of
reference to negotiable instrument and the the United States'* is drawn in question by
rights and liabilities of the parties thereto,
and does not comprehend the decisions of
local courts construing like contracts that
had been or might thereafter be announced,
nor can it be expended so as to make the de-
cisions of the local courts the governing law
with respect to the construction of the pro-
visions of the mortgage given to secure such
note. Eeene Five Cent Sav. Bank v. Reid,
123 Fed. 221, 227, 50 C. C. A. 225.
Within the provision of Bankr. Act, i
64b(5), giving priority to debts owing to any j gard of such regulations*
person who by the laws of the state or the ' 160 Fed. 154, 162.
the defendant American Security & Trust
Co. V. Commissioners of District of Colum-
bia, 32 Sup. Ct 553, 554, 224 U. & 401, 56
L. Ed. 856.
The phrase, "laws of the United States,"
as used in the removal acts, authorising re-
moval of a cause arising under the laws of
the United States, means acts of (Congress,
and does not include executive rules and reg-
ulations, unless a recovery of damages is
expressly authorized by statute for a disre-
Beck y. Johnson,
LAW OF THE UNITKP STATES il
LAWFUL BUSINESS
The laws enacted by a territorial Legla-
Uiture, subject to dlsapproyal by Congress*
are not ''laws of tbe United States,*' and a
snlt arising onder them, as where a corpora-
tion organized under them is a party to th^
suit, does not arise under the laws of the
United States, and a federal court has no
jurisdiction on that grouzid. Maxwell v.
Federal Gk>ld ft Ck>pper Ck>., 155 Fed. 110, 112,
83 C. C. A. 570.
X.AW8, BUItES, AWP BSOtrUkTIOHS
GOVEBNINO THE 8O0IETT
A certificate in a mutual benefit associa-
tion, requiring that members should comply
with all "laws, rules, and regulations govern-
ing the society/' or that might be thereafter
enacted for its government, related to by-
laws enacted to control the internal manage-
ment of the association, and did not include
a by-law by which the society attempted to
limit its liability on aU outstanding certif-
icates to an amount not exceeding one-half of
the amomit the association had contracted
to pay on the death of members in good
standing. Bomstein v. District Qrand Lodge
No. 4 Independent Order B'nal B'rith, 84
Pac. 271-276, 2 OaL App. 624.
I.AW7UI.
See Shall be LawfnL
See, also, Legal.
Where plaintiffs alleged that, being the
owners of certain capital stock in defendant
company, they deposited it with the com-
pany, to be sold by defendant and the pro-
ceeds used in paying its debts, in considera-
tion of an agreement that plaintiffs should
hold certain offices of defendant until its
business should be in successful operation,
that defendant violated its agreement and
ejected plaintiffs from tbe offices, and had
sold and issued the stock to others, and
refused and failed to deliver it to plaintiffs,
or to pay plaintiffs the value thereof, though
requested to do so, there could be no recov*
ery as on a contract, as the alleged contract
was illegal under Civ. Code, | 431, requiring
directors of a corporation to be elected an-
nually by the stockholders or members, and
section 2240, declaring that which is con-
trary to an express provision of the law
not "lawful." Glass v. Basin & Bay State
Mln. Co., 77 Pac 302, 804, 31 Mont 21.
Itesal, adequate, aad reasoaalile syn-
1015, 1019, 177 Mo. ee9 (quoting wltH ap^
proval from State v. Bulling, 15 S. W. 867,
16 S, W. 830, 106 Mo. 204).
In speaking of the provocation neces-
sary to arouse the heat of passion, which
would result in reducing the crime to man-
slaughter, "this court has held that iawful,'
legal/ 'adequate,' and 'reasonable,' when
used as adjectives qualifying 'provocation,'
are synonyms ; and, as a general rule, with
very few exceptions, it takes an assault or
personal violence to constitute this provoca-
tion." State V. He^th, 121 S. W. 149, 154,
221 Mo. 565; State v. McKenzie, 76 S. W.
UkWFin. ACT
The words "lawful act," as used in Pen.
Code 1895, i 684, providing that if any per-
son in the performance of a lawful act shall
by negligence and carelessness causie the
death of another he is guilty of negligent
homicide of the first degree, is defined by
article 685 as an act not forbidden by the
penal law, and which would give no just
occasion for a dvil action. Gorden v. State
(Tex.) 90 S. W. 636. 637.
LAWFUL AXTTHOBITT
See Proper and Lawful Authority.
Plaintiff's superintendent visited the
land on which defendants were claimed to
have committed a trespass in cutting timber,
and on each of the visits stopped at defend-
ants' camp. On his first visit the superin-
tendent pointed out the section or lot lines
to the foreman of defendant company and
requested him to keep an accurate account
of all timber he might cut A like request
was made of defendant S., who was presi-
dent and general manager of defendant com-
pany. Held, sufficient to show that plaintiff
acquiesced in the cutting and removing of the
timber, subject to defendants' accounting for
its actual value, and that it was not cut
without "lawful authority," within Rem. &
Bal. Code, § 939, authorizing a recovery of
treble damages for the cutting of timben
without lawful authority, etc. Lytie Log-
ging & Mercantile Co. v. Humptullps Driving
Co., Ill Pac. 774, 775, 60 Wash. 559.
LAWFUL BEHETIOIABT
The word "lawful," as used in a benefit
certificate, providing that the beneficial as-
sociation would pay to the beneficiary a cer-
tain sum of money, provided he was the
"lawful" beneficiary of the member at the
time of his death, means, according to the
laws of the beneficial association, that plain-
tiff should be at the time of the member*s
death within the order of family relation-
ship to the beneficiary mentioned in the char-
ter. Davln V. Davin, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1012,
1014, 114 App. Div. 896.
LAWFUL BUSINESS
In Business Corporations Law, | 2, au-
thorizing the formation of stock corporations
for any lawful business, "lawful business"
means one lawful to all who engage in it and
does not include the business of practicing
law; the right to practice law being in the
nature of a franchise from the state confto-
red only for merit. In re Co-operative Law
Co., 92 N. B. 15, 16, 198 N. Y. 479, 32 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 55, 139 Am. St. Bep. 839, 19 Ann. Cas.
879.
liAWFUL CHASTISEMENT
42
LAWFUL DCFEKSB
IJLWFUXi OHASTISEMEIIT
Wh^e the paniahment inflicted by a pax^
ent on a child Is so ezcesslye and cruel as
to show that the parent was not acting In
good teith for the benefit of the child, the
parent Is guilty of an onlawfol assault, and
cannot justly his act by claiming that the
punishment inflicted was a 'lawful chastise-
ment" ; but so long as a parent acts in good
faith, honestly thinking that what he does is
for the benefit of the child, he is within his
prerogatlye, and the law will not Interfere.
State y. Koonse, 101 S. W. 189, 141, 123 Mo.
App. 666.
LAWFUL CHILD
Where a will provided that the property
given to one of the devisees diould, if he
died without lawful children, go to the heirs
of another devisee, an adopted child of the
devisee first mentioned was not a 'lawful
child,** within the meaning of the wllL Coch-
ran V. Cochran, 96 S. W. 781, 782, 48 Tez.
ay. App. 269.
LAWFUL CLAIM
A good faith dlaim, appearing to be for-
midable and founded on grounds haying the
appearance, though false, of a paramotmt
title^ is not covered by a warranty against
lawful claims, but such a warranty is in-
tended to cover real claims and not claims
only appearing real. An outstanding legal
title is within a covenant of warranty against
"lawful claims," and If asserted, is a "law-
ful claim,'* though an eviction may be avoid-
ed by showing a superior equity. Mackenzie
v. Clement, 129 S. W. 780, 731, 144 Mo. App.
114.
LAWFUL OOUBSE
A bond recited that plaintiff lumber and
oil company had a claim on certain timber
in litigation which had been attached in a
certain suit against the S. Lumber Company,
and provided that in consideration of the re-
lease of the attachments, and that plaintiff
would not litigate its rights in 8U<di suit, the
obligors bound themselves to pay any inter-
est which plaintiff might have in the timber
to be determined by any lawful course.
Held, that a lawful course for determining
plaintiff's interest was by suit on the bond;
plaintiff not being required to establish first
its Interest in the timber by suit against the
S. Lumber Company. Camp v. Capital Min-
ing, Lumber A Oil Co. (Ky.) 128 S. W. 323,
324.
LAWFUL GURREHOT
See Lawful Money.
An indictment charging theft from the
person of *'two dollars in money, lawful cur-
rency of the United States of America and
of the value of two dollars," was sustained
by proof of the theft of two dollars in silver ;
the term "currency," or "lawful currency,"
being suflUdently broad to Include gold and
silver, as well as paper money. Brlttatn v.
State, 106 8. W. 817, 819, 820, 62 Tex. Cr. B.
109.
Under a statute providing that in an in-
dictment for the larceny of money It is suf-
ficient to allege the larceny of the same^ with-
out specifying the denomination or kind there-
of, an indictment, charging accused with steal-
ing money "lawful currency of the realm"
(X. e., of the United States), to the amount
and value of $20 or more, sufficiently de-
scribes the money, to constitute larceny,
within Ey. St 1903, i 1194, punishing lar-
ceny of money of the value of $20 or more.
Todd V. Com. (Ky.) 93 S. W. 631, 632 (citing
Commonwealth v. Mann [Ky.] 14 S. W. 686;
Jones V. Commonwealth, 13 Bush [76 Ky.)
356; Travis v. Conmionwealth, 27 S. W. 863,
96 Ky. 77).
Where a theft is charged, and the alle-
gation is general that the money taken was
lawful current money of the United States,
the evidence must show that it was legal
tender coin or legal tender currency of the
United States, and the nickel is legal tender
under the provisions of U. S. CSomp. St 1901,
p. 2349. Blade v. State, 79 S. W. 811, 46
Ter. Or. B. 107.
LAWFUL DEBT
"A *debt' is defined as 'that whidi is due
from one person to another, whether money,
goods, or services; that which one person
is bound to pay to or to perform for anothtf ,
that which one is obliged to do, or suffer.' "
Plaintiff's husband gave his bond for the pay-
ment of money, securM by a mortgage on
his farm, in which plaintiff Joined. The
husband died, devising, the farm to plaintiff,
who deeded it to her son, who assumed and
agreed to pay the mortgage, but failed to
do so. On the death of the son, without is-
sue, his widow, having a dower in trust in
the farm, executed a quitclaim deed of it to
plaintiff and the other heirs, subject to de-
cedent's "lawful debts," which plaintiff as-
sumed and agreed to pay. Held that, since
plaintiff did not sign the bond and was not
personally liable for the mortgage debt, the
covenant of her son to pay it was not en-
forceable against him, and hence the cove-'
nant in the deed from his widow to plaintiff
did not obligate plaintiff to pay the debt; a
claim not enforceable at law not being a
"lawful debt" Bonhoff v. Wiehorst, 108 N.
Y. Supp. 437, 441, 57 Misc. Rep. 456 (quoting
and adopting definition in Imp. Diet. ; citing
Latimer v. Veader, 46 N. Y, Supp. 823, 20
App. Dlv. 426).
LAWFUL DEFEH8E
By the words "lawful defense of the per-
son" is meant what is sometimes termed
self-defense. Robinson y. Territory, 85 Pac.
451, 456, 16 OkL 241.
LAWFUL DUTY
48
LAWFUL F£NCS
ZkAWfuii duty
In.Bev. St. | 6461, urtiidi makes it a
criminal offense to give or offer bribes, etc.,
to Induce any officer of, or person acting lor
9r on behalf of, the United States in any offi-
cial function to do or omit to do any act in
violation of his lawful duty, the phrase *'law-
ful duty** is not restricted to a duty imposed
by statute, but is broad enough to cover a
duty imposed by a lawful superior; and an
indictment charging a conspiracy to induce
an assistant statistician in the Department
of Agriculture to furnish to the accused ad-
vance news of crop conditions, and to cause
to be published false reports as to such con-
ditions in violation of the rules of the depart-
ment, to aid defendants in market specula-
tions, by promising such employ^ a percent-
age of the profits of such speculations, charg-
es a conspiracy to commit an offense against
the United States under Rev. St § 5440.
United States v. Haas, 1^ Fed. 908, 910.
Regulations of the Agricultural Depart-
ment having forbidden the giving out of any
statement relating to the business of the de-
partment without the approval of the chief
of the bureau, and secrecy having been im-
posed on all employ^ by the established us-
age and practice, Indictments charging bri-
bery of an associate statistician of the Bureau
of Statistics of the Department of Agricul-
taie to divulge the contents of the current
cotton crop report In advance of its official
publication stated an offense under Bev. St
I 5461, making it a crime to bribe any per-
son acting for the United States in any offi-
cial function to do or commit any act in vio-
lation of his lawful duty. Haas v. Henkel,
166 Fed. 621, 627.
LAWFUL EKTBT
The expression that the "entry must be
lawful*' means, not that It must have been
effected under a formal right capable of en-
forcement by legal proceedings, but that it
must not be through any unlawful or wrong-
ful act, upon which the mortgagee would be
estopped to found a right Stouffer v. Har-
lan, 74 Pac. 610, 613, 68 Kan. 185, 64 L. B.
A. 320, 104 Am. St Bep. 396.
LAWFUL EXOU8E
That provision for alimony made by a
Nevada court is not enforceable against the
husband, a resident of California, because no
jurisdiction of his person was acquired, does
not constitute a lawful excuse within Pen.
Code, i 270, which makes It an offense for
a parent to willfully omit without lawful ex-
cuse to furnish necessary food, etc., for his
cfaUd. Ex parte McMuUin, 126 Paa 368, 370,
19 Cal. App. 48L
LAW BXPEirSBS
Other lawful expenses, see Other.
LAWFUL FENCE
See, also» liSgal and Sufficient Fences
A fence, posts oi Thl<di are rotted off. Is
not a lawful fence within Rev St 1899, i
8295, providing that in a county where swine
are restrained from running at large a fence
composed of three barbed wires, stretched
on posts, firmly set in the ground, not more
than 16 feet apart shall be a lawful fence.
Smith V. Chicago A A. Ry. Co., 105 S. W. 10,
12, 127 Mo. App. 160.
Under Sev. St 1899, i 1105, requiring
a railroad company to construct and main-
tain fences sufficient to prevent stock getting
on the track, an instruction, in an action
under such section for injuries to stoc^
which defined a lawful fence as one sufficient
''to resist hoirses, cattle* swine, and like
stock,'* was not erroneous for using the
phrase 'to resist" ; such phrase not being as
strong as the phrase "to prevent*' in the
statute. Hax v. Qulncy, O. A K. C. R. Co.,
100 8. W. 696, 60S, 128 Mo. App. 172.
Rev. St 1899, § 3295, providing for the
construction of fences sufficient to prevent
swine from running at large, composed of
wire 4 feet high and posts 16 feet apart, re-
ferred to outside fences other than those re-
quired of railroads, so that a fence conform-
ing to such specifications, constructed by an
adjoining landowner along a railroad right
of way, did not constitute a "lawful fence,**
for the building of which the landowner
could recover from the railroad under Rev,
St 1899, § 1105 (Ann. St 1906, p. 945). Sharp
V. Qulncy, O. A K. C. Ry. Co., 123 S. W.
507, 508, 139 Mo. App. 525.
The petition in an action for damages to
growing crops from trespassing stock alleged
that the premises were situated in a subdiyl-
sion where hogs, etc., were prohibited from
running at large, and were inclosed by a law-
ful fence under the statute when the tres-
passes occurred, and described the stock law
district by metes and bounds, and further al-
leged that in the event that plaintifTs fence
was not in strict compliance with the statute,
nevertheless it was sufficient to keep out all
stock sought to be excluded of an ordinary
disposition, and not of a fence-breaking na-
ture. Held, that the petition alleged a com-
mon-law liability based on the stock owner's
negligence in knowingly permitting vicious
animals to run at large, as well as the statu-
tory liability based upon plaintiff's main-
tenance of a 'lawful fence," within the stat-
ute. Posey V. Coleman (Tex.) 133 S. W. 937,
939.
Sayles' Ann. Olv. St 1897, art 2496, re-
quires every farmer, etc., to make a sufficient
fence at least five feet hi^ which shall be
hog-tight, around his cleared land. Article
2497 permits one injured by the trespass of
cattle or other stock to complain to a Justice
of the peace, who shall appoint two free-
holders to ascertain the sufficiency of the
Lawful fencb
44
LAWFUL HSIR8
taioe and the damages, and, If It appears that
the fence was sufficient, the owner of the
stock shall he liable for the damages. Article
2498 author!^ the impounding of trespass-
ing stock for a second offense when the owner
of the premises deems it necessary for his
protection. Article 2499 exempts the stock
owner from liability if the fence be insuf-
ficient Sayletf Ann. CLy. St 1897, art 4998,
as amended by Acts 1901, c. 123, provides
that any fence in a locality which has stat-
utory restrictions upon the running at large
of stock which is sufficient to ieep out or-
dinary stock permitted to run at large under
the chapter shall be deemed a lawful fence,
and requires all such fences to be four feet
high. Held, that the statutes were enacted to
give lanaowners complying with their re-
quirements as to fences a special remedy for
damages by trespassing stock, irrespective
of negligence. Posey v. Coleman (Tex.) 133
S. W. 937, 939.
Under Code Civ. Proc c 44, providing
that a corral fence exclusively for the pur-
pose of inclosing stacks, if outside of any
lawful inclosure, shall be sufficient and law-
ful if it is not less than 15 feet distant from
the stacks, is substantially built with posts
not more thau 8 feet distant from each other
and with not less than 5 strands of barbed
fence wire and not less than 5 feet high, and
that any other kind of fence which is as
effective for the purpose of a fence as that
above prescribed is lawful and sufficient, a
fence the posts of which were 17 or 18 feet
apart, which approached the stacks in places
within 6 feet, consisted of but 4 strands of
barbed wire, and was only 46 inches high,
was not a 'iawful fence/* Johnson v. Rick-
ford, 122 N. W. 386, 389, 18 N. D. 268.
Rev. St 1899, i 1973, defining a lawful
fence, and providing that unless the fence
comes up to the requirements any person
may have a right of action for damages re-
sulting from injuries to his live stock from
such illegal fence, refers to what is termed a
"lawful inclosure," and does not create a
liability on the railroad company for the kill-
ing of live stock in collision with a train,
where such stock strayed onto the right of
way because of a defect in the railroad's
right of way fence. Martin v. Chicago, B.
& Q. Ry. Co., 89 Pac. 1025, 15 Wyo. 493.
LAWFUL HEIRS
See Personal and Lawful H^r.
Devise to lawful heirs as devise to class,
. see Class.
The word "lawful" before the word
"heir" in a devise does not, in the absence of
a contrary intent clearly indicated in the
will,, mean "legitimate," but means simply
the pofrson designated by law to take by de-
scent Harrell v. Hagan, 69 8. E. 909-911,
147 N. C. Ill, 126 Am. St Rep. 539.
"Children" are embraced within the term
"lawful heirs," but the word is not per se
descriptive of the whole line of lawful heirs.
ReiUy y. Bristow, 66 Aa 262, 264, 105 Md.
326.
The word "lawful," qualifying the word
"heirs," is not sufficient per se to show an
intention not to use the word "heirs" in its
ordinary legal sense as a word of inheritance
or of limitation. Wool v. Fleetwood, 48
S. n. 786, 789. 136 N. O. 460, 67 L. B. A. 444.
The words "lawful heirs," as used in a
will whereby the testator bequeathed his
residuary estate to his lawful heirs, without
other or further designation as to who are in-
tended as his beneficiaries, and directed that
the same should be equally divided among
his lawful heirs, share and share alike, de-
scribed all the persons who, at the time of
the death of the testator, answered the de-
scription of lawful heirs and were entitled
to share in the residuary estate, regardless
of the degree of their relationship to the tes-
tator, and resort must be had to the statute
in order to determine who were the legal
h^s of the testator. Mooney v. Purpos, 70
N. B. 894, 896, 70 Ohio St 57.
In construing a will using the words
"legal heirs" and "lawful heirs," the words
"legal" and "lawful" do not modify or change
the legal effect of the word "heirs." Btlsser
V. Stlsser, 85 N. £. 240, 242, 235 IlL 207.
In oommon parlance, the terms "heirs at
law" and **lawful heirs" are used indiscrim-
inately as synonymous and convertible terms,
and, whenever either is used, they invariably
refer to the heirs on whom descent is cast by
law, and not to an heir by adoption. The
relation of an heir by adoption is an excep-
tional and unusual one, and does not come
within the ordinary and usual meaning of the
words "lawful heirs," and those words ought
not to be held ex vi termini to include an
adopted heir. Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S. W.
585, 589, 200 Mo. 456, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117,
118 Am. St Rep. 672, 9 Ann. Cas. 775 (citing
Reinders v. Koppelman, 7 S. W. 288, 94 Mo.
338).
A devise to the testator's 'lawful heirs"
should be construed as referring to those who
are such at the testator's death, unless a dif-
ferent intent is plainly manifested by the
will. Hill V. Hill, 132 N. W. 738, 789, 90
Neb. 43, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 19a
A devise of land to testator's children,
subject to the provision that the share of
any child dying without issue of his body
shall descend to the survivors of the chil-
dren, or the lawful h^rs surviving any of
the children, gives to the diildren an estate
in fee, defeasible as to each on his dying
without leaving lawful issue, and on the
death of a child, without issue surviving, his
interest passes to the surviving children or
grandchildren surviving any of the children ;
the words "lawful heirs" meaning surviving
children and grandchildren of the devisees,
tiAWFUIi HEIBS
45
IiAWFUIi ISSUE
who take and hold as purchasers directly
from testator. Smith v. EUlngton-Gnj Tim-
ber Ck>., 71 S. B. 445, 446. 156 N. G. 889.
Under a will giving all the testator^s
land to his son for life with remainder to
his "lawful heirs bom of his wife," the son
did not take a fee under the rule In Shel-
ley's Case so as to glre his widow a dower
therein. The words "bom of his wife," qual-
ifying and explaining his "lawful heirs,"
confining the remainder to the children of his
wife, and preventing the operation of the
rule. The superadded words show that the
devisor Intended to make the words 'law-
ful heirs" deslgnatlo personarum; that Is,
they show an intention on his part to limit
the remainder over to a particular class of
heirs. Thompson v. Crump, 50 S. B. 457, 188
N. C. 82, 107 Am. St Rep. 514.
Testatrix adopted defendant In 1880, but,
aside from recording of the deed, no public
recognition of the relationship appears, testa-
trix having assumed no authority over de*
fendant who continued to reside with her
natural parents and other relatives until her
marriage. In 1905 testatrix made a will giv-
ing defendant, who was designated '*my
young friend," |100. After various other
dispositions, the will provided that the resi-
due of the estate should go to testatrix's
"lawful heirs," excepting specified nephews.
Held, that defendant Is not entitled to share
under the residuary clause. Warden v.
Overman, 185 N. W. 649, 652, 156 Iowa, 1.
Where a testator deVlses a parcel of real
estate to his son for life with remainder to
his lawful helr% and the son marries after
the death of the testator, held, that upon the
death of the son, the wife takes as heir,
where there is nothing In the will tending to
show that the testator used the words "law-
ful heirs" In a different sense from their
strict technical Import. Miller v. Miller, 29
Ohio Cir. Ot R. 451, 454.
In a devise to the testator's grandson of
a tract of land, and^lf he should die without
"lawful heirs of his body" then to the tes-
tator's granddaughter, does not limit the es-
tate of the grandson to a life estate where
he had heirs of his body, but merely creates
a conditional estate in the granddaughter
by way of executory devise or shifting use.
Sessoms v. Sessoms, 66 S. E. 687, 688, 144
N. C. 121 (dtlng Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. a
284; Morrlsett v. Stevens, 48 S. B. 661, 186
N. C. 160; Jones v. Ragsdale, 53 S. E. 842,
141 N. C. 200; Whitfield v. Garrls, 42 S. B.
568, 181 N. C. 148, reafilrmed in 45 S. E. 904,
184 N. C. 24; criticising Bird v. GUllam, 28
S. B. 489, 121 N. C. 328; X>aws6n V. Quiu-
nerly, 24 S. E. 483, 118 N. C. 188; Thompson
T. Crump, 50 S. B. 457, 188 N. 0. 32, 107
Am. St. B^. 51^.
A grantor executed a deed to his son,
granting the property to him during his natu-
ral life, and at his death, then to his lawfully
constituted heirs. Held, that the term "law-
fully constituted helis" was merely a tauto-
logical way of referring to his lawful h^rs
at his death; and that the grantee took a
llfto estate, with remainder to those who
should comprise the class known as the gran-
tee's heirs at his death. Bradley v. Uoif,
147 8. W. 1012, 1014, 248 Mo. 95.
A testator gave his wife, for life, all of
his estate, and provided that after her death
It should go to his eldest daughter for life.
He then declared that after the daughter's
death such portion of his estate as might
remain should be equally divided between
his lawful heirs. Held, that the testator
meant by the term "lawful heirs" those per-
sons who at his death were entitled to In-
herit his Intestate real estate. In re Cow-
ley's WIU, 97 N. W. 930, 931, 120 Wis. 263.
IlAWFUXi usite
See Die Without Lawful Issue Surviv-
ing.
The term "lawful Issue" Is not a techni-
cal term, and when used In a deed does not
necessarily bring the deed under the rale In
Shelley's Case, like the word "heirs," which
Is always a technical word, necessarily bring-
ing the deed under the rule regardless of In-
tention. Hopkins V. Hopkins, 114 8. W. 678,
676.
Am oUUtm bova la wedloek
After death of testator and probate of
his win, devising land In New York to B. for
Ufe, and on his death to his "lawful issue,"
Acts Mich. 1881, p. 48, No. 55, and Laws N.
Y. 1895, p. 818, c. 531, declaring that the
subsequent marriage of the parents shall
legitimatize their children previously bora,
were passed. Prior to either act, and while
B. had a lawful wife, M., by whom he had
children, he had children by another woman,
S., and, after enactment of the Michigan
act, he, In an action in that state In which
Jurisdiction was not acquired of M., a resi-
dent of New York, and on grounds not recog-
nized by the laws of New York for divorce,
obtained a decree of divorce; and there-
after In Michigan there was a marriage cere-
mony between him and S. Subsequently, in
an action In New York by M. against B. for
separation, there was a decree establishing
the fact that M. was still the wife of B., not-
withstanding the Michigan decree. Held,
that B.'s children by S. were not entitled to
take under the will. Olmsted v. Olmsted,
83 N. B. 569, 190 N. Y. 458, 128 Am. St Rep.
585.
Under the rale that, where statutes can
reasonably be constraed to avoid conflict,
that construction must be adopted. Civ.
Code Cal. fi 1388, providing that when an Ille-
gitimate child, who has not been acknowl-
edged or adopted by his father, dies Intestate
without lawful issue, his estate goes to his
mother, or In case of h^r decease to her heirs
LAWFUL ISSUE
46
LAWFUL IfiSXJB
at law, and aectiozi 1887, proylding that every
illegltiinate child Is an heir to the person
who, in writing signed in the presence of a
competent witness, acknowledges himself to
be the father of such child, and in all cases
is an heir of his mother, and inherits his or
her estate, in whole or in part, as the case
may be, in the same manner as if he had
been born in lawful wedlock, will be held
not to be in conflict in the case, where both
the mother and child are illegitimate, on the
ground that section 1387 makes the child the
heir of his mother, while section 1388, takefa
alone, excludes him, but section 1387, which
has to do solely with the right of illegiti-
mates to inherit, will be construed as appli-
cable only to inheritance by an illegitimate
from a parent who is legitimate, or, for pur-
poses of inheritance, the illegitimate child
by reason of section 1387 is to be held to be
within the terms "lawful issue," as that term
is used in section 1388. In re De Cigaran's
Estate, 89 Pac. 833, 836, 160 Cal. 682.
Where the father of defendants at the
time of their birth was the lawful husband
of another woman than their mother, but
thereafter, in Michigan, obtained a divorce
legal in that state, though not in the state
of New York, and married their mother there-
by establishing their legitimacy in that state,
under Act Mich. March 28, 1881 (Pub. Acts
1881, p. 48, No. 66), they are entitied in New
York to take under a devise to "the lawful
issue" of their father. Olmsted v. Olmsted,
102 N. Y. Supp. 1019, 1020, 118 App. Div. 69.
A will, dated and which took effect in
lS72, gave property in trust for the testator's
son, with remainder to his* "lawful issue."
The son was then married and had children.
After the death of his then wife, he married
the mother of certain illegitimate children.
Laws 1895, c. 531, providing that illegitimate
children whose parents had theretofore inter-
married or should thereafter intermarry
should thereby become legitimatized. Held,
that the illegitimate children were not enti-
tled to share in the remainder, since, while
all children, whether legitimate or not, are
the 'Issue" of their parents, that word, when
qualified by the adjective "lawful," which is
the antithesis of unlawful or illegitimate, is
ordinarily understood to mean those only be-
gotten and born in lawful wedlock, and it
cannot be assumed that the testator consid-
ered the contingencies of the birth of illegiti-
mate children, the enactment of a statute by
which they might be legitimatized, and the
marriage of their parents. Central Trust Co.
of New York v. SkilUn, 138 N. Y. Supp. 884,
886, 154 App. Div. 227.
As desoendants
The words "lawful issue, if any, of the
body," mean lineal descendants, taking by
right of representation per stirpes. Union
Safe Deposit & Trust Co, v. Dudley, 72 Atl.
166, 169, 104 Me. 297.
The primary meaning of ^Hawful Issud"
is descendants, and, in the absence of the use
of the words in a will in another sense, it
will be so construed. Under a residuary be-
quest to testator's stepmother and half-sister,
in equal portions, and, in the event of either
dying without issue, the share of the one so
dying to the survivor, the stepmother dying
before testator, he does not die intestate as
to the share given, but there is an implied
bequest of it to her issue. In re Disney's
Will, 103 N. Y. Suw>. 391, 392, 118 App. Div.
378 (quoting and adopting definition in New
York life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 56 N.
B. 311, 161 N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St. Rep. 238;
Chwatal v. Schreiner, 43 N. B. 166, 148 K. Y.
683).
Under a will, establishing a trust fund
for the benefit of a daughter of the testa-
trix during her life, {md directing that on
her death the principal be paid to her then
"lawful living issue," the term "lawful living
issue" does not include an adopted daughter.
In re Hopkins, 89 N. Y. Supp. 467, 468, 43
Misc. Rep. 464 (citing New York life Insur-
ance & Trust Co. V. Viele, 66 N. B. 8U, 161
N. Y. 11, 76 Am. St Rep. 239).
Where testator by will devised his prop-
erty in trust for his wife, on her death to be
divided among his lawful issue, and gave
the same to the persons entitled to the other
half of his residuary estate, and by a clause
disposing of such half testator provided that
it should go to the lawful issue of his children
or to his lawful issue per stirpes and not per
capita, it was the intent of the testator to
limit the phrase "lawful issue" in the first
clause to the lawful issue of his children, or
to his lawful issue. Inglis v. McCook, 59
Ati. 630, 633, 68 N. J. Bq. 27.
'*The words lawful issue,' when used in
a domestic will, primarUy and generally
mean descendants. Where there is nothing
to the contrary to be found in the context of
the instrument, or in extraneous facts proper
to be considered, that Is the sense in which
they are presumed to be used. The real ques-
tion ♦ ♦ ♦ is whether the testatrix used
them in that sense or in some other sense.
In giving construction to the words used by
the testatrix in a domestic will, we cannot
assume, without the clearest evidence, that
she used the words 'lawful issue' in the sense
they might possibly bear under the laws of
a foreign cduntry in which she died." In re
Tenney, 93 N. Y. Supp. 811, 818, 104 App.
Div. 290 (quoting and adopting definition in
New York Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Viele, 65
N. B. 311, 161 N. Y. 19, 20, 76 Am. St Rep.
238).
Testator's will directed that his estate be
divided into as many parts, as he had chil-
dren, the income of each part to go to a
child for life, and upon the child's death the
part to be divided among the "lawful issue"
XiAWFUIi ISSUB
a
IiAWFUIi OBDBB
of the child. At the time tiie wiU was exe-
cuted several of the testator's childien were
married and had children. Held, that the
daughters of a deceased daughter and a
grandchild of snch daughter took equally un-
der the dense ''lawfol issne'*; that phnse
b^ng equivalent to "descendants." Phelps t.
Cameron, 96 N. Y. Snpp. 1014, 1016» 109 App.
Mt. 798.
Testator gave one half of his residuary
estate to trustees for the use of his wife for
Ufe, and on her death to divide the same
among his lawful issue, or to trustees for
their use as his wife should direct by will.
In default of such will, he gave the same to
persons then entitled to the other half of his
residuary estate, to be distributed and held
on the same trusts and in the same propor-
tions as were mentioned in another clause of
his will. Held, that the term "lawful issue"
includes not only children but descendants.
Inglis V. McCook, 59 AtL 630, 635, 68 N. J.
Bq. 27.
Where the phrase 'Oawfnl Issae" is used
in a will, if it clearly appears that it was
used in a particular meaning, the phrase may
be I'estricted to children then living, or to
diildren thai living and to the representa-
tives of any deceased child. Inglis v. Mc-
Cook, 59 Aa 680, 685, 68 N. J. Bq. 27.
Testator gave property to trustees lA
trust, with directions to pay the net income
to his three children for life; the trust to
continue as long as any of the children lived.
He provided that, if any of his children should
die without lawful issue, the surviving chil-
dren should have his share, and if any of
the children should die, leaving lawful issue,
the child so surviving should take the share
of the income which the deceased parent
would have taken, had he survived, and on
the termination of the trust the property
should vest in the surviving lawful issue of
testator's children. Held, that words "lawful
issue" meant children, and Included only the
lawful children of testator's children in be-
ing at the time of their death. Brlsbin v.
Huntington, 103 N. W. 144, 147, 128 Iowa,
166, 5 Ann. Gas. 931.
Am words of pwofcAse
The words "lawful issue" in a deed are
words of purchase and not of limitation. La-
cey V. Floyd, 87 S. W. 665, 667, 99 Tex. 112.
Where a deed conveyed land to the gran-
tee and his wife and to the legitimate heirs
of the grantee, and in case of no "lawful
Issue^' then over, the words "lawful issue"
mean legitimate heirs and are words of pur-
chase. Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N. EL 1012, 1013,
85 Ind. App. 662.
XtAWXUI. MERGHAXBISE
Asfphalt is "lawfal merchandise" in a
charter for West Indian trade, which pro-
vides that the vessel shall be employed in
carrying 'Hawfiil merchandise." Dene Ship-
ping Co. T. Tweedie Trading COt 148 Fed.
854, 866, 74 a a A. 606.
ZJkWFUL MOXET
See Lawful Currency.
The term "lawful money,** in an Indict-
ment charging *1arceny" of certain money
being "lawful money" of the Uuited States,
means money as commonly understood and
includes bank notes. State v. Finnegean, 108
N. W. 155, 157, 127 Iowa, 286, 4 Ann. Cas. 62&
''Lawful money" means money which
passes from hand to hand and from person
to person and circulates through the com-
munity, and is synonymous with "current
money." Lawful money is that which is usu-
ally used as a medium of exchange. State v.
Quackenbush, 108 N. W. 958, 956^ 98 Minn.
516.
ZJkWFUX. OBSTBUOnOHS
Although the grass plats and shade
trees along the sidewalk may be "obstruc-
tions," yet when ample wVlth is left to an-
swer the demands of travel they are obstruct
tions that serve a useful purpose and are not
inconsistent with the object for which streets
are made and maintained. Like a fence, a
hydrant, a hitching post, telei^one or tele-
graph poles, they are 'lawful obstructions,"
and a wire stretched around a grass and tree
plat in a street for the protection of the plat
is not such an obstruction as to render the
dty liable for injuries received by one who
tripped and fell over such wire; the wire
being in plain sight of pedestrians passing
along the street Teague v. dty of Bloom-
ington, 81 N. B. 103, 104, 40 Ind. App. 68
(citing Lostutter v. City of Aurora, 26 N. B.
184, 126 Ind. 436, 12 L. B. A. 259; aty of
Vincennes v. Specs, 74 N. B. 277, 35 Ind. App.
389; Welnstein v. City of Tene Haute^ 46
N. B. 1004, 147 Ind. 55^.
LAWFUIi OBDEB
Interstate Commerce Act, t 10» relating '
to the authority of a commerce commission,
provides with respect to proceedings at law
in a Circuit Court of the United States in
case of the disregard of a "lawful order" of
the commission, the finding of fkcts of the
commission shall be prima fade evidence of
the matters therein stated. The court says
that the phrase "lawful order" Implies more
than the exercise of mere Jurisdictional pow-
er or authority. "The words lawful order*
mean an order the commission has Jurisdic-
tion to make. An order may be lawful and
at the same time erroneous, so that if the
commission made an order in a matter over
which they had Judisdictlon, whidi was
merely an error of Judgment as to precisely
the degree of reparation, for instance, the
carrier ought to make, the order would still
be lawfuL" Western New York. & P. B. Go.
LAWFUIi POSSESSION
4B
LAWFUL I^BSTRAWT
T* Penn B^fliitag €o., Limitedl* of Oil CUyt
Pa^ 137 Fed. 343, 852, 70 a €. ▲. 28.
LAWFUL P088ES8IOir
In St 1907, p. 099, c. 588, | 2, providing
that the owner or ottier person In the lawful
po80e08ioa of land may recover damages by
trespassing animals from the owner or per-
son chargeable with the care of such ani-
mals, the words "lawful possession'' mean
only peaceable or quiet possession, contradis-
tinguished from * possession which is not
merely constructively tortious, but actually
so. Flsch y. Nice, 106 Pac 598^ 599, 12 OaL
App. 60.
LAWFUL PURPOSE
County Government Act 1897 (St 1897,
p. 466) I 25, subd. 35, authorizes county su-
pervisors to grant franchises over the public
roads and highways for all "lawful pur-
poses" on such terms and conditions as, in
their Judgment, may be necessary and prop-
er, and in such manner as to present the
least possible obstruction and inconvenience
to the traveling public. Held, that the words
"lawful purposes," as so used, should be con-
strued as limited to purposes in aid of the
public's easement of travel, something which
would promote the public comfort and con-
venience In the use of the highway; and
hence such act did not authorize a county
board of supervisors to grant a franchise to
an electric power company to erect Its power
line along a highway, the title to the soil of
which Is not in the abutting property owners,
for the primary purpose of furnishing light
and power to private individuals, without
rendering compensatloQ to such abutting
owners. Gurnsey v. Northern California
Power Co., 117 Pac. 906, 909, 160 CaL 699,
36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185.
The payment of a debt by a county
which the Legislature has authorized is a
"lawful purpose," for the issuing of bonds
as authorized by County Law, | 12 (Laws
■ 1892, p. 1746, TR 686), giving to boards of
supervisors the power to borrow money on
the credit of the county. County of Ontario
V. Shepard, 91 N. Y. Supp. 611, 614, 100 App.
Dlv. 200.
A "lawful purpose" which will excuse
one for carrying a concealed weapon is "a
lawful purpose that was specific, and, in a
sense, temporary. For example, if a person
should buy a deadly weapon at a store, and
put it in his pocket for the purpose of taking
it home; or if a person should find a deadly
weapon, and place it in his pocket for the
purpose of keeping it only till he could re-
store it to the owner, or make some other ;
disposition of it—fluch person would not be
carrying a deadly weapon concealed within
the meaning of said act." State v. lannucd
(JDeL) 55 Aa 336^ 387, 4 PennewlU, 193.
Under (bounty Government Act Oal. 1897
(St 1897, p. 458) i 25, subd. 35, authorizing
a board of supervisors to grant franchises
along and over the public roads and high-
ways fOr all "lawful purposes," upon such
terms and conditions as in their judgment
may be necessary and proper, the authority
of the board has relation to the purposes for
which a highway is dedicated, and is llmltea
by the uses, primary and incidental, to
which under the law a highway is devoted;
the "lawful purpose" must be consistent
with the character and in furtherance of
the design of the easement which the public
has in and to the highways. The only right
which the public has in and to the highways
is to use it for the purpose of traveling over
it without obstruction or interference; and
the control which the board of supervisors
can lawfully exercise must have in view the
promotion of that use, and cannot extend be-
yond whatever is necessary to facilitate
travel. A grant by a county board of super-
visors x)f a franchise to erect poles and string
electric wires thereon, along and over the
public highway of a county tcr the purpose
of lighting the highway, is an incident to
the contemplated use of such highway, and
is for a "lawful purpose^" and it is immate-
rial that the lighting .was in part used for
private purposes. Gurnsey t. Northern Cal-
Momia Power Co., 94 Pac. 858, 860, 7 CaL
App. 534.
The words "lawful purposes," in the
New York statute providing that no corpo-
ration shall issue either stock or bonds ex*
oept for money, labor, or property actually
received for the 'use and lawful purposes of
such corporation, are general in character,
but would seem to mean such property as
would be germane to, or connected with, the
business purposes of the corporation, as de-
fined in its charter or articles of incorpora-
tion. Corporate bonds cannot be issued for
the consideration of a note which is never
collected. In re Waterloo Organ Go, X34
Fed. 341, 343, 67 0. C. A. 255.
LAWFUL REASOHS
See Good and Lawful Reasons
LAWFUL BESTRAIirr
Where a bank which paid money into
the state treasury as taxes, supposing that it
had the right to do so, in lieu of county and
city taxes, delayed for more than two years
to make application to the auditor to issue
his warrant for the repayment of the money,
relying upon a decision of the C!ourt of Ap-
peals to the effect that such payments by
other banks similarly situated were proper,,
it lost the right to demand such a warrant,
though that decision was overruled after the
lapse of the two years, as the decision was
not a "lawful restraint," within Ky. St i
2544, providing that. In all cases where the
doing of an act necessary to save any rlghjt
Ukynnjh restrictions
49
LiiWTER.
or benefit is restrained at superseded bj In-
junction or other **lawful restraint," the
time covered by the injunction or restraint
Bhall not be estimated in the application of
mjoj statnte ot limitattons. Bank of Com-
merce of LooisviUe V. Stone, 66 S. W. 683,
68i, 108 Ky. 427.
I.AW7UI. BESTBIOTIOirS
The "lawful restrictions" authorised by
P. L. 1893, p. 302 (Gen. St p. 8280, providing
for the granting of a location for street rail-
way tracks subject to restrictions, refer to
restrictions that are to be made in the inter-
est of the public and Indicate a legislative
act In granting a location. An ordinance
granting a location may contain restrictions
In the fbrm of covenants requiring the street
railway comi>any to pave the streets in which
the tracks are laid, and such restrictions are
obligatory on any subseQuent purchaser of
the street railway tracks and franchisee,
even without an express assumption. Bor-
ough of Rutherford v. Hudson River Trae*
tlon Co., 63 AtL 84, 88, 78 N. J. Law, 227.
LAWFiiii vn
An instruction, In an action for the
death of an automoblllst struck by a car,
that the street railway company must use
reasonable care to operate its cars on publle
streets with regard to "the lawful and eusto-
mary use" of the streets by others, and that
If, at the time decedent was killed, the com-
pany was not operating the car with regard
to **the lawful and customary use" of the
streets, but negligently operated the car, it
was liable, Ib not erroneous as referring to
the extent of travel, of which there was no
evidence, but refers to the use of the street
by the public; the word "lawful" meaning
according to law as distinguished from an
unlawful use and the word "customary"
meaning according to usage and referring to
the mode of using the streets. Smiley v.
East St Louis & S. Ry. Co., 100 N. B. 157,
158, 256 lU. 4^.
JsAWTUh WEDX^OK
See Same as Lawful Wedlock.
I.AWFUIXT AITTHOBXZEB
Under Civ. Code 1001, pars. 721, 726,
782, 26d6, providing that no estate in land
for a term of more than one year shall be
conveyed, except by an Instrument in writing
subscribed by the party, "or by his agent
thereunto authorized in writing," prohibiting
actions on any lease for more than one year,
unless in writing and signed by the party to
be charged, **or by some person by him
thereunto lawfully authorized," a lease for
more than a year, signed by one of the par-
ties and by a person verbally authorized by
the other party, but not acknowledged by
•ither, is not a valid lease, but Is not within
the prohibition in paragraph 2690, and Is en-
8 Wl>s.& P.2D Sbb.-^
foroeftble as a contract to lease; the words
"lawfully authorized" in paragraph 2686 not
meaning an authorization in writing. Mur-
phey V. Brown, 100 Pac. 801, 804, 12 ArhL
268.
LAWFUZXT BEOOTTEK
See Heirs Lawfully Begotten.
LAWFULLY CLAXMIKO P088E88IOII
Civ. Code, I 1927, provides that agree-
ments of letting upon hire bind the letter to
secure to the hirer the quiet possession of
the thing hired during the term of the hiring
against all persons lawfully claiming the
same. Defendant on August 29, 1906, leased
to plaintiff for 22 months, to commence Jan-
uary 21, 1907, certain land. P. A. was In
possession of the land under lawful lease
from the owners, and it was determined In
litigation to oust him that he was entitled to
possession until March 6, 1907. Plaintiff had
been a tenant of P. A. but his lease exi^red
In November, 1906, but he was permitted by
P. A. to occupy a house but Instructed by P.
A. not to farm the land. He did farm the
land and gave defendant his share of the
crops as rental under the lease commencing
January 1, 1907. During January and Feb-
ruary, 1007, P. A.'s cattie got upon the land
and did -damage to the plaintiff's croi>. Held,
that plaintiff was entitled to damages from
defendant as for breach of the Implied cove-
nant for quiet enjoyment, as P. A.'s act was
the act of one lawfully claiming possession.
Agoure v. Lewis, 113 Pac. 882, 884, 10 CAl.
App. 71.
LAWITTLLT HATUBALIZED
In Rev. St i 1004, providing that any
woman married to a citizen of the United
States, and who might herself be lawful-
ly naturalised, shall be deemed a citizen, the
clause *'who might herself be lawfully natr
urall^ed" limits the section to a woman
lawfully within the country, her own capac-
ity independent of her marital status, being
essential to citizenship; so that where an
alien married woman was not entitied to
enter the country under the Immigration reg-
ulations, because of a contagious disease, the
naturalization of her husband would not
make her a citizen entitied to enter, under
the statute. In re Rustigian, 166 Fed. 980,
082.
LAWTEB
As laborer, see Laborer.
As learned in the law, see Learned in
the Law.
As member of learned profession, see
Learned Profession.
A "lawyer" is one skilled in the law,
while an "attorney" is an officer in a court of
Justice who is eraplc^ed by a party in a
cause to manage it for him. A law student
fresh from his school and not a licensed of-
LAY— LAID
50
LAT OUT— liAID OUT
fleer of the court may well be termed a law-
yer, bnt not an attorney. Danforth y. Egan,
119 N. W. 1021, 1024, 23 S. D. 43» 139 Am.
St Bep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 418.
UY— LAID
As ooiEfttraot
Where the city of Camden laid new pipes
in place of old ones, which had been laid by
a water company, the city's predecessor, such
laying is within the meaning of Act March 9,
1871 (P. Li p. 415), authorizing the city to
charge 75 cents per foot of frontage on land
bordering on streets through which water
pipes are laid. Doughten y. City of Camden,
59 AtL 16, 17, 71 N. J. Law, 42^
I<AID DOWN
The word "laid down," in a contract of
sale which requires the buyer to pay a spec-
ified price t o. b. cars at his place of busi-
ness in this country, or "laid down" at his
place of business, or free at his place of
business, duty unpaid, must be construed ac^
cording to the uniyersal understanding of
merchants and importers throughout the
United States and the foreign country, and
the universal understanding is that the buy-
ers should pay import duties ; and the buyer
must pay such duties without deduction from
or credit on the price. -Steidtmann t. Joseph
Lay Co., 84 N. B. 640, 642, 234 IlL 84.
LAID UP
Ship
A yacht is "laid up for repairs," within
a provision of the charter party, in such
case allowing a rebate from the charter
money, where it is at re^t, having some dam-
age made good, that in a material degree
impairs its ability to pursue the voyage as a
yacht, though the charterer may continue to
eat and sleep and entertain friends on board.
Dahlgren v. Whitaker, 124 Fed. 695, 696.
liAT OFF— LAID OFF
The words "laid off," in Pierce's Code
1905, i 3560, providing that all streets, lanes,
and alleys "laid off" and recorded in accord-
ance with the statute shall be considered
highways, must be given their usual and or-
dinary meaning, and a town site or addition
Is "laid off" when it is surveyed or measured
and marked on the ground. Meachem ▼.
Seattle, 88 Pac. 628, 630, 45 Wash. 380.
Though the words "lay off" were used in a
notice terminating the service of an employ^,
it was a sufficient indication of action under
Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, p.
636, a 466) { 1543, authorizing his suspen-
sion without pay for a year. Shane v. City
of New York, 120 N. Y. Supp. 428, 430, 135
App. Div. 2ia
ULY OUT-^LAID OUT
The words "lay out," in the will of Ben-
jamin Franklin, creating a trust fund for the
town of Boston, do not mean merely the
adoption of a plan for the use of the money
in accordance with the will, but include the
actual expenditure of it by the board of man-
agers named in the will in the establishment
of public works of the kind described. City
of Boston V. Doyle, 68 N. EL 851, 864, 184
Mass. 373.
Under the deed of U^ the owner of the
east half of a block, of the southern half of
his land, the northern boundary line of the
land conveyed being described as binding on
a 10-foot alley "here laid out," and the grant
including the use of this alley in common,
"together with the use of any alley 10 feet
wide to be laid out by U., extending norther-
ly parallel to P. street from the northwest
corner of the land conveyed "to H. street,"
while the words "laid out," in reference to
the latter alley, are used in the sense of con-
structed or improved, and not in their
ordinary meaning of the adoption of out-
lines or location, the alley being laid out in
such sense by the deed, which clearly defines
its location, the grantee*s easement in the
alley is not dependent on the grantor im-
proving it, and is not lost by nonperformance
of his personal covenant to do so. Oberhelm
V. Reeside, 81 Atl. 590, 592, 116 Md. 265 (cit-
ing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4037).
The delineation of a street on a map
made pursuant to Act March 21, 1871 (P. L.
p. 638) I 23, in amendment of the charter of
the village of Passaic, does not suffice to
make an actual street within section 57 of
the charter (Act April 2, 1873 [P. U p. 507]),
empowering the counsel to alter any street
already or thereafter to be laid out Brie
R. Co. V. City of Passaic, 74 Aa 338, 339, 79
N. J. Law, 19.
Laws N. H. 1903, p. 267, c 255, | 3, rel-
ative to establishment of waterworks, pro-
vides that, "in case the town shall not be able
to agree with the owner of any property or
right taken for the purposes of this act, ei-
ther party may apply to the superior court to
have the same 'laid out' and damages deter-
mined." The court says the words "laid out"
are undoubtedly derived from the procedure
followed In laying out highways, "and the
term itself and the direct reference indicate
that the method of the divestiture of pri-
vate title in road-laying proceedings was with-
in legislative contemplation in this class of
legislation. The decision of the selectmen
laying a highway is a Judgment, and in-
cludes both a finding upon the question of
public good and a location upon the ground
of the new way. The term *lald ouf is of
familiar use in the taking of land for rail-
roads. In such cases the corporation is au-
thorized to locate its road, subject to petition
by any landowner for a change of location,
and to obtain title by deed to any lands
which it deems necessary for the road. Pub.
St 1901, c. 158, I 8. If such deeds cannot
LAY OUT— LAID OUT
51
LBAD
be obtained, a{^]icatLoii may be made for
an assessment of damages. Id. { d. The
damages must be paid, or tendered, or de-
posited for the landowner, before entry is
made upon the land to construct the road, ex-
cept by the owner's consent Id« K l^t 19.
From all the eridence it is clear that by
the permission given in certain cases to ap-
ply to have the desired right 'laid out* was
meant an application to have the desired
light, in the language before quoted (Lkws
1901, p. 806, c 290, I 2), 'taken, appropriated,
and condemned.' The words 'laying out' and
taking,' in a statute relating to eminent do-
main, were held to have the same meaning
in Charlestown Branch R. v. County Com'rs
of Middlesex, 7 Mete [48 Mass.] 78, 84.
The legislative intention seems clear, there-
fore, to authorize the plaintiffs to secure the
necessary rights by purchase if they could;
if not, by condemnation.'* Town of Littleton
Y. Berlin MiUs Co., 68 AtL 877, 880, 78 N. H.
IL
Am siurreyed or platted
A town site or addition is "Oald ontf'
when it is surveyed or measured and marked
upon the ground. Meachem v. City of Seat-
Ue^ 88 Pac. 628, 630, 45 Wash. 380.
AU meoesMKvy steps laolitded
The city of Boston took part of lands fbr
a short parkway, to be controlled by the
park commissioners, and made a settlement
with the owner, by which the city agreed to
construct a roadway and walk, to which he
should have perpetual access, and to assume
any assessment for betterments for the con-
stmction of the park on the land not taken.
Subsequently the dty street commissioners
laid out a street several miles long, which,
where the owner^s land lay, was superim-
posed on the parkway, and no physical
change was made therein. Held not to pre-
clude assessment for betterments on the
owner's lands for the new street, which was
a wholly new layout by the commissioners;
to "lay out" meaning, in this connection, to
fix the termini and presciibe the boundaries
of a highway, and establish it as a public
easement of travel, by oflaclal act of the
proper authorities. Leahy v. Charles, 95 N.
E. 834, 835, 209 Mass. 316.
The word "established," in Pol. Code, {
671, providing that, if a private way is "es-
tablished" over the wild lands of a person
who has no notice of the proceeding, he may
within six months after receiving such no-
tice, and not thereafter, proceed to have his
damages assessed, has the same meaning as
the words "laid out" in section 672; that
is, the laying out of a way under the order
of the ordinary. Watklns v. Country Club,
47 S. ET. 538, 539, 120 Oa. 45.
Under Bums' Rev. 8t 1894, | 6759, de-
claring that every public highway 'Oald out,**
er which may hereafter be "laid out," and
which shall not be opened or used within six
years ftom the time of its beinf laid out;
shall cease to be a highwaj for any imr-
pose whatever, the words "laid out" doabtleas
mean established, surveyed, declared a road ;
a highway has been laid out—- that is to
say, it has been estabUshed and declared to
be a highway by the Judgment of the court
Where a highway was established by the
Judgment of the county commissioners, and
within six years thereafter it was Included
within the corporate limits of a town, it did
not become extinct, under such statute,
though not opened or used as a highway.
Baltimore, O. & C. R. Co. v. Town of Whit-
ing, 65 N. E. 759, 761, 30 Ind. App. 182 (quot-
ing and adopting definitions In Decker v.
Washburn, 35 N. B. 1111, 8 Ind. App. 673),
As looate
A petition for a highway was not ob-
jectionable, because it prayed that the court
"locate and establish" a road, instead of ask-
ing to have the road "laid out"; the term
"laid out" being colloquial, meaning "to plan
in detail," while "to locate" is to define the
limits, to establish In a particular place, and,
in a road proceeding, is as comprehensive as
"lay out" — ^the term 'lay out" expressing the
work to be done by the viewers in establish-
ing on the ground the lines and angles of the
road. Feagins v. Wallowa County, 123 Pac.
902, 62 Or. 186.
UkTINO OB BELATIKO
Buffalo City Charter, § 288 (Laws 1891,
p. 200, a 105, as amended by Laws 1901, p.
661, a 228, i 8), provides for the laying and
relaying of sidewalks at the expense of abut-
ting owners. Laws 1891, p. 221, c. 105, i 398,
divides streets into carriage ways and side-
walks, and Buffalo City Ordinance, a 4, pars.
8, 9, declares that the owner or occupant
may be required to grade and level the side-
walk in front of his premises between the
street and curbs, and, on his failure to grade
and level the sitlewalk for ten days after no-
tice, the same may be done at his expense.
Held, that the words "laying or relaying" of
a sidewalk, within section 288, have the same
meaning as "grading or regrading" in section
8, in each case referring to original work
on the sidewalk or street, and not to repair
after the sidewalk 1b once laid or relaid.
Konowalskl v. City of Buffalo, 115 N. Y.
Supp. 467, 470, 131 App. Div. 465.
LEAD
The zinc ores known as carbonate, sili-
cate and sulphide of zinc are free of duty,
the carbonate and silicate as "calamine,"
and the sulphide as "minerals, crude," under
Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, i 2, Free list
pars. 514, 614, 30 Stat 196, 199, except that
when they contain lead they are subject to
the duty provided on "lead-bearing ore of all
kinds," in section 1, Schedule C, par. 181, 30
Stat 166. United States v. Brewstw, 167
Fed. 122, 123, 92 a a A. 574.
USADZNO
62
LEADING QUESnON
LEADING
XiEABIlfO XiIFB OF mOSTXTUTIOH
AND LEWDNEM
Resorting to a botel for the commission
of acts of lewdness during one night, consti-
tuting parts of a continuous transaction, does
not amount to "leading the life of lewdness'*
within Code, { 4043. State v. McDavitt, 118
N. W. 370, 140 Iowa, 842, 132 Am. St Rep.
275.
A woman who inhabits a house of ill
fame or other place as a shelter or resort
in which to engage in unlawful sexual com-
merce is ''leading a life of prostitution and
lewdness," within the meaning of Code, i
4943, which provides that if any person for
the purpose of prostitution or lewdness re-
sorts to, uses, occupies, or inhabits any house
of ill fame or place kept for sucdi purpose, or
if any person be found leadln|f a life of pros^
tlttttion, such person shall be imprisoned,
etc. The law means during every instant of
her residence there^ and not merely while In
the flagrant act True, as counsel say, "she
must be found while in the act prohibited by
the statute*'; but the acts here prohibited
Is not the act of sexual intercourse, but the
living of a life of prostitution and lewdness
in the house or other resort in which she is
found. State v. Shaw, 101 N. W. 109, 126
Iowa, 422.
liEADINO QtnssTioir
A "question is leading" when it suggests
the desired answer to the witness. Bl Paso
ft S. W. Ry. CJo. T. Welter (Tex.) 125 S. W.
45, 49.
"Leading questions" are such as suggest
answers favorable to the interests of the
party asking them. Parsons v. Bridgham, 34
Me. 240, 242 (citing 1 Starkie, Bv. [7th Ed.]
109).
A "leading question" is a question "em-
bodying a material fact and admitting of an
answer by a simple negative or affirmative."
Walker v. Baldwin & Prick, 68 Atl. 25, 30,
106 Md. 619 (quoting and adopting definition
in 1 GreenL Bv. i 434; Lee v. Tinges* 7 Md.
234).
A "leading question" is one which sug-
gests the desired answer; and a question
susceptible to either an affirmative or nega-
tive answer, which does not suggest the de-
sired answer, is not objectionable as leading.
Williams v. Smith, 72 AtL 1093, 1099, 29 R.
L562.
"Any question by which the fact is made
known to the witness, which the interrogator
wishes to find asserted in and by his answer,
is a 'leading question.' It is none the less
leading because the alternative form of ex-
pression is used, as *Dld you, or did you
not? " Parsons v. Huff, 38 Me. 137, 141 (cit-
ing People V. Mather [N. Y.] 4 Wend. 247, 21
Am. Dec. 122; Hopper v. Ck)mmonwealth, 6
Grat [47 Va.l 68«;
"Leading questions" are defined to be
those which ordinarily suggest to the witness
the answer desired,. or which, embodying a
material fact, admit <A a direct answer by a
simple "yes" or ••no," or which instruct a
witness how to answer on material iM>tnts.
Rosenkovitz v. United Railways & Blectric
Co., 70 Atl. 108» 110, 108 Md. 806.
A question is not necessarily "leading"
beeause it admits of a direct negative or af-
firmative answer, but to make it objection-
able when only a single fact is sought to be
elicited it should suggest the answer. The
use of the words "whether or not" in pro-
pounding a question to a witness does not in
all cases relieve the question from the objec-
tion of being leading. Bryan Press Co. v.
Houston k T. C. Ry. CJo. (Tex.) 110 S. W. 99,
100, 101.
A question, containing the words •'wheth-
er ^ not," so as in most instances to pre-
vent the use of the words "yes" or "no" in
answer, is said to be ordinarily not leading;
whether it is or not depends on the nature of
the question, the subject-matter, and the par^
ticular manner in whidi the other parts of it
are framed. State v. Taylor, 60 S. B. 247,
254, 57 W. Va. 22a
A question is "leading" when it indicates
the real or supposed fact which the examiner
desires to have confirmed by the answer and
the use of the words "whether or not" does
not necessarily prevent a question from being
leading if it still suggests the answer desired.
Peebles v. 0*Gara Coal Co., 88 N. B. 166, 168,
239 IlL 370.
A question propounded plaintiff, as to
whether two items in an account previously
rendered defendant, and offered in evidence
by him, represented or was intended to repre-
sent the notes sued on, was rightfully reject-
ed as being "leading." Sayre v. Woodyard,
66 S. B. 320, 322, 66 W. Va. 288.
The question, "Did you make any de-
mand upon the defendant for the value of
said damaged goods?" addressed to a wit-
ness, was not "leading." International & G.
N. R. Co. V. H. P. Drought k Co. (Tex.) 100
S. W. 1011, 1012.
A witness was asked by the state in a
burglary case, in order to identify a suit
case as one which accused and another had
in their possession: "Do you think that you
would know that grip if you was to see it?
A. I do not know ; I think I would. Q. How
does that compare with it? A. That kinder
looks like the color of the grip they had. Q.
Do you know whether it is or not? A. No,
sir ; I do not know exactly whether it is or
not" Held, that the questions were not ob-
jectionable as leading; a "leading question"
being one framed so as to indicate the an-
swer desired. Majors ▼. 8tate» 140 8. W.
1095, 63 Tex Cr. R. 48a
The question asked by the defense, if ft
was possible^ during the time the fight tras
LEADING QDESTIOK
«8
In progress, for any man to leave the crowd
and go 40 feet and return with a bat without
witness seeing him, whidi question was ad-
dressed to the evidence of the state that de-
fendant had done just this thing, is not a
"leading question'*; a question not being
leading because it can be answered "Yes** or
*'No," but being leading where it suggests the
answer desired. People y. Jones, 117 Pae
176, 180, leO Cat 358.
In an action by a mine employ^ for in-
juries resulting from the fUl of ro^ or slate
from tlie roof, a question on the direct ex-
amination of a witness called on behalf of
plaintiff ''whether in that mine that roof will
sound all right in response to tapping and
drumming with a pick and in a minute or
two fall," is objectionable as leading. Har-
per y. Black Diamond Coal Co., 142 III. App.
594, 597.
A 'leading question" is one that may be
answered "yes" or "no," and suggests the an-
swer desired. Indeed, by a "leading" ques-
tion is meant one which suggests to the wit-
ness the desired answer. Merely because it
may be answered by "yes" or "no" does not
render the question leading. Where a wit-
ness was asked by his counsel (1) 'if his
wife • • • had ever had any cough or
lung trouble" prior to a certain exposure ; (2)
"whether or not his wife had ever had any
female trouble** prior to such exposure; (3)
"If his wife * • • ever suffered with
rheumatism, lumbago, or anything of that
kind** before such exposure — ^it was held not
leading, though answerable "yes" or "no."
St Louis Southwestern R. Co. y. Lowe (Tex.)
97 8. W. 1087, 1088 (citing Able y. Sparks, 6
Tex. 350; Mathls y. Buford, 17 Tex. 155;
Trammel v. McDade, 29 Tex. 301; Lott y.
King, 15 S. W. 231, 79 Tex. 292; Birgen y.
Producers' Yard, 11 S. W. 1027, 72 Tex. 55;
Cleveland v. Duggan, 2 Willson, Civ. Cas. Ct
App. I 84).
LEAF TOBACCO
Filler tobacco as leaf tobacco, see Filler
Tobacco.
'Xk>ngre88 is, of course, presumed to be
familiar with the fact that 'leaf tobacco' is
divided into classes, or is subjected, before
being placed in bales, to some kind of an
assortment" Brhardt v. Schroeder, 15 Sup.
Ct 45, 48, 156 17. S. 124, 39 L. Ed. 94.
LEAGUE
See Major League; Square League.
"Leagpe" and "legion" are of entirely
different meanings; "league*' being defined
as an "alliance of persons," and "legion" as
a "military body or organisation." People
«z reL Felter v. Rose, 80 N. B. 298, 296, 225
lU. 496.
LEARNED
lA&BNED nr THB ULW
Where an attorney has been disbarred
for violation of legal ethics, which is one of
the branches required by Pol. Code, | 680, to
be considered in passing upon the qualifica-
tions of one seeking admission to the bar, be
is not "learned in the law** within the con-
stitutional provision requiring that a state's
attorney shall be learned in the law. Dan-
forth v. Bgan, 119 N. W. 1021, 1025, 23 S. D.
43, 139 Am. St Rep. 1030, 20 Ann Cas. 418.
LEARHCD PROTEsnmr
Aliens imported under contract as ex-
pert accountants were not members of a
recognlEed "learned profession,'* within Act
Cong. March 8, 1908, a 1012, 32 Stat 1218,
relating to the departure of aliens, and de-
claring in section 4 that the inhibition against
the importation of aliens to perform labor or
services of any Idnd, skilled or unskilled,
shall not apply to persons belonging to any
recognized learned profession. The defini-
tion of the word ''profession** given in the
Century Dlctonary and approved in United
States v. Laws, 16 Sup. Ct 998, 168 U. 8.
259, 41 L. Ed. 151, is a broad one, and it
seems not unreasonable to assume that Con-
gress qualified it with the adjective ''learn-
ed** for the express purpose of restricting
the scope of the exception. In re Ellis, 124
Fed. 637, 643.
Physicians, teachers, and lawyers be-
long to the "learned professfona." Flanders
v. Daley, 48 S. B. 827, 120 Ga. 886.
XJSARVIHO
See Institution of Learning.
LEASE
See Entire Lease; Further Lease; Grant-
ed and Leased ; Lessee ; ^kinlng Lease;
Oral Lease; Sublease.
Expiration of lease, see Expire — Expira-
tion.
See, also, Let
'Tbe right to lease* by the ordinarily
accepted meaning of the terms is unto the
lessee. The owner, or first party, grants the
lease, lets or demises the leased premises,
and it is the second party who leases.*'
Hence where plaintifTs predecessor in title
as ''party of the first part" executed a lease
of certain premises to defendant "as party
of the second part** for a term of two years,
which contained a clause that at the expira-
tion of the lease the party of the "first part**
should have the privilege of leasing the
premises for a further term of one year, etc.,
the words "party of the first part"* used in
such renewal clause were so plainly a cler-
ical error, used in the place of party of the
"second part*' intended, as to put a purchas-
er of the property on inquiry as to the ten-
IaEASE
54
I4EASB
anf 8 right to renew. Gray y. Maier & Zobe-
lein Brewery, 84 Paa 280, 281, 2 CaL App.
653.
A ''lease" is a commutatiye contract
Werlein y. Janssen, 86 Soutlu 216, 218, 112
La. 31,
'*A 'lease' is nothing but a contract, and
is goyemed by the same rules that other con-
tracts are." Feaster y. Fagan, 113 N. W.
478, 479, 136 Iowa, 633.
The contract employed in the creation of
the relation of landlord and tenant is called
a "lease," and with reference to this the par-
ties are designated as "lessor" and "lessee."
Foss y. Stanton, 67 AtL 942, 76 Vt 365.
The indenture or writing is the eyidence
of the lease, though the term "lease" is some-
times used to designate the writing or instru-
ment. Mattlage y. McGuire, 111 N. Y. Supp.
1083, 1085, 59 Misa Rep. 28.
The word "lease" has a settled technical
import It imports a contract by which one
person, either natural or artificial, deyests
himself, or itself of, and another person
takes possession of, lands or chattels for a
term. Moorshead y. United States Rys. Co.,
96 S. W. 261, 272, 203 Mo. 121.
A "lease" in writing constitutes a writ-
ten contract, and the lessee cannot surren-
der it or be released from its terms without
the consent of the lessor, and it is absolutely
essential to the termination of the term that
both the lessor and lessee agree to the sur-
render, and, when this is shown, the tenant
is no longer liable. To constitute the surren-
der there must be a mutual agreement be-
tween the lessor and lessee. Higgins y.
Street, 92 Pac. 153, 154, 19 Okl. 46, 13 U R.
A. (N. S.) 398, 14 Ann. Cas. 1086.
A "lease" is "a species of contract for
the possession and profits of lands and tene-
ments, either for life, or for a certain term
of years, or' during the pleasure of the par-
ties." A writing by which defendants gaye
plaintiff the right to enter on and take pos-
session of a strip of their land, and construct
thereon a tramway, and occupy it for a stated
time, in consideration of a certain amount
per year, is a lease. Asher y. Johnson, 82
S. W. 300, 301, 118 Ky. 702 (quoting Bouyier).
An Instrument reciting that it is agreed
that a lease will be giyen on certain terms,
and which was preceded by a letter in which
different terms were proposed, and the par-
ties subsequently agreed on still other terms,
did not constitute a "lease," though It was
accompanied by a payment of rent and the
lessee took possession. Ver Steeg y. Becker-
Moore Paint Co., 80 S. W. 346, 351, 106 Mo.
App. 257.
To constitute a "lease" the essentials of
a contract must be present and there must be
an offer and an acceptance of the terms of
the offer. Israelson y. WoUenberg, 116 N. Y.
Supp. 626^ 627, 63 Misc. Rep. 293.
A "lease" is a contract for the poeseBslon
and profits of land and tenements on the
one side and the recompense of rent or prop-
erty on the other. Ward y. American Health
Food Co., 96 N. W. 388, 391, 119 Wis. 12.
A paper cannot be considered as a
"lease," where it is not signed by the lessee,
does not identify the premises, or state when
the term is to begin or upon what dates the
rent is payable. Kuntz y. Mahrenholz, 88 N.
Y. Supp. 1002, 1003.
An agreement to glye a lease Is not a
"lease," unless followed up by occupation,
which is eyidence of lessee's agreement to
hire. Goldberg y. Wood, 90 N. Y. Supp. 427,
428, 45 Misc. Rep. 327.
No particular form of expression Is nee-
saiy to constitute a lease, and whateyer ex-
pressions explain the intentions of the parties
to be that one shall diyest himself of the pos-
session of his property and that the other
shall take it for a certain period of time are
sufficient and will amount to a "lease" for
the specified time as ^ectually as if the most
proper form of words had been used for that
purpose. Board of Supers of Hancock County
y. Imperial Nayal Stores Co^ 47 South. 177,
179, 93 Miss. 822, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 698.
The word 'lease," as used in Bums' Ann.
St Ind. 1901, I 5624, proylding that any tele-
phone company authorized under the act
shall haye power to lease or attach to other
telephone lines or exchanges by lease or pur-
chase, does not include the power to sell all
the property and franchises of a telephone
company to another corporation, nor can the
power to sell be necessarily Implied from the
grant of the expressed powers. Cumberland
Telephone & Telegraph Co. y. City of Eyans-
yllle, 127 Fed. 187, 193.
The word "lease," as used in a lease for
a term of one year with the priyilege of four
years' additional "lease," was equiyalent to
"term." Quinn y. VaUquette, 68 Ati. 515, 519,
80 Vt 434, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 962 (citing
Harding y. Seeley, 33 Atl. 1118, 148 Pa. 20.
A direction by one who had been occupy-
ing an apartment to the Janltress, who was
without authority to lease the same, not to
let any one haye the apartment during his
absence, and a statement by him that whei
he came back he would sign the lease with
the agent and that he wanted it for a year,
did not constitute an "oral lease," and was
no more than an agreement for a lease. Co-
lumbia Bank y. Clarke, 108 N. Y. Supp. 587,
588.
An instrument reciting receipt from de-
fendants of $10 for deposit on rent of two
specified lofts, "rent to be $65 per. month and
to run for two years," did not constitute a
"lease" of the lofts for two years ; it haying
been deliyered to defendants by an agent of
the owners not authorized to make leases,
and it also b^ng contemplated that a "leasei"
66
T.iBAine
■honld be sQbeeQuently executed by tbe own-
en. Finkelst^n t. Fabylk, lOT N. Y. Bnpp.
07, 69.
Ab instrument described as a 'lease,**
whicb fixed no length of time for it to run
nor expressed any consideration tberefor, and
wMcih recited tbat it was for ''•
montbs," and provided that "on leaving the
order for said goods dollars on the
deliyery of the same, dollars, and
every week thereafter the sum of dol-
lars," and which purported to be for the rent
of household goods and Jewelry, which were
nowhere set forth or included in the cove-
nants or agreements contained in the instru-
ment, was not a "lease." State v. Gordray, 98
a W. 1, 2, 200 Mo. 29, 9 Ann. Gas. UIO.
Since Bev. St 1899, § 1187, expressly au-
thorizes a street railway company to lease
its property, and since section 4160, provides
that when technical words having a peculiar
meaning are used in a statute they shall be
understood according to their technical im-
port, a street railroad company leasing its
property and franchises to another street
railroad company is not liable for an Injury
to a passenger resulting from the negligence
ef the employ^ of the latter company; the
word "lease" importing a contract by which
one person devests himself and another per-
son takes possession of property for a term.
Moorshead v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis,
100 & W. 611, 618, 203 Mo. 121.
Where the owner of a sewing machine
places it in possession of a prospective pur-
diaser with an option to purchase at a fixed
valuation, and with no agreement to rent,
such transaction is not a lease within Comp.
St 1907, c. 32, I 26, providing that an agree-
ment for lease must be in writing, and a
copy filed with the county derk. Singer
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Omaha Umbrella Mfg.
Ca, 119 N. W. 958, 959, 83 Neb. 619.
The word "lease,** as used in Bev. St
1899, § 1060, authorizing railroad leases, con-
templates such an instrument as divests the
lessor of possession and control and places
the same in the lessee to the exclusion of
the lessor, possessing all the qualities and
Incidents of a lease at common law between
landlord and tenant The rule that a land-
lord, in the absence of a covenant to do so,
is under no obligation to make repairs, is ap-
plicable to leases of railroads; so that the
lessor, in the absence of a covenant to repair,
is not liable for injuries sustained by em-
ployte of tbe lessee company by the latter's
negligence in failing to keep the track in
proper repair. Hahs v. Cape Girardeau & O.
B. Co., 126 S. W. 524, 528, 147 Mo. App. 262.
Where an instrument granted to defend-
ants the use of and the right to occupy cer-
tain lands described as a game preserve, and
provide! that it was understood that any fail-
ure on defendants' part to perform any of
the agreements expressed should work "a for-
feiture of this lease^** and plalntlfT In Its com-
plaint alleged that it "entered into a certain
indenture of lease,** and that "at the time of
the commission of said acts last aforesaid
such defendants were tenants of said plain-
tlif under and by virtue of said lease, and for
the purposes therein mentioned," the instru-
ment would be regarded as a "lease,** creat-
ing the relation of landlord and tenant
Shafter Estate Go. t. Alvord, 84 Pa& 279, 2
Gal. App. 602.
A "lease** is defined by Bouvler to be:
"A species of contract for the possession and
profits of lands and tenements either for life
or for a term of years or during the pleasure
of the parties. A conveyance by way of de-
mise always for a less term than the party
conveying has in the premlsea Duration for
a shorter period than the duration of the
interests of the lessor in the land is one of
its essential features, for if the lessor dis-
poses of his entire interest It becomes an
assignment, and is not a lease. In other
words, the granting of a lease always sup-
poses that the grantor reserves in himself
a reversion.** In 18 Am. & Eng. Bnc of Law
(2d Ed.) 697, a lease is defined as: "A con-
tract for the possession and profits of lands
and tenements oh the one side and the rec^
ompense or rents on the other, or in other
words, a conveyance to a person for life,
years or at will, in consideration of a rent
or other recompense.** Within these defini-
tions a sealed writing, witnessing that "the
lessors do demise, let and lease for coal
mining and coke manufacturing purposes for
a period of thirty years" a tract of land, and
which expressly agrees that "if at the expira-
tion of the said period of thirty years, all the
available merchantable coal which can be
profitably mined has not been mined and
removed, the lessees shall have the privilege
of an extension of this lease on the same
terms and conditions as those hereinbefore
set forth, for a reasonable additional time
until the whole of said coal can be so mined
and removed," and which provides for a rent
or royalty to the lessors of a certain amount
per ton, created a 'aease.** Harvey Coal,&
Coke Co. V. Dillon, 53 S. B. 928. 930, 59 W.
Va. 606, 6 li. B. A. (N. S.) 628.
Where a statute provides for the pay-
ment of a franchise tax by railroads, express
companies, chair and dining car companies,
etc., to the state, and also a local tax to
the county, dty, or taxing district, and an-
other statute provides for the ascertainment
of the franchise tax according to that pro-
portion of the capital stock which the length
of lines operated, owned, or leased in the
state bears to the total mileage operated,
owned, or leased, and the proportion of the
tax to be paid in any locality is to be com-
puted In the same way, a trafllc arrangement
by which one railroad obtains the right t6
use the tracks of another for a certain pe-
riod of time at a certain rental, in order to
I/BASB
5«
y^ilE^jlH
obtain ingrasB to a terminal dty, to a ''lease/'
within the meaning of the statute and tor
the mileage operated under which the rail-
road is liable to pay a franchise tax. Jeffer-
son Ck>unty t. Board of Valuation & Assess-
ment of Kentucky, 78 S. W. 443, 445, 117 Ky.
531.
Where a will devised a farm to a son
of testatrix, and provided that if the farm
should be leased for the purpose of mining
the proceeds of the lease should be divided
among the children of testatrix, the word
"lease" was not used in a technical sense,
but indicated a method of converting the min-
erals into proceeds. Hyde v. Rainey, 82 Atl.
781, 784, 233 Pa. 540, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 726.
Under a covenant in an oil and gas lease
that the lessor would, in and by any deed
thereunder executed by him, prohibit any
drilling for oil or gas on any land so con-
veyed, the word "deed" does not Include a
"lease," so as to prohibit the lessor from
leasing the IsBd for the purpose of drilling
oil and gas wells thereon. Test Oil Co. v.
La Tourette, 91 Pac. 1025, 1029, 19 Okl. 214.
The use in a< writing of such words as
"lease" and "rent," the fact that it is for a
definite period and a recited consideration,
that it provides for an abatement of rent in
case of the obstruction of the wall by other
buildings, also for necessary access through
and upon the premises, and that the lessor
warrants the title to said leasehold for the
time herein mentioned, demonstrates that the
writing was intended as a "lease." Levy
V. Louisville Gunning System, 89 S. W. 528,
580, 121 Ky. 510, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 859.
The words "reserves" and "leases," in
the title and body of chapter 244, p. 456,
Laws 1897, providing for the assessment and
taxing of mineral reserves, or leases, or sep-
arately owned mineral, or mineral rights,
to the owner thereof, separately from the
land, and providing penalties for its viola-
tion, mean at one time reserved or leased
mineral, and at another written instruments
evidencing mineral rights. Kansas Natural
Gas Co. V. Board of Com'rs of Neosho Coun-
ty, 89 Pac. 750, 751, 75 Kan. 335.
Naphtha lamps and fire alarm lanterns
owned and used by a lighting company in
performance of its contract to light and
maintain all naphtha lamps used by the city
for lighting are not within Rev. Laws, c. 12,
i 23, cl. 2, making personal property "leased"
for profit liable to taxation where located,
since the lamps are not held by the city as
a "lessee." Rising Sun St. Lighting Co. v.
aty of Boston, 63 N. E. 408, 181 Mass. 211.
A "lease" granted premises, described
on a blueprint attached, reserving from the
said "leased premises" that portion lying
between the tracks of the L. Railroad, as
shown on such blueprint, and also reserving
a strip of land 10 feet on either side of
said railroad tracks. Another clause granted
the lessee an optSou to purdiaae 111*' said
"leased premises" at a certain price. Held,
that the saving clause was not a reservation
of an easement merely, but reserved from
the operation of the lease the fee of the por-
tion reserved, and, such reservation having
been omitted from a deed executed on the
exprcise of the option, the grantor was en-
titled to have the mistake corrected. Los
Angeles ft R. R. Co. v. New Liverpool Salt
Co., 87 Pac. 1029, 1030, 150 Cal. 21.
A Jury's negative answer to the special
interrogatory, "Did you find that" the land-
lord's agent "had authority to waive the
lease" of the landlord on any part of the
crop covered by his lien, is not inconsistent
with the verdict for the defendant, as author-
ity to "waive the lease" is something different
from authority to waive the lien. Fishbaugh
V. Spunaugle. 92 N. W. 58, 60, 118 Iowa, 337,
As eoaTejraaoo
Conveyance as including, aee ConTeyancft
A "lease" is defined to be "a conveyance
of lands or tenements to a person for life,
for a term of years, or at will, in considera-
tion of a return of rent or some other rec-
ompense." Hayes v. aty of Atlanta, 57
S. B>. 1087, 1089, 1 Ga. App. 25 (quoting and
adopting definition In Black, Law Diet).
A "lease" is a conveyance of an estate
or interest in real property for life^ for years,
at will, or for a term less than the grantor
had in the real property. The term is not
satisfied by a contract by which a landowner
gives to another a right to convey water
from a spring. Clark v. Strong, 93 N. T.
Supp. 514, 516, 105 App. Div. 179.
"A 'lease' may be in a sense a convey-
ance, but such is not the commonly accepted
nor the accurate meaning of the term. When
we say premises are 'leased,' we generally
mean that the use of them Is transferred."
Duff V. Keaton, 124 Pac. 291, 294, 33 Okl. 92,
42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 472 (quoting definition in
Perkins v. Morse, 2 Atl. 130, 78 Me. 17, 57
Am. Rep. 780).
A "lease" is a conveyance by the owner
of an estate to another of a portion of his
interest therein for a term less than his own,
and it passes a present Interest in the land
for the period specified. Chandler v. Hart,
119 Pac. 516, 519, 161 CaL 405, Ann, Cas.
1913B, 1094.
To "lease" is to transfer, for a term
specified therein, from the lessor to the lessee,
the property therein demised. Moorshead v.
United Rys. Co., 96 S. W. 261, 277, 203 Mo.
121.
The word "lease" is sometimes used to
signify the interest and estate which is
conveyed, but may properly apply to the in-
strument or means of conveyance. Weauder
V. Claussen Brewing Ass'n, 84 Pac 7^, 736».
42 Wash. 226, 114 Am. St Rep. UO, 7 Ana
Cas. 536.
IrEASE
67
tXABA
"A lease^ Is a contract for the posaeaston
of profits of land and tenements on tlie one
aide and the recompense or rents on the oth-
er, or, in other words, a conveyance to a per-
son for life, years, or at will in consideration
of a rent or other recompense." Headley v.
Hoopengamer, 56 8. E. 744, 748» 60 W. Va.
026.
Onutt of oasememt
Ky. St 1903, S 2031, anthorizes a guard-
ian to lease any real estate of his ward until
the latter shall arrive at full age provided no
such lease Is made for a longer term than
seven years. Held that, where a guardian
granted an easement for the laying of pipe
line over his ward's land, a conveyance would
be construed as a valid lease of the property
for the purpose intended during the minority
of the ward but not for a longer term than
seven years. Cumberland Pipe Line Oo. v.
Howard (Ky.) 100 S. W. 270.
As deed
(see ijeeo*
See Grant
As iaewAtoftaee
See Incumbrance.
Zdcense diatbugnUiheA
The difference between a license and a
lease is that a lease gives to the tenant the
right of possession against the world, while
a license creates no interest in the land, but
is simply the authority or power to use it in
some specific way. Joplin Supply Oo. v.
West, 130 S. W. 166, 161, 149 Mo. App. 78.
A license in respect to real estate is an
authority to do a particular act or series of
acts on the land of another without possess-
ing an estate therein. The test to determine
whether an agreement for the use of real
estate is a license or a lease is whether the
contract gives exclusive use of the premises
against all the world, including the owner»
in which case it is a lease, or whether it
merely confers a privilege to occupy under
the owner, in which case it is a license, the
question to be determined by a construction
of the instrument Shaw v. Oaldwell, 116
Pac. 941, 943, 16 CaL App. 1.
The test to determine whether an agree-
ment for the use of real estate is a "leased*
or a license is whether the contract gives ex-
clusive possession of the premises against
the world, including the owner, in which case
it is a lease, or whether it merely confers a
license to occupy under the owner. An in-
strument by which the owner of premises let
to defendant '*his ioe business and privileges
in * * * with the use and benefit of his
icehouses," for a term ending on a certain
date^ gave defendant the exclusive posseo-
Bion of, and the entire beneficial interest in,
the icehouses and the land under them, so
as to eonstitnte a lease of the iwemises, in-
stead of a mere contract for their use as
licensee under the owner. Roberts v. Lynn
Ice Oo., 78 N. E. 623, 624, 187 Mass. 402.
A contract, whereby it was agreed that
plaintiff should have the exclusive privilege
of the public stenographer's office in a cer-
tain hotel, plaintiff agreeing to pay the rent
promptly each month in advance for the
exclusive privilege of the public stenogra-
pher's office, and to do private correspondence
for the hotel management, and to furnish
competent stenographers for this service,
was not a "lease," but a mere agreement to
allow plaintiff to carry on bqfitneBS in the
hotel. Hess v. Roberts, 108 N. Y. Supp. 894,
896, 124 ^p. Div. 828.
An agreement whereby tenants of a store
building, leased for a plumbing business, al-
lowed a third person to occupy part of it in
conducting an electrical supply business, was
a 'lease," though called a "license" by them.
Denecke v. Henry F. Miller ft Son, 119 N. W.
880, 384, 142 Iowa, 466^ 19 Ann. Gas. 949.
An instrument by whidi defendant con-
tracted to "let," and plaintiff to "take," the
right to maintain, at a race park, three
stands for sale of candies, said right b^ng
exclusive for said business within said park,
also the storeroom under the tracks, and one
of said stands, not to exceed a certain size,
to be in the main pavillion, and providing
the period of "letting," and the amount and
times of payment of the "rent," instead of
b^ng a "license," is a "lease," affecting de-
fendant in the exclusive use of the land, so
that plaintiff, having paid the rent, can re^
cover no part of it, though the park is de-
stroyed by fire before the end of the period
of letting. Mehlman v. Atlantic Amusement
Co.. 119 N. T. Supp. 222, 223, 66 Misc. Rep.
26.
A contract to let to plaintiffs the exclu-
sive news, confectionery, view, and checking
privileges on defendant's steamers for cer-
tain specified seasons, though denominated a
"lease," was not a "lease," but a "license."
Nash V. Thousand Islands Steamboat Co.,
108 N. T. Supp. 336, 342, 123 App. Div. 148.
An instrument granting, demising, and
leasing certain land for the purpose solely of
mining and operating for oil, gas, and other
minerals, laying pipe lines, building tanks,
and structures to take care of the products
is a lease conveying an interest in the land,
and not merely a license to enter and operate
for oil or gas. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas
Co., 74 AU. 207, 226 Pa. 838.
An instrument by whidi the owner of
land therein described grants to another all
the gas and oil under it, with the exclusive
right to enter thereon at all times to drill
and operate for oil or gas, etc., and provides
for the time within which the various wells
shall be completed, with a stipulated month-
ly rental for each well not finished on time.
UBASB
68
T^TCAftTB
and tbat each locatioa shall consist of ten
acres more or less, and that no well shall
occupy more than one acre, is not a *'lease/'
as leases are usually understood, but a mere
grant of an ezduslye right to enter and ex-
plore for oil and gas, and prosecute such busi-
ness, occupying no more land than is needed
for that purpose, not more than one acre to
a well. Stahl v. Illinois Oil Co.. 90 N. E.
632, 633, 45 Ind. App. 211.
Mining lieense
A contract simply giving a right to take
ore from a mine, no estate being granted,
confers a mere "license," and licensee ac-
quires no right to the ore until separated
from the freehold; but an instrument deyls-
ing lands for mining purposes, for a desig-
nated term of years, at a fixed rent, and giv-
ing the right to erect all necessary buildings,
is a ''lease," not merely a mining license.
BarnsdaU v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 AtL 207,
208, 225 Pa. 338, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 614.
Implied eeTenaAt tor qvlet enjoyment
The words "grant," "demise," or "lease,"
in a lease for years, creates a covenant in
law for good title and quiet enjoyment of the
lands demised during the term. Headley v.
Hoopengamer, 55 S. B. 744, 747, 60 W. Va.
626.
Am purpetnlty
See Perpetuity.
As property
See Personal Property; Property.
As privileso
See Privilege.
Sale and eontraot of sale distingnislied
A conveyance of standing timber for
sawmill purposes is a sale of land and not a
'lease" within Civ. Code 1895, | 3613, declar-
ing that on a sale of land there is no implied
warranty of title, and hence a vendee of
standing timber cannot defend against a suit
on purchase-money notes in any plea predi-
cated on the breach of an implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment McLendon Bros. v.
Finch, 58 S. E. 600, 692, 2 Ga. App. 421.
A contract binding the party of the first
part to rent certain land to the party of the
second part, providing for the payment of
three installments of rent, and agreeing that
if these are paid the party of the first part
will convey the land to the party of the sec-
ond part, was a "lease" and not a contract of
sale. Thomas v. Johnson, 95 S. W. 468, 460,
78 Ark. 574 (citing Quertermous v. Hatfield,
14 S. W. 1096, 54 Ark. 16; Ish v. Morgan, 3
S. W. 440, 48 Ark. 413 ; Watson v. Pugh, 10
S. W. 493, 51 Ark. 218; Cheney v. Ubby, 10
Sup. Ct 496, 134 U. S. 68, 33 L. Ed. 818;
Blanchard v. Raines, 20 Fla. 467; Houston
V. Smythe, 5 South. 520, 66 Miss. 118).
A written instrument denominated a
"lease," acknowledging the receipt of $50,
and providing for further payments of $10
per month, with interest, until a certain sum
was paid, after which the leased personalty
was to become the property of the lessee, was
a conditional sale. Pringle v. Ganfield, 104
N. W. 223, 19 S. D. 506.
A contract provided that plaintiff leased
from the owner of certain land a tract con-
taining 250 acres and agreed to pay $205 for
the year 1905, with the privilege of rerenting
the property on the same terms for seven
successive years, and that In case of such re-
newals, on full payment of the rent, the own-
er on completion of the period would convey
the property to plaintiff in consideration of
$1, and the amount, with legal interest, of
taxes paid pending the contract Held, that
such contract operated as a "lease," and
the annual payments as rent, so long as it
was executory, and on completion of the pay-
ments it became a sale, at plaintiff's option,
on his paying $1, taxes, and interest pending
the contract. Heard v. Heard ft Lee, 41
South. 827, 828, 148 Ala. 673 (citing Davis v.
Robert, 8 South. 114, 89 Ala. 404, 18 Am. St
Rep. 126; Wilkinson v. Roper, 74 Ala. 140).
The owner of land on which there were
dumps of slag and smelter products entered
into a contract denominated a "lease," by
which he purported to lease the land for a
stated term, with the right to remove the
dumps on payment of a series of notes matur-
ing at intervals through a portion of the
teruL The contract provided, in effect, that
removal of the dumps should proceed only in
proportion as payments were made, that
when all the dumps were removed the lease
should terminate, and that on payment of all
the notes on or before maturity the lessee
should be entitled to a bill of sale of the
dumps, with the right to remove the same
within a specified term. It further provided
that: "It is mutually agreed that all worts
on the said above-described slag, slag dumps
and materials and smelter products shall be
performed in a thoroughly workmanlike man-
ner, and that any failure of the said party
of the first part to do or keep any of the
agreements herein, • • • or any failure
to pay immediately when due any one or
more of said 100 promissory notes, • • *
shall work a forfeiture of all rights of the
said party of the first part under this agree-
ment, and the said party of the second part
shall have the right * * * to declare
each and every one and all of the said 100
promissory notes, or whatever number of the
said notes may remain unpaid, • • • im-
mediately due and payable, and • • •
to collect the same, • • • and in case of
forfeiture as aforesaid all work done and
money expended by the said party of the
first part shall inure to the party of the sec-
ond part as liquidated damages, • ^ *
and the said party * * * may thereupon
* * • enter upon said premises and dis-
possess all persons occupying the same."
Held, that such transaction was not a leasee
IiEASB
69
LEASE FROM TEAB TO TEAR
but a conditional sale of the material In the
dumps, whicli gave the owner alternative
remedies for breach of the contract, and that,
where lie declared a forfeiture and took pos-
eesalon because of default In payment of
notes, he conld not also collect the notes ma-
turing thereafter. Manson v. Dayton, 163
Fed. 258, 258, 265, 82 a a A 588.
An agreement to sell a machine for a
certain price. Installments to be paid on ac-
ceptance of the proposition and shipment of
the ma<diine, with an option of returning It
within a certain time In lieu of the last pay-
ment, and giving no claim on the part paid,
is a 'lease" for experimental purposes with
the privilege of completing the purchase, and
not a sale within Cav. Gbde, § 1770, providing
that one who manufactures an article under
an order for a particular purpose warrants
It reasonably fit therefor. Kullman, Salz &
CkK V. Sugar Apparatus Mfg. Co., 96 irac 369,
372, 153 OaL 725.
A contract recited that S. desired to
have the "use" of plalntlflrs building and
saloon fixtures, to become "the owner of said
fixtures w^hen fully paid for,** and provided
that 8. could use the premises for a spedfled
term ; that he should make spedfled month-
ly payments to plalntilf, until the total pay«
ments, after deducting monthly ground rent,
should equal the cost of the building, fix-
tures, etc., and 8 per cent per annum Interest
thereon, when S. should be deemed the owner
of the fixtures, thereafter paying plaintiff
$55 per month until the expiration of ids
ground lease, and that S.'s failure to make
the monthly payments should evidence a re-
llnqnishment of his rights under the contract.
Held, that the contract evidenced a condi-
tional sale of the flxtures, etc., and not a
"lease** thereof ; S. becoming the owner there-
of on reimbursing plaintiff his original in-
vestment, with interest, etc. Ooors v. Rea-
gan, 96 Pac. 966, 967, 44 Colo. 126.
A contract, after reciting that the ven-
dors had "rented" certain furniture, provided
that the title should remain In the vendors
until the purchase money was paid In spec-
ified Installments, and on default in any
payment the vendors reserved the right to
take possession without legal process. There
was further provision that all payments
should be placed to the credit of the vendee
as payments on the "lease," or any other
goods for which he might owe the vendors
on open account on any other "lease,** and
that the vendee was to have no title to the
'iease" until his account should be settled in
full. Held, that the contract was one of
conditional sale, entitling the vendors to the
protection afforded by Code 1907, { 7342, mak-
ing it a crime to remove or sell personal
property to hinder or defraud any person
who has a valid claim thereto, wltti knowl-
edge of the existence of such claim. Steele
V. State, 48 South. 673, 674, 159 Ala. 9.
A contract, though in the form of a lease
and called a "lease," by whldi the vendor
reserves title until final payment should be
made, and the right of rescission in case the
purchaser should fail to pay any installments
of the so<»lled rent, Is a conditional sale.
Unitype Co. v. Long, 143 Fed. 315, 317, 74
O. a A. 458.
A "lease" of property under an agree-
ment that, on payment of a specified sum in
installments, title shall pass to the lessee,
amounts to a conditional sale, valid as to
third parties as well as the parties to the
transaction. Kidder v. Wlttler-Corbin Ma-
chinery Co.. 80 Pac. 801, 802, 38 Wash. 179.
Sliartiig eontraet
An owner of a farm and milk route let
it to one on condition that he furnish horses,
etc., and divide the proceeds as follows:
Eggs, daily; crops, w)ien sold ; milk, month-
ly. Held, that the contract did not create
the relation of landlord and t^iant and is
not a "lease," and h^ice did not create the
relation necessary to allow the application
of the law relating to the right of distress
for rent Olden v. Mather, 67 AtL 435, 73
N. J. IQq. 217 (citing Gray T. Reynolds, 50
Atl. 670, 67 N. J. Law, 169).
IAA8B AT WnX
A lease of real property f6r more than
three years, signed by an agent whose au-
thority Is not in writing, has against the
principal no other force or effect, either in
law or In equity, than a '^ease at will," be-
cause of the first section of the statute of
frauds. Clement v. Young-McShea Amuse-
ment Co., 67 Aa 82, 84, 70 N. J. Bq. 677, 118
Am. St Rep. 747 (citing (3en. St p. 1602).
IAA8B FOB TBABS
A lease for any definite period is a
^ease for years," and a lease for one year
and a lease for 99 years create an estate of
equal dignity. Moss Point Lumber 0>. v.
Board of Sup'rs of Harrison County, 42
South. 290, 298, 89 Mlsa 448.
"A 'lease for years* is a contract between
lessor and lessee for the possession and
profits of lands and .tenements on the one
hand and a recompense by rent or other con-
sideration on the other." City of New York
V. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 104 N. T.
Supp. 157, 160, 53 Misc. Rep. 126 (quoting and
adopting definition in McAdam, LandL ft T.
127).
XiEASE FROM TEAB TO TEAR
A lease for one year to continue there-
after from year to year so long as mutually
agreeable to the parties Is a "lease from year
to year" after the first year, and entitles the
tenant to possession for at least two years
and to sixty days* notice before the end of a
year to terminate the lease. McQuinn v.
Logue^ 128 S. W. 516» 517, 143 Mo. App. 232.
LEASE OF OONVICTS
60
LEAVE— ^LBAVINa
I.SA8B or ooinrzoTs
'The attempt is made to constrae the ex-
pression 'leasing or hiring of convicts,' as
used in the Oonstitation, as being synony-
mous with 'leasing of farms to be worked by
the convicts.' How futile such an effort is
will be apparent when we recall that at the
adoption of the Oonstitution there was no
system of leasing farms, and hence it was
Impossible that the constitutional convention
could have dealt with a situation which had
never arisen." Henry v. State, 39 South. 856,
876. 87 Miss. 1.
LEA8EHOIJ>
A "leajsehold" is defined to be "an es-
tate in realty held under a lease." Hayes y.
Olty of Atlanta, 67 S. B. 1087, 1089, 1 Ga.
App. 25 (quoting and adopting definition in
Blade, Law Diet).
"A leasehold interest' is not real estate,
but merely a chattel real, which is personal
property." Townsend v. Boyd, 66 AtL 1099,
1101, 217 Pa. 386, 12 L. B. A. (N. S.) U48.
A "leasehi^d" is an intangible chattel
real; it is an entity per se, distinguished
from the fee ownership out of whidi it is-
sues. "Whether the disdnction seems re-
fined or not, it is real in legal thought, for a
leasehold is not the wheat or com produced
under the right conferred by the lease. The
lease is a thing apart from the commodities
produced under the right conferred by it" A
sealed writing demising and leasing for ooal
mining and coke manufacturing purposes for
thirty years a tract of land, and granting
unto the lessee the sole right of mining, ship-
ping, and selling coal from the leased prem-
ises, with an extension to remove ooal which
can be profitably mined, providing for a rent
or royalty to the lessor of ten cents a ton
for all coal mined, containing a forf<^ture
clause for breach of covenant, created a
leasehold or chattel real, taxable to the les-
see under Acts 1905, p. 285, c. 35. Harvey
Coal, etc., Co. v. DiUon, 53 S. B. 928, 936, 59
W. Va. 605.
A "leasehold" is the right to use proper-
ty upon which a lease is held for the purpos-
es of the lease. It is intangible property,
which the law recognizes as having value,
but which is incorporeal in its nature. It is
not the property upon which the lease is held
nor the property used in its exercise. In
determining the taxable value of the lease-
hold, the pecuniary value of the property
used in connection therewith or the use of
which constitutes the leasehold estate may
not be teken into consideration. The land
which constitutes the subject of the lease-
hold is taxed, not as a leasehold, nor in the
name of the lessee, but as land, In the
name of the owner, and is not to be taxed
over again in the name of the lessee, on the
theory that it constitutes part of the lease-
hold. Nor are the improvemente on the land,
whether they bdong to the landowntf or the
lessee, to be taxed under the designation of
"leasehold." If they belong to the owner of
the land, they are charged to him, either as
land or as personal property. Their value
is not to be included in, or taken to make up^
the value of the intangible thing, the lease-
hold. Stete T. Bare, 66 S. E. 890, 893, 60
W. Va. 483.
IJnder Bums' Ann. St 1908, |$ 8396,
8396, giving a mechanic's lien on buildings
and land to the extent of the title of the
owner for whose immediate benefit the labor
was done, or materials furnished, and where
the owner has only a leasehold, the lien is
not Impaired by a forfeiture of the lease for
rent, one furnishing materials under, a con-
tract with a purchaser in possession does
not obtein a lien on the building as against
the vendor after a surrender of the posses-
sion and righto of the purchaser; the
term "leasehold" not including such purchas-
er. Toner v. Whybrew, 96 N. B. 460, 468, 60
Ind« App. 887.
As ehattel real
See Chattel Real.
As freeliold
See Freehold.
As goods and eliattels
See Goods.
As lionestead
See Homestead.
As interest in land
See Interest (In Property).
As property
See Personal Property; Property; Beal
Property.
LEAST
See At Least
LEAVE— LEAVING
See Die Leaving Children; Die Leaving
No Children; Die Leaving No Issue;
Loss Through His Leaving; Should
They Leave Issue.
Going away from a horse, beyond sight,
hearing, and reasonably immediate reach, is
"leaving" it, within a city ordinance declar-
ing leaving any horse unhitched within a
street a nuisance. Monroe v. Hartfoid St.
Ry. Co., 66 Aa 498, 600, 76 Conn. 201.
The word "leaving," as used in an ordi-
nance forbidding the leaving of a horse, etc.,
unattended in the street, means to desert, to
abandon, to forsake; hence to give up, to
relinquish. Southern Hardware & Supply
Co. V. Standard Equipment Co., 48 South.
357, 358, 158 Ala. 696.
The word "leave," in a letter written by
testator to plaintiff, reciting "Delos, if there
is not any change in my family, I shall leave
IJBAV]B*-IiSAVIKa
61
LEFT WITH
oae-half of wbat I liave for yoUt but hare
willed yoa $1,000— now I want to say to you
— ^yon get me up a cane that will be good
enough f6r you when I get through with,
and I win 'leave' the cane and $1,000 with
It when I get through/* means prima fade
wllL The testator accepted the cane fur-
nished by plaintiff, and used It for many
years, but did not leave $1,000 to plalntlfE,
but substantially all of his property to an
adopted daughter, who was amply provided
for without the $1,000. Plaintiff was entitled
to specific performace of the contract cre-
ated by the letter. Bush v. Whltaker, 91 N.
Y. Supp. 616, 618, 45 Misc. Rep. 74.
D^endanf a dray driver finished loading
his dray from a car, drove away from the
car from four to six feet and stopped the
team, and was tying the load on the dray
without having hold of the lines, when an-
other team frightened his horses and they
backed against the car, crushing plaintiff.
Held, that the driver was not negligent as
having left his team, within an ordinance
making it unlawful to leave an animal at-
tached to a dray upon a public street with-
out locking the wheels of the vehicle; to
leave,*' within the ordinance, meaning to
depart or abandon for the time, to go away
from the immediate charge and supervision
of the animals. While the driver of M.'8
team had gotten down to fasten his load,
B.'s team was negligently drivoi so as to
frighten M.'s team, which backed up and
crushed plaintiff's intestate. Held, that the
fact that the accident would not have hap-
pened if the wheels of M.'a dray had been
locked was no excuse for the negligent driv-
ing of B.'s team, where the act of M.'s driv-
er in getting down did not amount to a leav-
ing of his team within an ordinance requir-
ing wheels to be locked in such cases, the
condition and equipment of M.'s dray being
immaterial on the question of B.*s liability,
unless M.'s driver violated the ordinance and
by the fact of so doing was negligent. Sul-
Uvan V. Morton Draying ft Warehouse Co.,
108 Pac 895, 896, 13 Cal App. 85.
Laws N. C. 1899, p. 175, c 54, { 62, author-
izes service on certain insurance companies
by ''leaving" the summons in the office of
the conmaissioner of insurance. Held that,
where a return recited that service was made
by reading the summons to the commission-
er of insurance and "delivering" a copy there-
of to him, it would be presumed that a copy
of the summons was left with the commis-
sioner; the court in which the action was
brought being one of general Jurisdiction.
Johnston V. Mutual Reserve life Ins. Co.,
98 N. Y. Supp. 1052, 1059, 104 ApQ. Div. 550.
LEAVENED
Edible wafers, raised in the making by
the use of baking powder or bicarbonate of
soda, are "leavened," although such agents
do not produce fermentation. F. H. Leggett
ft Ck>. V. United States* 181 Fed. 817, 818.
LEAVES
See Ornamental Leaves.
Artificial leaves, see Artificial Flowers.
As to palm leaves which have been sub-
jected to processes that restore their natural
appearance and prevent decay, and some of
which have been arranged in wreaths on
wire frames, held* that, as there had be^ no
advance in manufacture that destroyed the
original articles or made them useful for oth-
er purposes, or altered their trade designa-
tion, they still remained dutiable as "leaves,"
under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, a 11, J 1.
Schedule N, par. 425, 30 Stat 191, rather
than as "manufactures" of palm leat pro-
vided for tn paragraph 450, 30 Stat 198.
Kreshower t. United States, 152 Fed. 485,
486.
LEDGER
See Stoac Ledger.
As book of original entries, see Book of
Original Entries.
A ledger is a book of accounts in which
are colleeted and arranged, each und^ its
appropriate head, the various transactions
scattered throughont the journal or daybook.
First Nat Bldg. Co. v. Vandenberg, 119 Pac
224, 227, 29 OkL 688.
LEFT
See Whatsoever is Left
''Left," in a devise of all the testatrix's
estate to two grandchildren equally to be
their estate, not subject to the debts or con-
trol of their husbands, and providing that
on the death of either of them without de-
scendants the survivor should have the share
of the one so dying, and on the death of the
survivor without descendants what was left
should go to the others, shows that testatrix
did not intend to devise to others the entire
fund, but only so much of it as should vest
at the death of the surviving issue. Irvine
V. Putnam (Ky.) 89 S. W. 520, 521.
lAFT SECURED OE MT BEAL ESTATE
In a will giving testator's wife the in-
terest on a sum of money so long as she
lives and ronains unmarried, to be "left se-
cured on my real estate," the phrase quot-
ed did not require the legacy to the wife to
be secured by a mortgage on testator's real
estate, but created a charge on such real
estate without the aid of a mortgage. Plum
V. Smith, 82 Aa 768, 764, 70 N. J. Bq. 002.
LEFT WITH
A person being in charge of an ofllce
must be understood to have been la charge
of the whole of it, and a paper placed before
jjEa
IiEOAOT
his eyes in a conspicuous place on the office
desk therein Is, In contemplation of Ckxle Olv.
Proc. § lOU, "left with a person having
charge" of the office. People t. Perils Irr.
Dist, 76 Pac. 381, 142 Cal. 601.
LEG
See Breaking of a Leg.
A policy insuring against an accidental
breaking of a "leg or arm" covers fractures
of bones of the limbs whether In the hands
or feet or in the upper or central divisions of
the limbs, Including a fracture of the heel
bone (OS calcis). Rogers v. Modem Brother-
hood of America, 111 S. W. 618, 181 Mo.
App. 358.
LEGACY
See Beneficial Legacy; Contingent Leg-
acy; Cumulative Legacy; Demonstra-
tive Legacy ; Entitled to Legacy; Gen-
eral Legacy; Modal Legacy; Specific
Legacy; Vested Legacy.
Legacies are parcels of the distributable
estate. Their amount may be expressed in
precise figures, or they may be determinable
upon an established basis of computation.
Blakeslee v. Pardee. 56 AtL 503, 505, 76 Conn.
268.
Testamentary trustees are entitled to
pay the Income from, trust funds to the
guardian of an infant beneficiary pending
proceedings for settlement of their accounts
without requiring a bond; such income be-
ing neither a "legacy" nor "distributive
share," within Code Civ. Proc. f 2746. In re
Williams, 123 N. Y. Supp. 883, 884, 66 Misc.
Rep. 417.
Testator gave his sister a specified
amount and also one-half of his residuary
estate. By a codicil he gave to two nieces
and a nephew **the legacy which I have left
to my sister," share and share alike. Held,
that the word "legacy" will be construed to
include, not only the money legacy in the
win, but the gift of half of the residuary
estate. In re Norritf Estate, 66 AtL 1000,
1001, 217 Pa. 560.
"No particular words are essential to
create a 'legacy' or devise; the essential
thing is that the intention of the testator
to thereby make the gift from property of
the estate is shown." A clause of a will
providing that "the residue of my real es-
tate, after my son H. has been paid what he
has paid for me at various times, I will and
bequeath," etc., creates a "legacy" to H.
of the amounts paid by him for the tes-
tator. In re Barclay's Estate, 93 Pac 1012,
1014, 152 Cal. 753.
The right given to a beneficiary by a
will to receive a stated share of the net
income from the entire residuary estate of
^he testator, left in trust until the time fixed
for its distribution, Is not a "legacy^ or
"distributive share," within the meaning of
such terms as used in War Revenue Act
June 13, 1808, c. 448, | 29, 80 Stat 464;
and, under Act June 27, 1902, c. 1160, | 8,
32 Stat 406, which provides that no tax
shall be assessed under said section 29 in
respect of any contingent beneficial interest
which shall not become absolutely vested in
possession or enjoyment prior to July 1, 1902,
the only interest of the legatee in such in-
come which was subject to taxation was the
amount thereof actually received by him
prior to said July 1, 1902, provided such
amount was $10,000 or more. Lynch r.
Union Trust Co. of San Francisco, 164 Fed.
161, 168, 90 C. C. A. 147.
Shares of stock in a New Jersey cor-
poration belonging to a testatrix, residmit of
Rhode Island, and passing under a bequest
in her will, are subject to the inheritance
tax imposed by P. L. 1906, p. 432, c. 228,
entitled "An act to amend an act entitled
*An act to tax intestates' estates, legades,'"
etc, which by section 1, subd. 2, imposes a
tax when the transfer is by will of property
within the state, and decedent was a non-
resident of the state at death; the stock be-
ing embraced by the term "legacies" as used
in the title. Dixon v. Russell, 73 Atl. 51,
52, 78 N. J. Law, 296.
Gift oausa mortis dlstingwlslied
See Gift Causa Mortla
Paymemt of d«1»t
A legacy implies a bounty, and not a
payment In re Bailey's Estate, 89 N. T.
Supp. 538, 542, 43 Misc. Rep. 662.
The word "legacy," as used In the War
Revenue Act June 13, 1898, imposing a tax
on "legacies" in the hands of administratorSk
executors, or trustees, is a definite gift by
wUl of personal property either general and
pecuniary, or spedflc. It is of specific article
of personal property or of ascertained and
definite pecuniary amount which may be
readily valued by the executor or trustee
having it in charge. Disston v. McOain,
147 Fed. 114, 117, 77 O. C. A. 340.
Personalty or realty
A "legacy" is a gift by will of personal
property. Harding's Adm'r v. Harding, 116
S. W. 305, 307, 132 Ky. 133.
A "legacy" is defined as "a bequest or
gift of personal property by last will and
testament" Desloge v. Tucker, 94 S. W.
283, 286, 196 Mo. 587 (quoting Black, Law
Diet).
The terms "legacy" and "legatee" have
different meanings in the French Code and
Civil Law, from what they usually have
under the English system; but even in the
United States they may be used to refer to
a devise of real property. Lindsay t. Wll-
IiEGACT
LEOAOT TAX
8on, 63 Aa 566, 570, 108 Hd. 262, 8 L. B.
A. (N. 8.) 408.
A "legacy" is a disposition of personal
property by wllL Under a will creating a
trust, tbe benefldary was empowered to dis-
pose of the property by will and giye tbe
same to varioas charitable institutions and
directed her executors after the payment
of numerous bequests, to pay out of the
residue any inheritance taxes due on any of
tbe legacies whether to the state or federal
authorities. Held, that the various disposi-
tions of the trust estate constituted *'leg-
ades" and are entitled to have the transfer
taxes paid out of the residuary estate. Is-
ham Y. New York Ass'n for ImproTlng the
Condition of the Poor, 69 N. E. 367, 869,
m N. Y. 218.
Strictly speaking, the t^m "legadeir re-
fers to personal property, but it may be,
and often is, used in a more extended sense
by persons una^uainted with the precise
meaning of legal terms, and, when so used,
may embrace real estate. Bussell t. Blden,
15 Me. 103, 196.
Although the words "devise** and "dev-
laee" properly and technically apply only to
real estate, and the words "legacy," "leg-
atee," "bequest," and "bequeath" only to
personal property, they have been made in-
terchangeable by Ky. St 1903, f 467, which
provides that "the words 'legatee' and 'dev-
isee' shall each be held to convey the same
idea; and the words 'bequeath' and 'devise'
to mean the same thing; and the words
'bequest' and 'legacy' shall each be held to
mean the same thing and to embrace and
in<dude either real or personal property or
both." Roberts v. Chenoweth, 112 S. W. 625,
627.
In common acceptation, "bequest" and
"legacy" are synonymous terms, but "be-
qaeath" is the term generally by which a
gift of personalty is made in a will, and a
legacy is the money or personal property
bequeathed. The words "devise," "bequest,"
and "legacy" are not infrequently used in
wills in a sense different from their strict
legal meaning. It is stated, in a recent
work on wilhi, that: "Of the verbs used to
denote the act of making a will, 'devise'
is properly used of realty, and 'bequeath'
of personalty. Of the nouns used to name
the various forms of gift, 'devise' is used
of a gift of realty. 'Legacy' is used of a
gift of personalty in general. None of these
words have so fixed a legal meaning, how-
ever, that a gift will fail because testator
does not use the words descriptive of the gift
or the act of giving with technical accura<*y.
A devise is often miscalled a 'bequest,' or
'bequest' is often used to include both
realty and personalty, or is used of a gift of
money alone. So the verb 'devise' is often
used to refer to personalty alone." In re
CkunpbeU's Estate, 75 Pac 851, 853, 27
Utah, 361 (citing Page, Wills, I 2).
"Legacy and devise" and "legatee and
devisee^' are often used as interchangeable
phrases in wills and everyday conversation,
and therefore courts would not feel fettered
to any nice construction where the subject-
matter or context shows the words were
used intendiangeably and as of the same
import But such popular and loose con-
struction is hardly permissible in view of
the statutory rule of hermeneutics. Desloge
V. Tucker, 94 8. W. 283, 286, 196 Mo. 587.
While the word "devise" is the appro-
priate term to pass title to real estate, and
"bequeath" the term applicable to gifts of
personal property, a strict adherence to
technical words Is not necessary to give
effect to a testator's intent, and the fact
that the word "devise" is not used does not
prevent the title to real estate passing by
the use of the word "bequeath." Mills v.
Tompkins, 97 N. Y. Supp. 9, 10, HO App.
Div. 212.
USOAOT TAX
See Inheritance Tax.
A tax on an interest in personal prop-
erty passing by will is a "legacy tax." In
re Macky's Estate, 102 Pac 1075, 1078^ 46
Colo. 79, 23 L. B. A« (N. S.) 1207.
The inheritance tax is variously termed
"succession tax," "legacy tax," and "probate
duties" ; but, whatever it may be termed, it
is not a tax upon property, but upon the
right of succession thereto. State ex rel.
Foot V. Bazllle, 106 N. W. 93, 96, 97 Minn.
11, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 732, 7 Ann. Cas. 1056.
A tax may be laid upon property Im-
mediately after it has devolved upon any
person by will or inheritance so as to be not
easily distinguishable from a form of taxa-
tion sometimes called "legacy tax." Appeal
of Hopkins, 60 AU. 657, 659, 77 Conn. 644.
The tax variously called an "inheritance
tax," a "legacy tax," a "transfer tax," and a
"succession tax," is a "burden imposed by
government on all gifts, legacies, and succes-
sions, whether of real or personal property or
both, or any Interest therein, passing to cer-
tain persons (other than those specially ex-
cepted), by will, by intestate law, or by deed
or assignment made inter vivos, intended to
take effect at or after the death of the gran-
tor." In re Morris' Estate, 50 S. E. 682, 138
N. G. 259 (quoting and adopting definition in
Dos Passes [2d Ed.] § 2).
The words "an act to tax • • •
cies," in the tltie of Act May 15, 1906 (P. L.
p. 432) do not express that the object of the
act, so far as It relates to legacies, is the
Imposition of a tax upon the transfer of prop-
erty which is the subject of a bequest, and
as Const art. 4, § 7, par. 4, requires that the
object of every law shall be expressed in the
UE^AJj
64
JJEQAJj CAUSB
dtle thereof; the statote is vnconstitutioiial
so far as It se^s to tax the transfer of prop-
erty which Is the subject of a bequest Dix-
on T. Russell* 76 Aa 082, 988, 79 N. J. Law,
490.
LEGAL
See, also, LawfuL
The term "legal" means that which Is ac-
cording to law. Vaughn v. National Council,
Junior Order United American Mechanics,
117 S. W. 116, 116, 136 Ma App. 362.
"Legal" is defined as according to the
principle of law; according to the method
required by statute; by means of judicial
proceedhigs. In re Folwell's Estate, 62 Atl.
414, 415, 68 N. J. Bq. 728, 2 L. B. A. (N. S.)
1193.
Lawful, adequate, and reasonablet syn-
onyuLoiui
"'Legal,' 'lawful,' 'adequate,' and 'rea-
sonable,' when used as adjectives qualify-
ing 'provocation,' ^are synonymous, and, as
a general rule, with few exceptions, it takes
an assault or personal violence to constitute
this provocation." State v. McKenzle, 76
S. W. 1015. 1019, 177 Mo. 699 (quoting with
approval from State v. Bulling, 15 S. W. 867,
16 S. W. 830, 105 Mo. 204) ; State v. Heath,
121 S. W. 149, 154, 221 Mo. 665 (quoting and
. adopting definition in State v. Balling, 15 S.
W. 867, 16 S. W. 830. 105 Mo. 204).
LEGAL ADVICE AHB SERVICES
The services of an attorney for an ad*
ministratrix, consisting of giving her advice,
drawing leases and other legal instruments,
ejecting nonpaying tenants, collecting doubt-
ful demands due the estate, discovering as-
sets, and in investigating and adjusting dis-
puted claims, are such as the estate is liable
for. under Rev. St 1899. $ 223, providing for
allowances for "legal advice and services."
Hill V. Bvans, 91 S. W. 1022, 1024, 114 Mo.
App. 715.
LEGAL AND SUFFICIENT FENCE
The phrase "legal and suffldent fence,"
as used Id Rev. St 1883, c. 61, §§ 36, 37, re-
quiring a railroad company to erect and
maintain along the line of its road a legal
and sufficient fence, means a fence sufficient
to restrain and exclude any of the ordinary
domestic animals from straying oh that part
of its track which passes through and is
contiguous to the inclosure where such ani-
mals are pastured or kept; and a fence abut-
ting a railroad, four feet in height and other-
wise complying with the statute, and that will
restrain horses, cows, and oxen, but will not
restrain sheep, is not a legal and sufficient
fence. Cotton v. Wiscasset, W. A F. E* CJo.,
57 Atl. 785, 786. 98 Me. 511.
LEGAL AVOIDANCE
See Matter of Legal Avoidance^
LEGAL CAFAcmnr
See, also. Legal Disability.
The ''capacity to sue" is the right ts
come into court, and differs from a "cause
of action," which is the right to relief in
court Howell v. lola- Portland Cement Co.,
121 Pac. 346, 847, 86 Kan. 460.
"Incapacity to sue exists where there
is some legal disability, such as infancy, or
lunacy, or a want of title in the plaintiff to
the character in which he sues." That plain-
tiff was appointed administrator as alleged,
accepted the office, and qualified therefor,
and letters of administration de bonis non
are issued to him, and the validity of his ap-
pointment was not questioned, gives him "ca-
pacity to sue," though he may not be the
real party in interest and though the admit-
ted facts may not authorize a recovery by
him. Homans v. New York Life Ins. Co., 106
N. Y. Supp. 929. 930, 56 Misc. Rep. 574 (quot-
ing and adopting Ward v. Petrie, 61 N. B.
1002, 167 N. T. 301, 68 Am. St Rep. 790).
"Want of legal capacity," within the
meaning of Rev. St 1898. | 2649, specifying
the grounds for demurrer to a complaint, re-
fers to personal disability, such as infancy,
idiocy, coverture, and the like, or to want
of title to the character in which the plaintiff
sues; a defect going to the cause of action
itself as regards the plaintiff. One showing
that in no event, under no circumstances, and
in no capacity does plaintiff own or repre-
sent the cause of action sought to be enforced,
does not fall within the statute. McKenney
V. Minahan. 97 N. W. 489, 491, 119 Wis. 651.
Under the express provisions of Rev. St
1899. S 3535, it is only when the plaintiff has
no legal capacity to sue that a demurrer will
lie on the ground that he has no capacity to
sue; the words "legal capacity to sue" re-
ferring to infancy, want of authority, or any
personal disability to maintain the action.
Littleton v. Burgess, 91 Pac 832, 836, 16
Wyo. 58, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49.
A demurrer on the ground of want of
"legal capacity to sue" must relate to some
legal disability on the part of the plaintiff
to prosecute and maintain his action. This
disability must be "such as infancy, cover-
ture, idiocy, and the like, and not the absence
of facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action." Pratt v. Northern Pac Exp. Co., 90
Pac 341, 342, 13 Idaho. 373, 10 L. R. A. (N.
8.) 499, 121 Am. St Rep. 268 (quoting and
adopting definition in Pomeroy Code Reme-
dies [4th Ed-] p. 180).
LEGAL CAUSE
"Legal cause" is necessarily the deduc-
tion from some act, event, or circumstance.
Wells, Fargo & Co. v. McCarthy, 90 Pac 208,
206, 5 Cal. App. 301 (citing Marsh y. 8a-
perior Court, 26 Pac 962, 88 Cal. 596).
"Legal cause," as used in an Instmctian
In an action for abuse of process author-
LEGAIi CAUSE
65
LEGAL EVIDENCE
izlng recovery if defendant Issued an attach-
m^it against plaintiffs without legal cause,
was not synonymous with "probable cause."
Sehon, Blake & Stevenson ▼. White (Ky.) 92
S. W. 280, 281.
An entry, under statutes authorizing an
entry on land under the directions of a rall<
road company solely for the purpose of
making a preliminary survey of a proposed
railway line subject to liability for all dam-
ages dode to the land, constitutes a "legal
cause and good excuse" within the statute
providing that any person who without legal
cause and good excuse enters the premises of
another after warning shall be punished.
State V. Simons, 40 South. 662, 145 Ala. d5.
I£6AI. CHAKOE OF CRIME
A "legal charge of crime," as contem-
plated by extradition statutes, means one
made in that state having jurisdiction to try
the offense, and from which the fugitive
fled. The word "charged," in 2 Ballinger's
Ann. Codes & St. | 7017, declaring that, when
any person shall be found within the state
charged vrith an offense committed in another
state, the court or magistrate may on com-
plaint issue a warrant for his arrest, con-
templates that the person arrested and de-
livered up committed the offense in another
state and is in such state legally charged
with crime. State ex rel. Grass v. White,
82 Pac. 907, 908, 909, 40 Wash. 560, 2 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 563.
I.EOAI. COXntTY ROAD
In Sess. Laws 1893, p. 380, making a
<x>unty liable for injuries from defects in a
"legal county road," it is apparent that the
Legislature only intended to provide a rem-
edy for injuries received by a traveler on a
county road or highway. Schroeder v. Mult-
nomah County, 76 Pac 772. 778, 46 Or. 92.
IiEOAIi DEPENDEHT
A member of a fraternal insurance order,
who dies leaving only brothers and sisters
and nieces and nephews not livhig with him,
dies without "legal dependents," within the
certificate of membership, providing for pay-
ment to legal dependents, and his adminis-
trator is entitled to the fund for the pay-
ment of debts and distribution in due course
of administration; the words "legal depend-
ents" meaning those relying on the member
for support Little v. Colwell, 74 S. B. 10,
158 N. C. 351, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 450 (citing
2 Words and Phrases, pp. 1991, 1992).
There being no legal duty imposed by
law on insured to support his mother, as is
the case with his wife and minor children,
she is not a "legal dependent" within the
meaning of a policy payable to his "legal
dependent" Vaughn v. National Council,
Junior Order United American Mechanics,
117 S. W. 115, 116, 186 Mo. App. 362.
3 WDS.& P.2d Seb.— 5
IiEOAIi DISABIUTT
A petition by adult heirs and on behalf
of minor heirs to open a decree of the county
court approving the final report of the execu-
tor and distributing the estate, to correct an
error resulting from an erroneous allowance
to the executor and his attorney, which pur-
ports to be a petition of persons interested
in the estate, and which sets forth facts
showing that the allowance is erroneous as
a matter of law, and which avers the fact'
of the minority of heirs and presentation of
the petition on their behalf, is, as to such
heirs, a sufficient petition within Prob. Code,
8 287, authorizing persons laboring under any
legal disability, to move to reopen the ac-
count of executor before final distribution;
the term "legal disability" including minor-
ity, though the minors have a guardian. In
re Nelson's Estate, 129 N. W. 113, 116. 26
S. D. 615.
Rev. St 1898, f 3968, provides that no
action can be maintained against the sure-
ties on any bond given by a guardian unless
It be commenced within four years from the
time when the guardian shall have been
discharged, excepting that if, at the time of
such discharge, the person entitled to bring
the action shall be under any "legal dis-
ability to sue," the action may be commenced
at any time. Held, that the words "legal
disability to sue," as used therein, referred
to some characteristic of the person disqual-
ifying him from acting freely for the pro-
tection of his rights, and not to an impedi-
ment to the suability of the particular cause
of action, and so inability of the plaintiff to
sue during the period of accounting and
until the settlement of the guardian's account
was not within the exception of persons "un-
der [any] legal disability to sue." Wescott
V. Upham, 107 N. W. 2, 3, 127 Wis. 590 (cit-
ing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4060).
IiEOAI. DUTY
See Lawful Duty.
IiEOAIi EKTITT
See Etatity.
I.EGAI. ESTATE
Seised importing, see Seised.
Seisin importing, see Seisin.
IiEOAIi ESTOPPEIi
Equitable estoppel distinguished, see Es-
toppel in Pais.
Estoppel by deed, see Estoppel.
IiEGAIi EVIDEHCE
It was unnecessary to advise the Jury
oi the meaning of "legal evidence" in an in-
struction that the law demanded conviction
where there was sufQdent legal evidence to
show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as any
man competent to serve as a Juror would un-
derstand that it meant any evidence the Jury
LEGAL EXPENSES
66
LEGAL HEIRS
had a right to consider. People v. AndersoD*
87 N. E. 917, 918, 923. 239 lU. 168.
LEGAL EXPENSES
See Proper and Legal Expenses.
LEGAL FENCE
See Lawful Fence.
LEGAL FRAUD
Promissory representation, looking to the
future, as to what the vendee can do with
the property, how much he can make on It,
and how much he can save by the use of it,
are on a par with false affirmations and
opinions as to the value of property, and do
not generally constitute "legal fraud." Na-
tional Cash Register Co. v. Townsend Gro-
cery Store, 50 S. B. 306, 307, 137 N. C. 652,
70 L. R. A. 349.
A bill of sale intended as an absolute
transfer of title, but made with a secret
agreement that the grantee, after selling
enough goods to pay the grantor's indebted-
ness to him, should turn back to the grantor
the remainder, or their proceeds, presents a
case of "constructive fraud," sometimes call-
ed "legal fraud." Walklin v. HorswiU, 123
N. W. 668, 672, 24 S. D. 191.
Misrepresentations of a material fact,
made willfully to deceive, or recklessly with-
out knowledge, or if made by mistake and in-
nocently, and acted on by the opposite party,
constitute legal "fraud," under Code 1907, |
4298, authorizing the rescission of a contract
of sale of stock of a corporation. Southern
States Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Wllmer
Store Co. (Ala.) 60 South. 98, 99.
"Misrepresentation of a material fact
made willfully to deceive, or recklessly with-
out knowledge, and acted upon by the op-
posite party, or if made by mistake and
Innocently and acted upon by the opposite
party, constitutes 'legal fraud.' " Camp v.
Carithers, 65 S. B. 583, 585, 6 Ga. App. 608
(quoting definition in Civ. Code, § 4026).
LEGAL GROUND FOR NEW TBL^kL AS
MATTER OF LAW
The words "legal ground for granting a
new trial as matter of law," in a request for
a ruling that if plaintiff after testifying was
arrested in court during the trial of the
case, and the jury noticed some of the acts
connected with her arrest, and were thereby
made suspicious that plaintiff was arrested
for perjury, there was a "legal ground for*
granting a new trial as a matter of law,"
mean that the conditions referred to called
for a new trial as a matter of law, and as
so construed the request is erroneous. Kel-
ley V. City of Boston, 87 N- B. 493, 494, 201
Mass. 86.
LEGAL HEIRS
See Lawful Heirs.
My legal heirs, see My.
The term "legal heirs," in its technical
sense, as used in the common law, includea
all i)ersons born in lawful matrimony who
succeed to the estate in real property of an
ancestor. Thomas v. Supreme Lodge Knights
of Honor, 105 N. W. 922, 923, 126 Wis. 593,
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 904, 5 Ann. Cas. 456.
The term "legal heirs," in legal strict-
ness signifies those entitled to inherit real
estate ; it is also used to indicate those who
would take under the statute of distribution.
Dickerman v. Ailing, 76 Atl. 362, 363, 83
Conn. 342 (citing Ruggles v. Randall, 38 Atl.
885, 70 Conn. 44; Tlngler v. Chamberlin, 42
Aa 718, 71 Conn. 469).
In construing a will using the words ''le-
gal heirs" and "lawful heirs," the words
"legal" and "lawful" do not modify or change
the legal effect of the word "heirs." Stisser
V. Stisser, 85 N. E. 240, 242, 235 111. 207.
As used in a will making a bequest to
testator's wife and the legal heirs of hia
son, and, in case his son should die without
wife or heirs,- then to the heirs of another,
the words "heirs" and "legal heirs" meant
"children." Knowles ▼. Knowles, 65 S. B.
128, 130, 132 Ga. 806.
Where testator, by a codicil to his will,
provided that the income derived from cer-
tain property should go to "my legal heirs,"
the term "legal heirs" means next of kin and
legal heirs of testator, and does not include
next of kin or legal heirs of his wife. Miller
v, Metcalf, 58 Atl. 743, 744, 77 Conn. 176.
Under a limitation in a wUl to the "legal
heirs" of a person, they were to be deter-
mined as of the date of his decease, and are
the persons who under the laws then in force
would have been entitled to inherit his real
estate if he had died intestate. Holmes v.
Holmes, 80 N. E. 614, 617, 194 Mass. 552.
The words "legal heirs," In a wUl which
bequeathed a feather bed to testator's son
and devised to his "wife and legal heirs of J.
my youngest son" all the household furni-
ture, meant "chlldren.Y Knowles v. Knowles^
65 S. E. 128, 130, 132 Ga. 806.
Testator bequeathed certain personalty
to "the legal heirs" of his housekeeper.
Held, that her husband was excluded* In re
Schnitzler, 114 N. T. Supp. 934, 935, 61 Misc.
Rep. 218.
Where a testator left to trustees an estate
for his grandchild, the trust to continue
three years during which the trustees were
to possess and manage the property and its
income and provide for and pay over to the
grandchild at their discretion, and at the
end of the three years the estate to pass Uy
the possession of the grandchild, if then
alive, and "if the grandchild die before the
trust ceases her legal heirs to be substituted
in place of deceased in every respect," the
granddaughter's husband is not one of her
"legal heirs" in the sense of the devise over
LEQAL HEIRS
67
LBGAIi HOLIDAYS
to her legal helra Buck t. Paine, 75 Me.
582,689.
Testator gave half of his residuary es-
tate of which his homestead formed a part to
a Diece for life, and provided, on her death
without issue, the homestead should pass to
the children of an uncle, and such children
should participate equally with testator's
*negal heirs" in whatever balance there
might be over and above the homestead.
Held, that his legal heirs were those who, in
absence of a will, were entitled by law to in-
herit by descent ascertained at the time of
testator's death, excluding the widow. Per-
ry V. Bulkley, 72 Aa 1014, 1019, 82 Conn. 158.
A deed of gift by parents to a son, which
designates the son and his legal heirs as par-
ties of the second part, and whidi conveys
the property to the legal heirs, and which re-
cites that the son shall liave full control of
it for life to maintain his family, and de-
clares that he shall not sell, mortgage, or
transfer his life interest, and that at his
death his wife surviving shall, for life or
until her remarriage, have equal shares with
the heirs of the son, she not to sell or incum-
ber her interest, gives the son no interest in
the property except the power to control it
for life, and In the absence of any showing
that there is a surplus of income above what
Is necessary for the family, the son has no
taterest subject to execution, within Ky. St
I 1691, subjecting equitable interests to the
payment of the debt of an execution creditor;
the words "legal heirs*' meaning children.
Mt Sterling Nat Bank v. Duflf, 140 8. W. 60,
61. 145 Ky. 67.
A testator bequeathed corporate stock to
a trustee, to pay the income thereof to a
grandson and granddaughter for life, and at
their death the same to be distributed to
their respective "legal heirs,*' except that, if
the 'legal heirs" of the grandson should be
the granddaughter, tlie trusteeship should
continue and the income be paid to the
granddaughter for life. Held, that the words
"legal heirs" were used in their primary
sense. Grant v. Stlmpson, 66 Atl. 166, 167,
79 Conn. 617.
The * legal heirs" intended by a will
were those who answered the description at
the time of testator's death, where no con-
trary intention was indicated. The term
"legal heirs" meant those who answered that
description under the laws of the state; and
a provision for equally dividing each of four
certain parts of the estate among the legal
heirs of the persons named required such a
division as is provided by the laws of the
state for the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person among his descendants.
Harris v. Xngalls, 68 AU. 34, 37, 74 N. H. 339.
Where testator devises land to his wife
for life, and after her death to his daughter,
and, if she shall not outlive her mother **and
leave no legal heirs," then to the son, Ihe
words 'leave no legal heirs" are equivalent
to "leave no lawful issue." Church v. Baer,
84 AtL 1009, 1100, 286 Pa. 605.
LEGAI. HOLIDATS
The words ''legal holidays," as used in
Comp. Laws 1897, { 5395, requiring saloons
to be closed on all "legal holidays," not only
includes legal holidays existing at the time
of the adoption of the section, but includes
holidays subsequently created by the Legis-
lature, such as Labor Day, made a holiday
by the act of 1893. People v. Kriesel, 98 N.
W. 850, 851, 136 Mich. 80, 4 Ann. Caa. 5.
Code, § 2448, par. 9, provides that sa-
loons shall not be open nor shall any sales
be made on Sunday, or any election day, "or
legal hoUday." SecUon 3053, headed "HoU-
days," directs that certain days, including
July 4th, shall be legal holidays for purposes
relating to bills of exchange. Section 3541
provides that no person shall be held to an-
swer in any court on the days enumerated in
the preceding secti^m. Section 4688, headed
"Not on election days or holidays," declares
that no party shall be required to take deposi-
tions on any days on which appearance can-
not be required. Held, that the term "legal
holiday,** as used in section 2448, relates to
the days designated in section 8063 as ''holi-
days." Brennan v. Roberts, 101 N. W. 460,
462, 125 Iowa, 616.
The meaning of the phrase "days of
public rest and legal holidays" is the oppo-
site of "secular or business day," and ex-
cludes entirely and absolutely the idea of
holding court The words "legal holiday"
and "dies non" are convertible terms. That
they are so in the legislation of Louisiana "is
demonstrated by the fact that they are so
used in Act No. 110 of 1896, p. 158, malting
Decoration Day a legal holiday." State t.
Duncan, 43 South. 283, 287, 118 La. 702, 10
L. R. A. (N. S.) 791, 11 Ann. Cas. 557.
Act March 4, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 196, c.
118), is entitled "An act concerning legal hol-
idays, the maturity of negotiable instru-
ments, creating a Saturday half-holiday for
banking institutions in certain cities, repeal-
ing all laws," etc Section 1 designates cer-
tain days, including Labor Day, as "legal
holidays," without restriction or limitation.
Section 2 (page 197) declares that every Sat-
urday after 12 o'clock noon in cities of more
than 35,000 inhabitants shall, in addition to
the legal holidays mentioned in section 1,
be a legal holiday for banks, etc., and section
3 provides for the presentation, payment,
etc., of negotiable instruments which mature
on Sunday or a legal holiday. Held, that the
holidays created by section 1 were legal holi-
days for all purposes, and hence the sale of
liquor on Labor Day constituted a violation
of Act March 10, 1905 (Laws 19Q6, p. 721, c
169, S 579), prohibiting the sale of liquor on
liEOAIi HOLIDAYS
68
L£QAL MEETIKa
certain specified days '"or any legal holiday.**
State v. Shelton, 77 N. E. 1052-1054, 38 Ind.
App. 80.
In view of Const art 6, § 5, providing
that courts shall be always open, legal holi-
days excepted, and Code Civ. Proc. § 10, as
amended by St 1907, p. 561, c. 287, making
every Saturday from 12 o*clock noon until 12
o*clock midnight a holiday, and sections 134,
135, as amended by St 1907, pp. 681, 682, c.
358, authorizing courts to be open on holi-
days for specified purposes, trial courts ought
to treat Saturday afternoon as a legal holi-
, day. People v. Heacock, 102 Paa 543, 546,
10 Cal. App. 450.
Under Rev. St 1895, art 2939, declaring
February 22d a legal holiday, and article
1180, inhibiting the issuance of process on
any legal holiday excepting in cases of in-
junction, distress proceedings, etc., a citation,
in a divorce preceeding, whether original or
an alias, issued on February 22, is invalid,
and will not confer Jurisdiction upon the
court nor support a judgment Michael ▼.
Michael (Tex.) 100 S. W. 1018.
IJBO AI. IN JURY.
Whatever invades a person's rightful
dominion over his property is a "legal in-
jury,'* whether damage ensues or not Such
dominion is a right for the violation of which
the law Imports damage, and courts of equi-
ty have always interposed, in a proper case,
to protect the right without any reference to
the question of actual damage, the motive
which instigated the party to invoke its aid,
or the benefits it derives from the act Al-
len V. Stowell, 79 Pac 371, 372, 145 Cal. 666,
68 L. B. A. 223, 104 Am. St Rep. 80.
A contract or combination in restraint of
interstate commerce, prohibited by Aatl-
Trust Act July 2, 1890, c 647, 26 Stat 210,
is not merely illegal in the sense that it Is
not enforceable, but is per se unlawful, and
one who is harmed in his business or proper-
ty by such a contract or combination has suf-
fered a "legal Injury," within the meaning of
section 7 of the act, and is by such section
given a right of action therefor. Wheeler-
Stenzel Co. v. National Window Glass Job-
bers* Ass*n, 152 Fed. 864, 865, 871, 81 O. C. A.
658, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 972.
I.EOAI. IN8ANITT
"Iiegal insanity" excusing the commis-
sion of a criminal act is a disease of the
brain, rendering a person incapable of distin-
guishing between right and wrong with re-
spect to the ofl'ense charged. State ▼. Privltt,
75 S. W. 457, 459, 175 Mo. 207.
UBOAI. INTENT
The words "legal intent," when applied
to the intention of a testator, mean that
where a testator has used in his will techni-
cal terms to which the courts of his domicile
have attached a settled judicial meaning con-
stituting a rule of property in that state, then
the courts of other states construing the will
give to such words the same meaning. Ball
V. Phelan, 49 South. 966, 968, 94 Miss. 293» 23
L. R. A. (N. S.) 895.
I.EOAI. INTEBE8T
See Direct Legal Interest
Ab interest see Interest (In Property);
Interest (On Money).
Under Revision 1902, i 56, providing for
a rebate of legal interest on the payment of
that portion not yet due of a mortgage pay-
able at a future date without interest such
"legal interest*' is the rate used by the
parties in fixing the amount of the mortgage
payable in monthly installmehts without in-
terest Greenville Building ft Loan Ass'n ▼.
Wholey, 59 Atl. 341, 346, 68 N. J. Eq. 92.
I.EOAI. ISSUE
Legal heirs as including, see Legal H^bnu
The words "legal issue," when used in a
will and tinexplained by the context have
the meaning of descendants, and gift to the
"legal issue" of testator's daughter, after a
life estate to her, is a gift to her descendants,
and is not limited to her diildren. Under
a gift to the "legal issue" of testator's
daughter, after a life estate to her, the trust
fund held for her life will vest on her deatli
absolutely in interest in all her descendants
who are living in equal portions per capita.
Schmidt V. Jewett 88 N. B. 1110, 1111, 195
N. Y. 486, 133 Am. St Rep. 815.
LEOAI. XKOWUSDGE
See Presumption of Legal Knowledge.
I.EOAI. LIFE ESTATE
"Legal life estates" are those made by
operation of law. Disley y. Disley. 75 AtL
481, 483, 30 R. I. 366.
IiEOAIi MAUOE
See ImpUed Malice; Malice.
LEGAL MEASUBE OF DUTY
The rule of law now generally recognized
is that the "legal measure of duty," except that
made absolute by law, is better expressed by
the phrases "due care," "reasonable care," or
"ordinary care," used interchangeably. Ray-
mond V. PorUand R. Co., 62 Aa 602, 604, 100
Me. 529, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94.
LEGAL MEETIKG
In the statute providing that no alien-
ation, or mortgage, of the real estate of
any mining corporation shall have any force
or efl'ect unless authorized at some meeting
of stockholders, and that no meeting of stock-
holders shall be held to be "legal or valid,"
unless notice of the time, place, and object
of holding the same be published, etc., the
words "legal or valid" are not to be given
a literal interpretation. The statute does not
give strangers the right to raise questions as
LEGAL NAME
LEGAL POSSESSION
to the regularity of a mortgage which the
stockholders elect to waive. Thus where the
notice for a stockholders' meeting of a corpo-
ration stated that the purpose of such meeting
was to authorize the issue of bonds to the
extent of $100,000, to be secured by mor^
gage, etc., and the issue authorized was $150,-
000, one not a stockholder, but a purchaser,
at execution sale, of the corporation's equity
of redemption in the property mortgaged,
could not raise the question of the irregular-
ity. Beecher ▼. Marquette & Pacific Rolling
Mill Co^ 7 N. W. 005. 006, 607, 45 Mich. 103.
IXGAI. NAME
For the purpose of giving constructive
notice to a defendant in a suit to foreclose
a mortgage, where he has not sued on a
written Instrument signed by himself, his
"legal name*' Includes his first Christian
name and surname. Hence foreclosure of a
mortgage did not divest the title of a non-
resident defendant who was sued by the ini-
tial letters of his name^ there being no per-
sonal service of summons upon him, or ap-
pearance in his behalf, and the record show-
ing that he did not sign the mortgage or the
note secured thereby. Butler v. Smith, 120
N. W. 1106, 1107, 84 Neb. 78, 28 L. R. A. (N.
S.)436.
I.EOAI. KEGLIOENOE
"Legal negligence" is the omission of
such care as persons of ordinary prudence
exercise and deem adequate to the circum-
stances of the case. Doollng v. City of New
York, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1012, 1014, 148 App.
Mv. 713.
UBOAI. HEWSPJlPEB
See Newspaper.
I«EOAI< NOTICE
See Implied Notice.
"Legal" or "Implied notice" Is the same
as "constructive notice," which, according to
Wilson's Rev. St Ann. 1903, c. 16, 1 12, is no-
tice imputed by the law to a person not hav-
ing actual notice. Implied notice does not
indude either positive knowledge or infor-
mation 80 direct as to necessarily carry con-
viction to the mind of the person notified,
and neither does It belong to that dass
which depends on legal presumption, but it
is substantial evidence from which the jury
after estimating its value may infer notice.
Cooper V. Flesner, 103 Pac. lOlG, 1020, 1021,
24 Okl. 47, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1180, 20 Ann.
Cas. 29 (quoting Wilson v. Brown, 15 N. Y.
354; Wade, Law of Notice, K 3, 4, 5).
Rules of the Mississippi Railroad Ck>m-
misslon provide that railroad companies shall
give prompt notice by mall or otherwise to
the consignee of the arrival of goods and
that no storage or demurrage charges shall
be allowed unless legal notice of the arrival
of the goods has been given, and defines "le-
gal notice" in this connection as either actual
or constructive notice, and provides that,
where the consignee is personally served
with notice, free time begins at 7 o'clock the
following morning. New Orleans & N. E. R.
Go. V. A. H. Qeorge & Co., 35 South. 193, 195,
82 Miss. 710.
Notice of appointment of two executors,
one residing within the state and the other
without, the state, which failed to Include the
name and address o^ the agent or attorney
of the latter, was not a "legal notice" with-
in the meaning of Rev. St a 87, § 18, provid-
ing that, when an executor or administrator
does not give "legal notice" of his appoint-
ment, he cannot avail himself of the statute
of limitations against claims against the es-
tate. Id. I 12, providing that executors or
administrators residing out of the state at
the time of giving notice of their appoint-
ment shall appoint an %gent or attorney in
the state, and insert his name and address
in such notice. Dyer v. Walls, 24 Atl. 801,
802, 84 Me. 143.
Where it appeared from the report of
viewers for the laying out of a lot that they
had given "legal notice" of the fact, presum-
ably they had given the notice required by
law. Crescent Tp. v. Pittsburg ft L. E. R.
Co., 59 Ati. 1103, 1105, 210 Pa. 334.
Whatever is sufficient to put a subse-
quent purchaser on inquiry must be consid-
ered 'Megal notice" to him of the facts in-
quiry would have disclosed by the exercise
of reasonable diligence. Jennings v. Lentss,
93 Pac. 327, 829, 50 Or. 488, 29 L. B. A. (N.
S.) 584.
I.EOAZ. OBUOATION
Debt as legal obligation, see Debt
IJSOAI. PEB80NAUTT
The Roman Catholic Church in the Phil-
ippine Islands is a legal personality, with ca-
pacity to hold property acquired by gift.
Santos V. Holy Roman. Catholic and Apostol-
ic Church, 29 Sup. Ct 838, 339, 212 U. S. 463,
53 L. Bd. 509.
LEOAI. PI.AXNTIFF
The "legal plalntifl" Is the person in
whom the legal title or right of action is
vested, while the "equitable plaintiff" is the
person who does not have the legal title to
the right of action but is in equity entitled
to the thing sued for. Burrell v. United
States, 147 Fed. 44, 46, 77 C. C. A. 308.
LEOAI. POSSESSION
As possession, see Possession.
When a delivery of goods is made for a
specific purpose, the possession is still sup-
posed to reside in the first proprietor, and,
where any person has the bare charge of an-
other's effects, legal possession remains in
the owner; and therefore where the finder
of the purse told defendant's wife thereof.
LEGAL POSSESSION
70
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
and she stated that the purse looked like
her husband's and took the same, telling the
finder that If it did not belong to her hus-
band she would return it, and afterwards
possession was given to him on his claim of
ownership, when in fact it belonged to an-
other, the "legal possession'* remained in
the finder, and defendant's claim thereto
constituted larceny. Williams v. State, 75
N. B. 875, 877, 165 Ind. 472, 2 L. 1^. A. (N.
S.) 248 (citing Smith v, People, 53 N. T. Ill,
13 Am. Rep. 474; Bish. New Cr. Law, | 824).
To be "legal," possession taken by a
mortgagee must have been taken in good
faith, free from fraud or wrong, and with-
out violation of any contract relation with
the mortgagor. Jaggar v. Plunkett, 106 Pac
280, 281, 81 Kan. 565, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935.
The term "legal possessor," as used in
Glv. Code CaL { 3052, providing that a per-
son who makes, alters, or repairs any arti-
cle of personal property at the request of
the owner or legal possessor of the property
has a lien upon the same for his reasonable
charges, means one who has the right by
' virtue of his possession to originally con-
tract with reference to the manufacture, al-
teration, or repair thereof, such as, for ex-
ample, a lessee or pledgee of the property;
some one having a possession coupled with a
right of property so that he can contract
with reference to it respecting any of the
matters enumerated in the section. Where
defendants engaged another to peel tanbark
from trees on their land and deliver it at a
certain place, and the latter hired plaintiffs
to do the work, and no contractual relation-
ship existed between defendants and plain-
tiffs, plaintiffs were not entitled to a lien
for their wages on bark peeled by them re-
maining on defendants' land. Qulst v. Sand-
man. 99 Pac. 204, 209, 154 Cal. 748.
LEGAL FBESTJMPTION
'The French Civjl Code, calls all 'pre-
sumptions' consequences that the law or
the Judge draws from a known fact to an
unknown fact, and a 'legal presumption' one
that a special law applies to certain facts.
Cachard'A Translation, arts. 1349, 1350." In
re Cowdry's Will, 60 Atl. 141, 142, 77 Vt 359,
3 Ann. Cas. 70.
As said by Doe, J., in Lisbon v. Lyman,
49 N. H. 553, 663: **A 'legal presumption' Is
not evidence. In civil cases it Is the finding
of a fact or the decision of a point, when
there is no testimony, and no inference of
fact from the absence of testimony, on the
subject or when the evidence is balanced.
And often the fact is also found, or the de-
cision made, by the rule of law which im-
poses the burden of proof on the party hav-
ing the afllrmatlve." In his Treatise on Evi-
dence, Prof. Thayer says (page 314): "Pre-
sumptions are aids to reasoning and argu-
mentation, which assume the truth of cer-
tain matters for the purpose of some given
inquiry. They may be grounded on the gen-
eral experience or probability of any kind,
or merely on policy and convenience.* On
whatever basis they rest, they operate In
advance of argument or evidence, or Irre-
spective of it, by taking something for grant-
ed; by assuming its existence." And on
page 337 this language occurs: "While it 1«
obvious, then, that a presumption — i. e., the
assumption, intendment, taking for granted
— Which we call by that name, accomplishes,
for the moment at any rate, the work of
reasoning and evidence it should be remark-
ed, as I have said before, that neither this
result, nor the rule which requires it, con-
stitutes in itself either evidence or reasoning.
This might seem too plain to require men-
tion if it were not for the loose phraseology
in which courts sometimes charge the jury,
leaving to it in a lump 'all the evidence and
the presumptions' as if they were capable of
being weighed together as one mass of pro-
bative matter." If there is a legal presump-
tion that the ordinary man performs his du- '
ty and is not negligent, it Is no more com-
petent as evidence to prove the fact In a
particular case, in the absence of other proof,
than are other rules of law, including the
presumption of innocence of criminal cases.
Wright V. Boston & M. R. Co., 65 Atl. 687,
691, 74 N. H. 128, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 832, 124
Am. St. Rep. 949.
A "legal presumption" is one which the
law will recognize. Thus where testator re-
tained custody of his will or had ready ac-
cess to it, and it could not be found after
his death, a "legal presumption" would be
raised that the will and codicil were destroy-
ed by him animo revocandi. Hutson v. Hart-
ley, 74 N. E. 197, 199, 200, 72 Ohio St. 262.
In an action against a physician for
malpractice, there is no presumption of the
physician's negligence, and the burden of
showing it is upon plaintiff. A true "legal
presumption" is in the nature of evidence,
and is to be weighed as such. The rules
which impose the burden of proof upon cer-
tain parties, when designated as presump-
tions, are dry presumptions, having only a
technical existence, and barren of all pro-
bative character when the case goes to the
jury on conflicting evidence. Sheldon v.
Wright, 67 Atl. 807, 814, 816, 80 Vt. 298.
LEGAL PRO0EEBINO8
Expenses of legal proceedings, see Ex-
penses.
Attachment proceedings are "legal pro-
ceedings" within Bankruptcy Act July 1,
1898, c. 641, i 8a (3), 30 Stat 646, which
makes it an act of bankruptcy for an insolv-
ent person to permit a creditor to obtain a
preference through legal proceedlng& In re
Putman, 193 Fed. 464, 473.
LBGAL PROCEEDINGS
71
LEGAL REPRESENT ATIVE
A landlord within four months before
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy may
levy his distress and thereby acquire a lien
which a subsequent bankruptcy adjudication
would not render void or voidable, the lien
thereby secured not being under the' law of
Maryland a lien secured "by legal proceed-
ings" within Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1898, c.
541, § 67c, 30 Stat 564. In re Potee Brick
Co. of Baltimore City, 179 Fed. 526, 530.
All goods on demised premises, by the
common law, or the statutory law of Penn-
sylvania, may be considered as under a quasi
pledge to the landlord, which gives superiori-
ty to the specific lien acquired by a dis-
traint Such a lien is not one obtained
through legal proceedings within Bankr. Act.
July 1, 1898, e. 541, § 67f, 30 Stat 565. and
is not divested by the bankruptcy of the ten-
ant within four months thereafter, and the
same rule applies where the bankrupt was
a subtenant, admitted to the premises by the
lessee without the landlord's consent In re
West Side Paper Co., 162 Fed. 110, 112, 89
0. a A. UO, 16 Ann. Ca& 384.
The general lien of a landlord for rent,
given by Code Oa. S 2795, to "date from the
time of the levy of a distress warrant to en-
force the same," is not created by judgment,
nor obtained through legal proceedings, with-
in the meaning of the bankrupt act of July
1, 1898 (30 Stat 665, c. 641), f 67f, and is
therefore not defeated by the provisions of
that section, although the levy was made
within four months of the filing of the pe-
tition in bankruptcy against the tenant
Henderson v. Mayer, 32 Sup. Ct 699, 700, 226
U. S. 631, 56 L. Ed. 1233.
A lien on a bankrupt's assets secured by
filing a creditor's bill within four months of
the filing of a bankruptcy petition is one se-
cured "by legal proceedings," which by Bank-
roptcy Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, i 67c, 30 Stat
541, is avoided by the adjudication. In re
Potee Brick Co. of Baltimore City, 179 Fed.
525, 530.
ILEGAJL FBOCES8
The term "legal process" means a pro-
cess fair on its face, and one charged with
resisting an officer in the levying of an
execution issued by a justice of peace on
a judgment rendered by him may show that
the judgment was void and that the officer
had knowledge thereof, though the state to
make out a case need not show that the exe-
cution had behind it a legal Judgment. State
T. Knapf, 96 Pac. 1076, 50 Wash. 229, 21 L,
R. A. (N. S.) 66.
The phrase "legal process" means valid
legal process* Where a policy provided that,
if any change take place in the possession of
the property by legal process, it shall avoid
the policy, an illegal assessment and a sei-
snre and sale of the insured property there-
under were not a change in the possession by
"legal process." Bunkle v. Citizens* In& Co.,
6 Fed. 143, 145.
I.EOAI.RATE
See Contract Rate.
The expression 'Uegal rate," used in Rev.
St 1899, i 1092, requiring railroads to fur-
nish double-deck cars for the' shipment of
sheep, and declaring that it shall not be law-
ful for any railroad to charge for transpor-
tation of a double-deck car more than the le-
gal rate of freight allowed for the shipment
of stock, means that, as a maximum rate has
been fixed for stock of all kinds, the charge
for a double-deck car of sheep should not ex-
ceed that rate. Wynn v. Wabash R. Co., 86
S. W. 562, 564, 111 Mo. App. 642.
I.EOAI1 RELATION
"Legal relation," as used in the rule
that the measure of a succession tax under
a will is the "legal relation" borne by the
legatee to the testator, is the relation estab-
lished by the law, and, while it usually fol-
lows the natural relation, it does not in all
cases. In re Cook's Estate, 79 N. E. 991.
993, 187 N. Y. 263.
I.EOAI. BEMEDT
A '^personal remedy" is where the injur-
ed party seeks redress of the party who in-
flicted the wrong and thus obtains a remedy
for the wrong committed, while a "legal rem-
edy" is where the injured party seeks his
remedy by and through the intervention of
the courts. People ex reL Stidger v. Horan,
86 Pac. 263, 34 Colo. 336, 114 Am. St Rep.
163.
LEGAI. REPRESENTATIVE
The phrase "legal representatives" usu-
ally means executors or administrators, but
it cannot, of course, mean executors and ad-
ministrators only, in whatever instrument it
may appear, and with reference to all the
different subject-matters treated of in the
multitude of varying instruments, and no
matter what the plain purpose of the maker
of the instrument using the phrase may be in
using it It may, in various circumstances,
mean executors, administrators, heirs, lega-
tees, assignees, and devisees, even while lega-
tees or devisees are strangers; in short it
may mean any person or corporation taking
the beneficial interest in property, real or
personal. Allen v. Alliance Trust Co., 36
South. 285, 286, 84 Miss. 319.
The terms "legal representatives," ••per-
sonal representatives," etc., are often used in
statutes and instruments of writing so as to
include all persons who stand in place or rep-
resent the interests of another, either by his
act or by operation of law. In re Barton's
Estate, 62 Atl. 1058, 1059, 213 Pa. 499, 4 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 939.
Testator, after bequeathing one half of
his estate to his wife, directed that t&e re-
LBX>AL REPRBSENTATIVB
72
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
malning half be distributed among his legal
heirs and legal representatives according to
the laws of distribution. Held, that the term
"legal representatives*' was without precLse
determinate meaning, and was used merely
to indicate that testator intended that all
who would take under the statute of distri-
bution were entitled to share under the term
"legal heirs," and hence did not include chil-
dren of testator's first cousins who died be-
fore testator, they not being entitled to dis-
tribution in intestacy, as provided by Gen.
St. 1902, I 398. Dickerman y. Ailing, 76 AU.
362, 363, 83 Conn. 342.
A certificate issued by a fraternal insur-
ance association payable to the estate of a
member is payable to his "legal representa-
tive" within the by-laws of the association
authorizing certificates to be made payable
to legal representatives of members. Vaugh-
an's Adm'r v. Modem Brotherhood of Amer-
ica, 149 S. W. 937, 938, 149 Ky. 587.
As BdiBialstrators or ezeontors
The phrase "legal representatives" ordi-
narily means executors or administrators
where not qualified by context An act of
Congress (Act April 28, 1904, c. 1759, 33 Stat.
436) provided a pension of $1,000 which
should be exempt from payment of debts of
decedent, to be paid to the legal representa-
tives of any railway clerk killed while on
duty. Held, that the words, "legal represent-
atives," were used in their ordinary sense;
the intent being that the money should be
imid to the administrator to be distributed
according to the laws of the state of dece-
dent's domicile, saving the payment of debts.
Wolfe V. Wolfe, 134 S. W. 33, 34. 154 Mo.
App. 218.
The phrase "legal representatives," in
its ordinary acceptation, means executors
and administrators, though it may mean next
of kin or descendants. Kelsay v. Baton, 76
Pac. 770, 772, 45 Or. 70, 106 Am. St. Rep.
662.
"The words 'legal representatives' or
'personal representatives' have also been used
as designating executors or administrators,
and not next of kin, in acts of Congress giv-
ing actions for wrongs or injuries causing
death." Briggs v. Walker, 19 Sup. Ct 1, 3,
171 U. S. 466, 43 L. Ed. 243.
The words "legal representatives" have
a well-recognized meaning in law that are
e<iuivalent to executor or administrator, and
are technical words, and when used in any
legal instrument, and there is nothing in the
context or otherwise to explain their mean-
in??, they should be understood in their tech-
nical sense. Page v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 135 S. W. 911, 912, 98 Ark. 340.
It may be conceded that the words "le-
gal representatives" frequently mean execu-
tors and administrators as used in a policy
of insurance payable to insured's wife and
children if li\'ing at the time of his death,
otherwise to the legal representatives or as-
signs of said member. Hall v. Ayers' Guard-
ian (Ky.) 105 S. W. 911, 913, 914.
Where a will provided that any real
property* of testatrix that had not been dis-
posed of by her husband at his death should
be equally divided between her heirs and le-
gal representatives and his legal representa-
tives, one who was executrix of the husband's
will and a devisee thereunder was a "legal
representative,*' of the husband, within the
will of testatrix. Gruenewald v. Neu, 74 N.
E. 101-103, 215 111. 132.
The use of the expression, "heirs and le-
gal representatives" instead of "heirs, execu-
tors, and administrators," may, under some
circumstances, raise the presumption that
those who are beneficially interested and suc-
ceed to the property and rights of the dece-
dent are intended. Marsh v. Marsh, 137 N.
W. 1122, 1124, 92 Neb. 189.
"The ordinary meaning of the words 'le-
gal representatives' is 'executors and admin-
istrators,' and they are to be given that
meaning unless there is something in the will
properly construed to show that they should
have some other meaning." Alexander v. Mc-
Peck, 75 N. E. 88, 91, 189 Mass. 34.
"Personal representatiTes'* and "legal
representatives" are sometimes used inter-
changeably, as signifying not only executors
or administrators, but also those who legal-
ly stand in place of, or represent the inter-
ests of, another. Lowry v. City of Duluth,
101 N. W. 1059, 1060, 94 Minn. 95.
Under a life policy in which the insurer
agreed with the "insured, his executors, ad-
ministrators, and assigns," to pay the amount
of the policy to losured's "legal representa-
tives," the amount is payable to insured's ex-
ecutors or administrators, and not to his
next of kin. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kan-
sas City Nat Bank, 97 S. W. 195, 196, 121
Mo. App. 479.
The words "legal representative" are pre-
sumed to mean executors and administrators,
and that meaning will be attributed to them
in any instance, unless by the context or sur-
rounding circumstances it be shown that the
words were not so used, but denote some oth-
er and difl'erent idea. Rockland-Rockport
Lime Co. ▼. Leary, 97 N. E. 43, 47, 203 N. Y.
469, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 62.
The term "legal representatives" of a
deceased person will mean the executor or
administrator if the subject-matter is per-
sonalty, and heirs or devisees if it is realty,
within the rule that all the necessary par-
ties to a judgment sought to be reviewed
must be the parties to the bill of review, and,
if they are dead, their "legal representa-
tives" must be parties. State Fair Ass'n v.
Terry, 85 S. W. 87, 89, 74 Ark. 149 (citing
Cochran v. Cochran, 17 Atl. 981, 127 Pa. 486;
Ralston v. Sharon, 51 Fed. 702; Johnson v.*
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
73
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
Van Epps, 110 111. 557; Turner t. Berry, 8
IlL 541).
In wlUs and other written Instruments,
the words "legal representatives" are fre-
quently used to mean the persons who suc-
ceed beneficially to the property or Interest
of the deceased. Whether In any given case
they are so used, or the executor or adminis-
trator is Intended, must be determined from
a consideration of all of the provisions of
the will. Marsh t. Marsh, 137 N. W. 1122,
1124, 02 Neb. 189.
Within an order of a probate court that
money be paid to a legatee of testatrix or his
''legal representative," his executor or ad-
ministrator, and not his heirs, is such repre-
aentative, as that court could not properly
undertake to distribute his estate as part of
the settlement of testatrix's estate; the as-
certainment of his legal heirs being, under
Gen. St 1902, S 394, for that court In the
settlement of his estate. Cooley v. Pigott,
80 AU. 92, 93, 84 Conn. 323.
The words "legal representatives," in a
certificate issued by a foreign corporation
authorized to issue benefit certificates, whi^
recites that the amount thereof shall be paid
to 'legal representatives, related to the mem-
ber as "do not Include any of the per-
sons spedfled in Rev. St. 1909, | 7109, pro-
viding that death benefits shall be paid to
the families, heirs, blood relatives, afllanced
husband or wife of, or to persons dependent
on, the member, but mean the executor or
administrator of the member, and the liabil-
ity of the corporation is that of a life in-
surance company, under section 6945, making
the defense of suicide unavailable to life in-
surance companies. Ordelheide v. Modem
Brotherhood of America, 139 S. W. 269, 270,
158 Mo. App. 677.
The words "representattre" and "legal
representative" of a person do not necessarily
exclude the administrator or executor, but
such words employed in a policy of a l>enefit
association in view of the purposes of the
association to benefit the family and heirs
of deceased members were not intended to
include the administrator of the member
referred to in a policy. Tucker v. Knights
of Pythias of North and South America, 68
S. Bw 796, 797, 135 Ga. 56.
A claim against a dty for the instanta-
neous death of plaintiff's intestate, through
the city's negligence, stated that the dalm
was for damages sustained by his estate,
legal representatives, and heirs, and that his
estate, legal representatlTes, and heirs claim-
ed a specified sum as damages. Held, that
the words "legal representatives" were not
used in their strictly technical sense as exec-
utors or administrators, nor was the word
•'heir" used in its primary and technical
sense as one who, by reason of birth in law-
ful wedlock. Inherits real property, but that
the expression, "estate, legal representatives,
and heirs," was used with the idea of using
words broad enough in their significance to
include all persons having claims against the
city on account of the death, and hence the
claim was sufiiclent as a basis for an action
for the benefit of the widow under the stat-
ute. Moyer v. aty of Oshkosh, 139 N. W.
378, 380, 151 Wis. 586 (citing 4 Words and
Phrases, pp. 3241-3264 ; 5 Words and Phras-
es, pp. 4070-4079).
Gen. St 1906, | 3147, provides that,
where the death of a mitior child is caused
by the wrongful act or negligence of a cor-
poration or its agents, the father, as the
legal representative of such minor child, may
sue for the loss of services of the child and
for* the mental pain and suffering of the
parent or parents. Held, that the damages
authorized are personal to the parents, and
an action therefor should be by the parent
personally, and an administrator of the mi-
nor child has no interest in or right to such
recovery; the term "legal representative"
havidig reference to the parties benefited by
the rights conferred, and not to the adminis-
trator or executor of a decedent. Seaboard
Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 53 South, 718, 719.
60 Fla. 186.
Testator devised the residue of his es-
tate to trustees, and directed that, if his
wife survived him, they should set apart a
third thereof and pay the income to her for
life, and at her death the fund should be
divided into three parts, one of which should
be paid to his son, if surviving testator's
wife, otherwise to his issue living at the
time of her death, and in default of issue to
his legal representatives. He directed the
trustees, if the son survived him, to set apart
and invest a specified sum and pay the in-
come thereof to the son for life, and at his
death to pay the principal to his issue, and
in default of Issue to his legal representa-
tives. Held, that the words "legal repre-
sentatives" meant executors and admini.stra-
tors, so that the son took one-third of the
trust fund created for the use of the widow
if he survived her, and the right to have it
administered as a part of his estate by his
own executors or administrators, if he died
before the widow without issue, and the
trust fund created for his own use was also
to be turned over to his executors or admin-
istrators, if he died without issue Alex-
ander V. McPeck, 75 N. EL 88, 91, 189 Mass.
34.
Where two beneficiary certificates were
payable to testator's mother, who died be-
fore he did, and provided that in such case
they should be payable to the "legal repre-
sentatives" of the member, and the articles
of incorporation declared the object of the
association to be the equitable distribution
of the fund among the "families or benefici-
aries" of deceased members, and declared
that each certificate entitled "the heirs or
legal representatives or designated benefici-
UIGAL REPRESENTATIVE
74
liKOAX REPRESENTATIYS
arles" to |2,000, and testator's will gave each
of hifi two sisters such of his property as
they might have in charge at his death, and
all the "residue of which I may die seised,
real, personal and mixed," absolutely to his
affianced, it was held that, while the words
*'legal representatives" might sometimes be
interpreted as "legal heirs," here they must
be given their usual meaning and carried the
certificates to the executor, and they went to
the affianced by the residuary clause. Walk-
er V, Peters, 124 8. W. 35^ 86, 13» Mo. App.
G81.
The word "heirs" properly means those
on whom the law casts the real estate im-
mediately on the death of the ancestor, and
the words "legal representatives" mean exec-
utors and administrators. These words are
to be construed unless from the context of
a will it may be seen that testator intended
to use them with another meaning. Where
a share of an estate consisting of both real
estate and personalty was to go to the "heirs
or legal representatives" of a deceased lega-
tee, the "heirs," according to the plain mean-
ing of the term, would take the real estate.
Where a share of an estate consisting of
both real estate and personalty was to go to
the "heirs" or "legal representatives" of a
deceased legatee, the personalty would go
to the next of kin, since to construe 'iegal
representatives" in its primary meaning
would make the personalty subject to the
testamentary disposition and the debts of
the deceased legatee, while the real estate
was not Howell v. Gifford, 53 AU. 1074,
1077. 64 N. J. Eq. 180 (citing Williams' Bx'rs,
1013).
Testator bequeathed to his wife the
balance due on a poUcy of insurance issued
by a company which was neither a fraternal
nor a mutual benefit association. The policy
provided for payment to the beueflciary,
his "legal representatives" or assigns. The
application directed that the insurance
should be paid "to whom I may direct in
my will." Held, that the titie vested in the
widow, after the satisfaction of a debt to
secure which it had been assigned, as execu-
trix, and not as a beneficiary under the
policy. Leonard v. Harney, 66 N. E. 2, 173
N. Y. 352.
A fraternal insurance association issued
a certificate of membership to a man who
named his wife as beneficiary. It provided
that if his wife died before he did, he might
name another beneficiary, but if he failed to
do so, the insurance should be paid to his
legal representative. The wife died; he
died later; an administrator was appointed
to whom the association paid the money. The
insured left three children who sued the ad-
ministrator to recover the money. Held,
that the administrator was the legal repre-
sentative of the deceased within the meaning
of that term and was entitled to the money.
Hunt T. Remsberg, 112 Pac. 590, 591, 83 Kan.
665, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 246, 21 Ann. Gas. 1267.
Aseat
A provision of an insurance policy that
the term insured, as used therein, shall in-
clude his "legal representatives," does not
include his agents. Boston Marine Ins. Go.
V. Scales, 49 S. W. 743, 745, 101 Tenn. 628.
Assignees, pmroliasers, a&d Kr«nte«i
The words "legal representative," as
used in a statute relating to settlement on
public lands, included not only heirs, execu-
tors, or administrators of a settier, but his
legal assigns. Lapish y. Wells, 6 GreenL
(6 Me.) 175, 185.
An assignment of a patent to two per-
sons named, "and to their legal representa-
tives," to be held and enjoyed by them for
their own use and behoof "and for the use
and behoof of their legal representatives,"
is not a mere personal license to the persons
named, but the words "legal representatives"
mean "assigns" as well as "executors and ad-
ministrators." Hamilton v. Kingsburg, U
Fed. Ga& 346, 347, 15 Blatchf. 64.
On the death of a party to an action In-
volving real estate, the heir of the deceased
party must be brought in as successor, and
hence a contention that the provisions of the
Code of Public General Laws, providing that
if a party to a suit in equity shall die before
final decree, leaving heirs at law or repre-
sentatives who should be made parties, it
shall not be necessary to file an amended
bill, do not contemplate that such proceed-
ings should be revived by summoning in the
heir, but that they mean, by using the term
"legal representative," that the purchaser,
and none other, in case of a sale of the land
by the fraudulent vendee, should be brought
In, is untenable. Sinclair v. Auxiliary Real-
ty Go., 67 Atl. 664, 668, 99 Md. 223.
The term "legal representative," as used
in a land patent, embraced a representative
by contract, a grantee, or assignee, as well
as a representative by operation of law. The
purchaser of a land claim sold by a Louisi-
ana parish court in administration proceed-
itngs is a "legal representative" of the claim-
ant, within the meaning of Act Gong. June
2, 1858, requiring the surveyor general of the
district in which a land claimed is located,
on satisfactory proof that such claim had
be^i confirmed and is unsatisfied, to issue to
the claimant or his "legal representative" a
certificate of location of a quantify of land
equal to that so confirmed and unsatisfied.
Bradley v. Dells Lumber Go., 81 N. W. 394,
396, 105 Wis. 245.
Gode Civ. Proc. Gal. { 473, provides that
an assignee or grantee is a "legal representa-
tive" of the assignor or grantor In regard to
the things assigned or granted. Abb. Law
Dictionary says that "to represent a person"
is to stand in his place, to act his part, ex-
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVS
75
LEGAL KEPBESENTATIVB
ercise bis right, or take his share. Brown t.
Massey, 76 Pac. 226, 228, 13 Okl. 670.
While In common parlance the expres-
sion '*legal representatives" means adminis-
trators or executors, legally it is not always
so exclusive. Under a lease giving the lessor
the right to cancel the lease and providing
that the covenant and agreements contained
therein were binding on the parties and their
legal representatives, a grantee of the lessor
had a right to cancel the lease. Adler v.
Lowensteln, 102 N. T. Supp. 492, 493, 52
Misc. Rep. 556 (citing Mutual lAte Ins. Go. v.
Armstrong, 6 Sup. Ct 877," 879, 117 U. S. 691,
597, 29 L. Ed. 999 ; Warnecke v. Lembca, 71
IlL 91, 93, 12 Am. Rep. 85).
As asslsits
See Assigns.
Desceadaate
While the term "legal representatives'*
in Its ordinary acceptation means executors
and administrators, it may also mean de-
scendants. Kelsay v. Eaton, 76 Pac 770, 772,
45 Or. 70, 106 Am. St Rep. 662.
Under a will giving legacies to relatives
who shall be living or whose legal represent-
atives shall be living at a certain time, the
words "legal representatives" mean children
or lineal descendants. Miller v. Metcalf, 68
Ati. 743. 745, 77 Conn. 176.
Testator created a testamentary trust,
and provided that the Income thereof should
be applied to the use of daughters named
and a son named, and declare<l that on the
death of the daughters, respectively, the
principal held in trust for the daughter dy-
ing should be transfoiTed to the children of
the deceased daughter, and, in default of chil-
dren, the property should go to the other chil-
dren named in the will and to their legal rep-
resentatives. Held, that the words **legal rep-
resentatives" meant lineal descendants,
though the daughters were illegitimate chil-
dren of testator. Dwight v. Gibb, 129 N. X.
Sopp. 961, 964, 145 App. Div. 223.
DeTisees and legatees
The words "legal representatives," as
used in a contract for preferential rates be-
tween a railroad company and "a shlpi)er,
which provided that the railroad agreed to
transfer logs for such shipper and his as-
signs at a prescribed rate, and defined the
word ''assigns" as limited to the shipper'a
legal representatives in case of death, to his
successors in the timber and lumber business
in case of his retirement, and to any mill
that he might build or purchase, does not in-
clude a legatee of the shipper's lumber busi-
ness under his will. Sullivan v. Louisville
& N. R. Co., 36 South. 694. 697, 138 Ala. 650.
In Rev. Civ. St art 2248, providing that
in actions against executors, etc., neither par-
ty shall be allowed to testify against the oth-
er as to any transaction with the testator,
etc., unless called by the opposite party, and
provldipg that the provision shall extend to
all actions by or against the heirs or **legal
representatives" of a decedent arising out of
transactions with the decedent the reference
to heirs and "legal representatives" does not
include devisees and legatees, and In an ac-
tion to cancel a deed given to one since de-
ceased, where it appeared that by a settle-
ment among the defendants certain churches
were entitled to an interest in the estate as
legatees and other defendants were entitled
to an interest as heirs, plaintifl'*s testimony
that the deed to the decedent had been given
to secure a debt which had been released by
decedent's will was admissible, as against the
churches as legatees, but not as against the
other defendants as heirs. Emerson v. Scott
87 S. W. 369, 370, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 66.
The term "legal representatives" of a de-
ceased person will mean the executor or ad-
ministrator if the subject-matter is person-
alty, and heirs or devisees if it is realty,
within the rule that all the necessary par-
ties to a judgment sought to be reviewed
must be the parties to the bill of review, and,
if they are dead, their ''legal representatives"
most be parties. State Fair Ass'n v. Terry,
86 S. W. 87, 89, 74 Ark. 149 (citing Cochran
V. Cochran, 17 Atl. 981, 127 Pa. 486; Ralston
V. Sharon, 51 Fed. 702 ; Johnson v. Van Eppe,
110 IlL 657; Turner v. Berry, 8 111. 641).
Under Laws 1885, p. 698, c. 405, S 6, pro-
viding for the delivery of a tax deed to the
purchaser, his "legal representatives" or as-
Bigns, a deed is properly delivered to the
sole devisee of the purchaser's estate, the
quoted term not being necessarily confined to
executors, administrators, etc. Rosenblum v.
Elsenherg, 108 N. Y. Supp. 350, 353, 123 App.
Div. 896 (citing Griswold v. Sawyer, 26 N. E.
464, 125 N. Y. 411 ; Rice's Lessee v. White, 8
Ohio, 216 ; 2 Blackw. Tax TiUes, i 963, and
note 1, citing cases; Black, Tax Titles, p.
312 ; Morehouse v. Phelps, 18 111. 472 ; Mutu-
al Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 6 Sup. Ct 877,
117 U. S. 691, 29 L Ed. 997 ; Duncan's Les-
see V. Walker [Pa.] 1 Yeates, 213 ; Common-
wealth ex rel. Kreber v. Bryan [Pa.) 6 Serg.
& R. 81; Wamsley v. Crook, 3 Neb. 844;
Lee V. DUl [N. Y.j 39 Barb. 621).
Heirs, aezt of kia» and distrlbvtees
Heirs as Including, see Heirs.
Lineal heir as including, see Lineal
Heirs.
While the term "legal representatives"
ordinarily means executors or administra-
' tors, it may be shown to mean next of kin.
• Wolfe V. Wolfe, 134 S. W. 33, 34, 154 Mo.
' App. 218 ; Kelsay v. Eaton, 76 Pac. 770. 772,
' 45 Or. 70, 106 Am. St Rep. 662.
P. L. 1898, p. 778, § 168, provides that
^ the orphans' court shall make distribution
', **to the next of kindred to the intestate in
equal degrees, or legally rei)reHentmg their
' stocks," and section 169 provides that, "in
LKGAL REPRESENTATIVE
76
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
case there be no child, then to the next df
kindred of equal degree of or unto the intesh
tate and their legal representatives as afore-
said." Held that the words "legal represen-
tatives/' as used in section 169, mean legal
representatives of their stocks, and, having
found a common ancestor of the intestate
and the living next of kin, the logical con-
clusion is that the nearest class of kinsman
descending from that ancestor, together from
the stock to which representation is limited.
Smith V. McDonald, 61 AtL 453, 454, 69 N. J.
Bq. 765.
The term, "legal representatives" of a de-
ceased person will mean the executor or
administrator if the subject-matter is per-
sonalty, and heirs or devisees if It is realty,
within the rule that all the necessary par-
ties to a Judgment sought to be reviewed
must be the parties to the bill of review, and,
if they are dead, their "legal representatives"
must be parties. State Fair Ass'n v. Terry,
85 S. W. 87, 89, 74 Ark. 149 (citing Cochran
V. CJochran, 17 Atl. 981, 127 Pa. 486 ; Ralston
V. Sharon, 51 Fed. 702 ; Jo&nson v. Van Epps,
110 111. 557; Turner v. Berry, 8 111. 541).
While it may be conceded that the words
"legal representatives" mean executors and
administrators, as used in Ky. St 1904, f
655, providing that when a policy of insur-
ance is effected on one's own life, in favor
of some person other than himself, having an
insurable interest therein, the lawful benefi-
ciary, other than himself or his "legal repre-
sentatives," shall be entitled to its proceeds
as against creditors and representatives of
insured, yet in an assessment insurance poli-
cy that the amount should go on his death
to his wife (naming her) and his two daugh-
ters, if living, otherwise his "legal representa-
tives" should be entitled to the insurance
in equal parts, the words mean heirs and
distributees. Hall v. Ayer's Guardian (Ky.)
105 S. W. 911, 913, 914.
That the heirs at law of a lessor, who
dies intestate, were the only persons who
could execute a good and sufl9clent deed to
premises leased with an option to the lessee
to purchase, will not make them the "legal
representative" contemplated by the lease, to
whom notice of a desire to exercise the op-
,tion was to be given, where, by its terms, the
legal representative provided for was not re-
quired to execute the deed, but only to deliv-
er it or cause it to be delivered. Rockland-
Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 97 N. B. 43, 47,
203 N. Y. 469, Ann. Gas. 1913B, 62.
"While technically the words 'legal rep-
resentatives' mean administrators or execu-
tors, they may refer to heirs or next of kin.
A 'representative' is one who stands in the
place of an owner of real estate as heir, of
personalty as next of kin. He is one, also,
who takes by representation, and in wills
and settlements the terms 'representatives*
and legal representatives' are frequently held
to mean heirs and next of kin, and not ex-
ecutors and administrators." Davidson v.
Jones, '98 N. Y. Supp. 265, 266, 112 App. Div.
254 (citing Griswold v. Sawyer, 26 N. E. 464,
125 N. Y. 411).
In Davidson v. Jones, 98 N. Y. Supp. 265,
112 App. Div. 255, it was held that though
the words "legal representative" in a will de-
vising property to the testktor's wife and on
her decease, to her children, or to their legal
representative, refer technically to executors
or administrators, yet they may also mean
heirs at law or UQxt of kin, and where used
in reference to real estate, they mean heirs
of testator's deceased children. In re Alli-
son, 102 N. Y. Supp. 887, 895, 53 Misc. Rep.
222.
Where a testator makes a bequest to his
sister, or, in case of her death before his
own, to her heirs and legal representatives,
the expression "legal representatives" is
equivalent to "heirs," and may be regarded as
mere surplusage. In re Riesenberg's Es-
tate, 90 S. W. 1170, 1171, 116 Mo. App. 308.
Where there was nothing in the contract
of insurance nor in any statute or provision
in the charter of the company to indicate
that the words "legal representatives" were
used in their broader sense to mean heirs at
law, and the policy was an endowment paya-
ble to the insured if he was alive at the end
of 15 years, and to his legal representative
if he died before that time, his heirs had no
vested interest in the policy by the use of
such phrase, which would prevent the insured
from assigning the policy. Page r. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 135 S. W. 911, 912, 98
Ark. 340,
Gen. St 1902, § 398, provides that ances-
tral real estate shall be distributed to the
brothers and sisters, and those who legally
represent them, of the blood of the ancestor
from whom such estate came; that, if there
are none such, then to the children of the
ancestor, and those who legally represent
them; that, if there be none such, then to
the brothers and sisters of the ancestor, aiid
those who legally represent them ; and that,
if there be none such, then it shall be divided
in the same manner as other real estate.
Held that "legal representatives" means
those who inherit property per stirpes as
the representatives of a deceased ancestor,
in whose place, for the purpose of succession
to such property, they stand, and so, where
a son as the sole issue of his father died
without issue, his mother surviving, ances-
tral estate which he had inherited from his
father did not pass to her as the "legal rep-
resentative" of the son's children, and hence
on the death of the mother the nearest of
kin to the son on his father's side were en-
titled to the property as against the nearest
of kin on his mother's side. In re Tuttle's
Estate, 59 AtL 44, 45, 77 Conn. 310 (citing
Ketchum v. Corse, 31 AtL 486, 65 Conn. 89).
LEGAIi REPKESENTATIVE
77
LEGAL RESIDENCE
In Const. § 193, the phrase "legal or per-
sonal representatives," embraces not only the
executor or administrator, but the heirs or
next of kin, as the case may be, and action
for death may be brought by the executor,
administrator, heirs, or next of kin, and the
widow, children, and administrator may join
in an action. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Wash-
ington, 46 South. 614, 92 Miss. 129.
By "legal representatiyes" in a bequest
in trust to pay the income to H., nephew of
testatrix, and, at his death, the principal
to such of his legal representatives "as are
related to me by blood," is meant his heirs
at law. Hartford Trust Co. v. Wolcott, 81
Aa 1057, 85 Conn. 134.
A life policy stipulated that the insurer
agreed with the "insured, his executors, ad-
ministrators and assigns," to pay the amount
of the x)olicy to the insured's "legal repre-
sentatives" within . a specified time after
proof of the death of the Insured. The in-
sured, at the time the policy was issued, was
unmarried. Held, that the words "legal rep-
resentatives" meant the insured's executors
or adminlstrntors, and not his next of kin.
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Kansas City Nat
Bank, 97 S. W. 195, 196, 121 Mo. App. 479.
Receiver
A provision in an insurance policy that,
where the expression "insured" is used there-
in it shall include the "legal representatives"
of the insured, does not entitle a receiver to
take the place of the insured in answer to
a demand by the ccmipany that the insured
shaU appear for examination under oatjbi re-
specting a loss, as required by the policy, al-
though the receiver was appointed for the
express purpose of collecting the insurance;
the insured having absconded and having
been adjudged a bankrupt Sims v. Union
Assnr. Soc., 129 Fed. 804, 805, 808.
Spouse
The fact that the statute authorizes
proof to be made by the heirs or "legal rep-
resentatives" does not give the widow, claim-
ing only a dower interest, any title in the
land, since the quoted phrase, in its ordi-
naiy acceptation, means executor or admin-
istrator. Braun v. Mathieson, 116 N. W.
789, 791, 139 Iowa, 409.
Swvivliic partner
Under the statute prohibiting a party to
testify against the opposite party in actions
by or against the heirs or legal representa-
tives of a decedent arising out of any trans-
action with such decedent, etc., a surviving
partner, suing for the benefit of the firm, is
not a "legal representative" of the deceased
partner. Shivel & Stewart v. Greer Bros.
(Tex.) 123 S. W. 207, 208.
Triftstee Im bankniptey
"The terms legal representative' and
'personal representative,* in their commonly
accepted senses mean administrator or ex-
ecutor, though this is not their only defini-
tion. They may mean heirs, next of kin, or
descendants, and sometimes assignees or
grantees. The sense in which the term is to
be understood depends somewhat on the In-
tention of the party using it, and is to be
gathered, not altogether from its use, but
by the surrounding circumstances." Whether
a trustee in bankruptcy is a "legal represen-
tative" within Act June 3, 1864, § 30, la
Stat 108, c. 106 (Rev. St fg 5197, 5198). pro-
viding that, where a greater rate of interest
has been paid a bank than that allowed by
that section, the person paying the same or
his "legal representative" may recover back
twice the amount of interest so paid, might
admit of doubt. Reed v. American-German
Nat Bank, 155 Fed. 233, 236 (citing 6 Words
and Phrases, p. 5358; Griswold r. Sawyer,
26 N. B. 464, 125 N. Y. 411).
LEOAI. BESIBEKOE
As residence, see Residence.
Inhabitant synonymous, see Inhabitan-
cy— Inhabitant
Resident importing, see Resident
The "legal residence" of a corporation,
within a statute providing that actions shall
be tried in the county In which defendant re-
sides, etc., is the county designated in its
articles of incorporation as the county in
which its principal office shall be kept
Woods Gold Min. Ck>. v. Royston, 1j03 Pac.
291, 292, 293, 46 Colo. 191.
"There is a broad distinction between
a legal and actual residence. A 'legal resi-
dence' (domicile) cannot, in the nature of
things, coexist in the same person in two
states or countries. He must have a legal
residence somewhere. He cannot be a cos-
mopolitan. The succession to movable prop-
erty, whether testamentary or in case of in-
testacy, except as regulated by statute^ the
Jurisdiction of the probate of wills, the right
to vote, the liability to poll tax, and to mili-
tary duty, and other things, all depend up-
on the party's legal residence or domicile.
For these purposes, he must have a legal res-
idence. Othe law will, from facts and cir-
cumstances, fix a legal residence for him, un-
less he voluntarily fixes it himself. His le-
gal residence consists of fact and intention.
Both must concur. And when his legal resi-
dence is once fixed* it requires both fact and
intention to change it Aa contradistinguish-
ed from his legal residence, he may have
an actual residence in anothtt state or coun-
try. He may abide In the latter without
surrendering his legat residence in the for-
mw, provided he so intends. His legal res-
idence, for the purposes above indicated, may
be merely ideal, but his actual residence
must be substantive. He may not actually
abide at his legal residence at all, but his ac-
tual residence must be his abiding place."
Pickering v. Winch, 87 Pac. 768, 766, 48 Or.
500, 9 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1169 (quoting and
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE
76
LEOAIi REPRESENTATIVE
case there be no child, then to the next dt
kindred of equal degree of or unto the intes-
tate and their legal representatives as afore-
said." Held that the words "legal represen-
tatives," as used in section 169, mean legal
representatives of their stocks, and, having
found a common ancestor of the Intestate
and the living next of kin, the logical con-
clusion is that the nearest class of kinsman
descending from that ancestor, together from
the stock to which representation is limited.
Smith V. McDonald, 61 AtL 453, 454, 69 N. J.
Eq. 765.
The term, "legal representatives" of a de-
ceased person will mean the executor or
administrator if the subject-matter is per-
sonalty, and heirs or devisees if it is realty,
within the rule that all the necessary par-
ties to a Judgment sought to be reviewed
must be the parties to the bill of review, and,
if they are dead, their "legal representatives"
must be parties. State Fair Ass*n v. Terry,
85 S. W. 87. 89, 74 Ark. 149 (citing Cochran
V. Cochran, 17 Atl. 981, 127 Pa. 486 ; Ralston
V. Sharon, 51 Fed. 702 ; Jol^nson v. Van Epps,
110 111. 557; Turner v. Berry, 8 111. 541).
While it may be conceded that the words
"legal representatives" mean executors and
administrators, as used in Ky. St 1904, i
655, providing that when a policy of insur-
ance is effected on one's own life, in favor
of some person other than himself, having an
insurable Interest therein, the lawful benefi-
ciary, other than himself or his "legal repre-
sentatives," shall be entitled to Its proceeds
as against creditors and representatives of
insured, yet in an assessment Insurance poli-
cy that the amount should go on his death
to his wife (naming her) and his two daugh-
ters, if living, otherwise his "legal representa-
tives" should be entitled to the insurance
in equal parts, the words mean heirs and
distributees. Hall v. Ayer's Guardian (Ky.)
105 S. W. 911, 913, 914.
That the heirs at law of a lessor, who
dies Intestate, were the only persons who
could execute a good and sufficient deed to
premises leased with an option to the lessee
to purchase, will not make them the "legal
representative" contemplated by the lease, to
whom notice of a desire to exercise the op-
,tlon was to be given, where, by its terms, the
legal representative provided for was not re-
quired to execute the deed, but only to deliv-
er it or cause it to be delivered. Rockland-
Rockport Lime Co. v. Leary, 97 N. B. 43, 47,
203 N. Y. 469, Ann. CJas. 1913B, 62.
"While technically the words 'legal rep-
resentatives* mean administrators or execu-
tors, they may refer to heirs or next of kin.
A 'representative' is one who stands in the
place of an owner of real estate as heir, of
personalty as next of kin. He is one, also,
who takes by representation, and in wills
and settlements the terms 'representatives'
and 'legal representatives* are frequently held
to mean heirs and next of kin, and not ex-
ecutors and administrators." Davidson v-
Jone8,'98 N. Y. Supp. 265, 266, 112 App. Dlv.
254 (citing Griswold ▼. Sawyer, 26 N. E. 464,
125 N. Y. 411).
In Davidson ▼. Jones, 98 N. Y, Supp. 265,
112 App. Dlv. 255, it was held that though
the words "legal representative" in a will de-
vising property to the testktor's wife and on
her decease, to her children, or to their legal
representative, refer technically to executors
or administrators, yet they may also mean
heirs at law or UQxt of kin, and where used
in reference to real estate, they mean heirs
of testator's deceased children. In re Alli-
son, 102 N. Y. Supp. 887, 895, 53 Misc. Rep.
222.
Where a testator makes a bequest to his
sister, or, in case of her death before his
own, to her heirs and legal representatives,
the expression "legal representatives" is
equivalent to "heirs," and may be regarded as
mere surplusage. In re Riesenberg's Es-
tate, 90 S. W. 1170, 1171, 116 Mo. App. 308.
Where there was nothing in the contract
of Insurance nor in any statute or provision
in the charter of the company to indicate
that the words "legal representatives" were
used in their broader sense to mean heirs at
law, and the policy was an endowment paya-
ble to the insured if he was alive at the end
of 16 years, and to his legal representative
if he died before that time, his heirs had no
vested Interest in the policy by the use of
such phrase, which would prevent the insured
from assigning the policy. Page v. Metropol-
itan Ufe Ins. Co., 135 S. W. 911, 912, 98
Ark. 340.
Gen. St 1902, § 398, provides that ances-
tral real estate shall be distributed to the
brothers and sisters, and those who legally
represent them, of the blood of the ancestor
from whom such estate came; that, if there
are none such, then to the children of the
ancestor, and those who legally represent
them; that. If there be none such, then to
the brothers and sisters of the ancestor, and
those who legally represent them ; and that,
if there be none such, then It shall be divided
in the same manner as other real estate.
Held that "legal representatives" means
those who Inherit property per stirpes as
the representatives of a deceased ancestor,
in whose place, for the purpose of succession
to such property, they stand, and so, where
a son as the sole issue of his father died
without issue, his mother surviving, ances-
tral estate which he had Inherited from his
father did not pass to her as the "legal rep-
resentative" of the son's children, and hence
on the death of the mother the nearest of
kin to the son on his father's side were en-
titled to the property as against the nearest
of kin on his mother's side. In re Tuttle's
Estate, 59 AtL 44, 45, 77 Conn. 310 (citing
Ketchum v. Corse, 31 AtL 486, 65 Conn. 89).
LEQAIi KEPKESENTATIVE
77
LEGAL RBSIDENCB
In Const. § 193, the phrase 'legal or per-
sonal representatives," embraces not only the
executor or administrator, but the heirs or
next of kin, as the case may be, and action
for death may be brought by the executor,
administrator, heirs, or next of kin, and the
widow, children, and administrator may Join
in an action. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. y. Wash-
ington, 45 South. 614, 92 Miss. 129.
By *legal representatiyes" in a bequest
in trust to pay the income to H., nephew of
testotrix, and, at Ills death, the principal
to such of his legal representatives "as are
related to me by blood,'* is meant his heirs
at law. Hartford Trust CJo. ▼. Wolcott, 81
Aa 1057, 85 Conn. 134.
A life policy stipulated that the insurer
agreed with the "insured, his executors, ad-
ministrators and assigns," to pay the amount
of the i)ollcy to the insured's "legal repre-
sentatives" within a specified time after
proof of the death of the Insured. The in-
sured, at the time the policy was issued, was
unmarried. Held, that the words "legal rep-
resentatives" meant the insured's executors
or administrators, and not his next of kin.
New Yoric Life Ins. Co. v. Kansas City Nat
Bank, 97 S. W. 195, 196, 121 Mo. App. 479.
BeceiTer
A provision in an insurance policy that,
where the expression "insured" is used there-
in it shall include the "legal representatives"
of the insured, does not entitle a receiver to
take the place of the insured in answer to
a demand by the c(Hupany that the insured
shaU appear for examination under oatjbi re-
.specting a loss, as required by the policy, al-
though the receiver was appointed for the
express purpose of collecting the insurance;
the insured having absconded and having
been adjudged a bankrupt Sims v. Union
Assnr. Soc., 129 Fed. 804, 805, 808.
Spouse
The fact that the statute authorizes
proof to be made by the heirs or "legal rep-
resentatives" does not give the widow, claim-
ing only a dower interest, any title in the
land, since the quoted phrase, in its ordi-
nary acceptation, means executor or admin-
iBtrator. Braun v. Mathieson, 116 N. W.
789, 791, 139 Iowa, 409.
SvvviTliic partaer
Under the statute prohibiting a party to
testify against the opposite party in actions
by or against the heirs or legal representa-
tives of a decedent arising out of any trans-
action with such decedent etc., a surviving
partner, suing for the benefit of the firm. Is
not a "legal representative" of the deceased
partner. Sbivel A Stewart v. Greer Bros.
(Tex.) 123 S. W, 207, 208.
Traatee Im bankniptoy
"The terms legal representative* and
'personal representative,' in their commonly
accepted sense, mean administrator or ex-
ecutor, though this is not their only defini-
tion. They may mean heirs, next of kin, or
descendants, and sometimes assignees or
grantees. The sense in which the term is to
be understood depends somewhat on the in-
tention of the party using it, and is to be
gathered, not altogether from its use, but
by the surrounding circumstances." Whether
a trustee in bankruptcy is a "legal represen-
tative" within Act June 3, 1864, § 30, ]:i
Stat 108, a 106 (Rev. St f| 6197. 6198), pro-
viding that, where a greater rate of interest
has been paid a bank than that allowed by
that section, the person paying the same or
his "legal representative" may recover back
twice the amount of interest so paid, might
admit of doubt. Reed v. American-German
Nat Bank, 155 Fed. 233, 236 (citing 6 Words
and Phrases, p. 5358; Oris wold Y. Sawyer,
26 N. B. 464, 125 N. Y. 411).
I.EGAI. BESIBEKOE
As residence, see Residence.
Inhabitant synonymous, see Inhabitan-
cy— Inhabitant
Re^dent importing, see Resident
The "legal residence" of a corporation,
within a statute providing that actions shall
be tried in the county in which defendant re-
sides, etc., is the county designated in its
articles of incorporation as the county in
which its principal office shall be kept.
Woods Gold Min. Ck>. v. Royston, 103 Pac.
291, 292, 293, 46 Colo. 191.
"There is a broad distinction between
a legal and actual residence. A legal resi-
dence' (domicile) cannot, in the nature of
things, coexist in the same person in two
states or countries. He must have a legal
residence somewhere. He cannot be a cos-
mopolitan. The succession to movable prop-
erty, whether testamentary or in case of in-
testacy, except as regulated by statute^ the
Jurisdiction of the probate of wills, the right
to vote, the liability to poll tax, and to mili-
tary duty, and other things, all depend up-
on the party's legal residence or domicile.
For these purposes, he must have a legal res-
idence. The law will, from facts and cir-
cumstances, fix a legal residence for him, un-
less he voluntarily fixes it himself. His le-
gal residence consists of fact and intention.
Both must concur. And when his legal resi-
dence is once fixed* it requires both fact and
intenticm to change it As contradistinguish-
ed from his legal residence, he may have
an actual residence in anothtt state or coun-
try. He may abide in the latter without
snrroidering his legat residence in the for-
mer, provided he so intends. His legal res-
idence, for the purposes above indicated, may
be merely ideal, but his actual residence
must be substantive. He may not actually
abide at his legal residence at all, but his ac-
tual residence must be his abiding place."
Pickering v. Winch, 87 Pac. 768, 766, 48 Or.
500, 9 li. R. A. (N. S.) 1169 (quoting and
I^EGAIi RESIDENOE
78
LEGAIi SHARE
adopting definition in Tipton v. Tipton, 8 S.
W. 440, 87 Ky. 245; Michael y. Michael, 79
8. W. 74, 75, 34 Tex. av. App. 630).
The actual residence is not always the
"legal residence'* or inhabitancy of a man.
The foreign minister actually resides and
is personally present at the court to which he
is accredited, but his "legal residence" or in-
habitancy or domicile are in his own country.
Under Ck)de Iowa, § 2906, which requires a
chattel mortgage to be recorded in the coun-
ty where the holder of the property resides,
a mortgagor may be a resident of a coun-
ty, within the meaning of the statute, al-
though his legal donUcile is elsewhere; and
a mortgage given by a railroad contractor on
property in his possession, in a county where
he is at work, and in which he actually re-
sides with his family, while engaged in per-
forming his contract, is properly recorded in
such county, although his residence there
may be only temporary. In re Brannock, 131
Fed. 819, 822, 823.
LEGAI. BIGHT
See Mutuality of Legal Right
A "legal right" is a claim recognizable
and enforceable at law. In re Folwell's Es-
tate, 62 Atl. 414, 415, 68 N. J. Eq. 728, 2 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1193.
By "legal rights" are meant rights which
have been firmly established, and are undis-
puted or indisputable. Tacoma R. & Power
Co, V. Pacific Traction CJo., 155 Fed. 259, 261.
The words "legal right," within the rule
relating to uttering forged writings to the
effect that the writing forged or counter-
feited must be apparently such as will de-
prive a person of property, estate, or a "le-
gal right," evidently mean a right that may
be enforced in a civil action. Commonwealth
v. Tabor (Ky.) 104 S. W. 261, 262.
A cause of action is inconceivable sep-
arately from the rights which it invades, and
a legal right is inconceivable separately from
I)08sible infractions of that right A "legal
right" or title in this aspect is the privilege
found in law against certain acts or omis-
sions on the part of others. Telulah Paper
Co. V. Patten Paper Co., 112 N. W. 522, 524,
132 Wis. 364, 425.
The order of deportation of a Chinese
I)erson, who has plainly violated the ezclu
sion act made by a court of the- United
States, pursuant to the acts of Congress, is
not made in an ordinary justiciable case, and
does not deal with "le^al lights," as that ex-
pression is generally understood. It merely
involves the pretended claim to remain in
this country of an individual who, against
settled American policy and against the posi-
tive command of our statutes, has surrepti-
tiously and fraudulently obtruded his unac-
ceptable presence among our people. Unit-
ed States V. Pah Chung, 132 Fed. 109, 110.
IiEGAI. SEPARATION
The provision of Code, f 966, that "legal
separation from bed and board may be grant-
ed for drunkenness, cruelty, and desertion,''
read in connection with the other sections of
the Code relating to divorce, and their index
or head lines, which plainly contemplate and
provide for the two kinds of divorce known
to the law before the adoption of the Code,
namely, divorce a vinculo and divorce a men-
sa et thoro, has no application to voluntary-
deeds of separation, nor does it apply to di-
vorce a vinculo, but means that a divorce a
mensa et thoro may be granted for the causes
mentioned; the prefixing of the adjective "le-
gal" to the words "separation from bed and
board" being only an inartificial mode of ex-
pressing the meaning of what would have
been better expressed by the use of the word
"divorce," instead of the term "legal sep-
aration." Maschauf v. Maschaur, 28 App.
D. C. 87, 89.
I.EOAI. 8ERVIOE8
"Legal services" are "extraordinary serv-
ices" within Rev. St 1898, | 3929, providing
that an allowance may be made to adminis-
trators for all extraordinary services. In re
Ryan's Estate, 94 N. W. 342, 344» 117 Wis.
480.
UBOAI. gSTTLEMENT
Rev. PoL Code 1903, §§ 2810, 2812, charge
the care of an insane person to a county
where he has acquired a "legal settiement,"
without defining what shall constitute such
a settiement Held, that it must be deemed
to have been used with the same meaning
as in section 2764, relating to poor and indi-
gent persons, and providing that they acquire
a "legal settlement" diarging a county with
their support by a residence therein, for 90
days which they lose by acquiring a new one
or by willful absence from the county for
90 days; it not appearing that a legal sup-
plement was otherwise defined by any stat-
ute. In re Bigelow, 96 N. W. 698. 17 S. I>.
331.
LEOAI* SHABE
The words "legal share,** standing alone
and unqualified by other expressions in a
will whereby testator gave to his wife the
legal share of his real estate and personal
property, indicate an intention that she shall
take one-half of the personal property abso-
lutely and the income of one-half of the real
estate for life, in the absence of any children
of the parties, and a will whereby testator
gave to his wife described property for use
as long as she desired, after which the same
should be sold by his executors and become
a part of his estate, and whereby he declared
that the legal share of his real estate and per-
sonal property should be paid to his wife as
her share, and whereby he gave a legacy in
money and the balance of his estate to
enumerated relatives, and whereby, he di-
I^EGAJj SUBDIVISION
79
USaAL YOTBR
rected his ezecators to dispose of all bis
estate within a spedfled time, used the term
in SDch sense. In re Dull's Estate, 71 Atl.
9, 10, 222 Pa. 206, 128 Am. St Rep. 790.
LEGAL 8UBBIVI8IOH
''Legal subdivision/' as used in Gen. St
1901, i 6339, requiring each "legal subdivision
of Behool land to be appraised separately
pilor to its being exposed to sale, refers to
the smallest subdivision under the congres-
sional system of surveying, namely (except
where for special reasons lots are platted in
more or less irregular shape as in the case
of fractional sections), quarter-quarter sec-
tions, or 40-acre tracts. Hopper t. Nation,
98 Pac. 77, 78, 78 Kan. 108.
LEGAL SUB vznr
Act March 30, 1872 (St 1871-72, p. 706,
c. 531), for the survey of a line dividing par-
ticular counties, declaring that the line so
surveyed should be conclusive until the Legls-
lotore should change it or order another sur-
vey, did not repeal Pol. Code, §| 39()9-3972,
providing that any county lines not adequate-
ly marked should be run and marked by the
Surveyor General; and hence a survey under
the qiedal act was a "legal survey." Trini-
ty County V. Mendocino County, 00 Pac 685,
686, 161 CJal. 270.
LEGAL TEHDEB
As money, see Money.
To constitute a **legal tender" it is essen-
tial to prove an actual offer of the sum due,
onless the actual production and offer of the
money be dispensed with by the express dec-
laration of the creditor that he will not ac-
cept it, or by some equivalent act Green-
wood V. Watson, 171 Fed. 610, 621, 06 C. C.
A. 421 (citing Buchenau v. Homey, 12 111.
336).
A decree requiring payment at a certain
time is not complied with by a tender of the
amount in "national bank notes." Lawrence
V. Staigg, 10 R. I. 581, 508.
A bill of exchange is not "legal tender."
United States Health A Accident Ins. Co. v.
(nark, 83 N. E. 760, 762, 41 Ind. App. 345.
LEGAL TITLE
See Inchoate Legal Title.
Seisin importing, see Seisin.
A purchaser's interest in land by virtue
of a contract of sale is '*legal title" within
the one-year limitation (Ode Supp. 1007, i
3447b), barring the claim of a spouse not
joining in a conveyance by the holder of the
legal tiUe. Hutchinson v. Olberding, 130 N.
W. 130, 140, 150 Iowa, 604.
The phrase "legal title" in CkMie av.
Proc. i 368, providing that in an action to
recover real property he who establishes a
legal title to the premises is presumed to have
been possessed thereof within the time re-
quired by law, is not necessarily a mere pa-
per title, but such a title as undisputed will
sustain an action of ejectment Aubuchon v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 122 N. T.
Supp. 581, 588, 187 App. Div. 834.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia, referring to a statement in Adams
V. Alklre, 20 W. Va. 480. in regard to ad-
verse possession, that 'It is entirely immate-
rial whether this color or claim of title be un-
der a good or bad, a legal or equitable title,"
say that they "do not think the Judge meant
to say that an equitable title is color of title.
In his statement he includes both color and
claim, two dLstlnct things. This is followed
by the terms *legal title' and 'equitable title.'
We think that he meant that Uie terms 'le-
gal' and 'equitable* should be used distribu-
tlvely ; 'legal' referring to color of title and
'equitable' to clalm.^ Lewis v. Yates, 50 S.
E. 107a. 1075, 62 W. Va. 575.
LEGAL VOTER
Nonregtetered electors who may exercise
the right to vote at an election by the pro-
duction of the proof required by L. O. L. {
3463, prescribing the manner in which non-
registered electors may establish their right
to vote, are "legal voters" within Ck)nst. art
11, I 2, and article 4, f la, granting to legal
voters the right to amend their municipal
charter, and such electors may sign an initia-
tive petition proposing an amendment to the
charter. Woodward v. Barbur, 116 Pac. 101,
104,. 60 Or. 70.
A county court, in considering a petition
for an election to determine whether the sale
of liquors shall be prohibited, recited in their
order that the matter came before them on
the petition of "legal voters" of the county,
and that "it appearing to the court that said
petition is signed by more than 10 per cent
of the qualified electors, * * * and has
been properly compared and certified to be
genuine and is in all respects in due form of
law, it is therefore considered and ordered
by the court that the prayer of said petition
be and the same is hereby granted." Held,
tliat the terms "legal voters" and "qualified
electors" as used in the order are not equiva-
lent to "registered voters" as used in Laws
1005, p. 41, providing for the calling of an
election to determine whether the sale of in-
toxicating liquors shall be prohibited on pe-
tition of 10 per cent of the "registered vot-
ers." Roesch T. Henry, 108 Pac 430-441,
54 Or. 230.
Laws 1005, p. 41, provides that whenever
a petition therefor, signed by not less than 10
per cent of the "registered voters" of any
county, shall be filed with the county clerk,
the county court shall order an election to
determine whether the sale of liquors shall
be prohibited, and that, in detennining
whether any such petition contains the req-
uisite percentage of "legal voters," said per-
centage shall be based on the total vote in
such county for Justice of the Supreme
LEGAIi VOTER
LEGALLY AUTHORIZED
Court at the last preceding general election,
provided that In no event shall more than GOO
petitioners who are legal voters be necessary
upon any such petition, and "the county
clerk shall, upon receipt of such petition, Im*
mediately file the same, and shall compare
the signatures of the electors signing the
same with their signatures on the registra-
tion books of the election then pending, or,
if none pending, with the signatures on the
registration books and blanks on file in his
office for the preceding general election."
Held, that the phrase "legal voters" is a
synonym for "registered voters," and that no
qualified elector is a competent petitioner for
a local option election unless his signature
appears on the registration books, the privi-
lege of signing such a petition not being a
right of franchise In which all the electors
enumerated in Const, art 2, { 2, may partici-
pate, but whether there is a sufficient number
of signers is to be determined by comparing
such number with the number who last voted
for Justice, and the number of registered vot-
ers in a district is only important for the
purpose of comparing the signatures of the
petitioners with the signatures on the regis-
tration books. Roesch v. Henry, 103 Pac.
439-441, 54 Or. 230.
A nonregistered voter may sign a peti-
tion for the nomination of a candidate for a
public office, though the statute uses the
words "voter" and **logally qualified voter
or elector." In re Herman, 90 N. Y. Supp.
144, 145, 108 App. Div. 335.
The General Election Law (P. L. 1898,
p. 819) defines the phrase "legal voters" as
persons entitled to vote and who do vote at
the time and in the manner prescribed in and
by the statute on the question or proposition
^submitted. Murphy v. City of Long Branch
(N. J.) 61 Ati. 593, 594.
Revision 1898, Act April 4, 1898, S 185
(P. L. p. 319), declares the meaning of the
words "legal voters" to be persons entitled to
vote and who do vote at the time and in the
manner prescribed in and by the statute up-
on the question or proposition submitted.
Nugent V. City of Newark, 72 Ati. 11, 12. 77
N. J. Law, 425.
A finding by the county court in an or-
der calling the election that a petition for a
local option election was signed by "legal"
voters, when L. O. L. { 4920, requires such
petition to be signed by "registered" voters,
would not Invalidate the election; "legal"
voters being synonymous with "registered"
voters as used in the statute. State v. Bll-
lups, 127 Pac. 686, 689, 63 Or. 277.
Article 4, |§ 2 and 8, of the state Con-
stitution, provides that senators and members
of assembly shall be elected by the legal
voters. "Legal voters" are the male citizens
who, by article 2, are given a vote for officers
elected by the people. Carpenter v. Cornish,
85 Aa 240, 243, 83 N. J. Law, 690,
XJBOAI. WRONG
It is the general rale of law that'^
'legal wrong* is committed whenever a man
is dispossessed of his property against bis
will." De Vries v. Crofoot, 111 N. W. 775-
777, 148 Mich. 183.
X.EOALITT
Where plaintiffs recovered against a
county for taxes paid on an alleged errone-
ous assessment of a section of land whi<^
by mistake of the taxing officers was assess-
ed as containing more land than it in fact
contained, the action did not involve the
"legality of a tax or assessmeiit," within
provisions permitting an appeal to the Su-
preme Court in certain cases involving the
legality of a tax or assessment Thomas ▼.
Lincoln County, 83 Paa 18, 24, 41 Wash.
150.
UBOAIXT
The conclusion of the court In an action
involving the dedication of a street, tried
to the court without a Jury, that the street
was never "legally" dedicated to the public,
was properly designated as a conciuslon of
law, and was reviewable on appeal; the
word "legally" clearly indicating that the
court referred to a statutory dedication.
Sweatman v. Bathrick, 95 N. W. 422, 424,
17 S. D. 138.
I.EOAIXT ASSESSED
Under Rev. Code Civ. Proc. | 64, making
10 years* possession under color of titie, and
payment of all taxes "legally assessed,"
ground for an adjudication of ownership,
actual possession and payment of taxes un-
der color of title, and in g<k)d faith, for the
required period, entitles one to be deemed
the legal owner, although the assessment of
taxes for one or more of the years may be
technically Illegal; the term "legally assess-
ed" meaning merely assessed uPder color of
legal authority. Murphy v. Nelson, 102 N.
W. 691. 694, 19 S. D. 197.
Mills* Aim. St S 3807, requires the state
board of equalization to make assessments
upon railways, and include therein Its rights
of way, etc., and the revenue act (Laws 1902,
c. 2) requires such board to assess all prop-
erty used or controlled by railroad compa-
nies with certain exceptions. Held, that a
railroad company in posrsession of and using
land as its right of way was "legally assess^
ed" thereon by the state board of equaliza-
tion, within the meaning of Sess. Laws 1893,
c. 118, f 6 (Rev. St 1908, f 4089), making
every person the legal owner of land who is
in the actual possession thereof as stated,
for seven successive years, and during such
time pays all taxes legally assessed thereon.
Denver & R. 6. B. Co. v. Doels, 111 Pae.
595, 596, 49 Colo. 48.
LEOALLT AUTHORIZEB
See Lawfully Authorized.
LaEQALLT CAUGHT
81
LEGALIST SUFFICIENT
LE6AIXT GAirOHT
See Fiah Legally Qaugbt
LE6ALLT CHARGED
Under policies issued to employers and
railroad companies insuring them against
damages with which they might be "legal-
ly charged" by reason of injuries to em-
ployes or to persons or property while being
traasported, the liability of the insurer arose
on the happening of the injury, and not at
the time Judgment was recovered against the
toaured for such injury. Boss v. American
ii)mployer8* Liability Ins. Co., 38 AtL 22, 23,
56 N. J. Eq. 41.
LEGALLY COMPETENT
The words "legally competent" meah
tbat the person named as executor must be
of legal age, of sound mind and memory, and
untainted by conviction for a crime which
renders the convicted person iii£amoa&
Clark V. Patterson, 114 la App. 312, 816.
LEGALLY COH STITU TED COURT
A de fSacto court is a "legally constituted
orart" within a habeas corpus statute. State
ex reL Bales v. BaUey, 118 N. W. 676, 678,
106 Minn. 138. 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 775, 130
Am. St Rep. 092, 16 Ann. Gas. 338.
LEGALLY DISCHARGED
The phrase ''legally discharged," as used
in Code Civ. Proc. § 2972, providing that
every guardian of an incompetent person
shall have the custody of the person of his
ward and his estate until such guardian is
'legally discharged," does not mean until he
is discharged by an order of the court, but
his authority is terminated under section
2973 ipso facto by an adjudication of res-
stlfutlon to capacity. In re Scheuer's Es-
tate, 79 Pac. 244, 246. 31 Mont. 606.
LEGALLY DUE
Where a city tax was assessed against
a bankrupt's property on May 1, 1899. prior
to his being adjudged a bankrupt on August
8th, such taxes became "legally due and
owing" on the day they were assessed, with-
in Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, § 64, c. 541, 30
Stat 563, making such taxes a preferred
claim against the bankrupt's estate, though
the taxes were not payable until after the
adjudication. In re Flynn, 134 Fed. 145.
The franchise tax assessed under Qen.
St. N. J. 1895, {§ 251, 252, 257, 258, 260, on
the basis of the capital stock of a corpora-
tion, issued and outstanding on the 1st of
January preceding the making of the re-
turn, is 'Hegally due and owing" within the
meaning of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, | 64a,
providing that, taxes must be paid in ad-
vance of the payment of dividends to credi-
tors, although such tax may not have been
collectible until after the corporation was ad-
judged a bankrupt State of New Jersey v.
Anderson, 27 Sup. Ct 137, 141, 203 U. S.
483, 51 L. Ed. 284.
8 WDS.& P.2d Skb.— 6
LEGALLY LTABLT8
Where a bill of lading contained a
provision that neither the company nor any
connecting carrier shall be liable for dam-
ages to or the destruction of the cotton by
fire, and the consignor of the cotton gave
up insurance thereon in his favor and took
out a policy in favor of the carrier, fully
protecting it from loss or destruction by fire,
such insurance was a valid consideration for
the promise not to insist on recovery of
damage on account of the destruction by
fire contained in the bill of lading, for it
fully protected the carrier from loss or
damage by fire for which it was "legally
liable," and this included liability resulting
from the negligence of its own employes,
and for which it was unquestionably liable
to the consignor, notwithstanding the exemp-
tion in the bill of lading. Texas ft P. R.
Co. v. Can, 120 Fed. 15, 16, 57 O. O. A. 35.
LBOALLT BEQimiED
Code Civ. Proc. | 1989, provides that a
witness is not obliged to attend as witness
before any court out of the county in which
he resides, unless the distance be less than
30 miles from his residence to the place of
trial, and by Pol. Code, § 4300g, witnesses,
when "legally required" to attend the su-
perior court in civil cases, are entitled to
mileage actually traveled. Witnesses for the
plaintiff residing 200 miles from the place
of trial, without subpoena, and on the request
of the plaintiff, voluntarily went from their
residence to the place of trial and testified.
Held, that they were not "legally required"
to attend, and hence were not entitled to
the mileage allowed by section 4300g, and
that an allowance for mileage could not be
taxed in plaintiff*s cost bill. Naylor v.
Adams, 114 Pac. 997, 998, 15 CaL App. 353.
A witness may waive the manner of
service and accept service in some other form
though not in strict compliance with the
statute, and he will be required to obey a
subpoena so served, so that such witnesses
were "legally required to attend," within
Comp. Laws 1907, § 994, so as to be entitled
to mileage fees from their home to the place
of triaL Holt v. Nielson, 109 Pac. 470, 475,
37 Utah, 566.
LEGALLY SUFFICIENT
Under L. O. Lu § 3474» providing that
the court, on a showing that any petition for
a referendum is not legally sufficient, may
enjoin the Secretary of State and all other
officers from certifying or printing the title
and number of the measure on the official
ballot, the petition, to be "legally sufficient,"
must be a valid petition, signed by legal vot-
ers, and complying substantially with the
requirements of the law; and, although a pe-
tition appears regular on its face, the court
may Inquire into its legal sufficiency. State
v. Olcott, 125 Pac. 303. 304, 62 Or. 277.
LEGATEE
ffi
LBQIOK
LEGATEE
See General Legatee; Residuary Lega-
tee ; Sole Legatee ; Specific Legatee.
A "legatee" Is a person to whom a legacy
Is given. Desloge v. Tucker, 94 S. W. 283,
286, 196 Mo. 587 (dUng Black, Law Diet
tit "Legatee").
Societies and corporations to whom lega-
cies are given by a will are "legatees," within
the meaning of a clause of the will providing
that property of testatrix, not otherwise dis-
posed of, shall be sold, and the money "paid
to the legatees hereinbefore named." So,
also, where the will provided that the prop-
erty of testatrix otherwise undisposed of
shall be sold, and proceeds paid to the "lega-
tees hereinbefore named" in specified propor-
tions, trustees previously named In the will
and who are thereby given the legal title to
the trust fund during the period of trust are
^legatees," and as such take the legal title to
whatever share of the property not otherwise
disposed of the trust fund Is entitled. Craw-
ford V. Mound Grove Cemetery Ass'n, 75 N.
£. 998, 1001, 218 111. 399.
Testator by olographic will, after having
bequeathed to his wife the homestead with
furniture, etc., together with a one-fourth In-
terest in the residue after paying all be-
quests made, bequeathed the remaining three-
fourths of the* residue to his three other chil-
dren, and provided that, if any of the "lega-
tees" died before testator's death, then the
legacy provided for him or her should be di-
vided equally among the residuary legatees.
Held, that the word "legatees" was used In
an ordinary nontechnical sense to include
bequests of both real and personal proper-
ty, and that, under the rule that the testa-
tor's intention, as disclosed by the language
used, must control, such term included the
bequest to the wife, and that on her pre-
deceasing the testator her share became a
part of the residue within the substitution-
ary clause. In re Henderson's Estate, 119
Pac. 496, 498, 161 Cal. 353.
A will provided that upon the death of
the life tenant the remainder should be di-
vided pro rata among the legatees named
in the -will. If the word "legatees" was in-
tended to indicate the five persons named as
such in the will, the entire estate could not
be disposed of, and, if testator had so in-
tended, he could easily have called them by
name. In another clause providing for abate-
ment of legacies, a certain process of propor-
tion was ordained necessarily applicable only
to the beneficiaries who survived testator.
Held, that "legatees" should be construed to
mean only those who survived testator, and
thus became legatees In the proper Import of
the term. In re Hoffman, 124 N. Y. Supp.
680, 681, 67 Misc. Rep. 334.
CUldrea
Where testator Revises stock in trust for
his daughter, one of the trustees being also
an executor, and by another item directs
that the executors shall hold it, together with
other stock, the dividends of which are dis-
posed of by the will, until a designated time, in
the meantime paying the dividends and prof-
its to each of said "legatees,** and provides
that, if any of the legatees die before such
time without children, the dividends so be-
queathed to each legatee, as well as the stock,
shall be distributed among his surviving chil-
dren, the words "legatees" and "children" are
used interchangeably, and, as to that item of
the \iill, synonymously, so that the dividends
are payable directly to the beneficiary of the
trust, and not to the executors as trustees.
Lamar v. Harris, 48 S. E. 932, 933, 121 Ga.
285.
As oreditor
See Creditor.
Devisee
Devisee as including, s^ Devisee.
The terms "legatee" and "devisee" are
more strictly interpreted as referring the
one to personalty and the other to realty, in
the construction of statutes than in the con-
struction of wills and deeds, and, where a
deed describes the grantor as the only heir
and legatee of a certain person, the word
''legatee" may be regarded as meaning dev-
isee of land as well as donee of personalty.
Weigel V. Green, 75 N. E. 913, 918, 218 111.
227.
"Legacy and devise" and "legatee and
devisee" are often used as interchangeable
phrases in wills and everyday conversation,
and therefore courts would not feel fettered
to any nice construction, where subject-matter
or context shows the words were used inter-
changeably and as of the same import But
such popular and loose construction ia hardly
permissible in view of the statutory rule of
hermeneutics. Desloge ▼• Tucker, 94 S. W.
283, 286, 196 Mo. 587.
Although the words "devise'' and "dev-
isee" properly and technically apply only
to real estate, and the words "legacy" and
"legatee" only to personal property, they
have been made interchangeable by Ky. St.
1903, f 467, which provides that "the words
'legatee' and 'devisee' shall each be held to
convey the same idea." Roberts v. Gheno-
weth (Ky.) 112 S. W. 625, 627,
As heir
See Heirs.
As legal represeatatiTS
See Legal Representatiye.
LEGION
"League" and "legion" are of entirely
different meanings ; "league" b^ng defined as
"an alliance of persons," and "legion" as "a
LEGISLATION
LEOISLATIYK ACT
military body or organization.** People ex
rel. Felter v. Rose, 80 N. B. 2d3, 2d5, 225
111496.
LEGISUTION
See Class Legislation; Bxclnsiye Leg-
islation; Expository Legislation; Mu-
nicipal Legislation; Specially Named
Legislation.
See, also. General Law ; Special Law.
The Legislature at a special session has
all the power it has at a regular session, ex-
cept 80 far as restrained by the Constitu-
tion, and the limitation by article 3, S 40,
proyiding that at such sessions there shall
be no "legislation*' on subjects not designat-
ed by the GoTemor, does not preclude the ap-
pointment of an inyestigating committee to ob-
tain information for future use, even on a
subject not submitted by the Goyemor ; the
word "legislation*' having a well-defined
meaning, and indnding only the Enactment,
repeal, and amendment of laws. Ex parte
Wolters, 144 S. W. C31. 538. 64 Tex. Cr. R. 238
(DavidBon, P. J., dissenting).
The word "legislation," as used in Const
8 76, 246, providing, respectively, that at a
special session of the Legislature there shall
be no legislation upon subjects other than
those designated in the call for the session
except by vote of two-thirds of each House,
and that no railroad shall have the benefit
of any future legislation by general or spe-
cial laws, refers to the enactment of statutes
and is not descriptive of the processes by
or through which laws are perfected by con-
stituted authority, and hence such sections do
not forbid the introduction of bills not with-
in the subjects specially designated in the
proclamation, unless the named proportion of
the respective Houses sanction It. State ex
reL Woodward v. Skeggs, 46 South. 268, 271,
154 Ala. 249.
Const art 14, declares that the Gen-
eral Assembly may propose constitutional
amendments, each amendment being embrac-
ed in a separate bill, by three-fifths of all
members elected to each of the two houses,
which bill shall be published by order of
the Governor for a specified time before the
election at which the amendment shall be
submitted to the voters in a form to be pre-
scribed by the General Assembly. Many pro-
visions of the Constitution refer to the "Gen-
eral Assembly** in a manner indicating that
the Governor is not included witliin the term.
By the Constitutions of 1776, 1851, and 1864
the Governor was given no authority to veto
a proposed constitutional amendment Const.
1867, art 2, | 17, declares that, to guard
agahist hasty and partial legislation, every
'Ml" which shall have passed the House of
Delegates and the Senate shall be presented
to the Governor before It becomes a "law."
Only a majority of both houses is required to
adopt leglslatiye measures. Held, that a pro-
posal to amend the Constitution is not "legis-
lation,** and the term ''General Assembly** in
article 14 does not include the Governor;
and hence a bUl proposing a constitutional
amendment, and having appended to it no
measures essentially legislaUve, need not be
submitted to the Governor for his approval.
Warfield v. Vandiver. 60 Atl. e3&-643, 101
Md. 78, i Ann. Cas. 692.
When an incumbent of an office is remov-
ed by the action of the Legislature by abol-
ishing the office or termluating his term*
the officer is popularly said to be "legislated
out of office.** This colloquial term ex-
presses with the precision of the logician the
character of the removal. It is "legislation."
People ex rel. Devery v. Coler, 66 N. B. 956»
059, 173 N. Y. 103.
LEGISLATIVE
The word ^legislatiye" is applied to the
organ or organs of government which makes
the law. People v. Salsbury, 06 N. W. 036,
038-041, 134 Mich. 637 (citing Webst Diet).
Z.EOI8rATZVS ACT
The filling of vacancies in a city council
by the council is not a "legislative act," and
therefore no aye and nay vote is necessary :
Bums* Ann. St 1008, | 8662, requiring the
clerk of the common council to enter ayes
and nayes on the passage of every ordinance
and resolution applying only to legislative
acts. Wagner v. State ex reL Walker, 01 N.
B. 1, 2. 173 Ind. 603.
The creation of reclamation districts and
the setting off of lands and the fixing of the
boundaries of such districts are legislative
acts, within the power of the Legislature, and
the Legislature can neither be compelled to
act or to refrain from acting, or controlled
by any other power of government when it
has acted within constitutional limitations.
Inglin ▼. Hoppin, 106 Pac. 682, 688» 166 Oal.
483.
Judicial aet distlAsnislied
An act is a "Judicial** one where It un-
dertakes to determine a question of rl^ht or
obligation or of property as the foundation
on which it proceeds. ▲ "Judicial act** deter-
mines what the law Is and what the rights
of parties are in reference to transactions al-
ready had; a "legislative act** determines
what the law shall be in future cases. New-
eU V. Franklin, 74 Atl. 1000, 1011, 80 R. L
258 ; In re County Commissioners of Counties.
Comprising Seventh Judicial Dist., 08 Pac.
557, 560, 22 Okl. 435 (quoting and adopting
definition in Sinking Fund Cases). ,
"A ^legislative act* is one which pre-
scribes a general rule of conduct.** A munic-
ipal ordinance providing for the paving of a
street at the cost of the property benefited
thereby to the extent of the benfit being a
Judicial and not a legislative act, is invalid
liEGISIiATIVE ACT
84
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY
because passed without notice to the prop-
erty owners affected thereby. Sears ▼. At-
lantic City, 64 Atl. 1062, 1063, 73 N. J. Law,
710, 118 Am. St Rep. 724.
The official action of a legal body whlcdi
Is the result of judgment and discretion is a
"Judicial act" rather than a "legislative
act," and so too an act which determines the
rights and duties of parties under existing
law, with relations to existing facts, Is said
to be judicial rather than legislative. Gul-
nac V. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 64 Atl.
d&8, 1000, 74 N. J. Law, 548, 122 Am. St
Rep. 405.
State courts, in reviewing orders of the
public service commission, act judicially and
not "legislatively." Delaware, L. & W. R.
Co. V. Stevens, 172 Fed. 595, 600.
When the public service commission, on
complaint after hearing and the taking of evi-
dence, entered an order requiring that com-
plainants stop its Interstate trains at a sta-
tion, the commission's act was "legislative"
and not judicial. Delaware, L. & W. B, Co.
V. Stevens, 172 Fed. 595, 606.
The passage of a dty ordinance granting
a franchise to a public service corporation
involves "legislative action" only, and such
action cannot be reviewed by a writ of cer-
tiorari. Tenny v. City of Columbia, 92 Pac.
895, 896, 48 Wash. 150.
That which distinguishes a "judicial"
from a "legislative" act is that the one is a
determination of what the law is in relation
to some existing thing already done or hap-
pened, while the other is a predetermination
of what the law shall be for the regulation
of future cases falling under its provisions.
Tyson v. Washington County, 110 N. W.
634, 636, 78 Neb. 211, 12 L. R. A. (N.^ S.) 350
(citing and adopting definition in Oooley.
Oonst Um.).
Establiflbuent of rates m lesislntiTe
or jndicdal act
The fixing of water rates by a city, when
not a matter of contract is a "legislative
function" rather than a judicial function.
<31ty of Pocatello v. Murray, 173 Fed. 382,
385 (citing Reagan v. Farmers* Loan & Trust
Co., 14 Sup. Ct 1047, 154 U. & 397, 38 L.
Ed. 1014; Southern Pac. CO. v. Colorado B^iel
A Iron Co., 101 Fed. 779, 42 C. C. A. 12).
The function of fixing railroad rates is
A "legislative function." Oregon R & Nav.
<?o. V. Campbell, 173 Fed. 957, 973, 974.
The establishment of railway passenger
rates by the Virginia Corporation Commis-
sion is not res judicata in a spit which seeks
injunctive relief on the ground that the
rates are confiscatory, although such commis-
sion for some purposes is a court, and acted
only after hearing and investigation, since
proceedings to establish rates are legislative,
and not judicial, in their nature. Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ck)., 29 Sup. Ct 67, 69,
211 U. S. 210, 63 L. Bd. 160.
Injunctive relief against railway passen-
ger rates as fixed by the Virginia State Cor-
poration Commission may be granted by a
federal court If such rates are confiscatory,
although, for some purposes, the commission
is a court since proceedings to estabUsh
rates are legislative, and therefore are not
comprehended by the provision of Rev. St {
720, forbidding federal courts from enjoining
proceedings in state courts, which provision
looks to the character of the proceedings, not
the character of the body. Prentis v. Atlan-
tic Coast Line Co., 29 Sup. Ct 67, 69, 2U U.
S. 210, 53 L. Ed. 150.
LEGISLATIVE AUTHOBITT
The words "legislative authority/' as
used in Const art 11, S 8, have no gieater
significance than such words as "common
council or other legislative body" would have
had. They were simply intended to desig-
nate the particular body, ^hich it was recog-
nized would exist under some name or other
in every municipality, as the proper ofilcial
agency to submit propositions for amend-
ments to charters, and were not intended to
define the powers of that body or place It in
a position where it would be beyond restric-
tions by the organic act of the city. Hence
the "initiative" provision of the charter of
Los Angeles, giving power to the electors to
adopt ordinances, is not shown to be uncon-
stitutional because of the words "legislative
authority" being used by the Constitution to
designate the ordinary legislative body of
a dty, in providing for submission by legis-
lative authority of the city of a proposed
charter amendment to the voters of the city.
In re Pfahler, 88 Pac. 270, 278, 150 CaL 71,
11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1092, 11 Ann. Cas. 911.
The term "legislative authority of a
city," as used in Laws 1908, p. 364, c. 175, as
amended by Laws 1907, p. 192, c. 99, provid-
ing that the legislative authority of a dty
having contipl of any public street shall have
power to grant authority for the construction
of street railways thereon of which the mo-
tive power is other than steam, and to pre-
scribe the terms and conditions, and in
Const art 11, f 10, providing that dty char-
ters may be amended by proposals therefor,
submitted by legislative authority of the city
to the electors thereof, etc., and in numerous
statutes, means the mayor and council, and
hence the mayor and coundl had the sole
power to prescribe the terms on granting a
street railway franchise; and an ordinance
passed by the dty council, and approved by
the mayor, granting such a franchise is val-
id, notwithstanding an amendment to the
city charter requiring the council to submit
street railway franchises to the voters for
their approval. Benton v. Seattle E^lectric
Co., 96 Pac. 1033, 1035, 60 Wash. 166.
LEGISLATIVE BOAKD
85
LEGISLATIVE POWER
IEOI8LATIVIS BOABB
Acts 1906, pt 1, c. 1, empowering cities
of the first class to construct a system sewer-
age, authorizing tbe mayor to appoint a oom-
mission who may appoint an engineer, secre-
tary, and treasurer, and determine what sys-
tem of sewerage is most expedient, and re-
port the same to the council, etc, is not in
conflict with Const { 160, providing thAt the
mayor, police Judges, members of legislative
boards, etc., shall be elected by qualified vot-
ers; the commission not being a "legtslative
board." MiUer v. City of LouisvUle (Ky.) 99
S. W. 284, 286.
LEGISLATIVB BODY
A "legislative body" is any body of per-
sons authorized to make laws or rules for the
community represented by them. It is one
capable of or pertaining to the enactment of
laws. The common council of a city or town
is the local legislature of tiiat dty or town.
Burke v. Wood, '162 Fed. 688, 638.
Bouvler defines "legislative oflicers** as
•those whose duties relate mainly to the en-
.actment of laws." The board of aldermen of
the dty of New York is a "legislative body "
withUi the Civil Service Law, providing that
the unclassified service shall comprise offi-
cers and employ^ of a legislative body. As
the services rendered by the appointees in
tbe office of the city derk and clerk of tiie
board of aldermen are in the main legislative,
such appointees are in tiie undassifled serv-
ice, though such appointees are not directly
appointed by the board of aldermen, but by
the dty clerk himself elected by the board.
Such employes are in the unclasstfied serv-
ice, though they may also aid the clerk in
the discharge of other duties not legislative.
O'Gwdy V. Polk, 116 N. Y. Supp. 290, 291, 182
Api^. Div. 47.
Under N. Y. Const art 8, § 26, provid-
ing that the powers and duties of a board
of supervisors may be devolved upon the mu-
nicipal assembly, etc., or other "legislative
body," the words "or other legislative body"
mean the legislative body of the city by
whatever Lame it may be designated. Wil-
cox V. McClennan, 95 N. Y. Supp. 941, 942, 47
Misc. Rep. 466.
LEOIBLATZVE BVKOnSBU
Under Const art 4, f 8, relating to ex-
tra sessions of the Legislature, and provid-
ing that it shall transact no "legislative busi-
ness" other than that for which it is espe-
cially convened, or which is called to its at^
tention by the Qovemor, except by a two-
thirds vote of each house, the confirmation
by the Senate of executive appointments to
office cannot be regarded as "legislative busi-
ness," since such confirmation is not essen-
tially legisUitive in its nature, and does not
require the co-operation of the House of Rep-
resentatives. In re Advisory Opinion to the
Qovemor, 59 South. 782, 786, 64 Fla. 16.
ZiEOnrATZVB BEPABTMEBT
The "legislative department*' witliin
Const art 3, dividing the powers of govern-
ment into the legislative, executive, and Judi-
cial departments, is composed of the body
enacting laws for the state or, by delegation,
for minor subdivisions and municipalities.
Witter V. Cook County Oom'ra, 100 N. B. 148,
149, 256 IlL 616.
LEGISLATZVS FUHGTIOH
Const, art 3, dividing the powers of gov-
ernment into the legislative, executive, and
Judicial departments, and prohibiting the ex-
ercise of any power belonging to any depart-
ment by any person belonging to another de-
partment, does not mean that the legislative,
executive, and Judicial powers shall be kept
so entirely separate and distinct as to have
no connection with or dependence on each
other, and it is a "legislative function" to
provide places for holding courts and for the
expenses of the Judicial system and the com-
pensation of Judicial oflBcers, and the Legis-
lature may invest the board of county com-
missioners with the custody of property of
the county, though the property is used in
the exercise of Judicial power by the Judicial
department; and, though a sheriff and derk
are essential to a court and to the exercise
of Judicial power, the former performs exec-
utive and the latter clerical duties only. Wit-
ter ▼. -Cook County Com'rs, 100 N. E. 148,
149, 256 IlL 616.
The function exercised by voters or a
representative body upon whose approval the
inception of a franchise grant by the Legis-
lature is made conditional is not the exercise
of a "legislative function." It is the exer-
cise of the function of "referendum." which
is not legislative. Duflleld v. Aahurst, 100
Pac. 820, 825, 12 Ariz. 360.
XiEOZ8I.ATZVS OFFIGER
"Legislative ofllcers" are those whose du-
ties relate mainly to the enactment of laws.
State V. Kelly, 77 8. W. 996, 997, 103 Mo.
App. 711 (quoting Bouv. Law Diet.) ; O'Grady
V. Polk, 116 N. Y. Supp. 290, 291, 132 App.
Div. 47 (quoting Bouv. Law Diet).
LEGI8LATZVS POWER
See Full Legislative Powers.
See, also, Public Power.
The 'leglslattve power" of government is
that which makes the laws. In re Appoint-
ment of BevlBor of Statutes, 124 N. W. 670,
671, 141 Wis. 692, 18 Ann. Cas. 1176.
''Legislative power** is the power to pre-
scribe the rules of dvil conduct Schaake v.
Dolley, 118 Pac. 80, 82, 85 Kan. 598, 37 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 877, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 254.
"Legislative power," within Const art 4,
I 1, providing that the legislative power
shall be vested in the General Assembly, is
the power to make laws. M'erchants* Bx-
LEaiSLATlVE POWEK
LiEGISLATIVE POWER
change of St. Louis y. Knott, 111 S. W. 665,
571, 212 Mo. 616.
The words ''legislative power,'' used in
Const I 20, providing that the legislative
power shall be vested in a House of Repre-
sentatives, etc., is a comprehensive phrase,
meaning all powers that appertain to or are
usually exercised by a legislative body.
Bootli*s Ex'r V. Commonwealth ex rel. Jeff-
erson County Attorney, 113 S. W. 61, 62, 130
Ky. 88, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 592.
The term "legislative power," as used in
section 1 of article 4 of the Constitution, de-
claring that legislative power shall be vested
In the General Assembly, elected by the
people, means the power to enact laws, or to
declare what the law shall be. It is the
power to enact new rules for the regulation
of future conduct, rights, and controversies.
It does not mean that every act of officers
created by the Legislature must be expressly
prescribed by the lawmaking power. People
V. Koth, 94 N. m 953, 954, 249 lU. 532, Ann.
Casj 1912A, 100.
Theoretically the "legislative power" la
the authority to make, order, and repeal
laws. Richardson ▼. Young, 125 S. W. 664,
668, 122 Tenn. 471.
The power to carry into effect Const. U.
8. art 4, | 4, providing that the United
States shall guarantee to very state. in the
tJnion a republican form of government is
a "legislative power" and resides in Con-
gress; and Congress may delegate to the
President the power to determine whether
the Constitution of a new state is republican
In form. Frantz v. Autry, 91 Pac. 193, 214,
18 Okl. 561.
Whether ,or not a state has ceased to be
republican in form within the meaning of
the guaranty in Const, art. 4, { 4, because of
its adoption of the initiative and referendum,
is not a Judicial question, but a political one,
which is solely for Congress to determine.
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v.
State of Oregon, 32 Sup. Ot 224, 228, 223 U.
S. 118, 66 L. Ed. 377.
The words "legislative power," as used
in Const art 4, § 1, conferring legislative
power on the G^eneral Assembly, mean the
power or authority, under the Constitution
or form of government, to make, alter, and
repeal laws and to pass any law within the
ordinary functions of legislation not delegat-
ed to the federal government or prohibited by
the state Constitution, not transferring, how-
ever, from the people fundamental legisla-
tive power. EUingham v. Dye, 99 N. E. 1, 4,
178 Ind. 336.
The granting to a municipal corporation
of power to pass all necessary ordinances
for the protection of the safety of citizens
is not an infringement of the maxim that
"legislative power" may not be delegated.
Sluder v. St Louis Transit Co., 88 8. W.
648, 650, 189 Mo. 107, 5 U R. A. (N. S.) 186.
By the provision in the federal Constitu-
tion that all "legislative powers" herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States is meant that Congress keep-
ing within the limits of its power and observ-
ing the restrictions imposed by the Constita-
tion may in its discretion enact any statute
appropriate to accomplish the objects for
which the national government was establish-
ed. The powers of the federal government
were not exceeded by the enactment of Rev.
St. { 1782, making it a misdemeanor for a
United States senator to receive or agree to
receive compensation for services rendered
before any department, in relation to any
proceeding in which the United States is in-
terested. Burton v. United States, 26 Sup.
Ct 688, 693, 202 U. 8. 844, 50 L. Ed. 1057,
6 Ann. Cas. 392. '
The authority granted to a city council
to grade and pave streets and sidewalks is
"legislative" in character, so that the amount
of the improvement its kind and character,
must first be ascertained by the city council'
and cannot be delegated to any other official
or committee. Harton ▼. Town of Avondale,
41 South. 934, 939, 147 Ala. 458.
Act May 29, 1908 (Sess. Laws 1907-08,
p. 453, c. 46, { 1), providing that upon the rec-
ommendation of the Supreme Court the Gov-
ernor shall appoint an additional judge "for
the time recommended by the court" for
a district which has such an unusual number
of cases awaiting trial that a thorough and
effective administration of Justice cannot be
secured, is, at least as to the fixing of the
term of office of such additional Judge by the
Supreme Court a delegation of legislative
power to the Judicial branch of the govern-
ment in violation of Const art 4, 1 1 (Bunn's
Ed. $ 50), dividing the powers of government
into three separate departments, the legisla-
tive, executive, and Judicial, and providing
that neither shall exercise the powers proper-
ly belonging to either of the others. In re
County Com'rs of Counties Comprising Sev-
enth Judicial Dist, 98 Pac 557, 559, 22 Okl.
435.
Acts 1905, p. 873, c 410, providing that it
shall be unlawful for any person, other than
the authorized agent of a common carrier,
to sell nontransferable tickets, issued and
sold below the standard schedule rate, etc.,
and providing a penalty for Its violation, is
not unconstitutional as a delegation to the
common carrier of legislative authority to
create a penal offense or not by the issuance
or nonissuance of nontransferable tickets to
the original purchaser below the standard
schedule rate. There is a distinction be-
tween a ''delegation of legislative power" in-
volving discretion and conferring of authori-
ty or discretion as to the execution of the
law to be exercised under and in pursuance
IiSOISLATIVE POWER
87
LEGISLATIVE POWER
of tbe law. The former cannot be done,
wliile to the latter no valid objection can be
made. The Leglslatare cannot delegate Its
power to make a law, but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some
fact, or state of things, upon wliieh the law
makes, or intends to make, its own action
depend. Saniuelson v. State, 95 S. W. 1012,
1016, 116 Tenn, 470, 116 Am. St. Rep. 805
(citing appeal of Locke, 72 Pa. 491, 13 Am.
Rep. 716; Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Clin-
ton County Com*rs, 1 Ohio St. 88 ; State y.
Barrlnger, 14 S. B. 781, 110 N. C. 525; Com-
monwealth y. Abrahams^ 80 N. E. 79, 156
Mass. 57; Commonwealth y. Dayis, 4 N. E.
577, 140 Mass. 485; In re Nightingale, 11
Pick. [28 Mass.] 168: Commissioners of
Easton y. Coyey, 22 Atl. 266, 74 Md. 262; In
re Flaherty, 38 Pac. 981, 105 CaL 558, 27 L.
B. A. 529 ; Debardelaben y. State, 42 S. W.
684, 99 Tenn. 649).
'To declare what a law is or has been
is a 'Judicial power' i to declare what it shall
be is 'legislatiye.* *' Act July 6, 1906 (Pub.
Acts 1905, p. 413, c 217), which limits the
recoyery in a suit against an administrator
for the statutory penalty for failing to file an
inyentory does not inyade the Judicial proy-
ince nor interfere with, dictate to or coerce
the Judicial department. Atwood y. Bucking-
ham. 62 Atl. 616, 618, 78 Conn. 423 (citing
Dash y. Van Kleeck [N. Y.} 7 Johns, 477, 498,
5 Am. Dec. 291).
A statute authorized a dty to enlarge
or contract its boundaries by ordinance defin-
ing the territory, and provided that any per-
son interested might by certain procedure ap-
ply to the district court, which should de-
termine tbe reasonableness of the alteration.
Held, that the statute was not objectionable
on the ground that it conferred "legislatiye
power" on the court "To legislate is to make
or enact a law or laws.'* Webster's Diet.
"L^islatiye power" is, therefore, the power
to nmke laws, and incidentally to repeal
tbem. But the power to determine, in a given
case, presented by parties baying property
or other rights at stake, and independent of
the exerdse of any enacting power, whether
a municipal corporation, professing to leg-
islate under incidental or general authority,
has exercised such authority In accordance
with the condition of the grant, relates, not
to the power of legislation, but to the man-
ner of its exercise, and is itself Judicial.
New Orleans & N. W. R. Co. y. Town of
Vidalia, 42 South. 139, 143, 117 La. 561 (cit-
ing CaUen y. City of Junction City, 28 Pac.
652, 43 Kan. 62T, 7 L. R. A. 736; Porsythe
V. Hammond, 40 N. E. 267, 41 N. B. 950, 142
Ind. 505, 30 L. R. A. 576 ; Territory ex reL
Kelly y. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405, 1 Wash. 98, 8
Ia R. A 106; In re Incorporation of Village
of North Milwaukee, 67 N. W. 1033, 93 Wis.
616, 33 L. R. A. 638 ; Wahoo y. Dickinson, 36
N. W. 813, 23 Neb. 426; Forsythe v. City of
Hammond, 58 Fed. 774).
The board of superyisors of a county, in
passing a resolution reylying the distinction
between town and county poor, pursuant to
Laws 1896, p. 176, c. 225, § 134, and appor-
tioning among the town the taxes for the sup-
port of poor, pursuant to sections 9, 10 (page
139), discharges "legislatiye functions,'* so
that its acts cannot be reviewed by certior-
ari. People ex rel. Allen y. Board of Sup'rs
of Westchester County, 99 N. Y. Supp. 348,
849, 113 App. Diy. 773 (citing People y. Board
of Supers of Queens County, 30 N. E). 488, ISl
N. Y. 468; People ex rel. O'Connor y. Board
of Sup'rs of Queens County, 47 N. SL 790, 168
N. Y. 370).
The power to determine what persons
and property shall be taxed belongs exclu-
sively to the legislative branch of the govern-
ment, and, whether exercised by the Legisla-
ture itself or delegated to a municipal cor-
poration, is strlctiy a "legislative power."
Risley y. TJtica, 173 Fed. 502, 507 (citing New
Orleans Water- Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar
Refining Co., 8 Sup. Ct 741, 125 U. S. 18,
31 L. Ed. 607 ; United States ex rel. Ranger
v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381, 392, 25 L. ETd.
225 ; Meriwetiier y. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 26
L. Ed. 197).
The "legislatiye power" of the territory
of Oklahoma extended to all rightful subjects
or legislation pertaining to local self-govern-
ment when not inconsistent with the CTonsti-
tution and laws of the United States, and
when the exercise of such power did not in
any way interfere with the supreme right
of Congress to control its governmental af-
fairs. Territory y. Long Bell Lumber Co.,
99 Pac. 911, 914, 22 Okl. 890.
St 1889, p. 368, c 247, proyiding that
new territory may be annexed to any town
by tlie filing of a petition describing the ter-
ritory desired to be annexed and a favorable
vote at the election called pursuant to the pe-
tition, thus leaving the determination of the
boundaries of the annexed territory to the in-
habitants, is not for this reason Invalid as
a delegation of "legislative authority," since,
under Const art 11, | 6, forbidding the Leg-
islaturo to create or provide for the organiza-
tion of municipal corporations by any other
than general laws, fixing the boundaries of
towns is not a legislative function. People v.
Town of Ontario, 84 Pac 205, 207, 148 Cal.
625.
While it is one of the settied maxims in
constitutional law that the "power confer-
red upon the Legislature to make laws can-
not be delegated*' by that department to any
other body or authority, this does not pre-
vent legislatiye functions, which are merely
ministerial or executive in their character,
from being delegated by that branch of the
government to other departments or to bodies
created by it for that purpose. Laws 1905, p.
275, c. 163, creating a board for the purpose
of procuring the erection of a capitol building
LEGISLATURE
88
LEGITIMATE TITLE
and authorizing such board to procure the
erection of a building adopt plans and sped-
flcatlons, etc., is not unconstitutional as a
delegation of "legislative power." Daven-
port V. Elrod, 107 N. W. 833, 836, 20 S. D. W7.
LEGISLATURE
See House of Legislature.
Member of Legislature, see Member.
The word "Legislature," as used in
Const U. S. art 1, § 4, providing that the
time, place, and manner of holding elections
for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each state by the Legislature
thereof, but that Congress may make or alter
such regulations does not mean simply the
members who compose the Legislature, but
refers to the lawmaking body or power of
the state, as established by the state Consti-
tution, and which in this state, under the ref-
erendum Const art 3, 8 1, includes the peo-
ple, and hence SSess. Laws 1909, c. 223, divid-
ing the state into congressional districts, is
subject to the referendum vote of the people
the same as any other law passed by the
Legislature. State ex rel. Schrader v. Pol-
ley, 127 N. W. 848, 849, 26 S. D. 5.
A 'legislator** Is one who makes laws
for a state or community. Burke v. Wood,
162 Fed. 533, 538.
LEGITIMACY
LEOITIliATE
"Legitimate" means lawful ; lawfully be-
gotten ; born in wedlock ; of lawful birth ; a
legitimate heir. Lamb v. Medsker, 74 N. E.
1012, 1013, 35 Ind. App. 662 (quoting and
adopting definitions in Webst Diet.; Cent
Diet.).
The term "legitimate," in Laws 1895, c.
570, providing for the incorporation of asso-
ciations for the improvement of the breed of
horses and for the establishment of a state
racing commission, and authorizing the com-
mission to issue licenses for running races
and for the revocation of licenses, if for any
reason the continuance thereof shall not be
conducive to the interests of "legitimate"
racing, is used in its broad and not techni-
cal sense, and means good or proper and not
merely unlawful. People ex rel. Empire City
Trotting Club v. State Racing Commission,
103 N. Y. Supp. 955, 961, 57 Misc. Rep. 331.
LEGITIMATE CHIIiD
Child as including, see Child-— Children
(In Statutes).
" 'A legitimate child* is he that is bom
in lawful wedlock or within a competent time
afterward.*' A child born 20 days after its
mother was divorced from one husband,
whose whereabouts were not shown, and 15
days after her marriage to another man, wbo
recognized the child as his offspring, will
be presumed to be his legitimate child. Zach-
mann y. Zachmann, 66 N. E. 256, 257, 201
111. 380, 94 Am. St Rep. 180 (citing 5 Cyc p.
626; Coke^ Litt 344a; Dennison v. Pafi^e, 2»
Pa. 420, 72 Am. Dec. 644 ; quoting and adopt-
ing definition in 1 BL Comm. 446).
A child bom after marriage, during
wedlock, and within the usual period of ges-
tation, after the husband has had opportu-
nity to have begotten it is conclusively pre-
sumed to be "legitimate." Buckner's Adm'r
V. Buckner, 87 S. W. 776, 777, 120 Ky. 596.
UiOITIMATE ISSUE
Under Act Cong. Feb. 28, 1891, c. 383, 26
Stat. 794, f 5, in amendment of Act Cong.
Feb. 8, 1887, c. 119, 24 Stat 388, providing
that for the purpose of determining the de-
scent of land to the heirs of any deceased In-
dian allottee of land, whenever any male, and
female Indian shall have cohabited together
as husband and wife according to the custom
of Indian life, the issue of such cohabitation
shall be, for the purpose aforesaid, taken to
be the legitimate issue of the Indians so liv-
ing together, and that every Indian child,
otherwise illegitimate, shall for that purpose
be taken to be the legitimate issue of the
father, the illegitimate children of an al-
lottee are entitled to inherit and share in the
lands allotted to their father the same as
though they were legitimate children, and the
children of a deceased illegitimate child are
entitled to the share of their deceased par-
ent In re House's Heirs, 112 N. W. 27, 29,
132 Wis. 212.
LEGITIMATE PXJBPOSE
The term "legitimate purpose," as ap-
plied to the acts of a municipal corporation,
means such a purpose as is authorized by the
municipal charter. Vaughn v. Village of
Greencastle, 78 S. W. 50, 61, 104 Mo. App.
206.
The creation of so-called treasury stock
and disposition of It upon the representation
that it was fully paid and nonassessable, and
at a price inferentially below par, for the
purpose of providing working capital for a
corporation, is not a "legitimate, corporate
purpose," within the act concerning corpora-
tions (revision of 1896), granting power to
corporations to purchase shares of their own
capital stock, if such purchase is for a legiti-
mate corporate purpose, but not otherwise.
Knickerbocker Importation Co. v. State
Board of Assessors, 65 AtL 913, 914, 74 N. J.
Law, 583, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 885.
LEGITIMATE TITLE
In the provision of the protocol of the
treaty of tbe Guadalupe Hidalgo that Mex-
ican "grants" in the ceded territory shall
preserve their legal value, and that the gran-
tees may cause "their legitimate titles" to be
acknowledged, the terms "grants" and "legit-
imate titles" are not restricted to absolute
perfect grants made prior to the treaty, but
Include also equitable titles which, if there
LEGITIMATION
UESSEXnSSD CAPACITY
litd been no change of sovereignty, would
have become perfect or could have been made
perfect If the proper steps had been taken.
The words *iegitlmate titles" mean titles
that are comprehended in the term "grants/*
^ud since the term "grants " as employed in
treaties, embraces all character of titles,
equitable or legal, it reflects the sense and
meaning In which the term "legitimate titles'*
was intended to be employed. State v. Rus-
sell, 85 S. W. 288, 203, 38 Tex. Ciy. App. 13;
Haynes v. State (Tex.) 85 S. W. 1029, 1039.
. '^
XEGITIMATIOH
While "adoption,'^ properly considered,
refers to persons who are strangers in blood,
''legitimation*' refers to persons where the
blood relation exists. The verb "adopts," in
WUson's Rev. & Ann. St.. 1903, c. 59, art 2,
I 36, providing that the father of an illegiti-
mate child, by acknowledging it as his own,
etc., thereby "adopts" it as such, is used in
the sense of "legitimates." Allison v. Bryan,
97 Pac. 282, 283, 21 Okl. 557, 18 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 031, 17 Ann. Cas. 468 (quoting Blythe v.
Ayres, 31 Pac 915, 96 Gal. 582, 19 L. R. A.
40, and dtlng Bouvier, Black, Anderson, and
Rapalje Law Dictionaries).
LEMON
As fruit, see Fruit
As goods, wares, and merchandise, see
Goods.
LEND— LENT
See Money Lent ; Money Loaned and In-
vested.
Rev. St. c. 48, { 64, providing that pre-
mioms for building association loans shall
consist of a percentage charged on the
amount lent in addition to interest, and sec-
tion 65, providing that the monthly interest
flhall not be at a greater rate than 6 per cent
per annum, mean by the words "loan" and
*'lent" the whole sum contracted for, not the
som actually advanced. Tlbbetts v. Deering
Loan & BuUding Ass'n, 72 AU. 162, 166, 104
Me. 404.
As glTe
Under Revlsal 1905, { 1578, converting
estates tall into estates in fee simple, a will
whereby the testator "lends" land to his
grandson and his lawful heirs of the body
forever conveys an estate in fee simple. Ses-
soms V. Sessoms, 56 S. B. 687, 688, 144 N. C.
m (citing Cox V. Marks, 27 N. C. 361 ; Bang
▼. Utley, 85 N. C. 59; Edgerton v. Aycock, 31
S. E. 382, 123 N. 0. 134 ; Hlnson v. Pickett
[8. C] 1 mu Eq. 86).
A clause of a will bequeathed two sep-
arate parcels of land to the daughter of the
testator, and, on her death, to her heirs and
to her issue if living in fee simple, otherwise,
"all the real estate loaned her to be divided
between" certain persons. There was no
punctuation or anything to indlc&te that the
testator intended to differentiate the two par-
cels of property in reference to the quantity
of the estate. Held, that as "lend" may be
construed as synonymous with give, devise,
or bequeath, unless it is manifest that a dif-
ferent meaning was intended, the testator
must be held to have referred to all the prop-
erty devised his daughter in the residuary
clause. Falson y. Moore, 75 S. B. 993, 160
N. O. 148.
LENSE
It is necessary that "lenses" should be
both ground and polished in order to be
brought within the provision of the Tariff
Act for "lenses • • ♦ ground and polish-
ed to a spherical, cylindrical or prismatic
form"; and, where they have been brought
to such form by molding, they are not within
that provision. United States y. Robinson,
140 Fed. 968, 969.
LESS
See More or Less ; Not Less Than.
In an action under Laws 1907, p. 495, c.
254, defining the liabilities of railroads for in-
juries to employ^, for the death of a brake-
man, the use of the words "less or greater,"
Instead of the statutory words "slighter or
greater," in determining decedent's negli-
gence as a contributing cause in comparison
with that attributable to the railroad, was
not erroneous, as the word "less" conveyed
the idea conveyed by the word "slighter" as
used in the statute. Boucher v. Wisconsin
Cent Ry. Co.^ 128 N. W. 913, 914, 141 Wis.
160.
LESS NOTE
Where a will gave a legacy, less a note
held by the testator against the legatee, in-
terest was properly charged on the note up
to the time of the probate of the will. Rev.
CkMles, I 4770, requiring the language of a
will to be given its ordinary meaning, and the
words "less a note" would, in ordinary busl*
ness transactions, refer to the debt as a
.whole, and not tiie sum mentioned as the
principal only. In re Beck's Estate, 121 Pac.
784, 789, 44 Mont 561.
IiESSElfED OAPAOIT7
In a personal injury action, an instruc-
tion that the jury, in assessing damages, might
consider the bodily and mental pain endured
by the Injured party, loss of time, and inabil-
ity to work and earn money, and her dimin-
ished capacity for labor, etc., was not er-
roneous as permitting double damages for the
same cause ; "inability to work" meaning the
total suspension of the power to work, and
"diminished capacity to labor" meaning les-
sening, without totally destroying, the power
to labor, and "inability" meaning without
ability, and "lessened capacity" meaning that
LESSEB OFF£NSK
90
LET
partial ability remains. Houston ft T. C. R.
Co. V. Maxwell (Tex.) 128 S. W. 160, 166.
LESSEB OFFENSE
Under a count of a presentment for sell-
ing liquor without a license, In violation of
Acts 1899, c. 161, § 1, to constitute which of-
fense a single sale is sufficient, defendant can-
not, there being no evidence of any s|)ecific
sale, so as to authorize a conviction of the
offense charged, be convicted of violation of
Acts 1909, c. 479, § 16, making it an offense
to exercise the privilege of retail liquor deal-
er without first paying the taxes prescribed
for exercise thereof, though he has a United
States revenue license to retail liquor, made
by the act (page 1743) prima fade evidence
that he is in the retail liquor business ; the
offense denounced by the act of 1909, though
having a lighter punishment prescribed, not
being a lesser offense than, and included in,
the offense denounced by the act of 1899,
within Shannon's Code, §§ 7085, 7195, permit-
ting, on an indictment for an offense admit-
ting, or consisting, of different degrees, a con-
viction of a lower degree of the offense than
that charged, or of any offense necessarily in-
cluded in that charged. Brinkley v. State,
145 S. W. 161, 162, 125 Tenn. 445.
LESSEE
A petition in summary proceedings for
the possession of land, alleging that the pe-
titioner is the "lessee" and landlord thereof,
is not a sufficient compliance with Code Civ.
Proc. § 2235, requiring the petition to state
the Interest of the petitioner in the premises.
The statement that the petitioner was the
•^lessee*' and "landlord" is the assertion mere-
ly of an interest and not a description of
such interest Ferber y. Apfel, 99 N. Y.
Supp. 215, 216, 113 App. Div. 720 (citing Ka-
zis V. Loft, 80 N. Y. Supp. 1015, 81 App. Div.
636; Loft v. Kaziz, 84 N. Y. Supp. 228; Bn-
gle. Heller Co. v. Henry Ellas Brewing Co.,
75 N. Y. Supp. 1080, 37 Misc. Rep. 480; Pot-
ter V. New York Baptist Mission Society, 52
N. Y, Supp. 294, 23 Misc. R^. 671 ; Ross v.
Same, 52 N. Y. Supp. 303, 23 Misc. Rep. 683 ;
Cram v. Dietrich, 78 N. Y. Supp. 948, 38
Misc. Rep. 790).
A covenant to pay to the lessees and
their assigns, on the termination of the lease,
a compensation for buildings and improve-
ments put on the demised land during the
term of the lease was not to be restricted to
buildings put on the land by the lessees, but
would include buildings put on it by subten-
ants or assigns of the lessees. If the op-
posite were the true construction of the word
"lessees" in this covenant, the covenant In
the earlier part of the lease that the said
"lessees" shall have a right of way, and the
covenant to "warrant and defend," would
have to be restricted in the same way. Hol-
lywood V. First Parish in Brockton, 78 N. E.
124, 125, 192 Mass. 269.
A 'lessee'* of a store building, who as-
sumes entire control of a room connected
therewith, is the "lessee and occupant'* of
such room within the law forbidding gamini:.
Ford V. State, 38 South. 229, 230, 86 Miss.
123.
As e«mtraotor
See Contractor.
See Owner.
As pnroluiser for Talnalile eoiuide:
tion
See Purchaser fof Valuable Considera-
tion.
le'ssor
See Owner.
LET
See Agree to Let
The term "let" is usually applied to leas-
es and conveyances of real estate and con-
tains the idea of a grant, and when the par-
ties have used it as the operative word ap-
plied to a transfer of timber rights and con-
tracts passing such interest for 91 years and
more, by fair interpretation and consider-
ing the nature of the interest, the parties
could only have intended an assignment At-
lantic & N. C. R. Co. V. Atlantic & N. C.
Co., 61 S. E. 185, 190, 147 N. C. 368, 23 li.
R. A. (N. S.) 223, 125 Am. St Rep. 550, 15
Ann. Cas. 363.
As allow or permit
Where defendant who had an option to
purchase certain property, represented to
plaintiff that they were to be 'let in on the
ground floor" with certain spedfled excep-
tions, it meant that they were to come into
the purchase upon the same terms and condi-
tions that he had made with the holder of
the property, save as particularly specified.
KroU V. Coach, 78 Pac. 397, 399, 45 Or. 459.
As demise, arant, or lease
The term "let" contemplates the relation
of landlord and tenant. It is defined as **t(>
give leave to; to permit; to grant the use of
realty for a compensation correlative to
hire; to lease or hire out for compensation.'*
Land, into possession of which one enters un-
der a contract to purchase, is not **let* to
him, within a statute making it forcible de-
tainer to willfully hold over without force
after the termination of the time for which
the property was "let" after demand for pos-
session. Francis v. Holmes, 118 S. W. S81»
883, 54 Tex. av. App. 608.
'*The mere use of the words lease' and
*let' in a contract of letting, does not neces>
sarily create a lease as distinguished from
a license;" but an instrument by which one
contracted to let and another to take the ex-
liET FOR HIRE
91
liEVEB
dnslve right to malDtain stands for the sale
of candles at a race park, also a storeroom
onder the tracks providing the period of "let-
ting** and the amount and times of payment
of rent, Is a lease and not a license. Mehl-
man r. Atlantic Amusement Co., 119 N. Y.
Supp. 222, 223, 65 Misc. Rep. 25.
LETFOBHIBE
As used in an ordinance providing for
the payment of a license by owners of ve-
hicles used or let for hire, the term "letting
for hire" was intended to apply to cases
where persons, the hirers, took temporary
possession of the wagon and t^m. 8wet-
man v. aty of Covington <Ky.) 82 8. W. 886.
LETTINO
See Public Letting; Subletttnf.
LETTER
See Not to the Letter; Threftteolng Let-
ter.
See Memorandum.
As publio doonment
See Public Document.
As ■•Ueitatiom
See SoUcit
LETTEB8 OF ASMXNI8TRATIOH
See Ancillary Letters; Domiciliary Let-
ters.
IiETTEBB OF CREDIT
A "letter of credit" is a letter containing
a general or special request to pay the bear-
er or person named money, or sell him some
commodity on credit, or give him something
of value, and look to the writer of the letter
for recompense, and which partakes of the
nature of a negotiable instrument. Liggett
V. Levy, 136 S. W. 299, 801, 233 Mo. 590, Ann.
Cas. 1912C, 70.
LETTERS PATEHT
** ^Letters patent* are not to be regarded
as monopolies, created by the executive au-
thority at the expense and to the prejudice
of all the community except the persons
therein named as patentees, but aa public
franchises granted to the inventors of new
and useful improvements for the purpose of
securing to them as «uch inventors, for the
limited term therein mentioned, the exclusive
light to make and use, and vend to others to
be used, their own inventions, as tending to
promote the progress of science and the use-
ful arts, and as matter of compensation to
the inventors for their labor, toil, and ex-
pense in making the inventions and reducing
the same to practice for the public benefit,
as contemplated by the Constitution and
sanctioned by the laws of Congress.'* Mon-
aghan v. City of Indianapolis, 76 N. B. 424,
^25, 37 Ind. App. 280 (quoting and adopting
definition in Seymour t. Osborne, 11 Wall.
[78 U. 8.1 516, 20 L. Ed. 83).
A license to keep a dramshop is not a
'letter patent," which can be tested or va-
cated by quo warranto. Ilargett v. Bell, 46
8. B. 749, 750, 134 N. C. 394.
LETTERS TE8TAMEHTART
See Entitled to Letters Testamentary.
"Letters testamentary'* are of two kinds,
"domiciliary letters** and "ancUlary letters";
the first being issued at the place of the tes-
tator's domicile, and the latter at some place,
other than domicile, where personalty of the
testator is found. Such letters depend upon
the situs of Huch personalty, and do not au-
thorize the administrator or representative
to perform any act or to reduce to possession
personalty not within territorial authority of
the court where Issued. Lockwood v. Unit-
ed States Steel Corporation, 138 N. X. Supp.
725, 727, 153 Appu DlY. 655.
LEVEE
"Levees" keep out the water. Mound
aty Land ft Stock Go. v. Miller, 70 S. W.
721, 724, 170 Mo. 240, 60 L. R. A. 190, 94 Am.
SL Rep. 727.
"A ievee' is a space adjacent to a navi-
gable water where vessels may approach and
land to unload and receive passengers and
freight, and where articles of freight may be
left for loading on the vessels, or after they
have been unloaded until they can be taken
away.** Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. People
ex reL Dalley, 78 N. E. 790, 793, 222 111. 427
(quoting and adopting definition in Farnham,
Water ft Water Righte, § 145a).
The word "levee," as used in the West
and South, means a landing place for vessels
for the delivery of merchandise, and, as in-
cident thereto, for the temporary storage of
the merchandise. In other words, a public
landing. Louisville ft N. R. Co. v. City of
Cincinnati, 81 N. E. 983, 989, 76 Ohio St 481.
That a tract of land bordering a river
was designated as a steamboat lauding on a
plat and was dedicated to public use shows
it to be a "levee." Betcher v. Chicago, M. ft
St P. Ry. Co., 124 N. W. 1096, 1097, 110
Minn. 228.
Where a strip of land lying along the
margin of a navigable stream was included
in the plat of a city and dedicated to the
public by the use of the word "levee" writ-
ten thereon, and several streets opened upon
this tract, and many lots had no other means
of Ingress and egress, except over and along
it. Its dedication included its use as a street,
as well as a landing place for boats. Mc-
Alpine V. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 75
Pac. 73, 74, 68 Kan. 207, 64 L. R. A. 85, 1
Ann. Cas. 452.
LEVEE
LEVY
A "levee" is a landing place for yessels,
or a dyke or breakwater. Sanborn y. Van
Duyne, 96 N. W. 41, 44, 90 Minn. 215.
As street
See Street.
LEVEE BOARD
As municipal corporation, see Mnnicipal
Corporation.
LEVEE DISTRICT
As citizen, see Citizen.
As municipal corporation, see Municipal
Corporation.
LEVEE DI8TRIOT DIRECTOR
As county officer, see County Officer.
LEVEE TAX
A tax levied by a sanitary district organ-
ized under Act July 1, 1907 (Laws 1907, p.
289), is not a "levee tax" within Act July 1,
1909 (Laws 1909, p. 323), providing for a re-
duction in taxes, excepting "levee taxes," etc.
People ex rel. Sanders v. Chicago & A. B. Co.,
94 N. E. 14, 15, 248 111. 417; Same v. Toledo,
St. L. & W. R. Co., 94 N. B, le, 249 111. 175.
LEVEL
There is a distinction between the words
"aim," "point," and "leveL" "Aim" expresses
more than the other two words inasmuch as
it denotes a direction towards some minute
point in an object, and the others imply direc-
tion towards the whole objects themselves.
We aim at a bird ; we point a cannon against
a wall ; w& level a cannon at a wall. Point-
ing is of course used with most propriety
with reference to instruments that have
points. It is likewise a less decisive action
than either aiming or leveling. A stick or
finger may be pointed at a person merely out
of derision ; but a blow Is "leveled" or aimed
with an expressed intent of committing an
act of violence. Livingston v. State, 65 S. E.
812, 6 Ga. App. 805 (quoting Crabbe's Eng-
lish Synonyms).
LEVEL RATE PREMIUM
A "level rate premium policy" is a policy
on which the regular annual renewal premi-
ums provided are to be kept down to a level,
or are to be brought down to the level of the
premiums charged for the first year's insur-
ance by the application of the profits earned
on the policy. IJams v. Providental Sav.
Life Assur. Soc. of New York, 84 S. W. 51, 60,
185 Mo. 466.
LEVER
See (3ut-Off Lever.
LEVY
All levies, see All.
LEW (Of Taxes)
"Levy" is defined as "the amount accru-
ing from a tax or execution." State ex reL
Ledwith v. Brian, 120 N. W. 916, 917, 84
Neb. 30.
"Levy" is used variously, but, as applied
to the determination of the amount or rate ta
be charged, it is a legislative function, to be
exercised only by the state, or some infe-
rior political division to which the power
has been delegated. School Dist. No. 127 of
Reno County v. School Dist. No. 45 of Bena
County, 103 Pac. 126, 127, 80 Kan. 641.
The word "levy,'* as applied to taxation,,
is given a variety of meanings, among wMch
are: "To impose or assess" ; "to impose, as-
sess and collect under authority of law"; **ta
raise or collect by assessment" ; "to charge a
sum of money already ascertained against a
person or property subject to the charge";
"to determine by vote the amount of tax to
be raised" ; "to fix the rate at which property
is to be taxed." Gray v. Board of Sch'
Inspectors of Peoria, 83 N. E. 95, 98, 231
111. 63.
The word "levy," as used in constitu-
tional and statutory provisions that the coun-
ty commissioners shall levy a tax in their
respective counties for the support of pub-
lic schools, and that county boards shall levy
ah annual tax on all the property in their
respective counties, to be collected at the
same time and by the same officers as other
taxes, excludes from the act of levying any
signification of creation. The duty to levy
Imposed on the board is therefore purely
ministerial, and only imports that it should
take such action as would result in the tax
being placed on the auditor's books. The
boards have no power to do anything more
or less than require that the tax be entered.
Dickson V. Burckmyer, 46 S. E. 343, 346, 67
S. C. 626.
"Levied," with reference to taxes, means
the extension of a tax against taxable prop-
erty, since a tax cannot be said to be levied
until it has been so extended. Pettibone v.
West Chicago Park Com'rs, 74 N. B. 387, 392,
215 111. 304.
A tax cannot be said to be "levied" when
it is only estimated, and the time for levying
it has not arrived. The limitation on the
power of the county board to contract for
bridge building to coA a sum not greater
than the amount of money on hand in the
county bridge fund derived from a levy of
previous years and two-thirds of the levy of
the current year gives no authority to the
board to take into account the levy of the
current calendar year prior to the making of
such levy. Until this is made, there Is no
levy of the current year. Clark v. Lancaster
County, 96 N. W. 593, 599, 69 Neb. 717.
"Three things are essential to a *tax,'
as that term is understood by our Constitu-
LBVT
8S
UIVT
tlon: First, the aacertainment of a aam cer-
tain, or tbat can be rendered certain, to be
Imposed on the collective body of taxpayers;
second, a legal imposition of that sum as an
obligation on the coUectiye body of taxpay-
ers; third, an apportionment of sach sum
among individnal taxpayers so as to ascer-
tain the part or share that each should
bear. ♦ ♦ ♦ The first two acts above de-
scribed, namely, the ascertainment of a sum
to be imposed on the collective body of tax-
payers and its imposition by a legislative
declaration to that effect, are essentially leg-
islative acts or acts proper directly to the
lawmaking function of the government.
• • • The third act, namely, the appor-
tionment of the whole sum imposed by way
of tax on the collective body of taxpayers
npon the separate Individuals composing that
body, is usually an administrative act per-
formed under specific statutory directions,
ascertaining the mode and time of its per-
formance. • • • The word *leTy* Is indif-
ferently employed, as conunonly used, to ex-
press either one of these processes separately
or both collectively. A tax is said to be lev-
led when the amount or rate to be imposed is
fixed by law, for what is wanting to com-
plete such levy Is supplied by the standing
tax laws, and consists in a course of adminis-
trative action. When the levying of a tax
is spoken of as a legislative act, it Is common-
ly understood to describe such action on the
part of the Legislature as would, with stand-
ing tax laws, complete the legislative authori-
ty requisite to enable the administrative de-
partment to distribute and collect the tax.
* ♦ ♦ In other words, the tax directed to
be levied must be so far imx)osed, in order to
comply with the letter and spirit of the Con-
stltntion, that no further legislation will be
necessary to enable its collection.'* Rice v.
Shealy, 50 S. B. 868, 870, 71 8. C. 161 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Morton v.
Ck)mptroller General, 4 S. C. 430, 453).
The power of the state tax commissioner
conferred by Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art
81, i 150, requiring the commissioner to levy
taxes on shares of corporate stock and to
place a valuation on corporate stock for pur-
poses of assessment. Is not affected by Laws
1906, c. 404, amending article 81, § 22, and
fixing a tax for each $100 for a specified pur-
pose, and directing the Comptroller to levy
the taxes on corporate stock, since the func-
tion of the Comptroller, nnder the act of
1906, is a purely ministerial act fully per-
formed when he enters on his books the num-
ber of shares of stock liable to taxation, the
corporation the stock of which is taxed, the
rate of taxation, and extends the amount of
the tax, and since the word "levy" as applied
to taxes means in some cases to raise and
exact by authority of government the amount
of a tax to be raised, and in other cases the
word is used with reference to the mere min-
^Bterlal act of entering the taxes on the tax
book and collecting them. Union Trust Co.
of Bfaryland v. State, 81 AU. 878, 874, 116
Md. 368.
By section 16 of P. L. 1903, p. 789, the
commissioners are required each year to
cause a tax to be "levied and assessed," etc.,
and to certify to the tax assessor, taxing
board, or taxing officer the amount of tax
required to be levied, assessed, and raised,
and the said assessors, etc., shall assess said
sums so directed to be assessed and certified
upon all the persons and property liable, and
the said tax shall be levied, assessed, and
collected by the same officers, etc., and the
tax so levied upon real estate shall be a lien
thereon. Held, that throughout the section
the word "levy" is used as referring to the
administrative functions of taxation and not
to the legislative function, the differences
between which are pointed out in the case of
Township of Bernards v. Allen, 61 N. J. Law,
228, at page 288, 89 AU. 716, at page 719,
also referred to in the dissenting opinion, 61
N. J. Law, 692, 41 AtL 250; one of the judges
using the phrase "levying taxes" as descrip-
tive of the legislative function, while the
other used it as referring to the administra-
tive process of collecting the taxes. Van
Cleve V. Passaic Vall^ Sewerage Com'rs, 68
Atl. 671, 586, 71 N. J. Law, 188.
Provisions in the body of an act confer-
ring on parochial and municipal corporations
power to levy license taxes was within the
title of the act "to levy, enforce, and collect
a license tax." Mayor and Council of Alex-
andria V. White, 16 South. 16, 16, 46 La.
Ann. 449.
As all aeeessaiy prooeedlrngs
A city ordinance authorizing the issuance
of bonds dated in 1910 and payable in 1930,
which provides that "there is hereby levied"
on the taxable property of the dty a spedfled
sum, of which a certain amount Is to pay
the principal of the bonds and the balance
to iMiy interest, of which sum a spedfled
amount shall be collected each year to and
including 1930, the amount collected each
year over that required for interest to con-
stitute a sinking fund to the principal, com-
plies with Laws 1907, c 236, and Const art
11, S 3, requiring dties issuing bonds, to pro-
vide before, or at the time of doing so, for the
collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to
pay the interest as it falls due and to dis-
charge the principal within 20 years, since
"levy" in tax matters has various meanings
dependent on the context, and in this Instance
includes everything necessary to the collec-
tion of the tax. Borner v. City of Prescott,
136 N. W. 552, 554, 150 Wis. 197.
Assess distinsnlslied
Assessment as including, see Assess.
To "assess" a tax is to adjudge and de-
termine what proportion of his property the
taxpayer shall contribute to the public. To
"levy" a tax is to make a record of this de-
LKVT
94
I-BVT
termination, and to extend the assessment
against the taxpayer's property. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Ca V. Klein, 71 N. W. 1069, 1071,
52 Neb. 258.
As used in Code CIt. Proc. { 325, requir-
ing an adverse occupant to pay all the taxes
which have been levied and assessed upon
the land, the word "levied" refers to the act
of the board of supervisors In making the
"levy," and the word "assessed" refers to the
act of the assessor in making the assessment.
The statute does not require the payment of
taxes assessed before the occupancy, and
levied afterwards, but only such taxes as
were both levied and assessed during the
occupancy. Allen y. McKay, 52 Pac. 828, 829,
831, 120 Cal. 332.
As €oUeetioa
In our revenue laws the word "levy" is
sometimes used in the sense of "raising" or
"imposing," and not in the sense of "collect-
ing" a tax by execution. In different places
in these laws the boards of county commis-
sioners are authorized to "levy," or lay, tax-
es, while the word "collect" is used to define
the power of the county treasurers to gather
in or receive money for taxes theretofore as-
sessed by county assessors and levied by the
boards. Parsons v. People, 76 Pae. 666, 669,
32 Colo. 22L
The tonnage tax imposed on the use of
foreign built yachts owned by citizens of
the United States by Tariff Act Aug. 5, 1909,
c. 6, § 37, 36 Stat. 112, being a tax upon the
privilege of use, is assessable to and collect-
ible from the personal user, and the provi-
sion of the statute that such tax shall be lev-
ied and collected by the "collector of cus-
toms of the district nearest the residence of
the managing owner" requires that, where
the owner resides in one district, the col-
lector of that district shall levy and collect
the tax, and the attempted action of the col-
lector of another district to that end is not a
"levy" and will not support an action to recov-
er the tax. United States v. Blair, 190 Fed.
372, 375 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, pp.
4101-4104).
Special assessments
The "levy" of special assessments for
street improvements is the exercise of a spe-
cies of the taxing power of the state, and not
of the right of eminent domain. New York,
C. & St. L. Ry. Co. V. aty of Hammond, 83
N. E. 244, 245, 170 Ind. 493.
LEVY (Of Wrfts)
See Equitable Licvy.
As a sheriff's deed to land sold under
execution need recite only the names of the
parties to the execution, the date when issu-
ed, and of the Judgment, and other particu-
lars recited in the execution, which necessa-
rily includes the fact that notice was given,
and as a "levy," is under Rev. St. 1909, f
2195, defined as a "taking," whicb means to
gain control or possession of, in any way,
a sheriff's deed, need not recite that a levy
was made, for the recital of notice and other
formality shows that the land was taken,
and hence a deed is prima facie correct al-
though reciting an invalid levy, for that recit-
al will be rejected as surplusage. Butler ▼.
Imhoff, 142 S. W. 287, 288, 238 Mo. 584.
In a notice of sale, reciting that tlie
land was levied under a Judgment rendered
before a Judge named, and that the levy men-
tioned was made by virtue of an order ot
sale, the contention that the words "levy*'
and "Judgment" indicate an execution sale
is not tenable, as under the Code Judgment
is the apt word in proceedings of an equitable
nature, as well as in those which are strictly
legal. Gray v. Enrich, 96 N. W. 848, 2 Neb.
(Unof.) 194.
Seianre under garatshmemt
The word "levied," as used in Civ. Code
1895, § 2913, providing that a "thing hired is
not subject to sale under Judgment obtained
subsequent to the contract of hire against the
ovmer, but may be levied on, and a b<Hid for
its forthcoming at the expiration of the time
for which it is hired may be demanded of the
person hiring," is to be given its technical
meaning (that is, an actual seizure of the
property by a levying officer under a pro-
cess); and the latter part of the section in re-
lation to a forthcoming bond would have no
application to a case where the property is
seized under a garnishment which is not a
technical "levy," within the meaning of the
statute, though for some purposes a garnish-
ment is treated as in effect a levy upon the
property. Southern Flour & Grain Co. v.
Northern Pacific R. Co., 56 S. E. 742, 743, 127
Ga. 626, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 853, 119 Am. St
Rep. 356, 9 Ann. Cas. 437.
Selsnre under writ of replevin
"The strict meaning of the woTd •levy'
is usually a seizure of the defendant's prop-
erty." By the word "levy," as used in Bankr.
Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, { 67f, 30 Stat. 565,
making void all levies. Judgments, attach-
ments, or other liens obtained through legal
proceedings within four months prior to the
bankruptcy of an insolvent defendant, seems
to include any seizure of property in the
bankrupt's possession and which he claims
to own, and seems to cover a seizure on a
writ of replevin in a suit to recover property
sold and delivered on credit under a contract
which the plaintiff claims a right to rescind
for fraud. In re Weinger, Bergman St Ca,
126 Fed. 875, 877.
GonstmetiTe seianre
As used in Rev. St 1899, 9 4043, provid-
ing that if a constable levy an execution, and
a third party claim the property, he may
take a bond of indemnity, the word "levy"
means such levy, either actual or construc-
tive, as the situation of the property permits.
LEVY
96
USWDXESS
If It l8 already in the custody of the law,
because preyioualy seized under a writ of at-
tachment, a levy or seizure under a subse-
quent execution in a mode adjudged to be suf-
ficient to give a lien on the property and en-
able the officer to sell it is also sufficient to
bring into operation the statutory provisions
in regard to a demand for indemnity by the
officer if notice is given of outside ownership.
Smith ex rel. McElhaney v. Rogers, 73 S. W.
243, 244, 09 Mo. App. 252.
TrnkinslaiMl
In Georgia, a levy on land la made by the
official entry thereof on the execution, and
not by seizure. Keaton v. Farkas, 70 S. E.
1110, 1111, 136 Ga. 188.
The object of a levy of execution is to
bring the property within the custody of the
law and prevent the judgment debtor from
disposing of it to the prejudice of the credi-
tor before sale can be made, and in case of
real estate, on which the Judgment is already
a lien by docketing, the ordinary meaning of
the word "levy" as used in section 6827 and
elsewhere is inapplicable. Britannia Mln.
Ot). v. United Stotes Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
115 Pac. 46, 48, 43 Mont 83.
Sclsvre required
"A levy* under an execution upon per-
sonal property is made by the officer having
the writ seizing the property and taking it
into his possession.*' People, to Use of Ken-
field, V. Finch, 76 Pac. 1120, 1123, 19 Oolo.
App. 512.
To constitute a levy there must be an ac-
tual or constructive ^seizure of property, and
the property must be so far brought under
the sabjection of the officer that he can exer-
else control, and does assume to exercise con-
trol, by virtue of the writ; and the mere
declaration of an intent to seize does not
coDstltate a levy, but the officer must do
some act for which be could be prosecuted as
a trespasser, if it were not for the protection
afforded by the writ Dean y. State, 71 S. B.
597, 598, 9 Ga. App. 303.
LEWD
See, also. Lascivious.
** 'Lewd' is defined to mean given to the
onlawful Indulgence of lust; eager for sex-
ual indulgence." Jamison v. State, 94 S. W.
675-678, 117 Tenn. 58 (quoting and adopting
definition in United States v. Bebout, 28 Fed.
522).
As used in Rev. St. { 3893, declaring
every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pam-
phlet, print, or other publication of an in-
dec^t character, or notices giving informa-
tion for obtaining such publications, to be
nonmailable matter, the words "obscene,"
"lewd," and "lascivious" signify that form
of immorality which has relation to sexual
impurity, having the same meaning as is
g^y&L them at common law in prosecutions
for obscene libel. Hanson v. United States,
157 Fed. 749, 750, 85 C. C. A. 325.
The words "lewd and lascivious," as
used in a statute providing that any person
who shall unlawfully and feloniously commit
any lewd and lascivious act, other than those
constituting other crimes, on or with the
body, or any part or member thereof, of a
child under the age of 14 years, with the
intent of arousing the passions or sexual de-
sires of such child, shall be guilty of a felony,
do not limit the application of the section to
an act attempted or committed between per-
sons of opposite sexes. People v. Zuell, 82
Pac. 1128, 1129, 2 CaL App. 59.
LEWD H01T8E
■ The words "ill fame" are synonymous
with the word "lewd," as used in the statute,
making it an offense to keep a lewd house,
and the reputation of a house being kept and
maintained as a lewd house is admissible
evidence on a trial of a person charged with
the offense. McConnell v. State, 58 S. E.
546, 547, 2 Ga. App. 445.
A house may be a lewd house, within
Pen. Code 1910, | 382, making it criminal for
any person to maintain a lewd house or place
for the practice of fornication and adultery,
though the house may be devoted chiefly to
the carrying on of some other vocation (such
as boarding house or hotel), if lewd women
are accustomed to frequent there and to
carry on their practices. Fitzgerald v. State.
72 S. E. 541, 542, 10 Ga. App. 70.
There is no difference in meaning be-
tween the two expressions "house of ill fame"
and "lewd house or place for the practice of
fornication or adultery." Cotton v. City of
Atlanta, 73 & E. 683, 684, 10 Ga. App. 397.
LEWDNESS
See Leading LAfe of Prostitution and
Lewdness.
"Lewdness is lustfulness and lascivious
behavior; a synonym of unchastity, sensuali-
ty, and debauchery." On a prosecution for
keeping a house of ill fame, instructions that
a house resorted to for the purpose of prosti-
tution and lewdness was a house visited by
persons of both sexes for the purpose of hav-
ing sexual intercourse, or some other lewd
purpose, and that lewdness was the unlaw-
ful indulgence of the animal desires, were
correct State v. Wilson, 99 N. W. 1060,
1061, 124 Iowa, 264.
The Century Dictionary makes "lewd-
ness** synopymous with "impurity," "unchas-
tity," "licentiousness," "sensuality." In Com-
monwealth V. Warden, 128 Mass. 54, 35 Am.
Rep. 357, it was held that "lewdness" is the
irregular indulgence of lust, whether public
or private. "Lewdness," as used in the age
of consent law (Acta 1901, p. 29, c. 19), which;
after prohibiting carnal knowledge of a fe-
male over 12 and under 18 years of age, de-
LEWDNESS
96
LIABIiB
dares that nothing contained In the act shall
authorize a conviction when the female is
at the time or before the carnal knowledge
a bawd, lewd, or kept female, includes pri-
vate as well as public unchastity. Jamison
V. State, 94 S. W. 675, 678, 117 Tenn. 58.
The term "lewdness," as used In Code, {
4939, prohibiting the keeping of a house of ill
fame resorted to for the purpose of prosti-
tution or lewdness, means lustfulness, lech-
erous, lascivious, or libidinous conduct.
As used in section 4938, declaring that if any
man or woman not being married to each
other lewdly and lasciviously associate and
cohabit together, or if any man or woman
married or unmarried is guilty of open and
gross lewdness, and designedly makes an
open and indecent or obscene exposure of his
or her person, or of the person of another,
every such person shall be imprisoned, etc.,
the term "lewdness" means open and public
indecency tending to corrupt public morals,
and not mere unlawful indulgence of the ani-
mal desires, so that where accused was in-
dicted for conspiracy to induce certain fe-
males to commit the crime of lewdness, and
no act was shown indicating illicit inter-
course or anything more than a conspiracy to
procure the girls' willing assent to a single
act of intercourse, an instruction defining
'lewdness" as the unlawful indulgence of
the animal desires was misleading and erron-
eous. State V. Mitchell, 128 N. W. 378, 379,
149 Iowa, 362.
A statute declaring that whoever commits
an unnatural and lascivious act with another
person shall be punished, etc., makes crim-
inal any and all unnatural and lascivious
acts with another person; and it is no de-
fense that the act was not an act of copula-
tion, since copulation is not within the stat-
ute. Ck)mmonwealth v. Delano, 83 N. E. 406,
197 Mass. 166.
Prostitution is the common "lewdness"
of a woman for gain, or the offering of her
person to indiscriminate intercourse with
man, while "lewdness" is unlawful indul-
gence of the animal desire. State v. Porter,
107 N. W. 923, 924, 130 lowa, 690.
To convict of the crime of "lewd and las-
civious cohabitation," denounced by section
2596, Rev. St. 1892, there must be proved
both lewd and lascivious intercourse, and a
living or dwelling together as though the
conjugal relation existed between the parties.
Where the proofs show a residing together of
the parties, but are silent as to any lewd and
lascivious intercourse between them, there
can be no conviction of the crime. White-
head V. State, 37 South. 302, 48 Fla. 64.
"Lewd and lascivious association and co-
habitation," as used in Code 1906, § 4358,
queans the living and cohabiting together of a
man and a woman, not married to each other,
in the same house, as husband and wife.
State V, White, 66 S. E. 20, 66 W. Va. 45.
Under a statute providing that, if any
man or woman "cohabit together as husband
and wife without being married," each of
them shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, proof
of sexual intercourse between persons not
married, though living in the same house, is
insufficient to constitute the offense defined,
without evidence that they cohabited and
dwelled together and deported themselves to-
ward each other as husband and wife. Mc-
Neely v. State, 106 S. W. 674, 84 Ark. 484.
LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS
"The phrase 'lex loci contractus' is used,
in a double sense, to mean, sometimes, the
law of a place where a contract is entered in-
to; sometimes, that of the place of its per-
formance. And when it is employed to de-
scribe the law of the seat of the obligation, it
is, on that account, confusing." Pritchard
V. Norton, 1 Sup. Ct 102, 111, 106 U. S. 124,
27 L. Ed. 104.
LIABLE
See Party Uable; Primarily Liable;
Secondarily Liable; Usually Liable.
The word "liable" in a plea of contrib-
utory negligence, that plaintiff attempted to
cross the road in front of the approaching au-
tomobile, when she knew that by so doing
she was "liable" to be struck by the machine^
does not mean "probably," but no more than
"possibly." Terrill v. Walker, 59 South. 775.
776, 5 Ala. App. 535 (citing 5 Words and
Phrases, p. 4110).
The words **probable," "likely," and "li-
able" are synonymous when applied to the
effects of a personal injury, each dealing
with reasonable probability, not with possibil-
ity, and what may probably, or is likely or
liable to, be the future result of a personal
injury, is competent evidence to prove what
is reasonably certain in the matter. Hallum
V. VUlage of Omro, 90 N. W. 1051, 1054, 122
Wis. 337.
In Webster's Dictionary, the word "lia-
ble" is said to refer to a possible or probable
happening which may not actually occur, as
horses are liable to slip; even the sagacious
are liable to make mistakes. The word, as
used in an insurance policy, does not signify
a perfected or fixed legal liability, but rather
a condition out of which a legal liability may
arise. The word as most frequently used
does not necessarily exclude the idea of a
contingency. State ex rel. Breeden v. Sheets,
72 Pac. 334. 335, 26 Utah, 105 (quoting and
adopting definition in Home Ins. CJo. of New
York V. Peoria & P. U. R CJo., 52 N. B. 862,
178 111. 64).
"The word liable' denotes something ex-
ternal which may befall us; 'subject* refers
to evils which arise chiefly from internal
necessity, and are likely to do so. Hence the
former applies more to what is accidental;
TTjA'ftT.ie
97
LIABI«B TO FORFXrrUBJB
tbe latter to fMngs from whldi we often or i
IneTitably enffer." Webster. Therefore the
proYisloii of the general drain law that an
application for the establishment of a drain
shall be signed by not less than ten free-
holders, flye or more of whom shall be own-
ers of land ''liable" to assessment for benefits
in the constmctlon of sach drain, means
that at least five of the signers must be per- ;
sons who may properly be assessed for bene- 1
flts» and« as so construed, is not snbject to |
the objection of being impossible of enforce- 1
m&it Albert t. Gibson, 105 N. W. 19, 21, j
141 Mich. 888 (dUng 6 Words and Phrases,
p. 4110).
"A party Hable^ is one who may be held
reeponsible ^ther directly or conditionally,
liability is predicable of a contingent obli- !
gation as well as one matured and flzed." j
Code Civ. Proc. | 1027, subd. 1, providing
that any person who is liable to the plaintiff •
for the payment of a debt secured by a mor^ ;
gage may be made a defepdant in the f ore- !
closure salt, applies to an assic^nor of a bond
and mortgage who has guaranteed the collec-
tion thereof. Robert t. Kidansky, 97 N. T.
Snpp. 918, 916, 111 App. Div. 475.
The qualifying phrase "and against the
property liable for assessment for such im-
provement at the time of the making there-
of/' in section 129, c. 122. p. 207, Laws 1903,
means the property which would have been
liable for the special assessment had no in-
firmity existed therein or in the steps leading
thereto, which Infirmity this section was en-
acted to cure by the terms thereof. To con-
strue the word 'liable** to mean legally liable
would take away the entire force of the cura-
tive act. Shepherd v. Kansas City, 106 Pac
581, 533, 81 Kan. 809.
The word "liable," in an instruction, in
an action for personal injuries, that if the
Jury find for plaintiff they can take into con-
sideration as elements of damages plaintiff^s
I^ysical and mental pain and suffering, and
that which he is "Uable" to endure in the
future by reason of his Injury signifies some-
thing that may happen without importing
reasonable certainty that it will happen, and
tbe charge indicates that the Jury may enter
into full conjecture as to the possible future
suffering and injury, and the charge should
be that the verdict may include not future
damages which plaintiff is liable to suffer
(that is, may suffer), but such damages as it
Is reasonably certain will of necessity result
from the injury; Qreen v. Oatawba Power
Go^ 55 8. B. 125, 120, 75 8. O. 102 (citing
Ayers v. Delaware, L. ft W. B. Co.. 53 N. IB.
22, 158 N. T. 254; Stutz v. Chicago ft N. W.
By. Co., 40 N. W. 053, 73 Wis. 147, 9 Am. St
Bep. 769; Louisville 8. B. Ca v. Minogue, 14
S. W. 857, 90 Ky. 309, 29 Am. St Bep. 878»
and note; Ford v. City of Des Moines, 75 N.
W. 630, 106 Iowa, 94; McBride v. St Paul
8 WDS.ft P.2D Saa.— 7
aty By. Oo., 76 N. W. 281, 72 IClnn. 291; It
Cyc pw 18$).
The word 'liable,'* in an instruction, in
an action for injuries to a pedestrian trip-
ping over a brick thrown on the sidewalk
ttom a pile of brick between the curb and the
sidewalk, that tbe municipality was respon-
sible if the brick was placed on the sidewalk
so that it was "liable" to taU upon or be
ttirown thereupon, has the effect of imposing
on the municipality the highest degree of
possible care, and makes that which was pos^
sible negligence on the part of the munici-
pality and is erroneous. Sutter v. Kansas
City, 119 S. W. 1084, 1086, 188 Mo. App. 105.
As used, an instruction that it was the
duty of a railroad company to exercise ordi-
nary care to keep its right of way free from
dry and combustible matter which would be
"liable^ to teke fire and communicate it to a
trestle, ete., had a meaning sufficiently wide
to admit of a gloss rendering ite meaning
"within the range of possibility,*' which made
the instruction erroneous as imposing too
high a degree of care. Boot v. Kansas City
■ Southern B. Co., 92 S. W. 621, 681, 195 Mo.
I 348, 6 L. B. A. (N. S.) 212.
i The expression "liable to catdi and hold
' vehicles" Is indeterminate and of a wide
; i«eanlng,.and the fact that a street railway
switch was so constructed that it was liable
; to "catch and hold vehicles** does not of it-
self show that the switeh was such a struc-
ture as to render the railroad liable for in-
I Juries to a traveler in a buggy, the wheels of
, which were caught by the switch, and who
was thereby thrown to the ground and In-
; Jured. Morie v. St Louis Transit Co., 91 S.
I W. 962, 967, 116 Mo. App. 12.
jlJABIiE AS OABBSBB
i The phrase "liable as carrier,** as used
in Bev. St i 4281, providing that if any ship-
per of certein designated merchandise shall
lade it as freight or baggage on any vessel
without then giving to ite master or agent a
written notice of the true character and val-
ue thereof, having the same entered on the
bill of lading therefor, the master and owner
shall not be "liable as carriers*' thereof in
any form or manner, means only the liability
attached by law to the carrier's public em-
ployment, and does not attech to ite liability
as baUee. La Bourgogne, 144 Fed. 781, 786,
75 C. a A. 647.
IJABLE TO FORFEITURE
Webster defines "liable** thus, "Obliged
in law or equity, subject,** and says it "de-
notes something external which may befall
us.'* Bev. St I 4189, declaring that for the
commission of a certein act a vessel "shall
> be liable to forfeiture,** does not effect a
I present absolute forfdture, but only gives a
j right to have the vessel forfeited upon due
process of law, and the property in the same
UABLB TO FORFJCITUBB
98
LXABILITT
remains in the owner nntU setznre and con-
demnation, wbich relates back to the time of
seizure and invalidates intermediate sales.
The Kate Heron, 14 Fed. Cas. 180, 141, 6
Sawy. 106.
Where a certificate of a mutual boieflt
society provided that all the benefits accru-
ing should be ''liable to forfeiture*' if the
member did not comply with the associa-
tion's constitution and by-laws one of which
declared that, in case of omission to pay
does and assessments on the first of each
month,, the member should stand suspended,
the phrase "liable to forfeiture," when con-
strued in connection with the by-laws, part
of the contract making the default itself op-
erate as a forfeiture did not require affirma-
tive action on the part of the association be-
fore a member's rights could be barred.
Brown v. Knights of the Protected Ark, 96
Pac. 450, 453, 43 Colo. 280.
LIABILITY
See Contingent Liability; Contract Lla-
bUlty; Existing LiabiUty; Fixed LU-
biUty; Original Liability; Prima Fa-
de LiabiUty; Statutory Liability.
Any and all liability, see Any.
Any other liability, see Any Other.
Other liabilities, see Other.
"Liability" in its broadest and most com-
prehensive use includes any obligation one
is bound in law or Justice to perform, and is
synonymous with "responsibility"; in a more
restricted and perhaps in its popular sense,
it means that which one is under obligation
to pay to another. State ex rel. City of Mil-
waukee V. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light
Co., 120 N. W. 623, 630, 144 Wis. 386, 140 Am.
St Rep. 1025.
The words "debt" and *lUbillty," as
used in Const art 8, i 1, forbidding the Leg-
islature to create any debt or liability, singly
or in the aggregate, exceeding 1% per cent
of the assessed value of taxable property in
the state, are not employed tn a technical
sense, but have special reference to the basic
legislative authority on which a state con-
tract must rest, and in which alone a state
debt must find its sanction. Lewis v. Brady,
104 Pac. 000, 001, 17 Idaho, 251, 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 140.
A "liability" on an insurance policy as
afTecting deductions in assessing insurer's
property for taxation is an obligation by in-
surer to pay the moneys which the policy
calls for, on compliance by insured with
binding conditions, regardless of whether the
sum to be paid under the contract is a fixed
amount or a stated sum plus profits. Supple-
ment to the general tax act, approved May
11, 1006 (P. L. p. 418), provides for taxation
of certain property of life insurance com-
panies after deducting "liabilities," and re-
quires "liabilities on policies" to be deter-
mined as of the date of taxation on a basts
adopted by the insurance commissioner.
Held, that an amount apportioned to de-
ferred dividend policies as required by Laws
1007, p. 132, is not properly deducted from
an assessm^it as constituting a "liability";
widsL amount b^ng a "liability on the poli-
cies" comprehended in valuing the polidee.
City of Newark v. State Board of Equaliza-
tion of Taxes, 79 Aa 843, 345, 81 N. J. Law,
416; Same v. Board of Bqualisation of Tax-
es of New Jersey, 77 AtL 705, 80 N. J. Law*
258.
The term 'liability" is commonly used
to denote the indebtedness* or claim of a
mutual insurance order against its members
for dues or assessments, though it may not
be a technical ^'liabiUty" for the reason that
the whole matter is optional with the mem-
ber. The term is not used in the sense that
an absolute personal obligation to pay ex-
ists, but rather in the sense that, if he would
continue the liability of the insurer, the
member himself is obligated to pay. The
use of the term is not fatal to a pleading.
Logsdon V. Supreme Lodge of Fraternal
Union of America, 76 Pac. 202, 204, 84 Wash.
The charter of a corporation, which de-
clares that it shall have a first lien on all
stock registered in the names of each mem-
ber for his liabilities to the corporation, and
that the lien shall extend to all dividends,
embraces a demand for damages for breach
of contract by a stockholder receiving the
stock in consideration that the corporation
may purchase at a fixed low price machines
to be made by the stockholder; the word
"liability" meaning responsibility, or the
state of one who is bound in law and Justice
to do something which may be enforced by
action. United Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wins-
ton Cigarette Mach. Co., 104 Fed. 047, 060,
114 C. C. A. 583; United States v. General
Inspection ft Loading Co., 102 Fed. 228 (quot-
ing 5 Words and Phrases, pp. 4111, 4114,
4115).
As used in a policy of Indemnity insur-
ance providing that the policy should only
cover losses sustained by, and liability for, /
any claims against the assured as a result
of the risk specified in the attached contract
or contracts, the word "liability" referred to
a liability other than one strictly in the na-
ture of indemnity, and included liability in-
curred in calling a physician in case of an
emergency. Kelly v. Maryland Casualty Co.,
04 N. W. 880, 800, 80 Minn. 337.
Decedent executed a demand note to de-
fendant, agreeing that the proceeds of cer-
tain policies of life insurance, which he had
deposited with defendant as collateral to se-
cure the note, should be applied to the pay-
ment thereof, and that, if he should come
under any other liability or enter into any
other agreement with defendant while it was
UABHilTT
99
UABILITT
the holder of sach obllgatioii, tben any ezoetB
of eoUaterals abould te applied to aiicli other
note or claim* axid, In case of any exchange
of the ooUaterala, the pzoTlBons of the note
should extend to the new oollaterala. Dece-
dent thereafter executed a new note to de-
fendant's cashier for a debt owing to de-
fendant, which note was, in fact, for defend-
ant's benefit When decedent died, he waa
alao a member of a firm which waa indebted
to defendant for insarance preminma collect-
ed and unpaid. At this time all but $181.50
of the original debt had been paid, for which
amount a renewal note had been given
which was due and unpaid. Held, that the
words "liability," "agreement" and "daim,"
used in the collateral agreement, were sufB-
dent to coyer every concelyable obligation,
and that the surplus due on the policies was
therefore liable^ not only for the balance of
the original debt, but also for the note made
payable to defendant's cashier, and for the
firm's liability for the unpaid premiums.
Norfieet ▼. Pamlico Ins. & Banking Co^ 76 8.
B. 937, 939, 160 N. O. 827.
Bond
A bond is not a 'llaMUty** but is only
the evidence or representation of an indebt-
ednesa City of Los Angeles r. Teed. 44 Pac.
580, 582, 112 Gal. 319.
CkmtiBaiwmt fmtww UaMUty
When we speak of "liabilities," we mean
those obligationa which are contingent, as
well as those which are absolute. Fidelity
& Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Commonwealth
Trust Co^ 119 N. Y. Supp. 598, 599, 65 Mlsa
Rep.8&
^There is a distinction made by the au-
thorities between a contract of Indemnity
against liability for damagesf and a simple
contract of Indemnity against damages.' In
the former case it has very generally been
held that an action may be brought and a
recovery had as soon as the liability is le-
gally imposed, while in the latter there la
no cause of action until there la actual dam-
age." Agreements, in an employer's Ua-
Ullty policy, that If suit la brought against
the assured he shall immediately forward the
process to the Insurer, which will defend or
settle the dalm, do not, when considered with
a provision of the policy dedarlng Its pur*
pose to be indemnity to the assured "against
loss from liability for damages," and another
agreement that no action shall He against
the Insurer in reference to any loss under the
policy unless brought by the insured him-
self to reimburse him for payment by him
in satisfaction of a judgment, render the
policy one of "indemnity against liability,"
but it Is a policy against loss or damage by
reason of liability. Finley v. United States
Casually Co., 88 S. W. 2, 8, 118 Tenn. 692, 8
Ann. Cas. 962 (quoting Fenton v. Fidelity &
Casoalty Co., 56 Pac. 1096, 86 Or. 283, 48 L.
R. A. 770, and dtlng Jones v. Chllds, 8 Nev.
121; Smith v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 18
Wis. 21; Thompson v. Taylor, 30 Wi& 73;
Locke V. Homer, 131 ICass. 93, 41 Am. Rep.
190; TMnlty Church v. Hlgi^ 48 N. Y.
Contract respoasllillity
As used in the statute of limitations
whldi provides that an action on a contract
or "liability," express or implied, which is
not in writing and does not arise out of any
instrument, etc., the term "liability" was ev-
idently Intended to refer to a contractual lia-
bility. Suter V. Wenatchee Water Power Co.,
76 Pac 298, 299, 36 Wash. 1, 102 Am. St
Rep. 881.
The word "aiability," as used in BalUn-
ger^s Ann. Codes ft St Wash. | 4800, subd. 3,
providing a limitation for an "action upon a
contract or liability,' expressed or implied,
whldi is not in writing and does not arise
out of any written instrument," is applicable
only to contracts. The personal 'liability" of
shareholders In a national bank, under Rev.
St U. 8. I 5151, for the contracts, debts, and
engagements of the bank, cannot be regarded
as a contract "liability," for the imrpose of
making applicable the limitation prescribed
by Bellinger's Ann. Codes ft St Wash. 1 4800,
subd. 8, for an "action upon a contract or
liability,' expressed or implied, which is not
in writing, and does not arise out of any
written Instrument" McClalne v. Rankin,
25 Sup. Ct 410, 411, 197 U. 8. 154, 49 L. Ed.
3 Ann. Cas. 500.
The liability of a corporatlen for rent
accruing from August 1, 1902, to June 11th
following, under a lease executed in 1,^99, and
fixing a m<mthly rental, is a liability within
Membership Corporation Law, Laws 1895, p^
335, c 559, I 11, making the directors of a
membership corporation liable for any debt
of the corporation contracted while they are
directors and payable within one year or less
from the date when contracted. Thistle v.
Jones, 107 N. X. Supp. 840, 841, 123 App. Div.
40.
Costs
As between the parties to a pending pro-
ceeding to establish a public drain, unadjudg-
ed costs do not constitute a liability within
Bums' Ann. St 1908, | 248, providing that r^
peal of a statute shall not extinguish any
liability incurred under it; so that as be-
tween such parties repeal of the statute for
the proceeding by Act March 6, 1905 (Acts
1906, p. 456, c. 167), and its consequent dis-
missal, did not affect any vested or contracts
ual right Kunkalman v. Gibson, 84 N. B.
985v 86 N. SL 850, 851, 171 Ind. 503.
€or«Bamt
A covenant of warranty in a deed createa
a liability as of the date of the deed and not
as of the date of an eviction thereunder, and
hence persons who have assumed the liabil-
ities of a national bank on its voluntary liq-
UABILITT
100
LIABIIiITT
uidatlon cannot escape UaMll^ for breadi of
the bank's warranty in a deed because tbe
warranty was not broken when tbe liabili-
ties were assumed. McLean ▼. Moore (Tex.)
145 S. W. 1074, 1076 (citing 6 Words and
Phrases, p. 4112).
DaM
The word 'liability^ Is mnch more com-
prehensive than the term "debt" ; "UabiUty**
meaning the state or condition of one who
is under obligation to do at once or at some
future time something which may be enforc-
ed by action. Hyatt ▼. Anderson's Trustee
(Ky.) 74 S. W. 1004, 1096 (citing White T.
Green, 74 N. W. 929, 105 Iowa. 181).
The proYlsions of Pub. St N. H. a 140,
relative to the execution and record of chat-
tel mortgages, must be fully complied with to
render them valid against any one except the
parties thereto. Under section 6 requiring
the parties to swear that the mortgage is
made for the purpose of securing the debt
spedfled in the condition and for no other
purpose, and section 9 providing that if the
mortgage Is executed to secure the mort-
gagee for a liability other than a debt due
from the mortgagor, the form of the oath
shall be so varied as truly to describe the
"liability" ; if the mortgage is given to se-
cure a debt, the condition and oath must
describe it as a debt; if to secure a liability,
it must be described as such, and a liaUlity
is not covered by the term "debt" Sherman
V. Estey Organ Ck)., 38 AtL 70,- 71, 69 Vt 355.
Franclilse
The relation between a dty and the owii-
er of an existing telephone franchise being
quasi contractual for the performance of a
service, an ordinance modifying the terms of
the franchise for the purpose of securing
more efTective service in competition with the
owner of another franchise ia not invalid as
releasing an "indebtedness" or "liability" to
the municipality in violation of Const f 52.
Louisville Home Tel. Ck). v. Oity of Lonia-
vUle, 113 S. W. 855, 856, 860, 130 Ky. 611.
Judgment
The term 'liability" generally includes
every kind of legal obligation and is used in
Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 17, 80 Stat
550, as amended to 1903 (Act Feb. 5, 1903, c.
487, 32 Stat 798), providing that a discharge
in bankruptcy releases a bankrupt from his
debts, except such as are liabilities for ob-
taining property by false pretenses or repre-
sentations as including every obligation to
pay money whether evidenced by Judgment
or not &nd every unsatisfied Judgment is a
UablUty. Woehrle v. OancUnl, 109 Pac. 888,
889, 158 OaL 107 ; In re United Button Co.,
140 Fed. 495, 505.
Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c 541, 30
Stat 544, as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c
487, 1 17, 32 Stat 800, excepting certain "lia-
bilitieB" from those released by a discharge
in bankroptcy, an excepted liability need not
be reduced to judgment Bevor v. Swecker,
lie N. W. 704, 706^ 188 Iowa, 721.
The diaractex' of the "UabiUty,** as that
word is used in Bankr. Act (Act July 1, 1898.
a 641, 80 Stat 660) f 17, subd. 2, as amended
by Act Feb. 6, 1908, a 487, f 6, 82 Stat 798.
specifying certain debts of a bankrupt not
affected by a discharge^ is not changed by
the fact that the liability has been reduced to
Judgment Peters v. United States, 177 Fed.
885, 887, 101 0. O. A. 99.
The change made in Bankr. Act July 1,
1898, a 541, | 17a (2), 30 Stat 550, which as
originally enacted provided that a discharge
should release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts except such as "are Judgments
in actions • • • f or willful and mali-
cious injuries to the person or property of
another," and which was amended Feb. 5,
1903, c. 487, I 5, 32 Stat 798, by substituting
for the words "Judgments In actions" the
word *aiablUties," did not have the effect of
removing Judgments for such causes from the
excepted class, but of including such liability,
whether judgment has been rendered upon
it or not Thompson v. Judy, 169 Fed. 663,
554, 95 0. 0. A. 51.
As oUlsAtloa
See Obligation.
As all oliligatioas
An order of the federal court directing
its receiver of a railroad to restore to the
railroad its property in his hands on the
agreement of the railroad to assume "all law-
ful liabilities and obligations of* the receiver
existing on a designated date and save the
receiver harmless against the payment of
liabilities incurred by him. Imposes on the
railroad the payment of liabilities incidental
to the receiver's operation of the road, in-
dnding that for injuries to a passenger
through the negligence of the receiver's serv-
ants ; the word ''obligations" meaning dntiee
arising out of a contract or from an action-
able tort and the word 'liabilities" includ-
ing any form of legal obligation measured by
money valuation, whether arising from con-
tract, express or implied, from duty imposed
by law or Judgment of court or in conse-
quence of a tort Yandalia Ry. Go. t. Keys,
91 N. B. 173, 175, 46 Ind. App. 353 (qnottng
6 Words and Phrases, p. 4878).
Ordlnamoe
**UabiUt7," within MUwaukee Charter, c.
4, U 2, 4, requiring the vote on ordinances
creating "liability" against the dty or any
fund thereof to be taken by ayes and noes,
means more than a naked undertaking In
volving no expense, covering a claim or ob-
ligation presented to the council for audit
and allowance against some fund, and hence
the section does not apply to an ordinance
requiring street railway companies to sprin-
kle the part' of streets occupied by their
IJABIIJTT
101 LIABUilTT CREATED BT XjAW
tmckn on tbe dtj farnishing tbe neoeaaary
water. State ez rel. City of BAilwankee t.
MHwankee Electric Ry. ft Light Ck>., 129 N.
W. 623, 029, 144 Wis. 380, 140 Am. 8t Rep.
1025.
TaiB
The word "liabUity" ia of large afgnifl-
cance, bat, as used in the statute limiting the
time for bringing actions founded on con-
tracts or liabilities, express or implied, it re-
fen plainly to liabilitleB of a oontractoal
nature, and not to taxes. Bradford t. Sto-
rey, 75 N. E. 250, 257, 189 Mass. 104.
laalrfUty f •» tort
The word ''liability," in the absence of
anything limiting its acope, include^ obli-
gations arising out of torts as well as out
of contracts. Thus where, on the dissolu-
tion of a firm engaged in the insurance and
brokerage business, the continuing partner
gaTe a bond to the outgoing partner, condi-
tioned to par all *«liabiUtie8" of the firm, it
embraced a claim against the firm for dam-
ages caused by false representations nmde
in a sale by the firm of certain secailtie&
Price ▼. Parker, 83 N. B. 323, 187 Maw. 1,
125 Am. St. Rep. 820.
The limitation of a shipowner's liabili-
ty for maritime torts not the result of his
own fault, provided by Rev. St |f 4288-4286,
was extended to nonmaritime torts by Act
June 20, 1884, 23 Stat 67, c. 121, f 18, Hmit-
ing the tndlvidual liability of a shipowner
for ''any or all debts and liabilities" except
wages and liabilities incurred prtor to such
enactment to his share in the vessel, and
the aggregate liabilities of all the owner of
a vessel on account of the same to the value
of the vessel and freight pending. Richard-
son V. Harmon, 82 Sup. Ot 27, 29, 222 U. &
90, 56 L. Ed. 110.
The exemption of lands, acquired under
the homestead laws, from "liability** for any
debt contracted by the parties does not ex-
empt them from liabilities for torts. Brun v.
Kann, 151 Fed. 145, 166. 80 O. O. A. 513, 12
L. R. A. (N. 6.) 164.
Const art 12, | 7, declares that *^o cor-
poration shall lease or alienate any franchise
so as to relieve the franchise or property
held thereunder from the liabilities of the
lessor or grantor, lessee or grantee, contract-
ed or incurred in the operation, use, or en-
joyment of such franchise or any of its
privileges." Held, that a corporation exer^
dsing the right to occupy and use the streets
and public places for the operation of an
electric light and power plant axul a street
lailwajt under a franchiae granted by the
dty, cannot convey such franchise so as to
relieve the property used in the exercise
thereof from liability for a Judgment ob-
tained for personal injuries to an employ^
in the operation of such property. Coop^ v.
Utah Ught ft R. Co., 102 Pac. 202, 200, 36
Utah. 570, 130 Am. St Rep. 1075.
Temporarily eoMaiforeeable obUgattea
" 'liability,' in a legal sense, is the state
or condition of one who \b under obligation
to do at once, or at some future time, some-
thing which may be enforced by action. It
may exist without the right of immediate
enforcement" Hyatt v. Anderson's Trustee
(Ky.) 74 S. W. 1094, 1090 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in White v. Green, 74 N. W.
929, 105 Iowa, 181, and citing Fisse v. Bln-
steln, 6 Ho. App. 78 ; Home Ina Ca of New
York V. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 52 N. B.
802, 178 lU. 04 ; Pittsburgh & C. R. Co. v.
Clarke, 29 Pa 140; Cochran v. United States,
15 Sup. Ct 028, 157 U. S. 290, 39 U Ed. 704).
uabujtt obsated bt ulw
See also. Legally Liable.
The liability of a stockholder for his
proportion of a corporate debt is a "liability
created by law," as that term is used in the
statute of llmitationa O'Neill v. Quam-
Strom, 92 Pac. 391, 392, 0 CaL App. 409.
An action against a railroad company to
recover for personal injuries alleged to have
been caused by the violation by defendant of
Safety Appliance Act la one "upon a liabil-
ity created by statute" within the meaning
of Ky. St i 2515, Umitlng the time for bring-
ing such actions to five years, and, in ab-
sence of any federal statute of limitations,
is governed by that section where the action
is in that state. Nichols v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry. Co., 195 Fed, 913, 910, 115 C. C. A.
OOL
Though the master's liability for injury
to an employ^ in a mine through negligence
of a fellow servant did not exist prior to
Rev. Codes, | 5248, yet such statute is to be
regarded not as creating a new cause of ac-
tion, but as merely carrying forward the
right of the injured party, and removing a
defense theretofore available in such class of
cases; so that as regards the statute of lim-
itations, the action for personal injuries is
founded on actionable negligence, and not on
a "liability created by statute" within sec-
tion 0449, subd. 1; which phrase has come
to have a fixed application to a class of cas-
es Quite distinct from those elsewhere meu-
tioned or referred to in the chapter on 11m-
itationa Beeler v. Butte & London Copper
Development Co., 110 Pac. 528, 530, 41 Mont
406.
City taxes on omitted property are a
**UabiUt7 imposed by statute," within the
meaning of that term as used in the statute
of limitations, and are barred in five yeara
Mulr's Adm'r v. City of Bardstown, 87 S.
W. 1090, 1100. 120 Ky. 739.
Taxes are a "liability created by stat-
ute," within Ky. St S 2515, limiting an ac-
tion on a liability created by statute. Chat-
terson v. City of Louisville, 140 S. W. 047,
145 Ky. 485.
LIABlIilTY OP CX)UNTY
102
UBEL
Z.IABILITT OF OOITIITT
The state may authorize drainage dds-
trlcts to Incnr indebtedness for which they
alone are liable and to issue evidence of in-
debtedness for which lands within the dis-
tricts are alone liable, and where such bonds
are issued they are not a "liability of the
county," within Const art 12, | 5, prohibit-
ing the loan of credit by any county to any
corporation or association. Lee Wilson &
Go. y. Wm. R. Ck>mpton Bond ft Mortgage
Ck)., 146 S. W. 110, 113, 108 Ark. 462. .
LIBEL
See Criminal LibeL
Malice in libel and slander, see Malice.
See, also. Actionable Per Se; Jactita-
tion; Privileged Communication.
"Libel" is the invasion of the reputation
of private persons. State ex inf. Crow v.
Shepherd, 76 S. W. 79, 02, 177 Mo. 205, 09
Am. St Rep. 624. See, also, Brown v. Pub-
lishers: George Knapp ft Co., 112 S. W. 474,
485, 213 Mo. 655.
A "libel" is a malicious defamation ex-
pressed in printing or writing, or by signs,
pictures, etc., tending to injure the reputa-
tion of another, thereby exposing such per-
son to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
Henry v. Cherry ft Webb, 73 AtL 07, 00, 30
R. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 001, 136 Am. St.
Rep. 028, 18 Ann. Cas. 1006; State v. 0*Ha-
gan, 63 Aa 05, 73 N. J. Law, 200 (quoting
4 Black. Com. 150; Ogders on Libel and
Slander); Horton v. Binghamton Press Co.,
106 N. Y. Supp. 875, 876, 122 App. Div. 332;
Hughes V. New York Evening Post Co., 100
N. Y. Supp. 082, 084, 115 App. Div. 611.
A "libel" is a malicious publication, ex-
pressed either in printing or in writing, or
by signs and pictures, tending either to
blacken the memory of one dead, or the rep-
utation of one who is alive, and expose him
to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule.
Watson V. Detroit Journal Co., 107 N. W. 81,
84, 143 Mich. 430, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 480, 8
Ann. Cas. 131 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion of Chief Justice Parsons in Common-
wealth V. Clap, 4 Mass. 168, 3 Am. Dec. 212);
Vassar College v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co.,
107 Fed. 082, 085.
"A *liber is malicious defamation, ex-
pressed either by writing or printing, or by
signs, pictures, effigies, or the like, tending
to blacken the memory of one who is dead,
or to impeach the honesty or integrity or
reputation, or publish the natural or alleged
defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to
expose him to public hatred, contempt, ridi-
cule, or obloquy, or to cause him to be shun-
ned or avoided, or to injure him in his office,
business, or occupation." Hubbard v. Pur-
man University, 57 S. B. 478, 76 S. C. 510
(quoting and adopting the definition in Smith
V. Bradstreet Co., 41 S. B. 763, 764, 63 8. a
525, 630).
"Ubel." in the criminal law, is "a ma-
licious defamation, ^pressed either in print-
ing or writing, or by signs or pictures, tend-
ing to blacken the memory of one who is
dead, with intent to provoke the living; or
the reputation of one who Is alive and to ex*
pose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridi-
cule.'* State V. Kieman, 41 South. 55, 116
La. 789 (quoting and adopting the definition
in Bouv. Law Diet and Black, Law Diet).
"A 'liber is the malicious defamation of
a person, made public by any printing or
writing which tends to provoke him to wrath
or expose him to public hatred, contempt,
or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits
of public confidence and social Intercourse.
A libel* is a tort, and, generally speaking,
neither the intention with which a tort feas-
or acted, nor the state of his feelings toward
the person injured or mankind at large, les-
sens his responsibility for injuries actually
caused by his wrongful act He must make
recompense, although he was free from mor-
al delinquency. Any false or defamatory
publication which is not privileged gives rise
to a case for damages sustained from it
This is true of libel, notwithstanding the
formula so often reiterated that malice is
the gist of the action. The essential facts
are the falsity of the charge, and its pub-
lication and libelous nature. If true, no de-
gree of malice in the publisher will make it
libel, nor, if false, will rectitude of purpose
exonerate him." Farley v. Evening (^roni-
cle Pub. Co., 87 S. W. 566, 567, 113 Mo. App.
216.
A "libel'' is a malicious publication, ex-
pressed either in printing or writing, or by
signs or pictures, tending either to injure
the memory of one dead or the reputation of
one living, and exposes him to public ridicule
or contempt; the injury to reputation in
the case of one living being the gist of the
action. Cohen v. New York Times CJo., 138
N. Y. Supp. 206, 200, 153 App. Div. 242.
A "libel" is a malicious publication ex-
pressed either in printing or writing or by
signs or pictures, tending to blacken the
memory of the dead, or the reputation of one
who is alive, and expose him to public ha-
tred, contempt, or ridicule. As the falsity
of the publication is essential to render a
publication a libel, which may be defined as
any publication injurious to the reputation
of another, an instruction in an action upon
a libel which, in purporting to define a libel,
failed to mention the element of falsity, is
erroneous. Words written of a person's
trade or business may be libelous when they
might not be so if spoken of the individual
personally, for every publication, written or
printed, which as a necessary or natural con-
sequence will occasion pecuniary loss to a
business man, is a UbeL Dobbin v. Chicago^
XJOBEL
108
LIB£L
R. I. A P. Ry. Co., 188 8. W. 682, 685, 157
Mo. App. 689 idUng 5 Words and Phrases,
p. 4116).
Since, under the statnte, the tmth of an
alleged libelous article may be shown in Jus-
tification, the word "false** must be added to
the definition of libel as any publication in-
jurious to the reputation of another. Julian
V. Kansas City Btar Co., lOT 8. W. 496, 500,
aoe Mo. 86.
"A libel' is anything written or printed
whi<^ from its terms is calculated to injure
the character of another by bringing him
into hatred, contempt, or ridicule, and which
is published without lawful Justification or
excuse.** ''Scandalous matter is not neces-
sary to make a libel. It is enough if the
defendant induces an ill opinion to be had
of the plaintiff or to make him contemptible
and ridiculous.** Cranfill t. Hayden, 80 8.
W. 609, 612, 97 Tex. 544.
"Ubel*' Is that which is written and
published to injure the reputation of another,
by bringing him into ridicule, hatred, or
contempt Petitioners, as members of a
society, published an article charging a
majority of their fellow members with un-
just and stupid attacks and low and vile
insinuations against petitioners, causing
them to resign from a c^ebration committee.
It was also alleged that the "new brave
committee** were inefficient to conduct a con-
templated celebration by reason of illiteracy,
etc., and charged the president with being
"more unreasonable still and childishly
ambitious,** bringing to the society dishonor,
and that petitioners, representing a minority,
did not recognize the celebration of the
majority as a celebration of the society, for
the purpose of safeguarding the dignity of its
members. Held, that such article was de-
famatory, and warranted petitioners' expul-
sion from the society under a by-law author-
izing such expulsion for defamation of the
association. Del Ponte v. Societa Itallana Dl
M. S. Guglielmo Marconi, 60 Atl. 237, 240, 27
B. I. 1, 70 L. R. A 188, 114 Am. St. Rep. 17.
"Any false and malicious writing pub-
lished of another is 'libelous per se' when its
tendency is to render him contemptible or
ridiculous in public estimation, or expose
him to public hatred or contempt, or hinder
virtuous men from associating with him.'*
WUllams V. FuUer, 94 N. W. 118, 119, 68
Neb. 354 (citing Cooley, Torts, 206; World
Pub. Co. r. Mullen, 61 N. W. 108, 43 Neb.
126, 47 Am. St Rep. 737).
Any written words which directly or
Indirectly charge a person with crime, or
which tend to injure his reputation in any
other way, or to expose him to public hatred,
eontempt, or ridicule, if published without
legal excuse or Justification, constitute a
'Oibei,'* and the person ip respect to whom
they are written may see therefor, without
alleging or proving q^edal damages. Bich-
ardson v. Thorpe, 63 Atl. 580, 73 N. H. 532
(citing Giles V. John B. Clarke CSo., 36 Atl.
876, 69 N. H. 92; Palmer v. City of Concord,
48 N. H. 211, 97 Am. Dec 605; Newell,
Slander & Libel [2d Bd] 43-45).
Any publication in writing whi<di holds
one up to ridicule, contempt, hatred, or
obloquy is **libelous»" even though it charge
no criminal offense. Gordon v. New York
Bvening Journal Pub. Co., Ill N. T. Supp.
574, 576, 127 App. Div. 353.
It is not necessary, to constitute a libel,
that the publication charge one with the com-
mission of a crime or with having a conta-
gious disease, but any words which impute to
him conduct or qualities tending to injure
his character, or to degrade him or which
expose him to contempt, ridicule, or public
hatred, are libelous per se. Weeks v. News
Pub. Ca, 88 Aa 162, 164, 117 Md. 126.
A letter, to be libelous, must be defama-
tory, and communicated to bring another
Into contempt, ridicule, or hatred. Dickin-
son V. Hathaway, 48 South. 136, 137, 122 La.
644, 21 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 33.
To make a writing actionable as being
libelous, it must impute something which
tends to disgrace a man, lower him in or ex-
clude him from society, or bring him into
contempt or ridicule. It is not intended by
this that to make a publication libelous it
must contain a direct and open charge. The
publication must be Judged by its general
tenor, and if, taking the terms in their ordi-
nary acceptation, it conveys a degrading
imputation, however indirectly, it is a "libel.**
If the article complained of represents a per-
son as a dishonest or dishonorable man, it
would be a libel. Tqdd v. Every Bvening
Printing Co. (Del.) 66 Aa 97, 99, 6 PennewlW,
233 (citing Rice v. Simmons [Del.] 2 Har.
429, 31 Am. Dec. 766).
A ftalse and malicious printed or written
publication, whi<di imputes conduct or quali-
ties tending to disparage or degrade the
plaintiff, or exposes him to contempt, ridi-
cule, or public hatred, or prejudice his pri-
vate character, or credit, is "libelous per se.**
A publication stating that the vestryman of a
diurch ''relentlessly turned his back on
moral and legal obligations to the detri-
ment of a rector, who had suffered himself
to become debilitated while plodding along
the path of duty to the congregation,** or
that the vestryman had violated a promise
he had made to the members of the church
whereby objections to his election as vestry-
man were prevented, was libelous per se.
Goldborough v. Orem ft Johnson, 64 Atl. 36,
40, 103 Md. 671.
Any language written of another that
tends to degrade him or to bring him into ill
repute or to destroy the confidence of his
neighbors in his integrity, or to cause other
like injury, is libelous per se. Stewart v.
Godrington, 45 South. 809, 812» 55 Fla. 327,
lilBEL
104
UBTL
To constitute a pubUcatloii respeetliig a
person libelous per se, it must reflect on the
character of sudi person by bringing bim into
ridicule, hatred, or contempt, or affect him
injuriously in his trade or profession, and a
statement in a newspaper concerning a
woman that she had hysterics, the same not
containing any imputation upon her as an
indiyidual or in respect to her profession, is
not, though untrue, per se libelous, and can-
not be ground of recovery of damages in the
absence of proof of special damage. Cleve-
land Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 95
N. E. 735, 737, 84 Ohio St. U8, Ann. Cas.
1912B, 978.
A publication is 'libelous per se*' where
it has a tendency to injure a person in his
business or occupation or exposes him to pub-
lic hatred, contempt, ridicule, or disgrace.
Bergstrom v. Ridgway-Thayer Co., 103 N. Y.
Supp. 1093, 1094, 53 Misc. Rep. 95.
A written or printed publication, false,
defamatory, and tending to expose one to
ridicule or contempt, or to render him odi-
ous, or injure him in his business or calling
or in his social standing, is a libel. Register
Newspaper Co. v. Worten, 111 S. W. 693, 697.
A writing is libelous if it subjects the
person referred to to odium or ridicule, or
tends to subject him to obloquy. Kentucky
Journal Pub. Co. v. Brock, 131 S. W. 1, 140
Ky. 373.
The test whether a newspaper article is
*'libelous per se" is whether to the mind of an
intelligent man, the tenor of the artide
and the language used naturally import a
criminal or disgraceful charge. It is libel-
ous per se to chargs a person with but a
single commission of an act, if the act itself
amounts to or imports moral delinquency
or disreputable conduct Church v. Tribune
Ass'n, 119 N. T. Supp. 885, 886, 185 App.
Wv. 30.
An article designed and calculated to
exhibit plaintiff as a shallow, ridiculous,
and contemptible person, dishonest and un-
deserving of confidence, is libelous per se.
Morse v. Times-Republican Printing Co., 100
N. W. 867, 869, 124 Iowa, 707.
A written or printed statement or arti-
cle published of or concerning another, which
is false, and tends to injure his reputation
and thereby expose him to public hatred, con-
tempt, scorn, obloquy, or ^hame, is "libelous
per se." Woolworth v. Star Co., 90 N. Y.
Supp. 147, 148, 97 App. Div. 525 (citing Triggs
V. Sun Printing ft Publishing Co., 71 N. B.
739, 742, 179 N. Y. 1^4, 153, 66 L. R. A.
612, 103 Am. St Rep. 841, 1 Ann. Cas. 326.
To call a white man a negro is a *'libel,"
since it tends to interfere with his social
relation with his fellow white men. Flood
V. News ft Courier Co., 50 S. B. 637, 639,
71 S. C. 112, 4 Ann. Cas. 685.
UULtatoTf dcflaitiims
The California statute (Civ. Code, i 45)
defines "libel" which may be the subject of a
dvil action for damages as a false and un-
privileged publication by writing, printing,
picture, effigy, or other fixed representation
to the eye, which exposes any person to
hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or
which causes him to be shunned or avoided,
or has a tendency to injure him in his oc-
cupation. Under this definition, malice is
not an ingredient of a cause of action for a
civil libel, and a recovery of full and com-
pensatory damages may be had, though ab-
sence of malice is proved. Another provi-
sion (Pen. Code, | 248) defines "libel," the
basis of a criminal prosecution, to consist
of a malicious defamation, expressed either
by writing, printing, signs, pictures, or the
like, tending to blacken the memory of one
who is dead, or to impeach the honesty,
integrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish
the natural or alleged defects of one who
is alive, and thereby expose him to public
hatred, contempt, or ridicule. While mal-
ice is an essential element of the offense
of libel 80 defined, prima fade proof of such
maUce is made by evidence that an injurl*
ous publication conGeming another has been
made without Justifiable motive, whereupon
the law presumes malice sufficient to sup-
port a criminal charge, as provided by sec-
tion 250. Davis v. Hearst, 116 Pac. 530, 5S1,
160 Cal. 143.
The Idaho statute (Rev. 8t 1887, | 6737)
defines "libel" as a malicious defamation,
expressed either by writing, printing, or by
signs or pictures, or the like, tending to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or
to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation, or publish the natural or alleged
defects, of one who Ib alive, and thereby to
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule. It is sufficient that the defamation
tends to impeach the honesty, integrity, vir-
tue, or reputation, and thereby to expose sudi
person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.
To constitute libel, it is not necessary that
the alleged libelous matter charge the person
named with a crime. State v. Sheridan, 93
Pac. 656, 657, 14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 497.
Under the Colorado Statute (Mills' Ann.
St I 1313), defining "Ubel" as a malicious
defamation expressed either by printing, or
by signs, or pictures, or the like, tiding to
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or
to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation, or publish the natural defects of
one who is alive, and thereby to expose him
or her to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule^
a publication to be libelous must be maU-
cious. Rocky Mountain News Printing Oo.
V. Frldbom, 104 Pac. 956, 958, 46 Colo. 440,
24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 891.
The Georgia Statute defines "Ubel" as a
false and malidous defamati<m of anot^ar,
UBELi
IW
jfimcfM
repressed in print or writing, or piotarea. or
fii^ns, tending to injure the repntatioa of an
individnal and exposing him to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule. To falsely publiah of
another that there are criminal cases pending
against him is libelous per se. Witham ▼.
Atlanta Journal, 53 S. E. 106, 107, 124 Ga.
688, 4 L. R. A- (N. S.) 977.
Gr. Ctode, f 177 (Huid's Ber. St 1909, c
38), defines libel as a malicious defiimation,
expressed either by printing or by signs or
pictures, tending to impeach the honesty, in-
tegrity, virtue, or reputation, or publish the
natural defects of one who is alive and there-
by expose him to public hatred, contempt,
ridicule, or financial injury. A newspaper
article published by accused charging pros-
ecutor with improper and dishonest actions
as state's attorney, and with having prosti-
tuted his office for private interests and po*
litical purposes, and that he was in collusion
with violators of the liquor law, that he was
actuated by improper motives with reference
to an alleged bridge trust, and that there
was no doubt but that such trust had "prov-
en a fat goose to some one," that there was
also good ground to suspect something dis-
honest and crocked in the matter, and that
it was not prosecutor's purpose to enforce
the law, was libelous per se. Beople v.
Strauch, 98 N. & 126, 130, 247 IlL 220.
At common law any publication is a "li-
bel*' which degrades and injures another
person, or brings him into contempt, hatred,
or ridicule, or which accuses him of a crime,
punishable by law, or of an act odious and
disgraceful in society. It is defined by the
Penal Code of Indiana to be a malicious
publication of any false charge of and con*
eeming another, accusing such other of any
degrading or infamous act Cronin v. Zim-
merman» 88 N. E. 718, 719, 44 Ind. App. 118;
Id., 90 N. E. 339. 45 Ind. App. 712.
The Iowa statute (Oode, | 5086), defines
libel as the malicious defamation of a person,
made public by any printing, etc., tending to
provoke hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to
deprive him of the benefit of public confi-
dence and social intercourse. In a criminal
prosecution for libel, the information alleged
that defendant charged the prosecutor with
scheming to disbar certain attorneys, because
they acted as attorneys for a temperance or-
ganization, and that he was guilty of grossly
unprofessional conduct by testifying as a
witness while acting as prosecutor in the
disbarment cases, and that the prosecution
was an attempt to cover the record of prose-
cutor as county attorney for unprofessional
conduct before the grand Jury, and that he
attempted to falsify the court record in the
disbarment proceedings, and suppressed cer-
tain affidavits in the investigation, which
charges defendant pubUsbed in a temperance
paper edited by him. Held, that the publica-
tion charged was libelous per se, and it was
erroir to leave to the jury the (luestion wheth-
me it was libti.ou8, as there was no ambiguity
in the language. State v. Cooper, 116 N. W.
691, 692, 188 Iowa, 516.
The Kansas stetute (section 2271, Gen.
St 1901) defines a "libel" as a malicious def-
amation of a person made public by any
printing, writing, sign, picture, represente-
tion, or efflgy, tending to provoke him to
wrath or expose him to public hatred, con-
tempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of tiie
benefite of public confidence and social inter-
course, or any malicious defamation made
public as aforesaid, designed to blacken and
vilify the memoir of one who is dead, and
tending to scandalize or provoke his surviv-
ing relatives and friends. To say of a man
that he is a eunuch is actionable per se. Eck-
ert V. Van Pelt, 76 Pac. 909, 910, 69 Kan.
357, 66 L. B. A. 266.
It is libelous per se to write of a clergy-
man, an applicant for a pulpit, *'I would not
have anything to do with him or touch him
with a ten-foot pole," if the words would ex-
pose the person written of to hatred or con-
tempt, or injury to his business or occupation
within the definition of "Ubel" in the Minne-
sote statute (Rev. Laws 1906„ | 4916). Dole
V. Millspaugh, 126 N. W. 626, 111 Minn. 159,
28 L. B. A. (N. S.) 152, 137 Am. St Rep. 546,
20 Ann. Out. 717.
The Missouri stetute (Rev. St 1899, S
2259) defining libel as a malicious defamation
of a person made public by any printing,
writing, sign, picture, etc., tending to provoke
him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred,
contempt, and ridicule, etc., and section 2260
making the circulation of a libel a misde-
meanor, made all classes of libels misdemean-
ors and actionable per se, but did not make
publications libelous that were not so at com-
mon law. Kenworthy v. Journal Ck)., 93 S.
W. 882, 885, 117 Mo. App. 327. Under the
stetute of this state (Rev. St 1899, f§ 2260,
2863; Ann. St 1906, pp. 1426, 1637), declar-
ing that one publishing a libel shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor, and providing that it is
actionable to publish falsely that any person
has been guilty of adultery, it is libel to al-
lege in a circular printed and published that
one has committed adultery. Stete v. Sant-
huflr, 110 S. W. 624, 626, 131 Mo. App. 620.
The stetute of this stete (Rev. St 1909, |
4818) defining a libel as the maUdous def-
amation of a person by printing so as to
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, though a part of the Criminal Ck)de,
is applicable to dvil actions, and, under it a
newspaper article steting that plaintiff was
served with a summons in an alleged fraudu-
lent cattie transaction, and that he had tok-
en advantege of the banKruptcy law to es-
cape liability, is libelous per se. Sotham v.
Drovers' Telegram CO., 144 8. W. 428, 431,
239 Mo. 606. Under this stetute the publica-
tion, without consent, of the picture of a
XilBBL
in
dklld five years old, with the false statement
that "Papa Is going to buy mamTna an Blgtai
watch for a present, and some one (I must
not tell who) Is going to buy my big sister a
diamond ring, so don't yon think you ought
to buy me something?" as an advertisement
In aid to business, Is libelous, as exposing
the child to ridicule. Munden y. Harris, 134
S. W. 1076, 1081, 153 Mo. App. G52.
Under the Montana statute defining '^li-
b^" as a false and unprivileged publication
in writing, printing, picture, efllgy, or other
fixed r^reeentation to the eye whldti exposes
any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule^ or
obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or
avoided, or which has a tendency to injure
him In his occupation, the existence of malice
is not a necessary ingredient to entitle plain-
tUf to recover. Paxton v. Woodward, 78 Pac
215, 217, 31 Mont 195, 107 Am. St Bep. 416,
3 Ann. Gas. 546.
The Penal Law of New Tork (OonsoL
Laws, a 40) I 1346, provides that an indict-
ment for a libel contained in a newspaper
published in the state against a resident
thereof may be found In the county where
the paper was published or In the county
where the person libeled resided when the
offense was committed, and section 1847 pro-
vides that in libel against a nonresident the
indictment shall be found and the trial had
at the place where the paper containing the
libel purports on its face to be published, or,
if no county Is Indicated thereon, in any
county where the paper Is circulated. Code
Cr. Proc. 1 138, contained substantially simi-
lar provisions relating to the place of Indict-
ment and trial where the person libeled is a
resident and nonresident Penal Law, |
1340, defines libel as a malicious publication
by writing, printing, etc., which exposes any
living person to contempt, etc. Held, that
the purpose of sections 1346 and 1347 was to
designate the place of Indictment and trial,
and not to define libel; and hence do not
limit the operation of section 1340 by exclud-
ing books or writings other than newspapers,
and, under the latter section, as well as at
common law, one could be prosecuted for a
libel published in a book in this state, though
committed against a nonresident People v.
Fomaro, 119 N. Y. Supp. 746, 748, 65 Misc.
Rep. 457.
The North Dakota statute (Rev. Codes
1899, § 2715) defines "Ubel" as "a false and
unprivileged publication by writing, printing,
picture, effigy, or other fixed representation
to the eye, which exposes any person to ha-
tred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which
causes him to be shunned or avoided, or
which has a tendency to Injure him in his
occupation." If the language of an alleged
libel is fairly susceptible of a construction
which renders it defamatory, the complaint
states a cause of action. It is not necessary
to render the words defamatory and action-
able that they shall make the diarge in di-
rect terms. Lauder v. Jones, 101 N. W.
907, 9U, 18 N. D. 625.
The statute (Rev. Codes 1905, | 8877) de-
fines "criminal Ubel" as "the maUdous def-
amation of a person made public by any prints
Ing, writing, sign, picture, r^utation or effigy
tending to expose him to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the
benefits of public confidence or social inters
course. • « •»» And the f oUowlng sectl<m
provides that: "Every person who makes or
composes, dictates or procures the same to
be done or who willfully publishes or circu-
lates such libel or in any way knowingly or
willfully aids or assists in making, publish-
ing or circulating the same is guilty of a
felony." The gist of the crime Is the mali-
cious defamaticm of a person made public in
one or more of the modes prescribed and
tending to expose such person to public ha-
tred, contempt, or ridicule, etc State v. Td-
ley, 186 N. W. 784, 786, 23 N. D. 284.
It is not necessary, In order to render a
publication libelous, that it should charge
any crime or public offense, inasmuch as the
South Dakota statute (Giv. Code, | 29) defines
"libel" as a false and unprivileged publica-
tion, by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or
other fixed representation to the eye, which
exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridi-
cule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be
shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency
to injure him In his occupation. Barron v.
Smith, 101 N. W. 1106, 1106, 19 S. D. 50;
Nichols V. Smith, 102 N. W. 1135, 19 S. D.
159.
The Texas statute (Acts 1901, p. 30, c.
26) defining a "libel" as a defamation tending
to blacken the memory of the dead or to in-
jure the living, or expose him to public ha-
tred, contempt, ridicule, or financial injury,
or to Impeach his honesty and Integrity, etc.
Includes any case which, in the absence of
statute, was libelous at common law, and
a publication directly Impeaching one's in-
tegrity and truthfulness is libelous per se.
Fleming v. Mattlnson, 114 S. W. 650, 652, 52
Tex. Civ. App. 476. In view of this statute,
words libelous per se and from the publica-
tion of which damages are implied as a mat-
ter of law are such words as tend to expose
one to public hatred or disgrace or vilify him
or injure his character. Allen v. Blarnest
(Tex.) 145 S. W. 1101, 1103.
Under Pen. Code, art 721, declaring that
he iB guilty of "Ubel" who, with intent to
injure, makes, publishes, or circulates any
malicious statement affecting the reputation
of another as to any matter or thing pointed
out in the chapter, and article 727 declaring
that the written, printed, or published state-
ment, to come within the definition of "libel,"
must convey the idea that the pers<Hi to
whom it refers has been guilty of some penal
offense, eta, it was held that an indictment
LIBSi;
107
LIBSL
for Ubel, alleging that defendant published
a malicious statement concerning complain-
ant, reciting that he was a United States fed-
eral gaard, that he was a highwayman and
cowardly assassin, and the murderer of a cer-
tain person who on the morning of March 19,
1906, was cowardly assassinated on a public
highway, etc, sufficiently charged complain-
ant with a penal offense, and was therefore
sufficient. Gonzalez v. State, 124 S. W. 937,
938, 58 Tex. Or. B. 141.
The Texas statute (Rev. dr. St 1911,
art. 5595), defining a libel as a defamation
expressed In printing or writing tending to
Injnre the repotation of a person and expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule,
or to Impeadi his honesty, Int^g^ty, or yir-
toe, modifies the common-law rule as to
libel and slander, and a publication is libelous
whether it is libelous per se or not; it being
sufficient if it can be shown by innuendo that
the matter imputed had the tendency de-
scribed in the statute and had reference to
tbe plaintiff. Guisti r. Galveston Tribune,
150 S. W. 874, 876, 105 Tex. 497.
A "Oibel," as defined by the Washington
statute, is the defamation of a person made
public by any words, printing, writing, sign,
picture, representation, or effigy tending to
provoke him to wrath, or expose him to pub-
lic hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to de-
prive him of the benefits of public confidence
and social intercourse, or any defamation,
made public as aforesaid, designed to
blacken and vilify the memory of one who
is dead, and tending to scandalise or provoke
his surviving relatives or frienda Reynolds
V. HoUand, 90 Pac. 648, 650, 46 Wash. 537;
Chambers v. Leiser, 86 Paa 627, 628, 43
Wash. 285, 10 Ann. Cas. 270; State v. Mays,
107 Pac. 368, 866, 57 Wash. 640. And where
a newspaper published an article stating
that plaintiffs father had been charged with
using the mails to defraud in selling land,
and would be arrested, giving the details of
the fraudulent operations, and published a
photograph of the members of his family,
including plaintiff, his young daughter, the
publication of plaintiff's photograph in con-
nection with the article concerning her fa-
ther was not a "libel," within this statute.
miiman v. Star Pub. Co., 117 Pac. 594, 596,
64 Wash. 691, 35 L. R. A (N. S.) 595. As
tUs statute does not expressly make malice
an ingredient of libel, a publication which
tends to expose a person to public hatred,
contempt, or ridicule is libelous, without re-
gard to the existence of actual malice.
Byrne v. Funk, 80 Pac. 772, 774, 88 Wash.
606^ 8 Ann. Gas. 647. And so, where there
has been an unwarranted publication in a
newspaper of a list of conditional sales made
by a retail dealer taken from memoranda
legally filed by him with the county auditor,
the dealer to charge a criminal libel under
Rem. & BaL Gode, | 2424, defining libel as a
malicious publication exposing any person
to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or injuring
him in his business, must allege facts to
show that the publication produced such re-
sults. State V. Darwin, 115 Pac. 309, 311,
63 Wash. 803, 33 L. R. A (N. SO 1026.
IaJ«rj to bwsimass or trade
To be libelous, as tending to injure one
in his business or profession, the words must
have a direct tendency to hurt, as in the case
of a charge of incapacity, dishonesty or in-
solvency. T^ publish concerning a lawyer
that he was thrown into Jail by a magistrate
without a chance to tell his side of the
case on the complaint of a woman for whom
he had collected a debt, and from which
amount of money collected he had deducted
only the legal percentage for collection, was
not "libelous," since tbe only fair import
was that the lawyer was wrongfully thrown
into Jail which could not refieet upon his
previous conduct, capacity, or character and
did not tend to injure him in his profession.
Hughes V. New York Evening Post, 100 N. Y.
Supp. 982, 984, 115 App. Div. 611.
Any written words are ''libelous" which
in any manner are prejudicial to another
in the way of his employment or trade. In
a publication referring to plaintiff twice as
a detective, and stating that, when plaintiff
was attacked by robbcl^s, he showed great
cowardice and attempted to hide under the
seat of the vehicle, the tendency of the
words was to hold him up to scorn as a
detective^ and was "libelous." Holland v.
FUck, 61 AU. 828, 829, 212 Pa. 201.
Ckmstmettoaa of laMCwage
The fact that an alleged libelous article
uses a slang word upon which its libelous
character depends does not render the ar-
ticle any the less libelous, provided the word
used has a well-recognised meaning, or by
the article itself is given a meaning which
conveys to the reader the understanding that
the word is used so as to impeach the hon-
esty or reputation of the person named and
expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule. State v. Sheridan, 93 Pac. 656, 657,
14 Idaho, 222, 15 L. R. A (N. S.) 497.
In a published statement, referring to
plaintiff, a candidate for public office, that
"no man in the community has any interest
in seeing the county disgraced by sending
a 'social lej;^ to qpeak and act f6r her in
public councils," the term "social leper" may
mean that his moral traits of character are
such as to require his banishment from so-
ciety, and, if there Is an inducement and
innuendo, which, fairly interpreted, would
give this meaning, may be "libelous."
Sweeney v. Baker, IB W. Va. 158, 198, 81
Am. Rep. 757.
Defendant wrote and published a letter
to tbe mayor of New York, stating that de-
fendant had written a letter to the Qovemoc
UBBL
108
XJB1SL
to get redress "Yor the sconndrelism" herein-
after mentioned throngh the power of re-
moval of city officials, but on second thought
concluded to seek redress from the mayor.
He then proceeded to make complaint against
plaintiff as police commissioner for alleged
Incompetency and lawlessness in the admin-
istration of the police force of New York;
the scoundrelism referred to being plaintiff's
refusal as police commissioner to remove the
photograph and record of a certain boy from
the Rogues' Gallery; plaintiff being the only
one defendant was complaining of, and his
removal from office being the only redress
sought Held, that the word "scoundrelism"
referred to plaintiff with sufficient certainty,
and was libelous per se. Bingham v. Gaynor,
126 N. Y. Supp. 363, 360, 141 App. DIt. 301.
Imputation of orimo
Whai a newspaper published a news
article stating that, within 15 minutes after
the discovery of the body of plaintiff's wife,
plaintiff had a quarrel with the undertaker,
who had been called by her sister, and
threatened to kill the undertaker unless he'
left the house, since the publication repre-
sented, in effect, that plaintiff threatened
to kill another in a passion, without Just
cause, it would necessarily bring him into
contempt and hatred so as to make the pub-
lication actionable llbeL Gordon v. New
York Evening Journal Pub. Co., Ill N. Y.
Supp. 574, 575, 127 App. Div. 353.
Imputation of deatb
It is libelous per se to publish of a living
person that he is dead, because, exposing
him to ridicule; a libel being a malicious
publication tending to expose one to public
hatred, contempt, or ridicule. Cohen v. New
York Times Co., 132 N. Y. Supp. 1, 74 Misc.
Rep. 618.
MaUoe
A publication tending to expose one to
contempt, ridicule, hatred, and derogation of
character, if malicious, is "libelous." Mul-
derig V. Wilkes-Barre Times, 64 Atl. 636,
637, 215 Pa. 470, 114 Am. St Rep. 967.
As misdemeanor
See Misdemeanor.
As personal injnry
See Personal Injury.
Slander distingnislied
Included in slander by writing or speak-
ing, see Slander by Writing or Speak-
ing.
A "libel" differs from a "slander" in
that a publication may be libelous when, if
spoken orally, it would . not be slanderous.
This distinction is said by the books to be
based upon the grounds that a vocal utter-
ance does not import the same quality of
deliberation, and Is more prone to be the
ebullition of mere effervescence or lack of
mental equipoise, and to be accepted as in-
dicative of feeling, rather than of conTictloii,
and therefore not so much gravity is al-
lowed to it as to words deliberately written
down and published; the latter justifying
the inference that they are the expression of
settled conviction and affect the public mind
correspondingly. So, too, an oral charge
merely falls upon the ear, and the agency
of the wrongdoer in inflicting injury comes
to an end when his utterance has died on
the ear, but not so with the written or
printed charge, which may pass from hand
to hand ludefinitely, and may renew its
youth, so to speak, as a defamation as long
as the libel itself remains in existence, and
hatch a new crop of slanders, to be blown
hither and yon like thistledown at every
sight of the libel, so that a printed slander,
when published, takes a wider and more
mischievous range than mere oral defama-
tion, and is more reprehensible in the eye of
the law. Cooley, Torts (2d Ed.) 240; Odgers,
L. & Sland. (2d Ed.) 3; Dexter v. Spear,
7 Fed. Cas. 624, 4 Mason, 115. Thus^ for
instance, to publish of a man that he is a
"skunk" (Massuere v. Dickens, 35 N. W. 349,
70 Wis. 83), a "swine" (Solverson v. Peter-
son, 25 N. W. 14, 64 Wis. 198, 54 Am. Rep.
607), a "drunkard," a "cuckold," a -tory"
(Giles V. State, 6 Ga. 276), "I look on him
as a rascal" (Williams v. Karnes, 4 Humph.
[28 Tenn.] 9), "an imp of the devil and a
cowardly snail" (Price ▼. Whitely, 50 Mo.
439), or that he has been "in collusion with
ruffians" (Snyder v. Fulton, 84 Md. 128, 6
Am. Rep. 314), are each and all libelous.
Ukman v. Dally Record Co., 88 S. W. 60, 64,
189 Mo. 378 (citing Nelson v. Musgrave, 10
Mo. 648; Hermann v. Bradstreet Co., 19 Mo.
App. 227; Manget v. O'Neill, 51 Mo. App. 35).
"Libel" is a published writing, picture,
or similar production of such a nature as
to immediately tend to do mischief to a
party, or injure the character of an in-
dividual. Slander of title is a false and
malicious statement, whether by word of
mouth or in writing, In reference to a person's
title to som^ right or property belonging to
him, as where a person alleges that the
plaintiff has a defective title to land. A
written slander of title Is sometimes called
a libel in the nature of slander of title.
Words, though not slanderous in themselves,
yet if published in writing, tending in any
way to the discredit of a man, are "libel."
Macurda v. Globe Newspaper Co., 165 Fed.
104, 107 (citing Bacon's Abridgement and
Rapalje).
Written or printed matter which Is com-
municated to third persons stands on a dif-
ferent footing from spoken words, and is often
actionable when it wduld not be if spoken,
and if it is of a character conducive to
blacken the reputation of the person referred
to, or excite ridicule or wrath against him,
or destroy public confidence in him, H U
jTtm^f
IM
UBSBTT
actionable without proof of special damagea,
because written or printed Injuriona state-
ments about a person imply a deliberate pur-
pose to do harm, whereas detrimental wcwds
are often spoken thoughtlessly or in a pas-
sion. Wei^t is allowed, also^ to the more
enduring character and wider vogue of pub-
lished statements. Farley ▼. Eyening Chron-
icle Pub. Ck).. 87 a W. 665, 008, 113 Mo.
App. 216 (citing Odgen^ U * Sland. [4th
Ed.] p. 4).
As trespass
See Trespass.
LIBERAL
LTBEBAIi OOHSTKirOTXOir
Strict construction distinguidied» see
Strict Construction.
UBEBAIiITT
See Salvage.
LIBERTIES
See Indecent UbertiflSi
LIBERTY
See Abuse of liberty; Oivll Uberty;
Constitutional Uberty; IndiTidnal lib-
erty; life, liberty, and Property;
life, liberty, and Pursuit of Happi-
ness; Personal liberty; Restrained
and Deprived of liberty.
Bestrained of liberty, see Bestrain.
The term "Uberty" includes the Individu-
al righta of dtisenship and its privileges.
State ex reL Ouion r. llUes, 100 S. W. 695,
610, 210 Mo. 127.
One definition of 'liberties" is privUeges
or licenses taken in violation of the laws or
propriety. Dekelt v. People, 09 Pac. 880, 881,
44 Colo. 525 (adopting definition in Webst
Wet).
"liberty," in its broad sense, means the
right, not only of freedom from servitude,
imprisonment, or restraint, but the right of
one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to
live and work where he will, to earn his live-
lihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue
any lawful trade or avocation. Wyatt v.
James McCreery Co., Ill N. T. 8. 86, 88, 126
App. Div. 660 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in Fisher Co. v. Woods, 70 N. B. 886, 187
N. Y. 90, 12 Ii. R. A. [N. 8.] 707) ; Health De-
partment of CSty of New York v. Rector, etc.,
of Trinity Church, 89 N. B. 888, 145 N. Y.
32, 27 L. R. A. 710, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579;
People V. Ginson, 17 N. B. 348, 109 N. Y.
889, 4 Am. Bt Rep. 466; Colon v. lisk, 47
N. EL 802, 153 N. Y. 188, 69 Am. St Rep. 609;
Lawton V. Steele, 14 Sup. Ct. 489, 162 U. &,
133, 38 L. Ed. 885; People ex rel. Tyn^r v.
Warden of City Prison, 51 N. Bw 1006, 167
N. Y. 116, 48 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St Rep.
768; Stoart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 188, 80 Am.
Rep. 289; Oilman v. Tucker, 28 N. B. 1040,
128 N. Y. 190, 200, 18 L. R. A. 804, 26 Am. St
Rep. 464; Frank L. Flaher Co. v. Woods, 79
N. B. 837, 187 N. Y. 90. 12 L. R. A. (N. S.)
707.
"Liberty," in its broad sense, means the
right not only of freedom from actual re-
straint of the person but the right of such
use of his faculties in all lawful ways to
live and work where he will, to earn his live-
lihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue
any lawful trade or avocation. All laws,
therefore, which impair or trammel those
rights or restrict his freedom of action or his
choice of methods In the transaction of his
lawful business are infringement upon his
fundamental right of "liberty" and are void.
People V. Lochner, 69 N. B. 878, 386, 177 N.
Y. 145, 101 Am. St Rep. 773.
The "liberty*' guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment of the federal Constitu-
tion against derivation without due process
of law Is a liberty of natural, not artificial,
persona Western Turf Ass*n v. Greenberg,
27 Sup. Ct 884, 886^ 204 U. S. 359, 61 L. Bd.
520.
"liberty" includes not only the right to
be out of prison, free to come and go, If the
law is not violated in so doing, but to en-
gage in all lawful pursuits, earn a livelihood,
and own and enjoy property. To exclude
from entry into the United States, or to de-
port therefrom, a citizen of the United States
deprives him of liberty in the constitutional
sense. In re Sing Tuck, 126 Fed. 886, 894.
Const U. S. Amend. 14, and Const. R. I.
art 1, i 10, providing that no person shall be
derived of "liberty" without due process of
law, were borrowed from the thirty-ninth ar-
ticle of the Great Charter, declaring that no
free man shall be taken or Imprisoned, or
disseised, or outlawed or punished or in any
ways destroyed, nor "will we pass upon him,
or send upon him, unless by legal judgment
of his peers, or by the law of the land"; the
words corresponding to "liberty" in the first
pronouncement being- **taken,** "Imprisoned,"
"outlawed," and "punished," which are not
confined to mere freedom from incarceration
or imprisonment Henry v. Cherry St Webb,
73 Att. 97, 107, 80 R. I. 13, 24 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 991, 186 Am. St Rep. 928, 18 Ann. Cas.
1006.
The word "liberty," as used in Const,
art 2, providing that no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property except by
due process of law, means not only the right
to freedom from actual servitude, imprison-
ment, or restraint, but the right of one to use
his faculties in all lawful ways, to live and
work where he will, to earn his livelihood
in any lawful calling, and to puvsoe any law-
ful trade or vocation. State ex rel. Oalle v.
City of New Orleans, 86 South. ^999, 1001, 113
La. ^71, 67 L. R. A. 70, 2 Ann. Cas. 92 (dt-
LIBERTY
110
LIBSRTT
lug In re Jacobs, 08 N. T. 98, 50 Am. B^.
"By the term 'liberty/ as used In the pro-
vision [Fourteenth Amendment], something
more is meant than mere freedom from phys-
ical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose,
and to act in such manner, not inconsistent
with the equal rights of others, as his judg-
ment may dictate for the promotion of his
happiness; that is, to pursue such callings
and avocations as may be most suitable to
develop his capacities, and give to them their
highest enjoyment." Powell v. Pennsylvania,
8 Sup. Ot 992, 1269, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. Ed.
263 (Field, J., dissenting).
"The Uberty of which the fburteenth
amendment forbids a state from depriving
any one without due prooess of law is some-
thing more than freedom from the enslave-
ment of the body or from physical restraint
In my judgment the words 'life, liberty or
property* in the fourteenth amendment should
be interpreted as embracing every right that
may be brous^t within judicial cognizance,
and therefore no right of that kind can be
taken in violation of 'due process of law.'"
Taylor v. Beckham, 20 Sup. Ct 890, 1016, 178
U. S. 548, 44 Ii. Bd. 1187 (Harlan, X, dissent-
ing).
"The term 'liberty,' as protected by the
Constitution, is not cramped into a mere
freedom from physical restraint of the per-
son of the citizen, as by incarceration, but it
is deemed to embrace the right of man to be
free in the enjoyment of the faculties with
which he has been endowed by his Creator,
subject only to such restraints as are neces-
sary for the common welfare." MacMullen
7, City of Middletown, 98 N. Y. Supp. 146,
149, 112 App. Dlv. 81 (quoting Rapallo, J., in
Pe<^le V. Marx, 2 N. B. 29, 99 N. Y. 877, 52
Am. Rep. 84).
"'liberty,' in the sense in which the
term is employed in the Constitution, is not
restricted to mere freedom from imprison-
ment, but it embraces the right of a person
to use his God-given powers, employ his fac-
ulties, exercise his judgment in the affairs
of life, and to be free in the enjoyment and
disposal of his acquisitions, subject only to
such restraints as are imposed by the law of
the land for the public welfare. The word
'liberty,' as thus c^mployed in the Constitu-
tions and understood in the United States, is
a term of comprehensive scope. It embraces
not only freedom from servitude and from
imprisonment and arbitrary restraint of per-
son, but also all our religious, civil, political,
and personal rights, including the right in
each subject to purchase, hold, and sell or
dispose of iHToperty in the same way that his
neighbor may; and of such liberties no one
can be deprived except by due process of
law." Block T. Schwartz, 76 Pac 22, 26» 27
Utah» 887, 66 L. R. A. 308, 101 Am. St.Bep.
971, 1 Ann. Cas. 660.
The word "liberty," as used in the con-
stitutional guaranty against deprivation of
liberty, means the right, not only to freedom
from actual servitude, imprisonment, or re-
straint, but the right of one to use his fac-
ulties in all lawful ways, to live and work
where he will, to earn his livelihood In any
lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful
trade or vocation. City of New Orleans v.
Smythe, 41 South, 33, 36» U6 La. 686, 6 K
R. A. (N. S.) 722, 144 Am. St Rep. 666 (cit-
ing In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 60 Am. Rep.
636; People v. Marx, 2 N. E. 29, 62 Am.
Rep. 34, 99 N. Y. 386; Bx parte Virginia,
100 U. 8. 339^ 26 L. Bd. 676),
By the term "liberty," as used in the
fourteenth amendment to the federal 0>nsti-
tutlon, something more is meant than mere
freedom from physical restraint or the
bounds of a prison. It means freedom to
go where one may choose, and 1^ act in such
manner, not inconsistent with the egual
rights of others, as his judgment may dictate
for the promotion of his happiness; that is,
to pursue such callings and avocations as
may be most suitable to develop his capac^
itles and give to them their highest enjoy-
ment Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell,
172 Fed. 646, 666 (dting Munn T. XUinois, 94
U. S. 118, 24 L. Ed. 77).
The "liberty" mentioned in the four-
teenth amendment of the Ck)nstitution of the
United States means not only the right of
the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by Incaroeration,
but the term is deemed to embrace the right
of the citizen to be free in the employment
of all his faculties; to be free to use them in
all lawful ways; to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling. It is a part of every man's civil
right that he be left at liberty to refuse
business relations with any person whomso-
ever, whether the refusal rests upon reason,
or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice,
or malice. Bx parte Drayton, 163 Fed. 986,
989 (quoting and adopting definition in AU-
geyer v. State of Louisiana, 17 Sup. Ct 431,
165 U. S. 589, 41 L. Ed. 832; Cooley, Torts,
p. 278).
"The term 'liberty,' as used in the Con-
stitution, is not dwarfed into mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, as by Incarceration* but is deemed
to embrace the right of man to be free in
the enjoyment of the faculties with which he
has be^i endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraints as are necessary for
the common welfare." It Is not every equal
law which is a just law, but, within limits, it
may be said that equality Is an attribute of
liberty. McKlnster v. Sager, 72 N. B. 864,
867, 163 Ind. 671, 68 I/. R. A. 273, 106 Am.
St Rep. 268 (quoting and adopting definition
LXBBBTT
HI
XJBlSaTT
In People r. Gttlson, 17 N. B. Ml, M5, 109 N.
Y. 389, 898» 4 Am. 8t Rep. 485).
The state may decline to confer official
power on residents of otlier states without
depriving sncfa nonresidents of ^'liberty*' or
"^property,** within the meaning of those
words as used In the Oonstltntlon. "liber-
ty,'* as the term is nsed In the constltational
proTlsion, includes freedom from serrltude
and nnlawfol restraint, the right to pursue
any ordinary calling, trade, or employment,
and acQulre property thereby, but does not
Include any supposed right of a nonresident
to receive an appointment to a position cre-
ated by the general laws of the state for the
purpose of carrying into tf ect legislation af-
fecting the state and its people. No nonres-
ident enjoys the right of "Uberty" or prop-
erty in tbe fees or emoluments of the office
of the executor or administrator. In re Mul-
ford, 75 N. B. 846, 846, 217 111. 242, 1 L. R. A.
(N. 8.) 841, 106 AnL 8t Rep. 249, 8 Ann. Oas.
960.
Bickt to iMmtrmet
Freedom to contract is "Uberty," within
Const, art 1, | 5, and Const U. S. Amend 14,
f 1. Sturgess y. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
(S. C.) 00 8. B. 1135, 1141.
The privilege of contracting i» both a
"liberty" and a property right, and is pro-
tected by the Constitution. People v. Steele,
83 N. B. 236, 237, 231 IlL 840, 14 I4. R. A.
(N. 8.) 861, 121 Am. St Rep. 821.
"It has been held that the word liberty,'
as used in the Constitution, was not to be
confined to the mere liberty of person, but
included, among others, a right to enter into
certain classes of contracts for the purpose
of enabling the citizen to carry on its busi-
ness." Addyston Pipe ft Steel Co. v. United
States, 20 Sup. Ct 96, 102, 175 U. S. 211, 44
L.Bd.186.
''Congress may restrain individuals from
making contracts under certain circumstanc-
es and upon certain subjects." United States
V. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 10 Sup. Ot 25, 88, 171
U. 8. 505, 43 L. Bd. 259.
'The word liberty,' as used in the con-
stitutional declarations, means more than
freedom of locomotion. It includes and
comprehends, among other things, freedom
of speech, the right to self-defense against
unlawful violence, and the right to buy and
sell as others may." Rev. St 1899, | 8142,
prohibiting any person or corporation from
issuing, in payment of wages, any order or
evidence of Indebtedness not negotiable and
redeemable at its face value in lawful mon-
ey of the United States by the person issu-
ing it, section 8143, requiring all persons is-
suing such orders during business hours to
be ready to redeem the same in lawful mon-
ey at the United States at the option of the
holder, and section 8144, providing that a
violation of the preceding sections shall con-
stitnte a misdemeanor subject to fine er
imprisonment or both* axe unconstitutional
as depriving persons or corporations issuing
suoh orders of their property without due
process of law, In that they restricted their
freedom, or "liberty," to contract State v.
Missouri Tie ft Timber Co., 80 S. W. 933,
941, 181 Mo. 636, 65 li. R. A. 588, 103 Am.
St 614, 2 Ann. Cas. 119 (citing 2 Story,
Const [5th Bd.] | 1950).
The ''liberty" guaranteed by the four-
teenth amendment to the federal Constltu-
tlon means, not only the right of the dti-
aen to be free from mere physical restraint
of his person, but the term embraces the
right of the dtlzen to be free in the enjoy-
ment of his faculties in lawful ways, to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pur-
sue any livelihood, and for that purpose to
enter into contracts which may be proper,
but the freedom of contract is a qualified
right and the freedom of contract is not
unconstitutionally infringed by Code Iowa, |
2071, defining the liability of railway cor-
porations for injuries from negligence, so
that a railway company, when sued on such
liability, is precluded from making the de-
fense that a recovery Is barred by the ac-
ceptance of benefits under a contract of
membership in its relief department Chi-
cago, B. ft Q. R. Co. V. McGuixe, 31 Sup. Ct
259, 262, 219 U. 8. 549, 55 L. Bd. 328 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Allgeyer v.
State of Louisiana, 17 Sup. Ct 427, 165 U.
a 578, 41 I4. Ed. 832).
The fourteenth amendment, however,
does not guarantee the citizen the right to
make within his state, either directly or in-
directly, a oontrect the maldng whereof is
constitutionally forbidden by the state. The
proposition that because a dtisen might
make such a contract tot himself beyond the
confines of his state, therefore he might au-
thorize an agent to violate in his behalf the
laws of his state, within her own limits,
involves a clear non sequltur, and ignores
the vital distinction between acts done with-
in and acts done beyond a state*s Jurisdic-
tion." Hooper v. California, 15 Sup. Ot
207, 211, 155 U. 8. 648, 39 L. Ed. 297.
Blglit to ehoose employmemt
''Privileges and immunities" of a citi-
zen, as well as his ''liberty," within the
guarantiee of Const U. 8. Amend. 14, in-
volve the right, not only to be free from
physical restraint but the right to follow
any lawful business or avocation in life
and to make all proper contracts in fur-
therance thereof. Bx parte HoUman, 60
S. E. 19, 80, 79 8. C. 9, 21 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
242, 14 Ann. Cas. 1105.
"liberty," as guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, is the right of a dtlzen to use his
faculties in all lawful ways, to live and
work where he will, to earn his livelihood
in any lawful calling, and to pursue any law-
XilBBRTT
lis
LIBERTY
Tal trade or ayocatlon. Irm r. Sootli Biif-
ftilo Ry. Co., 94 N. B. 481, 439, 201 N. T.
271, 84 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 162, Ann. Oaa. 1012B,
ise.
"liberty,** in the constitatlonal Bense^
means, not only freedom from seryitude
and restraint, but embraces tbe right of ev-
ery man to be free In the use of his facul-
ties and to adopt such avocation as he may
choose, subject only to the restraints neces-
sary to secnre the common welfare, and the
right of every man to choose his own oocn-
patlon Is Included in the constitutional right
to the pursuit of happiness. People v. Steele,
83 N. E. 236, 237, 281 111. 840, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 361, 121 Am. St Rep. 321; City of
Chicago V. Powers, 83 N. B. 240, 281 111. 600.
The word "liberty," as used in the four-
teenth amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion, means not only the right of the citizen
to be free from mere physical restraint of
his person, as by incarceration, but the term
is deemed to embrace the right of the clti-
ssens to be free In the enjoyment of all his
faculties; to be free to use them in all law-
ful ways; to live and work where he will;
to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any livelihood or vocation and for
the purpose to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out to a successful conclusion
the purposes above mentioned. Toney t.
State, 37 South. 332, 333, 141 Ala. 120, 67
L. R. A. 286, 109 Am. St Rep. 29, 3 Ann.
Cas. 319 (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 17
Stip. Ct 427, 166 U. S. 578, 41 L. Ed. 832);
Hodges V. United States, 27 Sup. Ct 6, 16,
203 U. S. 1, 36, 36, 51 L. Ed. 66; Crescent
liquor Co. v. Piatt, 148 Fed. 894, 902 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Allgeyer v.
State of Louisiana, 17 Sup. Ct 427, 431, 165
U. S. 678, 689, 41 L. Ed. 832).
"liberty,** In its broad sense, as under-
stood in this country, means the right, not
only of freedom from actual servitude, im-
prisonment or restraint, but the right of one
to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to
live and work when he will, to earn his live-
lihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue
any lawful trade or avocation. All laws,
therefore, which impair or trammel these
rights, or which limit him in his choice of
a trade or profession, are infringements up-
on his fundamental rights of liberty which
are under constitutional protection. State
ex rel. Richey r. Smith, 84 Pac. 861, 42
Wash. 287, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 674, 114 Am.
St Rep. 114, 7 Ann. Cas. 577 (quoting In re
AUbxy, 78 Paa 900, 36 Wash. 308, 104 Am.
St Rep. 962, 1 Ann. C^s. 927).
*The word liberty,* as used in the Con-
stitution of the United States and the sev-
eral states, has frequently been construed,
and means more than mere freedom from
restraint It means, not merely the right
to go where one chooses, but to do such
acts as lie may Judge best tOft his interest,
not inconsistent with the equal rights of
others; that is, to follow such pursuits as
may be best adapted to his faculties, and
which will give him the highest enjoyment
The liberty mentioned is deemed to embrace
the right of the citizen to be free in the en-
joyment of all ills faculties, to be free to use
them in all lawful ways, to live and work
where he will, to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling, and for that purpose to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, neo-
essaiy, and essential to his carrying out to
a successful conclusion the purpose above
mentioned. These are individual rights, for-
mulated as such under the phrase *pur8uit
of happiness,* in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, which begins with the fundamen-
tal proposition that all men are created
equal; that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights ; that
among these are Ufe, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness." E7x parte Drexel, 82 Paa
429, 430. 147 CaL 763, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588,
3 Ann. Cas. 878 (quoting and adopting def-
inition in Young v. Commonwealth, 46 S. E.
327, 101 Va. 853).
In its broad sense, as used in this coun-
try, "liberty** means the right, not only to
freedom from actual servitude, imprison-
ment, or restraint, but the rig^t of one to
use Ills faculties in all lawful ways, to live
and work when he will, to earn his liveli-
hood in any lawful calling, and to pursue
any lawful trade or avocation. An act re-
quiring examination by and a license from a
dental board before one may own, run, or
manage a dental office, as distinguished from
the actual practice of dentistry, is not a prop-
er exercise of the police power, but is uncon-
stitutional. State V. Brown, 79 Pac. 636, 637,
37 Wash. 97, 68 L. R. A. 889, 107 Am. St
Rep. 798 (quoting and adopting definition in
Re Aubry, 78 Pac. 900, 36 Wash. 308, 104 Am.
St Rep. 952, 1 Ann. Cas. 927).
Sess. Laws 1901, p. 116, c. 67, providing
for the examination and registration of
horseshoers, is unconstitutional, as depriv-
ing citizens of their liberty and property
without due process of law. *'One may be
deprived of his liberty, and his constitution-
al rights thereto may be violated, without
the actual Imprisonment or restraint of his
person. 'Liberty,* in its broad sense, as un-
derstood in this country, means the right not
only of freedom from actual servitude, im-
prisonment, or restraint, but the right of
one to use his faculties In all lawful ways,
to live and work when he will, to earn his
livelihood in a lawful calling, and to pur-
sue any lawful trade or avocation. All laws,
therefore, which impair or trammel these
rights, which limit him in his choice of a
trade or profession, are infringements of his
fundamental rights of liberty, which are
under oonstitational protectien." In le An-
UBEBTT
113
LIBERTT OP CONTRACT
hrj, TB Pac 900, 902, 86 Wash. 806. 104 Am.
St. Bep. 952, 1 Ann. Gas. 927 (citing People
ex leL Nechamcns v. Warden of City Pria-
on, 39 N. E. 680, 144 N. Y. Q29, 27 L. R. A.
718),
*'The term 'liberty,' aa used in the four-
teenth amendment to the federal Conatitu-
tlon, is not dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the dtl-
sen, as by incarceration, bnt is deemed to
embrace the light of a man to be free in
the employment of the faculties with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, sub-
ject only to such restraints as are necessary
for the common welfare: liberty, in its
broad sense, as miderstood In this country,
means the right not only of freedom from
serritnde, imprisonment, or restraint, but
the right of one to use his faculties in all
lawful ways, live and work where he will,
to earn his liTelihood in any lawful calling,
and to pursue any lawful trade or avoca-
tion," so that Laws 1901, c. 128, am^ding
Pen. Code, | 640, by making it an offense, in
cities of the first and second classes, for any
person to offer real property for sale with-
out the written authority of the owner, or
his attorney in fact, appointed in writing, or
of the bolder of a written contract with the
owner for the purchase of such property, is
unconstitutional. Grossman v. Camineas, 79
N. Y. Supp. 900, 902, 79 App. Div. 16 (quot-
ing and applying People v. Gillson, 17 N. Bl
843, 346, 109 N. X. 889, 899, 4 Am. St. Rep.
466).
Rickt to Imhme
St. 1903, p. 88, c. 10, providing an eight*
hour day for workmen in mines, smelters,
and mills, does not contravene the consti-
tutional provision relating to deprivation of
'^liberty." Belknap, C. J., dissenting, quotes
to the effect that the term "liberty," in the
COinstitutiou, is not dwarfed into mere free-
dom from physical restraint of the person,
but embraces the right to be free in the en-
joyment of the faculties with which the cit-
izen has been endowed by his Creator, and
that "liberty," in its broad sense, as under-
stood in this country, means the right not
only of freedom from servitude or restraint,
but the right of one to use his faculties in
all lawful ways, to live and work where
he wUl, to earn his livelihood in any lawful
calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or
avocation. In re Boyce, 75 Pac. 1, 17, 27
Nev. 299, 66 U R. A.'47, 1 Ann. Cas. 66.
Restiralnt 1>y law implied
"Even 'liberty* itself, the greatest of all
rights, is not unrestricted license to act ac-
cording to one's own wilL It is only free-
dom from restraint under conditions essen-
tial to the equal enjoyment of the same right
by others. It is, then, 'liberty' regulated by
Uw." McLaury v. Watelsky, 87 S. W. 1046,
1047, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 394 (quoting and ap-
8 WDS.ft P.2D SxB.— 8
proving Crowley y. Chrlstensen, 11 Sup. Ct.
13, 137 U. S. 86, 84 L. Ed. 620).
"Liberty," aa understood in this coun-
try» ia not license but liberty regulated by
law. The personal liberty of every man Is
subject to such reasonable regulations as
in the wisdom of the Legislature are regard-
ed as necessary to promote, not only the
peace and good order of society, but its well-
being. Rev. St. § 4284, prohibiting g^ier-
ally the keeping open on Sunday of any
place of business for the purpose of trans-
acting business therein, is not, as applied
to a barber's shop, unconstitutional, as be-
ing an undue restraint of personal liberty,
and depriving a person of life, liberty, and
property without due process of law, but is
a proper exercise of the police power of the
state. State v. Sopher, 71 Pac 482, 484, 26
Utah, 318, 60 li. R. A. 468, 05 Am. St Rep.
846 (quoting and adopting State v. Powell,
60 N. E. 900, 58 Ohio St 324, 41 U R. A.
864).
The industrial insurance law (Laws 1911,
c. 74), whidb undertakes, by requiring contri-
butions from employers to an accident or. in-
surance fund, to provide fixed and certain
relief for workmen injured in extrahazardous
work, and for families and dependents, re-
gardless of questions of fault or negligence,
to the exclusion of every other remedy or
compensation, and which, by section 11, pro-
vides that no employer shall exempt himself
from the burden or waive the benefits of the
act by any contract, agreement, or regulation,
and that any such contract or regulation
shall be pro tanto void, is not an interference
with the right to contract, since there is no
absolute right to do as one wills, pursue any
calling one desires, or contract as one choos-
es, and since the term 'liberty" means ab-
sence of arbitrary restraint and not immuni-
ty from reasonable regulations and provisions
imposed in the Interests of the community.
State ex reL Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 117
Pac. 1101, 1112, 66 Wash. 166, 87 L. R, A. (N.
S.)466.
ZiZBSBTT OF OOHTR ACT
Liberty of contract does not imply liber-
ty in a corporation or individuals to defy the
national will when legally expressed; nor
does it Involve a right to deprive the public
of the advantages of free competition in trade
and commerce. The enforcement of Anti-
Trust Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat 209,
declaring illegal every combination or con-
spiracy in restraint of interstate or foreign
commerce, and forbidding attempts to monop-
olize such commerce, or any part of it does
not infringe on liberty of contract Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 24 Sup. Ct
436, 462, 198 U. S. 197, 48 L. fid. 679.
**Whlle it may be conceded that gener-
ally speaking, among the Inalienable rights of
the citizen is that of the liberty of contract,
yet such liberty is not absolute and unlver-
LIBEBTT OF CONTRACT
114 LIBEBT7 OF SPEBCk AND THB PRESS
BsL It is within the undoubted power of
govemment to restrain some indiyidualB from
all contracts, as well as all individuals from
some contracts. It may deny to all the right
to contract for the purchase or sale of lottery
tickets, to the minor the right to assume any
obligations, ezc^t for the necessaries of exist-
ence; to the common carrier the power to
make any contract releasing himself from
negligence, and, indeed, may restrain all en-
gaged in any employment from any contract
in the course of that employment which is
against public policy." Friable r. United
States, 15 Sup. Ot 586, 588, 157 U. B. 160, 89
L. Bd. 657.
"Liberty to contract" is one of the in-
alienable rights of man, guaranteed to every
citizen by the Bill of Rights (Const art 1, I
1), subject only to such restrictions as clearly
appear to be for the general welfare. The
mere fact that the General Assembly has en-
acted a law which narrows the liberty of
contract as to the whole people or to a class
of citizens is not dedslye. Where an act re-
lating to the giving of surety bonds makes se-
curity by surety companies exclusive and
compulsory, it is not promoted by considera-
tion of the public necessity or public welfare,
and hence it follows that it is an unconsti-
tutional restriction on the liberty to con-
tract, guaranteed by the Constitution. State
V. Robins, 73 N. B. 470, 471, 71 Ohio St 278,
69 li. R. A. 427, 2 Ann. Cas. 486.
Act Dec. 10, 1906, No. 117, requiring cer-
tain corporations to pay their employ^ each
week in lawful money, is not invalid as re-
stricting the rights of employ^ to contract
with their employer; such restriction not be-
ing direct, but resulting from the employer's
right, and that restriction being valid as to
the employer. Lawrence v. Rutland R. Co.,
80 Vt 370. 67 Atl. 1091, 1096, 15 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 350, 13 Ann. Cas. 475.
LIBEBTT OF 8PKB0H AND THE
PRESS
The "freedom of the press" consists in a
right to print what he chooses without pre-
vious license, but subject to be held respon-
sible therefor. Levert v. Dally States Pub.
Oa, 49 South. 206, 211, 123 La. 594, 23 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 726, 131 Am. St Rep. 356w
The phrase "liberty of the press" means,
in the language of the Bill of Rights, that any
citizen may write or publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible only for the
abuse of that right Williams Printing Co. v.
Saunders, 73 S. B. 472, 477, 113 Va. 156, Ann.
Cas. 1913B, 578.
The press has only the same privilege as
to publications as private individuals; the
phrase "liberty of the press" merely meaning
that newspaper publications shall not be sub-
ject to censorship. Williams Printing Co. v.
Saunders, 73 S. B. 472, 477» 113 Ya. 156, Ann.
Cas. 1913E, 57&
The "liberty of tiie press** Is not guaran-
teed by the Constitution against the publica-
tion of deliberate falsehood and misrepresen-
tation in regard to decisions of courts, even
though the publishers may think that pablic
and political interests would be subserved
by such falsehood and misrepreeentatton.
McDougall V. Sheridan, 128 Pac. 954, 968» 28
Idaho, 191.
"Liberty of ngeech and of the press** im-
plies not only liberty to publish but complete
immunity from legal censure and punishm^it
for the publication, so long as it is not harm-
ful in its character, when tested by such
standards as the law affords. People ex reL
Attorney General v. News-Times Pub. Co.,
84 Pac. 912, 948, 35 Colo. 253 (adopting defin-
ition in Cooper v. People ex reL Wyatt 22
Pac. 790, 13 Colo. 837, 378, 6 L. R. A. 430).
"Liberty of the press" is not synonymous
with license^ nor does it give a newapaper any
greater license to publish libelous matter
than the ordinary citizen may hare. Lowe
V. News Pnb. Co., 70 S. B. 607, 9 Oa. App.
106.
The "liberty of the press,*' as the law
now stands, is only a more extensive and
improved use of the liberty of spee<di which
prevailed before printing became general, and
is the right belonging to every one, whether
the conductor of a newspaper or not, to pub-
lish whatever he pleases without the license,
interference, er control of the government;
the publisher b^ng responsible only for the
abuse of the privilege. Williams v. Black,
124 N. W. 728, 732, 24 S. D. 501 (citing 25
Cyc. pp. 406, 407).
Liberty and freedom of speech guaran-
teed by the Constitution does not mean the
unrestricted right to do and say what one
pleases at all times and under all circum-
stances. Act Cong. Sept 26, 1888, c. 1039,
25 Stat 496, forbidding deposit in the mails
of anything upon the exposed surface of
which appears language scurrilous, defama-
tory, threatening, or calculated and obvious-
ly intended to reflect injuriously on the
character or conduct of others, is not objec-
tionable as denying or abridging freedom of
speech. Warren v. United States, 183 Fed.
718, 721, 106 C. C. A. 156, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)
800.
"'Liberty of the press' consists in the
right to publish, with impunity, truth with
good motives and for justiflable ends, wheth-
er it respects the government, magistries, or
individuals.*' Laws 1889, p. 66, c. 20, forbid-
ding'the publication by newspapers of de-
tailed accounts of the execution of criminals
convicted of murder, is not in conflict with
Const art. 1, | 3, which preserves the liberty
of the press. State v. Pioneer Press Co., 110
N. W. 867, 868, 100 Minn. 173, 9 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 480, 117 Am. St Rep. 684, 10 Ann. Cas.
351 (quoting and adopting definition of Chan-
cellor Kent).
UBERTX OF SPBiOOH AND THB PRESS U5 UBBBXX OF SPEECH AND THE PRESS
''Liberty of the praw'* li stIU an naite-
fined teno, and, like some otber flwinllliiT
phrases of oonstltatioiial law, most remain
undefined. Certain boundaries are fairly dis-
cernible within which the liberty most be dis-
played, but precise roles cannot be formulat-
ed in advance to gorem its exercise on partic-
ular occasions. In the decision of controver-
sies, the charaoter, the organization, the
needs, and the will of society at the present
time must be given dne consideration. The
press, as we know it to-day, is almost as mod-
em as the telephone and the phonograph.
The functions which It performs at the pres-
ent stage of our social development, if not
substantially different in kind from what they
have been, are magnified many fold, and the
opportunities for its influence are multiplied
many times. Generally publication should
be no wider than the moral or social duty
to publish. If it be designedly or unnecessar-
ily or negligently excessive, privilege is lost
But, if a state newspaper, published primar-
ily for a state constituency, have a small cir-
culation elsewhere, it is not deprived of its
privilege in the discussion of subjects of
state-wide concern because of that fact Cole-
man V. MacLennan, 98 Pac. 2S1, 283, 78 Kan.
711, 20 Ij. R. A. (N. B.) 861, 180 Am. Bt Rep.
390.
The "liberty of the press," guaranteed by
Const art 1, | 7, guaranteeing to every per-
son the liberty to speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, but holding
him responsible for the abuse of that right,
has sever been held to mean that the pub-
Usher of a newspaper diall be any less re-
sponsible than any other person would be for
publishing otherwise the same libelous mat-
ter. The contrary rule has been affirmed by
the courts of this country and England with
great uniformity. Morse v. Times-Republican
Printing Co., 100 N. W. 867, 873, 124 Iowa.
707 (dtlng Jones v. Townsend*s Adm*x, 21
Fla. 431, 58 Am. Rep. 676 ; Sheckell v. Jack-
son, 10 Cush. [64 Mass.] 25 ; Aldrich v. Press
Printing Co., 0 Minn. 138 [Gil. 129] 86 Am.
Dec 84; Root v. King [N. T.] 7 Cow. 628;
TiUson V. Robbins, 68 Me. 295, 28 Ajn. Rep.
50 ; Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N. H. 137 ; Foster
V. Scripps, 39 Mich. 876, 33 Am. Rep. 403;
Barr v. Moore, 87 Pa. 385, 80 Am. Rep. 367 ;
Eviston V. Cramer, 3 N. W. 392, 47 Wis. 669;
Edwards v. San Jose Printing ft Pub. Soc.,
34 Pac 128, 99 Cal. 431, 37 Am. St Rep. 70;
McAllister v. Detroit Free Press, 43 N. W.
431, 76 Mich. 338, 15 Am. St Rep. 318; I^pton
V. Hume, 33 Pac 810, 24 Or. 420, 21 Jx R. A.
493, 41 Am. St Rep. 863 ; Smith v. Tribune
Co., 22 Fed. Cas. 689; Davis v. Sladden, 21
Pac 140, 17 Or. 26&; Barnes v. CampbeU, 59
N. H. 128, 47 Am. Rep. 183; MaUory v. Pio-
neer Press Co., 26 N. W. 904, 34 Minn. 5^1;
Delaware State Fire ft Marine Ins. Ca v.
Croasdale [DeL] 6 Houst 181; Palmer v. City
of Conco'dt 48 N. H. 216, 97 Aol Dec 605).
'The Constitotion of this state declares
what is meant by 'liberty of speech' and
'liberty of the press' in the following words:
'Any person may speak, write, and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being respon-
sible for the abuse of that liberty.' Civ.
Code 1895^ | 5712. The right preserved and
guaranteed against invasion by the Consti-
tution is therefore the right to utter, to
writer and to print one's sentiments, subject
only to the limitation that in so doing he
shall not be guilty of an abuse of this priv-
ilege, by Invading the legal rights of others.
The Constitution uses the word 'sentiments,'
but it is used in the sense of thoughts, ideas,
opinions. To make intelligent, forceful, and
effective an expression of opinion, it may
be necessary to refer to the life, conduct,
and character of a person; and, so long as
the truth is adhered to, the right of privacy
of another cannot be said to have been in-
vaded by one who speaks or writes or prints,
provided the reference to such person, and
the manner in which he is referred to, is
reasonably and legitimately proper in an ex-
pression of opinion on the subject that is
under investigation. It will therefore be
seen that the right of privacy must in some
particulars yield to the right of speech and
of the press. It is well recognized that
slander is an abuse of the liberty of speech,
and, that a libel is an abuse of the liberty
to write and print, but it is nowhere ex-
pressly declared in the law that these are
the only abuses of such rights. And that
the law makes the truth in suits for slan-
der and in prosecutions and suits for libel
a complete defense may not necessailly
make the publication of the truth the legal
right of every person, nor prevent it from
being in some cases a legal wrong. The
truth may be spoken, written, or printed
about all matters of a public nature, as well
as matters of a private nature in which the
public has a legitimate interest The truth
may be uttered and printed in reference to
the life, character, and conduct of individ-
uals whenever it is necessary to the full ex-
ercise of the right to express one's senti-
ments on any and all subjects that may be
proper matter for discussion. But there
may arise cases where the speaking or print-
ing of the truth may be considered an abuse
of the 'liberty of speech and of the press,'
as in a case where matters of purely private
concern, wholly foreign to a legitimate ex-
pression of opinion on the subject under dis-
cussion, are injected into the discussion for
no other purpose and with no other motive
than to annoy and harass the individual re-
ferred to. Such cases might be of rare oc-
currence, but, if such should arise, the par-
ty aggrieved may not be without a remedy.
The right of privacy is unquestionably lim-
ited by the right to speak and print It
may be said that to give liberty of speech
and of the press such wide scope as has
I4IBERUM T£N£H£NTUM
IK
LIOENSB
^een Indicated would impose a very serious
fimitatioii upon the right of privacy, bnt,
if it does, it is due to the fact that the law
considers that the welfare of the public is
better subserved by maintaining the liberty
of speech and of the press than by allowing
an individual to assert his right of privacy
in such a way as to interfere with the free
expression of one's sentiments, and the pub-
lication of every matter in which the public
may be legitimately interested. In many
cases the law required the individual to sur-
render some of his natural and private
rights for the benefit of the public, and this
is true in reference to some phases of the
right of privacy as well as other legal rights.
Those to whom the right to speak and write
and print is guaranteed must not abuse this
right, nor must one in whom the right of
privacy ezists abuse this right The law
will no more permit an abuse by one than
by the other. Liberty of the speech and
of the press is and has been a useful in-
strument to keep the individual within lim-
its of lawful, decent, and proper conduct;
and the right of privacy may be well used
within its proper limits to keep those who
speak and write and print within the legit-
imate bounds of the constitutional guar-
anties of such rights. One may be used as
a check upon the other, but neither can be
lawfully used for the other's destruction.**
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 00
S. E. 68, 73, 74, 122 Ga. 190, 09 L B. A.
101, 106 Am. St Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Gas. 061.
LIBERUM TENEMENTUM
The plea of "liberum tenementum" was
at one time used only where plaintiff's dec-
laration was very general in its description
of the land, not specifying it, and this plea
performed the office of compelling a new
assignment or more definite description, but
the plea has long since performed a wider
function, and its office is to confess that the
plaintiff had possession of the land at the
time the act complained of was committed,
and that such act was in fact committed by
defendant, as set forth, but avoiding the al-
legation by the averment of a right to en-
ter and do the act as alleged. In legal ef-
fect the plea admits possession in the plain-
tiff sufficient to enable him to maintain the
action against the wrongdoer and asserts
a freehold in the defendant, with right to
immediate possession as against plaintiff.
On the filing of this plea, defendant must
prove his title either by deed or other docu-
mentary evidence, or by an actual adverse
and exclusive possession for 20 years, since
by the issue he undertakes to show a title
in himself by which the presumption arising
from plaintiff's possession will be avoided.
Since the plea raises the question of titie
and boundary, a judgment on the plea is
conclusive on the question of titie to land,
and therefore a writ of etror wHl He to re-
view the judgment Dickinson v. Mankin,
06 8. B. 824, 825, 61 W. Va. 429.
LIBRARY
St 1909, I 4260, obUgates a county rer-
enue agent to cause to be listed for taxa-
tion all property omitted* by the assessor
and other taxing office, and provides that
he shall file a statement of propwty omit-
ted, and that such statement shall contain
"a description and value of the property pro-
posed to be assessed." A revenue agent
acting under such statute filed a statem^it
of property belonging to a person named
omitted from taxation, and such statement
specified, among other things, a "library^
of a value specified. Held, that the state-
ment was sufficient as to the library, as
"library" means such books or works of
literature, science, art, or business as one
may have in his residence or office. Com-
monwealth V. Glover, 116 & W. 769, 774,
132 Ky. 58a
As charity
See Charity.
As edaeatloaal eorporatlom
See Educational Corporation.
As pablie j^laee
See Public Place.
LICENSE
See Exclusive License; Implied Ucenae;
Irrevocable lioense; Life License;
Mining license; Resident license;
Simple License.
A ''license" is a permission to do some-
thing. People ex rel. Moses v. Gaynor, 137
N. Y. Supp. 196, 198, 77 Misc. Rep. 576.
A mere 'Ulcense" is but an authority
to do a particular act or series of acts up-
on another's land without possessing any es-
tate therein. Dawson v. Western M. R. Co.,
68 Ati. 301, 305, 107 Md. 70, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 809, 126 Am. St Rep. 337, 15 Ann.
Cas. 678.
"A 'license' is technically an authority
given to do some one act or series of acts
on the land of another without passing any
estate in the land." Where an owner orally
offered to give land to another, providing
the latter would not construct a building
in such a way as to cut off the light of a
window in the owner's house, and the of-
fer was accepted, and a building erected
according to the plans agreed on, the own-
er merely gave a parol license for the erec-
tion of the building. Shipley v. Fink, 62
Ati. 360, 362, 102 Md. 219, 2 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1002.
A 'license" merely — a verbal license — ^Is
the right to do a particular act or series of
acts, without any interest in the land. Sueh
lilCJENSB
117
UOEMSB
a llcenae will exempt a party from an ac-
tion of trespass for entering the land of
another to dig ore and will give him the
property in the ore which is actually dug
under it, but it is revocable at the pleas-
ure of him who gives it. Clark ▼, Wall, 79
Pac 1052, 1053, 32 Mont 219.
'*A 'license' is a personal revocable and
nonassignable privilege conferred either by
writing or parol to do one or more acts on
land without possessing any interest there-
in.*' Rodefer v. Pittsburg, O. V. ft 0. B. Co.,
74 N. EL 188, 18(1, 72 Ohio St. 272, 70 U R.
A. 844 (quoting and adopting definition in
Greenwood Lake ft P. J. R. Ck>. v. New
York ft G. L. R. Co., 81 N. B. 874, 875, 134
N. T. 435, 489); Yeager v. Tuning, 86 N. B.
657, 658, 79 Ohio St 121, 19 L. R. A. (N.
8.) 700, 128 Am. St Rep. 679; Reeve v.
Dnryee, 129 N. Y. Supp. 748, 750, 144 Ai^.
Dlv. 647.
A 'license** is a mere personal or rev-
ocable privilege to do an act or series of
acts upon lands of another without possess-
ing any interest or estate in the lands. City
of Berwyn v. Beiglund, 99 N. B. 706, 70^
2S6 HI. 49a
A "license" is a personal privilege to
do certain acts upon the lands of another,
but creates no estate therein, is revocable at
wHl, and may rest in parol. Howes v. Har-
mon, 81 Pac. 48, 49, 11 Idaho, 64, 69 L. R.
A. 568, 114 Am. St Rep. 255.
A "license" contemplates not a denial
of a right or power, but the regulation of
such right or power. A license is a permis-
sion to do something under regulations, and
not a prohibition. People ex rel. Empire
City Trotting Club v. State Racing Com-
mission, 105 N. Y. Supp. 528, 630, 120 App.
Dlv. 484.
A "Ucense" implies that the Uocosee
shall not be evicted from its enjoyment, and
such an eviction is a defense to a suit for
royalties accruing after it occurred. Amer-
ican Street Car Advertising Co. v. Jones,
142 Fed. 974, 977, 74 C. C. A. 236.
A "Ucense" is simply a permission or
authority to do something, and a Ueense to
take tlm^r would be an authority or permis-
sion to go on the land and cut and remove
tbe timber specified in the license. Snyder
▼. East Ba^ Lumber Co., 97 N. W. 49, 50,
135 Mich. 31.
A "license" is defined to be: "An au-
thority to do some act, or a series of acts,
on the land of another, without passing an
estate in the land. It amounts to nothing
more than an excuse for the act 'Which
would otherwise be a trespass. Being a
personal privilege, it can be enjoj'ed only by
the licensee. It is not assignable, so that
an undertenant can claim the benefit of the
license to the licensee." ^aintitfs convey-
^d to defendant by deed all the timber and
trees on the tract of land described; the
deed providing that the grantee should have
all the rights of way and privileges over and
upon the land usually extended to lumber-
men, provided that the timber should be
removed within three years, and that all ref-
use, timber, bams, houses, cabins, sheds,
etc., remaining on the premises at that time,
should revert to and become the property
of plaintiffs. Held, that such deed was not
a mere "license," but was sufllcient to cre-
ate the relation of landlord and tenant
Alexander v. Gardner, 96 S. W. 818, 819,
128 Ky. 552, 124 Am. St Rep. 378 (citing
Tayl. Land. & Ten. | 237; Wood, Land. &
Ten. I 227; Haywood v. Fulmer, 32 N. B.
574, 158 Ind. 658, 18 L. K A. 491).
A ticket of admission to a race track,
a theater, a concert, or any such entertain-
ment is a mere revocable "license.** Buen-
zle V. Newport Amusement Ass'n, 68 AtL
721, 722, 728, 29 R. L 2S, 14 Li R. A. (N. S.)
1242.
An instrument leasing the side wtJl of
defendant's proi)erty to plaintUOF for adver-
tising purposes, *'until said wall is obstruct-
ed so it is not available for advertising pur-
poses," grants a mere 'license*' revocable at
the owner's option. Manheimer v. Gndat,
106 N. Y. Supp. 461, 4^, 55 Misc. Rep. 330.
Where the owner of a building exe-
cuted a written contract granting defendant
the right to use one of the walls thereof for
advertising purposes for a specified con-
sideration and for a definite period, and
providing that, in case of an obstruction
of the wall by other buildings, defendant
should have an abatement of the land, to-
gether with necessary access through and
upon tlie premises, and warranting title to
the leasehold for the term mentioned, the
contract was to be regarded as a ^'license."
A license may, if executed in proper form,
take effect as a grant as to some things and
as a mere license as to others. Levy v.
Louisville Gunning System, 89 & W. 528,
530, 121 Ky. 510, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 359.
A contract for a right to erect advertis-
ing matter was described as a "wall or fence
permit," and provided that, in consideration
of 150 cash payable yearly in advance, the
owner leased to the R Sign Company the
entire side wall of a certain building for ad-
vertising purposes for one year with privilege
of renewal at the same rate, and that, in
case the sign was obstructed or the house
sold, the money would be returned for the un-
expired term. Held, that the instrument
constituted a mere "license** revocable by the
owner at will on returning a pro rata amount
of the license fee for the unexpired term.
Reeve v. Duryee, 129 N. Y, Supp. 748, 749,
144 App. Dlv. 647.
"A siding or switch constructed by a
railroad company from its road to a manu-
factory at the expense and over the land df
lilGENSB
118
LICENSE
the latter, solely for Its benefit, and for the
sole purpose of affording it facilities for re-
ceiving and shipping freight, and under a
written agreement silent as to the length of
time it is to remain, may not be maintained
by the railroad company against the objec-
tion of the owner of the manufactory; the
agreement, so far aa the right of the rail-
road company is conoemed, being merely a
'license' revocable at the option of the licen-
sor or his grantee." Rodefer y. Pittsburg,
O. V. & C. B. Co^ 74 N. H. 18^-186, 72 Ohio
8t. 272, 70 L. R. A. 844.
The interest conveyed by an <^ and
gas lease is a mere 'license" to explore, an
incorporeal hereditament, a profit k prendre.
A mechanic's lien will not attach to the in-
terest acquired in lands by the lessee under
an ordinary oil or gas lease, notwithstanding
oil or gas is discovered. Phillips v. Spring-
field Crude Oil Co., 02 Pac. 1110, 76 Kan. 783.
Where the president of a corporation by
a verbal) agreement grants permission to
another to box and gather the turpentine
from the pine trees growing upon the land
of the corporation, such permit amounts to
nothing more than a "license," which termi-
nates and becomes void on the appointment
of a receiver for the corporation. McKinnon-
Young Co. v.* Stockton, 44 South. 237, 247, &3
Fla. 734.
Where the right of way on which plain-
tiff's decedent was killed was not on or par-
allel to an adjoining street, but was entire-
ly inclosed to prevent its use by the public,
its use by the public in sometimes passing
that way did not amount to a "license."
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Redmon's Adm'z,
01 S. W. 722, 724, 122 Ky. 385.
A paper, entitled "Application for Sewer
Attachment," executed by a property owner
and a sewer company, allowing the owner to
attach his property to the main sewer i^pe,
sewer to be used at named rates per year,
and reciting that the owner applies for sewer
attachment as above, and agrees to comply
with all the company's present and future
rules relative to the use of sewer, is a
"license*^ to connect Fogg v. Ocean City
Sewer Co., 66 Ati. 600, 610, 72 N. J. Eq. 736.
CoTenaat numing with land distln-
An instrument giving a person the right
to construct a drainage ditch through the
land of the person executing the instrument,
without consideration and not acknowledged
and recorded, was a mere "license," revoca-
ble at the will of the licensor and his gran-
tee, and not "a covenant running with the
land." Williams v. Beatty, 122 S. W. 323,
326, 130 Mo. App. 167.
Dedioation distingnlsked
Mere user by the public of a supposed
street, though long continued, will be regard-
ed as a mere "license," revocable at the
pleasure of the owner of the land, and not
to constitute a dedication, where it does not
appear that any public or private interests
have been acquired on the faith of the sup-
posed dedication of the land for a street
Town of West Point v. Bland, 56 S. B. 802,
805, 106 Va. 702 (quoting Harris' Case, 20
Grat [60 Va.] 840; Talbott v. Richmond &
D. R. Co., 81 Grat [72 Va.] 688,
Easememt distincvislied
Irrevocable license as easement, see
Easement
With reference to real estate, "license"
is a permission or authority to do a partic-
ular act or series of acts on the land of
another without possessing any estate there-
in. So, with reference to personal property,
"license" impUes and carries the power to
do some act upon or in reference to cmt to do
something with the property of another.
Herein it differs from 9^ easement The
word "easement" always implies an interest
in the land. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 130
Fed. 155, 188 (citing 5 Words and Phrases,
p. 4133).
A "license" Is an authority given to do
some act or acts on the land of another
without giving any estate in the land itself.
It differs from an easement in that the lat-
ter is a permanent interest with a right at
all times to enter and enjoy it, while the
continuance of the former depends on the
will of the person who has created it There
is a distinction between an easement and a
license, although in some cases It is difficult
to see a substantial difference between them.
An easement is a privilege in land founded
upon a deed or other writing or upon pre-
scription. It is a permanent Interest In
another's land with the right to enjoy it
fully and without objection. It may attach
to the land and pass with the dominant tene-
m&kt as an appurtenant thereto. Asher v.
Johnson, 82 S. W. 300, 801, 118 Ky. 702 (quot-
ing 5 Lawson, Rights, Rem. & Pr. { 2668).
A "license" is a permission to do some
act or series of acts on the land of the licens-
or, without having a permanent interest in
the land, and is distinguished from an "ease-
ment" in that an easement is a right with
reference to certain land o(mferri|jg on the
owner of the easement a perman^it interest
in the land; the word "permanent," being
used not in the sense of perpetual, but as
relating to a specific period. Borough Bill
Posting Co. V. Levy, 120 N. Y, Supp. 740, 742,
144 App. Div. 784.
A 'license" is distinguished from an
easement in that a license is an authority to
enter on land, but confers no interest in the
estate ; it is generally granted by parol, and
may be revoked by the licensor at pleasure,
and, being a personal privilege, is not as-
signable, and usually amounts to an excuse
for what would otherwise be a trespass, while
an easement confers an interest in the land
UOEKSB
119
UCBK8B
and iDTests the owner with privUeges that
he cannot be deprived of at the mere wiU or
wlflh of the proprietor of the senrlent estate.
Rlttenhonae r. Swango (Ky.) 07 8. W. 743, 744
(4dtlBg Wliklna T. Irvine, 33 Ohio St 138).
A "Ilcenae" in respect of real property is
authority to do a particular act or series of
acts on the land of another withoat possess-
ing an estate or interest therein, while an
easement always implies an interest in the
land involving two distinct elements, a domi-
nant tenement to which the right is appoz^
tenant, and a servient tenement upon which
the servitude is imposed ; but a license is in
the nature of a personal privilege, which may
be revoked before any rights have been as-
serted under it, or money expended on the
faith thereof. Where an easement is granted
speciflcally or by language from which such
an interest is implied under settled rules
of construction, the covenant will be enforced
accordingly, but, where the language used is
of doubtful meaning, it is for the court to
construe the grant and determine whether it
la of a permanent interest running with the
land, or only a personal privilege aJlecting
the rights of the parties. Lehigh ft N. B. B.
Co. V. Bangor & P. By. Ck>., 77 Atl. 552, 553,
228Fa«850.
A permission, given without considera-
tion by an owner for the use by a township
of his land for the discharge across his land
of the surplus water of an artesian well sunk
by the township on its land for , irrigation
purposes for the inhabitants of the township,
and not given in the form of a grant or con-
veyance in writing, is a mere Ueense, subject
to revocation by the owner or his grantee;
a "Ueense," in real estate, being an authority
to do a particular act on the land of another
without poBsesslng any estate therein, and
being founded in personal oonlldence, revoo-
aMe at will; and an "easement" being a
privilege in land, without profit, existing die*
tlnct from the ownership of the land, found-
ed on a grant in writing, within the statute
of frauds (Civ. Code, | 1238). Butz v. Blch-
land Tp., 134 N. W. 805, 898, 28 S. D. 442.
See Incumbrance.
XBTltation distiasuUAed
There is a clear distinction between a
"license" and an "invitation" to enter prem-
ises, and an equally clear distinction as to
the duty of the owner in the two cases. An
ovnier owes to a licensee no duty as to the
condition of the premises, unless imposed by
statute, save that he should, not knowingly
let him run upon a hidden peril or willfully
cause him harm, while to one invited he is
under obligation for reasonable security for
the purposes of the invitation. Mere per-
mlsBion to enter creates the relation of
licensee. Mandevllle Mills v. Dale^ 58 8. E.
lOeO-KNC, 2 Ga. App. 607 (quoting and adopt-
ing Beehler v. Daniels, 29 Aa 6^ IS B. L
968, 060, 2T L. R. A 612, 40 Am. 8t Beix
790).
As respects the question whether a per-
son is on premises as a licensee or by invita-
tion, "invitation is inferred where there is a
common interest or mutual advantage, while
'license' is inferred where the object is the
mere pleasure or benefit of the person using
it" Southern R. in Kentucky v. Goddard, 89
8. W. 675, 676, 121 Ky. 667. 12 Ann. Caa 116
(quoting and adopting distinction stated in 1
Whart Neg. § 349).
A "licensee" who goes on the premises of
another by that other's invitation and for
that other's purposes is an "invitee," and the
duty to take ordinary care to prevent injury
is at once raised, and the word "invitation,"
in the rule, covers and includes in it, entice-
ment, allurement, and inducement if the
case holds such features, and the invitation
may also be implied by a dedication, or it
may arise from known customary use, or it
may be implied by any state of facts on
which it naturally and reasonably arises.
Where a proprietor of a store invited plain-
tiff to come to the store to advise him in a
business transaction, and plaintiff, on reach-
ing the store, found the proprietor busy, and
while waiting, as he was required to do, he
asked permission to go to the basement
to a doset, and permission was granted, and
while going he fell into an unguarded pit in
the basement, plaintiff was on the premises
in response to the proprietor's invitation and
was not a bare licensee at the time, and the
proprietor owed him the duty of exercising
ordinary care for his protection. Glaser v.
Rothschild, 120 S. W. 1, 3, 221 Mo. 180, 22
L. B. A. (N. S.) 1045, 17 Ann. Cas. 576.
"It is sometimes difficult to determine
whether the circumstances make a case of
'invitation,' in the technical sense of that
word, as used in a large number of adjudged
cases, or only a case of mere license. The
principle,' says Mr. Campbell, in his treatise
on Negligence, 'appears to be that invitation
is inferred where there is a common interest
or mutual advantage, while a "license" is
inferred where the object is the mutual pleas-
ure or benefit of the person using it' " De-
fendant operated a railroad to the summit
of Pikes Peak and leased certain buildings
to H. for a hotel for 25 p^ cent of H.'s
gross receipts. The hotel was higher than
the station platform, and a retaining wall
protected the platform from loose stones
which might roll down the side of the moun-
tain. The wall was ascended by a flight of
steps, and the buildings were located 16 feet
from the top thereof. Plaintiff arrived at the
hotel at about 10 o'clock p. m., and, after be-
ing informed that the beds were all full, he
obtained an employfi^s bed. Later in the
night he went out of doors for a private pur-
pose and, not keeping within the light reflec-
tion from the house, stepped off the retaining
UOEENBB
120
IJOENW
wall and was injured. Held, that plaintiff
was not an invited guest of the railroad com-
pany, but was at most a mere licensee there-
of, as to whom It owed no active duty to
light or rail the wall. Watson y. Manitou
& Pikes Peak Ky. Co., 92 Pac 17, 19, 41 Ck>lo.
138, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 916.
An implied "inyltation" to use danger-
ous premises, as distinguished from a mere
'^license," arises when a benefit accrues to the
owner from such use, or when the use is in
the interest of both parties, or is connected
with the owner's business. Cleveland, C, 0.
Sc St. li. R. Co. T. Powers, 88 N. B. 1073,
1077, 173 Ind. 105.
Lease distiiiciKished
Q^ie difference between a license and a
lease is that a lease gives to the tenant the
right of possession against the world, while a
license creates no interest in the land, but
is simply the authority or power to use It in
some specific way. Joplln Supply Go. ▼•
West, 130 S. W. 156, 161. 149 Mo. App. 78.
A license in respect to real estate is an
authority to do a particular act or aeries of
acts on the land of another without possess-
ing an estate therein. The test to determine
whether an agreement for the use of real es-
tate is a license or a lease is whether the con-
tract gives exclusive use of the premises
against all the world, including the owner,
in which case It is a lease, or whether it
merely confers a privilege to occupy under
the owner, in which case it is a license, the
question to be determined by a construction
of the instrument Shaw v. Caldwell, 115
Pac. 941, 943, 16 Cal. App. 1.
The test to determine whether an agree-
ment for the use of real estate is a ''lease"
or a * 'license" is whether the contract gives
exclusive possession of the premises against
the world, including the owner, In which case
it is a lease, or whether it merely confers a
license to occupy under the owner. An in-
strument by which the owner of premises let
to defendant "his ice business and privileg-
es in * ♦ ♦ with the use and benefit of
his icehouses," for a term ending on a cer-
tain date, gave defendant the exclusive pos-
session of, and the entire beneficial interest
in, the icehouses and the land under them,
so as to constitute a lease of the premises,
instead of a mere contract for their use as
licensee under the owner. -Roberts v. Lynn
Ice Co., 73 N. B. 523, 524, 187 Miass. 402.
A contract whereby it was agreed that
plaintiff should have the exclusive privilege
of the public stenographer's office in a cer-
tain hotel, plaintiff agreeing to pay the lent
promptly each month In advance for the ex-
clusive privilege of the public stenographer's
office, and to do private correspondence for
the hotel management, and to furnish compe-
tent stenographers for this service, was not
a lease, but a mere agreement to allow plain-
tiff to carry on business in the hotcO. Hess
T. Boberti^ 108 N. T. Sapp. 894, 895, 124 App-
mv. 32a
An agreement whereby tenants of a store
building, leased for a plumbing bnalneaa, al-
lowed a third person to occupy part oC It
in conducting an electrical supply business,
waa a 'lease," though called a "license" by
them. Denecke v. Henry F. Miller & Son*
119 N. W. 380, 384, 142 Iowa, 486, 19 Ann.
Cas. 949.
An instrument by whi(di defendant con-
tracted to 'let," and plaintiff to "take," tlie
right to maintain, at a race park, three
stands for sale of candies, said right beingr
exclusive for said business within said park«
also the storeroom under the tracks, and one
of said stands, not to exceed a certain size*
to be in the main pavilion, and providing the
period of "letting," and the amount and
times of payment of the "rent," instead of
being a "license," is a "lease," affecUng de-
fendant in the exclusive use of the land, bo
that plaintiff, having paid the r^at, can re-
cover no part of it, though the park is de-
stroyed by fire before the end of the period
of letting. Mehlman ▼. Atlantic Amusement
Co., 119 N. Y. Supp. 222, 223, 66 Misc. Bep. 25.
A contract to let to plaintiffs the exclu-
sive news, confectionery, view, and checking
privileges on defendant's steamers for certain
specified seasons, though denominated a
Uase, was not a "lease," but a "license.**
Nash V. Thousand Island Steamboat Co., 108
N. Y. Supp. 336, 342, 123 App. Div. 148.
An instrument granting, demising, and
leasing certain land for the purpose solely of
mining and operating for oil, gas, and other
minerals, laying pipe lines, building tanks,
and structures to take care of the products
is a lease conveying an interest in the land«
and not merely a "license" to enter and op-
erate for oil or gas. Bamsdall ▼. Bradford
Gas Co., 74 AU. 207, 225 Pa. 838, 26 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 614.
An instrument by which the owner of
land therein described grants to another all
the gas and oil under It, with the exclusive
right to enter thereon at all times to drill
and operate for oil or gas, etc., and provides
for the time within which the various wells
shall be completed, with a stipulated month-
ly rental for each well not finished on time,
and that each location shall consist of ten
acres more or less, and that no well shall oc-
cupy more than one acre is not a "lease," as
leases are usually understood, but a mere
grant of an exclusive right to enter and ex-
plore for oil and gas, and prosecute such
business, occupying no more land than is
needed for that purpose, not more than one
acre to a well. Stahl v. Illinois Oil Co., 90
N. B. 632, 633, 45 Ind. App. 211.
A contract simply giving a right to take
ore from a mine, no estate being granted,
confers a mere "licensci" and licensee ao-
LICEK8B
121
lilCBNSB
quires no rigbt to fhe ore until MpftrfttoA
from the frediold; bnt an InBtmment de-
misincr land tor mining purposes, for a des*
Isnated term of years, at a fixed rent, and
giving the right to erect all necessary bnlld*
inSB, is a "lease," not merely a mining "li-
cense.'* Barnsdall v. Bradford Qas Co., 74
AtL 207, 208, 225 Pa. 338, 26 U a A. (N. &)
614.
See Office.
As a r^TooaUe atttikoritj
A "license" is a mere authority to use
real property, and hence is revocable. Unit*
ed Merchants' Bealty & ImproYement Ck>. ▼•
American Billposting Go., 128 N. Y. Sapp.
666, 667, 71 M&sc Bepu 457.
A deed whereby, for raloe, one grants
tbe right to lay pipes to convey petroleum,
together with all rights and privileges neces-
sary to the enjoyment of the grant and to
the removal of the pipes, the pipes to be laid
within ten feet of the line of the grantor's
property, does not grant a "license" which
may be revoked at the grantor's wilL Stand-
ard Oil Ck>. V. Bnchi, 66 AU. 427, 429, 72 N. J.
Bq.4d2.
Bateats
A grant of any interest in or right on-
der a patent, less ttum the exclusive rights
as to making, using, and vending the same,
la a "license." Paulus t. M. M. BiMdc Mfg.
Co., 129 Fed. 594-596, 64 O. G. A. 162.
Sai^e-^Asfligaateat distlaaolsked
A conveyance by a patentee to another
of the sole and exclusive right and license to
use and to build for use within territory de-
acribed the machines of the patent, with cer-
tain express exceptions, and also reserving
to the patentee the right to build machines
In said territory for use outside thereof, is a
mere "license," and not an "aaslgnment**
Bowers v. Atlantic, Gulf ft Pacific Co., 162
Fed. 895, 902.
A patent secures the exclusive right to
make, use, and vend the invention it pro-
tects. A grant of all these exclusive rights
throughout the United States or a specified
part thereof is an assignment of an interest
In the patent by whatever name it is desig*
nated. A grant of any interest In or right
under a patent, less than these, is a "license."
Paulus V. M. M. Buck Mfg. Oo., 129 Fed. 594,
096, 64 C. 0. A 162.
IiXOENSE (OoTemiaemtal Regnlatloa)
See Sale Without a (License.
Application for as civil action, see Civil
Action — Case — Suit— ete.
Licenses of all kinds, see All.
Order granting license as Judgment, see
Judgment.
Renewal license, see RenewaL
Bequiiing license to sell liquor as taking
prcHPerly, see Taking (la Ominent Do-
main).
'The popdiar understanding of the word
license^ undoubtedly is a permlnlon to do
something which, without the license, would
not be allowable. The object of the license
is to confer a right that does not exist with«
out the license." Ck>mmonwealth v. Central
Hotel Co., 90 8. W. 565, 121 Ky. 846, 12 Ann.
Gas. 172 (Quoting and adopting definition in
Standard Oil Co. v. Commonwealth, 82 & W.
1021, 119 Ky. 75).
A "license" is a mere permit to do some-
thing that without it would be unlawful.
Littleton V. Burgess, 82 Pae. 864, 866, 14
Wyo. 173, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 631.
A "license" confers the right to do that
which, without the license^ would be unlaw-
ful. Board of Oom'rs of Jefferson County v.
Mayr, 74 Pac. 458, 31 Colo. 173 (citing People
V. Raima, 89 Pac. 341, 20 (>)lo. 489);
Schwarts v. People, 104 Pac. 92, 103, 46 Colo.
239 (Quoting and adopting definition in Peo-
ple T. Raima, 89 Pae. 841, 20 (3olo. 489).
"The word license' means permission or
authority, and a license to do any particular
thing is a permission or authority to do that
thing, and, if granted by a person having
power to grant It, transfers to the grantee
the right to do whatever it purports to au-
ttiorise. It certainly transfers to him all
rights which the grantor can transfer to do
what is in flie terms of the license." Ry-
man Steamboat Line v. Commonwealth, 101
& W. 408, 404, 125 Ky. 268, 10 Lu R. A. (N.
8.) 1187 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat
(22 U. 8.1 1, 6 Li Bd. 2«.
The law dictionary and lexicographers
concur in saying that a "license" Is a "per-
mit^ to do a certain thing, and it is clear
that these words are used synonymously in
the act in Sees. Laws 1895, p. 221, c. 96, giv-
ing municipal corporations power to "license"
the sale of liquor and grant "permits" to drug-
gists for the sale of liquor for medicinal uses,
and the contention that the license to sell liq-
uors and the permit w«re distinct things was
untenable. Parsons v. People, 76 Pac. 666,
669, 82 Colo. 22L
A "license" is a privilege granted by the
state directly or indirectly through the mu-
nicipality usually upon payment of the con-
sideration, and confers authority to do some-
thing which would be illegal if done without
a license. License fees may be imposed for
regulation, revenue, or prohibition. Metropo-
lis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 92 N. B.
597, 599, 246 IlL 20.
"Power to 'license,' conferred on a mu-
nicipality, is generally understood to mean
power to regulate by prescribing the condi-
tions or compliance with which the thing
shaU be permitted." Village of St Anthony
V. Brandon, 77 Pac 822, 325, 10 Idaho, 205
(quoting Cent Diet).
"A 'license' is a pernlt to do bustness
paid for in advanosb end. In the nature ol
UCSN8X
122
laosaiBB
tbingB, all queetioiiB pertaining to iti issu-
ance should be determined before the privi-
lege is exercised and as early in the current
tax year as is practicable. Like an assess-
ment, a license apportionment once made and
returned cannot be changed without express
legislatiye authority.*' A social club is not
subject to license taxation, except in so far
as it engages in the sale of intoxicating liq-
uors to its members. Where such club has
for five successive years paid license taxes
based on sworn returns, which were accepted
as correct by the taxing ofiBcers, no action
will lie in behalf of the state to recover addi-
tional license taxes for the same year. State
V. New Orleans Chess, Checkers ft Whist
Club, 40 South. 52e, 628, 116 La. 46.
A tax on the net receipts of an insur-
ance company is not a "license" to do busi-
ness. People V. Cosmopolitan Fire Ins. Co.,
©2 N. B. 922, 927, 246 IlL 442.
A "license to practice medicine" is a priv-
ilege or franchise granted by the government,
and a refusal to grant such franchise, what-
ever the reason may be for such refusal, does
not constitute a penalty. Morse v. State
Board of Medical Examiners, 122 S. W. 446,
448, 57 Tex. av. App. 93.
A "license^' to sell intoxicating liquors
is the authority of the state to carry on the
business, and Act March 21, 1906, making it
unlawful for any person to bring into any
coxmty, eta, where the sale of intoxicating
liquors is prohibited, or may be prohibited,
any intoxicating liquors* does not apply to
liquor destined for one whose "license" to
sell liquor has not expired. Sheehan v.
Louisville ft N. R. Co., 101 S. W. 380, 381, 125
Ky. 478.
Act March 12, 1909 (100 Ohio Laws, p.
89), providing that no person shall engage In
the sale of intoxicating liquors without hav-
ing properly answered certain spedfled ques-
tions, was not objectionable as thereby li-
censing those who answered the questions
correctly in violation of Const. Schedule, |
18, providing that no license to traffic in in-
toxicating liquors shall be granted in the
state, but that the General Assembly may by
law provide against the evils resulting there-
from; the term "license" as so used mean-
ing permission to do something which with-
out the license would not be allowed, to
confer a right that did not exist without it,
the granting of a special privilege to one or
more persons not enjoyed by citizens gener-
ally, or the class to which the license belongs.
Bloomfleld v. State, 99 N. B. 309, 310, 86 Ohio
St 253, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, Ann. Ca&
1913D, 629 (citing 6 Words and Phrases, p.
4133).
The word "license^" as used in an ordi-
nance requiring every person and corpora-
tion erecting and using poles on the public
streets of a dty to pay as a license therefor
a certain sum for each pole, means the sum
paid for permission to erect or maintain polea
in the streets and alleys of the city, for the
purpose of defraying the expenses of regu-
lating and controlling the use of the same
under the police power of the city. City of
Ft Smith V. Hunt, 82 S. W. 163, 165, 72 Ark.
656, 66 L. R. A. 238, 106 Am. St. Rep. 61.
An ordinance^ requiring a fee to be paid
by milk and meat dealers to the inspector of
milk and meats solely to defray the cost of
inspection, is not in the nature of a "license"
as that word is used in Acts 1911, p. 847, 1 1,
making it unlawful for any city coundl to
impose a tax or license upon any person in
the selling of any farm products including
meats; the statute being Intended to pro-
hibit the issuance of a license as a condition
to carrying on the business. Carpenter v.
aty of Little Rock, 142 S. W. 162, 164, 101
Ark. 23a
Acts 1905, p. 258, c 129, authorizing any
city to tax, license, or regulate junk stores,
etc., authorizes the enactment of ordinances
regulating the general business of junk deal-
ers, and not merely the places where junk
is dealt in, in view of the purposes of the act
and the granting of authority to license; a
"license" being a privilege granted to a per-
son, and not to an inanimate object, to pur-
sue some occupation ot exercise some right
declared unlawful, except upon compliance
with such conditioiiai Grossman v. City of
IndianapoUs, 88 N. E. 946, 947, 173 Ind. 157.
The 92 on each |100 of premiums paid by
foreign iDsuranee companies doing biydness
in the etate, which Is required to be paid in-
to the stete treasury, is no part of the 22
cents on each $100 valuation of property or
corporate franchises directed to be assessed
for taxation for the school fund by Ky. St
1903, § 4370, subdi 5, nor is it a "fine," 'for-
feiture," or "license," within subdivision 6,
providing that a portion of such revenues be
paid into the school fund. Fuqua v. Hag^,
84 S. W. 325, 119 Ky. 407.
The word ''licenses," as used in the Tlli-
nolB act relating to the Chicago City Rail-
ways, and providing that any deeds of trans-
fers of rights, privileges, or franchises be-
tween railway corporations, or any two of
them, and all contracts, stipulations, licenses,
and undertakings made, entered Into, or giv-
en, and as made or amended by and between
the common council of the dty and any one
or more of the railway corporations respect-
ing the location, use, -or exclusion of rail-
ways in or upon the streets, or any of them,
of the city, etc., refers to the designation by
the council of the streets to be occupied by
the companies. Covin v. City of Chicago, 132
Fed. 848, 867.
Where a dty ordinance regulating auto-
mobiles required registration and numbering
thereof at a cost to the owner of |1 to cover
the value of figures fumiahed by the dty to
form the number, such provisions are not ob-
XJGENSB
123
LICENSE
jecHonable as a "license"; it being at most
a mere means of regulation and not a license
for revenue. The court said: "If the provi-
sion for registration and numbering, wbidi
inrolTed no discrimination, and requires the
payment of nothing more than is necessary
to pay for the number which the municipality
fumlahes, can be regarded as a license (for
conflicting definitions of license^' see Gooley,
Tax. [3d Ed.] p. 1137; Adler v. Whitbeck, 9
N. E. ei2, 44 Ohio St 539) it is not a license
for the purpose of raising revenue. If it
were, it might well be contended that it did
not pass as an incident to the power to regu-
late. See Ck>oley, Tax. (3d Ed.) p. 1141 ; The
Laundry License Case, 22 Fed. 703. It is a
license (if a license at all) as a mere means
of regulation; indeed, we might say, as al-
ready shown* as a necessary means of regu-
lation. This proposition is self-evident, viz.,
that the grant of authority to accomplish a
certain purpose carries with it authority to
use any proper and lawful means without
which that purpose cannot be accomplished.
If, therefore, the speed of automobiles can-
not be effectually regulated without licensing
them, the grant of the power to regulate con-
fers upon the city power to license, unless
some other provision of law forbids the ex*
erdse of that power.*' People v. Schneider,
1(» N. W. 172, 173, 139 Mich. 873, 09 I/. K A.
345, 5 Ann. Cas. 790.
Buffalo City (Charter (Laws 1891, p. 137,
a 106, I 17, subd. 6, as amended by Laws
1904, p. 83, c. 31), empowering the city to en-
act an ordinance imposing a "taf* on auto-
mobiles ''for the privilege^' of operating the
same on its streets, and to prohibit such use
in case of nonpayment of the tax, and to
provide a penalty for violation of the ordi-
nance, is repealed by a later act, Hie Motor
Vehicle Law (Laws 1904, p. 1816, c. 538, | 4,
subd. 4), providing that the city shall have
no power to pass, maintain, or enforce ordi*
nances requiring from owners of automobHes
"licenses" or permits to use the streets, or
prohibiting them tnm the free use thereof; a
tax for the privilege of operating automobtles
on the streets being but a license. CSity of
Buffalo T. Lewis, 108 N. Y. Supp. 450, 123
App. DiT. 103.
A city ordinance provided that it should
be unlawful for any person to keep any sa-
loon where IntozicatiDg liquors were sold or
drunk as a beverage without first pajring a li-
cense fee of |300 per annum, and that the
dty treasurer, on payment of the fee, should
give a receipt for the amount paid, which
should constitute a license for the keeping of
a saloon. Held, that the ordinance applied
only to saloons where intoxicating liquors
were sold, and hence was an attempt to "li-
cense** the sale of such liquors contrary to
Comp. Laws 1897, f 3107, giving such city au^
thority to license all taverns and houses of
public oitertainment, saloons, restaurants,
and eating houses, but providing that such
act should not authorize the licensing of the
sale of intoxicating liquors. Fitzpatrick v.
Weaver, 111 N. W. 168, 164, 147 Mich. 382.
As m oontraoi
See Contract
As written doomneatt
The word ''Ucense," in Oen. St. 1902, tit
16, entitled "Intoxicating Liquors," providing
for the issuance of liquor licenses, and pro-
hibiting the sale of liquor without a license,
etc., signifies an intangible right granted to
the licensee and signifies the writing signed
by the county commissioners, which is the in-
strument, and evidence of that grant, but the
grant of such right can only be had by writ-
ing signed by the county commissioners in
which the town and the particular building
in which the sales licensed ;ire to be made
and person who is licensed to make them, as
provided by sections 2669, 2672, 2675. Con-
necticut Breweries Co. v. Murphy, 70 Atl. 450,
452, 81 Conn. 145.
The word ''Ucense^" as used in Act March
11, 1903, relating to the appropriation of pub-
lic waters, and regulating the issnance of a
certificate ahd license after inspection by the
state engineer, applies to the paper to be is-
sued on proof of aiHPlication to beneficial use
of the waters. Idaho Power & Transporta-
tion Co. V. Stephenson, 101 Pac. 821, 823, 16
Idaho, 418.
The word 'license,'* in AcU 1905^ p. 492,
1 1, providing tliat no person shall be eligible
to the office of county superintendoit of
schoola unless he shall hold a 86 months' li-
cense^ a 60 monthsP license, a life or prof es^
sional license to teach in the schools of the
states means the written document by which
permission or authority has h&exk granted to
the holder thereof te teach in the common
sdiools for the period of time required by
the act, and sudi a document, in the absence
of fraud affecting it, is conclusive evidence
that tiie person to whom it Is issued has the
legal qualifications of a teacher. State ex
r^ Benham v. Bradt, 84 N. S. 1084, 1087, 170
Ind. 480 (citing Blmore v. Overton, 4 N. EX
197, 104 Ind. 548, 54 Am. St Bep^ 848).
As lawful act
A "license" to carry on a business or
trade has been defined to be an official per-
mit to carry on the same, or perform other
acts forbidden by law except to persons ob-
taining such permit Bauvler*s Law Diction-
ary. City of Savannah v. Cooper, 63 S. B.
138, 140, 131 Oa. 670.
Franeliise dlstliigliislied
Permission given by a city ordinance for
the exercise of a corporate franchise within
the dty Is a "license" and not a franchise.
People ex reL Fitdienry v. Union Gas ft Elec-
tric Co., 98 N. S. 7681, Ttl, 254 111. 395.
The right to construct a street railway
within any municipality comes from the
state as a "franchise," while the power to
LICENSE
124
LICENSE
consent and designate the streets to be occa-
pied comes from the municipality as a 'li-
cense'* or contract right Potter v. Calumet
Electric St R. Co., 168 Ted. 621, 627 (citing
Chicago City Ry. Co. ▼. People ex rel. Story,
73 lU. 641).
A gas "franchise** is property, a vested
right protected by the Constitution, while a
"license" is a mere personal privilege, and
revocable, except in rare instances and under
peculiar conditions. Elizabeth City v. Banks,
64 S. B. 189, 102, 160 N. C. 407, 22 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 926.
A "franchise** is a privilege which eman-
ates from the sovereign power of the state or
government A power conferred upon a rail-
road company by ordinance to locate and
maintain a railroad in the streets of a city
is a "license,'* Which, after the road is built,
may be irrevocable, but such ordinance does
not create or confer on the railroad company
constructing the railroad in the street a
"franchise." The "license" granted by the or-
dinance is no more a '*franchise" than would
be a grant of right of way by a private dti-
aen to the company to construct its road over
his lands, and it is as competent for the dty
as for a private owner to extend the time
of performance or to amend, modi^T, or annul
the contract by mutual agreement City of
Chicago V. RothschUd ft Co., 72 N. B. 098, 099,
212 111. 690 (citing Chicago City Ry. Co. v.
People ex rel. Story, 78 IlL 641, 647 ; Metro-
politan City Ry. Co. v. Chicago, W. D. By.
Co., 87 111. 817; Board of Trade of Chicago
T. People ex reL Sturges, 91 IlL 80; Mills Vi
Parlin, 106 111. 60; Chicago Municipal Gas-
light ft Fuel Co. V. Town of Lake, 22 N. B.
616, 130 IlL 42; aty of Belleville v. Citisens'
Horse Ry. Co., 38 N. B. 684, 162 IlL 171, 26
L. R. A. 681 ; People ex reL City of Pontlac
V. Central Union TeL Co., 61 N. B. 428, 192
BL 807, 86 Am. St Rep. 338; Rostad v. Chi-
cago Suburban Water ft Light Co., 71 N. B.
078, 211 lU. 248; Davis v. Mayor, etc., of
City of New York, 14 N. T. 606, 67 Am. Dec
186; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 18 Pet [38
U. S.] 679, 10 L. Ed. 274; City of Bridgeport
T. New York ft N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 266, 4
Am. Rep. 63; Morgan v. Loulsianat 93 U.
S. 217, 23 L. Ed. 860).
A right not essential to the general pur-
pose of a grantee, and such that a private
party might grant over his property, such as
a revocable permission to occupy a portion
of some public ground, highway, or street,
is a "license," and not a franchise. McPhee
ft McGinnity Co. V; Union Pac. R. Co., 168
red. 6, 10, 87 C. C. A, 619.
The grant by a municipality of a fran-
chise to use its streets is the exercise by
delegation of a powjer which resides in the
state, and which is by its nature governmen-
tal; hence, if grounds for forfeiture arise,
the state may alone enforce it, and may
alone waive it; toza, franchise may be said
to be a giant from the state to a omporatlon
of authority to oocupy the dty streets, "li-
censes*' to be the designation by the dty
council of the streets to be occupied, and
"contracts" the stipulated arrangements be-
tween the companies and the dty as to the
manner of occupancy. State on Inf. of Jones
V. West Bnd Light ft Power Co^ 162 S. W.
67, 76, 246 Ma 618L
InTmlid Ueense
A dramshop license issued without com-
pliance with an ordinance, requiring the ap-
plication to be signed by a majority of the
property owners according to frontage on both
sides of the street in the block where the
dramshop Is to be kept, or by a majority of
the bona flde householders and persons or
firms living in or doing business on each side
of the street in the block on which the dram-
shop has its entrance, is invalid, and a dram-
shop, operated under such a license is "oper-
ated without a license" within Hurd's Rev.
St 1909, c. 43, i 7, providing that an unli-
censed dramshop shall be a nuisance. Hoyt
V. McLaughlin, 96 N. B. 461, 467, 260 111. 442.
As a peraomd trust or privilege
A Ucense is a grant of spedal privilege
to one or more persons, not enjoyed by dtl-
zens generally, or, at least» not enjoyed by a
class of citizens to which the licensee belongs,
and grants a permission to do something
which, without a license, is not allowable.
State V. Parker Distilling Co., 139 S. W 453,
466, 236 Mo. 219, 237 Mo. 103 (auoting 5
Words and Phrases, p. 4137).
"A license' to deal in intoxicating liquors
is in the nature of a personal trust, and the
applicant for such privilege must be a per-
son able, willing, and competent to carry out
such trust, and not delegate it entirely to
others, whose character may not be such as
the law requires of the licensee." In re
Krug, 101 N. W. 242, 244, 72 Neb. 676 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Watklns ▼«
Grieser, 66 Pac. 332, 11 OkL 802).
A "license" for the sale of liquor is but
a personal privilege and not assignable ex-
cept as authorized by the Legislature and in
the mode therein prescribed. Though a trus-
tee in bankruptcy cannot sell a retail liquor
license issued to a bankrupt, he can sell the
unexpired lease of a licensed saloon with
the furniture and fixtures, on condition that
the license shall be transferred to the pur-
chaser by the license court, and, where the
purdiaser abandons his purchase without any
attempt to secure a transfer of the license^
he is liable for loss on resale. Snyder v.
Rougher, 63 Aa 893, 894, 214 Pa. 453 (dting
in support of definition, Blumenthal's Peti-
tion, 18 AU. 396, 126 Pa. 412).
A "license" to sell intoxicating liquor is
a personal privilege, which may be valuable
as property, in a certain s^ise, for the per-
sonal use of the holder, but which is not as-
signable or transferable by him in any way.
UOJBKSa
126 LICENSE, REOX7LATE. AND TAX
Tracy v. Glnzberg, 75 N. IL 637^ 688; 188
Mass. 260, 2S5.
As a mere veeeipt
Under Pen. Code 1895, art 112, penaliz-
ing tLe pursuit of a profession without a
•Ticenae" therefor, a receipt for the occnpation
tax ia, in the absence of a statutory provi-
sion aa to what the license shall contain, a
^mcense." Fduts y. State, 101 & W. 223, 224,
61 Tex. Gr. B. 8.
The word "license," in the Chicago
Wheel Tax Ordinance, which requires owners
of automoMles to obtain a license or permit
to use a Tehicle in the city in addition to the
license or permit obtained from the Secretary
of State, as required by the Motor Vehicle
Law, is used in the sense of tax, and the ia-
Buance of the license thereunder amounts to
no more than the giving of a receipt showing
that the annual tax imposed by the ordinance
liaa been paid. Ayres v. City of Chicago, 87
N. B. 1073, 1076, 238 IlL 287.
Under the statotea of Alabama all occn-
paticm taxes are evidenced by a receipt,
which ia called a "license," and the fact that
an act Impoeiag a tax on the occupation of
aa emigrant agent called the receipt evidenc-
ing the payment thereof a license did not ren-
der it any less a tax on the eeenpatlon for
revenue. Kendrick v. State, 88 Souttu 208»
204, 142 Ala. 43.
diatiBgvlalMd
See Assignment.
Aa property
See Property.
BesaUie dlstlBgiilalied
To "license" means to permit, to give an-
thorlty, to couduct or carry on. It differs
from "regulate** in that regulate means to
preacribe the manner in which a thing may
be conducted. Pacific University r. Johnson,
84 Pac. 704, 706, 47 Or. 448.
Tax dlstlBSiiiahed
Sea Tax— Taxation.
Aa vested nigkt
See Vested Right
A "license fee** ia a sum demanded of
mxk individual in return for the grant of a
privilege which he did not previously possess,
and is not a tax, as ordinarily understood,
mm a contribution demanded by a sovereign
from his subjects in return fbr his protection.
The power to enforce the terms of a treaty
with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indiana
that no person shall expose goods for sale
virlthout a pennit is a duty imposed on the
executive department of the government, and
In the discharge of that duty it la not within
the jurisdiction of the courts to enjoin sudi
action. Zevely v. Weimer, 82 S. W. 941, 843,
6 Ind. T. 646.
"A license fee' la understood to be a
charge for the privilege of carrying on a
business or occupation, and is not the equiv-
alent or in lieu of a property tax." The con-
tract arrangements for the payment to a mu-
nicipality of a "license fee" on each street
car, modified as to the amount of such fees
under the authority of a statute accepted by
the street railway company, stating that such
fees should be taken "in full satisfaction for
the use of the streets or avenues," does not
exempt the company from the tax Imposed,
under Laws N. T. 1899, c. 712, on its fran-
diiae. People of State of New Tork ex rel.
Brooklyn City B. Co. v. State Board of Tax
Com'rs, 25 Sup. Ct 718, 714, 199 U. S. 48,
60 U Ed. 79.
The registration fee of f2, required by
St 1908, p. 607, c. 473, 1 1, providing for the
registration of automobiles, is a '^license fee,"
and not a tax for revenue. Commonwealth
V. Boyd, 74 N. B. 266, 266^ 188 Mass. 79,
106 Am. St Rep. 464.
A tax on the gross recdpts of a street
railroad company Imposed as a condition to
the exercise of the special privileges grant-
ed it is not a property tax but is a "license
fee." North Jersey St By. Co. v. Jersey City,
67 AU. 38, 84, 74 N. J. Law, 761.
Under Tax Law, | 46, providing that
where a dty haa assessed a tax upon the
ffpedal franchise of a corporation, and it ap-
pears that the corporation has paid to the
dty any sum based on a percentage of gross
earnings or other income or any license fee
or any sum of money on account of such
special franchise, which payment was in the
nature of a tax, anoh payment shall be de«
ducted from the franchise tax assessed,
whi^e a subway company, under the condi-
tions of its franchise^ waa compelled to fur-
nish free, to the dty, spaoe In its subway%
the giving of thla free space waa not a "li-
cense fee^'; the term "Ucense fee" not mean-
ing anything else than a payment in cash.
Consolidated Telegraph & Biectrlcal Subway
Co. V. Metz, 104 N. Y. Supp. 922, 923, 119
App. Dlv. 836.
UOBlfSS, BSOULATEt AHD BE-
8TBAIV
See, also, Begulate and Bestraln.
The grant of power to "license, regulate,
and restrain" shops for the sale of iutoxl-
cating liquors is sufBdently broad to war-
rant a city ordinance requiring applicants
for such license to procure the written as-
sent of a majority of the property owners
in the Immediate district City of Baton
Bouge V. Butler, 42 South. 660, 663, U8 La.
73.
UCEiraE. BEOUUkTE, AHD TAX
The new charter of the dty of Baltimore
(section 6), authorizing the mayor and couje^
dl "to license^ tax, and regiUate all busi-
UCENSE TAX
126
IJOXKSBaB
nes8e0, trades, ayocatioiis or profeisloDs/'
conferred on the city the power to impose a
charge on commission merchants for the prly-
ilege of selling in the city market; such
charge being a tax for revenue, and not a
liooise or regulation tax. Meushaw y. State,
71 Aa 467, 459, 109 Md. 84.
UOEHSE TAX
As tax, see Tax — ^Taxation.
A "license tax" is one imposed on the
privilege of exercising certain callings, pro-
fessions, and avocations, and, when collect-
ed, is a part of the general funds of a city.
State ex reL Smith v. Berryman, 127 S. W.
129, 1S2, 142 Mo. App. 373.
Every "license tax*' is imposed for rais-
ing revenue or as a police regulation, or for
both purposes. Johnson v. City of Great
Falls, 99 Pae 1069, 1060, 38 Mont 369, 16
Ann. Cas. 974.
A "license tax*' is "either a license, strict-
ly so called, imposed in the exercise of ordi-
nary police power of the state^ or it is a tax
laid in the exercise of the power oi taxatioa
City Council of Montgomery v. Kelly, 38
South. 67, 68, 142 Ala. 552, 70 L. R. A. 209,
110 Am. St Rep. 43 (citing Tied. -Urn. Po-
lice Power).
The words "licence tax,'* used with ref-
erence to corporations exclusively, mean no
more necessarily than a charge of some kind
imposed upon them solely for their corpo-
rate privilege. Kaiser Land & Fruit Co. y.
Curry, 103 Pac. 341. 344, 349, 156 Cal. 638.
The tax authorized by Sees. Laws 1902,
p. 73, c. 3, i 65, caUed a "license tax,** is, in
form of an excise, a tax on the business of
foreign corporations levied for the purpose of
state revenue, and Is not a property tax, and
so does not violate the uniformity clause of
the Constitution. American Smelting & Re-
fining Co. V. People ex reL Lindsley, 82 Pac.
631, 538, 34 Colo. 24a
The tax imposed by Act Ky. March 28,
1906, upon persons engaged in compounding,
rectifying, adulterating, or blending distilled
spirits, is a "license or occupation tax,'* and
not a property tax. Brown-Forman Co. v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 30 Sup. Ct 578,
580, 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. Bd. 883.
An ordinance enacted by the board of
supervisors of the city and county of San
Francisco is entitled "An ordinance impos-
ing a license for the purpose of regulation
upon persons • • • selling • • • malt
or ferm^ited liquors • ♦ • in quan-
tities of one quart or more, less than five
gallons, when the same is contained in seal-
ed packages, and not to be drunk on the
premises where sold, • • • requiring a per-
mit therefor.'* The ordinance makes it un-
lawful to sell such liquors "without first hav-
ing obtained a permit therefor from the
board of police commissioners, and paying
the license fee herein provided"; requires
any person doing such act to procure a li-
cense, paying therefor "a license fee of $150
per annum**; requires application for renew-
als to be passed upon by the board of police
commissioners, and declares that the ordi-
nance and "the license herein imposed" are
enacted to regulate the business described.
The charter of the dty and county of San
Francisco (article 2, c. 2, | 1) authorizes the
board of supervisors to make all necessary
police regulations; and subdivision 15 au-
thorizes it to impose "license taxes," but
provides that no license taxes shall be Im-
posed upon one who, at any fixed place of
business, sells goods, etc., except such as re-
quire permits from the board of police com-
missioners, as provided in this charter. Held,
that the ordinance was enacted solely for
regulation, and not for revenue, and the li-
cense imposed was a "license tax" within
subdivision 15, so that the board had no pow-
er to impose it, since, while a "tax," tech-
nically, only Includes diarges Impcraed for
producing revenue, and not for purposes of
regulation under the police power, the term
"license tax,*' as used in the statotes and
by the courts, Inclttdes license charges of
every character, whether imposed for reve-
nue or police regulations, or both. John
Rapp & Son y. Kiel, 115 Paa 661, 662, 159
Cal. 702.
UOENSED
See Duly Licensed.
UiiXENMEE
A "licensee" is one who goes onto the
land of another for his own purposes only.
Williams V. Belmont Coal & Coke Co.^ 46 S.
E. 802, 806, 56 W. Va. 84.
The terms "mere licensee" or "bare li-
censee'* are often used as synonymous with
"trespasser." Pittsburgh, C, C. & St L. R.
Co. V. Simons (Ind.) 76 N. B. 883, 886.
A -"mere licensee** is one who is clothed
with no right and to whom no invitation has
been extended but who is upon the premises
of another by permission or acquiescence.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. *Denny*s Adm'r, 56
S. E. 321, 328, 106 Va. 383.
A person is a mere "licensee^' where he
was not on the premises by . invitation ex-
pressed or Implied, nor for any business con-
nected with defendant nor in relation to any
business for which the freight house in which
he was injured was used, but went there of
his own volition, uninvited, concerning a
matter which was personal to himself In
which the defendant had no Interest Means
v. Southern CaL R. Co., 77 Pac. 1001* 1002,
144 CaL 473« 1 Ann. Cas. 206.
A person is a "licensee** when he is on
the land of others with their consent, ex-
pressed or Implied. If a person is a licensee,
he is rightfully on the landowners' premises^
LTCEKSEB
127
UOENSSB
mud it cftnnot be found he la in fault when
be shows he was exercising ordinary cara
Consequently he may recover if it appears
they failed to do what the ordinary man
would have done to prevent an accident.
Brown t. Boston & M. B. B., 64 AtL 194, 109,
78 N. H. 6a&
Where plaintiff went on defendant's
premises to transact private business with
the defendant's employes, in which defend-
ant had no Interest, he was a mere 'licen-
see," though defendant directed him to use
the elevator in which he was Injured; and,
no active negligence being shown, he was not
entitled to recover for injuries sustained in
using the elevator. Muencfa ▼. Heinemann,
96 N. W. 800-802, 119 Wis. 441.
"In a strict and legal sense there is a
well-defined distinction between a mere 'li-
censee' and one who goes upon the premises
of another by invitation, express or implied.
In a general sense, one upon the premises of
another by invitation is a licensee, and, if
sued for trespass, his defense would be leave
and license of the owner; but, in a strict and
somewhat technical senses to go upon prem-
ises upon an implied invitation means more
than a mere license." Pauckner v. Wakem,
83 N. E. 202. 204, 231 IlL 276, 14 L. R A. (N.
S.) 1118.
The occupant ct a stall in a public mar-
Icet is not neoessailly a mere "licensee."
Swayze v. City of Monroe, 40 South. 926,
928, 116 La. 643.
A newsboy who enters a stone quarry to
sell papers, in his own interest or that of
his employer, or who enters by permission
to sell his papers, or to accommodate some
workman who wishes to purchase a paper, is
only a '^censee," as his business has no re-
lation to the business of the proprietor, and
it was not the duty of the proprietor to have
the grounds reasonably safe for such licensea
Norrls v. Hugh Nawn Contracting Co., 91 N.
£L 886, 887, 206 Mass. 68, 31 L. B. A. (N. S.)
628, 19 Ann. Cas. 424.
Where a complaint for injuries to plain*
tiff alleged that he was employed by defend-
ants, and that defendants by their agent of-
fered to convey plaintiff in a sleigh to his
place of employment, wliich- offer plaintiff ac-
eei>ted, and was injured by the negligent
driving of such agent, plaintiff was not pre-
cluded by the complaint from proving that,
at the time of the injury, the relationship ex-
latin^ between him and defendants was that
of "licensor and llc^isee," and not that of
master and servant Pigeon v. Lane, 67 AtL
886, 887, 80 Conn. 237, 11 Ann. Cas. 371,
Unless mainly imposed for revenue a li-
cense fee is not a tax, but the price paid for
the privilege of exerciiEding a franchise. Sums
Imposed in the regulation of the business of
running vehicles for hire are license fees and
not occupation taxes. Bx parte Dennyp 129
8. W. 1115, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 57a
''A "bare licensee' is one who enters upon
the land of another simply without objection
of the owner or by sufferance of the owner
or occupier, whether such land be inclosed
or unlncloeed. Such bare licensee enters the
land at his own risk, and if, while on such
land, such bare licensee be injured by the
negligence of the owner or occupant of such
land, he has no right to recover." Connell
V. Keokuk Electric B. & Power Co., 109 N.
W. 177, 178, 131 Iowa, 622.
A person accompanying passengers to as-
sist them in entering a train, though not a
passenger, is not a "bare licensee," as he
has at least a tacit invitation of the carrier
by virtue of the relation existing between the
carrier and the passenger, and the carrier
must exercise at least ordinary care to avoid
injuring him by defective stational facilities
or approaches thereto. Chesapeake & O. By.
Co. V. Paris' Adm'r, 59 S. SL 398, 399, 107 Va.
408.
A bare "licensee," barriilg wantonness or
some form of intentional wrong or active neg-
ligence by the owner or occupier, takes the
premises as he finds them, and mere per-
mission involves leave and license but be-
stows no right to care. Where a proprietor
of a store invited plaintiff to come to the
store to advise him in a business transaction,
and plaintiff, on reaching the store, found the
proprietor busy, and while waiting, as he was
required to do, he asked permission to go
to the basement to a closet, and permission
was granted, and while going he fell into an
unguarded pit in the basement, plaintiff was
on the premises in response to the proprie-
tor's invitation and was not a bare licensee
at the time, and the proprietor owed him the
duty of exercising ordinary care for Ms pro-
tection. Glaser v. Bothschild, 120 S. W. 1, 3,
221 Mo. 180, 22 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1045, 17
Ann. Cas. 576.
A "licensee" of a patent is one who is
not the owner of an interest in the patent,
but who has, by contract, acquired a right to
make, or use, or sell machines embodying the
invention. Hartman v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 145 Fed. 358, 368; Cortelyou v. Charles
Eneu Johnson & Co., 138 Fed. 110, 117 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Heaton-Pen-
insular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Spe-
cialty Co., 77 Fed. 288, 25 C. O. A. 267, 35
L. B. A. 728, and citing Oayler v. Wilder, 10
How. [51 U. S.3 477, 18 L. Ed. 504; GUver v.
Bumford Chemical Works, 3 Sup. Ct. 61, 109
U. S. 75, 27 L. Ed. 862).
A club incorporated by Acts 1858, p. 121,
c. 95, as amended as a social club, and main-
taining a clubhouse in the dty of Baltimore,
and there furnishing to its members refresh-
ment, including intoxicating liquors, and
holding a license to sell liquors in the city
of Baltimore, is a "licensee" under Pub. Loa
Laws Baltimore City, art. 4, relating to in-
toxicating liquors, and by virtue of Acts 1S98,
IiIOEKSEB
128
LIEK
p. 778, e. 246, and Acts 1906, p. 474, C 278,
l8 liable to the penalty prescribed by Balti-
more City Charter, ( 685, for selling llqaor on
Sunday, though the sale is made to its mem-
bers. State y. Maryland Club, 66 Atl. 667,
668, 105 Md. 585.
"Lieensee^" as that term la used in con-
nection with railway property, and the op-
eration of railway trains, is one who goes
upon the station grounds or tracks for pur-
poses other than transportation by permis-
sion, either express or implied. Where the
wife of a station agent was accustomed to
assist her husband with the work in the sta-
tion office, which was known to the officers
of the road in charge of the diTlsion, and not
objected to by them, she was a licensee, and
the road was liable for injuries to her while
so in the office, owing to the derailment of a
train caused by running it at a dangerous
speed over a defective track. Croft ▼. Chi-
cago, B. I. & P. R. Co., 108 N. W. 1063, 1056,
182 Iowa, 687.
The relation of carrier and passenger is
one of contract. There must be an agreement
by the carrier and generally a consideration
paid by or for the passenger to bring the
relation into being. Where plaintiff, upon
the invitation of his brother, a switch brake-
man, attempted to Vide ^upon a portion of a
freight train being switched in railroad yards
and was injured, he was neither a passen-
ger nor a "licensee." Skirvin v. Louisville ft
N. R, Co, (Ky.) 100 S. W. 308.
Where the roadbed of a railroad had
long been used with the knowledge and tacit
consent of the railroad as a common passage-
way by the public generally at. all times, a
pedestrian on the roadbed was a "licensee,**
and the railroad owed him the duty of ordi-
nary care to avoid injuring him. Chesapeake
ft O. Ry. Co. V. Corbin's Adm'r, 67 S. El 179,
181, 110 Va. 700.
A "licensee" is a person who is neither a
passenger, servant, nor trespasser, and not
standing in any contractual relation to the
railroad, and permitted to come on its prem-
ises for his own interest, convenience, or
gratification. Gainesville ft Gulf R. Co. r.
Peck, 46 South. 1019, 1022, 55 Fla. 402.
Mere failure to pay fare does not deprive
one riding on a street car of his rights as a
passenger, nor does it convert his relation to
the owner into that of a mere "licensee."
Gabbert v. Hackett, 115 N. W. 345, 347, 135
Wis. 86, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1070 (citing Qeve-
land, C, C. ft St L, Ry. Co. v. Ketcham, 33
N. B. 116, 133 Ind. 346, 19 L. R. A. 339, 36
Am. St Rep. 550; Hurt v. Southern R. Co.,
40 Miss. 891; Muehlhausen v. St. Louis R.
Co., 2 S. W. 315, 91 Mo. 332; Rose v. Des
Moines Val. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 246; Shear, ft
R. Neg. f 491 ; Todd v. Old Colony ft F. R.
R. Co., 3 Allen [85 Mass.] 18, 80 Am. Dec. 49 ;
Wilton V. Middlesex R. Co., 107 Mass. 108, 9
Am. Rep. 11; Jacobus v. St Paul ft C. Ry.
Co., 20 Minn. 126 [GIL 110], 18 Am. Bep. 800 ;
Philadelphia ft R. B. Co. v. Derby, 14 How.
[65 U. S.] 468, 14 Jj. Sd. 502; The New World
▼. King, 16 How. [57 U. SJ 469, 14 L. EVL
1019).
UCEH8EE BT BZFRESS INVXTATKMr
"A 'licensee by eaq;>reB8 invitation' is one
who is directly invited by the owner of the
land to enter upon it, and such person Is
rightfully upon such land." Connell ▼. Keo-
kuk Electric B. ft Power Co., 109 N. W. 177,
178, 131 Iowa, 622.
LICENSEE BT IMPLIED IHVITftTIOir
"A 'licensee by implied invitation' is one
who has been invited to enter upon the land
either by the owner or occupier of the same
by some affirmative act done by such owner
or occupant, or by appearances which justify
persons generally in believing that such own-
er or occupant had given his consent to the
public generally to enter upon or to cross
over his premises; and, while such licensee
is acting within tbe scope and limit of such
implied invitation, he has the lawful right to
be where he is so invited." Connell v. Keo-
kuk Electric B. ft Power Co., 109 N. W. 17T,
178, 131 Iowa, 622.
UGEHSEE WITH AK HfTEBEST
"One who, in the performance of bis
own InterestB or those of his master's, as-
sists servants of another In the performance
of their work, is not a 'fellow servant' of
such servants, .nor a 'volunteer,' but occupies
a third position, viz., that of a licensee with
an interest.' " Kelly v. Tyra, 114 N. W. 750,
753, 103 Minn. 176, 17 L. B. A. (N. S.) 334
(quoting and adopting definition in Byan v.
John O'Brien Boiler WorkSi 68 Mo, App. 148»
151).
LICENTIOUSNESS
See Lewdness.
LIEN
See Attorney's lien; Builder's JAem;
Carrier's Lien; Charging Lien; Com-
mon-Law Lien; Equitable lien; Fac-
tor's lien; Grantor's lien; Judgment
fbr BecoVery of Property or for ESn-
forcement of lien; Judgment lien;
Maritime lien; Mechanic's lien;
iPartner's lien; Possessory Lien; Pre-
ferred lien; Seller's Lien; Statutory
lien; Tax lien; Valid lien; Vm-
dor's Lien.
Other lien, see Other.
Secured by legal proceedings, see Legal
Proceedings.
Such ilen, see Such.
''A 'lien* is said to be a qualified right
which. In a given case, may be exercised over
the property of another." Advance Thresher
Co. T. Beck, 128 N. W. 815, 816, 21 N. D. 55,
umr
129
KJBN
Ann. OttB. mSB, MT (quoting and dtlng^ a
defiDition In Anderson y. State. 28 liiae. 4S9).
A "Uen" iB a right by which a person is
entitled to obtain satisfaction of a debt by
means of property belonging to the person In-
debted to him. Frlck v. Hllllard, 96 M. O.
117, 122.
In the strict legal sense, a 'lien** is a
right in one person to detain that which is in
his possession belonging to another until cer-
tain demands of such person in possession
are satisfied. In re Ransford, 194 Fed. 658,
eaO, 115 C. G. A. 560.
A 'lien" is a holding or claim which one
person has on the property of another as se-
curity for a Judgment or some charge or
debt out of that property. United States Ox-
ygen Co. y. Bernard A. Buge, 136 N. Y. Supp«
297, 301 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p.
4144); Meanor y. Goldsmith, 65 Atl. 1084,
1086, 216 Pa. 489, 10 U R. A. (N. S.) 342
(quoting definition In 2 Bouy. Law Diet 226).
A "lien** is the right of the creditor to
take bis debt out of a specified res, which,
though it may be a changing fund, must ney-
ertheless be ascertained, since it is a prop-
erty right, and could not be said to arise by
a mere custom restricting a borrower's right
to use the money loaned to release certain
securities ftom a former pledge, nor by a
promise to pay the creditor from a partic-
ular fund. Hotchklss y. National City Bank
of New York, 200 Fed 287, 291.
The term *'lien,*' in a narrow ti>r*hnimi
sense, signifies a right by which a person in
possession of personal property holds and
detains It against the owner in satisfaction
of a demand. The term, howeyer, has a
more extensiye meaning, being used to de-
note a legal claim or charge on property, real
or personal, for the payment of a debt or
dtity;eyery such claim or charge being still
a •'lien," though the property be not in the
possession of him to whom the debt or duty
is due It is a hold or dalm which one
has on the property of another as security
for some debt or charge and may exist inde-
pendent of possession. As in maritime law
and in equity, the term is used as synony-
mous with a charge or incumbrance on the
tiling where there 1b neither jus in re nor ad
rem, nor possession of the thing. In re Ma-
her, 169 Fed. 997, 999 (citing 6 Words and
Plirases, p. 4144 et seg.).
"The term Tien,* in a narrow and more
te<3mical sense, signifies the right by which
a person in possession of personal property
holds and detains it against the owner in
satisfaction of a demand; but it has a more
extensiye meaning, and in conunon accepta-
tion is understood and used to denote a le-
gal claim or charge on property, either real
oiT personal, for the payment of any debt or
duty. Byery such claim or charge 1b stiU a
tten on the property, although the property be
not in the possession of him to whom the
3 WDS.& PJ2d Ssb.— 9
debt or daty is due. A lien' Is defined to be
a hold or claim as security for some debt ot
(diarge. At common law there could be no
lien without possession. It is therein defin-
ed as a right in one man to retain that which
is in possession and belonging to another.
In maritime law, liens eidst indQ[>endently
of possession, either actual or constructiye;
and in the courts of equity the term lien' is
used as syonymous with a charge or Incum-
brance upon the thing, where there Is nei-
ther jus in re nor ad rem, nor posBesslon of
the thing." Irrespectiye of whether tbe lien
upon the funds impounded by the senrice of
the summons of garnishment attaches before
fiinal Judgment or not, the serylce of the sum-
mons of garnishment so far places the funds
found in the hands of the garnishee (espe-
cially when the money is paid into court, or
in lieu thereof a dlssoMng bond giyen) into
the custody and control of the court admin-
istering the case that it will be entitled to
hold and subject the fund, despite the sub-
sequent bankruptcy of the defendant, if the
petition in bankruptcy be filed more than
four months after such custody is obtained.
National Surety Co. of New York t. Med-
lock, 68 S. B. 1131, 2 Oa. App. fi66 (quoting
5 Words and PhraseSk P- 4144).
The '*lien" giyen persons who haye fni^
nished material for the construction of a
yessel has been defined as "a tie hold or se-
curity," or "a sort of proprietary interest
springing from the nature of the transaction
and beneficial serylce rendered to the ship,'*
or as a "hold upon property specifically at-
taching thereto for the satisfitctlon of some
claim.'* Wight y. Maxwell, 4 Mich. 46, 66.
A bank holding notes of a depositor
which are due has the right to charge the
same to the depositor's account Such right
is not strictly a lien, within the meaning of
the bankruptcy law, but a right of set-ofT;
but it can be exercised only as to notes which
are due. Irish y. Citizens' Trust Ck>. of Uti-
ca, N. Y., 163 Ve± 880, 89L
The word '^en** is inaptly applied to a
general deposit which is the property of the
bank Itself, but can be properly applied to
special specific deposits of chattels, choses in
action, yaluables, etc. • Wynn y. Tallapoosa
Ck>unty Bank, 63 South. 228, 236, 168 Ala. 469.
A right to a "lien" does not include the
right to eyery onerous burden which may
be thought to be adyantageous to the fayor-
ed creditors. The burden sought to be en-
forced must be something that can reason-
ably be considered as naturally a part of
the thing granted->the lien. But a lien on
real property is a thing entirely different and
distinct from a personal obligation in the
form of a bond. The latter is not included
in the former, and Is, Indeed, a totally differ-
ent kind of security. Shaughnessy y. Amer-
ican Surety Oa, 71 Pae. 701, 188 OaL 648.
lilEN
130
UXN
Under Civil Damage Act (Oodd 1900, e
92) i 26» proTidlng that If a landlord's prop-
erty be "seized or taken" for any fine, etc.,
by reason of his tenant's unlawful acts, such
landlord may recover damages and costs, a
"Hen" upon a landlord's property, being de-
fined as a hold or dalm which one has upon
the property of another as a security for
some d^t or charge, does not constitute a
''seizure or taking" of his property within
the meaning of the statute. Brown t. United
States FideUty & Guaranty Co., 74 8. EL 868,
869, 70 W. Va. 613.
The right of creditors of a mortgagor,
dying without sufilcient personal estate to
pay his debts, to sell the real property for
that purpose within three years after admin-
istration, as authorized by Code Civ. Proc. f §
2749, 2750, is a mere statutory power, and
not a "lien" on the lands, which would make
them necessary parties to a foreclosure ac-
tion. Heidgerd y. Reis, 11^ N. Y. Supp. 921,
928, 185 App. DlT. 414.
A contract with a subagent to solicit in-
surance for commissions, stipulating that
the general agent will advance him $25 per
week, and providing that all money collected
by the subagent for premiums on policies
must be turned over to the general agent,
and that the subagent will repay the general
agent all sums advanced, said advances to
constitute a lien against all commissions, ab-
solutely binds the subagent to repay all ad-
vances; the word "lien" meaning a claim
which one has on the property of another as
a security for a debt, contemplating that the
advances constitute a debt. Straus v. Rosen-
thal, 121 N. Y. Supp. 267, 269.
Pub. St 1901, c. 245, i 28, provides that,
if a trustee is adjudged chargeable for any
personal property subject to mortgage, pledge,
or other lien, the court may appoint a receiv-
er. Section 29 provides that, if a trustee is
adjudged chargeable for any security for
payment of money, or any chose in action
upon which execution cannot be levied, the
court may appoint a receiver. Section 80
provides that the trustee may be adjudged
trustee for the value of any note, chose in
action, etc., which he refuses to deliver to
the receiver. The trustee held a check pay-
able to himself and defendant, who trans-
ferred his interest to claimant, after service
of the writ with claimant's knowledge. Held,
that the check was a chose in action, the
possession of which was a 'lien" within the
statute, though defendant did not indorse the
check to him for collection, so that the trus-
tee was chargeable therefor, and a receiver
was properly appointed to collect it Mus-
grove V. Qoss, 72 Aa 371, 873, 75 N. H. 208.
Under Civ. Code 1895, I 2801, subd. 2.
Us amended by the act of 1899 (Acts 1899, p.
88; Van Bpps' Code Supp. f 6176), giving to
mechanics, contractors, materialmen, and
persona furnishing material for the improve^
ment of real estate, special liens thereon, and
when work done or material furnished for
the improvement of real estate is done or
may be furnished upon the employment of
a contractor, or other persons than the own-
er, the lien shall attach to the real estate
improved, for the amount of work done, or
material furnished, unless the owner shows
that such lien has been waived in writing,
or produces the sworn statement of the con-
tractor, or other person, at whose instance
the work was done, or material was furnish-
ed, that the agreed price or reasonable value
thereof has been paid, the word "liens" is to
be construed to mean, not the perfected and
recorded liens, but the inchoate or imperfect
liena^ or claims arising by the mere furnish-
ing of material or the performance of labor.
Green v. Farrar Lumber Co., 46 S. B. 62,
68, 119 Oa. SO.
Lien Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 33) {
17, providing that, if a lienor is made de-
fendant to a suit to enforce another li^i,
and plaintiff or such defendant has filed no-
tice of pendency of the suit, the lien of such
defendant is continued, does not extend to
municipal "liens." William Bradley & Son
V. Henry Huber Co., 181 N. Y. Supp. 888, 390,
146 App. Div. 630.
The word "lien," in Comp. Laws, i 5031,
giving a "lien" to warehousemen which shall
extend to all legal demands for storage
against the owner of the property, means a
general "lien," and, where goods removed
without payment of charges are subsequent-
ly stored, the warehouseman may retain
them for payment of the first charges. Kauf-
man V. Leonard, 102 N. W. 632, 139 Mich.
104.
The "lien" given under Wilson's Rev. &
Ann. St 1903, c. 3, §§ 108, 110, providing that
any person employed in feeding or herding
any domestic animals shall, for the amount
due for such feeding or herding, have a "Uen"
on the animals, is similar to a lien under a
chattel mortgage. It may be foreclosed, and
the property sold to satisfy it Crlsmon v.
Barse Live Stock Commission Co., 87 Pac.
876, 877, 17 OkL 117.
Where a deed provides that the grantee
shall assume and pay existing mortgages,
"liens," taxes, and claims of any and every
description, the assumption clause making
use of the general word "liens" includes not
only mechanics' liens but all kinds of "liens."
Gage V. Cameron, 72 N. B. 204, 209, 212 IlL
146.
A lien is a hold or daim which one per-
son has upon the property of another aa a
security for some debt or charge. In the na-
ture of things, no tax or assessment can ex-
ist, so as to become a lien or incumbrance
upon real estate, until the amount th^eof is
ascertained and determined. Gillmor t. Dale,
75 Pac. 932, 934, 27 Utah, 872.
UIIN
tSl
unr
Where the ewnsre 9I a tanemeiit bovae
Qn November 1, 1906, contracted to convey
the same free from all incumbrances and vio-
lations of the tenement house act (Laws 1901,
p. 889, c 334), and on May 26th had been
served with notice to install a water meter,
which was installed by the water department
on Ck!tober 8th, but the cost was not certified
until November 1st, nor the bill certified to
the comptroller until December 13, 1906, the
assessment therefor was not a lien on the
premises, when conveyed on December 11th,
the words "Uen or incumbrance" being used
to cover only a charge against the property
af ttf it has been ascertained or determined.
Feder v. Rosenthal, U6 N. Y. Supp. % 4, 62
Misc. Bep. 610.
Defendant vendors covenanted to pay
any assesnnent of a kind mentioned therein
for the payment of which any lien existed
July, 1899, on the lot conveyed; there being
then no power to lay any such assessments,
and the land not beii^ subject to any existing
lien for such assessments. A valid assess-
ment was thereafter laid under St 1902, c.
627. Held, that the word 'lien," in defend-
ants* covenant, referred to the lien of an ex-
isting incumbrance, and was not to be ex-
tended to include the possibility of a future
incumbrance being created by subsequent leg-
islation, and hence that the defendants were
not bound to pay such subsequent assessment
Campbell v. Haven, 97 N. B. 611, 612, 211
MasBB. 121.
Tax liens held by the state of IdOnnesota
are within the terms of Laws 1906, p. 469,
^ 306, I 13, providbig that it shall be Joined
as a party defendant whenever it has an in-
terest in or "lien upon the land" in suit In
re National Bond & Security Co., 104 N. W.
678, 679, 96 Minn. 119.
AMlcamaat
The right created by the assignment, as
security, of one's expectancy in the estate of
his living ancestor, being a present equitable
charge, which, when the descent is cast, at
once ripens into a "lien" on the property, is
within Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 641, i 67, 80
Stat 664, exempting trom its operation and
preserving all liens created by the bankrupt,
and therefore enforceable against the bank-
rapt after his discharge^ especially where the
property did not come into the possession of
the assignee in bankruptcy, because not then
acquired by the bankrupt Bridge v. Kedon,
126 Pac. 149, 152, 163 Cal. 493, 43 L. B. A.
<N. 8.) 404.
a dtJm against tba teodcttv was aot a valid
flien" against the property, unless it appear-
ed of record. Brown v. Gordon-Tiger Mining
& Reduction Co., 97 Faa 1042, 1046, 44 Colo.
311.
Under a provision, in a certificate of pre-
ferred stock in a corporaticm, that no mort^
gage or "lien of any nature" should be placed
upon the property of the company without
the unanimous consent of the preferred stock-
holders, tbe w<Hrds "lien of any nature" did
not include the claims of general creditors,
since a "lien" Is something distinct from a
daim and in the nature of a security. Fryer
V. Wiedemann, 146 8. W. 762, 766, 148 Ky.
379, 39 L. B. ▲• (N. 8.) 1011.
- As eentvaetaal lien
Under Civ. Code Prac. I 62, tabd. 8, re-
quiring an action for the sale of real proper-
ty under a mortgage lien, or other incum-
brance or charge, etc., to be brought in the
county In which the subject of the action, or
some part thereof, is situated, the words
"lien, or other incumbrance or diarge,*' do
not embrace an attachment lien, but refer to
liens or charges created by contract or Judg-
ment Hatton V. Bogers, 121 8. W. 696, 699,
134 Ky. 84a
A personal claim against a bankrupt's
estate does not constitute a "lien." Eason v.
Garrison ft Kelly, 82 8. W. 800, 801, 36 Tex.
GIv. App. 674.
Where a contract for the sale of land
containing a mine limited the application of
S60,000 of the price to the payment of "Uens,"
Dower is not a lien** of any kind, Imt an
estate. The fiict that it is an incumbrance
does not constitute it a lien« An incumbrance
is not always a lien, though a lien is always
an incumbrance. Wilson v. Wilson, 106 N. Y.
Supp. 161, 163, i20 App. Div. 681.
EqattaMeUoB
The term "lien** Is used in equity in a
broader sense than at law, and denotes any
right of a special nature over a thing, which
constitutes a charge or incumbrance upon it,
and may be enforced by proceeding against it,
and to the existence of sudi a lien possession
is not essential An equitable lien is distinct
from the general title, and may exist separate
from it, or both may be vested in the same
person. In re National Cash Beglster Co.,
174 Fed. 619, 681, 98 C. C. A. 426.
A "lien," from a legal standpoint, em-
bodies the idea of a deed or bond, and neces-
sarily implies that there is something in ex-
istence to which it attaches. In equity there
may be an agreement that there sfaidl be a
lien upon a thing if and when it exists, but
that agreement is not itself a "lien." On
an equitable assignment of money to be earn-
ed in the future by the assignor, the assignee
acquires no "lien" on the money unless th«
assignor has earned it Gogan v. Conover
Mfg. Co., 60 AtL 408, 414, 69 N. J. Bq. 868.
See Bstate.
As latevMit im laad
See Interest (In Property).
UBK
182
UttK
Service of a writ of gamisluneiit gives
plaintiff, at least before Judgment against
the garnished, a specific right to have his
claim satisfied out of the funds In the gar-
nishee's hands, which Is a ''Hen,** within
Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, { 67, subd.
''f ," 80 Stat 664, 566, making void 101 attach-
' ments or other liens obtained through legal
proceedings against the Insolvent within four
months after filing the petition In bankrupt-
cy; the statute applying to voluntary as
well as Involuntary proceedings, In view of
section 1, subd. 1, providing that the term
*'a person against whom a petition has been
filed*' shall Include one filing a voluntary pe-
tition, liongley Bros. v. McGann, 119 S. W.
268, 269, 90 Ark. 252.
Jndsmaat or attaehment
An attachment on mesne process under
the statute creates a Uen. This lien does not
depend upon possession. It is created by
process of law, sometimes by a record of* the
doings of an oflacer, as In the case of attach-
ments of real estate and of personal property
that cannot easily be removed. Undoubted-
ly an attachment by trustee process gives a
lien on property which will be good against
bankruptcy, If more than four months old.
Snyder t. Smith, 69 N. B. 1089, 1090, 185
^j^a^s. 58.
A "lien," In Its usual and ordinary sig-
nification. Is a claim which one person has
on the property of another as security for
some debt or charge for the payment or sat-
isfaction of which the property may be sold,
and COmp. Laws Dak. 1887, I 4339. giving
one who has a lien the right to redeem from
a superior lien on the same property, does
not give an attaching creditor,' whose claim
has not been reduced to Judgment, the right
to redeem from a purchaser of the attached
property at an auction sale before the pass-
ing of the sheriff's deed, which, under other
statutory provisions, is not Issued until the
expiration of a year after the sale; the in-
terest of such purchaser not being a lien in
a legal sense, but rather an Inchoate owner-
ship which may automatically ripen into a
legal title without any further act on his
part Hardin y. Eelley, 144 Fed. 353, 854,
75 C. a A. 355.
A Judgment is a purely legal "lien" on
land, and in an action In a court other than
that In which the Judgment was rendered,
and in which the issue was as to whether
one of the parties who had paid the Judg-
ment was entitled to subrogation, the land
on which the Judgment was a lien could not
be made the subject of a direct order or de-
cree, the proper mode of control being by di-
rections as to the legal ownership or control
of the Judgment Bolce v. Conover, 61 Atl.
159, 163, 69 N. J. Bq. 58a
A mortgage Is a *lien," and a pledge is
a lien, so that under Bev. Codes 1909, f
4308, subd. 1, providing that the deik of
the court must issue a writ of attachment up-
on receiving an afiadavlt by or on behalf of
the plaintiff, setting forth Inter alia that the
payment of the debt sought to be collected
has not been secured by any mortgage or
Hen upon real or personal property, or any
pledge of personal property, etc., an affidavit
partially following the language of the stat-
ute in regard to the debt not being secured,
and falls to state that it Is not secured by
pledge of personal property, and contains no
statement equivalent to that, is not sufficient
as it does not contain the language of the
statute or language equivalent to that re-
quired by the statute. Knutsen r, Phlllipa,
101 Pac. 596, 596, 16 Idaho, 267.
A deed of trust on a homestead is not a
"Uen," within Code Olv. Proc i 1476, requir-
ing the presentation of the claim against the
estate as a condition precedent to enforcing
a lien or incumbrance on the homestead, ao
that a trust deed executed by a husband and
wife on the homestead was enforceable with-
out presenting a claim to the husband's ad-
ministrator for the debt secured thereby.
Atheam v. Byan, 98 Pac. 890, 391, 154 CaL
554.
"A lien' is a charge Imposed in some
mode other than by a transfer in trust upon
specific property by which it is made security
for the performance of an act" Ov. Code, f
2872. Hence a deed of trust is not a lien,
within Code Civ. Proc. f 1475, declaring that,
if there are subsisting liens on the homestead
of a decedent, the claims secured thereby
must be presented and allowed as other
claims against the estate. Weber v. Mc-
aeverty, 86 Pac. 706, 708, 149 CaL 816. -
Same— Power of sale
av. Code, (I 868, 2932, provide that a
power of sale in a mortgage shall be deemed
a part of the security, and section 2872 de-
clares that a lien is a charge imposed in some
mode other than by a transfer in trust on
specific property, by which it is made securi-
ty for the performance of a particular act
Held, that a power of sale contained in a
mortgage is a *'lien,*' and can no longer be
exercised after an action on the debt is bar-
red. Goldwater v. Hibernia Savings &, Loan
Society, 126 Pac. 861, 862, 19 CaL App. 511.
Possessiom reqvlrod
The word "lien," at common law, signi-
fies that a person who has bestowed labor up-
on an article of personal property shall be
authorized to retain possession until his rea-
sonable charges are paid; it must be so un-
derstood, as used in Bev. St 1889, i 2843,
giving a lien for cutting wood, so that there
is no enforceable lien after the property liaa
lawfully passed out of the debtor's post^ea-
UEN
138
LIKNHOLDBB
iion to m ttilrd person. TorD«r r. Hoiton,
106 Pac 688, 091, IS Wyo. 281.
As rli^t of pviovit7
''A 'llm' l8 a priority. It Is tbat, and
something more. That something more is
that it is a hold on the property covered by
It that fixes the priority so that it cannot be
affected by subsequent events." In re Ben-
nett, 158 Fed. d73» 680, 82 0. O. A. 681.
''A 'Hen' is a right of one to retain prop-
erty in his possession belonging to another
until certain demands of him in possession
are satisfied." A right to prior payment is
not In itself a '*lien." Weisel v. Old Domin-
ion 8. 8. Co., 01 N. Y. Supp. 140, 141, 90 App.
Dlv. 668 (quoting and adopting definition in
Jordan v. National Shoe ft Leather Bank, 74
N. Y. 467, 80 Am. Rep. 810).
The creditors of a firm have the privi-
lege, sometimes loosely denominated a "lien,"
to have debts due to them paid out of the aa-
aets of the firm in course of liquidation, to
the exclusion of creditors of its several mem-
bers. This equity is a derivative one. It
is practically a subrogation to equity of the
iBdivldual partner to have partnership prop-
erty applied to the payment of partnership
debts in preference to those of any individu-
al partner. People's Nat Bank of Jackson
T. Wilcox, 100 N. W. 24, 20, 186 Mich. 667,
4 Ann. Cas. 466 (quoting CSase v. Beauregard,
00 U. S. 110, 26 L. Ed. 870).
As seeultj
See Security.
Am speeifle Ilea
Civ. Code, § 2872, declares that a 'Oien"
la a charge imposed upon specific property by
which it is made security for the perform-
ance of some act, and, if the contract with
a water company provides that the agree-
Doent to furnish water shall bind its canal,
there would be created thereby a lien on the
canal for the performance of the act of fur-
nishing the water as agreed. Stanislaus Wa-
ter Co. V. Bachman, 08 Pac. 868, 868, 162
Cal. 716, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 360 (citing Fres-
no Canal & Irr. Co. v. RoweU, 22 Pac 68, 80
CaL 114, 3 Am. St Rep. 112; Same v. Dun-
bar, 22 Pac. 276, 80 Cal. 630).
X«tEH OI.AI]fAHT
Act ^farch 13, 1800, | 1 (Laws 1800, p.
143, a 00), provides that costs shall not be
allowed in a suit to foreclose a logger's lien
unless a demand for payment of the lien has
been made before suit, unless the court finds
that the claimant had reasonable grounds to
believe that the owner or a person having
control of the property on which the lien was
claimed was attempting to defraud the claim-
ant Held, that the terms '*Uenholder'* and
"lien claimant" included a person having a
lienable claim, though not perfected, and
hence a demand b^ore the flUag of the lien
notice was a sufficient compliance therewith.
Smnpter v. Bumliam, 00 Paa 782, 768, 61
Wash. 600.
mar ob nrrEiuBST gbeateb
THEREBY
The owner of property, exempt from tax-
ation under Its charter (Pub. & Loc. Laws
1800, c. 140), executed a mortgage to secure
a loan, and executed its bonds to secure the
mortgage, and agreed that it would pay all
taxes aud assessments imposed on the mort-
gaged property, all taxes assessed or impos-
ed on the mortgage, and all taxes assessed
against the lien or Interest created by the
mortgage. St 1808, | 1042d, added by laws
1003, a 878, { 2, provided that, whenever tax-
able real estate is subject to mortgage, the
mortgage, for the purposes of taxation, should
be an interest in the real estate taxable as
such where the real estate was located or
might be separately assessed and taxed.
Heldt In the mortgagee's action to foreclose
because of the mortgagor's refusal to pay
taxes against the bonds in the hands of pur-
chasers from the mortgagee, that the first
obligation referred only to general taxes or
special assessments levied on the property;
that the third obligation referred to an as-
sessment against some interest in the mort-
gaged, real estate, not including an assess-
ment on the bonds; that the words "mort-
gage" and *1ien or interest created thereby"
were synonymous; that the obligation to pay
taxes on the "mortgage" did not comprehend
such taxes assessed on the bonds, and that
the mortgagor was not liable therefor. Citi-
zens' Savings & Trust Co. v. School Sisters
of Notre Dame, 130 N. W. 430, 441^ 161 Wis.
610.
UBNABLB ABTIGLB
Gas appliances, sudi as pendants, dian-
dellers, brackets, and globes, are not fixtures
nor "lienable articles," within the statute
giving liens for mat^al furnished and labor
done on buildings, in the absence of evid<M)ce
of an intention on the part of the owner
when he has them put in to make them per-
manent parts of the building, and audi inten-
tion is not ahown by the mere fitct that they
are put in by the original owner of the build-
ing, and remain in the same after it is sold
by him to another. Frank Adam Electric
Co. V. OottUeb, 86 S. W. 001, 008, 112 Mo.
App. 226.
LIEHABLB OLAHE
The term "lienable claim" suggests mere
right to obtain an interest in specified prop-
erty, instead of an interest in prffisentl there-
in. Jackman v. Ban Claire Nat Bank, 104
N. W. 08, 106, 126 Wis. 466, 116 Am. St Rep.
966.
LIENHOIiDEB
As owner, see Owner.
Act March 13, 1880, | 1 (Laws 1809, p.
143, c. 00), provides that coats shall not be
allowed in a suit to foreclose a logger*s lien
LIEU OF
134
LIPS BSTATB
unless a demand for payment of the Uen has
been made before suit, unless the court finds
that the claimant had reasonable grounds
to believe that the owner or a person having
control of the property on which the lien was
claimed was attempting to defraud the claim-
ant Held, that the terms "lienholder** and
"lien claimant*' Included a person having a
lienable claim, though not perfected, and
hence a demand before the filing of the lien
notice was a sufficient compliance therewith.
Sumpter v. Bumham, 99 Pac. 752, 768, 61
Wash. 699.
LIEU OF
See In lieu ot
LIFE
See During Natural life; Bzpeetancy
of life; For Life; Imprisonment for
Life or Less Than Natural life; Quar-
terly During His Natural life; Take
His Own life.
''By the term 'lif^* as here used [refer-
ring to the fourteenth amendment of the Oon-
stitution], something more is meant than
mere animal existence. The inhibition against
its deprivation extends to all those' limbs
and faculties by which life' is enjoyed. The
provision equally prohibits the mutilation of
the body, by the amputation of an arm or
leg, or the putting out of an eye, or the de-
struction of any other organ of the body
through which the soul communicates with
the outer world. The deprivation, not only
of life,' but of whatever God has given, to
every one with 'lif^' for its ^owth and en-
joyment, is prohibited by the provision In
question, if its efficacy be not frittered away
by Judicial decision." MacMullen v. City of
Middletown, 98 N. Y. Supp. 146. 160, 112 App.
DiT. 81 (quoting Field, J., in Munn v. Illinois,
M U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77).
The use of the word "life," in a will
creating a trust, devising the fund to the
trustees to hold and collect the rents, income,
and profits thereof, and pay over the same to
such three children annually, during the term
of their natural ''life," in the singular, if sig-
nificant, tends to show that the testator was
thinking of the life of each. Brown v. Farm-
er, 68 K. B. 32, 33, 184 Mass. 136.
UFE AND AGGIDEHT INSUBAKGE
"Life and accident insurance" is a con-
tract whereby one, for a stipulated consider-
ation, agrees to indemnify another against
injuries by accident or death. State v. Wll-
lett, 86 N. B. 68, 70, 171 Ind. 296, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 197.
UFE ESTATE
See Conventional Life Estate; Legal
Life Estate,
▲s dower of use, benefit, and profits* see
Dower.
An "estate for life" is a "freehold" estate
not of inheritance. Oummings v. CummingSp
76 Aa 210, 211, 76 N. J. Bq. 668.
life estates are freehold estates not of
inheritancie, and an estate that may last for
a life or lives, that is not inheritable, not at
will or for any fixed period of time, is a
"Ufe estate." Disley v. Disley, 76 Atl. 481,
483, 30 B. I. 366.
"The very idea of a 'life estate' prer
supposes a fee as existing elsewhere than in
the tenant for life, though the latter may be
empowered to convey the fee and thus divest
him who, but for the exercise of the power,
would be holden of the fee conditionally, or
a contingent remainderman." Beatson r.
Bowers, 91 N. B. 922, 924, 174 Ind. 60L
An "estate for life" is a freehold interest
in lands, the duration of whidi is confined to
the life or lives of some particular person or
persons or to the happening or not happening
of some uncertain event Where a grantee
agreed that the grantors should remain on
the premises during their natural lives, free
from rent, the grantors had a lif^ estate.
Bobb V. New York ft a Gas Goal Co., 66 AtL
938, 939, 216 Pa. 41&
"At common law there were two classes
of life estates': First, conventional 'life es-
tates,' or those which were created by con-
tract; and, second, those which came into
existence by operation of law. The former
were not impeachable for waste, unless ex-
pressly made so by the conveyance. The
reason assigned for this rule is that it is pre-
sumed that, if the grantor intaided to limit
the enjoyment of the estate, he would have
expressed his intention In the deed. As to
the second dass of life estates,' on the other
hand, they are, as a general rule, impeach-
able for waste; that is to say, the tenant for
life cannot use the property for any purpose
which would result in an injury to the inher-
itance, save those only to which it had been
devoted at the time the life estate came into
exist^ioe." Swayne y. Lone Acre Oil Go., 86
S. W. 740, 742, 96 Tex. 697, 69 L. R. A. 986,
8 Ann. Gifts. 1117.
Testator having devised certain lands to
his three sons by clauses under which, with-
out more, they would have taken the lands
in fee, in a subsequent clause provided that
the estates so taken by his sons should only
be "life estates," and, in case any of them
died without issue, the land thereby willed
for life should go to the other living children
or the issue of such as had died. Held that,
two sons having died subsequently to testa-
tor's death, without issue, the third took a
fee simple, and not merely a life estate ; the
words "life estate" being equivalent to de-
feasible fee. Smoot v. Kirk (Ey.) 104 S. W.
716, 717.
A life estate may be created by a deed,
leasee or devise^ with or without a stipulation
LIFE BSTAIS
186
UFB IKSURAKCB
for rent A lease of premises, to have and
to hold nnto leasee, his heirs, etc., so long as
lie shonld wish to live in the d^ in which
the premises were. Tested a life estate, ter-
minable only at his death or removal from
the city. Thompson v. Baxter, 118 N. W.
797, 708, 107 Minn. 122, 21 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
675.
Base fee distlngwUted
See Base Fee.
life rlffht symomTmosLS
See Life Right
As pvopertj
See Real Property.
TeBA&eies at wlll» from year to year*
or at saff eraaoe dUtiagaished
A life estate differs from tenancies at
will, or from year to year, or at sufferance ;
the principal distinction being that the for-
mer confers a freehold and the latter a mere
chattel interest Thompson v. Baxter, 119
N. W. 797, 798, 107 Minn. 122, 21 L. R. A.
(N. 8.) 576.
LIFE nf S17BAK0B
See Life and Accident Insurance.
Proceeds of, see Proceeds.
Since the term *W^ insurance^' includes
accident policies. Act Pa. June 23, 1886, pro-
viding that when a policy of life insurance
contains a warranty of the truth of the an-
swers contained in the application no untrue
statement made in good ftith shall effect a
forfeiture, unless the untrue statement re-
lates to some matter material to the risk. Is
applicable to accident Insurance. Miller v.
Maryland Casualty Go., 193 Fed. 848, 848,
113 C. C. A, 267.
As chose Im aetloa
See Chose in Action. .
As eoatraet to pay eertain svat
Life insurance is a promise to pay a
certain sum upon the death of the insure^.
Ellison V. Straw, 97 N. W. 168. 170, 119 Wis.
602.
An "insurance*' upon life is a contract
by which the insurer, for a stipulated sum,
engages to pay a certain sum of money if an-
other dies within the time limited by the
policy. It is a chose In action and even be-
fore the death of the insured may be as-
signed. Rylander y. Allen, 53 S. B. 1032,
1033, 126 6a. 206, 6 L. a A. (N. &) 128, 6
Ann. Caa 366.
As expressly defined by dv. Code Ga.
1896, I 2114, "life insurance" is '*a contract,
by which the Insurer for a stipulated sum en-
gages to pay a certain amount if another
dies within the time limited by the policy.
The life may be that of the assured, or of
another in whose continuance the assured
has an interest" Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
New York y. Lane, 161 Fed. 276, 27&
A "life insurance" poller is not merely
a contract of indemnity. It is a contract
to pay to the beneficiary a sum certain in
the event of death; and if the contract was
valid in its inception, and so continues until
its maturity, the beneficiary is entitled to
the whole of the stipulated sum. Keckley
V. Coshocton Glass Oo., 99 N. B. 299, 800,
86 Ohio St 218, Ann. Gas. 1913D, 607.
A "life insurance policy" is not a con-
tract of indemnity, but is a contract to* pay
money upon the death of the assured in con-
sideration of certain payments made during
his life. Wayland v. Western life Indemni-
ty Co., 148 8. W. 626, 630, 166 Mo. App. 221;
Reed v. Provident Sav. Life Assor. Soc., 82
N. B. 784, 786, 190 N. X, 111.
As iasaraaoe
See Insurance.
Beaeflt sosletlea
A certificate in a mutual benefit associa-
tion, providing that def^dant association
would pay on the member's death to his sis-
ter as beneficiary a specified sum on certain
conditions, was a life Insurance policy, with-
in Act April 11, 1903 (Acts 1903, c. 119), pro-
viding that, after Its passage, the suicide of
a policy holder of any life insurance compa-
ny doing business within tlie state should
not be a defense to the policy, whether the
suicide was voluntary or involuntary, or the
holder was sane or insane. Head Camp Pa-
cific Jurisdiction Wpodmen of the World v.
Sloss, 112 Pae 49, 60, 49 Colo. 177, 31 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 881.
A '^ife insurance contract" or policy is
"a contract by which a company or asso-
ciation agrees to pay a certain sum of money
on the dcfath of a member, in consideration
of the payment by the member of fixed
sums at fixed periods." A certificate issued
by a fraternal mutual benefit society, pro-
viding that on the death of the member a
spedfled sum will be paid his wife out of the
mortuary fund on condition of payments by
the member of fixed sums at fixed periods, is
a life insurance contract or policy, within
Code 1887, i 3261, providing what shaU be a
sufildent declaration in an action on a
policy, and is not merely a certificate of
membership in a beneficial society. Cosmo-
politan Life Ins. Co. V. Koegel, 52 S. E. 166,
168, 1C9, 104 Ya. 619 (dtlng Ix>gan v. Fidel-
ity & Casualty Co., 47 S. W. 948, 146 Mo. 114;
1 Bacon Benefit Societies ft Life Insurance,
f 62).
The object of an association was to fur-
nish each of its members at death a specific
sum for application to his funeral expenses,
by a system of mutual contribution; the
members at the death of any member paying
death assessments. It employed agents to
solldt business from the general public and
was not founded on prindples of philan-
thropy. Held» that Its contracts with its
LIFE IKSURAMOB OOBiPANT 136 LIFE, LIBERTY, AKD HAPPINESS
members constituted "life insarance," within
Burns' Ann. St 1908, S 4713, forbidding the
taking of an application for insurance upon
the life of any person in the state in favor of
a person not having a bona fide insurable
interest in the life of insured, or who is not
related to him within a certain degree. State
V. Willett, 86 N. B. 68, 71, 171 Ind- 296, 23
L. R. A. (N. S.) 197.
LIFE INSURANCE GOMPANT
In the ordinary sense^ a fraternal order
is not a '*life insurance company." That
class of fraternal organizations which agree
to pay a sum of money upon the death of a
member have that characteristic in common
with life insurance companies, but the two
classes of corporations are organized under
different acts and foo different purposes.
The insurance company is an ordinary busi-
ness corporation, and its poUdes are oh*
tained for ordinary business purposes, for in-
vestment, for security for the benefit of cred-
it, as well as the protection of the family,
while the beneficiary association is not or-
ganized for purposes of profit, its certificates
cannot be used for business purposes, and.
its members can receive no pecuniary ad-
vantage from its certificates and creditors
cannot reach them. The Modern Woodmen of
America is not an insurance company within
the meaning of a question In an application
for life insurance, "Have you ever been de-
clined or postponed by any company?' Pe-
terson V. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 91 N. B.
466, 469, 244 111. 329, 18 Ann. Cas. 96.
LIFE, LIBEBTTy AND PBOPERTT
Under the Constitution, no one may be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law, and the terms, "life,"
"liberty," and '•property" include every per-
sonal, political, and dvil right, including
that to labor, to contract, and to acquire
property. Josma v. Western Steel Car &
Foundry Co., 94 N. E. 945, 946, 249 lU. 508.
**The terms life,' 'liberty,* and 'property*
embrace every right which the law protects ;
they include not only the right to own and
hold, but also the right to use and enjoy,
property." Kansas City Gas Ca v. Kansas
City, 198 Fed. 500, 510 (quoting Spring Valley
Water Co. v. San Francisco, 166 Ffed. 667).
The terms "Ufe," "liberty," and "prop-
erty" are representative terms, and intended
to cover every right to which a member of
the body politic is entitled under the law.
These terms include the right of self-defense,
freedom of speech, religious and political
freedom, exemption from arbitrary arrests,
and the right freely to buy and sell as others
may. Indeed, they may embrace all our lib-
erties, personal, dvil and political, including
the rights to labor, to contract, to terminate
contracts, and to acquire property. None of
these liberties and rights can be taken away,
except by due piocess of law. Ooffeyville
Vitrified Brick ft TUe Co. ▼. Perry. 76 Pac.
848, 850, 69 Kan. 297, 66 L. B. A. 185, 1
Ann. Cas. 936 (citing Qlllesple v. People, 58
N. B. 1007, 188 lU. 176» 62 L. B. A. 283, 80
Am. St Bep. 176).
The terms "life," "liberty," and "proper-
ty," as used in the fourteenth constttutional
amendment, embrace every right which the
law protects; they Include not only the right
to own and hold, but also to use, property,
and profits and income are within the protec-
tion of the amendment, subject, however, to
the rule that when property is devoted to a
public use the owner is entitled to earn only
such income therefrom as is just and rea-
sonable as between him and the public.
Spring Valley Water Co. v. City and County
of San Francisco, 165 Fed. 667, 676.
"The term life, liberty, and property,'
as used in the federal Constitution, embraces
every right which the law protects. They
include, not only the light to hold and en-
joy, but also the means of holding and en-
joying, acquiring, and disposing of, property.
The right to labor is property. It is one of
the most valuable and fundamental of
rights. The right to work is the right to
earn one's subsistence, to live and to support
wife and family. The right of master and
servant to enter into contracts, to agree up-
on the terms and conditions under which the
one will employ and the other will labor, is
property. The master has the rii^t to fix
the terms and conditions upon which he is
willing to give employment; the servant
has the right to fix the terms and conditions
upon which he is willing to labor ; and any
statute which curtails or limits that right
deprives the party affected of his property,
and, in the same measure, of his liberty.
Both parties are free to enter into, or refuse
to enter into, the contract Before the law
there is the same freedom to employ as to
work, to buy as to sell, to choose one*s em-
ploy^ as to choose one*s employer.'* Branson
V. Industrial Workers of the World, 95 Pac
354, 361, 30 Neb. 270 (quoting Goldfield
Consol. Mines Co. v. Ck^dfleld Miners* Union
No. 220, 159 Fed. 600).
UFE, LIBERTTp AND PmEtSITIT OF
HAPPINESS
The refusal to permit one to engage in a
business of an undertaker is a violation of a
right to enjoy *'life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness," secured under the state and
federal Constitutions, unless there Is some
good reason for the refusal ; and the refusal
to permit one to bury the dead body of a rel-
ative or friend, except under an unreason-
able limitation, is an unlawful Interference
with a private right Wyeth t. Board of
Health of City of Cambridge, 86 N. BL 925,
927, 200 Mass. 474, 28 U B. A. (N. S.) 147, 128
Am. St Bep. 439.
Iii;FB LICSKfiE
187
UOHTER
LIFE I«XCKEiniS
An act approved March 7, 1906 (Acta
1906, p. 492, f 1 ; Bums' Ann. 8t Snpp. 1906,
f 5902a), provides that no person shall be
eligible to the office of county superintendent
of schools unless he shall held a 36 months'
license, a 60 months' license, a life or profes-
sional license to teach in the common schools
of the state. The act concerning common
schools, approved March 6, 1899 (Acts 1899, p.
488, c. 214, i 1; Burns' Ann. St 1901, |
5905b), provides for the issuance of a 36
months' license and a 60 months' license by
the state superintendent of public instruction.
The act of 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 243, c. 143,
i 7; Bums' Ann. St 1901, f 6905a), pro-
vides for the issuance of a professional li-
cense on snch examination held by the county
superintendent as may be prescribed by the
state board of education, and that such li-
cense shall issue only on the approval of the
state board. The school law of 1865 (Acts
1865, p. 34, c. 1, I 165; Bums' Ann. St 1901.
§ 5851), provides for the Issuance of state
certificates of qualification by the state board
of education, which shall entitle the holder
to teach in any of the schools of the state
without further examination and be valid
during the lifetime of the holder. The act
approved March 6, 1873 (Acts 1873, p. 199, a
86, f 3; Bums' Ann. St 1901, { 6049), in
amendment of and supplemental to the origi-
nal act creating the State Normal School, au-
thorizes the board of trustees to grant certifi-
cates of proficiency to teachers completing
the prescribed courses of study, and provides
that two years after graduation, satisfac-
tory evidence of professional ability to in-
struct having been received, such teachers
shall be entitled to diplomas appropriate to
such professional degrees as the trustees
shall confer on them, wbidi diplomas shall
be considered sufficient evidence of qualifica-
tion to teach in any of the schools of the
state. Held, that a post graduate diploma,
granted pursuant to the act aiH^roved March
5, 1873 (Acts 1873, p. 199, c. 86 ; Burns' Ann.
St 1901, I 6049), to a graduate of the State
Normal School of two years' standing, was
not a life license within title act approved
March 7, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 492, c. 168, S 1;
Bums' Ann. St Supp. 1906, § 6002a). State
ex rel. Benham v. Bradt, 84 N. B. 1084, 1066,
170 Ind. 480.
UFi: OF AOREEMEH T
See During life of Agreement
UFE OF OOWSFtBACT
See During Life of Conspiracy.
LIFE OB IiIVES IN MBOfQ
A corporation or Joint-8to(A company to
which an annuity is bequeathed will not be
deemed a life in being where so to regard it
would cause a trust created by the will to
violate the rule against perpetoitaa. Fitehie
V. Brown, 29 Sup. Gt. 106, 108, 2U U. S. 821,
68 U Ed. 202.
The rule has reference to time^ and not
to persons; the term "life or lives in being"
referring not to the persons who are to take,
as testator may select as the mea&ure of
time the lives of any persons in existence, and
"twenty-one years afterward" are 21 years
in gross without regard to the life or coming
of age of any person. Hays v. Mart;^ 89 N.
B. 303, 305, 173 Ind. 279.
LIFB POI.IOT
Old line life policy, see Old lAne Policy.
IiIFE BIGHT
The devise of a "life right" creates a
"life estate." Goldsboro Lumber Go. v. Hines
Bros. Lumber Ck>., 68 S. Bl 929, 930, 163 N.
0.49.
UFB TBKAHT
As owner, see Owner.
A provision in a judgment awarding to a
widow a "life use" of an interest in certain
property in controversy instead of a right of
dower therein was improper, the life use not
being the same as a dower interest, prior to
assignment of dower. Humphrey y. Gerard,
79 Atl. 67, 68, 84 Conn. 216.
LIFT
See Tbpping lift
LIGHT<-LIGHTING
See B^are up Light ; Joss Light
As public work, see Public Work.
Kind of light, see Kind.
UOKT STATION
See Blectric Light Station.
uoHTnre oompavt
As quasi public corporation, see Quasi
Public Corporation.
LIGHT (WEIGHT)
U€«TBR MATERIAZi
In a claim of a patent for a frame or
foundation for collars of dresses, a descrip-
tion of an upper band as of "lighter mate-
rial" than the lower band applies to material
of which the band is composed, as diatia-
gulshed from the band itself, and requires it
to be comparatively different — ^whether light-
er in weight, or i^mply more pliable — from
material composing the other. Warren Feath-
erbone Co. v. Roberts ft Co., 128 F^. 746,
747.
LIGHTER
As private carrier, ase Private Carrier.
uoHxinNa
1S8
LOCBKIN])
LIGHTNING
Under a fire insurance policy containing
a clause extending the policy to "any direct
loss or damage caused by the llflplitnlni^ mean-
ing thereby the commonly accepted nse of the
term '^lightning," and exdnding loss by cy-
clone or windstorm, damage to goods from
water and debris, Into which they were
thrown by the falling of the wall as a result
of lightning, was the direct and natural con-
sequence of the lightning. Oummlns t. Penn-
sylvania Fire Ins. Co., 134 N. W. 79, 83, 158
Iowa, 679, 87 U B. A. (N. S.) U69, Ann. Cas.
1913B, 235.
uoHTNnra abbestes
A devise used by a telephone company to
divert lightning from the line to the ground
is spoken of as a 'lightning arrester,'* though
It might have more properly been termed
a lightning dlverter; its office being, not to
arrest the lightning, but to divert it from the
wire by offering a comparatively easy course
to the earth. Wells v. Northeastern Tele-
phone Oo^ 64 AtL 848, 652, 101 Me. 871.
LIKE
See With Like Intent
See, also. Same.
UXS GASES
The phrase "in like oases as natural per-
sons,'* as used in Const Ala. 1901, S 240, giv-
ing the right to foreign corporations to sue in
all courts "in like cases as natural persons,"
must mean, where the cases are alike, the
same description of contract or tort Sea-
board Air Line By. Go. v. Bailroad Commis-
sion of Alabama, 165 Fed. 792, 799 (citing
Smith V. Louisville & N. B. Co., 75 Ala. 449).
The word "like" has been Judicially de-
fined to mean "having the same or nearly
the same appearance, qualities, or character-
istics; resembling; similar to; equal in
quantity, quality, or degree" (19 Am. & Bng.
Bncy. of Law, 180) ; and, when the Constitu-
tion declares that "all corporations shall have
the right to sue and shall be subject to be
sued in all courts in like cases as natural per-
sons," it must be construed to mean exactly
what It says, and, if the facts are such as to
give a private individual a cause of action
under similar drcumstanoes, if there are
facts which bring the case within equitable
principles, a municipal corporation has the
same rights that a private corporation or an
individual would have. Village of Haver-
straw V. Eckerson, 108 N. Y. Supp. 506, 507,
124 App. Dlv. 18.
XJKfi CTRCUMSTAKGES
An instruction that "ordinary care^* was
such care as the great majority of mankind
would and do exercise in the transactions of
human life under like conditions and drcum-
stanoes, was not erroneous because of . the
use of tlie expression "undor like dzcum-
stances"; this being the equivalent of "un-
der the same or similar circumstances,"
which is the proper standard. Warden v.
Miller, 87 N. W. 828, 880, 112 Wis. 67.
LIKE GOMPAlnr
As used in Ky. St 1899, | 4077, imposing
a franchise tax on 20 enumerated classes of
corporations, all having special or exclusive
privileges or franchises not allowed by law
to natural persons, and on every other like
company, the word "like" refers to corpora-
tions having or exercising some special or
exclusive privilege or franchise not allowed
by law to natural persons, or performing
some public service. iBtna lAfe Ins. Co. v.
CJoulter, 74 S. W. 1050, 1052, 116 B^y. 787.
LIKE EFFEOT
under an instruction that an affidavit
produced by defendant on cross-examlnati<m,
to impeach the credibility of the witness Who
made it may be considered in connection
with the affiant's deposition, as evidence
against the plaintiff of the facts therein stat-
ed under oath with "like effect" as his dep-
osition, the words "with like effect" were
evidently intended to instruct the Jury that
the deposition and the affidavit were each
independent of the other and each affirma-
tive testimony, not however, that they were
of equal weight and such instruction should
be given where such affidavit is introduced
in evidence by plaintiff on the cross-examina-
tion of another witness. Connecticut Mut
life Ins. Co. V. HiUmon, 23 Sup. Ot 294,
296, 188 n. S. 206, 47 L. Ed. 446.
UKE XIHD
The words "like kind," as used in (}ode,
c. 151, f 1, providing that a person who
shall keep or exhibit a gaming table common-
ly called A. B. C. or E. O. table, or fftro bank,
or keno table, or "table of like kind," etc,
shall be punished, etc., are used in a broad
sense, and the act forbids certain kinds of
gaming, among which are faro banks and
keno tables, and all other games like them.
So, on a trial for unlawfully keeping and
exhibiting a slot machine^ it is not error
to instruct the Jury that if they shall be-
lieve that the slot machine described is a
gaming table, and that the machine Is so
constructed that it offers unequal chances to
the player and exhibitor, and that the un-
equal chances are in favor of the exhibitor,
then the slot machine is a gaming table
of like kind and character to A. B. C. and
E. O. tables, faro bank, and keno table.
State V. Gaughan, 48 S. E. 210, 212, 55 W.
Va. 692.
The expression "like kind of property," as
used in Bev. St 1899, f 1129, providing that,
if a carrier shall charge a greater or less
compensation for any services in the transH
portation of any kind of property than it
charges any other person for doing him a
IJK£ MANNER
I3»
I/IKd/T
like serrloe in the transportation of a "like
kind of property" under substantially the
same conditions, it shall be deemed guilty
of discrimination, means "of the same kindt''
and does not put all live stock in one class,
an4 hence the charge of a higher freight
rate for transportation of sheep than that
fixed for cattle and other lire stock does not
constitute a discrimination. Wynn 7. Wa-
bash R. Go^ 86 S. W. 00%, 064, lU Mo. Appi
642.
Testator provided that, on the death of
one of his children, one-third of the Income of
Ms share of a trust fund should be payable
**in like manner'* for the benefit of his wld%w
for life, and, on her decease leaving lawful
issue of testator's son then living, such one-
tlilrd of the Income and principal was to go
to such issue in the same manner as the
other two-thirds had been decreed. Held,
that the phrase *in like manner" was used to
designate the mode in which the recipients
were to be boiefited, and not to describe such
recipients. Sterling t. Ives, 62 AtL 948, 054,
78 Gonn. 488.
St 1898, i 925—184, provides that, if a
landowner assessed for street improvement
feels himself aggrieved, he may appeal to the
circuit court, which appeal shall be tried *1n
like manner" as appeals from the disallow-
ance of claims. Held, that the words **ln
like manner" did not mean that equitable
Issues should be tried to a jury merely be*
cause legal claims and demands against a
city were so triable and did not prevent an
amendment on the appeal so as to allow the
presentation of issues connected with the
subject-matter not triable below. Nelson v.
aty of Waukesha, 182 N. W. 887, 888, 141
Wis. 163.
TiTTTBTiTHOOP
See In AU Likelihood.
T.nrBXiT
See Reasonably Lik^.
The term "likely" means probable or
reasonably to be expected. Vohs v. ShorthiU
& Co., 107 N. W. 417, 419, 180 Iowa, 638
(citing Webst Diet; Cent Diet).
Since the word '*llkely" means "worthy
of belief according to Webst Diet; "rea-
sonable expectation," aooording to Stand.
Diet ; or "as may be reasonably supposed,"
according to Cent Diet — an instruction tn
regard to future sofltaiing should not leave
the Jury in doubt as to what future losses
they may consider in estimating the damages,
and thus give the Jury a roving commission
to find what damages they saw fit, and an
instruction authorising the Jury to find such
damages as "plaintiff will be liable to suffer
in the future" was not rendered erroneous
by the use of the word "likely,** in that it au-
thorised the Jury to estimate the damages
irrespective of such as they might believe
from the evidence would reasonably result
from the injuries in the future. Holden v«
Missouri R. Co., 84 S. W. 138, 136, 108 Mo.
App. 666 (citing Illinois (}ent Ry. Ck>. v.
Davidson, 76 Fed. 617, 22 a C. A. 306 ; Scott
Tp. V. Montgomery, 96 Pa. 444; Curtiss v.
Rochester & S. R. Co. [N. Y.] 20 Barb. 282;
dlstingulBhing Schwend v. St Louis Transit
Co., 80 S. W. 40, 106 Mo. App. 634; Hardy
V. Milwaukee St Ry. Co., 61 N. W. 771, 88
Wis. 183 ; White v. Milwaukee City Ry. Co.,
21 N. W. 624, 61 Wis. 636. 60 Am. Rep. 154;
Kucera v. Merrill Lumber Co., 66 N. W. 374,
91 Wis. 637).
"Among other definitions of the term
likely* given by some of the lexicographers
are the following: 'Worthy of belief.'
Webst Diet 'Reasonably expected.' Stand.
Diet 'As may be reasonably supposed.'
Out Diet Of course, the term has other
significations less definite than the foregoing,
and for this reason it should not be used in
an instruction to a Jury when plainness and
deflniteness of direction are required; but we
do not think the Jury understood by the In-
struction that they were commissioned to
estimate the damages Irrespective of what
they might believe from the evidence would
reasonably result in the future from the con-
sequences of the Injury, but did not under-
stand that the future losses for which they
might assess present damages were such loss-
es as were reasonably certain to accrue from
the injury. It was in this sense the learned
trial court understood the term as used in
the instruction, and there is nothing in the
record to induce us to believe that the Jury
had a different understanding. We think a
fair construction of the term, as used in the
instruction, means, and was understood by
the Jury to mean, such losses as were rea-
sonably certain to accrue in the future as
the result of the injury complained of."
There is but a slight shade of difference be-
tween "reasonably expected" and "reason-
ably certain," and "likely," as used in a
question to an expert medical witness as to
what results were Ukely to follow, was com-
petoit; the term being used synonymously
with "reasonably expected," which might be
substituted for "reasonably certain." Ge-
rard V. Manufacturers* Coal & Coke Co., 105
S. W. 767, 771, 207 Mo. 242 (quoting Holden
V. Missouri R. Co^ 84 8. W. 133, 108 Mo. App.
66Q).
While the term "likely" has in it to a
certain extent an element of probability, it is
not strong enough to make proper evidence
facts which are likely to occur. In an action
for injuries, a medical expert cannot be asked
as to whether an injury such as the plaintiff
received would be "likely" to produce the
condition related to the witness. Higgios v.
United Traction Co^ 89 N. X« Supp. 76, 77,
96 App. Dlv. 6a
LISBLT
UO
UMIT AKD OOKTROL
In an action for personal injuries, it was
not error to refuse to strike out, on the
ground that it was indefinite and speculatire
expert testimony, that it was not "likely**
that there would be any 'improvement there-
after in plaintiff's sight, the word "likely,**
although not synonymous with "probable,"
having practically the same meaning in this
connection. Graham v. Joseph H. Bauland
Co., 89 N. Y, Supp. 695, 598, 97 App, Dlv.
141 (citing Knoll v. Third Avenue R. Co.,
62 N. Y. Supp. 16, 46 App. Div. 527).
To constitute "wantonness** it is suffi-
cient that the act complained of indicates
that the injury was the "likely" and not Im-
probable result of the wrongful act The
word "likely** is here used in the sense of
something more than possible and less than
probable. Conchin v. El Paso & S. W. B. Co.,
108 Pac. 260, 261, 18 Aris. 259, 28 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 88.
Idable synonyiiioiia
See Liable.
LILY OF THE VALLEY
In construing the provision in Tariff Act
Aug. 27, 1894, c. 349, S 1, Schedule G, par.
234%, 28 Stat 525, for " 'lily of the valley*
• • • plants used for forcing,** held that
"Uly of the valley** roots, sprouted, which are
imported for forcing, are dutiable thereunder,
being included within the term '^plants** in
a popular sense, though not technically.
"Lily of the valley** roots are not covered by
Tariff Act Aug. 28, 1894, c. 349, § 2, Free
List, par. 558, 28 Stat 542, relating to "moss,
seaweeds, and vegetable substances,** not be-
ing vegetable substances in the class of moss
and seaweeds. McAllister v. United States,
147 Fed. 773.
LIMB
The word "limb** includes the part of a
human being from the hip to the sole of the
foot Lorts & Frey Planing Mill Co. v. W^
(Ky.) 113 S. W. 474, 475.
LIMES
As fruit, see Fruit
Limes in brine held not to be dutiable as
"Umes** under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11,
S 1, Schiedule 6, par. 266, 30 SUt 172, but to
be free of duty under section 2, Free List
par. 556, of said act, 30 Stat 198, as "fruits
in brine, not specially provided for.** Bren-
nan v. United States, 136 Fed. 743, 744, 69
C. C. A 395.
LIMESTONE
As mineral, see MineraL
Hauteville stone, a compact "limestone**
susceptible of a fairly high polish and used
for decorative work in the interiors of build-
ings, is dutiable as "marble,** under Tariff
Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, f 1, Schedule B,
par. 114, 80 Stat 168, rather than as "lime-
stone • • • not specially provided for,"
under paragraph 117, 30 Stat 169. The defi-
nitions of "limestone** and "marble** as glT-
en in Century and Worcester*s Dictionaries,
New American Cyclopedia, and New Inter-
national Encyclopedia, do not aid in any
great measure in determining the dividing
line between what is "marble** and what is
"limestone** other than '^marble.** Bockmann
V. United States, 154 Fed. 1000, lOOL
Marble is defined as a "limestone** bar-
ing a granular and crystalline structure,
bi^ it is a crystalline limestone. Hauteville
stone is not a crystalline limestone^ but is a
high-grade limestone ornamental and polish-
able. In Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c U» I 1,
Schedule B, par. 114^ 30 Stat 158, the term
"marble" is used according to its more pre-
cise definition as a limestone having a gran-
ular and crystalline structure, rather than
its broader sense of belag a limestone suscep-
tible of a high polish. Henoe Hauteville
stone, though an ornamental, polishable,
high-grade limestone, is not crystalline, not
dutiable under the provision, but under par-
agraph 117, as limestone. Bockmann v. Unit-
ed SUtes, 158 Fed. 807, 808, 86 C. C. A. 67.
Hauteville stone, and various other
stones of substantially the same character,
which are susceptible of a high polish and
are used as an interior decorative stone, are
not the kind of limestone that is "marble,**
within the meaning of Tariff Act July 24,
1897, c. 11, i 1, Schedule B, par. 114, 30 Stat
158, but are dutiable as "limestone,*' under
paragraph 117, 30 Stat 159. United States v.
C. D. Jackson & Co., 176 Fed. 884, 885.
LIMIT
See May Limit; Patrol Limits; Terri-
torial limit; Within the Limits;
Without Time Limit
"Limit," as applied to a game of poker,
means simply the maximum amount which
under the rules of the game can be wagered
in one bet Ford ▼. State, 38 South. 229, 86
Miss. 123.
As restrict
See Restrict
Exempt synoymoiu ^
See Exempt
LIMIT AND OOHTROXi
The words *llmit and control,** as used
in Acts 1902, p. 420, c. 300, entitled ''An act
to limit and control the expenditure of mon-
ey upon public highways** by a designated
county, are sufficiently broad to cover a pro-
vision in the body of the act prohibiting the
county commissioners from levying taxes on
the assessable property of the county for the
purpose of constructing, maintaining, and re-
UMITS OF lUB VEIN
141
LIMITATION OF iiCTIONgr
pairing any highway, hridge, or public road
not in whole or 4n part within the connty;
and hence the act is not in conflict with
Const art S, i 29, providing that every law
Bball express bnt one subject, which shall be
described in its title. Gommlssionen of
Qneen Annexe County v. Conunissionen of
Tftlbot County, 57 AtL 18, 99 Md. 18.
LIMITS OF THE VSIN
In the absence of defined walls and of
ffllnemllsation appreciably greater than that
contained In the general mass of the moun-
tain, broken, stained, and fissured material,
or crashed and brecclated matter, character-
istic of the district, cannot be held to con-
stitute a vein or lode, and, in such cases, the
limits of fracturing do not constitute the
"limits of the vein," and even If there be
found an occasional vug, or fragment of ore,
yet, where It is disconnected from any ore
body and so intermingled with the surround-
ing country rock that it cannot be regarded
as continuous, it does not mark the line of
the vein or lode, within the meaning of the
law. Grand Central Min. Co. 'v. Manunoth
Hin. Co., 83 Pac. 648, 649, 676-^80, 29 UUh,
490.
UMITATIOH
See Conditional Limitation; Bxeeutory
Limitation; Small limitatioiis; Title
by Limitation or Prescription.
The word "limitation,** as used i|i a lease
for a term of years, reciting that it is sub-
ject to the conditional limitations herein stat-
ed, and stipulating in the following para-
graph that the occupation of the premises by
the tenant and his family as a strictly pri-
vate dwelling apartment Is a spedflc consid-
eration for the granting of the lease, means
restriction. Schwoerer t. Connolly, 88 N, T.
Supp. 818, 819, 44 Misc. Bep. 222.
An "estate upon limitation" is one which
is made to determine absolutely upon the
happening of some future event. The tech-
nical words generally used to create limita-
tions are conjunctions relating to time, such
as during, while, so long as, until, etc These
words are not, however, absolutely necessary,
for, where necessary in order to carry out
the intent of the grantor, an estate will be
construed to be a limitation, though words
ordinarily used in the creation of an estate
upon condition appear in their stead. An "es-
tate upon limitation" dUfers from one upon
condition in this: That the estate is deter-
mined ipso facto by the happening of the
<x>ntingency and does not require any entry
by the grantor in order to defeat it Dia-
mond V. Rotan (Tex.) 124 S. W. 196, 200
(quoting and adoptinig deflnitibn in Tied.
Real Prop, f 211).
Where an estate is so ^Epressly limited
by the words of its creation that ft cannot
endure for any longer time than until the
eontin£^ency haivsns vpon which the estate
la to fall, the provision is a limitation: Low
T. niompson. 111 N. 7. Supp. 607, 608.
Code, I 1329, whidi provides that "any
limitation by deed" to the h^rs of a living
person shall be construed to be to his chil-
dren, abolishes the common-law rule that a
deed to the heirs of a living person is void
for uncertainty, and makes a deed to the
heirs of a living person a valid deed to his
children; the word "limitation*' In the stat-
ute meaning the creation of an estate. 'The
confusion which has frequently arisen in the
use of the word 'limitation' has been due to
a failure to appreciate the distinction, its
original sense, namely, that of a member of
a sentence expressing the limits or bounds to
the quantity of an estate, and Its derivative
sense, in which it Is used, as an entire sen-
teiiee, creating and actually or constructive-
ly marking out the quantity of an estate. In
our statute the word is manifestly used in its
derivative or secondary sense." Campbell v.
Bverhart, 62 8. B. 201, 204, 189 N. C. 603
(dting 2 Fearne, Remainders [4th Am. Ed.]
marg. p. 10, | 24; Stames v. Hill, 16 S. E.
1101, 112 N. C. 1, 22 L. R. A. 698).
Estate om, oeaiditliiA Jlstl«g»lsliea
The distinction between an "estate on
limitation" and one **on condition" is that in
the former the event or occurrence relied on
to determine the first estate and as the be-
ginning of another merely marks the end or
limit of the first, and tiius indicates the
boundary between the two, while in estates
on condition it actively defeats what might
otherwise be a greater interest Diamond v.
Botan (Tex.) 124 S. W. 196, 20a
As perpetvlij
See Perpetuity^
As vroTlso
See Proviso.
luctatioh of aotiohs
The "statute of limiUtions" Is a statute
of repose. McWhorter ▼. Cheney, 49 8. E.
603, 606, 121 Ga. 641.
The statute of limitations is a statute of
repose, enacted as a matter of public policy
to fix a limit within which an action must be
brought, or the obligation be presumed to
have been paid, and is intended to run
against those who are neglectful of their
rights, and who fall to use reasonable and
proper diligence in the enforcement thereof.
Burleigh County v. Kidder County, 126 N
W. 1063, 1066, 20 N. D. 27.
"Statutes of 'UmUation' are statutes of
repose intended to prescribe a definite limit
of time within which the remedies included
within their provisions must be prosecuted.
They are designed to afford security from
stale demands, when from lapse of time,
death of witnesses^ failure of memory, loss
of vouchers, or other causes, the true state
of the transactions may ba in^pable of ex-
LIBitTA/!rrON OF ACTIONS
142
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
|»lft^tlon, and the rights of the partLes can^
not be satiBfiactorlly investigated." Davla ▼.
MuBie, 86 N. E. 943, 944, 23j5 111. 620.
The '*Btatate8 of llmitatton" are based
on the theory of laches. Schroeder y. Bo-
sarth, 79 N. E. 583, 586, 224 111. 310 (citing
Mettler v. liUler, 22 K. E. 529, 532, 129 IlL
630, 642).
A "statute of limitation'* is bnt the ac-
tion of the state in determining that, after
the lapse of a specified time, a claim shall
not be legally enforceable. State of South
Dakota t. State of North Carolina, 24 Snp.
Ct 269, 288, 192 U. S. 286, 48 L. Ed. 448.
"Statutes of limitation*' are such legis-
lative enactments as prescribe the periods
within which actions may be brought upon
certain claims, or within which certain ri^^ts
may be enforced. Peters y. Hanger, 134 Fed.
586» 588, 67 d C. A. 386.
"Statutes of limitation," as applied in
courts of law, are inflexible and framed up-
on the theory that mere lapse of time, irre-
spectire of other considerations, should bar
the claim, while the doctrine of "laches," ap-
plied in courts of equity, is sufflciaitly flex-
ible to give reasonable effect to the special
circumstances of any case, and rests not
alone upon the lapse of time, but upon the
inequity of permitting the claim to be en-
forced, because of some change in the condi-
tion or relations of the property or the par-
ties. Stevens v. Qrand Central Min. Co., 133
Fed. 28, 31, 67 C. O. A. 284 (citing Hammond
V. Hopkins, 12 Sup. Ct 418, 143 U. S. 224,
250, 36 L; Ed. 134; Townsend v. Vander-
werker, 16 Sup. Ct 258, 160 U. S. 171, 186,
40 L. Ed. 383; Ward v. Sherman, 24 Sup. Ct.
227, 192 U. S. 168, 176, 48 li. Ed. 391; Bryan
V. Kales, 10 Sup. Ct 435, 134 U. S. 126, 135,
33 L. Ed. 829).
"Limitation," when relied upon as a de-
fense in an action of trespass to try title, is
in no sense a plea of confession and avoid-
anca Unlike a plea of limitation, when
urged against an action of debt, it confesses
nothing. In the latter class of actions this
character of pleading admits that the debt
once existed, and seeks to avoid its collec-
tion by showing that the right of action is
barred by the lapse of time. In those suits
the plaintiff states specifically the facts by
which he expects to prove his debt, and
facts showing the promise, either express or
implied, upon which he relies. But in an
action of trespass to try title the defense
of limitation does not expressly or impliedly
admit that the plaintiff ever did have any
title to the land sued for. On the contrary,
it is as much the assertion of an aflirmative
title, or right to the land, acquired by the
defendant under the provisions of the stat-
ute, giving absolute title by reason of ad-
verse use and possession for the statutory
period, as a denial of the right of recovery
by reasion of the lapse of time. It is not
simply a defense limited In its effect to dis-
proving the plaintiff's right of action, but
the setting of a superior claim in the der
f endant In this respect it occupies the sam^
plane as would a superior right or title ac»
quired from any other source, and is no
more to be regarded as a confession that
the plaintiff once had a title than would tbe
pleading of a written conveyance acquired
under such conditions as' would render it
superior to that under whi<^ the plaintiff
might daim. Meade ▼. Logan (Tez.) 110 &
W. 188, 191.
Gen. Laws 1865, p. 749, c 191, | 31, pro^
viding that every judgment should be pre^
sumed to be paid after 20 years from rendi-
tion thereof, but that in any suit in which
the party against whom such Judgment was
rendered was a party the presumption might
be repelled by written acknowledgment or
proof of payment of some part of the amount
recovered by the judgm^it, but that in all
other cases it should be conclusive, is not
one of limitation, and the absence of a judg-
ment debtor from the state did not affect the
running of time in favor of the presumption-
Cobb V. Houston, 94 8. W. 299, 301, 117 Mo.
App. 645.
The provision of Civ. Code 1901, pax.
989, requiring daima against counties to be
presented within six months, is not a *aaw
of limitation" within Civ. Code 19Q1, par.
2968, providing that laws of limitation shall
not be Available in any suit unless specially
pleaded as a defense, but is a special statu-
tory limitation of the essence of the right
created, and the lapse of which not only bars
the remedy but extinguishes the right
Cochise County v. WUcox (Aria.) 127 Pac
758, 760.
Pub. St 1901, c. 187, i 7, pennlttinjc a
petition to have the probate of a will re-
examined in solemn form within one year
after the date of the decree, is a statute of
limitations designed to secure the final pro-
bate of wills, while the facts are within the
knowledge of living persons, and to promote
the requirement of public policy looking to
the speedy settlement of decedent's estates,
and such a petition cannot be maintained
more than a year after the probate decree.
Knight V. Hollings, 63 Aa 38, 42, 73 N. H.
495.
The statute allowing two years for re-
demption from a tax sale is not a statute
of limitations within Const | 104, providing
that limitations shall not run against the
state or any county, etc., and a county has
not the right after the expiration of the two-
year period to redeem land, which after the
tax sale it bought at a trustee's sale, to pro-
tect a loan made by it on the land prior to
the tax sale. Tallahatchie County v. little,
46 South. 257, 258, 93 Miss. 88.
Statutes of limitation do not run against
the state in ree^pect to '^public ri^^ts^" unleea
UMTTATIQN OF ACTIONS
148
UOOTBD PABTHKMHTF
the Btate la ezpready incliidad witlitn the
tenaa of tbe statute: but where tbe state
beoomea a partner witb indliiduali or en-
gages In bnatneaa, it devests itself of its
soTeieIgn character and is subject to the
statute. The rule that statutes of lindtatiLon
do not run against the state also extends
to counties, cities, towns, and mftoor munici-
palities in all matters reelecting strictly pub-
lic lights, as distinguished from pxiyate and
local rights; but as to matters involTlng
prlTate rights thsgr are subject to statutes
of limitation to the same extent as individ-
uals. Brown ▼. Trustees of Schools, 79 N.
a 57», 580, 224 IlL 184, 115 Am. St Hep. 146,
8 Ann. Gas. 96 (dtlng County of Piatt v.
Goodell, 97 HI. 84; Lee t. Town of Mound
Station, 8 N. B. 759, 118 IlL 304; President,
etc:, of Ksskaslria t. McClure, 47 N. B. 72,
167 111. 23).
EqvitaUe aetloas
''limitations*' and 'ladies,'** when ap-
plied to the period within which an equitable
right may be asserted, are not synonymous.
^'Limitations'* signify that fixed statutory
period, whether expressly applicable to suits
in chancery or followed by analogy, wMle
'Aches'* signifies unreasonable delay inde-
p»ident of statute or any fixed period of
time. "Laches" also involves prejudice, ac-
tual or implied, resulting from the delay.
It does not arise from delay alone, but from
delay whidi works disadvantage to another,
as the defense of ladies to neither a limita-
tion nor an estoppel, but partakes of the
characteristics of both. Wilder's Bx'r v.
WUder, 72 AtL 206, 205, 82 Yt 128.
As yjpeseripttoi
''So far, therefore, as the title to prop-
erty is concerned, or, at all events, so far as
the title to real property is concerned, 'pre-
scription' and 'limitation' are convertible
terms; and a plea of the proper statute of
limitations is a good plea of prescriptive
right. The language of decisions with ref-
erence to water rights has been in accord-
ance with this view." Hence, where defend-
ant at the -time plaintiff commenced Its ac-
tion had already had a prescribed right to
divert the waters of a certain ditch, the ex-
tent of that right is to be determined from
the nature and character of the adverse user
on whidi it is founded, and is commensurate
with the extent to which it was adversely
enjoyed for the requisite statutory period
auffident to vest the right Wutchumna Wa-
ter Co. V. Ragle, 84 Pac. 16^164, 148 CaL
759 (quoting and adopting Alhambra Addi-
tion Water Go. v. Richardson, 14 Pac. 381,
72 CaL 601).
The term '^limitations," as used in stat-
utes of this country relating to adverse pos-
session, is merely synonymous with the word
"prescription" used in the Roman law, and
means the time prescribed by statute within
which a title to property may be acquired by
adverse possession. Brock v* Kirkpatildl;
48 S. H 72, 79, 69 & a 281 (dtlng Tyler on
BJectment; p. 88).
UMZTATXOH 07 XJABXUTT
See Agreement Tiimlting liability.
LDCXT ATXON 07 A BEMAXN DEB
A "limitation of a remainder," strictly
so called, is a clause creating or transferring
an estate or interest in lands or tenements
which is limited, dther directly or indirect-
ly, to take effect in possession or in enjoy-
ment, or fn both, subject, only, to any term
of years or contingent interest that may in-
tervene Immediately after the regular ex-
piration of a particular estate or freehold
previously created together with it by the
same instrument out of the same subject of
property. Biggerstaff v. Van Pelt, 69 N. B.
804, 806^ 207 IlL 6U (dtlng Smith, Bx. Int
Ilfi9).
UMXTATXON 8PE0XAXXT P&ESOBIB-
SD BT X.AW
See Specially Prescribed by Law,
Determine equivalent, see Determine.
UXTTED B7 X.AW
See^ also. Law.
The expression ''limited by law,** em-
ployed in a statute, refers to statutory law.
People V. Knapp, 132 N. T. Snpp. 747, 700,
147 App. Div. 486.
UXITED JUBI8DIOTION
The Supreme Court of Appeals Is a "court
of limited Jurisdiction," as defined by the
Constitution and laws passed in pursuance
thereof, and the burden is on one invoking
its authority to establish its Jurisdiction over
the matter In controversy. Forbes v. State
Cyoundl, Junior Order United American Me-
dianics of Virginia, 60 & B. 81, 107 Va. 863.
LIMITEB P ABTBEBSKP
C^ode Civ, Proc. 1 758, as amended in 1877
(Laws 1877, c 416, | 1, subd. 169), provides
that in the case of death of one of two or
more defendants, if the entire cause of action
survives against the others, the action may
proceed against the survivors, but that the
estate of one Jointiy liable upon contract' with
others shall not be discharged by his death ;
and Partnership Law (Laws 1897, c 420) i 3,
makes a JNirtnership formed otherwise than
as prescribed in the chapter for tiie forma-
tion of a limited partnership a general part-
nership. Section 4 defines a "limited part-
nership" as one or mors persons called "gen-
eral partners," and also one or more called
"spedal partners." Section 6 makes every
general partner the agent for the firm. Sec-
tion 6 makes every general partner liable for
ail Ann obligations Jointiy and severally with
his. general, copartner^ Section 7 makes a
lilMITlX). FBRIOD
14A
LIKS OF DESCatBTT
flt>ealiil par(xie» llAble only to the amoimt of
tbe cai>itaMiive8ted by him, and. article 8 is
entiUed "Limited Partnership.'.'. Baction 36
provides that the genial partner "in sndi
partnership'* shall be jointly and severally
liable as general partners are by law> and
that special partners shall not be liable be-
yond the fund contributed by them to the
capital. Held, that section 6 of the partner-
ship law is confined to limited partnerships,
and does not make the partners of a general
firm Jointly and seyerally liable to the firm
creditors, and hence the representative of a
deceased partner cotfld not be substituted
for him in an action for firm debts. Sellg-
man v. Friedlander, d2 N. B>. 1047, 1019, 199
N. Y. 373.
lillfZTED PERIOB
While the Ijegislature can authorize the
dsSignment of a homestead upon* the granting
of a divorce to either party absolutely,
whether such homestead is carved out of the
separate property of one or selected from the
community, yet, under Giv. Code, 1 146, subd.
4, which limits the right of such party in a
homestead selected from the separate prop-
erty of the other to its enjoyment "for a lim-
itedf period," there may be enjoyment or oc-
cupation by the innocent party for a long
period of years, even during the life of such
party, but it does not mean that the court
has the powdr -of vesting the homestead ab-
solutely in saeh party unless he is the former
owner of property from which the homestead
was selected. Zanone v. Sprague» 116 Pac.
989, 991, 16 Cal. App. 333.
XnOTED PUBIilOATIOir
A "limited publication" is one which com-
municates market quotations to a select few
on condition expressly or impliedly preclud-
ing their rightful ulterior communication,
except in restricted private intercourse.
Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v.
WeUs, 111 N. W. 167, 159, 100 Minn. 205
(quoting and adopting definition in Keene v.
Wheatley, 14 Fed. Cas. 180).
UmTED TERM
See Fixed and Limited Term.
LINE
See Back Line; Building Line; Center
Line; Conditional Line; Connecting
Lines; Continuous Line; Curb Line;
Dividing Line; Each Line of Tax
Roll; Half Section Line; Lot Line;
Main Line; Marked Line; Meander
Line; On Its Line; Property Line;
Shore Line ; Side Lines ; Stage Line ;
Telephone Line ; True Line.
A building line, see A.
Competing lines, see Competing.
Straight line, see Straight
In a deed granting by metes and bounds
a small parcel of land out of the northeaatem
corner of a Uurge tract known to contain ooal,
and also the privilege, should the grantee,
"his heirs, or aoBdgns^ open a coal mine on said
<granted) tract of land, of undermining sooth-
ward beyond the lines of said tract of said
land, so far as not to injure the tract of land
of which this was a part, and now taken
from,*' the word "lines" strongly imported an
intention to make a larger grant than that
of the coal lying immediately south. Hl^^ns
V. Round Bottom Coal & Coke Co., G9 S. B.
1064, 1068, 68 W. Ya. 218. -
The St Louis dty charter, which author-
izes the assembly to establish "a building
line" along boulevards, does not prevent the
assembly from establishing different building
lines along the same boulevard; the word
"line," as used in the charter, meaning: a
mark of division or demarkation, an outline
or contour, a limit or boundary, and not a
straight line. City of St Louis ▼. Handlan,
145 S. W. 421, 423, 242 Mo. 88.
In printina
"The word 'line' is not a technical term,
but one in common use, and having, in com-
mon usage, when applied to printing matter,
a well-known signification. It then means a
row of words, letters, or figures printed
across a page or column, without regard to
the size of the type," and it has this mean-
ing in act approved April 14, 1891 (2 Qen.
St p. 2325), enacted to regulate the price of
legal advertising. Sheehey v. Hoboken, 40
AU. 626, 627, 62 N. J. Law 184 (quoting and
adopting Maillard t. Lawrence, 16 How. 251.
261, 14 L« Ed. 925; Daly v. Ely, 31 Aa 396,
53 N. J. Bq. 270).
In flnrTeyina
That the description of a survey called
for. the marked "line" of another survey be-
tween designated points which was not a
straight line but consisted of four lines and
three marked corners was immaterial; the
word "line" being often used for the plural,
and vice versa, and the singular being also
sufficient to describe the exterior boundary of
the survey line called for between the desig-
nated points. Bell ▼. Powers (Ey.) 121 S. W.
901, 993.
UNE OF DESOEHT
The "line of descwit" is the course that
property takes according to law when the
owner dies. Under Domestic Relations Law
(Laws 1896, p. 226, c 272, | 64), providing
that the foster parent and the minor sustain
toward each other the legal relation of par-
ent and child with all the rights and subject
to all the duties of that relation, including
the right of inheritance from each other, a
son of an adopted daughter of a testator is
a "lineal descendant** within Tax Law 1896
(Laws 1806, p. 869, e. 908, i 221), providing
that the transfer of property ffom a decedent
to any lineal descendant shall not be taxable
under the transfer tax law, etc In re Cook*s
Sstate^ 79 N:!:. 991, 994, 187 N. Y. 253.
IJN£ OF DUTY
145
UKS TREES
UMM OF DUTT
Laws 1903, p. 102, c. 41, aBthorislug ft
penfiioA to the widow and children of a po-
licetnan on his death **whlle In the line of
dQty," does not authorise a pension where
a poUconan while at his place of duty com-
mitted suicide because of insanity, where
there was no showing that the Insanity was
the result of the performance of his duty.
A policeman would be in the line of his duty
while walking upon his beat or while going
to any point where his duty called him, hut
if he should meet a person against whom he
held a grudge, and without provocation or
cause he should assault him, and in self-de-
fense such person should take his life, it
could not in reason be said that he came to
his death while in the line of his duty.
Again, a policeman's duty might call him to
where intoxicating liquors are sold to be
drunk as a beverage, and while there he
would partake of sw^ liquonr until he be-
came intoxicated, and while in that condition
go upon the street and get killed as a direct
result ot his intoxication, it would be tiaye»-
ty to say that his death resulted flrom the
performance of a duty enjoined upon him, or
that he was killed 'In the line of his duty."
In either event his death would not be the
result of his being a polic^aan, or the re-
sult of his attempting to discharge any duty
as sudL Hutchens v. Covert, 78 N. B. lOdl,
1062, 30 Ind. App. 882.
I.IKE OF 1iATT«1IOAl>
The term "line" in the general railroad
act declaring that the directors of every com-
pany formed under the act may, by a vote
of two-thirds of their whole number, at any
time, alter or change the route, if it shall
appear to them that the line can be improved,
means the same as "route." By "line" is
not meant the organization of the several
particulars taken together, which, when used
for the active affairs of the company might
colloquially be termed the 'line," but it is
that spedflc thing which, taken by itself,
even before the company goes into active op-
^ation, is called its "line" or "route." Webb
V. Forty-Second St., M. ft St N. Ave. Ry.
Co., 102 N. T. Supp. 762, 787, 52 Misc. Rep.
46.
'TTwo carriers may use the same road,
but each has its separate line.' The de-
fendant may lease trackage rights to any
other comjAny, but the Joint use of the same
track does not create the 'same line,' so as to
compel either company to graduate its tariffs
by that of the other." A joint traffic ar-
rangement by which connecting carriers haul
frcKU a point on one road to a point on the
other road for less than the first carrier
charges from the same point on its road to
its terminus between the points is not in
violation of Ky. St i' 820, making it an
offense for a carrier to charge mere for
hauling for -a^ shorter distance than for a
longer distance over Uie same line in thje
3 WDS.ft P.2d Seb.— 10
same diseetiim; the expression '^>ver the
same lla^" not including a shipment passing
in part over the line of each. Common-
wealth V. Chesapeake ft O. R. Co., 72 S. W.
361, 363, 115 Ky. 57 (quoting and adoptii«
Chicago ft N. W. R. Co. v. Osborne, 52 Fed.
012, 8 a a A 347).
As used in Rev. St 1883, c. 6, |.42, as
amended by Pub. Laws 1901, p. 100. c. 145,
relating to taxation, the word "railroad"
comprehends the equipment, roadbed, sites
of depots and warehouses and other real es-
tate, and the words "Une or system" cannot
be disconnected from it, and mean in this
connection a railroad operated as a part of a
Une or system extending beyond the state.
State V. Canadian Pae R. Co., 60 Atl. ^1,
902, 100 Me. 202.
lilHE OF SHIP OHAXNiX
A description of a boundary as following
the "line of ship channel" means the line of
low tide. Western Pac. Ry. Oa Souttiem
Pac. Co., 151 Fed. 376. 386, 80 a 0. A. 606.
UaXB OF TELBQMABM OR TBUEU
PHOSS POLES
By a "Une of telegraph or telephone
poles" is meant a line of poles carrying an
unlimited number of wires, and such a line
is not rendered lAural in its nature by hav-
ing more than one line stretched upon it
It still remains a single line. Northeastern
Telephone ft T^egraph Co. v. Hepburn, 65
Ati. 747, 749, 72 N. J. Bq. 7.
LnCE SHAFT
The word "shaft," as used in connection
with or applied to factories, is a revolving
bar to convey the force which is generated by
some prime mover to the different working
machines, and a "line or main shaft" is a bar
of considerable length, and usually bearing a
number of pulleys by which power is trans-
mitted to countershafts. Hohenstein-Har-
mets Furniture Co. v. liatthews, 92 N. £2.
196, 199, 46 Ind. App. 616.
UHE TB££S
"Line trees" are "trees standing directly
on the boundary between lands of adjoining
owners," and are "usuaUy considered com-
mon property, which neither may destroy
without the consent of the other." Harndon
V. Stultz, 100 N. W. 329, 330, 124 Iowa, 440
(citing Musch v. Burkhart, 48 N. W. 1025,
83 Iowa, 301. 12 L. R. A. 484. 32 Am. St
Rep. 305).
Under the express provisions of Civ.
Code, I 834, "line trees" are those whose
trunks stand partly on the land of two or
more coterminus owners, and belong to them
In common. Scarborough v. WoodiU, 93 Pac
383, 7 Cal. App. 39.
Where adjoining owners were co-tenants
of certain line trees, neither was at liberty
to cut the trees without the consent of the
UNBAIi
146
LINKAIi HSBfl
other, If he thereby Injured the common
property tn the trees. Scarborough r. Wood-
Ul, 08 Pac. 883, 7 O&L App. 89.
LINEAL
"Lineal" Is that which sabsiats between
persons of whom one is descended in a direct
line from the other, as between son, father,
grandfather, great-grandfather, and so up-
wards in the direct ascending line; or be-
tween son, grandson, great-grandson, and so
downwards in the direct descending line.
State ▼. De Hart, 83 South. 606, 606, 109 La.
670.
The Centnry Dictionary defines 'linear
as "proceeding in a direct or unbroken line;
unbroken in course; distinguished from
collateral; as lineal descent; lineal succes-
sion." Worcester defines "lineal" as in a
direct line from an ancestor, pertaining to a
direct line of descent, hereditary. In re
Cook's Estate, 100 N. T. Supp. 628» 629, 60
Misc. Rep. 487.
UHEAI. OOKSAjrOUmiTT
"Consanguinity" or kindred is the con-
nection or relation of persons descended
from the same stock or common ancestor,
and is either lineal or collateral; and "lin-
eal consanguinity" is that which subsists
between persons of whom one is descended
in a direct line from the other. Suman v.
Harvey, 79 Atl. 197, 204, 114 Md. 241.
UHEAI. DES0Ein>AHT8
Testator devised part of his estate to
trustees, to hold equally for the benefit of
testator's three children, and to pay to each
of them the rents and profits of his or her
portion for life, and at his or her death to
transfer and convey to his or her "lineal de-
scendants," if any, and, if none, then equally
to the survivors of testator's descendants,
or to their lineal descendants, if any; that
the descendants of any child should have
the portion which their parent, if living,
would have taken, and, in case of death of
all of testator's children without issue, to
convey the trust res to testator's heirs at
law. Held, that the words "lineal descend-
ants" had the same legal eifect as "heirs of
the body," and that equitable estates in fee
tail were therefore created by the will, with
contingent cross-remainders to the surviv-
ors or their descendants, if either child died
without issue. Paine v. Sackett, 61 AtL 763,
755, 27 B. L 300.
A trust deed conveying property to trus-
tees during their lives and the life of the
survivor of them recited that the grantor
wished to provide for the maintenance of
the beneficiaries named, directed the trustees
to distribute the proceeds among the bene-
ficiaries, provided for the distribution there-
of on the death of one or more of the bene-
ficiaries with or without "Uneal descend-
ants,** and that, on the temdnatioii of tbe
trust estatt by the death of the last stur-
viving trustee, the "lineal deaoendants" of
the beneficiaries named should take tiie body
of the fund, and further provided that tlie
beneficiaries should not take any cQn&t In-
terest in the grantor's property in the state
than that therein granted. Held, that the
phrase "lineal descendants" must be taken
in its technical sense, and the contingeo-
cies on which the corpus of the fund de-
volved on the issue of the beneficiaries were
that all the beneficiaries^ as well as all the
trustees, should be dead. Parrish v. Mills,
106 S. W. 882, 886, 101 Tex. 276.
Adopted eUld
A legally adopted child is a "lineal de-
scendant" of its adopting parents. In re
Winchester's Estate, 74 Pac. 10, 140 Oal.
468 (citing Warren v. Prescott, 24 Aa 948,
84 Me. 483, 17 L. B. A. 435, 30 Am. St Rep.
370).
The Oentury Dictionary defines the
words "lineal descendant" to mean "descend-
ed from father to son through successive
generations," and "descendant" as "an in-
dividual proceeding from an ancestor in any
degree; issue, offspring, near or remote."
"Lineal" is d^ined as "proceeding In a di-
rect or unbroken line; unbroken in course;
distinguished from collateral; as lineal de-
scent; lineal succession.'' Worcester de-
fines "descendant" as '*the offspring of an
ancestor; progeny," and "descent" as "pro-
ceeding from an original or progenitor, ex-
traction." A son of an adopted daughter
of testator is not a "lineal descendant" with-
in the transfer tax act, so as to exempt his
legacy from the transfer tax. In re Cook's
EsUte, 100 N. T. Supp. 628, 629, 60 Wac
Rep. 487.
A "lineal descendant" is one who is in
the Une of descent from a certain person,
but, since the passage of the domestic rela-
tions law, not necessarily in the line of gen-
eration. Under Domestic Relations Law
(Laws 1806, p. 226, c 272, | 64), providing
that the foster parent and the minor sustain
toward each other the legal relation of par^
ent and child with all the rights and sub-
ject to all the duties of that relation, in-
cluding the right of inheritance from each
other, a son of an adopted daui^ter of tes-
tator is a "lineal descendant" within Tax
Law 1896 (Laws 1896, p. 869, c. 908, | 221),
providing that the transfer of pKq^erty from
a decedent to any "lineal descendant" shall
not be taxable under the transfer tax law,
eta In re Cook's Bstate^ 79 N. B. 991, 994,
187 N. Y. 253.
As desoendaat
See Descendant
UNEAZ* KKTRIi
The words "lineal heirs," like "helm of
the body,*' mean all lineal descendants to
LINEAL HEIiUS
U7
WNT OOTTOK
the remotest posterity, and axe words of |
Inheritanoe, and not of parcha8e» unless the I
instrument clearly shows they were nsed in
a restricted sense to denote ''dUldren."
Clark y. Neves, 57 3. B. 614, 615, 76 S. C.
484, 12 L. B. A. (N. &) 298 (citing Dudcett
V- Butler, 45 S. B. 137, 67 S. C. 130; Hoi-
man t. Wesner, 45 S. B. 206, 67 S. a 307).
The phrase "lineal heirs" is equiyalent
to the words *l^:al representatlTe" In re
Tuttle's Estate, 68 Aa 44, 45, 77 Ck>nn. 810
(citing Ketchum ▼. Corse, 31 AtL 486, 65
Conn. 89).
XiUfEAZi IHHEBITAHOB TAX
A tax on the interests of lineal descend-
ants is a lineal inheritance tax, and that
on collateral descendants a collateral in-
heritance tax. In re Macky's Estate, 102
Pac 1075, 1078, 46 Colo. 79, 23 L. R. A
(N. S.) 1207.
LIHEAI. X88UB
Act 0>ng. Jnne 18, 1896, c. 448, 80 Stat
448, as amended by Act March 2, 1901, e
806, 31 Stat 938, imposing a succession tax,
classifled legatees and distributees with ref-
erence to their degree of blood relation-
ship to the deceased* and regulated the tax-
es accordingly. In the first class were
placed the lineal issue or lineal ancestor,
brother or sister of the decedent; in the sec-
ond the descendants of a brother or sister;
in the third the brother or sister of the
father or mother or a descendant; in the
fourth class, the brother or sister of the
grandfather or grandmother or a descend-
ant; and in the fifth all beneficiaries found
to be in any other degree of collateral con-
sanguinity, or who may be a stranger in
blood to the person dying seised of the prop-
erty. Held, that an adopted child, though
under the laws of the state entitled to all
the rights of heirship of a child bom in law-
ful ^nedlock, was not a ^'lineal issue" with-
in the first class, but was a stranger in blood
within the fifth dass. Kerr ▼. Ctoldsbor-
oush, 150 Fed. 289, 290, 80 a C. A 177.
LINER
A machine ^own as a "liner,** a heavy,
hollow, rerolving iron roller, filled with steam
of hi^h temperature, with a smaller roller
above, between which papers were passed
by the operator, was not the character of
machinery required to be guarded by Bums'
Ann. St 1908, i 8029, requiring employers
to guard '*all vats, pans, saws, planers, cogs,
gearing; belting, shafting, set screws and ma-
chinery** ; the liner b^g neither a ''rat** nor
a "gearing." Jenkins t. Lafayette Box Board
& Paper Co., 87 N. Bl 992, 993, 48 Did. App.
468.
LINK
The word "link,** in an instractlon on
reasonable doubt on a trial for crime where
the testtmony of the complaining witness to
the main ftict was direct and the only cir-
cumstantial evidence In the case was cor-
roborative, that it was not necessary that
every fact and drcumstanoe and every
"link" in the chain must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, but that all the evidence
in the case, when considered as a wholes
must satisfy the Jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant was guilty, is used to
refer only to evidentiary facts which may
add force or weight to other facts from
which the inference of guilt may be drawn,
and the instruction is not erroneous. People
V. Rich, 94 N. W. 375, 878, 133 Mich. 14.
LINOLEUM
See Qranite Lfnoleum.
Plank linoleum, made by running upon
the burlap foundation paste of two colors in
stripes of equal width, a process differing
from that employed in making inlaid lin-
oleum, is, under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, &
11, I 1, Schedule J, par. 337, 30 Stat 180,
dutiable as 'linoleum * * • figured or
plain," rather than as 'Inlaid linoleum."
United States v. Scott & West, 164 Fed. 286,
286.
UNSEED OIL
Laws 1897, p. 403, c 217, provides that
no person or corporation shall manufacture
or sell any linseed oil, unless the same an-
swers a chemical test for purity recognized
in the United States Pharmacopceia, and de-
clares that the same shall be sold under its
true name and in vessels bearing proper
stamps, describing it as pure linseed oil raw
or pure linseed oil boiled. Laws 1901, c. 332,
amends the act, and provides that no person
or corporation shall manufacture linseed oil,
unless the same answers to a certain de-
scribed test The amendment makes no ref-
erence to raw or boiled oil. The words "lin-
seed oil,** as used In the amendment, includes
both raw and boiled oil. State v. Williams,
100 N. W. 641, 642, 93 Blinn. 155.
LINTCOnON
Acts 1896, p. 172, c. 156, | 16, imposes a
tax on all "lint cotton** annually grown in
a levee district etc., and Acts 1904, p. 126,
c 90, i 5, makes it unlawful for any person
to remove from the district any "cotton**
grown therein without first paying the levee
tax thereon, and declares that the levee
board may recover from the person wrong-
fully removing such cotton a certain penalty
tax on each bale or hundredweight of "seed
cotton'* so removed. Held, that the wot6b
"lint cotton" in the first act and "cotton**
and "seed cotton" in the second act were
limited to "lint cotton'* ginned by ordinary
gins, and did not tndude "linter" or **Orab-
bof* cotton obtained by reginning cotton
LINTER 0OTTO»
148
LIQUIDATED
seed and hard locks of cotton and cotton
mixed with hulls, bolls, and other substanc-
es which could not be removed by ordinary
ginning. Mississippi Levee Com*r8 ▼. Ref-
uge Cotton OU Go^ 44 South. 82^ 829, 91
Miss. 480.
LiNTER COTTON
See Lint Cotton.
LIQUEUR
Vermuth is not a "wine,** "cordial," or
"liqueur," within the meaning of Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c 11, i 1, Schedule H, par.
296, 30 Stat 174, prohibiting an allowance
for the leakage of those three articles. Unit-
ed States Y. Julius Wile, Sons ft Co., 178
Fed. 269, 27Q, 101 C. C. A. 674.
LIQUID
See Inflammable Liquid ; Poisonous Liq-
uid.
LIQUID mZTUBE
The terms "beverage,** 'liquid mixture,"
or "decoction," as used in Ky. St 1903, |
2557a, making the sale at retail of a bev-
erage, liquid mixture, or decoction which
produces intoxication, unlawful in a terri-
tory wherein the sale of intoxicating liquor
is prohibited, are used interchangeably, each
synonymous with the other. Commonwealth
V. Jarvls & Williams, 86 S. W. 656, 557» 120
Ky. 334.
LIQUIDATE
Laws 1907, c. 244, entitled an act "for
the liquidation and payment of the claim
* • • against the state in full and final
settlement of said claim and all other de-
mands," does not indicate any legislative in-
tention to pay a debt or claim which did not
exist, as the word "liquidate" Is defined to
be the act of settling and adjusting debts, or
ascertaining the amounts or balance due:
Hanly v. Sims, 94 N. B. 401, 403, 176 Ind.
346 (citing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4130).
UQUIDATEB
Plaintiff's demand in an action on notes
is Uquidated, within Rev. St 1895, art 754,
providing that, if the suit be founded on a
certain demand, defendant may not set off
unliquidated damages. Wise v. Ferguson
(Tex.) 188 S. W. 816, 8ia
Whether a claim is of a nature connoted
by the term "set-off," and whether, as to
its liquidated or unliquidated character, cap-
able of being the subject of set-off, is to be
determined by applying the test, Will an ac-
tion of indebitatus assumpsit lie thereon T
If so, it la liquidated within the legal mean-
ii4; of the word "set-off." Links v. Marl-
owe, 84 AtL 1066, 1067, 83 N. J. Law, 389.
The words "sum liquidated,** as used In
a statute providing that no demand shall
be set off unless for the price of real or
personal estate sold or for money paid, mon-
ey had and received, or for services done,
unless it be for a sum liquidated or one that
may be ascertained by calculation, do not in-
clude an unliquidated claim for use and oc-
cupation. Hall V. OUdden, 39 Me. 446, 447.
The word "liquidated," in the sense of
the rule that payment of a lesser sum is a
discharge oi the remainder where the amount
in dispute Is unliquidated, but that it is not a
discharge where it is liquidated, means that
the amount due has been ascertained and
agreed on by the parties or fixed by opera-
tion of law. The rule does not apply where
there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount
actually due. A demand is not liquidated,
even, if it appears that something is due, un-
less it appears how much is due; and when
it is admitted that one of two Q^edflc sums
is due, but there is a gmeral dispute as to
which is the proper amount the demand is
regarded as "unliquidated" within the mean-
ing of the term as applied to the subject of
accord and satisfaction. T. B. Bedmond &
Co. V. Atlanta & B. Air Line By., 68 S. £L
874-876, 129 6a. 133 (quoting 6 Words and
Phrases, p. 4174).
A petition which shows that the amount
sued for was the price of an article sold hy
plaintiff to defendant, and which alleges that
defendant pfomised to pay plaintiff the sum
sued for, which sum was the agreed value
thereof, states a cause of action for a Uq-
uidated demand within Sayles' Ann. Olv. St
1897, arts. 754, 766, providing that, where
a suit is founded on a certain demand, an
unliquidated demand cannot be set off unless
it is connected with the cause of action, and
defendant cannot set up as a counterclaim a
demand for unliquidated damages for breach
of warranty In the sale of the other goods^
the word "liquidated" meaning adjusted, cer-
tain, or settled in respect to the amount; a
debt b^ng liquidated when the amount is
agreed on by the parties, or fixed by the op-
eration of law. Brooks Tire Mach. Co. y.
Shields, 108 S. W. 1006, 1006, 48 Tex. dr.
App. 63L
A claim \B a "liquidated claim** where
the amount due is fixed by law or has been
ascertained and fixed by the parties. Scar-
ritt Estate Co. v. J. F. Schmelzer & Sons
Arms Co., 86 8. W. 489, 491, 110 Mo. App.
406 (citing Bouv. Law Diet ; Chicago, R. I.
& P. R. Co. V. Mills, 69 Pac 317, 18 Colo.
App. 8 ; Commercial Union Assur. Ca of Lon-
don V. Meyer, 29 S. W. 93, 9 Tex. dv. App.
7; Mitchell v. Addison, 20 Ga. 60; Kennedy
V. Queens County, 62 N. Y. Supp. 276, 47
App. Div. 260).
"A demand is not liquidated,* even if it
appears that something was due, unless it
appears how much was dua*' The courts
UQUIDA'TBD
149
UQUIDATED DAMAGB8
hare defined fbe meaning of 'tiquidated de-
mand" in language 80 broad that almost any
daim abort of damages for an assault and
battery might be embraced in the definitions
given, but on principle and under the cases
the court holds that plaintifTs claim for
services in this case was not a ''liquidated
demand"* because the number of days he
worked for defendant was in serious dispute,
and the value of his services was also in
controversy; the evidence* showing that the
demand might be anywhere from $25 to $75.
White V. Curtis, 98 N. Y. Supp. 319, 320, 49
Misc. Bep. 50 (quoting from Nassoiy v. Tom-
llnson, 42 N. B. 715, 148 N. Y. 326, 330, 51
Am. St Rep. 095).
A demand is a ''liquidated demand"
whenever the amount due is agreed on by
the parties or fixed by operation of law. An-
other definition is adjusted, certain, or set-
tled in respect to amount In an action for
the price of goods sold, defendant pleaded
that he had paid plaintiff for a car load
of goods previously sold by plaintiff to de-
fendant at a certain price per sack, but that
on opening the car d^endant had found a
shortage and a certain number of sacks so
worthless that th^ were rejected. Held,
that the total of the price per sack for each
missing and rejected sack constituted a "liq-
uidated demand," and hence might be set
off in the action. Harrington Lumber Co. v.
Smith, 99 S. W. 110, 112, 44 Tex. Civ. App.
363 (quoting and adopting definitions in Wat
Set-Off, S 337; Abb. Law Diet).
Where one agreed to pay an attorney,
for professional services to be rendered, 5
per cent of the value of certain timber, tl«
tie to which was to be acquired as a result
of the attorney's efforts, the claim of the at-
torney for compensation became, upon the
performance of the services, a liquidated de-
mand, and, as such, bore interest from the
date it became due, notwithstanding the con-
tract provided that, in the event of disagree-
ment as to value, the owner of the timber
should submit to the attorney a "give and
take proposition," and thereafter refused to
do so. Council v. Hixon, 76 S. B. 603, 607, 11
6a. App. 818.
LIQUIDATED BT UTIOATION
The words "liquidated by litigation,"
within Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, a 541, | 57n,
30 Stat 561, limiting the time for proof of
claims liquidated by litigation, are not in-
tended merely to preserve to litigant credi-
tors th^r rights against a bankrupt estate,
80 as to preclude right of surety on bank-
rupt's bond for costs on appeal to prove a
claim to recover reimbursement In re Lyons
Beet Sugar Refining Co., 192 Fed. 445, 447.
The i^rase "liquidated by liquidation,"
as used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, f
67n, dO Stat 561, is not suflBciently compre-
hensive to include the Judgment or decree
of a court depriving a creditor of a voidable
preference at Hie suit of the trustee. In re
Otto F. Lange Co., 170 Fed. 114, 115.
The term "Uquidated by Utigation," as
used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1^8, c 541, |
57n, 30 Stat 561, permitting proof of claims
after a year if liquidated by litigation, ap-
plies to a case where the creditor has claim-
ed to hold security, and has litigated that
question and been defeated and thereafter
attempts to prove as a general creditor. In
re Salvator Brewing Co., 188 Fed. 622, 524.
After bankruptcy, certain proceedings
were brought in the state court to set aside
a conveyance of property from the bankrupt
to claimants before adjudication. If the
conveyance had been held good, the claims
would have been satisfied from the property
conveyed, which claimants sought to hold as
security for their claims, in which they were
unsuccessful. Held that, though such litiga-
tion did not in terms relate to the amounts
due claimants, the question litigated neces-
sarily involved a determination of the net
amount for which their claims should be
finally allowed, and hence such claims should
be regarded as "liquidated by litigation,'*
within Bankr. Act July 1, 1897, c. 541, | 57n,
80 Stat 5(11, providing that if claims are
liquidated by litigation, and final judgment
therein is rendered witiiin 80 days before or
after the expiration of a year from the ad-
judication, they shall be proved within 60
days after the. rendition of such judgment
In re Keyea, 160 Fed. 768, 764.
The term "liquidated by litigation," as
used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, § 57n, pro-
viding that claims shall not be proved against
a bankrupt estate subsequent to a year after
the adjudication or if they are liquidated
by litigation and the final judgment there-
in is rendered within 80 days before or aft-
er the expiration of such time, then within
60 days after the rendition of such judgment,
means that a creditor who during the year
was engaged in litigation with the bankrupt's
estate concerning its liability to him is enti-
tled to*additional time, though the litigation
was to determine whether a mortgage se-
curing the creditor was invalid as a prefer-
ence, which question was determined in the
affirmative. Powell v. Leavitt 150 Fed. 89,
91, 80 C. C. A. 43.
UQiriDATED DAMAOBS
Where a fire insurance loss was adjust-
ed and the amount due agreed on, audi
amount was "liquidated damages." a H.
Brown Banking Co. ▼. Baker, 74 S. W. 454,
455, 99 Mo. App. 660 (citing Bout. Law
Diet).
A contract for a penalty is an agreement
to pay a stipulated sum in case of default,
intended to coerce performance, to punish de-
fault or to secure the payinent of actual
damages, while a contract for liquidated
damages is a contract by which the parties
in advance of breach fix the amount of dam-
UQUIBATBD DAMAOS8
160
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
ages which will result therefroai and agree
on its payment Muefalebach ▼, Missouri ft
K. I. Ry. Co., 148 S. W. 453, 456, 166 Mo.
App. 305.
The term "liquidated damages" Is used
In reference to the breach of a contract or
nonperformance of duty as expressing a
fixed sum which Is agreed upon between the
parties as the ascertained damage which the
one is to recelye and the other .to pay because
of the default United States ▼. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 151 Fed. 634,
536.
CoBstraotion of eoatraets
There are two rules for inferring that
the sum to be paid for breach of a contract is
Intended as liquidated damages: First,
where the damages are not readily capable
of ascertainment by any known rule, whether
the uncertainty lies in the nature of the
subject, or in the circumstances of the case;
and, second, where from the agreement it is
apparent that the damages have been the
subject of a fair adjustment between the par-
ties. Charleston Lumber Co. ▼. Friedman, 61
S. £. 815, 816, 64 W. Va. 151.
In determining whether a sum named
in a contract is to be considered as a "pen-
alty" or as ''liquidated damages," the courts
are aided by circumstances extraneous of the
writing. When parties to a contract stipu-
late that in case of a violaUon thereof the
party making the default shall pay a stipu-
lated sum, the courts will 'take the sum so
fixed as the injured party's measure of dam-
ages only when It appears that to do so
will no more than compensate his loss; but,
if the sum so fixed in such contract will
more than compensate the Innocent party,
the court will regard the same as a penalty.
Lee V. Carroll Normal School Co., 96 N. W.
65, 66, 1 Neb. (Unof.) 681 (citing Glllilan
V. Rollins, 59 N. W. 893, 41 Neb. 540).
When damages arising from breach of
contract are uncertain, and are not readily
susceptible of proof, and, as stipulated, are
not so 'disproportionate to the probable dam-
age suffered as to appear unconscionable, the
stipulation will be regarded to provide for
"liquidated damages," and not a '^penalty";
but if it is Inserted to secure the payment
of a definite sum of money, or if the actual
damages are easily ascertainable, and are
less than the stipulated sum, or if the prin-
cipal agreement provides for the performance
of several acts of different degrees of im-
portance, and the stipulated sum is to be
paid on a violation of any or all of them,
and the sum will, in some Instances, be too
large, or it is uncertain whether the parties
intended liquidated damages or a penalty, it
will be treated as a **penalty." Thus, where
a contract for the exchange of real estate
provided that, if either of the parties should
fail to comply with the conditions thereof,
he should pay in forf ^t to the other the sum
of 1600 as liquidated and agreed damacen^
which amount was not so disproportionate to
the probable damage suffered as to appear
unconscionable, it would be construed as
liquidated damages, and not a penalty. Mad-
ler V. SUverstone, 104 Paa 165, 166, 55 Waah.
159, 84 L. B. A (N. S.) 1.
"Where an absolute sum is fixed In a
contract as security against all breach or
breaches of the contract without reference
to the magnitude of the breaches or the
number thereof and without referring to the
amount of the actual damages which might
ensue from such breach or breaches wheth-
er great or small, and this where there mig^t
be several breaches and each of a greater or
less magnitude, and each followed by greater
or less damages, audi fixed sum cannot be
considered as agreed or liquidated damages,'
but must be considered as a 'ptfialty.*"
Where a party sold his business and good
will and, as a part of the same transaction,
executed a written instrument in which be
said that he bound himself in the sum of
fSOO; that he would not engage in the same
business at the same place for the period
of five years, the sum named in the instm-
m^t was a penalty and not 'liquidated dam-
ages." Heatwole v. Gorrell, 12 Pac 135, 187,
85 Kan. 692.
When a sum which it is stipulated in
a contract shall be paid for its breach Is
dlsporportionate to presumable or probable
damage or to a readily ascertainable loss,
the courts will treat it as a ''penalty" and
will rely on the principle that the precise
sum was not the ees^ice of the agreement
but was in the nature of security for per-
formance. Hicks V. Monarch Oyde Mfg. Co.,
68 N. B. 127, 128, 176 N. T. Ill (citing Ward
V. Hudson River Bldg. Co., 26 N. B. 256, 125
N. Y. 230; Curtis v. Van Bergh, 66 N. BL
398, 161 N. Y. 47; 8 Pars. Oont [6th Bd]
157).
A stipulation that for each day's delay
beyond the time for completing a water sup-
ply works the contractor should pay $500 as
'*liqi}idated damages," and not as a penalty,
was not in fiict a penalty and not liquidated
damages, where, by failure To complete the
water supply works, the dty would be de-
prived of the right of selling its surplus
water to municipalities and other persons
outside its corporate limits, and the damages
which it would thereby suffer were alto-
gether uncertain in amount and not readily
susceptible of proof. Jersey City v. Flynn,
70 Aa 506, 507, 74 N. J. Bq. 104.
While it may be stated, as a general prop-
osition, that courts do not look upon tor-
feitures with favor, and will, when possible,
construe provisions thezefbr as one fior a
penalty rather than as one for liquidatad
damages, the true rule is to give sadi a
construction to the provision as will carry
out the Intent ot the parties it clearly as-
XiIQUIBATBD DAMAQBS
161
UQUIBATBD DAMAOXS
oertaiBable from the contract Tomer ▼.
Jfremont, 169 FML 221« 225.
Wbexe damages are not capable of bdng
aflcertalned by any satlsfiictory role and the
langaage of the contract admits of the con-
struction, the sum reserved Is "liqaldated
dtmages," but where the loss may be easily
determined by proof of market valnes, the
sum reserved is a ''penalty'* subject to the
intention of the parties as evidenced by the
contract Kellam ▼. Hampton (Tex.) 124
8. W. 970, 971.
Where the sum named in a contract is
declared to be fixed as liquidated damages
and is not clearly disproportionate to the
loai that may result from a breach, and the
damages are not measurable by any exact
pecuniary standard, the sum designated is
'^quldated damages." Burley Tobacco Soc.
T. Qfllaspy (Ind.) 100 N. BL 80, 91.
In determining whether a specified sum
was intended and must be treated as a pen-
alty or as liquidated damages, it is a well-
established principle of construction that it
will be treated and enforced as liquidated
damages where it is agreed to be paid for
doing or failing to do an act in respect to
which the damages are uncertain and not
measurable by any exact pecuniary standard.
In a contract for the improvement of a dty
atreet providing for completion before Octo-
ber 1st on failure to do which the contract*
or agreed to **piLy and forfeit" to the city
as "liquidated damages" the sum of $25 pot
day after October 1st though the word **tov-
felt" ordinarily means ''penalty," its mean-
ing, like that of the words "Uqnidated dam-
ages," is to be determiiied by the connection
hi which It is used, and in view of the f^ct
that it was necessary to complete such im-
provement in the summw months, and dam-
ages might reasonably fiow from a failure to
complete within the time limited, the dam-
ages will be considered liquidated damages,
and not a penalty, regardless of whether the
city actually suffered damages by the delay.
Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. City of Wabash,
86 N. BL 1034, 1080, 48 Ind. App. 107 <quot-
hig and adopting People v. Love, 19 Cal.
676; citing and adopting Merica v. Burget 75
N. B. 1063, 36 Ind. App. 463; Ghande v.
Shepard, 25 N. B. 358, 122 N. T. 897; Noyes
T. Phillips, 60 N. X. 408; Bx parte Alexander,
39 Ua. App. 108; Pogne v. Kaweah Power &
Water Ck>., 72 Pac. 144, 138 Gal. 664; Eakln
v. Scott 7 S. W. 777, 70 Tex. 442; Wibaux
▼. Grinnell Live-Stock Go., 22 Pac. 492, 9
Mont 154; Mayne, Dam. [5th Bd.] 146;
Pastor V. Solomon, 55 N. T. Supp. 956, 26
Misc. R^. 125; 3 Pars. Gont [9tiK Bd.] *157;
8treei;)er v. Williams, 48 Pa. 4S0).
*']Bven if the thing to be dona i« called
a 'penalty' or 'liquidated damages,' or given
DO luune at all, it will be treated according
to the evident intent of the parties and the
sQbject-matter of the contract" A provision
in a contract that, if defendant failed to
divest from a river a certain amount of
water through a certain uncompleted ditdi,
which it agreed to complete within a specified
time, and to continuously deliver sudi
amount of water, it would surrender to plain-
tiff all rights which it had acquired through
deeds of rights of way or water rights ex-
ecuted by plaintiff to its predecessor, was in
the nature of liquidated damages, and not a
penalty, within Giv. Gode, | 3369. Pogue
▼. Kaweah Power & Water Go., 72 Pac. 144,
145, 1S8 GaL 664 (citing and adopting People
▼. Love, 19 Cal. 677).
"If there are several covenants in the
contract of different degrees of importance,
and the same sum is stipulated to be paid
for a breach of either, the courts Incline to
treat the sum as a 'penalty,* and, in case
of the breach of a covenant, to assess no
greater damages than win compensate the
obligee." Whtfe a vendor in a contract for
the sale of realty bound himself to keep the
premises in repair. Insure the buildings
against fire, furnish an abstract within 90
days, and put a deed in escrow in the same
time, a stipulation for payment of ffSOO if
either party failed to perform his part of the
contract wbb for a simple "penalty," and not
for liquidated damages. Boulware v. Grohn,
122 Mo. App. 571, 99 S. W. 796, 800 (citing
Gower v. Saltmarsh, 11 Mo. 271; Hathaway
V. Lynn, 43 N. W. 956, 75 Wis. 186, 6 L. B.
A. 551; Wilkinson v. GoUey, 30 Aa 286, 164
Pa. 41, 26 L. R. A. U4).
A bidder for the erection of a public
building for a city, who made a deposit with
the city and agreed that the amount thereof
was the amount of damages which the dty
would sustain by failure to carry out the pro-
posal, made the deposit liquidated damages,
and not a penalty. Wheaton Building A
Lumber Co. v. Gity of Boston, 90 N. BL 598,
601, 204 Mass. 218.
When damages arising from the breach
of a contract are uncertain in their nature,
and not readily susceptible of proof by the
ordinary roles of evidence, and are not so
disproportionate to the probable damages
suffered as to appear unconscionable, and
it is reasonably clear from the whole agree-
ment that it is the intention of the parties
to provide for liquidated damages and not a
penalty, such a stipulation is for liquidated
damages. Herberger v. H. B. Orr Co., 114
Pac 178, 180, 62 Wash. 526.
In a contract for the purtshase and sale
of an article of merchandise, to be delivered
in stated quantities periodically during a
term of over five years, a provision that in
case of breadi by either party the other may
be released and recover as liquidated dam-
ages a sum equal to the entire purchase price
to be paid during the term, is one tov a
*'penaltyf" having no reference to the actual
damages, which in sudi case are readily as-
oortainable, and the amount being grossly
excessive in case the contract had been per-
UaUIDATEQD DAMAGES
162
UaUIDATBD DAMAOKB
fanned for. any considerable time before the
breach. McGall Ck>. ▼. Deachler, 174 Fed.
133, 135, 98 C. O. A. 169.
Wfiere a contract provides for the pay-
ment of a certain snm as liquidated damages
on nonperformance of a specific act which
may produce damages of an uncertain char-
acter, and no language is used that such
damages shall be considered only as a "pen-
alty," the same is to be regarded as "liqui-
dated damages." Where a street railroad, in
consideration of ^,481.07 paid to it by the
owner of property fronting on its line, agreed
that -during one^alf of the period named in
the company's charter the road should be
maintained and operated daring Its entire
length, and that in* event of Its fUluie to
do 80 it would pay the property owner the
sum of 13,481.07, with interest, the sum speci-
fied was not a "penalty," but "liquidated
damagesi" which the property owner was en-
titled to recover on a breach by the railroad.
Santa F6 St Ry. v. Schuts, 88 S. W. 89, 44,
87 Tex. Oiv. App. 14.
Where the payment of a certain sum is
agreed to be made for the breach of a single
stipulation in a contract, and the damages
for such breach are not readily susceptible of
proof, if such sum cannot be said to be in
excess of what might reasonably be recovered
in a suit for such damages, this sum will be
held to be for "liquidated damages," and not
a penalty. Gussow v. Beineson, 68 Atl. 907,
76 N. J. Law, 209.
A bond given by a bidder for a mail con-
tract conditioned as required by the federal
statute, which provides that the contractor
and his sureties shall be liable for the
amount of the bond as "liquidated damages
to be recovered in an action of debt on said
bond," is an absolute undertaking to pay
the amount named therein as "liquidated
damages" in case of condition broken, and
not one of indemnity or security to the gov-
ernment against loss or damages for breach
of contract, and in an action thereon the ac-
tual damages cannot be inquired into. Unit-
ed States V. Alcorn, 145 Fed. 995, 1001.
Where, on a contract to convey land,
$300 was paid by the vendee on condition
that the vendor furnish a fee-simple title,
and to be returned on failure to do so, such
sum, in the absence of any showing that
it was disproportionate to the damages likely
to result from the breach, was properly
treated as 'liquidated damages." Pinkney
V. Weaver, 74 N. E. 714, 717, 216 HI. 185.
The rule generally afitoned by authorities
is that, where it is asreed by the parties that
the sum or rate fixed in a contract shall be
"liquidated damages»" and the case is one in
which they are at liberty to so agree, such an
agreement must stand and control unless it
is inconsistent with other parts of the con-
tract or is unreasonable or unconscionable in
view of the probable damages which may flow
from a breach of such a oonlaract Where de-
fendant milkman contracted .with plelntiff
for the purchase of 1,000 pounds of milk each
day, which plaintiff was to be permitted to
purchase from certain territory without in-
terference by defendant, the stipulation that
plaintiff should pay five cents as damages for
each gallon of milk which he failed to furnish
was for "liquidated damages." Mondamln
Meadows Dairy Co. v. Brudi,.72 N. B. 643,
645, 163 Ind. 642.
A clause for liquidated damages most be
construed as a penalty, if the damages upon a
breach are capable of exact computation* or
if the so-called liquidated damages are out
of all proportion to possible damages; and
hence, where a party agrees to pay a definite
sum In damages for his failure to pay rent,
such sum cannot be regarded as "liquidated
damages," since, where a larger sum is to be-
paid in default of paying a smaller sum
agreed to be paid by the same instrument,
the larger sum is a "penalty," although the
instnunent denominates it "liquidated dam-
ages." Feinsot v. Bursteln, 138 K Y. Supp.
185, 188, 78 Misc. Bep. 259.
B. being the owner of stock in a coal
company, which owned no property exe^t a
contract assigned to it by B., whereby U.
agreed to sell coal land to B., and B. agreed
to buy it for 134,000, payable in three in-
stallments, a tripartite agreement was made,
whereby the company agreed to sell to R. and
R. agreed to buy 20,000 shares of its stock for
$5,000, of which $1,500 was then paid, with
right to B. to rescind if representations made
be found untrue; gave R. for the recited con-
sideration of such agreemeat and the pay-
ment made an option to buy another 20,000
shares at 25 cents a share; recited that it was
understood and agreed that the company was
Indebted to U. in the sum of $32,000 payable
in three stated installments; that B. was
thereby given by the company 35,000 shares
of its stock, in consideration of which he
thereby agreed to pay all Its said indebted-
ness as it became due; that, if such sums
were not so paid, said 35,000 shares should
be delivered to R., who should either pay all
such debts and release the company, or de-
liver such 35,000 shares to the company;
and that B. should deliver to a bank the
50,000 shares of stock of the company owned
by him, and, if he failed to pay the debts of
the company as agreed, then the bank should
deliver the 60,000 shares to R., and R. should
become the absolute owner thereof. Held,
that the provision as to the 50,000 shares was
neither part of the consideration nor one
for liquidated damages, but a penalty or for-
feiture; it being applicable whether B. failed
In the payment of one or all of the install-
luents to U., and even though R. did not pay
such indebtedness, and found that misrepre-
sentations had beoi made, and on that account
rescinded his contract of purchase. A provi-
dlou which would be one for a penalty if in-
UQDIDATED DAMAGES
168
IJQUO&
volYlng a sum of moDey Is technicaUy one for
a foif^tara if inTolvlDg loss of chattels or
secnrlty pledged. Bell t. Scranton Coal
Mines Co., UO Pac. e28, 631, 69 Wasb. 669.
Forf altiire m» indieatlas p«aaliy
See Forfeit— Forfeiture.
UQUIDATZOH
See Partial Liqiiidation.
"Uquidatlon'' implies a winding ap of the
affairs of a corporation. Assets Realiz&tion
Co. V. Howard, 127 N. Y. Snpp. 798, 816, 70
Misc. Rep. 661.
"Liquidation" in its general sense means
"the act or operation of winding up the af-
Mrs of a firm or company, by getting in the
assets, settling with its debtors and creditors,
and appropriating the amount of profit or
loss." In re Sllkman, 105 N. Y. 9upp. 872,
875, 121 App. Div. 202 (quoting 6 Words and
Phrases, p. 4180).
The word "liquidation," as used in the
Customs Laws, means the ascertainment of
the duties due the United States, taxed at
the rate prescribed by law upon the particu-
lar dass of merchandise Imported. United
SUtes ▼. Sommers, 171 Fed. 67, 63, 96 C. G.
A. 299.
Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c 641, | 57n, 80
Stat 561, declares that claims shall not be
proved against a bankrupt's estate subse*
quent to one year after the adjudication, or,
if liquidated, by litigation, and the final judg-
ment is rendered within 30 days before or
after the expiration of such time, then with-
in 60 days after the rendition of such judg-
ment Held, that the term ''liquidation," as so
used, was not limited to proceedings having
for their object only the ascertainment of
the amount due on the claim, but included
as well proceedings to ascertain the kind
and character as well as the amount of the
claim, and hence proceedings against a bank-
rupt's estate to establish certain bonds as a
preferred lien on the bankrupt's assets cover-
ed by mortgage given to secure the bonds
were proceedings for liquidation, so that, on
adverse determination, the bondholders were
entitled within 60 days to file their claims on
the bonds as general creditors. In re Stand-
ard Telephone & Electric Ck>., 186 Fed. 686,
SOL
Complainant held 260 shares, of which
186 had been pledged to decedent in his life-
time as security for complainant's note to tes-
tator. The remaining 250 shares were held,
100 by defendant trustees and 160 by two oth-
er persons individually. The business being
imsuccessful, it was decided to liquidate,
whereupon the estate, fearing that the divi-
dend distributable to complainant on the
pledged 8t#ck would be insuffident to pay the
iu)te, proposed tliat if complainant would
tarn over his other 60 shares the note would
be surrendered, with the understanding that
if, hi Ikfuldatioii, the property of tt&e com-
pany amounted to more than enough to pay
the note and accrued Interest, the balance
would be turned over to complainant, whidi
proposition was accepted in terms, after
which complainant participated in the liq-
uidation agreement, one of the clauses of
which declared that after the corporation's
indebtedness was paid the treasurer should
divide the balance among the stockholders
in proportion to their several holding& Held,
that the word "liquidation," as used in such
agreement, meant the act of winding up the
affairs of the company by getting in the as-
sets, settling with its debtors and creditors,
and apportioning the amount of profit or loss,
and that the agreement should be construed
to mean only that, if complainant's propor-
tion of the net assets amounted to more than
enough to pay the note, he should receive
the balance, and not that he should receive
all of the net assets above the amount neces-
sary to pay the note. Fuller v. Perkins, 73
Atl. 872. 378, 80 R. I. 3; Jones v. Seaman,
117 N. Y. Supp. 286, 188 App. Div. 127.
LIQUOR
See Com Liquor; Imitation Malt Liq-
uor; Intoxicating Liquor; Malt Liq-
uor ; Nonintoxicating liquor ; Spiritu-
ous liquors; Substitute for Malt Liq-
uor; Vinous and Spirituous liquors;
Vinous liquor.
Furnishing liquor, see Furnish.
Manufacture of liquor, see Manufacture.
Sale of, see Liquor ; S^.
Sale of as commerce, see Commerce,
Selling liquor as business, see Business.
nie term ''liquor or liquors" includes all
kinds of intoxicating decoctions, whether
spirituous, vinous, malt, or alcoholic. Marks
V. State, 48 South. 864, 868, 16^ Ala. 71, 188
Am. St Hep. 20.
The word "liquor" and the associated
word "drinks" in a statute regulating or
forbidding the sale of intoxicants, mean an
alcoholic beverage. Pennell v. State, 123 N.
W. 116, 116, 141 Wi& 36.
"Uquor" is defined as: "a) A liquid or
fluid substance, as water, milk, blood, sap,
etc. (2) A strong or active liquid of any
sort specifically, an alcoholic or spirituous
liquor either distilled or fermented: an in-
toxicating beverage especially a spirituous
or distilled drink as distinguished from fer-
mented beverages as wine and beer. <b) A
strong solution of a particular substance
used in the Industrial arts." It is also de-
fined as: "Any liquid or fiuid substance, as
water, milk, blood, sap juice and the like.
<2) Especially alcoholic or spirituous fiuid
either distilled or fermented. A decoction,
solution or tincture." Luther v. State, 120
N. W. 126, 128, 88 Neb. 466, 20 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1146 (dissenting opinion of Letton, J.;
citing Cent Diet; Webst Diet).
IiIQUOR
154
UQUOR DEALBB
Gen^niUy, the term "llqaor*' implies in-
tozicating liquor. Therefore proof tliat de-
fendant sold "liquor" is sufficient to show,
in the absence of adverse testimony, that he
sold Intoxicating liquor, especially where it
is shown that it looked like rye whisky.
Carswell ▼. State, 66 S. B. 488, 7 Ga. App.
198.
The measurement intended by the stat-
ute prohibiting the sale without a license of
liquor in less quantities than five gallons Is
a measurement of the quiet liquor after it
has been released from confinement and the
gas, froth, or foam arising when the liquor
is released from the vessel in which it is
contained cannot be considered in determin-
ing the quantity of liquor. People ▼. Nylin,
86 N. B. 156, 158, 236 IlL 19.
The word "liquor^ is collective, its sig-
nificance including the plural as well as the
singular, and a conviction in a prosecution
for selling alcoholic, spirituous, malt and in-
toxicating liquor may be supported by proof
of the sale of liquor which is either alcohof-
ic, spirituous, malt, or intoxicating in qual-
ity without proof that it possesses more than
one of such qualities. Wilbum v. State, 68
S. B. 460, 461, 8 Ga. App. 28.
Acts 1909, c 479, imposed a privilege tax
for revenue on liquor dealers selling liquor
under different conditions, and provided that
"liquor dealers" should include every person,
company, or firm selling spirituous, vinous,
or malt liquors, beer, ale, or intoxicating
bitters^ or any medicated or adulterated ci-
der, or any club or association handling such
liquors for sale^ etc. Held, that the words
'^liquor" and "liquor dealers" should be
construed as limited to beverages and per-
sons selling beverages containing a sufficient
amount of alcohol to make them intoxicat-
ing, and that the act did not Impose such tax
on a vendor of soft drinks containing a small
percentage of alcohol, insufficient in quantity
to render the liquors intoxicating. Austin
V. Shelton, 127 S. W. 446, 447, 122 Tenn. 634.
Laws 1897, p. 207, a 312, { 2, provides
that the term "liquors" as used in the act
shall Include all distilled or rectified spirits,
wines, fermented or malt liquora Section
81, p. 233, provides that it shall not be law-
ful for any person who has not paid a tax
and posted the certificate provided by the
act to sell liquors in any quantity in less
than five wine gallons at a time. Held, that
an indictment charging violation of the lat-
ter section need not allege that the liquors
sold were distilled or rectified spirits, wines^
fermented or malt liquors; it being sufficient
to charge the offense in the language of such
section. People v. Myers, 77 N. B. 1193, 185
N. Y. 558.
Under Laws 1897, p. 207, c. 312, | 2, the
term "liquors," as used in that act, includes
all "distilled, rectified spirits^ wines, fer-
mented or malt liquors." People v. Myers,
95 N. T. Supp. 993, 994, 109 App. Dlv. 143.
Liquor Tax Laws, | 2, defines "Uqnor"
as meaning all distilled or rectified spirits,
wine, fermented or nmlt liquors. CuUinan
V. Dwlght, 100 N. Y. Supp. 896, 897, 61 Mlaa
Rep. 221.
Flavoring extracts, composed of from 40
to 60 per cent alcohol, 3 per cent. flavorlOLg
principle, and water, the quantity of alcohol
being no greater than is required to hold the
fiavoring principle in solution, which are not
made, nor used, nor capable of being used,
as a beverage, but which are chiefly used In
fiavoring soda water sjN^ups, the quantity of
extract used in each glass of the beverage
being about 3 or 4 drops, are not "beverages,"
nor "liquors," within the meaning of Rev.
St i 3244, and the manufacturer is not sub-
ject to special tax as a rectifier or wholesale
or retail dealer in liquors. Allen v. Liquid
Carbonic Co., 170 Fed. 315, 817, 95 O. C.
A. IX
A sale of liquor known as "malt rose"
containing between .74 per cent and 1.18 per
cent in volume of alcohol, and intended to
aid in the evasion and defeat of the liquor
law, is a violation of Liquor Tax Law (Laws
1897, p. 207, a 312) i 2, defining Uquors, as
used in the act, to Include all distilled or rec-
tified spirits or fermented or malt liquors.
People V. Cox. 94 N. Y. Supp. 526, 527, 106
App. Dlv. 299; Id., 92 N. Y. Supp. 125, 45
Biisc Rep. 811.
Beer
The sale of 'lager beer" which was
drunk on the premises during the hours when
the sale of malt liquors was prohibited was
a violation of Liquor Tax Law (Laws 1897,
p. 207, c. 312) I 2, defining liquors as used
in the act to include all distilled or rectified
spirits or fermented malt liquors. Oul-
llnan v. McGovem, 94 N. Y. Supp. 525, 626.
LIQUOR BEAI.E&
See Retail Liquor Dealer.
Where one sold liquor under a valid
license and bond, though the application on
which the license was granted was defective,
he was a "liquor dealer" under the laws of
Texas, with the right to sell liquor, and sub-
ject to the penalties arising from an infrac-
tion of his bond. Castellano v. Marks, 83 S.
W. 729, 731, 37 Tex. av. App. 273.
Acts 1909, c. 479, imposed a privilege
tax for revenue on liquor dealers selling liq-
uor under different conditions, and provided
that "liquor dealers" should include every
person, company, or firm selling spirituous,
vinous, or malt liquors, beer, ale, or intox-
icating bitters, or any medicated or adulter-
ated dder, or any dub or assodation han-
dling sudi liquors for sale^ eta Hdd, that
the words "liquor" and "liquor dealers"
should be construed as limited to beverages
UQUOR DEALEB
156
us PSKBBNB
and persons selling beverages containing a
auffident amoont of alcohol to make them in-
toxicating, and that the act did not impose
such tax on a vendor of soft dvlnks contain-
ing a small percentage of alcohol, InsofBcient
in quantity to render the liqnors intoxicat-
ing. Austin T. Shelton, 127 8. W. 446, 447,
122 Tenn. 684.
Where a statute prohibited a merchant
and dealer in spirituous liqnors from keep-
ing open his place of business on Sunday for
the purpose of traffic and sale, a member of
a firm engaged in the sale of spirituous liq-
uors was a "dealer,*' within such statute,
and was amenable in his indiyidual capacity.
Morris v. State, 80 S. W. 882, 888, 48 Tex.
Cr. R.S62.
UQVOB DBinOCEB
See Drummer.
UQVOB xjOEma
See license (Government R^ulation).
Application for, as dvil actioUt see Civ-
il Action— Case— Suit— eta
As contract, see Contract
As franchise, see Franchise^
As property, see Pxt)perty.
UQUOB TAX OBBTinCATB
As property, see Property.
LIS
LX8MOTA
The phrase lis mots'* means the com-
mencement of the controversy. Mutual Re-
serve Ufe Ins. Co. v. Jay, 109 & W. 1116,
1118, GO Tex. Civ. App. 165.
In an action involving plaintlff*s legiti-
macy, testimony by a deceased Mnaman of
plaintiir, in a prior action, given when a con-
troversy existed on the question, but before
the present suit was brought, tending to es-
tablish plaintifrs legitimacy, was not admis-
sible; the term ''lis mota," as used in the
rule requiring ex parte declarations of de-
cedents to have been made ante litum mo-
tam to be admissible, meaning the beginning
of the controversy, and not of the action.
Rollins V. Wicker, 70 & BL 034, 980^ 154 K.
C. 560.
LIB PEHBENS
"Lis pendens" by itself does not con-
Btltnte a cloud or incumbrance upon a title,
and does not, of itself, furnish any ground
In reason why a purchaser should not be
compelled to complete his purchase. Baecht
▼. Hevesy, 101 N. T. Supp. 418, 416, 115
AiH^. Div. 500.
Though the result of a suit in one court
may enter as a factor Into the determination
of anocher in a (Xilferent tribunal, "lis pen-
dens" cannot be properly pleaded on the
Cround of the coexistence of the suits, where
the causes of action are not identicaL Cen-
tral Improvement & Contracting Co. v. Gras-
ser Oontractliig Co^ 44 SouUl 10, 18, 110 La.
Whether the doctrine of Us pendens is
based on constructive notice or on the pol-
icy of the law, forbidding parties to convey
property pending litigation concerning it to
the prejudice of the other party, the rule is
that during the pendency of a suit neither
party can alienate the property in dispute,
so as to affect the rights of the other par-
ty, Maes V. Thomas (Tex.) 140 8. W. 846,
847. •
''lis pendens" denotes those principles
and rules of law which define and limit the
operation of the conmxon-law maxim, ''Pen-
dente lite nihil Innovetur." Pending the suit
nothing should be changed, if it has the ef-
fect to bring the subjectrmatter of the liti-
gation within the control of the court; and
to render the parties powerless to place it
beyond the power of the final judgment
Powell V. National Bank of Commerce in
Denver, 74 Pac. 586, 588, 10 Colo. App. 67
(citing Freem. Judgm. | 108).
"As a general rule an action or suit
brought solely for the recovery of a money
Judgment or for other relief not directly
affectihg property will not constitute a 'lis
pendens*; and, in the absence of fraud or
collusion between the parties thereto, alien-
ations are valid until the property is afllxed
with a Judgment or execution lien, or taken
into custody by an attachment, receivership,
or other auxiliary proceeding." Horagne v.
Doe, 30 South. 161, 162, 148 Ala. 450, 111
Am. 8t Sep. 52, 6 Ann. Caa 88L
Where no steps were taken from March
4, 1887, until September 29, 1002, by plain-
tiff city in the prosecution of its action to
recover taxes due for 1885, and in the mean-
time defendant became a lender and pur-
chaser for value in good faith, without ac-
tual notice of the pendency of the suit or the
claim for taxes, and no reason for delay in
prosecuting the suit was shown, a "lis pen-
dens" did not exist in favor of the city at
the time defendant's rights intervened. City
of Louisville V. Burke (Ky.) 87 S. W. 260,
270.
The object of a "lis pendens" notice is
to warn persons and put them on their guard
in their dealings with defendants regard-
ing the subject-matter of a pending action.
First Nat Bank of Peoria v. Fanners' &
Merchants' Nat Bank of Wabash (Ind.) 82
N. B« 1018, 1016.
"Lis pendens" is simply a rule to give
effect to the rights ultimately established
by the Judgment It merely precludes any
change in the subject-matter to the prejuoice
of plaintiff during the pendency of the ac-
tion, and the filing of the statutory notice
is designed to effect that result not to give
constructive notice of plaintiff's claim as
does the recording of a deed or mortgage^
us P£KDEHB
166
lilST
Whatever effect actaal notice of a pending
action may have, the filing of a statutory
notice of pendency does not constitute con-
structive notice of anything more than the
pendency of the action, and, when the ac-
tion has ceased to be pending under the ihw
of lis pendens, the statutory notice ceases to
be effectual for any purpose. Its purpose Is
to prevent any alienation of the subject-
matter in litigation, pending the action, that
could prejudice plaintiff's rights or impair
or defeat any interest he should establish
as against defendant in the suit, and does
not constitute such notice of plaintiff's eq-
• uity as would affect the conscience of a
purchaser. McVay v. Tousley, 105 N. W.
032, 935, 20 S. D. 258, 129 Am. St Bep. 927.
The doctrine '*ll8 pendens" applies not
merely to purchasers from the defendant,
but also to purchasers from the plaintiff.
The rule has been applied to all cases of
transfer during the progress of the cause,
notwithstanding the hardships of individual
cases from considerations of public policy
and convenience. The rule applies to a judg-
ment creditor whose rights as an Incum-
brancer are acquired during the existence
of the lis pendens, and also to a purchaser
at a judicial sale, had in execution of a
judgment in favor of a person whose Inter-
ests in the property sold are affected by the
lis pendens. While in England and in some
of the states it has been held that lis pen-
dens begins upon service of process or sub-
poena, in this state a pending suit is notice
from the filing and docketing of the cause,
if followed by the Issuance and service of
process and due prosecution of the suit Giv.
Code 1895, § 3936. The question as to when
Us pendens begins, as applied to a cross-bill,
depends largely on what is the extent of the
lis pendens arising on the original suit, or
of what the original suit gives notice to one
dealing with the property affected. When a
suit is filed by a plaintiff, any one taking
from the defendant a conveyance of the
property involved takes with notice of plain-
tiff's action, including ordinary or amplify-
ing amendments which do not change the
identity of the suit or affect its general pur-
pose or object or create a new lis pendens.
A purchaser, pending a suit, must anticipate
that the defendant will resist the action and
will file appropriate defensive matter there-
to, but he is not bound to anticipate that de-
fendant will bring a cross-action against the
plaintiff, setting up some equitable right and
demanding affirmative equitable relief in re-
gard thereto. Bridger v. Exchange Bank,
56 S. E. 100, 101, 126 Oa. 821, 8 L. B. A.
<N. S.) 463, 115 Am. St Bep. 118 (citing Se-
combe v. Steele, 61 U. S. 106, 15 L. Ed. 838;
Fash V. Bavesies, 32 Ala. 451; Berry v.
Whltaker, 58 Me. 442; Cole v. Winnlpisse-
ogee Lake Cotton & Woolen Mfig. Co., 54 N.
H. 242 ; Olson v. Leibpke, 81 N. W. 801, 110
Iowa, 595, 80 Aul St Bep. 327; Welton v.
Co<^ 61 OaL 481; Borxowscale ▼. liUtile^
5 AUen [87 Mass.] 377; 2 Pom. Bq. Jar. [3d
Ed.] § 633; Story, Eq. PL [10th Ed.] | 156:
Oarmichael ▼. Foster, 69 Oa. 372; Bennett
Lis Pendens, p. 242, | 181; Allen v. HalU-
day, 28 Fed. 261; Cotton ▼. Dacey, 61 Fed.
481 ; Freeman, Judgnt | 205 ; Hope v. Blair,
16 S. W. 595, 105 Mo. 85, 24 Am. St Bep.
366; Watson v. Wilson, 2 Dana [82 Ky.] 406,
26 Am. Dec. 459 ; Ettenborough v. Bishop, 26
N. J. Eq. 262; McCauley v. Bogers, 104 111.
578; Weems v. Harrold, 75 Ga. 867; Cher-
ry V. North & S. B. B. Co., 65 Ga. 633; a C.
Hall Lumber Co. v. Gustin, 20 N. W. 616,
54 Mich. 624; Henderson v. Wanamaker, 79
Fed. 736, 25 C. C. A. 181; Kinney v. Con-
solidated Va. Mining Co., 14 Fed. Cas. 612;
English V. Thorn, 96 Ga. 557, 23 S. E. 843;
Garver v. Graham, 51 Pae 812, 6 Kan. App.
314; Mansur & Tebbetts Implement Co. v.
Beer, 45 S. W. 972, 19 Tex. Olv. App. SIX,
313; Tlnsley ▼. Bice, 81 & B. 174, 105 Ga.
289.
As Botlee
A "Us pendens" is not the commence-
ment of an action as against the defend-
ants. It is a mere notice to outside parties
that such an action is about to be or actu-
ally has been commenced. Cohen v. Blber,
108 N. Y. Supp. 249, 250, 123 App. Dlv. 528.
A "lis pendens" is for the purpose of
giving notice of the Jurisdiction or con-
trol which the court acquired over property
Involved in a suit pending the continuance
of the action. State v. Washington Dredg-
ing & Improvement Co., 86 Pac. 936, 038, 43
Wash. 508 (adopting definition in Washing-
ton Dredging & Improvement Co. ▼• Kin-
near, 64 Pac 522, 24 Wash. 405).
That the transferee of corporate stock
knew that suit was pending for the appoint-
ment of a receiver and dissolution of the cor-
poration, and to require the transferror to
account for property alleged to have been
wrongfully appropriated, did not prevent it
from purchasing the stock free from all eq-
uities between the transferror and another
stodcholder, or the corporation, as the doc-
trine of constructive notice by "lis pendens"
does not apply to such property. Central
Sav. Bank ▼. Smith, 95 Pac. 307, 3U, 43 Cola
90.
LIST
See Classified list; Tax List
Such list, see Such.
Unfair list, see Unfair.
"List," In its common ordinary flense^
means to put into a list or catalogue, regis-
ter, or enroll. Strout Co. v. Gay, 72 AtL 881,
882, 105 Me. 108, 24 L^ B. A. (N. S.) 562.
Of witnesses
Bev. St I 1033, requiring that In a cap-
ital case the list of the witnesses and jurors
shall be delivered to the defendant at leasi
LIST
167
UTEBABT PBOPEBTT
tiro oitlre days before the trial, by 'list of
the witnesses'* means a list containing the
names of the witnesses, and neoessarily this
means the names which they then bear, and
which identify them. A woman who has
been married and divorced is not incompe-
tent as a witness in a capital cause because
she is designated on the list of witnesses fur-
nished to the defendant in compliance with
the statute by her maiden name, under which
she has gone since her divorce some 10 or 12
yeais ago. Bird v. United States, 23 Sup. Ct
42. 45, 187 U. S. 118, 47 L. E3d. 100.
Tax Ust
The phrase '*Ust of all shares of stock,'*
used in the statute providing persons owning
shares of stock in banks shall not be required
to deliver to the assessor a list thereof, but
the president or other chief officer shall deliv-
er to the assessor a list of all shares of stock
held therein and the face value thereof, nec-
essarily means "a Ust of all shares of stock,
with tiie names of the owner or holders
thereof, and the amount of such holdings";
and under the statute the stock is not assess-
able to the bank. State e^ rel. Wilson v.
First Nat Bank of Oarterville, 7» S. W. 943,
945, 946, 180 Mo. 717.
The terms "list," "tax list," and "delin-
quent tax list" are, by common usage, under-
stood to refer to the notices or other matters
with which such lists are included, and the
list within Comp. St 1905, c 77, art. 9, | 7,
requiring the publication of a delinquent
list, Is a part of the notice of the pendency
of the suit and is a complete Ust of the landis
against which there are delinquent taxes,
while the list required by section 17 is a part
of the notice of sale under the decree, and is
merely a Ust of aU the lands on which de-
crees have been rendered. The latter Ust Is
not the delinquent tax list within the act,
nor as the term is generally understood, and
the pubUcation under section 7 precedes that
under section 17. State ex reL Oronln ▼.
CroniQ, 106 N. W. 986, 987, 76 Neb. 788.
Willi real estate aseat
A contract to "Ust" real estate is not sat-
isfied by taking a description of it by the bro-
ker, but it would at least require that some
mention of the real estate should appear in
some of the broker's advertisements, and, in
the absence of such listing, the broker could
not recover a commission provided in case of
withdrawal of the land by the owner. B. A.
fitrout Co. V. Gay, 72 Aa 881, 882, 106 Me.
108, 24 U B. A. (N. S.) 662.
^t is probably beyond dispute that the
ordinary transaction by which land is said to
be listed' with an agent— that is, where an
owner informs a real estate broker of his
wish to sell property upon stated terms, and
hivokes his professional services in tliat re-
spect—does not imply any grant of p&wet to
execute a contract for its sale." Brown v.
GUpin, 90 Pac. 267, 270, 75 KaxL 778.
Aasestment as indading, see Assessment
(In Taxation).
LITERARY
lilTERABT IN8TITUTIOH8
An incorporated school is a "scientiflc"
or 'literary" assocUtton within St 1898, |
1088, exempting from taxation property of
such assodationa. Board of Trustees of
lAwrenoe University ▼. Outagamie Ck>anty,
186 N. W. 619, 620, 160 Wis. 244.
The property of a corporation organized
to provide a home for working girls at a
moderate cost, which has no capital stock,
and which can divide none of the income or
profits among the members or use it for any
other than Uterary, educational, benevolent,
charitable, or sdentiflc purposes, is exempt
from taxation under Rev. Laws, c. 12, | 5, d.
8, exempting the property of ^'Uterary, benev-
olent, charitable, and sclentlflc institutions."
FrankUn Square House v. City of Boston, 74
N. B. 675, 676, 188 Mass. 409.
Under Rev. St c 9, | 8, providing for
taxation of real estate against the person in
possession, a university fraternity in posses-
sion of a chapter house, built on the campus
under a contract to purchase from the uni-
versity. Is liable for taxes assessed against
the property; the fraternity not being ex-
empt as a Uterary or scientific institution
within section 6, par. 2. Inhabitants of Oro-
no V. Kappa Sigma Society, 80 Atl. 831, 832,
108 Me. 820.
IiITERART PROPEBTT
The owner of a common-law copyri;^ht
has a peri)etual right of property and the ex-
clusive right of first general pubUcation, and
may, prior thereto, enjoy the benefit of a re-
stricted pubUcation without forfeiture of the
right of general pubUcation. Under Rev. St.
§ 4952, giving to the owner of a copyrighted
book the right to copy and vend the same,
protection against mnltipUcation of copies
and the incidents thereof constitute the only
protection afforded by the copyright statutes
to the publisher. There is a distinction be-
tween the common-law rlg^t of ^literary
property" commonly caUed common-law copy-
right and copyright under the statute^ A
copyright is an incorporeal right to print
and publish, being a property in notion with-
out corporeal, tangible substance. A copy-
right is property distinct from the corporeal
property out of which it arises, and each of
these classes of property is capable of ex-
isting and being owned and transferred es-
pecially and independent of each other. The
property of an author in his intellectual pro-
duction is absolute untU he voluntarily partA
therewith. He cannot be compeUed to pub-
Ush his production or to permit others to en-
Joy it, but he has the right to exclude aU
persons from its employmoat, and any use of
UTHOFOKB
158
UTIOATION
the property without his consent Js a Tlola-
tlon of his right He may permit one or
more persons to use it to the exdosion of all
others, and in doing so he may restrict the
use which shall be made of it He may give
a copy of a manuscript to a person without
parting with his literary property in it and
may circulate cojfiieB among his friends for
their own personal oijoyment without giving
them the right of publication. <}onmion-law
copyright and statutory copyright cannot co-
exist in the same composition, and when the
statutory right begins the common-law right
ends. Bobbs-Merrlll Ck>. t. Straus, 147 Fed.
15, 18, 77 0. C. A. 607, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 766
(citing Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126, 26 L.
Ed. 942; Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. [55 U.
S.] 528, 14 L. Ed. 528; Stevens v. Gladding,
17 How. [58 U. S.] 447, 15 L. Ed. 155; Werck-
meister v. American Lithographic Co., 134
Fed. 321, 323, 324, 69 G. G. A. 553, 555, 68
L. R. A. 591; Drone, Copyr. 100, 102, 103;
Bartlette v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Ca& 981, 4
McLean, 800; Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed.
Cas. 967, 5 McLean, 32; Press Pub. Co. v.
Monroe, 73 Fed. 196, 19 C. G. A. 429, 51 L.
R. A. 353; Holmes v. Hurst, 19 Sup. Gt 606,
174 U. S. 82, 43 L. Ed. 904; Jewelers' Mer-
cantile Agency v. Jewelers' Weekly Publish-
ing Co., 49 N. E. 872, 165 N. Y. 241, 247, 41 L.
R. A. 846, 63 Am. St Rep. 666; Palmer v. De
Witt, 47 N. T. 632, 536, 7 Am. Rep. 480; Cop.
Copyr. [3d Ed.] 1 ; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet
[33 U. S.] 591, 8 L. Ed. 1055; Id., 29 Fed.
Cas. 862, 8 Pet [33 U. S.] 725; Johnson v.
Donaldson, 3 Fed. 22; Perrls v. Hexamer, 99
U. S. 674, 25 L. Ed. 308; Henry Bill Pub.
Co. V. Smythe, 27 Fed. 914; Garst v. HaU
& Lyon Co., 61 N. E. 219, 179 Mass. 588, 591,
65 L. R. A. 631 ; Harrison v. Maynard, Mer-
rill & Co., 61 Fed. 689, 10 0. C. A. 17).
LITHOFONE
Where it was proved that •Tithofone,"
composed of 70 per cent sulphate of barytes
and 30 per cent sulphide of zinc, was known
as "lithofone," whether dry or ground in oil,
and by commercial designation was known
as '^sulphide of zinc white," it was classifi-
able for duty as such under TarifP Act July
24, 1897, par. 67, c 11, 30 Stat 164, and not
as a white paint or pigment containing zinc,
but not containing lead. Gabriel & Schall v.
United States, 123 Fed. 296, 69 C. a A. 362
LITHOGRAPH
UTHOGRAPHIO PBINT8
''Lithographic prints'* consist of complete
articles of a character of pictures ready
for use in mounting, binding or framing, and
are the product of the art of lithography,
which is the art of making a picture, design,
or writing on stone in sudi a manner that
ink impressions can be taken from the work
of producing such lmk>resslons by a process
analogous to ordinary printing. United
States V. O. G. Hempstead A Bon, 109 Fed.
290,292.
Under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c 11, |
1, Schedule M, par. 400, 30 Stat 188, relatliic
respectively to "lithographic prints'* and to
''booklets,'* articles consisting of several post
cards folded together and ready to be de-
tadied, with a paper cover pasted thereon,
are covered by the former rather than the
latter term. Downing & Co. v. United
States, 172 Fed. 447, 448.
Calendars composed of lithograidilc
sheets with a metal strip at each end, and
having a calendar pad composed of litho-
graphic sheeta attached thereto, the litho-
graphic printe being the most important fSea-
ture of the importation, are dutiable as
"lithographic printe" bound, under Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c. 11, 1 1, Schedule M, par. 400,
30 Stat 188, rather than as printed matter
(paragraph 403, 30 Stat 189), or as manu-
factures of paper (paragraph 407, 30 Stat
189). Luyties Bro& ▼. United States^ 180
Fed. 1022, 1023.
The expression 'lithographic prlnta,** In
Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c 11, | 1, Schedule
If, par. 400, 30 Stat 188, had no such defi-
nite, general, and uniform meaning in the
wholesale trade and commerce of the United
States at the time of the passage of that
act as to control ite construction. Knauth,
Nachod & Kuhne v. United States, 155 Fed.
144, 146.
Articles composed of cardboard on which
lithographic printa have been pasted, and
which is cut into forms adapted to be folded
into pockete to hang on walls, some of them
having pincushions or calendars attached,
are not dutiable as "lithographic prints,"
under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, e 11, | 1,
Schedule M, par. 400, 30 Stat 188, but as
''manufactures of paper," under paragraph
407, 30 Stat 189. Knauth, Nachod & Kuhne
V. United States, 165 Fed. 144, 140.
LITIGATED
UTIOATIOV
See Liquidated by Litigation; Necech
sary Litigation; Without Litigation.
Expenses of legal proceeding, see BIx-
penses.
A proceeding to have one declared an In-
competent is not a "litigation,'' in the ordi-
nary sense of the term ; and, in the absenoe
of express contract for services of an un-
official stenographer in taking the testimony,
the alleged incompetent is not liable therefor,
except upon an implied contract Carpenter
V. Hammond* 125 N. Y. Snpp. 31, 32, 68 Hiac
Rep. 438.
•rrhe purpose of all litigation* is to pre-
serve and enforce ri^to and secure compli-
ance with the law of the state, either stat-
ute or conmion.*' Missouri, BL A T. Ry. Go.
XA^
LITIGATION
169
UYB APART
T. Hickman, 22 Sup. Ot 18, 21, 188 U. 8.
63, 46 L. E<L 7a
San Diego City Charter, c. 6, art 8, |
2, provides "that the connnon council shall
haye control of all litigation of the city,
and may employ other attorneys to take
charge of any sndi litigation, or assist the
dty attorney therein.** H^d, that the term
"litigation of the city*' applies to civil ac^
tions only, and that the council has no power
to appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute
criminal violations of ordinances, so that no
liability results from audi appointment
Dadmun v. City of San Diego, 99 Pac. 988,
964, 9 CaL App. 549.
LinORAL AND AQUATIC RIGHTS
"littoral and aquatic rights" are simply
those rights which, in default of special stat-
utory provisions to the contrary, appertain
to lands shutting upon tide-waters, to which
±e common-law doctrine of riparian owner-
ship does not apply. Barataria Canning Co.
T. Ott, 87 South. 121, 124, 84 Miss. 737.
Land fronting on a sound was leased,
and the lessee obtained from the county
board of supervisors the right to bank,
plant, and cultivate oysters in the sound
within the limits of the entiiie front of the
property, and thereafter the lessor deeded
the land to the lessee, reserving all 'littoral
and aquatic rights appurtenant to the land,"
and in a suit between the parties it was
decided on appeal that, the lessor having had
no exclusive right to the water or fish, and
th^ grant of the supervisors having vested
a property right in the lessee, the reserva-
tion was of a thing which would not other-
wise have passed under the deed, and did
not deprive the lessee of his exclusive right
to tbe oysters. Held, that such decision did
not bar a reformation of the deed after
remand of the cause on the ground that the
real intent of the agreement between the
parties had been that the lessor should have
the right to the oysters and oyster beds.
Barataria Canning Ca t. Ott; 41 South. 878,
379, 88 lllsa 771.
LIVE— LIVING
See Then living.
'*One of the deflnltions given in the dic-
tionaries of the word live' is to dwell, to
reside, to abide.'* Powers ▼. United States,
m Fed. 562, 565, 56 C. a A. 128.
A witness could state in a "trustee suit"
to collect taxes. In which defendant's resi-
dence was involved, that defendant lived in
P. in a certain year; the word "live" not
stating the ultimate fact of resldenoe, but a
^ct bearing on the question of residence.
CooUdge T. Taylor, 80 Atl. 1088^ 1041, 85 Vt
8ft.
Statonent of a witness that he lived at
a certain street and number in a 4pecilled
dty was not inconsistent with his "residence"
in another county, since a person may "live"
in one place, and have a legal residence in
another. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 116 Pac. 602,
604, 16 CaL App. 103.
Under Rev. Laws, c. 154, | 6, providing
that the libel for divorce must be filed,
heard, and determined in the county in which
one of the parties "lives,'* a wife who has
separated from her husband because of his
adultery may obtain a domicile in a county
other than that in which he resides, and
bring a libel against him for divorce at the
domicile so obtained. Clark v. Clark, 77 N.
B. 702, 101 Mass. 128.
The word 'lives," in Code, | 1813, pro-
viding that moneys and credits shall be
listed where the owner "lives," is the equiva-
lent of "residence." Cover v. Hatten, 113
N. W. 470, 471, 186 Iowa, 68.
The place where a person lives, within
Code, 1 1318, providing that moneys and cred-
its shall be listed and assessed where the
owner lives, is the place of his residence.
Glotfelty V. Brown, 126 N. W. 707, 708, 148
Iowa, 124.
As used in St 1821, c 60, | 27, provid-
ing that in extending execution upon real
estate the officer may appoint an appraiser
for the debtor, if he neglect or refuse to
choose one after being duly notified by the
officer, if the debtor be living in the county
where the land lies, the phrase "living in the
county" means actual residence at the time
of the levy in the county where the land
levied upon is situated. Dodge v. Farns-
worth, 10 Me. 278, 270.
DeAtli of testator or life tenants refer-
red to
Testator gave to his son and the son's
wife the use of certain real estate for life,
and provided that at their death the prop-
erty should descend to the son's children
living at the time and the issue of any child
of the son then deceased. Held, that such
description of the remaindermen did not
mean children of the son living at the time
of testator's death, but excluded children
living at testator's death who did not survive
the life tenants. Birdsall v. Blrdsall (Iowa)
182 N. W. 800, 810, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1121.
UVE APART
Under Ky. St 1006, f 2117, making *niv-
Ing apart" without any cohabitation for five
consecutive years next before the application
a ground for divorce, the time elapsing since
a spouse became a lunatic cannot be count-
ed as part of the five years required by the
statute, but if the parties lived apart with-
out cohabitation for five years before one
became a lunatic, and they have since con-
tinued to live apart, divorce may be granted.
Andrews v. Andrews' Committee^ 87 S. W«
1080, 1081, 120 E:y. 718.
lilVB IN ADULTRT
160 LIVB STOCX IKStJRAXCB CJOMPANT
XJTE nr ADXTLTBKY
See, also, lAve Together.
To constitute "living In adultery " there
must be more than a single act, but there
need not be a liying together continuously,
or for a given time, nor Is It necessary for
the man to abide in the same house with the
woman; but the offense is committed if he
at stated periods, or frequently, spends the
day or night, or any considerable part of
his time, with a woman, not his wife, at such
times having carnal knowledge of her at will,
though at other times he be domiciled with
his wife. Baker v. Baker, 124 S. W. 866,
867, 136 Ky. 617.
A single act of criminal intercourse does
not constitute "living in adultery or fornica-
tion." Lawson v. State, 42 S. B. 752, 116
Ga. 671 (citing McLeland v. State, 25 Ga.
477; Blsh. St Crimes, | 697).
One act, or even occasional acts, of Il-
licit intercourse do not constitute the ot*
fense of "living together in a state of adul-
tery or fornication, or of adultery and forni-
cation,*' in violation of Pen. Code 1895, |
381. Winkles v. State^ 61 & B. 1128, 1129, 4
Ga. App. 559.
IiIVB TOGETHER
See, also, Live in Adultery.
A husband and wife are "living together"
when they dwell under the same roof, eat at
the same table, and hold themselves out to
the world and conduct themselves towards
each other as husband and wife, and it is in-
correct to say^ that they are living as husband
and wife when they do not occupy the same
room or have sexual intercourse. Levy v.
GoldsoU (Tex.) 131 S. W. 420, 421.
The mere fact that a man took his meals
at the house of a married woman did not
constitute a "living together" by such man
and woman, within the meaning of the stat-
ute defining the crime of adultery. Paul v.
State, 90 S. W. 171, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 20.
Where defendant had sexual intercourse
with prosecutrix while she was living In de-
fendant's house as his general servant, during
the Illness of defendant's wife, defendant was
not guilty under an indictment charging that
defendant and prosecutrix "lived together and
had carnal intercourse." The statute does
not Intend to convey the idea that a married
man with a family was "living together"
with a servant merely because the servant
might occupy a room in the house of the
master. To give the statute such construc-
tion would be to hold that, where a landlord
or family slept under the same roof with
the servant, this would be a "living together"
with the servant Boswell v. State, 85 S. W.
1076, 1077, 48 Ttex. Or. B. 47, 122 Am. St.
Rep. 731.
Civil Code, art. 1481 providing that those
who *Tiave lived together" in open concu-
binage are incapable of making to each other
any doaatioa of Immovables, does not mean
that the parties must have dwelt or resided
together. Succession of Jabraus, 88 Sooth.
417, 418, 114 La. 456.
LIVED VPOV
Where, on a trial for violating Act April
26, 1909 (Laws 1909, c. 196), punishing any
person who shall knowingly live on or be
supported in whole or in part by the money
procured by any female through the prosti-
tution of any other female, accused relied on
the fact that the money given him by a
third person was received in payment of
debts or to redeem jewelry for the third per-
son, and the third person testified that she
never gave accused any money for his own
use, a charge authorizing a conviction if ac^
cused received money from the third person
with knowledge that the same was derived
through the prostitution of another, and that
he used the same for his own living or per-
sonal expenses, was erroneous, because broad-
er than the statute, and as eliminating the
defense; the phrase 'lived upon" meaning
to be maintained in life; to acquire a liveli-
hood; to subsist with, on, or by, as to Uve on
spoils. Trozzo v. People, 117 Pac 160, 156,
51 Colo. 323.
UVE EKOmB
An engine having no steam is called a
"dead engine," and one with steam is a
••live engine." Turner v. Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. Co., Ill Pac 438, 88 Kan. 816.
UVE SFBOrOS
Springs occupying a space of about one-
half acre in a ten-acre tract, marshy part of
the year, resting right upon the brow of a
little drop-off, so that there was quite a lot
of water standing around in the springs, of
which it looked as there might be five or six,
but into which no stream led, and the water
from which formed no channel or stream,
though, during a part of the wet season, some
of the water would flow down the hUlslde
for a short distance and disappear In the
soil, were not **llve springs," but constituted
nothing more than a bog occasioned by seep-
age of the water. Dickey ▼. Maddux, 93 Pac
1090, 1091, 48 Wash. 411.
UVE 8TOOK OrSUBAEGE OOMPAHT
A "live stock insurance company" incor-
porated under Rev. St 1895, art 642, subd.
46, authorizing the incorporation of fire, mar-
ine, life, and live stock insurance companies,
to conduct a live stock insurance company
on a mutual or co-operative plan without
capital stock, and to issue policies of in-
demnity on live stock to its members, is a
live stock insurance company conducted on
the mutual or co-operative plan, and is not a
-mutual relief association" within article
3096, providing that nothing In the title-
title 68, entitled •'Incorporation of Insurance
Companies"— shall apply to mutual relief as-
».lal
UTE STOCK SANITARY CX}M'B 161
UVEBT STABLB KXSPXB
■odattooa. State t. Burgeaa* !€• 8. W.
822, 923, 101 Tax. 024.
UVE STOCK SAHITABT OOIOIZS.-
SIOHEB
An information drawn under aecCton 27,
e. 486, p. 823, Seas. Lawa 1905, relating to
the inspection by the "Uve atock sanitary
commissioner'* of cattle imported from places
beyond the south line of the state, whi<^
charges a want of inspection by the live
stock sanitary "commission," and charges
generally the want of any inspection, is not
invalidated by the omission of the terminal
syllable "er^ from the word nsed to deacilbe
the official having power to make the in-
spection, since there is no substantial differ-
ence betwe^i a commission composed of a
body of individuals having lawful warrant
to perform certain acts and a commissioner
having identical authority. Both terms are
general characterizations without fixed legal
signification and Import an office with pre-
scribed duties. State t. Asbell, 86 Pac. 467,
468, 74 Kan. 397, 121 Am. St Rep. 846.
UVE WXBS
The term "live wire^f is used in electricity
to describe a wire charged with a 4^01^^-
ona voltage of electricity. Potts v. Shreve-
port Belt By. Ck>., 84 South. 108, 110 La. 1, 08
Am. St Rep. 462.
A "live wlre^* is one charged with a
deadly current of Mectridty. City of Owens-,
boTO V. Knox's Adm'r, 76 S. W. 101, 102, 116
Ky. 461.
A "live wire** la one charged with a
deadly current of electricity. Mangan's
Adm'r v. Louisville Electric Light Co., 01 S.
W. 708, 705, 122 Ky. 476, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.)
4S9 (quoting and adopting City of Qwens-
boro V. Knox'a Adm'r, 76 S. W. 101, 116 Ky.
451).
uvnra
The word 'living,** aa ordinarily used In
reference to legatees, without anything in
the context to qualify Ita meaning, signifies
inch l^teea as are living at the time of
making the wUL Bryant v. Flanders, 87 N.
El 574, 676, 201 Mass. 373.
Child «B Teatra sa mmm
The term **eia ventre sa mere** comes
dearly within the description **9l dilld living
at the time of Its father's death." State v.
Atwood, 102 Pac 206, 207, 64 Or. 62Q, 21 Ann.
Gaa.616.
Lnmro Higfim
See Remaining Living Helis.
UVIHO XH STATS OF OOBABXTA-
TIOH An ABULTEBT
The worda ''living In a state of oohablta-
tion and adultery" in Pen. Code, | 260a, aa
amended by Act March 21, lOU (Lawa 1011,
p. 42Q, punishing living in a atate of oohabi-
8 Wd&A P.2D Skb.~11
latlon and adultery, mean the living together
aa hnaband and wife; and to Jnatlfy a convlo-
tlon it must appear that there exiated be-
tween defendanta an adulteroua cohabitatton.
People V. Breeding, 126 Pac 170, 181, 10 OaL
App. 800.
XJVZHOXS8UB
See iBrae (Deaoendantfl).
LIVERY STABLE
Aa mercantile pursuit, aee Mercantile,
A *nivery stable*' la a building where
horses or vehicles are kept or let for hire;
a 'tdace where horses are groomed, fed, and
hired; where vehldea are let;*' a atable
where horses are kept at livery and hire,
and vehldea are let; a atable where horses
are kept for hire, and where atabllng la pro-
vided. Elliott V. Hodgson A Jackacm, 66 S.
B. 406, 407, 138 Ga. 200, 184 Am. St Rep.
200 (quoting and adopting definition In WU-
liama v. Garignea, 80 La. Ann. 1004 ; Stand.
Diet; and Webater, International Diet).
A "livery stable'* la ordinarily a place
where horses and carriagea are kept to be
let for hire, and. In the ordinary conduct
of the busineaB, the horae or vehicle ao let
la In charge and under the control of the
hirer or hla representative. City of Dea
Mdnea v. Bolton, 102 N. W. 1046, 1040^ 128
Iowa, 106, 5 Ann. Caa. 006.
XilVEBiT STABUB SSSPEB
A "livery atable keeper" haa been de-
fined to be the keeper of a atable where hora-
ea or vehldea are k^ or let for hire; one
whoae butfneaa It la to keep horaea for hire
or to let, or to keep, feed, or board, horsea
for others ; one who takea horaea to bait and
board, and he usually keeps horses to let;
the keeper of a atable where horses are
groomed, fed, and hired, where vehicles are
let ; the keeper of a stable where horses are
kept at livery and hire, and vehicles are let,
where horses are kept for hire and stabling
is provided. While it la not absolutely nec-
essary for a stable keeper to exercise all the
difterent functions mentioned In the above
definltlona in order to be a livery atable keep-
er, his business must be substantially that as
indicated. Elliott v. Hodgson A Jackson, 66
S. B. 406, 407, 133 Ga. 200, 134 Am. St Rep.
206 (quoting Abbott, Law Diet; Anderson,
Law Diet ; Black, Law Diet ; Stand. Diet ;
Webster, International Diet ; Grovea v. KU-
gore, 72 Me. 480; WUttama v. Garignea, 80
La. Ann. 1004).
A "livery stable keeper** is "one whose
business it is to keep horsea for hire, or to
let, or to keep, feed, or board, horsea for
others'*; one who takea horsea to bait and
board; and he usually keepa horaea to let
It ia not abaoUitaly neeeaaary for a ttvery
atable kovpeit to ererdae all of the iUlEerent
fonctlona whldi auij be aometlmea performed
UVBRT STABLB KSBPXR
162
liOADIHO
by him In order to be a ''livery stable keep-
er," within the meaning of the lien law, but
his business must be substantially that indi-
cated thereby. Under Glv. Code 1895, |
2810, his Hen includes, not only the actual
feeding of a horse placed with him, but also
such charges as are directly connected with
his keeping as were naturally in the line of a
livery stable keeper's business, but expenses
of transporting a horse by railroad to races
In or out of the state, and of entering him
therein, do not furnish the basis of a lien;
and where a horse Is left with a stableman
to be boarded or kept at an agreed price, and
the stableman had two or more stables In
this state for the accommodation of stock,
and by agreement with the owner kept the
horse at one of the stables, the fact that he
was not kept at one of the stables rather than
at another would not defeat his Uen, al-
though, where a horse Is delivered to a livery
stable keeper and, under contract with the
owner, is sent to races at distant points and
kept in the stable of another person who is
paid by the liveryman, the liveryman there-
by acquires no statutory lien. Blllott v.
Hodgson & Jackson, 65 S. B. 405, 407, 133
Ga. 209, 184 Am. St Rep. 206.
▲n owner and keeper of a livery stable,
who boarded horses by the month at so much
per stall, but did not feed or care for them,
is entitled to a lien as a "livery stable keep-
er," within Lien Law (Laws 1897, p. 538, c.
418, § 74, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 942,
c. 465), saving a person keeping a livery sta-
ble or a boarding stable, or boarding animals,
a lien for the care, keeping, or boarding of
such animals; and the relation between the
parties was not that of landlord and tenant
Seiner v. Lyons, 110 N. Y. Supp. 1048, 1050.
"Livery stable keepers" are those whose
business it is to care for the horses and car-
riages of others and to let their own horses
and carriage either with or without drivers,
but they are not common carriers of passen-
gers, within the legal meaning of that term,
and the rule of law which requires the high-
est degree of diligence of a carrier of passen-
gers is not applicable to them. Stanley v.
Steele, 60 Atl. 640, 642, 77 Conn, 688, 69 L.
R. A. 561, 2 Ann. Cas. 342.
LLOYDS
The word "Lloyds" has, by use, come to
be understood by the general public as syn-
onymous with "insurance." Under General
Corporation Law (Laws 1909, p. 15, c. 28
[ConsoL Laws, c 23]) f 6, providing that no
corporation shall be organis^ed with the name
of "Insurance" in it, except a corporation
formed under the banking or the Insurance
law, a corporation cannot be formed under
the business corporations law with the name
"Lloyds" in Its name, as that word has by
use become synonymous with 'insurance."
Barker ▼. Koenig, 119 N. 7. Supp. 777, 778^
135 App. Div. 16.
LOAD
See Car Load.
LOADER
See Ground Loader.
coADnro
See Time Saved in Loading.
Ready for loading, see Ready.
Under a charter party for a vessel to
carry a cargo of coal, which provided that
she should "have turn in loading" and "be
loaded promptly," she was entitled to be load-
ed promptly in view of the facilities of the
port and the climatic condititons which exist-
ed at the time* and to have such facilities
used to their normal capacity, not only in
her own loading, but also in the loading of
other vessels after her arrival while she was
waiting her turn. Harding v. Cargo of 4,-
698 Tons of New Rivers Steam Coal, 147 Fed.
971, 973 (citing Abb. Shlpp. [18th Ed.] 297).
Charter parties required the vessel in
each case to load a cargo of phosphate at
Port IngUs, Fla., and provided that the vessel
should proceed to the Port IngUs anchorage,
"or as near thereunto as she may safely get,
and there load. ♦ ♦ ♦ The cargo to be
brought alongside and taken from alongside
.free of risk and expense to the vessel, any
custom of the port to the contrary notwith-
standing. * * * Steamer or vessel to pro-
ceed to safe anchorage at port of loading and
there load." Also: "The cargo to be sup-
plied at the average rate of not less than 400
tons per weather working day, ♦ ♦ •
commencing 24 hours after vessel Is in load-
ing berth and is ready to receive cargo and
written notice given to that effect" Vessels
were obliged to load at such port some miles
from shore, and the government had estab-
lished there two loading buoys. Three ves-
sels were ordered to proceed to the port at
the same time, and they reached there and an-
chored, and gave notice that they were ready
to load. Held, that the "loading berth" re-
ferred to in the charter was the "safe an-
chorage" spoken of in the prior clause ; that,
having reached such anchorage and given
the required notice, the lay days commenced,
and the charterer could not require the ves-
sels to await their turn at the loading buoys
before the time commenced, even though that
may have been the custom of the port, nor
avoid liability for demurrage because of their
detention for two or three weeks beyond the
time, either because they could not get to the
buoys or because they could not, perhaps have
been fully loaded where they lay— its duty
belDg to load them there, so far as could be
safely done, and then permit them to move
further out for its completion. Constantine
& Pickering S. S. Co. v. Auchindoss, 161 Fed*
843, 846, 88 C. a A. 661.
I^ADUfO
les
liOAH
The sum added to the net lUe iBflnzftnee
preminm to meet expenses and contingencies
Is called 'loading^ the premltim. United
States life Ins. Go. v. SpinlES (Ky.) 96 8. W.
889, 893, 13 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1053.
Where Insorance premioms and renewal
preminma were greater than the amount
necefisary to pay for the insurance^ the excess
Is caUed "loading.** Mutual Benefit Idf e Ins.
Co. ▼. Commonwealth, 107 & W. 802» 800,
128 Ky. 174.
LOAF
See Loiter, Loat and Idle.
LOAN
Sell,
See Money Loaned and Invested;
Barter, or Loan; Btodc Loan;
porary Loan.
Passing a loan, sea Pass.
See, also. Lend; Money Lent
From the use of the word ^loan,** in its
ordinary signification, the law Implies a
promise to repay. Herlihy t. Goney, 00 AtL
962, 963, 9Q Me. 400.
Rev. 8t c. 48» i 64, providing that pre-
miums for huilding association loans shall
consist of a percentage charged ,on ttie
amount lent la addition to interest, and sec-
tion 66, providing that the monthly interest
shall not be at a greater rate than 6 per cent
per annum, mean by the words "loan'* and
"lent" the whole sum contracted for, not the
Bum actually advanced. Tibbette v. Bearing
Loan k BuUding Ass'n, 72 AtL 162, 166, 104
Me. 404.
A party advancing money to another to
enable the latter to manufacture lumber on
an understanding that the lumber shall be
sold by the former on conunisaion, so that
the former may get back the advances, does
not make a *aoan," within the strict defini-
tion of the tenn. Murphy t. Dalton, 102 N.
W. 277, 130 Mich. 70.
Where the note of a borrowlhg member
of a building and loan association contained
the words "monthly installmento .on said
share," but no reference indicated an agree-
ment to apply such installments on the mem-
ber's loan, and the deed to secure the loan
was conditioned on the payment of the '^oan"
and of 'Installments on certain shares/' re-
ferring to the principal debt covered by the
note both as a "loan upon 18 membership
shares, " the terms ''loan'* and "installments"
were not used synonymously. Cooper v. New-
ton, 160 Fed. 100, lOa.
Rev. St 1806, art 2547, provides that
where any loan of goods or 4^attels shall be
pretended to have been made to any person
with whom, or those claiming under him,
possession shall have remained for the space
of two years without demand made and pur-
sued by due process of law on the part ot the
pretend»!^ lender, or -when any reseryation
or limitation shall be pretended to have been
made of a use of property, by way of condi-
tion, etc., the transfer shall be held fraudu-
lent, unless the loan is declared by a written
instrument duly acknowledged or proved and
recorded. Held, that such section bad no ap-
plication to a chattel placed in the bands of
bailees to be stmred without charge for a rea-
sonable time without any agreement that
such bailees should have the right to use the
same. Woodward v. San Antonio Traction
Co. (Tex.) 06 S. W. 76, 78 (citing Templeman
V. Gibbs, 24 S. W. 702, 86 Tex. 360; Hunstock
V. Roberto ITex.1 65 S. W. 676).
Bvidence, in an action by an ez-county
treasurer against the county for commission,
on the theory that a transaction by which,
during his tern^ a judgment creditor of the
county transferred the judgment to a bank,
it paying him therefor, was a loan by the
bank to the county and a payment of the
judgment creditor by the county, so that
such treasurer was entitled to commis0l<ms
for receiving and disbursing the money, held
sufllcient to support a fhiding that the trana-
action was not a "loan,'' but a puMdiase by
the bank of the judgment Benefield v. Mar-
ion County, 05 8. W, 713, 48 Tex. Civ. App.
245.
The word 'loaa" is defined to mean "to
deliver to another for temporary use, on con*
dition that the thing be returned, or to de-
deliver for temporary use, on condition that
an equivalent in kind shall be returned with
a compensation for ite use." Stete v. Brown,
102 8. W. 804, 805, 88 Ark. 44, 118 Am. St
Bep. 100 (quoting and adopting definition in
Webst Diet).
Where a bond guaranteed that the prin-
cipal would return certein securities on a spe-
cified day, and contained no provision either
permitting or requiring the principal to dis-
charge his obligation by payment of money on
or before the day named, which he was au-
thorized to do by a collateral agreement the
bond was not given for the "loan or forbear-
ance of money" within the New York usury
law (1 Rev. St [1st Ed.l pt 2, c. 4, tit 3, f 6),
making all bonds, whereon is reserved any
greater sum than 6 per cent for the loan or
forbearance of any money, void. Klein v.
Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 166 Ted. 366,
868.
Though payment of money be called a
"loan," it is not a loan where the money
was not to be paid back at all events but the
agreement was that on a certain condition it
should be paid back. Teed v. Parsons, 66 N.
B. 1044, 1046, 202 IlL 466.
A corporate officer having misappropriat-
ed funds, acceptance by the directors of his
notes in satisfaction of the misappropriations
did not constitute a "loan," within a charter
provision prohibiting "loans" of corporate
f tmds to corporate officers or employes. Mur-
LOAN
1<4
IiOOAIi
plij ▼. Pennlmaii, 06 AIL 28Sy ttTi 105 lid.
462, 121 Am. St Rep. 688.
Bailmemt dlstliisiasliad
See Bailment
Deposit
The depoOt of a nattonal bank eraatl-
tutes "loans" to it and confers on the deposit-
tor a mere chose in action. State v. Clement
Nat Bank, 78 AU. 944, 050, 84 ¥t 107, Ann.
Gas. 1912D, 22.
The transaction between a depositor and
the bank Is really a "loan" of money and
not a deposit, in the strict legal sense of the
term. Schippers ▼. Kempkea (N. J.) 67 Atl.
1042, 1048.
An ordinary deposit of money in a bank
is not a "loan" of the money to the bank.
ElUott ▼. Capital City State Bank, 103 N. W.
777, 778, 128 Iowa, 275, 1 L. B. A (N. S.)
1130, 111 Am. St Rep. 198.
A "deposit" in a bank la a "loan" payable
on demand, and the d^;>osltor may not, as a
general mle^ maintain an action for his
deposit nntil he has first made a demand
for its payment Pratt y. Union Nat Bank,
76 AU. 318, 314^ 79 N. J. Law, 117.
A national bank had throogh an em-
ploy6 deposited money with a sayings bank,
and subsequently, upon a request for more
mon^, the national bank wrote, ottering to
deposit more money, but refusing to make a
loan. In response, it received a oertiflcate
of deposit with a letter, asking that it be
placed to the credit of the savings bank.
The certificate was issued to L., the president,
of the savings bank, and was by him indors-
ed to A., an employ^ of the national bank,
who, in turn, indorsed it to the bank, which
gave credit on its books to the savings bank
for the amount of the certificate. The certi-
cate was marked "Paid," taken up, and re-
newal certificates issued from time to time in
the same way. After failure of the savings
bank, recovery was sought on the last certifi-
cate, which was issued directly to A., and
signed by the cashier of the savings bank.
Held, that the transaction was a "loan" and
not a "deposit," and hence did not create a
preferential daim. State v. Corning State
Sav. Bank, 113 N. W. 500, 508, 136 Iowa, 79.
A bank wrote to its correspondent that
180,000 worth of bonds had been allotted to
it and that it would have to take up and
carry about $15,000 of old bonds, stating that
it would have to finance the deal, and asked
if the correspondent could help out on $10,-
000 for 30 or 40 days; that, if so, it would
send up some paper maturing the next
month; and that it did not object to any
fair rate. Seven days later two certificates
of $5,000 each bearing 7 per cent interest
payable in 40 and 46 days were mailed to
the correspondent Credit for the ftill amount
was given. Held, that the transaction was
a "loan," and not a deposit and heocB did
create a preferential dalnL itate ex reL
Carroll r. Coming State 8aT. Bank, 116 N.
W. 987, 940, 189 Iowa, 338.
A deposit of moneys belonging to an in-
Buranoe corporation in a bank, returnable on
demand In accordance with Otttlfloates of de-
posit issued at tlie time. Is not a "loan," with-
in Insurance Law (ConsoL Laws 1909, c. 29
I 86. People ▼. Thomas, 180 M. 7. Snpp.
246^ 2M9, 71 MIbc. Bep. 889.
As pwreluuM atenej
See Purchase Money.
See Sale.
LOAN A8SOOZATIOV
See Homestead Loan AasodatioiL
LOAH FOB oomuionnoH
"A loan for consumption* la a transfer
of personal property, soeh as com or money,
to be consumed by the borrower and to be
returned to the lender in kind and quality."
State V. Brown, 102 S. W. 394, 895, 83 Ark.
44^ 119 Am. St Bep. 109 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in Kinne t. Kinne [N« X.] 45
How. Prac 81).
LOBBY
"Lobbying," which has a well-defined
meaning, and signifies to address or solicit
members of a legislative body for the purpose
of influencing their votes, Is ccmtrary to pub-
lic policy, whether or not It Is carried on in
such manner as to constitata a crime under
the statute; and a note given for money ad-
vanced for the exposes of a person to liable
him to engage in the boaineas of lobbying
will not be enforced. Le Tonmeiix ▼. 011-
liss, 82 Pac 827, 828, 1 OaL App. 546.
A lobbyist is one who solicits members
of a legislative body, in the lobby or else-
where, with the purpose of influencing their
votes, and a contract to render such services,
or services which consist in part of lobbying,
Is void as tfgainst public policy, and an acticm
cannot be maintained thereon. Burke v.
Wood, 182 Fed. 683, 637.
LOCAL
A "local," in railroad parlance, la a train
whl<^ stops at all stations and does not run
with great rapidity when in motion. Hides
V. Union Pac. B. Oou, 107 N. W. 798, 800,
76 Neb. 49a
The words "local and spedal" are fre-
quently used interchangeably, though they
do not have the same meaning; "local" sig-
nifying a belonging or confinement to a par-
ticular place and being a counter term to
"generak" People t. WUcox, 86 N. B. 672,
673, 237 lU. 421.
The word "local," which is the ^est^i^
tive word used In the phrase 'local improve*
U>CAIi ACT
166
uocAii Aonov
Is oftm uwd in leferenoe to towns
and dttaB so as to Inclode tbe wbols munidl-
paUty. We speak of the "local affairs" of a
town, Its "local goyemmenty" the lights of
its inhabitants to "local option," or their
liability to "local taxation,'* referring in each
iDstance to the whole corporation. In the
same way, if the local authorities of a town
should undertake a general system of street
improyement or a general system of sewer-
age, covering every street, we might, using
the language in its ordinary meaning, apeak
of such work as a "local improvement'*; the
purpose thereof being a benefit to the local in-
habitants. Crane v. Oity of Siloam Springs*
65 & W. 955, 957, 67 Ark. aa
lOOAX. ACT
See Local Law.
LOOAZ. AOnOH
Where the cause of action can arise in
one place only, the action Is local ; but, if the
cause of action is one that might bare arisen
anywhere, Hie action is transitory. Woolf
V. M cOau^, 57 South. 754, 765, 175 Ala. 20».
Trespass to real property is a 'local ac>
tion," and the suit must be brought in the
county or place where the cause of action
arose. Mayor, eto., of City of Baltimore v.
Meredith's Ford ft Jarrettsville Turnpike 0>.
in Baltimore & Harford Counties, 65 AtL 85,
86, 104 Md. 851.
Ejectment is a "local action" such as
can be maintained only in the district where
the land lies. Act Gong. Biarch 8, 1887, c.
373, 24 Stat 652, provides that no civil suit
shall be brought before either of the federal
courts of original Jurisdiction against any
person or, by any original process or proceed-
ing in any other district than that whereof he
Is an inhabitant, but where the Jurisdiction
Is founded <Hily on the fact that the action
is between dtisens of different states, suit
shall be brought only in the district of the
residence of either plaintiff or defendant
Held, that the restriction as to venue is not
applicable to local actions, and hence eject-
ment can be brought in a federal court in the
district where the land lay, though both
plaintiff and defendant are foreign corpora-
tions and nonresidents of the state. Elk
Garden Cto. v. T. W. Thayer Ck)., 179 Fed.
596, 557 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p.
4202).
By the common law an action for the
recovery of damages for injuries to land is
"local," and can be brought only where the
land is situated; and such is the law in most
of the states of the Union. In Minnesota,
an a<^on for pecuniary damages for trespass
to real estate in another state is viewed, not
as relating to the real estate^ but only as af-
fording a personal remedy. It is there deem*
ed to be transitory in Ite nature, and net
locaL Peyton v. Desmond, 128 VM* 1, 4»
» a a A 651.
A 'local action** as distinguished ftom a
transitory action is one where the principal
facte on which it is founded are of a local
nature, or which could have arisen only in
some particular county. Perry v. Seaboard
Air Line By. Oo., 68 S. B. 1060, 1061, 158 N.
a 117.
*1%e distinction between local and tran-
sitory actions Is as old as actions themselvesi
and no one has ever supposed that laws
which prescribe generally where one should
be sued induded such suite as were local in
tlieir character, either by statute or the com-
mon law, unless it was expressly so declared.
Local actions are In the nature of suite in
rem, and are to be prosecuted where the
thing on which they are founded Is situated."
A suit to enjoin a defendant from diverting,
In Oalifomla, the waters naturally flowing
down a river having its source in that state
and flowing Into and through the state of
Nevada, where comirialnant's lands are situ-
ated, he being the lowest proprietor on the
river, is an action transitory in Ite nature,
so diat a court In Nevada, having acquired
Jurisdiction of defendant's person, had Juris-
dlctton to try the same. Miller & Lux ▼.
Rfckey, 127 Fed. 573, 577 (citing Casey v.
Adams, 102 U. a 66, 26 L. Ed. 52).
A suit for partition is a local action
within the provisions of Act March d, 1875,
c. 187, i 8, 18 Stat 472, and one in which any
question between any of the parties, plaintiffs
or defendante, affecting their rights or inter-
esto In the land may be put in issue and de-
termined; and a federal court is not without
Jurisdiction because questions may arise be-
tween plaintiffs who are citizens of the same
state, nor will it make a realignment of par
ties to defeat ite Jurisdiction because such
questions may arise, where the bill, although
properly setting out the interest of each par-
ty in the premises, does not disclose any
controversy which renders it necessary. Ger-
man Savings 4 Loan Soc. v. Tull, 186 Fed. 1,
11, 69 C. C. A 1 (citing Greeley v. Lowe, 15
Sup. Ct 24, 155 tJ. 8. 58, 67, 74, 30 L. Ed. 69).
"Originally tiie pleader was required to
state truly the place where each fact assert-
ed by him occurred, and, if issue was Join^
thereon, the fact was tried by a Jury sum>
moned from that neighborhood or venue.
Afterwards, when Jurors were no longer ex-
pected to decide issues of fact upon their
own knowledge^ a fictitious venue was, In
some actions, permitted, and the pleader as-
signed to his faets, under a videlicet, the
place In which be desired the trial to be held.
These actions were then styled 'transitory.'
But this fictton was not allowed when the
cause of action was so rested to a certain
piece of land that it must have arisen on or
near the land. Actions for su<A causes were
styled 'local,' and triable only In the vicinity
where the land lay.*' Defiance Fruit Co. v.
Fox, 70 Aa 460, 461, 76 N. J. Law, 482 (quot-
LOCAL AOnOH
166
LOCAL AGENT
Ing HiU r. Ntiaon, 57 Aa 411, 70 N. J. Law,
376, 378).
An action to recover only the valne of
ore or timber severed from land is transito-
ry, and may be maintained wherever the
trespasser can be served with summons, al-
though plaintiff therein may be compelled to
allege and prove ownership of the land from
which the timber is cut, or the ore extracted;
but, where the whole or any part of the dam-
ages claimed is for injury to the freehold,
the action is ''local" and must, if the land is
located in this state, be tried, by the express
provisions of Code C^v. Proc. | 892, in the
county where the land is situated, or, if the
land is located in another state, it must be
tried in the courts of that state. Ophir Sil-
ver Min. Co. V. Superior Court of City and
County of San Francisco, 82 Pac 70, 72, 147
OaL 467, 3 Ann. Cas. 840.
Since the Missouil statutes provide for
every contingency as to the bringing of ae-
ttons, the rule of the common law, which re-
garded an action for breach of covenants of
seisin and warranty as 'local" and not 'tran-
sitory," was complete altered, and as to
such action sudi rule of the common law no
longer obtains in Missouri; the title to real
estate being only incidentally involved in
such action. Coleman v. Luckslnger, 123 S.
W. 441, 443, 224 Mo. 1, 26 L. B. A. (N. S.)
034.
LOCAL AFFEOTIOH
A "local affection" is not a local disease
within the meaning of a warranty in a policy
of insurance, unless such affection has suffi-
ciently developed to have some bearing on the
general health. Oady v. Fidelity A Casualty
Co. of New York, 113 N. W. 967, 971, 134
Wis. 322, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260.
LOCAL AOEMT
See^ also, Agent
The term "local agent,'* within Rev. St
1895, art 1223, providing for service of writs
in suits against foreign corporations on any
local agent within the state, means an agent
at a given place or within a definite district,
and an "agent for the state" is not a local
agent within the state. Western Cottage Pi-
ano A Organ Co. v. Anderson, 79 S. W. 616,
617, 97 Tex. 432.
Under Code, 8 217, authorizing service of
summons to be made upon a corporation by
delivering a copy thereof to the president,
secretary, etc., "or local agent thereof,*' and
providing that any person receiving or col-
lecting moneys within the state for any do-
mestic or foreign corporation shall be deem-
ed a local agent for the purpose of service
of summons, a traveling auditor of a foreign
corporation, which has ceased to do any busi-
ness in the state, who is not authorized to
collect or receive money, for the corporation,
is not a "local agent," on whom service may
be made. Sherwood Higgs A Co. ▼. Sperzj
A Hutchinson Co., 61 S. B. 1020, 1021, 138
N. C. 299.
Under a statute providing that citation
or other iwocess against a foreign corpora-
tion may be served on any •'local agent" of
the corporation within the state, where a ci-
tation directed the officers to summon de-
fendant foreign corporation by delivering to
B., "agent," and the return recited delivery
to B., "agent" and the petition alleged that
B. was defendant's agent in the state of
Texas, who resided in a spedfled county,
and on whom service could be had, the re*
turn was insufficient to show that B. was a
"local agent" within the state, and the de-
fect was not cured by the allegation in the
petition; hence a judgment by default was
not authorized. National Cereal Co. v. Earn-
est (Tex.) 87 S. W. 734.
Rev. St 1896, art 1228, provides that
citation may be served on a foreign corpora-
tion by service on the ''local agent" and arti-
cle 1194, subd. 26, provides that a fbreign
corporation may be sued in any county where
it has an agency or representative. Held,
that the statute contemplates service on a
person employed in forwarding the particu-
lar business for which the corporation was
organized, and service on an attorney repre-
senting the defendant and who was in the
county at the time of service merely for the
purpose of settling certain claims between
the parties to the action, was insufficient
Bay City Iron Works v. Reeves A Co., 95
S. W. 739, 740, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 254.
One who, without compensation, pro-
cured a watchman for a foreign corporation's
sawmill and sold oil belonging to it for $7,
which he applied to the payment of the
watchman's services, was not the agent of
the corporation, within Revlsal 1905, | 440,
providing that service of summons on a cor-
poration may be made upon a "local agent"
and that any person receiving or collecting
moneys in the state for any corporation shall
be deemed a local agent Kelly v. Lefalver
& Co., 56 S. E. 610, 511, 144 N. O. 4 (citing
Moore V. Freeman's Nat Bank, 92 N. C. 690;
Copland v. American De Forest T^egraph
C!o., 48 S. E. 501, 136 N. C. 11).
The local oi)erator of defendant wire-
less telegraph company, who Is in sole Charge
of defendant's property at a particular place
and in control of its business there, and has
received messages from ships at sea for pay,
though the office is not yet open tor general
business, is defendant's "local agent" with*
in a code provision, authorizing summons In
an action against a corporation to be served
on its local agent; the proviso that any per-
son rec^vlng or collecting moneys in the
state for any corporation shall be deemed a
"local agent*' for the purpose of the section
not being intended to limit but to extend
the meaning of the term "local agent** Cop-
LOCAL AGBNT
ler
LOCAL CONCBB17
land^T. American DeForest Wireless Tele-
graph Co, 48 S. B. 001, 136 N. C. IL
Under Rev. St 1805, art 1222, requiring
the citation to be eerred on the president,
etc^ or npon the local agent representing the
company in the connty. In actions against an
Incorporated company, considered in view
of article 1228, permitting process to be serv-
ed on the president general manager, or
upon any *'local agent^ within the state, in
salts against a foreign corporation, service
npon the manager of a domestic corporation
was not sufficient to sustain a defoult judg-
ment against the corporation, since the term
'local agent^ implies a representative of a
corporation appointed to transact its busi-
ness and represent It in a particular locality,
and it does not emtoace the idea of an agent
who casually happens to be in the particu-
lar territory, or one who Is temporarily sent
to snch locality to perform some particular
pmrpose or specified act' or to superintend
the business in a general way; and while,
nnder certain circumstances and in a certain
sense, the terms ''general manager^ and "lo-
cal agent" may oonv^ much the same idea,
they were not used in the statute as synony-
mous. Latham Co. v. J. M. Radford Grocery
Co., 117 S. W. 909, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 610.
Findings in a default judgment that
citation was served on defendant corporation
by delivering a copy to the local agent of
defendant resident in a certain city, who
was the representative, general manager,
and local agent of the corporation, sufDcient-
ly showed that the person served was the
'local agent representing such company" in
the county in which suit was brought with-
in the meaning of Rev, 8t 1895, art. 1222,
relative to the service of process upon cor-
porations. El Paso d( 8. W. R. OOl V. Kelly
(Tex.) 88 S. W. 865, 809.
LOCAL AMBVMMUEKTB
Bee, also. Special Assessment
A special assessment or forced contribu-
tion levied on particular property specially
benefited by the maintenance of a levee sys-
tem is a "local assessment ** The general
temporary exemption of new railroads from
taxation," as granted in article 280 of the
Constitution of 1898 and in the constitution-
al amendment of 1904 (Laws 1904, p. 19, No.
18)> includes all ad valorem district levee
tMcuB, but not "local assessment" such as
acreage and produce taxes and the mileage
tax levied on railroads. Louisiana Ry. &
Nay. Go. ▼. Madere, 60 South* 609, eiO, 124
La. 636.
Special taxes voted in aid of railroads
nnder constitutional sanction are not "local
assessments," since the word "special" im-
plies merely an additional tax over and
above the general tax authorised by the
OonstttutlOB. Loulslaiia A A Ry. Ck». v.
Shaw, 46 South. 994, 996, 121 La. 997.
LOGAI. AVTHOl
The term "local authorities," within
Railroad Law (Laws 1890, c 666) I 88 (0)n-
soL lAWB 1910, c 49, I 68), providing that
where a railroad crosses a highway at grade
and the railroad company refuses, on request
of the local authorities, to station a fiagman
there, the Supreme Court may, on applica-
tion of the local authorities, order one sta-
tioned there, means the ofiloer particularly
charged with the care of the highway, who
under Town Law ((^onsol. Laws, & 62^ § 80,
as amended by Laws 1909, c 491, | 1, is the
superintendent of highways. Local Authori-
ties of Town of Pawling v. New York, N. H.
A H. R. €k>., 129 N. T. Supp. 648, 144 App.
Div. 791.
Const IlL 1870, art 11, i 4, prohibits the
granting of a right to construct a street rail-
road in a street without the consent of the
"local authorities," and street railway act
(2 Starr A C. Ann. St 1896, p. 2110, c. 66,
f 3) requires the consent of the "corporate
authorities." Held, that the terms "local
authorities" and "corporate authorities"
were synonymous, and used to indicate those
representatives either directly elected by
the people or appointed in some mode to
which the people had given their assent
Potter V. Calumet Electric St Ry. Co., 168
Fed. 621, 627.
The Legislature hsving conferred upon
the commissioners* courts the power to es-
tablish, diange, and discontinue public high-
ways, and to exercise general superinten-
dence over all highways in their counties,
commissioners' courts are the "local authori-
ties" within the (Constitution, from whom
permission to build a street railway along
the public highways of counties must be ob-
tained. Galveston, H. A S. A. Ry. Ck>. v.
Houston Electric Co., 122 8. W. 287, 289,
67 Tex. Civ. App. 170.
LOOAX. BUSIITESS
A contract by a foreign corporation for
the installation of a new elevator and the re-
pair of an old elevator Is local business,
within Pub. Acts 1903, p. 40, No. 34, requir-
ing a foreign corporation doing business In
the state to first record a copy of its charter
or articles of incorporation. Haughton Ele-
vator A Machine Co. v. Detroit Candy Co.,
120 N. W. 18, 19, 156 Mich. 26.
LOCAX. COHCBBH
The formation of towns and cities, or
the change of their boundaries, is not a
"local concern,** of which the county court
has exclusive jurisdiction, under Const 1874,
art 7, I 28, giving to such courts exclusive
original jurisdiction in all matters relating
to county taxes, roads, bridges, ferries, etc.,
and in every other case that may be neces-
sary to the internal improvement and local
concerns of the county. The local concerns
ovar whi^ the county oourt Is given exdu-
IXKJAIi COURTS
1(»
UOOALJjAW
are Jnrisdictioii axe tbose whldi relate spe*
dally to «ouiity affairs, such as public roads,
bridges, ferries, and other matters of the
kind mentioned in the section. City of lit-
tle Bock T. Town of North Little Bock, 79 S.
W. 785, 788, 72 Ark, 195.
IiOOAI. OOUBT8
See Inferior or Local Courts.
LOOAX. FBfiZOHT
As the term is ordinarily employed, a
shipment between points on the same line
of road is "local freight." HiU v. Wadley
Southern By. Co., 57 S. B. 796, 709, 128 Oa.
705.
The term "Ideal freight" means a train
of freight cars receiving and delivering goods
within a limited distance, and carrying a
caboose for the accommodation of the train
crew, and, Incidentally, a few passengers.
State V. Mlssonri Pac By. Co., 117 S. W.
1173, 1175, 219 Mo. 166.
The words "local freight'* may refer ei-
ther to shipments from one way station to
another, or to freight to be carried wholly
within the boundaries of a particular state.
Selectmen of Clinton ▼. Worcester Consol. St
By. Co., 86 N. E. 507, 510, 199 Mass. 279 (cit-
ing Mobile A M. B« Co. ▼. Steiner, 61 Ala.
579; Shipper y. Pennsylvania B. Co., 47
Pa. 844).
X.OOAX. nEPROmBKlDIT
A 'local improvement,** within the mean-
ing of the law. Is an improvement whldi, by
reason of its being confined to a locality,
enhances the value of property situated with-
in the particular district, as distinguished
from benefits dllfused by it throughout the
municipality. City of Butte v. School Dist
No. 1, 74 Pac. 869, 870, 29 Mont 386.
The term "local improvements,** for
whlcb a city asserts the right to make special
assessments, as applied to a street, means the
improvement of the street whereby by the
real property abutting or adjacent is special-
ly benefited in its market value. A local
assessment can only rest upon substantial en-
hancement in values, rather than upon the
idea that the public may be Imposing this
burden upon the citizen because he is so sit^
uated that he can most promptly and con-
veniently perform a duty highly salutary
and advantageous to the public, a doctrine
which Is alleged to rest upon the police power
of the state. A statute authorizing a munic-
ipal corporation to assess cost of street
sprinkling on abutting land in proportion to
the frontage is unauthorized. Stevens v.
City of Port Huron, 113 N. W. 291, 296> 149
Mich. 536, 12 Ann. Cas. 603.
A "local improvement** is a public im-
provement which, through its being confined
to a locality, enhances the value of adjacent
property, as distinguished from benefits dif-
fused by it throughout the municipality, and
though a qystem of aewers to relieve the con-
gested condition of existing sewers by* fur-
nishing additional means, whereby the sur-
face water caused by excessive rain may be
carried away, may benefit all the property
in a village, if the improvement will spe-
cially enhance the adjacent property, it is
local and may be paid for by special assess-
ment Northwestern University v. VUlage of
Wilmette, 82 N. B. 616, 617, 230 la 80.
The term 'local improvement'* in Const
art 9, i 9, aathorialng the General Assembly
to vest municipalities with power to make
improvements by special assessmoit of con-
tiguous property, means su<^ improvements
sfl are paid f6r by fltpedal assessment or spe-
cial taxation, and the test whether an im-
provement is local is whether it spedally
benefits the property assessed and a local im-
provement is an improvement within and un-
der the control of one municipality. Loefiaer
▼. City of Chicago, 92 N. B. 686, 689, 246 IlL
48, 20 Ann. Cas. 336.
A "local improvement** is a public im-
provement which, by reason of its being
confined to a locality, enhances the value
of adjacent property, as distinguished from
an improrement which benefits the whole
municipality. The term, when used without
some specific designation, is not to be limited
mer^ to street improvements and sewers,
but it also includes the laying of a water
main. Yreeland ▼. City of Tacoma, 94 Pae
192, 198, 48 Wash. 626.
X.O0AL LAW
See, also. General Law; Private Law;
Special Law.
As applied to legislation, the word "lo-
cal** is used as a oounter term to "general,''
and signifies legislation relating to only a
portion of the territory of a stata People v.
Wilcox, 86 N. E. 672, 673, 237 111. 421 (citing
Bouv. Law Diet; Burrlll, Law Diet; Peo-
ple v.'CBrieii, 88 N, Y. 193; People v. New-
burgh & S. P. B. Co., 86 N. T. 1; Ellis T.
Frazler, 63 Pac 642, 88 Or. 462, 53 L. R. A
454).
A law is not local or special when it is
general and uniform in its operation upon all
in like situatloiL People ex reL Johnson v.
Barl, 94 Pac. 294, 302, 42 Colo. 238.
"Where a law is general and uniform
throughout the states (derating alike upon
all persons and localities of a dass, it is
not open to the objection that it is 'local or
special legislation.* " Allen v. Kennard, 116
K. W. 63, 64, 81 Neb. 289 (citing State ex reL
Jones V. Graham, 19 N. W. 470, 16 Neb. 74
State V. Berka, 30 N. W. 267. 20 Neb. 375
Van Horn v. State, 64 N. W. 366, 46 Neb. 62;
Livingston Loan & Building Ass'n v. Drum-
mond, 68 N. W. 375, 49 Neb. 206).
An act oitltled "An act providing for
tlie . permanent locatloii of the seat of gor-
emment and capital of the state, creatUg a
IX)OAI/ LAW
169
LOCAL LAW
kotrd of capital commlselo&erB and Aeflnliig
Its powers and duties, anthoriMng the Gov-
ernor to aecept, for capital parpoaefl) the pro>
oeeds of the sale of land* or donatioiMi from
other Bourcee, and declaring an emergency,''
Is not a "local law/' within Const art 6k
I 32, providing that no special or local law
shall be considered by the Legislature vntil
notice of the intended introduction thereof
shall first have been published in newspapeni,
etc. Coyle ▼. Smith, 118 Pac. 944, 948, 28
0U.121.
Acts gist Leg. c. 20, f 2, providing for a
state tax and authorizing a county tax for
mafaitalning tai iwohiMtion territory a cold
storage whera intoxicating or nonintoxicat-
lag liquors are kept on depoeit for others,
Is not a "local or special law," wlthla the
prohibition of Const art a, §8 M, 67. Efac
parte Flake fTex.) 149 8. W. 146» 15L
Bev. St 1890, H 827a-8817c prevMIng
fbr the drainage of everllowed land, applies
to and governs all persons equally who oome
within its scope, and is not a "local law,**
within Const art 4, | 08, pMhIbilIng local
laws. State «x reL Applegate v. Taylor, 128
S. W. 892, 9118, 224 Mo. 898 (dting State v.
Btdiman, 88 8. W. 848, 189 Mo. 948; State
ex inf. Hadley v. Standard Ofl Co., 116 8.
W. 902, 218 Ma 1; CoflPey ▼. City of Garth-
age, 98 S. W. 662, 200 Mo. 816).
"In order to determine whether or not a
given law is general, the purpose of the act
and the objects on which it is Intended to
opiate must be considered. If these objects
are distinguished from others by character-
istics evincing a peculiar relation to the
legislative purpose,, and showing the legis-
lation to be reasonably appropriate to the
former and inappropriate to the latter, the
objects will be considered, as respects such
legislation to be a class by themselves, and
legislation affecting such a class to be gen-
eral. Bnt if the characteristics used to dis-
tinguish the objects to which the legislation
applies from other be not germane to the leg-
islative purpose, or do not indicate some rea-
sonable appropriateness in its application, or
if objects with similar characteristics and
like relation to the legislative purpose have
been excluded firom the operation of the law,
then the dassiflcation is incomplete and faul-
ty, and the legislation not general, but 'local
and special.* *• Parker-Washington Co. v.
Kansas City, Kan., 86 Pac. 781, 782, 78 Kan.
T22.
An act is "geBoral,** as contradistinguish-
ed from, and inconsistent with, *'local," in the
sense the latter term Is used in Const art 4»
f 18, providing ttiat no private or local bill
Btiall embrace more ttukn one subject, and
that shaU be expressed in the title only when
Its operation extends te the whole state, or
perhaps to the whole of some dass of locaU-
tles thoKin which the Legislature may eon*
itttationally mak» upon the prlndpie leeog-
nlzed and approved for the classification of
cities for the purpose of general legislation.
An act is "goierar' in the restricted sense in
which the term is used in artlde 7, | 21, pro-
viding that no general law shall be in force
until published, when it is of that character
within the broad meaning of the term, and
also when it is ^'pubUc" In that its effects ex-
tend to the pe<9le of a locality such as a
county, dty, town, or Tillage, <v a collection
of localities not forming a legislative dass
formed for some legitimate cause; the term
"genwal** and the term ^^blic^ being con-
sidered in this respect synonymous. When
an act is "genersl" merely because it is "pub-
lic,** It is, at the same time, ^ocal," and
must be tested as to its validity by section
21, art 7, and section 18, art 4, as well, and,
if It belong to one of the prohibited classes of
qiedal legislation. It must also be tested by
the constitutional restriction upon that sub*
ject Milwaukee County v. Isenring, 86 N.
W. 131, 136, 109 Wis. 9, 68 L. R. A. 686.
Where all objects which can constitution-
ally be included in a dass are by legislation
recognized by inclusion therein, such legisla-
tion win be general in the constitutional
sense, and P. L. 1907, p. 306, art 25, sup-
plementary to the school law creating and
providing for the Teachers' Retirement Fund,
is not a private, local, or special law, violative
of Const art. 4, f 7, par. 11, prohibiting the
passage of such laws in certain cases, be-
cause for constitutional reasons it did not
compel teachers whose contracts antedated
the enactment of the supplement to become
members of the fund, but only those whose
contracts were made after it became effec-
tive. Allen V. Board of Education of City of
Passaic, 79 Atl. 101. 103, 81 N. J. Law, 135.
A law, general in its terms, applying to
all persons alike throughout the state, is not
a "local law" within Const arts. 48, 49, for-
bidding local laws, merely because the con-
ditions under which it can operate prevail
only In certain parts of the state, and Rev.
St I 910, as amended by Acts 1902, No. 06,
relating to the sale of intoxicating liquor
and restricted so as to apply only to prohi-
bition parishes, and Acts 1902, No. 107, as
re-enacted by Acts 1908, No. 176, fixing the
punishment for illegal sales of liquor, con-
strued to apply only to noDprohibition par-
ishes, are not local laws. State v. Donate,
58 South. 662, 664, 127 La. 393.
Act April 17, 1906, providing for spedal
elections for the rdocation or removal of
covnty seats, being malleable to all the
counties of tlie state alike, is not invalid as
a special or local law, prohibited by Const
art 6, H 82, 46. aty of Pond Creek v. Has-
kell, 07 Pac. 338, 841, 21 Okl. 71L
Laws 1903, p. 9, c. 7, authorising every
cttjr, '^heretofore^* incorporated under a spe-
cial charter, having less than *'10,900" in*
habitants, ta be determined by the "last pre-
IiOCAIi JJLW
119
IiOOAIiliAW
tMng United Stetes ocnaaa," and haTliig
"power to make special assessmoitB to oon-
struct sewers," to make such assessments in
a flpecifled manner, is not onoonstttutional
as a "local or special law/' wltbln Const
art 8, I 27, prohibiting Ba<A laws for the
incorporation of mnnidpalitles, or dianglng
or amending their charters, etc, on the the-
ory that the restriction of the act to cities
theretofore Incorporated under a special
diarter prevented other cities from entering
the class, since the only cities under ^;)ecial
charters are those* theretofore incorporated,
and since under the Ck>nstitution no other
dty can be especially incorporated. And the
act is not ''local or spedaV within such con-
stitutional prohibition, on the theory that
the phrase ''last preceding United States
census^' limits the act to cities haying the
required population at the last census be-
fore the passage of the act, since the phrase
relates to the census last preceding any
date which may become material in ascer-
taining whether any particular city has come
within the statute. And the act is not ''lo-
cal or special" within such constitutional
prohibition, because restricted to cities, in-
corporated under a special charter, having
10,000 inhabitants. And the act is not "lo-
cal or spedal" within such constitutional pro-
hibition, because limited to cities acting un-
der a Qpedal diarter, and having the pre-
scribed population, "having power to make
special assessments to construct sewers,"
though a particular dty is the only one which
could make such assessments when the act
was passed. McGarvey v. Swan, 96 Pac
697, 701, 17 Wyo. 120.
Const art 11, i % grants to the legal
voters of every dty and town power to enact
and amend their munldpal charter, and arti-
cle 4, I la, provides that the initiative and
referendum powers reserved to the people
are further reserved to legal voters of every
district as to all local, special, and municip
pal legislation. Held that, as the words
"local" and "special" mean enactments In-
tended only to affect certain persons who
operate in spedfled localities, an incorpo-
rated port cannot under a special election
had under such powers extend its boundaries
by annexing other territory without the con-
sent of the inhabitants of the territory an-
nexed, this being particularly true in view
of L. O. U I 3209, and Laws of 1911, p. 158,
1 8, both of which provide for the annexation
of new territory to munidpalities and ports
only with the consent of the inhabitants of
the territory to be annexed. State ex rd.
Anderson v. Port of Tillamook, 124 Pac. 687,
640, 62 Or. 882.
Highway Law (ConsoL Laws 1909, c. 26)
I 69a, added by Laws 1910, c. 701, providing
that awards undw any statute for damages
to real estate by duwge of grade of any
street, etc, shall bear interest, is a general,
and not a local, law, as affecting the snffl-
deoej of the title of the act People ex reL
Central Trust Co. of New York v. Prender-
gast, 96 N. E. 715, 717, 202 N. Y. 18&
The good roads law, Rev. Codes, H 1049-
1068, indusive^ providing for organization
and government of good road districts, being
general in its application, applying alike to
all sections of the state where the taxpayers
are willing to assume the burden of addition-
al taxation to improve the roads within
sndi sections and applying to all good road
districts within the state, relating to all of a
class, Is not a local or spedal law within
Const art 8, 1 19, prohibiting the Legislature
from passing local and special laws In cer-
tain cases. Hettinger v. Good Road Diet
No. 1 of WashlDgton County* 118 Pac. 721,
728, 19 Idaho, 818.
A local statute" is one which applies
only to a particular locality or limited part
of the state and the inhabitants of that part
But a law is not local or spedal that Is ap-
plicable throughout the state, even tiiough
Its operation In any locality Is made to de-
pend upon a local oontlngen<7f or a particu-
lar expediency to be ascertained or deter-
mined by a pablic vote in the locality or by
petition, w adjudication of a court or other
authority authorised by the act It Is, never-
theless, open to every locality when brought
within its terms. Witbin Const art 4, | 23,
subd. 10, forbidding the enactment of special
or local laws for the assessment and collec-
tion of taxes for states county, township, or
road purposes. Act Nov. 22, 1905 (Laws 1905,
p. 410), providing for the Improvement of
roads at the expense of the lands benefited
thereby on petition of a majority of the
resident landowners, etc., 'is general and ap-
plicable throughout the state, and is not a
local statute applicable only to a particular
locality or limited part of the state and the
inhabitants of that part, though its operation
is contingent, depending on the wish of the
landowners in the vicinity of a proposed im-
provement and the existence of certain con-
ditions. St Benedict's Abbey v. Marion
County, 93 Pac. 231, 233, 50 Or. 411 (dting
Fonts V. Hood River, 81 Pac. 370, 46 Or. 492,
1 L. R. A. [N. S.] 483, 7 Ann. Cas. 1160; Bax-
ter V. State, 88 Pac. 677, 49 Or. 853; Good-
rich V. Winchester & D. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind.
119; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind. 829; Paul
V. Gloucester County, 16 AtL 272, 50 N. X
Law, 586, 1 L. R. A. 8Q.
To understand the signification of the
words "munldpal teglslation^" as used in
Const art 11, § 2, prohibiting the L^slature
from amending the charters of dties and
towns, the right of which is reserved to the
voters thereof, and arttde 4, providing that
the referendum may be demanded by the
people, which power Is reserved to the legal
voters of every municipality and district as
to all local, special, and munldpal legislation
of every character in and for their respective
IiOCAL LAW
171
VOCAli LAW
nimidptUtlfis aad cttsttlcta, leqnlies aa tn-
teipretation oi tlie term *'local and special
legisUtlon," the right to formulate mlee 1b
relation to wh]<^ la Impliedly denied to
cities and towns, on the principle that the
expression of <me thing la the exclusion of
another. The qualifying words "local** and
'^speclar are synonymous, and. In the sense
in which they are used, mean any enactment
that Is plainly Intended to affect a particular
person or thing or to he In effect in some
spedfled locality only. The words **munlcl-
pallty*' and "district" are evidently expres-
sioDs of equlyalent import, for a district
legally created. from a designated part of the
state and organized to promote the conven-
ience of the public at large is a municipal
corporation. The authority of such a corpo-
ration has been heretofore derived from an
act of the legislative assembly creating it,
and, as such statute Is applicable to and en-
forceable In a part of the state only, it is a
local or special law. The change in the or-
ganic law deprives the legislative assembly
of all authority to enact, amend, or repeal
any charter of a town, the legal voters of
which reserve to themselves the ezerdse of
an such power, except the right of repeal,
and it was evidently the intention ot the
framers of such constitutionai provision, and
also the people who ratified it, to vest an
hicorporated city or town with authority to
proride the manner of exercising the initi-
ative and referendum powers as to amend-
ments of a charter, which change la reason-
ably within the term of "municipal legisla-
tion." Acme Dairy Go. y. City of Astoria,
90 Paa 153, 154, 49 Or. 520.
Oen. 8t 1006; ff 8772, 3775, regnlating
the catching of fish in rivers, creeks, bays,
bayous, or other waters on the coast, are
not 'local or special laws," where the first
provision therein covers the full territory of
the state defined as on the coast of the state,
while the latter applies to all the rivers of
the state, and are not in violation of Const
art 3, U 20, 21. Carlton v. Johnson, 55
South. 075, 076, 61 Fla. 15.
A class of laws are known in common
parlance as "local option laws," relating to
Bobjects which, such as intoxicating liquors
or the running at large of cattle, may be dif-
ferently regarded in different localities, and
are sustained on the ground that the subject,
though not embraced within the ordinary
power of the municipalities to make by-laws
and ordinances, is within the class of poUce
regulationa in respect to whi<fli it is proper
that the local Judgment should control. In
re O'Brien, 75 Pac 106, 200, 28 Mont 530, 1
Ann. Cas. 873 (citing Cooley, Const Linou
146).
Iav applyiac ^ olaoa
A "local or special law," within the con-
stitutional pxohlbitton against the passage
of such lawsy is oae which relates to partlca-
lar penona or tfainga of the same clas& Ball
V. BeU County (Tex.) 138 8. W. 17a, 170 (cli*
Ing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4206; 7 Words
and Phrases, p. 6577).
A "local law** applies to all persons with-
in the territorial limits prescribed by the
act, while a special law ai^lies to particular
persona or things of a class. Commissioners
of Prince George's County v. Baltimore & O.
R. Co., 77 AU. 488, 4S4, 118 Hd. 170.
Olassifloatioa as to poptalatlom
A statute classifying counties for certain
purposes and providing that the twenty-sev-
enth class, consl3tlng of only one county,
should be dasslfled according to the popula-
tion, as shown by the federal census of 1000,
whereas the method of ascertaining the pop-
ulation in all other counties la different, is a
''local and special law.** Johnson y. Oumi
(CaL) 84 Pac. 870, 871.
A statute classifying counties according
to population, providing that the population
of some of the counties shall be determined
by the federal cenaus of 1000, and that In
other oonnties the populatl<« shall be deter-
mined by different modes, la not a "local or
special law,** In violation of Const art 11, f
5. Johnson t. Qunn, 84 Pac. 665, 666, 148
Cal.745.
Act April 8, 1008 (P. L. 186), authorizing
county commissioners In counties having a
population of over 600,000 and less than
1,000,000 to erect a manorial hall or boild-
ing in memory of the soldiers and sailors of
the War of the BebeUion, la not a ''local act'*
regulating the affairs of Allegheny county
alone, but is a classification of counties ac-
cording to population in order to permit ex-
penditure of pubUc money in a q;)ecified way.
Y(^o V. Allegheny County, 67 Aa 648, 660,
218 Pa. 401 (dtlng Commonwealth r. (HlUgan,
46 Aa 124, 105 Pa. 504; Seabolt v. Commis-
sioners of Northumberland County, 41 Atl.
22, 187 Pa. 818).
A law is not "locar or "spedal," within
the constitutional Inhibition against such
laws regulating county and township affairs,
for classifying counties and townships on the
baals of population, if population makes a
substantial difference In the conditions af-
fected by the statute, and the statute, if con-
sidered aa regulating county and township
affairs, did not violate the constitotional in-
hibition for fixing a lower tax rate in coun*
ties and dtles having a larger population.
People ex reL Booth r. Opel, 01 N. B. 458,
461, 244 IlL 817.
Iiaws havlas loeal applioatioa
A law which has a bona fide apidicatlon
to the entire state aa to some of its chief fea«
tures la a "general" and not a "local law,**
as defined by Const 1001, | HO, though it
does not apply in every detalL The law is a
"general" and not a "local law," notwlth.-
LOOAIi LAW
172
IXXXALIiAW
itaMlnff the ftict that local laws m tfie ao^
]ect were passed at the same sessloii and ap-
proved en ttie same day. State ez ret Goll-
man y. Pitta, 49 South. 441, 442, leO Ala. 188»
185 AoL St Rap. 79.
*lJooal law" means that code of laws
which govems the affairs of a certain pre*
scrlhed Jurisdiction. Mather v. Cunningham,
74 AtL 809, 813, 106 Me. 326. 29 L. B. A«
(N. S.) 761, 18 Ann. Cas. 692.
Ck>nst I 110, defines a ''local law" as a
law which applies to any political subdi-
vision or subdivision of the state less than
the whole. State ez rel. Attorney General y.
Sayre^ 89 South. 240, 142 Ala. 641.
Const i 104, prohibits the Legislature
from passing a special or local law in speci-
fied instances, and section 110 defines "lo-
cal law" In this connection as one which ap-
plies to any subdivision or subdivisions of
the state less than the whole. Sisk y. Car-
gile, 85 South. 114, 117, 138 Ala. 164.
The word "local," as applied to legisla-
tion, signifies legislation relating to part of
tlie territory of a state only, while the word
"special" is more appropriately applied to
laws granting some special right, privilege,
or Imnmnity, or imposing some particular
burden upon some portion of the people of
the state less than all. People v. Wilcox, 86
N. B. 672, 673, 237 lU. 421.
A statute compelling the parish of Or-
leans to erect a courthouse with Its own
funds is a "local law," whose enactment
should have been preceded by the publica-
tion of the notice required by article 50 of
the Constitution. Such a statute does not
lose its character of a "local law" from the
fact that It provides that the state shall con-
tribute towards the erection of the building
and be part owner thereof. Such provision
adds a public side to the statute, but does
not do away wHh the local side, as to which
the inhabitants of the locality are entitled un-
der the Constitution to be notified and to be
heard. Benedict v. City of New Orleans, 39
South.. 792, 796, 115 La. 645.
An act providing for the accomplishment
of an object and providing means for pay-
ment therefor does not contain two subjects,
and hence the provision of the Public Service
Commissions law (Laws 1907, p. 889, c. 429)
for payment of salaries and expenses of the
commission for the First district by New
York City does not constitute a local act
joined with general legislation, within Const
art 3, i 16, providing that no local act shall
embrace more than one subject etc.; such
provision b^ng a matter of apportionment,
within the taxing power. Oubner y. McClel-
lan, 110 N. Y« Supp. 755, 757, 130 App. IHy.
716.
Act Feb. 25, 1905, abolishing the Watson
iDdldal district of Desha county^ and pro-
viding for Ih* transfer of eases pending In
the Mveral courts of tliat dlsferlct is Bot ft
"local or special act" within Ooost 1874, mrt.
S^ f 26, declaring that no "local or special
act" shall be passed until the notice prorld-
ed for Shan have been duly published. Wa-
terman y. Hawkins, 86 S. W. 844» 845, 75
Ark. 120.
Act Sept 26, 1903 (AcU 1903, p. 309),
providing for the removal of causes from the
dty court of Bessemer, Jefferson county, to
other courts in the county, is a "local law,**
within Const, f 106, requiring the publica-
tion of notice of intention to apply for the
enactment of local laws. Dudley y. Fltspat-
rlck, 39 South. 884, 885, 143 Ala. 162 (citing
Wallace v. Board of Revenue of Jefferson
County, 37 South. 321, 140 Ala. 491).
A "local law" is one "which applies to
any political subdivision or subdlvisious of
the state, less than the whole." An act to
consolidate the courts of a certain state and
county is a "local law." Wallace v. Board of
Revenue of Jefferson County, 37 South. 321,
322, 140 Ala. 491 (quoting Const | 110).
Gen. Acts 1907, p. 549, whldi amends
Loc. Acts 1907, p. 285, f 11, so as to provide
for the organisation of grand Juries for the
circuit court of a designated county, is a '^o-
oal law," within Const 1901, f 110, defining
a local law as one which applies to any politi-
cal subdivision or subdivisions of the state
less than the whole. Sellers y« States 50
South. 340, 841, 162 Ala. 85.
Iaw applying to slnclo sity
A "local statute" enacted fbr a particular
municipality, for reasons satisfactory to the
Legislature, is intended to be exceptional and
for the benefit of such municipality. Bx
parte Young, 95 S. W. 98» 104, 49 Tex. Or.
R.536.
A "local act" is one confined to a particu-
lar municipality or particular part of the
state. Oubner v. McClellan, 115 N. Y. Supp.
765. 769, 130 App. Div. 716.
"The term 'local,' as applied to statutes,
is of modern origin, and Is used to designate
an act which operates only within a single
dty, county, or other particular subdivision
or place and not throughout the entire legis-
lative jurisdiction. In this sense, the term
'local' is the antithesis of 'generaL'" State
ex rel. Attorney Oeneral v. Sayre, 89 South.
240, 142 Ala. 641 (dtlng State v. Chambers,
93 N. C. 600; Kerrigan v. Force, 68 N. Y. 381).
The act passed in 1907 (Laws 1907, p.
517) to make Judges of the Montgomery city
court elective by the people is a *local law,"
within the requirement of Const t 106, that
notice of such acts be given. State ex reL
Thomas v. Quhter, 54 South. 283, 284, 170 Ala.
166.
An act to oonsofidate the courts of a cer-
tain dty and county, IS a "local law," dtf ned
by Const | 110, aia law which applies to
any political tfabdlvialon «r subdiviaioiis of
LOCAL LAW
173
LOCAL OFFICSB
tfie state less than the whola WaSlaoe t.
Board of Rereniie of Jefferson Ooiinl7i 87
South. 821, 822, 140 Ala. 4B1.
Without undertaking to dlBcrbnlnate
nicely or define with precision, It may be
said that the character of a law as general
or 'local** depends on the character of its
BQbject-matter. If that be of a general na-
ture, existing throughout the state, In eT-
eiy county, a subject-matter in which all
the dtlsois hare a common interest, if it be
a court organized under the constitution and
laws withhi and for every county of the state,
and possessing a legitimate Jurisdiction over
every citizen, then the laws which relate to
and regulate it are laws of a general nature,
and, by virtue of the prohibition referred to,
must have a uniform operation throughout
the state, 92 Ohio Laws, p. 068, providing for
the penslGfning of school-teachers in school
districts in cities of the third grade of the first
class, is in violation of Ck>n8t art 2, i 26,
providing that laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation throughout the
state; such act at the time of Its passage
and taking effect being applicable only to
the dty of Toledo, and containing a provision
hi section 2 requiring the board of education
to select three members of a pension commit-
tee at its first regular meeting within 80
days after the law went into effect, aad mak-
hig no provision In msh regard for dtisB
whidi might thereafter come into the dass.
Hibbard v. State, 64 N. B. 109, 111, 66 Ohio
St 574, 58 U R. A 654 (citing Kelley v.
SUte, 6 Ohio St. 269, 271).
Chartev of ¥ntltHng aad loaa mmooI*-
tlom
The charter of a building and loan asso-
ciation, obtained under the general law, is
not a "local" or "private" law, within Code
1906, t 8, providing that private and local
laws, not revised and brought into the Code,
are not affected by its adoption ; and so is
not saved from the operation of section 2678,
revising the usury law, and doing away with
the exception thereof, whereby building and
loan associations could receive more than 10
per cent Interest Kisslssipid Building &
Loan Ass'n ▼. Mciaveen, 56 South. 187, 189,
100 Miss. 16.
As q^eolallaw
Theirords "local" and '^special," as used
in Gonst art 8, f 80, provkllng that no local
or special laws shall be passed for ttie Ineor-
poration of cities and towns, are synonymous
words of description. Bckerson ▼. City of
Des Moines, 116 N. W. 177. 188, 187 Iowa,
45Z
The words •*local*' and "special" in CJonst
art 4, I la, reserving the initiative and ref-
erendum powers to the voters of every mu-
nicipality as to all local, special, and munici-
pal legislation, &re synonymous, and mean
enactments intended to affect only certain
persons, or to operate In specified localities;
and an act Ss "locaT* when tiie subject v»>
lates to a portion only of the people or their
property, or ,whiBii it operatss only within a
irilngle city, coiinty, or other parttenlar dlvl-
sloiL Ik^ubel T. Oleott, 120 Pac. 875, 878,
aOOE. 506.
The terms "^ocal law** and •bipedal law**
are used interchangeably. Const 1901, f 10,
defines a "local law** as one applioable to any
political subdivision of the state, and a ''spe-
cial law*' as one which applies to an individ-
ual association or corporation. Montgomery
aty Charter (Acts 1692-93, p. 877) t ^> «c-
empts persons procuring a liquor license
from the dty from paying any tax or license
to the county. Act March 4, 1906 (Gen. Acts
1908, p. 164), provides for a oounty liquor
tax, and repeals all laws, general and "spe-
cial," Inconaistsiit with itself, and Act Sept
80, 1903 ((Sen. Acts 1908» p. 298) I 4, again
confers power on counties to levy a liquor
tax, and provides that the statute shall not
affect the exemption provided by any dty
charter. Held that, notwithstanding the con-
stitutional definitions, the exemption was
repealed by Act Kardi 4, 1908 (Gen. Acts
1903, p. 184), and not revived by Act Sept 80,
1908 (Gen. Acts 1908. p. 298) | 4. Gaston v.
O'Neal, 41 South. 742, 743, 145 Ala. 484 (dt-
Ing Maxwell V. State, 7 South. 824, 89 Ala.
150; Holt ▼. City of Birmingham, 19 South.
785, 111 Ala. 889).
I.O€AIi IfGULAnOX
See Local Law.
LOCAI. HATUKB
A suit by a creditor of a railroad com-
pany to have its property, situated in differ-
ent federal districts of the same states ad-
ministered for the benefit of all creditors Is
one of a "local nature,** which, under Rev.
St f 742, may be brought in either of such
districts, and the appointment of a receiver
therdn is an equitable attachment of all
property of the defendant within the state.
Horn V. Pere Marquette B. Co., 151 Fed. 626,
682.
I.OCAIi OFFIOEB
Const art 10, f % provides that dty,
town, and village officers whose appointment
is not provided for by the Constitution shall
be rtected by the electors of such dties, etc.,
or appointed by such authorities thereof as
the Legislature shall designate. No provi-
sion for election or appointment of local
health officers is provided for. Public Health
Law (Laws 1893, p. 1501, c. 601) | 20, as
amended by Laws 1907, p. 427, c 225, pro-
vides that the state commissioner of health
shall appoint a health officer for eadi mu-
nldpallty except cities on the nomination of
the local board of health, devolves certain
duties upon the commissioner respecting the
competency and 'qualifications of applicants,
and provides fhat thette shall eontlnue to be
"local" health officers in the several villages.
LOCAL OPTION ELECTION
174
LOCAL ROUTE
etc Laws 1893, p. 1502, c. 061,. f 21, as
amended by Laws 1907, p. 267, c. 189, pro-
rides tbat eveiy local board ot health shall
prescribe the duties and powers of the 'local
health*' officer. Held, thatmnnicipal health
offlicers are local officers within the Constita-
tlQn, and the provision of the statute em-
powering the state commissioner to appoint
them and pass on their competency and qual-
ifications was violative of the Constitution;
the right of appointment resting wholly in
the local authorities. Towne v. Porter, 113
N. Y. Supp. 758, 761, 128 App. Dly. 717.
LOCAI. OPTIOH ELECTION
Where the question of the sale of intox-
icating liquors may be submitted to the elec-
tors of each municipality at each biennial
election, the determination of the electors is
the exercise of "local option." ^People ex
reL Sandman t. Brush, 71 N. B. 781, 783, 179
N. y. 93.
"Local option elections" mean recurring
elections, and mean recurring elections for
the territory spedfled in Const 1876, art
16, I 20, as amended in 1891, providing for
the submission to voters of the question
whether the sale of intoxicating liquors
shall be prohibited within prescribed limits.
Ex parte Mills, 79 S. W. 555, 556, 46 Tex.
O.K. 224.
LOCAL OPTION LAW
The term "local option" implies the grant
of a right to one locality to adopt and an-
other to decline to avail itself of a law.
State ex rel. Hooyer v. Hickerson, 109 S. W.
108, 109, 130 Mo. App. 47 (citing Ex parte
Handler, 75 S. W. 922, 176 Mo. 389).
"A 'local option law' is a law framed for
the purpose of prohibiting, or severely re-
stricting, the sale of tutoxicating liquors,
under penalties, and containing a provision
that the several counties, townships, or other
divisions of the state may hold elections to
determine, by popular vote, whether they
desire the law to be in force in their limits,
and with a further provision that, in each
case where such election results in favor of
the adoption of the law, it shall take effect
in the district so voting, but that each dis-
trict rejecting it shall continue to be govern-
ed In this respect by the existing laws.
♦ ♦ • But the overwhelming preponder-
ance of authority is to the effect that such
a statute. If it is a complete enactment In it-
self, requiring nothing further to give it va-
lidity, and depending upon the popular vote
for nothing but a determination of the terri-
torial limits of its operation, is a valid and
constitutional exertion of the legislative pow-
er." State ex rel* Crothers v. Barber, 101
N. W. 1078, 1061« 19 S. D. 1 (quoting and
adopting definition in Blacky Intox. lAqu I
45).
LOCAL OPTIOH TIRBITOBT
Local Option Law, Act March 23, 1907,
p. 495, c. 198, f 1, provides that anti-saloon
territory shall mean all the territory within
the limits of any city, town, ward, ward sub-
division, district, or precinct in which,
through the action of the qualified electors
ther^n, as provided In the act, the keeping
and sale of Intoxicating liquors is prohibited,
etc. Section 2 lurovldes for a simultaneous
submission by a ward^ ^nd by a piednct
within the ward, of a proposition to become
anti-saloon territory. Section 7 provides
that all the territory within any political sub-
division which has become anti-saloon terri-
tory shall continue to be such through its en-
tire extent, etc. Held, that the several po-
litical subdivisions enumerated are given the
right to control within their own territory
upon the question of prohibition, and each
has the privilege of saying exclusively and
conclusively that prohibition shall prevail
within its limits, but not that It shall not
prevail; and, where the question is submit-
ted simultaneously in a ward, and in a pre-
cinct of the ward, and the ward votes for
prohibition, and the precinct votes against it,
prohibition will prevail throughout the en-
tire ward. Schwartz y. People, 104 Pac. 92,
94, 46 Colo. 239.
Under Acts 1910, c 190, t 30, requiring
shipments of ardent spirits into local option
or no-license territory to be plalidy marked,
showing the kind and quantity of spirits and
the consignee of the package, and section 19c.
defining ''local option territory^ as territory
which, by vote under the local option law,
has declared against the issuance of licenses
for the sale of ardent spirits, and '*no-license
territory" as territory in which, under the
provisions of that or some other act, no li-
cense for the sale of such spirits can be
granted, a conviction cannot be sustained for
failure to mark as specified a shipment into
a magisterial district, wliere licenses may be
Issued under certain conditions, and which
voted against local option at the last local
option election, although no licenses are
actually in effect. Armstead v. Ck)mmoD-
wealth, 74 S. E. 399, 400, 113 Va. 765.
LOCAL PROPERTY
Rolling stock of a railroad company,
which is one place to-day and another to-
morrow, and which is continually carried
along tiie line of the road in the actual opera-
tion, has no actual situs for the purposes of
local taxation, and hence is nob "local prop-
erty," within the meaning of the Constitution.
San Francisco A S. J. V. By. Ck>. v. City of
Stockton, 84 Pac 771, 774, 149 CaL 83.
LOCAL ROUTS
A street railway franchise which pro-
vides tor the exchange of transfers with any
other company operating street railways,
which shall give and receive transfers on the
LOCAL aXATUTE
175
LOOALLY €ll<OSBI> CIRCUIT
basis of settlement tliat tlM tnaaler lOadX be
redeemed at each a iwoportloiiate part of the
fitre iwld as the ran or local roate of the oar
<m which the transfer Is reeeiyed bears to
the sum of the runs of the local ronte of the
eus from whidi the transfer is Issued, and
on which it is reoelTod, giyes a passenger the
same right to travel as to distance oyer the
railway system to which a transfer is tender*
ed as if he pays fare on that system, and two
street railway companies operating systems
under the franchise and giying and reeeiying
transfers are each entitled to one-half of the
fares earned from passengers receiving and
using transfers, the words **local rente**
meaning the entire distance a passenger may
travel on the system aa if he paid fttre,
whether he dianges cars on that system or
not, and the word "snm" referring to the
result of two units added so that the entire
diatance a passenger may travel on eadi
system constitutes a unit or the sum whidi
goes to make up the entire service required to
be furnished on the payment of one fare.
State ex reL linhoff v. Seattle, R. A S. By.
Go^ U4 Pac. 431, 433, 02 Wash. 544.
LOCAL STATUTB
See Local Law.
LOCALITT
See General Locality.
The word "locaUty** within Rev. St 1908,
I 5625, providing that a nonproducing gold,
silTer, lead, copper, etc mine shall not be
waflcflsod at a greater amount per acre than
is aBooosod per acre against the lowest pro-
dodng mine in the same locality, is not
synonymous with "mining district" ; the term
''locality" haying a variable meaning, depend-
ing on particular drcumstancea. Foster v.
Hart ConsoL lUn. Co., 122 Pac. 54, 55^ 52
Ck>lo.429L
Under Cr. Code, f 568 (22 Stat at Large,
p. 128, f 7), providing that, where the county
board of control designates a locality for a
dispensary on 20 days' public notice^ a maj<»v
ity of the voters of the township can pre-
vent Its location by petition to the board, a
designation is sufBicient without stating the
exact location aa to street or number of the
building in which the dispensary is to be situ-
ated. A particular town is a locality** in a
township, while a street or street number is
s 'locality" in a town. Severance y. Hur^
phy, 46 & B. 85, 38, 67 & O. 400.
In an action for value of wood burned
by fire set by a railroad company*s engine,
Instruction that the measure of damages was
the value of the wood in the locality where it
was, and not what it could be sold for else-
where^ was not erroneous because of the use
of the word "locality," since such word would
be understood by the Jury to mean "place.**
Hart y« Atlantic €k>ast line R. R., 56 8. IL
550, 144 N. C. 01, 12 Ann. Gas. 706.
The word "locality** is a word of some-
What limited signification, tat it has puiely
a rdative meaning. By Pub. St 1882, c lift,
H 4aHUS, the Legislature intended to give the
board of railroad commissioners power to reg*
ulate the fares ^larged by street railway
companies, whether or not fixed in accord-
anoe with restrlctiottB imposed by municipal
oflloers, subject to the condition that fares
so established f6r a municipality should not
be raised except by mutual agreement with
such ofladals, and even if the fares between
a dty granting a location and another dty
in the state were net established for a "local-
ity,** within the statute, a street railway
company cannot complain of the taaea fixed
in granting a location, when no attempt
has been made to have the fftres revised by
the railroad commissioners. Selectmen of
Clinton y. Worcester ConsoL St By. Oo., 86
N. B. 507, 510, 100 Mass. 270«
LOOAUZBD FBOPE&TY
Acts 1807, p. 102, c 5, requiring rail-
roads to file a schedule setting forth the
length in miles of its railroad bed, switches,
and side trades, and the value of the whole,
providing that the road of any railroad shall
include side tracks^ switches, etc., and that
the roadbed, rolling stodc, franchises, choses
in action, and personal property having no
actual situs shall be known as distributable
property,'* and shall be valued separately,
and that the depot buildings and other prop-
erty, real, personal, and mixed, having an
actual situs, shall be known as the 'iocalized
property,** and shall be valued separately,
divides the taxation of railroad property
into "localized** and "distributable** property;
and switches and industrial tracks off the
main right of way, but used as a part of the
general system, and for the same purposes
as switdi tracks on the right of way are
used, must be assessed as "distributable**
property, but all buildings, coal bins, round-
houses, machine shops, depot buildings, and
other structures located on the terminal yards
must be assessed as "localized** property.
Nashville, O. A St L Ry. Co. v. Patterson,
122 S. W. 467, 460, 122 Tenn. 1.
LOCALLY 0L08£D OntOVIT
The term "locally closed circuit,** as used
in the patent by the patentee of the Thomson
Patent, Na 430,328, and in prior patents,
means a circuit disconnected from the main
line It refers to a circuit whldi does not
extend over the source of energy, but per-
tains to the local place and no other. As
used in such patent and interpreted by its
use in former patents, and construed in the
light of the file wrapper and contents, it
must be understood in its general and ordin-
ary sense. Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v.
Wagner Blectric Mfg. Co., 110 Fed. 178-180.
utoAva
176
IiOOATB
LOCATE
See Relocate.
Webster deflnea 'located as *%o place; to
set in a partlciilar site or position ; to desis-
nate the place of." The Gentuzy Diction-
ary defines it as "to fix in a place; to estah-
lish in a particular spot or position; to fix
the place ot; to reside ; to place one's self or
be placed; adopt or fonn a fixed residence.*'
. Where a foreign corpomtion had no office in
a county, and its loan bnsiness therein was
carried on by a trareling solicitor, who sent
applications to title office of the company in
another state, where the notes evidencing the
loan were payable, the corporation was not
"located" within the connty, within section
B48 of Rev. St Ariz. 1887, requiring the fil-
ing with the county recorder, of the appoint-
ment of an agent, upon whom notices and
processes may be served. Ixidustrial Build-
ing ft Loan AsB'n v. Meyers-Abel Go, 9fS Pac.
115, 117, 12 Arie. 48.
As establisli and flz
A petition for a highway was not objec-
tionable, because it prayed that the court *lo-
cate and establish" a road, instead of asUng
to have the road "laid out"; the term 'laid
out" being colloquial, meaning *to plan in
detail," whUe "to locate" is to define the lim-
Its, to establish in a particular place, and, in
a road proceeding, is as comprehensive as
•lay out" — the term *1ay out" expressing the
work to be done by the viewers in establishing
on the ground tiie lines and angles of the
road. Fciagins v. Wallowa County, 128 Pac
902, 62 Or. 180.
Const art 7» I 23, designates the tem-
porary location of the seat of government
the state university, insane asylum, and peni-
tentiary, and the last clause thereof provides
that the Legislature shall not locate any
other public institutions except under general
laws and by vote of the people. Act Jan. 10,
1881, provides that the establishment of the
Wyoming Agricultural College be located by
a vote of the people, and such college was
located by a vote of the people at Lander.
Subsequently Act Feb. 7, 1905, was passed
purporting to repeal Act Jan. 10, 1891, but it
was claimed that the last law was in contra-
vention of Const art 7, f 23, providing that
the Legislatore shall not "locate" any other
public institutions, except under general laws,
and by a vote of the people, in that the repeal
of the act constituted an attempt to dissolve
an institution created by the peotHe by their
own vote in locating it Held, "that the in-
stitution was not however, created or es-
tablished by the people as distinct from the
Legislature, either throng their votes in
locatiug it or otherwise. Nor have the people
by the fundamental instrument of their state
government reserved the right to themselves
to establish or create public Institutions.
The people have reserved the power to vote
upon the location of such institutions estab-'
Ushed or propoaad to he telabtlriMd. • • •
Unless, thersfbre, to 'locate' is to 'establish'
an institatioii of the character of the coh
lege In question, it is erroneous to say that
the people established it * • * Exam-
ples are numerous in the books of public in-
stitutions which were esUblished and In exis-
tence in advance of their location, or the se-
lection of a site. They may not be in a posi-
tion to conduct operations until located; but
that they may constitute an existing institu-
tion, if so declared by the Legislature and
provided with a governing board. Is, we think,
self-evident • • « The location of an in-
stitution differs essentially from its crea-
tion." Hence the dissolution by the Legisla-
tinre of the Wyoming Agricultural College
was not in contravention of the Constitution,
notwithstanding it was located by vote of the
people. State ex rel. Wyoming Agricultural
College V. Irvine, 84 Pac 90-106, 107, 14
Wyo. 318.
Laws 1909, c. 183, creates Lincoln county,
and section 3 provides that the town of Lib-
by shall be the county seat until the county
seat is designated as provided, and that for
the purpose of "definitely fixing and creat-
ing" a county seat the board of county com-
missioners shall insert on thelMUots In the
general election, "for the county seat of Lin-
coln county ^," and the town receiving
the largest number of votes shall be the coun-
ty seat Held, that the section contravened
Const art 5, § 26, prohibiting the Legisla-
ture from passing special acts locating or
changing the county seats, which was sub-
stantially adopted from Act Cong. July 30,
1886, c. 818, 24 Stat 170, relating to the ter-
ritories, construing the constitutional provi-
sion and act of Congress in view of their leg-
islative history; "locating," as used in the
statute, meaning to establish and fix a perma-
nent county seat, and "changing" meaning
the removal of an established, permanent
county seat. State ex rel. Geiger ▼. Long,
117 Pac. 104, 106, 43 Mont 401.
As puvoluwe
See Purcdiase.
As seleetion of plaoe
To "locate" is to select by fixed bound-
aries. Petersburg School Dist of Nelson
County V. Peterson, 108 N. W. 756^ 75^ 14 N.
D. 844.
A deed to an electric railway company
of a strip 26 feet in width and such addition-
al width as may be required for the use of
the railway at cutting and embankments
and also for side tracks and turnouts as final-
ly located, executed in consideration of the
company locating its railway on the land of
the grantor, limits the grant to the necessi-
ties of the railroad as finally located and lim-
its the grant of land for side tracks and
turnouts to such as were originally construct-
ed, and the company may not take additional
land- for clde tracks and turnouts; the word
U>OAT»
vn
IiO€4TXO|r
locate,** wlien referiing to roads, meanftnf a
determination and designation by those a\l-
thorized to do so of the pveoiser vUce where
the rottd is to be biriOt, or retarring to the
actual construction of the road. KenaingtaB
Ry. Co. oC Montgomery County y. Moore, 80
Atl. 614, 616b 115 Md. 86^ Ann. Ca& 1912C,
1306 (6 Words and Phrases, pp. 4217, 4218,
4221).
In an action to rescind a lease for fail-
are of defendant lessor to make certain imr
provements before the ooaunenoement of the
term, the answer alleged tb» pendency of
proceedin0» to open and estaUish a road, and
averred that the location of the improvements
was to be fixed after the road had been def-
initely located through the land, and con-
venient to the road when it was opened and
ready for travel. Held that, while the term
"located" as applied to a road is of uncertain
significance, and may refor to the fixing of
the ttne which the road is to occupy or to
the actual construction of the road, it was
meant as used in the answer to describe the
act of the public officials in determining the
place which the road was to occupy, and
hence a finding that the improvements were
to be placed after the road was located "and
built" was beyond the issues. Schwarting v.
Carpenter, 108 Pac. 818, 319, 157 Oal. 432.
The word "locate,** as used in the treaty
of September 24, 1810, with the Chippewa
Nation, reserving lands for the nae of the
Indians to be located at and near the Grand
Traverse of the F. river in such manner as
the President of the United States should di-
rect, does not mean to patent, but to have
the several sections surveyed, marked out,
•and a map made of them showing the particu-
lar section belonging to each of the reservees.
Frauds v. Francis, 27 Sup. Ot 120, 181, 203 U.
8. 283, 51 li. Bd. 166 (citing Stockton v. Wil-
liams [Mich.] Walk. Ch. 120, 129).
Under the Nelson Act, allowing allotr
meats to Indians located on the White Earth
Reservation, the expression "located" in-
cludes those Indians bom after the passage
of the act United States v. La Roque, 198
Fed. 645, 646, 117 C. C. A. 349.
An Indian need not have been on the
reservation at the instant when the act of
February 28, 1891, amending the general al-
lotment act of February 8, 1887, was passed,
hi order to avail himself of the benefit of
the previiion of the later act giving to each
Indian 'located" thereon one-eighth section
of land. Fairbanks v. United States, 32 Sup.
Gt 292, 296, 223 U. S. 215, 56 L. Ed. 409.
LOCATED PBOQPEBOT
Stock in a nonresident railroad corpora-
tion, owned by a' domestic railroad company,
Is taxable for county and municipal purposes
In ttiat county and city wherein the princi-
pal office of sudi' corporation Is fixed by its
charter or by4aw. Such proDerty is "located
property," in the meaning of the law of thia'
8 Wna& P.2D Skb.— 12
state providing the machinery for diaMba^
ing the -property of railroad companAes for
county and municipal taxation. Qreene
County V. Wright, 54 S. B. 951, 953» 126 Ga.
504.
X.OOATXOK
See Each Location; Final Location;
Lode Location ; Mining Location ; Plac-
er Location ; Relocation.
Removal, see Remove — ^Removal.
As. site ev sitnattoa
▲ notice of election for the removal of a
county seat is not objectionable in using the
word "site" in respect to both building and
offices. The word "location" is used in the
statute in respect to offices, and, while it may
be preferable, both words are frequently em-
ployed in the same sense, and no confusion
could have resulted. Stanton v. Board of
Sup'rs of E^Bsex County, 96 N. Y. Supp. 840,
842, 48 Misc. Rep, 415.
Hisliwmy
"Location" of a highway and "alteration"
of a highway do not amount to the same
thing. Ford v. Erskine (Me.) 83 Atl. 455, 457
The word 'location," as used in Pol
Code, f 2689, relating to the establishment of
highways, refers to proceedings designed to
fix the line of the highway at a time prior
to its actual construction and opening.
Schwartlng v. Carpenter, 108 Pac. 318, 320,
157 CaL 432.
Fnftnekise distinguished
See Franchise.
Railroad
Under Laws 1854-55, p. 264, c. 228, | 29,
providing that in the absence of contract in
relation to land through which a certain rail-
road may pass it shall be presumed that the
land bias been granted by the owner to the
company, unless the owner shall apply for an
assessment of the value of the land within
two years next after the road has been "lo-
cated," the location of the railroad is Its
physical location by the laying of its track,
aty of Hickory v. Southern Ry. Co., 49 S.
B. 202, 204, 137 N. C. 189.
Under the rule that, where a railroad
company, to which has been given the power
to choose its particular route between desig-
nated termini; has exercised its discretion In
this regard. Its power of choice is ejdiansted,
and it cannot subseguentiy change its "locap
tion," without express legislative authority,
the smthorities differ somewhat as to what
will constitute a «*location," within the rule,
but, after the selection of the route and acto-
al construction, they generally ooncur that
the "location" Is fixed. Brown v. Atlan-
tic & B..llty; Con 05 S. B. 24, 20, 126 Ga. 248,
7 Ann. Cas. 1026 (citing Mahaska County R.
Co. V. Des Moines Val. R. Co., 28 Iowa, 437;
i Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas. 199, 200, note to WeB^
em Penp. ^. Co.'s Appeal).
tiOOATEON
178
I/0OOMOTIVB
*lx>catton^ of a railroad, within the
legal definition of the terms, la a proceeding
In the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main, amoonting to an appropriation of the
particular place selected for the site of the
road, as against all persons except the owner
of the land, and a person who may hare per-
fected a prior location thereon; and, as to
the landowner. It gives a right to acquire his
title by purchase, or the further exercise of
the power of eminent domain, paramount to
that of a company claiming under a subse-
quent location. A mere survey made by the
engineers of a company, not adopted or de-
termined upon by the corporation Itself, by
an act of Its board of directors, as the loca-
tion of Its road, Is not an appropriation or
location giving priority of right as against
third persons. A survey staked out upon the
ground as a center line, a preliminary llne^
or an actual location, whether delineated
on paper or not, If adopted by the cor-
poration as aforesaid. Is a sufficient 'loca-
tion." A 'location," as between rival com-
panies, need not be exact as to the width of
the right of way claimed or other matters of
mere detalL If the site Intended to be held
Is substantially shown, the location Is suffi-
cient A survey made by promoters of a rail-
road corporation, for the purposes, before
the company Is Incorporated, or by an exist-
ing railroad company, for an extension of Its
road, before filing, In the office of the Secre-
tary of State, a certificate of extension, as re-
quired by section 63 of chapter 64 of the
Code of 1899, may be adopted as a location
after Incorporation or the filing of the certif-
icate, as the case may be. If, acting In good
faith and diligently prosecuting the enter-
prise. It professes t6 have undertaken the
construction of Its road, a railroad corpora-
tion may seize and hold, as against a rival
company, by location thereon, land on any
part of its proposed route, without having
made a survey of Its entire road. Though
not the only mode of adopting a survey, so
as to make It a location, the filing of a map
of It in the office of the Secretary of State,
by order of the board of directors of the com-
pany, is prima fade proof of such adoption.
The mere filing of such plat in such office,
without proof that it was authorized by the
corporation. Is not evidence of an adoption
of the survey shown by It A location can
be made only by act of the corporation
through Its board of directors, but acts done
by agents under the orders of the board of
directors, for the purpose of claiming and
holding a location designated by the board as
such, are evidence of Intent on the part of
the board of directors to claim and ludd audi
location. Chesapeake ft O. R. Co. v. Deep-
water Ey. Co., 50 S. B. 890, 804, 67 W. Va.
e41.
X.OGATOB
See Original Locator; Relocator.
LOCK
Bee IPoot-Lock.
In an action agaiost a lUltoad eompany
to recover for killing stodc, an Instractloa
that plaintiff could not recover If he had
faUed to '"lock" the gate leading to the right
of way was erroneous, since the only obliga-
tion of plaintiff was to secure the gate by the
usual means, and the word 'lodL** Implying
an obligation to lock the gate with a key.
Brownfield v. Union Fac B. Co., 104 N. W.
876, 877, 74 Neb. 440.
''A lock; Is almost invariably used In
connection with a canal, and forms part of it
It cannot exist except In connection with a
canal or some equivalent situation.*' Winne-
bago Paper Mills v. Klmberly-Olark Oo., 120
N. W. 411, 418, 188 Wis. 426.
XiOCKSD 8TOBEBOOM
"Locked storeroom,*' as used in an insure
ance policy covering goods in a locked store-
room provided for the exclusive use of the
assured by the landlord in the same house,
does not Include a separate laundry, under
lock and key. In the basement of a flat house,
set aside for the use of an occupant of one of
the fiats used by him for laundry purposes,
cooking, storing of vegetables, and wherdn
he stored trunks padced with winter doth-
Ing. Michaels v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
New York, 106 8. W. 788, 784, 128 Ma App.
1&
LOCKOUT
An employer's discharge of employ^
about to enter upon a strike, done before,
they can strike, \b commonly called a "lock-
out" Atchison, T. & S. F. B. Ca ▼. Gee,
140 Fed. 168.
"A lockout' Is a cessation of the furnish-
ing of work to employ^ In an effort to get
for the emi^oyer more desirable terms."
Iron Molders' Union No. 126 of Milwaukee,
Wis., V. AUls-Ghalmers Co., 106 Fed. 46, 62,
01 0. O. A. 631, 20 !«. B. A. (N. 8.) 316.
LOCO PARENTIS
See In Loco Parentis.
LOCOMOTIVE
Operating locomotive, see Operata
Code 1907, f 5473, providing that the en-
gineer having the control of the running of a
locomotive on any railroad shall give spedflc
signals in designated situations, does not ap-
ply to a street or Interurban railroad operat-
ed by electric power; for a street car, in its
popular sense, Is not a ''locomotive." Birm-
ingham Ry., light ft Power Oa y. Green, 58
South. 801, 4 Ala. App. 417.
Rev. St 1889, f 1106, provides that when
any stock shall go en a railroad xlfl^t of way
liOOOMOTIVB
179
LOCOMOTIYB
•t a place where the road la not fenced, and
the stock la frightened hy any locomottve or
train and Injured, the comiwny shall be lia-
ble; and section 4160 provides that words
and phrases shall be taken in their plain and
usual sense. Held, that a "speeder"— a con-
trirance similar to a hand car, save that it
is operated by a gasoline engine— is not a "lo-
comotive,*' within the statute, and a railroad
is not liable for injuries to stock frightened
thereby. Henson v. Williamsville, G. & St
L By. Co., 86 S. W. 597, 508, UO Mo. App*
506.
Bey. Laws, c. 106^ | 71, d. 8, declaring
that a master shall be liable for injuries to
t servant caused by the negligence of a per-
son In his employ, who is in charge of an
engine or train on a railroad, extends to a
manufacturing plant which operates a sys-
tem of railroad tracks in its yard in conneo*
tion with a commercial railroad, and an en*
gine and ears operated on the tracks constl-
tnte a "'locomottve and train on a railroad."
Bines V. Stanley O. I. Blec. Mfg. Oou, 85 N. B.
851, 862, 189 Mass. 622.
A whirley, derrick, or locomotive crane
built upon car trucks, and equipped with a
boiler and engine furnishing the power to op-
erate the crane, and to move the machine
about upon the railroad tracks in the vicinity
where it is being operated by a railway com-
pany for the purpose of unloading heavy ma-
terials to be used in the construction of docks,
and not employed by the railway company in
Its business as a common carrier in moving
state traffic, is not, while being so operated,
a "locomotive, car, tender, or similar vehicle
used in moving state traffic,*' required by sec-
tions 8050 and 8052 of the General Ck>de to
be equipped with an automatic coupler and
provided with drawbars of standard height
Where a railway company, as a common car-
rier, has deposited on tracks built upon a
partly constructed dock, cars loaded with nuu
tetials to be used by it in the further con-
struction of such dock, the use of this ma-
chine to shift these loaded cars a short dis-
tance to meet the needs and convenience of
the employes engaged in unloading the same,
does not bring the machine, during the time
it is so employed, within the provision of
these sections. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co.
V. Benson, 97 N. B. 417, 410, 85 Ohio St 215,
41 L B. A. (N. S.) 40, Ann. Cas. 1013A, 046.
The term "locomotive engine" has a well-
known significance, and is used generally for
an oigine to draw a train of trucks or cars
along a permanent or temporary aei of rails.
There is also a well-known class of engines,
such as traction engines, which, though they
are capable of being moved from place, to
places are never spoken of as locomotive eiv
gines. A pile driver, consisting of a steam
engine plkced on a flat car at one end and
a driver used in raising the hammer at the
other end, all forming one nachine^ capable
of self-propnlslon by means of a sprocket
wheel on the axle under the boiler, connected
by a chain with the engine, the chain being
removed when driving a pile, is not a "loco-
motive engine," within Bums* Rev. St 1001,
i 7083, subd. 4, providing that every railroad,
etc., shall be liable for Injuries suffered by
an employ^ and caused by the negligence of
any other employ^ having charge of any "sig-
nal, telegraph office, switch yard, shop, round-
house, locomotive engine, or train upon a
raUway." Jarvis v. Hitch, 87 N. B. 1057,
1059, 161 Ind. 217.
Ky. St I 786, relating to "railroads," re-
quiring every company to provide every loco-
motive engine on its road with a bell and
steam whistle, and to ring the one and sound
the other outside cities, at a grade crossing
of its road with a highway, in view of section
842a, subsec. 1, providing that all interurban
electric companies authorized to construct a
railroad 10 miles long shall be under the
same duties, so ftir as practicable, as railroad
corporations, requires such an interurban
electric to sound the gong and electric whistle
of its motors at such crossings; any engine
used in producing motion, whether by steam
or other power, being a locomotive engine,
within the statute ; and the gong and electric
whistle, being but substitutes for the bell and
steam whistle required by the statute. Oom-
monwealth v. Louisville ft B. R. Co., 183 S.
W. 230, 281, 141 Ky. 583.
An inspectlOB ear, operated by a steam
engine placed in the center thereof, and de-
signed to run from place to place for use by
the officers of the railroad in making inspect
tions, is a locomotive engine within a city or-
dinance limiting the speed of engines, and re-
quiring the giving of signals, and within Rev.
St 1800, i 1102, requiring the giving of sig-
nals at crossings, though the term "locomo-
tive engine" usually signifies a steam engine
used to draw a car or train of cars along a
railroad. Mudd v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co.,
124 S. W. 50, 61, 146 Mo. App. 388.
By the words "locomotive engine or train
upon a railroad" must be understood a rail-
road and locomotive engine and trains op-
erated and run, or originally Intended to
be operated and run, in some manner and
to some extent by steam. Bmployers' Lia-
bility Act March 4, 1893, p. 295, c. 130, { 1
(Bums' Ann. St 1001, { 7083), providing that
every railroad or other corporation shall be
liable for damages for personal injuries suf-
fered by an employ^, where the injury was
caused by the negligence of any employ^ hav-
ing charge of any signal, telegraph office, "lo-
comotive engine, or train upon a railroad,**
does not apply to employ^ operating electric
cars; such a car not being a "locomotive en-
gine** or a "train upon a railroad,'* within the
meaning of the statute. Indianapolis & G.
Bapid Transit Co. v. Andis» 72 N. B. 146^ 150,
33 Ind. App. 625,
LOOOMOTIVB
180
liODE OLAIM
See Any.
As freight oa»
See Freight Gar*
As Teliiole
See Vehicle.
xocoMOTivE zmonrEEB
See Engineer.
LODE
See Known Lode or Vein ; Mineral Lode.
As any minaval matter
A "lode,'* within the meaning of the fed-
eral statute making the dlscoYery of a vein or
"lode'' a prerequisite to the location of a min-
ing claim, is whatever the miner could fol-
low and find ore. A valid location of a min-
ing claim may he made whenever the prospec-
tor has discovered such indications of min-
eral that he is willing to cq[>end his time and
money in following with the expectation of
finding ore, and a valid location may be made
of a ledge de^ in the ground and appearing
at the surface, not in the shape of ore, but
in vein matter only. Ck)lumbia Copper Bfin.
Co. V. Duchess Mining, Milling & Smelting
Co., 79 Pac. 386, 386, 13 Wyo. 244 (quoting
and adopting definition in 1 Lindley, Mines
[2d Ed.] p. 610).
Beflaad bmmdaHes re^pilred
''A 'vein' or 'lode' is mineral-bearing rock
or other earthy matter in place in a fissure
in rock, so that its boundaries are sharply
defined by rocky walls in place." Webb r.
American Asphaltum Mining Co., 157 Fed.
203, 204, 84 C. C. A. 661.
A "lode" is a zone or belt of mineralized
rock, lying within boundaries clearly sepa-
rating it from the neighboring rock. Amber-
gris Min. Co. V. Day, 85 Pac. 109, 112, 114, 12
Idaho, 108 (quoting and adopting definition
in Eureka ConsoL Mln. Co. v. Richmond Min.
Co., 8 Fed.. Cas. 819, and citing definitions
quoted in 6 Words ft Phrases, p. 4423).
A vein or "lode," within Rev. St U. S. {
2333, providing that, where an application
for a patent for a placer claim does not in-
clude an application for a known vein or
lode within its boundaries, the application
shall be construed as a declaration that the
claimant of the placer claim has no right of
possession of the vein or lode claim, but that,
where the existence of a vein or lode claim
is not known, a patent for the placer claim
shall convey all valuable mineral and other
deposits within the boundaries thereof; is a
body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock with-
in defined boundaries in the general mass
of the mountain, and that a "known vein or
lode" is one clearly ascertained, and of such
extent as to render the land more valuable
on that account and Justify its e^iploitation
and development Noyes ▼. Clifford, 94 Pac.
842, 847, 87 Mont 188.
Veins or "lodes" are lines or aggr^atlons
of metal imbedded in quartz or other rock
in place, consisting of a strip of mineral-
bearing rock within defined boundaries in
the general mass of the mountain, which
must be continuous and without taterruption,
bounded by country rock mineralized to no
greater extent than the general condition of
the vicinity. Rock or matter of any kind.
In order to constitute a vein or *lode," with-
in the meaning of the statute, must be metal-
liferous and contain such mineral value as
will distinguish it from the country rock,
especially where no well-defined walls appear.
What values the fflling or material of a fis-
sure eAiould contain to constitute it a v^n,
within the meaning of the act of Congress,
must necessarily depend upon the character-
istics of the district or conntiy in which the
vein or lode, in any partlcnlar instance
claimed to exist, is located, and upon the
character, as to boundaries, of the vein itself.
Values, therefore, of the fflling of flie vein
must be considered with special reference
to the district where the vein or lode is
found. In the absence of defined walls and
of mineralization appreciably greater than
that contained in the general mass of the
mountain, broken, stained, and fissured ma-
terial, or crushed and brecdated matter,
characteristic of the district, cannot be held
to constitute a vein or "lode," under the
statute. In such case the limits of fractur-
ing do not constitute the limits of the vein,
and even if there be found an occasional
vug or fragment of ore, yet where it is dis-
connected from any ore body and so inter-
mingled with the surrounding country rock
that it cannot be regarded as continuous, it
does not mark the line of the vein or "lode,"
within the meaning of the law. Grand Cen-
tral Min. Co. V. Mammoth Min« Co., 88 Pac.
648, 676, 677, 678, 679, 29 Utah, 490.
Placer distliiciiiilied
A "lode" is a solid vein of metal, while
a 't>lacer" is earth, sand, or gravel contain-
ing valuable mineral In particles. A mining
lode is a totally dlfl'erent thing from a placer
mine^ and not a mere state or condition of
such mine They are two distinct things,
and not two different states of the same
thing. McCarter v. Sooy Oyster Co., 75 AtL
211, 215, 78 N. J. Law, 394 (quoting, and
adopting definition in Webst Diet).
X.OBB CLAIM,
Laws 1903, p. 360, entitled "An act to
regulate the construction, equipment and
operation of metalliferous mines, • • •
providing penalties for violation tfaereot
♦ ♦ ♦" provides by section 18 (Het. St
1908, 1 4297) ''that all abandoned mine shafts,
pits or other excavations endangerijli; the
life of man or beast shall be securely covered
or fmced.*' The eomi^aint in an action
LODE liOOATIOir
181
LOOS Ajm TIMBXR
•galBst tlid owner of an xawM. adning slmft
for damagen tw the deatii of plaintUfo' In-
tent 8on, resulting from the alleged negli-
gence of the owner In ftdllng to ooTer or fteee
the shaft, averred tbat the ehaft wae aban-
doned, ttMt it belonged to the defendant, that
tbe def aidant was a corporation eodsttng nn-
der the laws of this state and engaged la
mining gold and other preckNB metals, ahd
that the shaft was located npon mining porop-
ert7 known as ttie Australia lodtt mining
daim belonging to the defendant Held that,
while the act applied on|7 to mines yielding
metals, the term "lode claim" meant a min-
ing claim containing a vein of metallic ore,
and hence that the complaint snfBciently
ayerred tliat l^e shaft was upon a metallifer-
ons mine. Ittchardson v. M Paso Gonsol.
Gold Mining Go., 118 Pac 082, 085, 51 Colo.
440.
LODE Z.OCATIOH
A 'lode location" is a location of min-
eral-bearing rock in place in a flssnre in
ro<± in the manner prescribed by the act of
Congress.. Webb y. American Asphaltnm Min-
ing Co., 157 Fed. 208, 204, 84 C. O. A. 651.
"A valid lode mining location' must b^
open, unoccupied, and unappropriated public
domain." Hoban y. Beyer, 85 Paa 837, 888,
37 Colo. 186.
LODGE
LODOEB
See, also, Quest
Ordinarily the landlord supplies a "lodg-
^* with furnished rooms, the care and oc-
cnpation of which the landlord has, the lodg-
er merely having the use of rooms without
tbe exclusive possession, while the tenant
has exclusive possession. Mathews v. Liv-
ingston, 85 Aa 529, 531, 86 Conn. 263.
One who is in the possession of apart-
ments by virtue of a formal lease in writing,
by the terms of which the absolute right of
use and occupation is given to the lessee
for the purpose of a dwelling for himself and
&ml]y, the lessor having no right to enter
except for the purpose of making repairs or
alterations, and in which the lessee is desig-
nated as "tenant" and the lessor as "land-
lord," is not a "lodger," within the intent of
UwB 1800, p. 884, c 380, giving a lien to a
lodging house keeper on the baggage and
otber property brought upon the premises
by a lodger. Shearman y. Iroquois Hotel St
Apartment Co., 85 N. Y. S«m>. 365, 866, 42
Misc. Sep. 217.
LOFT
Of barn as building, see Building.
Loe
See Prize Logs; Saw Lpgs.
The word "log;" as used la a laggii^
coQtiact, dOaa. aot 'mean "tree." Dee AUe*
Lomber Co^ y. Morgan Oitj Tbnber
00^ 41 South. 882, 848, 117 La. L
Zmnber dlstlagnlAed
See Lumber.
See MerchandisOi
As timbev
See Timber.
I.OO MBAMrBS
See Scribner's Log Itula.
&008 Jjn BOX II
Blocks of wood from 6 to 15 incdies in
diameter and 88 to 42 inches long, sawed
from round logs in their natural state, are
not classified as "logs and box materials"
by the 110 commodities act (Laws 1007, p.
200); and a contract for th^ transportation,
which describes them as cordwood, at the
rate fixed for cordwood. Is binding on the
shipper and carrier; and the mere fact that
the consignee or subsequent buyer may manu-
facture the blocks into barrti heads does not
Justify the carrier in redassifjring them as
logs and box material, and demanding a
higher rate as a condition precedent to a de-
livery. Southern By. Ck>. y. Lowe, 54 South.
51, 170 Ala. 608.
% PBOIK
UOTS
See Other Timber.
X.008 ANB BOTOB UHlIAMnrAOTUB-
BD TIKBB&
Pulp wood subjected to the reeslng pro-
cess, by which the bark and excrescences are
mechanically removed, in order to prepare
it for use, is not, by reason of this treatment,
to be excluded from the provision in Tariff
Act July 24, 1807, c 11, | 2, Free List, par.
600, for "'logs and round unmanufactured
timber,' including pulp woods, * * * not
specially provided for." United States v.
Pierce, 140 Fed. 062, 063.
LOei AHB TODBB
Under Rev. St. 1878, f 3380, as amended
by Laws 1870, c. 187, f 1, giving a lien on
"logs and timber" to any person furnishing
supplies to those engaged in getting out logs
and timber, the word "legs" clearly means
the stem or trunks of trees cut into conven-
ient lengths for the purpose of being after-
wards manufactured into timber of various
kinds, and does not include manufactured
lumber of any kind nor timber which is
squared or otherwise shaped f6r use without
further change in form, and the wofd "tim-
ber^' was clearly intended to indude the same
stems or tmnlas of trees when cut and shaped
for use in tfao>eroetloa of buildings or othte
stractufes, and jn&t to be aaanufaetasBd Into
lumber, within the meaning of 'tha word
"lumber." Bailrsad ties are uSoaDy. made
from the stems of small trees and abaped for
LOOS, LUMBEB, AND OTH£» TIMBER 182
JjOim ACCOUNT
use 111 the constractiotff of a lallroad trmek;
and are clearly "timber,** within the meaning
of the word as used in the statute. KoU^k
V. Parcher, 9 N. W. 67, 69, 52 Wia. 393.
XOG8, LinflBER, AND OTHB& XIBI-
BER
See Other Timber.
X.OG8 OF WOOD
Sandalwood in pieces of YBijing sizes,
seyeral feet long and several inches thick,
to which nothing has been done beyond re-
moTing the bark and sawing the wood into
lengths convenient for transportation, is not
dutiable under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11,
i 1, Schedule C, par. 198, 30 Stat 167, as
"wood, unmanufactured, not specially provid-
ed for," but is free of duty, under the provi-
sion in paragraph 699 of said act (section 2,
Free Ust, 30 Stat 202, for "logs of wood."
George Lueders & Co. y. United States, 181
Fed. 656.
LOGGING AAZZiBOAD
As railroad, see Railroad — ^Railway*
LOGROLLING
'*Logrolling" consists in framing a bill
with numerous separate or independent pro-
visions, none of which would pass upon its
own merits, but each of which is made atr
tractive enough to cominand a certain num-
ber of votes, which, being united, are suffi-
cient to pass the bill. People t. Sullivan, 66
N. E. 989, 996, 173 N. Y. 122, 63 L. B. A.
358, 93 Am. St Bep. 582.
What is commonly known as 'logrolling^
is passing through a measure, not on its own
merits, by combining it with other measures,
each of which has a certain strength, and
thus pulling them through by virtue of their
combined strength. Christie v. Miller, 57 S.
E. 697, 698, 128 Ga. 412 (quoting and adopt-
ing the definition of Judge McCay in Oon-
ner's Case, 51 Ga. 573).
"Logrolling," as applied to elections, con-
sists in the combining of several questions so
that a voter cannot exercise his Judgment as
to one or more of the several propositions,
but must either adopt or reject them as an
entirety. Tolson v. Police Jury, 48 South.
1011, 1014, 119 Ga. 215, 12 Ann. Cas. 847.
LOITER
liOITER, XiOAF, AlfB XDIiB
In Gen Laws 3l8t Leg. a 59, i 1, par.
"d," defining as vagrants all able-bodied per-
sons who liabitually "loaf, loiter, and idle"
in any public plaee, etc, for the greater part
of their time, without any regular employ*
ment or visible means of support, and declar-
ing that one is not relieved from a charge of
vagrancy who habitually loafis, loiters, and
Idlefi, if he it without visible means of sup*
port by the ftoct tiiat only oceasioniklly he
has employment at odd jobs, being for the
most part without employment the terms
*'loiter,'* ''loaf,** and' "idle," when canstmed
with the words "larger portion of their time,"
require proof, to sustain a conviction of va-
grancy, that the person diarged was able to
woric, and, being so able^ habitually loafed,
loitered, and idled in the dty tor the greater
part of his time, without employment or visi-
ble means of support Ex parte Strittmatter,
124 S. W. 906, 907, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 166, 187
Am. St Rep. 937, 21 Ann. Ga& 477.
ZiOXTERER
The term "loiterer," in a charge that if
plaintilf wfis a mere "loiterer" about de-
fendant's station after his discharge^ he could
not recover for injories^ of necessity implies
plaintUTs presence about the station without
consent permission, or license^ and, if any-
thing, it Is even broader than those tarms, for
one may be about the premises without con-
sent permission, or license, and yet not be
a "loiterer" but a trespasser. Hon ▼. South-
er Pae Co., 81 Pac. 902, 907, 20 Utah, 127.
LONE ENGINE
A "lone engine" is a locomotive not haul-
ing any cars, except its own tender. Kiel-
beck V. Chicago, B. & Q. B. €k>., 97 M« W. 750,
70 Neb. 571.
LONG
xoHo Accomrr
The services of an attorney, r^idered in
an action or actions under a single or differ-
ent retainers, which mer^ involves charges
in connection with the vairlous steps in the
litigation, cannot be said to constitute a
long account On the contrary, the charge in
each action, although the service be permis-
sible of exhaustive itemization, is essentially
a single charge respecting each action, and
exceptional circumstances must be made to
appear in order to remove the case from the
operation of such rule. Prentice v. Huif , 90
N. Y. Supp. 780, 782, 98 App. Div. IIL
Where the issues framed by the plead-
ings in a cause are very numerous, involving
many dealings between the parties growing
out of farming transactions under a contract
under which plaintiff farmed certain lands
for the defendant also growing out of sale
of personal property of various kinds and at
various dates, and for work, labor, and serv-
ices performed by plaintiff for defendant
also for numerous items or claims for money
advanced to and paid out and expended at
various dates by each party at the request
of and for the benefit of the other, and
where there are numerous causes of action
set forth in the complaint aa well as those
set forth In various counterclaims contained
in the answer, are all for the recovery of
money iq^n contract, and some of the causes
IX>Na A<XDUKT
18S
Loira rnuL
of acttoB embrace manj 's^^aaratt iteipai of
aceoant, all of Wlildi ard.deniad tkr the op-
posite party, and where the lasneB are audi
as to render it practically impossible fbr a
Jury to intelligeaitl^ try and determine the
same, the case is one eminently proper to
be referred as involTlng the examination ot
a ^loDcr acconnf Smith y. Knnert, 116 N.
W. 76, 78, IT N. D. 120 (citing Sutton y. Weg-
ner, 43 N. W. 107, 74 Wis. 847; Tamer ▼.
NacbtBheim, 86 N. W. 637, 71 Wis. 16; La
Oonrsltf Y. Rnssell, 52 N. W. 176, 82 Wis.
266; Otiicago ft N. W. Ry. Co. Y. Faist, 58
N. W. 744, 87 Wis. 860; Ittner Y. St Lonis
Exposition & Music Hall A8S*n, 11 8. W. 58,
97 Mo. 561; People y. Peck [N. T.] 57 How.
Prac 315; Spence v. Simis, 33 N. B. 554, 137
N. T. 617; Salem Traction Go. y. Anson, 67
Pic. 1015, 69 Pac. 675, 41 Or. 562 ; Lewis y.
Snook, 84 N. T. Supp. 634, 88 App. DIy. 343;
Halg Y. Boyle, 45 N. Y. Supp. 816, 20 Misc.
Bep. 155).
The statute authorizing references does
not avp^j to an action, ex delicto, though
there may be a great number of items in-
volved, since such an action does not iuYOlYQ
tbe examination of a long account as con-
templated by the statute. Foster y. Missou-
ri Pac. Ry. Co., 128 S. W. 36, 37, 143 Mo. App.
647.
An action for work performed and mate-
rial furnished does not involve a "long ac-
count," within the meaning of New York
Code, so as to require a reference^ where the
work done, though upon 43 different apart^
ments in an apartment house appears to have
been under a single employment, and the
only work spedfled in the bill of particulars
is papering and kalsomlning, and none of
the items making up the cJiarge appears
to be at all complex, and all of them must of
necessity haYe been of the same general
character. Levine y. Boyal State Bank, 113
N. 7. Supp. 523, 61 Misc. Bep. 226.
A complaint alleged that between Decem-
ber and the following May plaintiff rendered
medical services for defendant, and attached
to the complaint was a schedule giving the
date and charge for ea^ visit The answer
admitted that the services were rendered, but
denied the dates and Yalues of the Yisits, and
that the serYlces were rendered as set fbrth
in the sdiedule. Held, that the pleadings
did not indicate that the trial would neces-
sarily iuYolYe the "examination of a 'long
account,'" within Code CflY. Proc f 1018,
authorizing a comimlsory reference in such
a case. Fowler y. Peck, 09 N. T. Supp. 816,
817, 51 Misc. Kep. 645.
Where serYlces relate to one matter, or
can be grouped into so few separate matters
that a jury can easily bear them in mind, a
compulsory referevKce is improper, tor numer^
OQs Itemized charges for one matter do not
loake a 'long account," within the meaning
of Code aY. Proa f 1013» anthorlxing the
eourt to- direct a mftaremoe, upon motion eC
either party without the consent of the other
where the trial will require the examination
of a long account <m either side, and will not
require the decision of difficult questions of
law ; and hence, in an action by an attorney
for services and disbursements, where the
disbursements are inslgniflcant, and of the
25 separate charges for services 3 are retain-
ers, and the remaining 22 relate to services
performed in five separate matters, not com-
plicated in diaracter, consisting mainly of
consultations, conferences, and negotiations
of settlements, a reference should be refused.
Russell Y. McDonald, 110 N. T. Supp. 050,
951, 125 App. DlY. 844.
In an action to recover part of the price
paid for shoes, defendant claimed that plain-
tiff told him he would sell him the shoes at
cost, and the way to figure the cost was to
divide the first figure marked on each pair of
shoes by 4, and add 5 to the next figure, and
plaintiff admitted that the true way to find
the cost was to dlYlde the first figure by 4,
bat that he did not agree to sell the shoes at
cost, but at 50 cents aboYO cost, which was
the price paid by defendant Held that, un-
der the compulsory reference statute, there
was no long account involved so as to au-
thorize a reference. Barger y. Beach, 127 S.
W. 120, 121, 142 Mo. App. 380.
LOHG AM
Bee As Long as; So Long asL
LOHG OH
In the parlance of the stock and produce
exchange, to say that one was "long on cot-
ton" means that he had too much cotton.
Whitley Y. Newman, 70 S. HL 686^ 690, 0 Ga.
App. 80.
LONG PBIOB
Tobacco in bond is sold in two ways:
At the "long price," which denotes that the
duty does not come in question but that the
goods are sold at a flat price without refer-
ence to duty; and "short price" is that the
merchandise and tbe duties are separated.
Friend y. Rosenwald, 108 N. Y. Supp. 701,
702, 124 App. Dlv. 226.
LOHG TIME
In a suit to enjoin the alleged illegal
use of a trade-name, an affidavit that com-
plainant had used the name for a "long time"
is too indefinite for Judicial action. Charles
R. De Bevoise Co. y. H. & W. Co., 60 Atl.
407, 60 N. J. Eq. 114.
Where the owner of lots wrote real es-
tate agents that he would sell the lots for a
glYen price, so nfuch cash, and the baUutoe on
"long time," the agents were not authorized
to seU on terms whereby notes running from
one to four years, given by the purchaser for
the balance, were payable "on or before" cer-
tain dates. The quoted words placed in each
Xionra tok
184
zxMm
^t tiie noteir gave the maker die priillefe of
paying them at any time he might chooee,
and they did not comply with the terms of
the authority, because they were not lon^
time notes. Oolrln y. Blanchard, 100 8. W.
323, 825, 101 Tex. 281.
LOK a TON
A "long ton" is a ton consisting of 2,240
pounds. Hale Broe. t. Mllllken, 80 Pac 866^
370, 5 Cal. App. 344.
LONGER PERIOD THAN ONE TEAR
An oral lease for one year, the term to
begin a day or two in the future, is not in-
valid, under Rev. Civ. Code 1903, i 1238,
subd. 5, providing that an agreement for the
leasing of real estate "for a longer period
than one year,'* or some note or memoran-
dum thereof, must be in writing. Paulton
V. Kr^ser, 101 N. W. 46, 18 S. D. 487, 5
Ann. Gas. 827.
LOOK
''A man does not discharge his duty to
*look' out for cars before going on a track by
looking where his sight is obstructed." Ris-
sler V. St Louis Transit Ck)., 87 S. W. 578,
579, 113 Mo. App. 120.
LOOKOUT
The word "lookout," as used in an in-
struction in an action for injuries to a street
car passenger in jumping from a car to es-
cape an imminent collision with a railroad
train, as to whether such street car com-
pany kept a reasonably daffident lookout for
such train, was used in a sense of looking
to ascertain the coming or presence of a
train. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Go. v. VoU-
rath, 89 S. W. 279, 283, 40 Tex. Olv. App. 46.
A "lookout" is only one of the many pre-
cautions which , a prudent navigator should
provide, but it is not indispensable, where,
from the circumstances of the case, a lookout
could not possibly have been of service; the
object being to discover dangers that are un-
known, such as the advance of an approach-
ing vessel or appearance of a light on the
coast, the discovery of a dangerous object,
and many other things, the existence and
presence of which could not be so easily and
quickly known to .the pilot as to the person
whose sole business it was to make and com-
municate such discoveries. The Pocomoke,.
150 Fed. 193, 198 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in The Farragut, 10 Wall. [77 U. SJ
338, 19 L. Ed. 940).
LOOSE
XiOOSE BBAM
Metal beads temporarily strung on cot-
ton cords or strtngs for the purpose of facili-
tating transportation are not dutiable, under
Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c 11, S 1, Schedule
N, par. 408, 30 Stat 188, as loose beads.
Henvjr-flL Itatrisenberg^Oo. ▼« United States,
27SUP. et.>«l8, at8^ aOtt U. fl. 224, 01 U
Bd. 1084.
LORD CAMPBELL'S ACT
The Bngllsh Act of 1S46 (SUts. 9 and 10
Vict c. 93) is commoniy known as ''liord
Campbell's Act," and related ta the right
to recover for death due to the negUip^ice
or wrongful act of another. This act has
served as. a model for all subaequeot legis-
lation on the subject. Oasey t. St Louis
Transit Co., 91 S. W. 419, 421, U6 Mo. Appu
235 (citing, Hayes v. WilUama, 80 Paa 352,
17 Colo. 465; Oooley, Torts [2d Bd.] 308).
LOSE
As applied to property, the word los^
ordinarily refers to an Involuntary, not a
voluntary, deprivation. No man may be said
to have lost that which on his motion he
abandons or resigns, and In common speech
the repression a woman "has lost her hus-
band" generally iiefers to a loss by death,
and not to a voluntary dlvoroe by the wife.
Snorgrass ▼. Oliomas, 150 S. W. 106, 108, 166
Mo. App. 603 (citing 6 Words and Phrases,
p. 4237 et seq.).
To 'lose" is casually and Involuntarily
to part with the possession, so that the mind
has no impress of, and can have no recourse
to, the event; and, if the property is found
on the surface of the earth, the conditions
suggest that it has been intentionally aban-
doned, and as such has returned to the com-
mon mass of things, in a state of nature,
which belongs to the first occupant or find-
er, the owner not appearing ; the distinction
between "losing" and "abandonment" being
that one is involuntary, while the other is
by intent or design. But the result, as it
relates to the property, is practically the
same ; the owner not appearing to lay claim
to it In the one case the finder has the
right to the possession against all except the
true owner. In the other he acquires the ab-
solute property by right of his occupancy.
It is the presumption of abandonment that
obtains until the owner appears and claims
the property that gives the right as legal
possessor to the first occupier ; the presump-
tion being disputable by the rightful owner.
Such presumption or inference does not ob-
tain as to property intentionally left or de-
posited in a designated place, and possibly
forgotten for the time being, as the loss de-
pends upon eomething more than knowledge
or ignorance, or the memory or want of mem-
ory of the owner as to the locality at any
given moment. '■'In such case the taker is
not Justified in conchading tiiat the goods
were lost, because thei^ Is little d<»u^t he
must httve -belieted that the owner would
know where to find them again, and he had
no pretense to consider them abandoned or
derelict" And where (datntUt, while in pos-
liOSB ▲ 90MICIIJB
186
session of defendantfB premlaet nadir a
letse^ ^iaeo^ered Hoh spidmeDa of gold-bear-
ing qoarti lying oo top of the grofmd. aad
by Inveatigatlon he dug up a large quantity
of such quartz found lying in the aM un-
connected with any ledge» pocket, placer, or
otber natural deposit, the quartE being im-
bedded in the loose surface soil, there being
also evidences of a sack or duck cloth in
wbich the quartz might have been burled.
Rich quartz was not *loet" or "abandoned
property," and therefore belonged to the
owner of the soil, aod not to the finder. Feiv
guson V. Ray, 77 Pac 600, 602, 44 Or. 057, 1
L R. A. (N. S.) 477, 102 Am. St Bep. 648, 1
Ann. Cas. 1 (citing 1 Black. Ck>m. [Lewis' Bd.]
c 8, •286, 296; 2 BL Com. [Lewis' Ed.]
c 26, •402; 2 Kent, Com. ^36%; McLaughlin
V. Waite [N. Y.] 6 Wend. 406, 21 Am. Dec.
232).
LOBE A BOMZCILB
*^o lose a domicile,' when onoe acquir-
ed, there must be an intention to do so. A
mere change of the place of abode, however
loDg continued. Is not sufficient, unless the
proper animus or intention is present This
Intention, it is true, may be inferred from
drcmnstances, and the residence may be of
such a character and accompanied by such
indices of a permanent home that the law
will apply to the facts a result contrary to
the actual intention of the party. Thus one
cannot make a permanent fixed commercial
residence with all the surroundings of a
permanent home in one place and a domicile
in another by a mere mental act But a
residence for mere pleasure or health is not
regarded as of any great weight in determin-
ing the question of a change of domicile, for
Id sudi case it is Just as likely that the party
intends to retain as to abandon his present
domldle." Pickering v. Winch, 87 Pac. 768,
767, 48 Or. 600, 9 L. R. A. (N. &) 1159.
LOSE AHAITD
The term "lose a hand," in the consti-
tution of a fraternal benefit association, is
nsed in its ordinary and popular sense, and
does not mean that there must be a total
destruction of the hand, anatomically speak-
ing, but that the loss of the use of it for the
purposes to which a hand is adapted would
be a loss of it Sisson v. Supreme Court of
Honor, 78 8. W. 297, 290, 104 Hio. App. 54.
L08EB
Cr. Code, f 162, providhig that any per-
son who siuOl by gaming lose and pay or ae-
Uver to any person any sum of money or
other valuable tiling may recover the same,
was intended to afford a remedy by way at
restitatlon, enabling the person losing to le-
cover back the money or other valuable thing
lost and the 'loeer" is the pennn to v^om
such money or other vsaluable ttdng
Ware v. Dnmont* 128 111. App. 1^ 6b
See
IiOSnia FABTT
An appellant, who dlmtnawi his appeal
after bringing the cause to the Appelate
Court and causing the same to be placed on
its dockets, on procuring a aettlement out
of court from the appellee, is the "losing
party,'* within Bums' Ann. St 1901, i 1837,
imposing a docket fee of |10 on the losing
party. Stafford t. ConweU, 75 N. H 600, 36
Ind. App. 313.
Bume* Ann. St 1906, | 1894, providing
for filing a petition for a rehearing by any
losing party, in any case in the Appellate
Court, and, after such petition has been over-
ruled, authorising such party to apply for a
transfer of the case to the Supreme Court
on the ground that the opinion of the Appel-
late Court contravenes ruling precedents of
the Supreme Court, is a remedial statute,
and to be liberally construed, and appellant
is a "losing party," notwithstanding the fact
that the judgment of the trial court has been
reversed, if the reversal was based on the
misconduct of counsel for appellee, and the
ruling upon other points alleged to contra-
vene ruling precedents of the Supreme Court,
makes a retrial of the case wholly unavail-
ing to appellant United States Cement Co.
V. Cooper, 88 N. B. 09^ 70, 172 Ind. 599.
LOSS
See Actual Loss; Constructive Total
Loss; Direct Loss; Irreparable Loss;
Partial Loss; Pecuniary Loss; Proof
of Loss; Tedndcal T6tal Loss; Total
Loss.
" *Loss* is a relative term. A failure to
keep that which one has is loss.'" Foeh-
renbach v. German-American Title & Trust
Co., 66 AU. 561, 563, 217 Pa 331, 12 L. R.
A« (N. a) 466, 118 AUL St Bep. 916.
The word "loss," as used in Civ. Code
1895, I 2629, decUrlng that a joint intere^st
in the profits and losses sustained by the
partnership^ means something more than the
mere failure to realise profits. Edwards v.
Hale, 68 S. B. 817, 129 Ga. 802.
"Loss," in relation to fire insurance, re-
fers to the damages of the assured measured
in money. Stephenson v. Agricultural Ins.
Co., 96 N. W. 19, 21, 116 Wis. 277.
Sand. 4 H. Dig. { 4133, excludes the ap-
plication of the insurance laws to mutual in-
surance societies conducted upon the assess-
ment plan, but requires them to give bond
conditioned for the prompt payment of all
assessments to tke parties entitled thereto,
and makes the sureties liable for any viola-
tion of condittonB thmsot or tx any **loss"
to the peUcy hoMeni, asd section 4124 re-
quires all fire^ etc, imnunnee companies to
give bond conditioned for the prompt payment
L08B
186
L06SBT THIOrC
of all claims. Held, that the sureties on a
bond given and conditioned nnder section 4133
are not required to pay the loss absolutely.
The word "loss,'* as used in section 4133,
means such a loss as would accrue to policy
holders if the assessments were not prompt-
ly paid over, and hence the obligation of the
sureties ceases when the assessments are col-
lected and paid over promptly. Ingle v.
BatesviUe Grocery Go., 117 S. W. 241, 243, 89
Ark. 878.
A policy insuring a vessel against "loss
sustained by collision" with another vessel is
identical with one insurjlng it against the
risk of collision sustained. Bumham v. China
Mut Ins. Ck>., 76 N. B. 74, 189 Mass. 100, 109
AuL St Rep. 627.
A liability insurance policy provided
that no action should lie thereunder, unless
brought to reimburse insured for loss actual-
ly sustained and paid by him in satisfaction
of a judgment after trial of the issue. An
employ^ recovered Judgment against the in-
sured for personal injuries, and release there-
of was obtained by giving insured's note
for the amount of the Judgment, in full sat-
isfaction thereof. Held, that there was a
"loss" within the meaning of the policy which
would support an action thereunder, not-
withstanding the possibility of insured's in-
solvency or of compromise for less than the
amount of liability under the policy. Seattle
& S. F. Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Maryland Casualty
Co., 96 Pac 609, 610, 60 Wash. 44, 18 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 121.
The words "loss or damage," in the pro-
vision in the contract of defendant railway
company to carry goods to Boston by its own
and specified connecting lines, and of a
steamship company to carry the goods from
Boston to Liverpool: "No carrier shall be
liable for loss or damage not occurring on its
road or its portion of the through route, nor
after said property is ready for delivery to
the next carrier. • • • The amount of
any loss or damage for which any carrier be-
comes liable shall be computed at the value
of the property at place and time of ship-
ment"— and according to which claims for
loss or damage must be made within a cer-
tain time after delivery or time therefor, are
limited to loss of or injury to the property,
and do not include damages for loss of a mar-
ket because of delay in transportation. John-
son V. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 96
N. y. Supp. 182. 186, 107 App. Dlv. 374.
A provision in a live stodE shipment con-
tract, requiring the shipper to give notice in
writing of any claim for loss or Injury to the
stodk before its removal from the. place, of
destination, is limited to loss or injury aris-
ing during tran^)ortation, and does not ap-
ply to a daim for loss caused by a falling
market during delayed transportation. Estes
V. Denver & R. Q. R. Co., 118 Pac 1005, 1007,
49 Colo. 378.
]hunas« syaon7aui«s
Damage means "lost*'; eompemnitlon
would be inadequate that did not cover the
loss sustained. Turner r. Woodward, ffl 8.
E. 762, 128 Ga. 866;
It is not error for the court in its in-
structions to use the words '^loss*' and "dam-
age" interchangeably. Turner v. Woodward.
61 S. E. 762, 123 6a. 866.
I^estmotlttm syaonyMows
Under Code Civ. Proc SS 1866, 1937, pro-
viding for secondary proof of *'loo" of writ-
ten instruments, the term "loss" is not oyn-
onymous with destruction, for, in the case of
destruction, loss would necessarily follow,
but not so in case of loss. "The instrument
may be lost for all practical purposes of the
trial when it cannot be found after diligent
search, and yet it may exist We do not
think that reasonable diligence in making
the search should require the exploration of
all possible places where the instrument
might be." King v. Samuel, 98 Pac 391, 395.
7 Cal. App. 66.
Injury dUsttngnlslied
The phrases "loss of property^ and "in-
Jury to property" are not synonymous. The
one means a total destruction of property
and the other partial destruction of property.
Nelson v. Great Northern R. Co., 72 Pac. 6^
648, 28 Mont 297.
LOSS BT FIBS
In an insurance policy covering loss or
damage by fire, it is not necessary that the
damage shall be occasioned by direct contact
with the fire. To render the fire the imme-
diate or proximate cause of the damage, it Is
not necessary that any part of the insured
property actually ignited or was consumed
by the fire. Where a building and machinery
used for generating electricity for electric
lighting was insured against loss or damage
by fire, and a fire occurred which caused a
short circuit of the electric current resulting
in damage to certain machinery in the build-
ing not reached by the fire, the injury to the
machinery was a "loss or damage by fire,"
within the meaning of the policy. Russell v.
German Fire Ins. Co., Ill N. W. 400, 403, 100
Minn. 628, 10 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 326 (citing
Lynn Gas ft Electric Co. v. Meriden Fire
Ins. Co., 83 N. E. 690, 168 Mass. 670, 20 L.
R. A. 297, 35 Am. St Rep. 640).
LOSS BT THEFT
A policy of fire insurance providing that
the company shall not be liable for loss caus-
ed directly or indirectly "by theft" or by neg-
lect of insured to use all reasonable means
to save and preserve the property at and aft-
er a fire, etc, includes theft committed dur-
ing the fire or when the goods are exposed
as a consequence of a fire. Sklencher v. Fire
Ass'n of FUiadelphia, 60 AtL 232, 72 N. J.
Law, 4& .
IiOBS OF ODMBORTIUM
187
UOGBEB
L088 OF CM>N80BTXW
The ^'l088 of consortium*' Is a depriva-
tion of the full Bodety, affection, and as-
slstance to which a wife is entitled. Angell
▼. Reynolds, 68 Ati. 625, 626, 26 R. 1. 160, 106
Am. St Bep. 707.
LOSS OF CONTBOIi
"Such a movement of a team* as would
not be uncommon, is not necessarily a loss of
control.' " Horses are not considered beyond
the control of their driver when they mere-
ly aby or start, or for a moment have their
own way. Johnson v. City of Blarquette, 117
N. W. 668. 660, 154 Mich. 60.
LOSS OF SABimros
See Future horn of Bsmlngs. .
The term "loss o(. eandngs,'* as used in
a chaise, in a persona^ tojury action against
a street car company, that plaintiff's dam-
ages, if any, should be assessed at such sum
as would be a reasonable pecuniary compen-
sation to him for all "loss of earnings," re-
ferred to such loss of earnings as plaintiff
had sustained by reason of his injuries up
to the time of trial« and not those that he
would probably lose in the future, so as to be
erroneous, where the petition only charged
diminished earning capacity^ without any ac-
tual past loss of earnings. Dallas Consol.
Electric St By. CJo. v. Hardy (Tex.) 86 S. W.
1053, 1064.
LOSS OF LIMB
See, also, Lost
A beneficial certificate entitling the mdm-
ber to one-fourth of his benefit if he should
"lose a foot," does not mean that there must
be a severance of the foot ftom the body, but
means a permanent loss of use of the foot;
the language 'loss of a foot" in common par-
lance meaning the loss of the use of that
member. Modem Order of Pretorians v.
Taylor (Tex.) 127 S. W. 260, 261.
Injuring a hand to the extent that it be-
comes useless as a hand is "loss of the hand,"
within the meaning of an accident policy,
though the injury does not require amputa-
tion of the hand above the wrist Lord v.
American Mut Ace. Ass*n, 61 N. W. 293, 294,
88 Wis. 19, 26 li. E. A. 741, 46 Am. St Rep.
815.
The term "loss of a hand" may be ap-
plicable to an injury where the use of. the
hand is destroyed, and in the case of a "loss'*
of both feet» the term, may cover loss of the
use of the feet by paralysis. Fishbum v.
Burlington ft N. W. R. Co., 103 N. W. 481,
488, 127 Iowa, 483 (citing definition in Sneck
T. Travelers' Ins. Co., 34 N. Y. Supp. 545,
88 Hun, 94; Lord v. American Mut Ace.
As8*n, 61 N. W. 28», 89 Wis. 19, 26 L. R. A.
741, 46 Am. St Rep. 815; Sheanon v. Pacific
Mut Life Ins. Co.. 46 N. W. 799, 77 Wis. 618,
9 L. R. A. 685, 20 Am. St Rep. 15D*
X1O88 OF BSRTt
An insurance policy which covers loss of
rents includes loss of income where the prem-
ises iti question were not demised for a spe-
dflc term. Gray v. Merchants' Ins. Co., of
Newark, 125 lU. App. 870, 372.
Z.08S OF TIME
"Loss of time," as an element of damages
for a personal injury means time totally lost
because of the inability of the Injured person
to follow any wage-earning occupation and
is more than the impairment of the power
to earn money, as "impairment" implies that
he can perform some services and his ability
to earn money, though reduced, is not total-
ly destroyed. .Blue Grass Tractio^ Co* v.
Ingles, 181 S. W. 278, 281, 140 Ky. 488.
An averment of "loss of time," in a pet^
tion for negllgsnt injuries, is the same in le-
gal effect as an avement of "loss of earn-
ings." SchoU V. Grayson, 127 S. W. 4U5, 417,
147 Mo. Ai^..652. .
The law tveats "loss of time," generally
q;)eahing, as synonymous with "the loss of
those earnings which accrue from employing
time in labor or business." Wall v. Conti-
nental Casualty Co.,. 86 & W. 491, 499, Ul
Mo. Ai^. 504.
An accident policy Insuring one against
injury necessarily resulting in "loss of time"
arising firom inability to engage in any busi-
ness insures against such a "loss of time" as
immediately arises from an inability to work,
and an accident and an injury do not affect
the policy unless there is a "loss of time,"
and it must be a "loss of time" which is at
once followed, or which Is at once caused by
the inability to work, and the Insurer is lia-
ble for disability resulting from plaintifTs in-
jury, though loss of time does not immedi-
ately follow it Baumister v. Continental
Casualty Co., 101 S. W. 152, 163, 124 Mo. App.
LOSS THROUGH HIS l^EAVJXa
An agreement by a third person to be-
come bound in a specified sum, in case an em-
ploy6 left his master during a certain season
and the master sustained loss through his
leaving, did not render the third person liable
for a defalcation by the employ^; for the
words "sustained loss through his leaving"
must be read in connection with what im-
mediately precedes, and, when so read, they
refer to the direct pecuniary loss that may
be suffered as the result of the employe's
leaving the employment during the period of
his employment Freeman v. Waxman, 88
N. Y. Supp. 129, 130, 43 Misc. Rep. 656.
Z.08SBS
See Claim tor Losses.
All other losses, see All Other.
Sharing losses as constituting partner-
ship, see Partnership.
L08SBS OF BUSINESS
188
UOT
LOSSES OF BUBINEBS
The "losses** of a business necessarily
Include such accounts as axe bad and uncol*
lectible. Crawford T. GaUdnfl, 136 N. W. 860,
870, 170 MIdL 687.
LOST
The law exempting those from payment
of a poll tax who hare "lost" a hand or foot
does not exempt one who has lost part of his
fingers or whose foot is useless. The word
**lost** must be taken in its ordinary acc^h
tatlon, and, when we speak of a person los-
ing a limb, we mean that It is gone, and not
that it is injured or mutilated. A man may
lose the use of a limb and not lose the Itmb.
If the word "lost,** as used in the statute, is
held to mean the absence of three fingers, it
could be held to mean the losa of one finger,
and so on. Big^am t. Glubb, 96 8. W. 676^
677, 42 Tex. Oiv. Appi 812.
' deposits
The word "lost,** as used in the banking
law, providing that if any baidcer shall fraud-
ulently receive any money, etc., of a person
not indebted to him at a time when he is in-
solvent whereby the deposit shall be "lost**
to the depositor, the banker shall be guilty
of embezzlement, etc., means a deprivation
of the use of the deposit or some part there-
of which may occur, though the estate is
found ultimately sufildent to pay all debts.
State V. Krasher, 88 N. B. 488, 500, 170 Ind.
48.
LOST AXX HOPS OF BBOOVBRT
The words of the statute **lost all hope of
recovery,*' relating to dying declarations
mean that it is a belief of the declarant in
death which excludes any hope of recovery.
Graven v. State, 00 S. W. 311, 48 Tex. Or. R.
78, 122 Am. St Rep. 789.
I.OST COBHEB
Section 2 of a circular of the United
States General Land Office relative to the
restoration of lost or obliterated comers de-
fines an ''obliterated comer" as one where
no visible evidence remains of the work of
the original surveyor in establishing it; and
defines a "lost comer** as one^ the position of
which cannot be determined beyond reason-
able doubt, either from original or reliable
marks or reliable external evidence^ Graven
V. Lesh, 126 Pac. 774, 776» 22 Idaho, 468.
XiOST HER BCUSBAHB
As applied to property, the word 'lose*'
ordinarily refers to an involuntary, not a
voluntary, deprivation. No man may be said
to have lost that which on his motion he
abandons or resigns, and in common speech
the expression a woman "has lost her hus-
band*' generally refers to a loss by death,
and not to a voluntary divorce by the wife.
Snorgrass v. Thomas, 160 S. W. 106, 106, 166
Mo. App. 608 (citing 5 Words ft Phrases, p.
4237 et seq.).
XiOBT FBOFBBVT
AeddentiUy leaving goods in a particu-
lar place l« not a case of "lost property,"
and the taking would be from the owner's
posscsiBioa. Moxle v. States 114 & W. 375,
378, 64 Tex. Gr. R. 628 (dtlng Statom v.
State, 8 Tex. App. 273).
Property to be "lost*' must have been
unintentimially or involuntarily parted with,
and money discovered in the highway or on
the ground or the floor will be considered as
having been casuaUy and unknowingly drop-
ped, and thus lost; but where it is Intention-
ally put down, as in a drawer or on a table,
and the owner forgets where he left it and
cannot find it, it is not in a legal sense lost
Booster v. Fidelity Safe Deposit Go., 146 S.
W. 138, 142, 162 Mo. App. 166.
Treaswe troTe distlacvished
"At common law a distinction was made
between lost property and treasure trove.
Lost property was such as was found on the
surface of the earth, and with which the
owner had involuntarily parted. The pre-
sumption arising from the place of finding
was that the owner had intended to aban-
don his property, and that it had gone back
to the original stock, and therefore belonged
to the finder or first taker, until the owner
appeared and showed that its losing was ac-
cidental, or without an intention to aban-
don the property. Treasure trove, on the
other hand, was money or coin fbund hid-
den or secreted in the earth or other pri-
vate place; the owner being unknown. It
originally belonged to the finder, if the own-
er was not discovered, bat Blackstone says
it was afterwards adjudged expedient, for
the purposes of state, and particularly for
the coinage, that it should go to the king;
and so ttie rule was promulgated that prop-
erty found on the surface of the earth be-
longed to the finder untU the owner ap-
peared, but that found hidden in the earth
belonged to the king. (1 BL Gonun. *285.)
In this country the law relating to treas-
ure trove has generally been merged into
the law of the finder of lost property, and
it is said that the question as to whether
the English law of treasure trove obtains
in any state has never been decided in Amer-
ica." Danielson v. Roberts, 74 Pac. 813, 914.
44 Or. 108, 66 U B. A. 626, 102 Am. St Bep.
627.
LOT
See Building Lot; Oity Lot; Bntlre
Width of Lot; Equal Apportionment
by Lot; One Lot; Small Lot; Town
and Village Lots.
My house and lot, see My.
As ezpresslTe of amamtttj
A "lot" sometimes means a great deal,
but as used In a confession, stating that a
short time before the alleged ciime defend-
LOT
188
IiOT
ant drank a "tor of bmekbarry wUm wlft^
oat aajlng bow much or wbat affect it hmd
on blm, it l8 too Indefinite onld imeAtMae*
tory to anthotlae an instruction on the ef-
fect of drankennesa State ▼. Chnicli, 08 &
W. 16, 17, 24, IM Mo. 005.
Tbe word ''lot," as nsed in an agreement
nnder which a party purchased a quantity
of apricots in the following words: 'This
agreement made by and between the J. K.
A. Co. and ttie 0. Fmit Company, witness-
eth: That ttie said J. K. A. Oo. has this
day sold and the said 6. Fruit Company has
this day bought twenty-fl^e hundred boxes
apricots, more or less, consistinf of: Lot A,
287 1)0X66, tot K, 104 boxes* lot O, 1400 box-
es, lot E, 715 boxes at seven (7) cents per
pound plus one per cent, net cash f . o. b.
cars at Pomoaa« on swrtender of biil of lad-
iDg; shipment to be made during die month
of October, 1901**— iM not an asiblguoas word
of warranty, but a word used solely to de-
serike and Identify. AU definitions of the
wotd display' its deviTation from "shaie^ per-
tton, or paie^" Neither tbe grammatical
construction of the language used in the con-
tract nor the definition giyen to the word by
the lexicograi^ierB Justifies attributing to It
a meaning wMch imports quality or warran-
ty and to hold that the words, lot A, 287
boxes," oonsidered either in tiielr ordinary
use or as used in a eommerdal way, relate
to warranty, rather than idoittflcatlon, would
do violence to the use of language. German
Frait Oo. T. J. K. Armsley Ckk, 00 Pac 819,
822, 108 Oal. 686.
As dlstlnat ov sopasate povtliMS of land
Milwaukee City Charter (Laws 1874, a
184) subc. 7, S 8» authorizing the board of
pubUc works to assess the damages to lots
which they deemed benefited by a change of
the street grade, and section 7, speaking of
soch lots as lots fronting on the Improve-
ment, do not Undt such an award of dam-
ages to platted lots abutting on the improve*
ment, since parcels forming a distinct home-
stead or other indosure, messuage, or unit
of property fronting on the improvement,
bat laid out, occupied, or inclosed without
regard to platted lines, may constitute a
**lot" fronting on the improvement Schmidt
▼. City of MUwaukee, 136 N. W. 868, 887,
149 Wis. 307.
Laws 1890, p. 376, a 132, | 32» provides
that the assessor shall actually view when
practicable and determine the true and full
Talue of each **lot" of real property listed
for taxation and shall enter the valve there-
of in one column, etc., and the statutes far-
ther provide that the term "tractf* or *aot"
and "piece** or "parcel of real property/'
and ''piece" or "parcel of land," whenever
used in the act relating to revenue and tax-
ation, shall be held to mean any eondguoas
quantity of land in the possession, owned
by, or recorded as the property of» the same
dalmaa^ pavsoa, or company. Held, that
uttAar the statutea smaller tracts or subdivi-
slooa composing a larger tract could not be
assessed as one tract, where the land was
owned by different persons under recorded
titlea or in joint ownership, and asseasnients
in one tract of different ownershi];is or es-
tatea in different tracts seem to be inhibited
where the different titles are of record.
State Finance Co. v. Myers, 112 N. W. 7d, 78,
16 N. D. Ids.
Xatprovameats
The words "lot," "piece,'* and "parcel"
apply peculiarly to the hind itself, and are
never employed to describe improvementa
Canty v. Btaley, 128 Paa 262, 264, 102 Cal.
879.
That an advertisement of a mortgage
sale described the premises to be sold as
"lots," without mentioning the improvements
upon them, was not a good objection to con-
firmation of the sale if the inrice was not
grossly inadequate. Guarantee Trust Sc Safe
Deposit Co. V. Jenkins, 2 Atl. 18, 15, 40 N.
J. Bq. 461.
Aa ylattod lots ov Moeks
The ordinary meaning of the term "lot,"
when used with reference to a town or city
property, is a subdivision of a block accord-
ing to the map or survey of such town or
dty. A statute relative to disconnecting ter-
ritory from a town provided that it must
appear that no part of the territory has been
platted into lots and blocks as part of the
town. Held, that where the territory in
question constituted a portion of a subdi-
vision of the town included in the town site
at the time of the incorporation, and the
plat of the subdivision showed the streets
of the town proper running east and west,
and each alternate street running north and
south laid out through the subdivision, and
the spaces between the streets divided into
parcels of various dimensions, the parcels
being numbered, the territory eould not be
disconnected; it being platted into lots and
blocksL Town of Fruita v. Williams, 60 Pac.
182, 188, 83 Colo. 167.
The ordinary meaning of the word "lot,**
when used with reference to town or city
property is a subdivision of a block accord-
ing to the map or survey of such city, and
so Acts 1869, p. 184, c. 122 (Burns* Ann. St
1901, S 4394), entiUed "An act to compel
owners of town lots to grade and pave or
plank sidewalks, and providing for proceed-
ings to compel the same," does not authorize
the fixing of a lien for such paving on large
tracts of land. Town of Greendale v. Suit,
71 N. a 668, 669, 163 Ind. 282.
A dty charter defined the term "lot," as
used in connection with the establishment
of assessment districts for street Improve-
ments, to mean lots shown by recorded plats
of additions or subdivisions, but, if there were
LOT
190
liOT
no Bu<di recorded plat, or if the ovner bad
disregarded the lots as platted, the whole
plat should be treated as one lot The allots
ment of portions of a tract in the surrey of
a partition snit, and the recording of snch
allotments with the commissioner's deed, did
not constitute a division of the lots by re-
corded plat, as contemplated by the char-
ter ; the allotment not having been approved
by the board of public Improvements, nor re-
corded in the platbook in the recorder's office.
Collier's Estate v. Western Paving ft Supply
Co., 79 S. W. 947, 953, 180 Mo. 362.
St Louis aty Charter, art 0, 1 14, with
reference to the establishment of special as-
sessment districts, provides that, if the prop-
erty adjoining the street to be improved is
divided into lots, the district line shall be
so drawn as to include the entire depth of
all lots fronting on the street to be improv-
ed, etc. It also declares that the word 'lot"
shall mean the lot as shown by recorded
plats of additions or subdivisions, but if
there be no such recorded plat, or if the
owners of property have disregarded the
lines of lots as platted, and have treated two
or more lots or fractions thereof as one, then
the whole parcel of ground or lots so treat-
ed as one shall be regarded as a lot for the
purpose of the creation of the assessment
district Held, that the term "lot" as so
used was not limited to a platted lot; and
hence, where original platted lots are divid-
ed either by deed or by distinct use, each of
such subdivisions constitutes a lot within
such charter provision. State ex. reL Skrain-
ka Const Co. v. City of St Louis, 111 S. W.
89, 94, 211 Mo. 591.
Comp. Laws, | 10,710, as amended, lim-
its the area of land to which a mechanic's
lien attaches to the "lot" or tract upon
which the improved structure is erected, not
exceeding 160 acres of rural land, or the
"lot or lots" upon which the Improvement
is made if in a city. Held, that the term
"lot or lots" refers to surveyed lots conform-
ing to a plat Adams v. Central City Gran-
ite Brick ft Block Co., 117 N. W. 932, 935,
154 Mich. 448, 129 Am. St Rep. 484.
A lot owner, to be entitled to an award
of damages on account of the grading of a
public street, must show that his lots abut
on that part of the street graded; but the
term "lot" does not mean necessarily the
platted lot In determining whether a given
area of land which does not directly border
on a graded street is to be regarded as a
part of the abutting land for the purpose of
awarding damages for a change of the grade,
all of the facts and circumstances of the
particular situation should be considered in
ascertaining whether the area in question is
so identified with the intervening land un-
der common ownership that the two cannot
be separated in use without Injury to the
value of each. Where plaintiff owned two
lots on a comer of two streets, botli lots
being divided by the recorded plats into In-
dependent subdivisions, and both were sep-
arately acquired and improved, plalntUT was
not entitled to an award of damages to the
inside lot for an alleged change of grade
of the street on which it did not abut Bur-
de V. City of St Joseph, 110 S. W. 27, 28. 130
Mo. App. 463.
Const art 16, { 51, provides that a ru-
ral homestead shall consist of not more than
200 acres, and that an urban homestead shall
consist of a "lot or lots" not to exceed in
value $5,000. Land, designated as a lot in a
particular block in the dty plan, and within
the limits of a city» was purchased and used
for a residence in connection with the own-
er's business as a merchant, and afterwards
the owner purchased land adjoining his resi-
denoe property* but s^jiarated from it by the
city's limits as generally recognized, which
he used for pasturing the family horses or
cattle, and for raising pvoducts for home
consumption; both lots b^ng valued at leas
than the constitutional limit for .urban home-
steads. The dty exercised no jurisdiction
over soch tract and levied no taxes thereon,
nor was it rendered for dty taxation. Held,
that the term "lot or lots" must be taken la
its popular sense, and did not embrace land
within the limits of the corporation not con-
nected with the plan of the dty; th&t the
original homestead was urban in character,
and the later acquisition was rural; and
that, as there could be no blending of urban
and rural homesteads, the tract last pur-
chased was not a part of the owner's home-
stead, and hence was subject to foredosure
under a deed of trust First Nat Bank v.
Litdifleld (Tex.) 144 a W. 85Q, 362.
PvUie street
See, also. Lots, Blocks, Tracts, and Par-
cels of Land.
That the fee of the street where a rail-
road bridge is built across it, together with
the fee thereof between that point and a dis-
tant block abutting on the street, is owned
by the owner of such block, and not by the
owners of the lots abutting at the point of
the bridge and between it and such block,
does not make the land under the bridge and
sudi block one parcel, within the rule as to
damages to the residue where part of a tract
is taken. Coatsworth v. Lehigh Valley Hy.
Co., 131 N. T. Supp. 300, ^1, 73 Misa Bep.
645.
As tract or pareel
When work is done and materials fur-
nished to erect a building for the owner of
a whole tract of land without visible divi-
sions, the whole tract is one "lot" within
Pub. St a 191, § 1, providing for a Usn
on the *'lot of land" on which a building is
situated for which labor and materials are
furnished. Orr v. Fuller, 52 N. B. 1091, 172
Mass. 597.
liOT
1»1
LOTTJS&Y
Bev. St 1880, I 6879, authorizes foortb-
class dtlefl to open and improve streets, make
sidewalks, etc., and gives them exclusive
control of all streets wltbln th^r limits.
Section 5881 authorizes them to repair side-
walks and levy special assessments on all
lots and pieces of ground abutting such im-
provements. Held, that an unplatted tract
within the limits of a fourth-class city can
be taxed for the construction of sidewalks,
provided such exercise of the taxing power
iB reasonable under the circumstances; the
word "lot* * used in section 5981 including
tracts or parcels of land, even if the section
did not authorize assessments on all pieces
of grounds. City of Salem ex rel. Roney v.
Young, 125 & W. 857, 861, 142 Ho. App. 160.
Two or aaoore lots
St Louis aty Charter, art 6, S 14, relat-
ing to the assessment of property for local
improvements, declares that the word *'lot," as
used in the section, shall mean the lots as
shown by recorded plats of additions or
subdivisions, but If there was no recorded
plat, or if the owners had disregarded the
lines of lots as platted, and have treated
two or more lots or fractions thereof as one
lot then the whole parcel so treated as one
shall be regarded as a lot for the purpose
thereof. Held that where the owner of a
tnct or lot had used the same in disregard
of platted lot lines, and had occupied it in
disregard of a platted street for a race track
since 1878, it was properly assessed for a
street improvement as a single lot, regard-
less of its original platted subdivisions.
Granite Bituminous Paving Co. v. McManus,
129 S. W. 448, 452, 144 Mo. App. 593.
LOT UNE
The term 'lot line^ or '^property line"
has a well known and understood meaning.
The fee to the streets and the sidewalks is in
the dty. The "property lintf* or "lot line"
extends only to the inner edge of the side-
walk. If the walks were to be constructed
one foot from the "lot line" or "property
line," that description definitely defines the
location. Gage v. City of Chicago, 79 N. B.
294, 285, 223 lU. 602.
LOTS, BLOCKS, TRACTS, AND FAB-
CELS OFUUro
The interests of a street railroad compa-
ny In the part of a street improved is not
subject to assessment for the improvement,
under Ballinger's Ann. Codes ft St S '796,
providing for assessing the "lots, blocks,
tracts, and parcels of land" that will be spe-
cially benefited thereby. City of Seattle v.
Seatae Electric Co.,* 94 Pac. 194, 196, 48
Wash. 589, 15 L^ B. A. (N. S.) 486.
LOHERY
Lottery or similar scheme^ see Similar
Sdieme
See, also. By COianee; Qtft Bnterprlse;
Piizsb
▲ lottery is a species of gaming which
may be defined as a scheme for the distribu-
tion of prizes by chance among the persons
who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable
consideration for the chance to obtain a
prize. Burks v. Harris, 120 S. W. 979, 980,
91 Ark. 205, 23 L. B. A. (N. S.) 626, 1^ Am.
St B^. 67, 18 Ann. Cas. 566.
Bvery drawing, where money or proper-
ty is offered as prizes to be distributed by
chance according to a specified scheme or
plan, and a ticket or tickets sold which enti-
tles the holder to money or property, and
which is dependent npon chance, is a "lot-
tery." Grant v. State, 112 S. W. 1068, 1069.
54 Tex. Cr. B. 403, 21 U B. A. (N. S.) 876,
130 Am. St Bep. 897, 16 Ann. Cas. 844.
In "lottery" there must be union of
three elements; consideration; chance and
prize. Bussell v. Equitable Loan ft Security
Co., 68 S. B. 881-^84, 129 Ga. 154, 12 Ann.
Cas. 129.
The three necessary elements of a "lot-
tery" are the furnishing of a consideration,
the offering of a prize, and the distribution
of the prize by chance rather than entirely
upon a basis of merit Brooklyn Daily Bagle
Y. Voorhies, 181 Fed. 579, 581.
Chance Is an essential dement of a lot-
tery, whether it be as to any return or mere-
ly as to the amount or value thereof, and,
where there is a hazard in which sums are
ventured on the chance of obtaining a great-
er value, the scheme partakes of the nature
of a lottery; that is, something gained or
won by lot State v. Perry, 70 S. B. 387, 388,
154 N. C. 616 (citing 5 Words and Phrases,
p. 4245).
*The word lottery' has no technical
meaning. A lottety is nothing more nor less
than a scheme or device of chance." State v.
Willis, 2 AtL 848, 849. 78 Me. 70.
"It has been said in some of the books
and by several of the courts that, while the
word 'lottery* is not a technical term of the
law, and to dispose of property of any kind
by lottery is not an offense which has a rec-
ognized and established legal definitiou, and
that the meaning of the word must be de-
termined with reference to a popular sense
of the mischief intended to be redressed by
the statute, yet when thus construed, it in-
dicates a scheme for the distribution of
prizes and for the obtaining of money or
goods by chance. The word 'lottery' has
been variously defined as a game of hazard,
in ^f^iich small sums are ventured for the
chance of obtaining a larger value, either
in money or other articles ; a distribution of
prizes won by lot or <diance; a kind of game
or hazard, whtf ein several lots of goods or
merchandise are deposited in prizes for the
benefit of the fortunate ; or a sort of gaming
contract, by which, 4for valuable considera-
tion, one may, by fs^or of the lot, obtain a
prize superior to th» amount or valne of
LOTTERY
192
liOTTBBY
that which he risks. Tested by any one of
these approved deflnitlons, a lottery always
Involyes the element of chance, fortune, or
hazard. It is gaming, pure and simple."
City of Winston y. Beeson, 47 S. B. 45T, 459,
136 N. O. 271, 65 L. R. A. 167 (citing State v.
Mumford, 78 Mo. 647, 650, 39 Am. Rep. 632;
State v. Clarke, 33 N. H. 829, 334, 66 Am.
Dec 723).
"Lottery" has been held to be a gaming
device, and the keeping of a house for the
purpose of selling lottery tickets is the keep-
ing of a "gambling house" within the power
of a dty to suppress gaming and gambling
houses. Portland v. Tick, 76 Pac 706, 709,
44 Or. 439, 102 Am. St Rep. 633.
"We approve the language used in the
opinion of Ballock v. State, 20 AU. 184, 73
Md. 1, 8 L. R. A. 671, 25 Am. St Rep. 559,
where it is said: 'Our statute does not justi-
fy a court in deciding a thing is not a 'lot-
tery" simply because there can be no loss,
when there may be considerable contingent
gain, or because it lacks some element of a
lottery according to some particular diction-
ary definition when it has all the other ele-
ments, with all the pernicious tendencies
which the state is seeking to prevent* " Peo-
ple V. McPhee, 103 N. W. 174, 176, 189 Mich.
687, 69 L. R. A. 505, 6 Ann. Cas. 885.
The general definition of a "lottery" was
declared to correspond with Gen. St Minn.
1894, { 6576, defining it as a scheme for
the distribution of property by chance, among
persons who have paid or agreed to pay a
valuable consideration for the chance, wheth-
er called a lottery, rafile, or gift enterprise,
or by some other name. State ex rel. Hath-
om V. United States Express Ck)., 104 N. W.
566, 658, 95 Minn. 442 (citing 5 Words and
Phrases, pp. 4245-4248).
A "lottery" embraces the elements of
procuring through lot or chance, by the in-
vestment of a sum of money, some greater
amount of money. A contract containing a
priase feature dependent on chance, the writ-
ing of new contracts and lapsation, both of
which are contingencies over which the par-
ties have no control and which they can-
not forecast, is a "lottery." Fidelity Fund-
ing Co. V. Vaughn, 90 Pac, 34, 37, 18 OkL 13,
10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123.
A company operated a scheme containing
investment ^d loan feature& The oppor-
tunity to obtain a loan was determined to a
large extent by the way in which the appli-
cations were received at the ofilce of the com-
pany, and where a number of applications
were received at the same time they were put
on the records of the company as they were
opened and recorded. The investment fea-
tures were not particalarly attractive, and
the main feature of the^scheme was the loan
feature, and the proposed loan contracts
contained attractive terms. Held, that the
scheme was a lottery because of a considera-
tion and becaase of the existence of chance,
based on obtaining a low number and there-
by obtaining a loan, and because the obtain-
ing of a loan at an eariy date was the prize
in the scheme, since to constitute a lottery
there must be a consideration, chance, and
prize. United States t. Pnrvls, 196 Fed. 618,
620.
A contract for the sale and purdiase of
stamps for delivery by the buyer to his cus-
tomers, which contemplates that the hold»8
thereof shall by chance dls];K>se of an automo-
bile furnished by the seller of the stamps, is
a lottery, and the contract is void. American
Copying Co. V. Thompson (Tex.) 110 S. W.
777, 779.
The derivation of the word •lottery" in-
dicates its general definition as the *'distri-
bution of anything by lot" or "the drawing
of lots," and the scheme known as "lottery"
is defined as one "for raising money by sell-
ing chances to share in a distribution of
prizes" or a "scheme for the distribution of
prizes by chance among persons purchasing
tickets; the corresponding numbered slips,
or lots representing prizes or blanks, being
drawn from a wheeL" An indictment for
using the mails to defraud, in violation of
Rev. St i 6480, by subdividing a tract of land
in Louisiana of small value into lots 10 or 20
feet square, and selling certificates, each
purporting to give the holder an option to
purchase an interest in a lot, upon false
representations that the lots were within an
oil district and very valuable, and that large
cash offers had been made for certain of tbe
same, construed, and held to charge a scheme
and artifice to defraud within the meaning
of the statute, which, when carried on by
means of correspondence through the mails,
constituted a violation thereof, and not to
describe a "lottery" or "gambling enterprise.**
GourdalB v. United States, 164 Fed. 453, 458,
83 0. C. A. 309 (quoting and adopting the
definition in Century Dictionary, and citing
Lottery Case, 23 Sup. Ct 321, 188 U. S. 321,
353, 47 L. Ed. 492).
"Bishop defines a lottery* as 'any acheme
whereby one on paying mon^ or other val-
uable thing to another becomes entltLed to
receive from him, such a return in value or
nothing, as some formula of chance may de-
termine.* " An indictment under Rev. St
§ 3894, for sending through the mails a news-
paper containing an advertisement of a lo^
tery or gift enterprise,; or a complete or par-
tial list of prizes awarded at the drawing of
a lottery or gift enterprise, must aver, ei-
ther specifically or by necessary intendment,
the existence of a lottery or gift enterprise.
United States v. Irvine, 156 Fed. 376, 3T7
(quoting 2 Bish. St Crimea, § 952).
A financial co-operative sidieme, whidi
contemplates the cveatiLon of a fund oat of
enrollment fees and monthly due% to be re-
IjOTTBET
193
LOTTERY
turned to tbe memben at Hke eoA of ft ftf)ed
periotf of Bieiibership in die Bbap^ €i 'teall-
SBtioiw," tbe anevnt of wbleli wfll depend
upon the growth 1b membership, the plan
being certain to InvolTe a loss to e?ery one
Interested as soon ae tbe nnmher of meat-
bers ceaeee to Increaee, becanee of the ab-
sence of any proYlaion for a reserve fund, Is
a lottery, or echeme for the distribution of
money by lot or chance^ within the meaning
of the iHToyislons of Rot. St. f 9929, as amend-
ed by AiCt Sept 19, 1890, e. 906, 26 Stat 465^
and of section 4041, and of Act March 2,
1895, c. 191, { 4, 28 Stat 964^ empowering
the Postmaster General to deny the prlTlleges
of tbe mails and the money order and ro-
istered letter service to persons engaged in
certain prohibited enterprises. Public Clear-
hig House v. Coyne, 24 Sap. Ct 789, 796,
104 U. S. 497, 48 L. Bd. 1092.
The term 'aottery'' in law Is of wide
stgnlflcatieti. In Homer ▼. United States,
13 Sup. Gt 409, 147 U. 8. 449, 37 L. Ed. 237,
Mr. Jnstloe Blatdtiford dtecnssed vailoas defi-
nitions of lottery, and among others approved
that foond In Worcester's Dictionary, in
whidi it is defined to he ''a game of Hazard
in which smflU soma a«e ventmed with tbe
chance of obtaining a large vahte, either in
money or other artides." A schense by which
certlllcates axe issaed by a corporation, on
each of whMi tbe holder agrees to pay fl
per week, snbject to forteitnre for nonpay-
ment, and about 75 per oent of wbtob pay-
ments are paid into a "^ntnal benefit credit
fond^ nntU all oertlflcatee prior tn date have
matured' and been canceled, When bis own
certificate rtiall matm^, and be shall be
paid frouft sncb food tbe snm of 92 for each
week sQcb certUlcate bas been in lone, pro*-
vlded there is so mnch in tbe fend, not e^
ceeding however flOO, is a 'lottery" witUn
the meaning of Rev. St I 8894, and any person
engaged in conducting such scheme by means
of letters or circulars sent through the mails
is guilty of a criminal offense under said sec-
tion. Fitasimmons v. United States, 156 Fed.
477, 479, 84 C. C. A. 28T, IB L. R. A. (N. S.)
1005; Id., 106 Fed. 482, 84 O. O. A. 292.
Where a pecuniary consideration is paid*,
and it is determined by lot or chance, ac-
cording to some scheme held out to the pub-
lic, what and how much he who pays the
money is to have for it, that is a "lottery."
It is a sort of gaming contract by which,
for a valuable consideration, one may, by
favor of the lot, obtain a prize of a value
superior to that of the amount or value of
that which he risks. It Is a scheme by which
a result is reached by some action or means
taken, and in which result man's choice or
will has no part, nor can human reason,
foreelc^t, sagsfeily, or design enable him to
Imow or determine such result until tbe same
bas been accomplished. However, it should
not be eonaQded* that ttite term "lotor eftance^
hsplles that IT any element &i certainty or
8 WbbJl P.2d Sxb.— 13
skin enters into the scheme tt therefore fe-
Ifeves It of Ite character as a "lottery^ or
scheme of chance. A guessing contest in-
stituted by a newspaper company, by wWdi
persons are invited to deliver to Uie company
50 cents each, 24 cente of which being pay-
ment for a subscription to the newspaper and
26 cents for (he prtvflege of making a guess
upon tbe totel' vote for a state officer wlio is
to be chosen at an approadbing election, the
guesser coming nearest to tbe actual total
vote cast to receive a money prize from tbe
fond equal to one-tenth thereof, and others
next nearest to receive from the fund lesser
money prises, fs within tbe condemnation of
the statute of Ohio against "lotteries and
schemes of chance, and is an unlawful enter-
prise. And a similar scheme, involving the
same amount of payment by each person,
but differing from the former, in that there
is to be no subscription to a paper, and the
prizes promised are definite amonnta from
$5,000 down to $2, is equally within the con-
demnation of the statute and unlawful. Ste-
vais V. Cincinnati TImes-Ster (k^ 78 N. B.
1058, 1060, 72 Ohio St 112, 100 Am. St R^.
685.
A guessing contest prior to tbe presi-
dential election of Novembv, 1904, by wbftb
defendant agreed to give $10,009 to tbe per-
son who would make tbe nearest oerreet
estimate of tbe totel popular vote cast for
the office of President ef ttie United SteteSr
on November S, 19M, and |5X)00 for tete sec-
ond nearest oorroet esttmatek persons Ming
goesses being reqnired to pay sauiH snaM as
a snbserlption to a periodioal naaaed In tbe
advertisement, constituted & "lottery" in vio-
lation of tbe federal laws and also of OonqK
laws Mich, i 11,844^ providing that eveir por-
Bon who shall set up or promote within tbe
state any ''lottery" or gift enterprise fbr
money, or sball dispose of any property, veal
or pwsonal, goods, chattels, or mecbandlse,
or any valna^le things by way of "lottery"
or gift enterprise, sball be punished, ete.
Waite V. Press Pnb. Astafn, 165 Fed. 58, 59;
85 C. O. A. 576. 11 Li R. A. (N. S.) 009,
12 Ann. Cas. 319.
Bead laTestmeat solieate
Where an Investment company lasnes
bonds, numbered consecutively in tbe order
in wbicdi applications haiHpen to be received
by the secretary, and tbe time of payment
of the bonds, and consequently their valne,
depend on the number tbey happen to re-
ceive, the scheme is a lottery. Slver v. Guar-
antee Inv. Gon 81 S. W. 1098, 1100. 183
Mo. 41.
et ygoyertr ^ elunaoe
Under Pen. Code, f| 828, 827, defining a
lottery as a sdieme for the dlstrfbution of
property by chance among persons who have
paid a valuable consideration for the diance,
and making advertising a lottery a misde-
meanor, a scflieme for the cyLstributlon of
money and cigars among pordiasers of eer-
liOTTfiRT
194
I/>TT£BT
tain brands of dgarB who will estimate most
closely the number of cigars of all brands on
which taxes would be collected by the gov-
ernment during a named month is a "lot^
tery/' though the distribution does not de-
pend exclusively on chance, and the adver-
tising of the same is a misdemeanor. Peo-
ple ex rel. Allison v. Lavin, 71 N. £1 753, 754f
170 N. Y. 164, 66 L. R. A. 601, 1 Ann. Cas.
165.
Am sambUms devio*
See Gambling Device.
Game of skiU
"A lottery is commonly understood as a
scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot
or chance, especially a gaming scheme in
which one or more tickets bearing particu-
lar numbers draw prizes, and the rest of the
tickets are blank." A knife rack, consisting
of an inclined table, with knives stuck there-
in, and so arranged that rings could be
thrown on them, which rings are sold to cus-
tomers, who endeavor to ring the knives on
the table, they being entitled to any knives
rung, or on which the rings caught, is not
a lottery. McRea v. State, 81 S. W. 741, 46
Tex. Cr. B. 489.
Gift eiiterprls*
Under the provisions of Rev. St { 8394,
as amended by Act Aug. 5, 1900, c. 6, § 38,
that no packages of manufactured tobacco
shall be permitted to have packed In them
"any paper, certificate or instrument purport-
ing to be or represent a ticket, chance, share
or Interest in, or dependent upon, the event
of a lottery," the definition of a lottery is
not limited to a scheme whereby the value of
the certificate or ticket is dependent upon
lot or chance, but Includes as well a scheme,
whereby the possession of a certificate or
prize, having a fixed value, is made to de-
pend on lot or chance, and the statute is
violated by concealing in 1 out of each 100
five-cent cuts of plug tobacco a tag redeem-
able by the maker for GO cents. United
States V. One Box of Tobacco, "Foot Prints,"
100 Fed. 781, 732, 111 C. C. A. 459.
Defendant, to induce the sale of a cereal
called "Mother's Oats," placed in each pack-
age a coupon on which one of the letters
which spelled the word "Mother's" was print-
ed, and offered premiums to persons holding
coupons which would spell the word "Moth-
er's"; the letter "O" being placed on only
one coupon In 500. Held, that such scheme
was a lottery, within Act Oong. March 2,
1895, c. 191, providing that any person who
shall cause to be carried from one state to
another in the United States any paper, cer-
tificate, or instrument purporting to be or
representing a ticket, chance^ share, or in-
terest in, or dependent upon the event of, a
lottery, etc., or other similar enterprises of-
fering prizes dependent upon lot or chance,
shall be guilty, etc. United States v. Jeffer-
son, 134 Fed. 299, 300.
Poliey playias
A scheme* generally known as "playing
policy," whereby an association sells for
five cents, or any other specific sum of
money, certificates or tickets which entitle
the purchaser to a lead pencil of trifling
value, and also permits such purchaser to
select certain numbers, say 3-^13, which, if
all drawn by a blind-folded boy from a re-
volving wheel in which several numbers are
placed, entitle the person purchasing the cer-
tificate or ticket to a prize of money much
larger in amount than he has paid for his
certificate or ticket, is a "lottery." State ex
rel. Kellogg v. Mercantile Ass'n, 25 Pac. 984,
985, 45 Kan. 351, 11 L. R. A. 430, 23 Am. St
Rep. 727.
Pool sellims
Rev. Code 1852, amended to 1893, p.
396, provides that if any person shall sell
or*dispose of any lottery policy, certificate, or
of anything by which such person or any
number of persons promises or guarantees
that any particular number, character, ticket,
or certificate shall, in an event or on the
happening of any contingency in the nature
of a lottery, entitle the purchaser or holder
to receive money, property, or evidence of
debt, every person so offending shall on con-
viction be subject to a penalty. Held, that
the fact that tickets representing member-
ship in a baseball pool aid not in themselves
show a promise or guaranty that on the
happening of an event, the holder should
be entitled to money, did not save the scheme
from being a violation of the statute, since
the term "lottery," as used therein, includes
any scheme for the distribution of money or
prizes by chance, not limited to a sale of
tickets nor to the terms or promises printed
or written upon them. State v. Sedgwick
(Del.) 81 Ati. 472, 473, 2 Boyce, 453.
As pnlilio nnisaiLoe
See Public or Common Nuisance.
Trading stamp buAiness
There can be no "lottery,*' In the ab-
sence of the element of chance. A trading
stamp business,, consisting of the selling of
checks or stamps to merchants, who give
the same to their customers on purchases of
goods, the number of stamps given being be-
ing determined by the amount of the pur-
chase, and the stamps, on presentation at the
trading stamp store, entitling the holders to
select any article from the assortment of ar-
ticles, each article being plainly marked with
its value in stamps, such value not being
greater than the market value of the articles,
is not a "lottery," within a statute denounc-
ing lotteries, etc. State v. Shugart, 35 South.
28, 29, 138 Ala. 86, 100 Am. St Rep, 17.
Three things must concur in order to con-
stitute a "lottery": (1) There must be the
purchase of a right; (2) the right must be a
contingent one to receive something greater
than that which is purchased; and (3) the
I^tl'BRT TICKET
195
iiOWEST Bn>i>:&Ji
<»nttngeait right most depend upon a lot or
cbance. Const art 18» { 2, and MIUb* Ann. 8t
I 2927, prohibiting "lotteries'' or gift enter-
prises, does not authorize an ordinance pro-
hibiting gift enterprises, designed to include
the giving of trading stamps, since the term
"gift enterprise*' as used in the Ck)n8tltution
and statute applied only to transactions in
which the element of chance is involved.
City and County of Denver v. Frueauff, 88
Pac. 389, 394, 39 Colo. 20, 7 L. B. A. (N. S.)
1131, 12 Ann. Cas. 521 (quoting and adop^
iDg definitions In Lohman t« States 81 Ind.
17).
LOTTEBT TICKET
A "ticket" is a thing which Is holder's
means of paklng good his rights. Policy
slips written by a; customer to indicate a
choice of numbers and delivered by him to an
agent of the policy game to be forwarded by
him to headquarters in another state are not
within the provisions of the act of Congress
making it an offense against the United
States to be caused to be carried from one
state to another any ticket in a "lottery."
Francis v. United States, 23 Sup. Ct 334»
335, 188 U. 8. 875, 47 Lu Bd. 608.
LOW
See Too Low.
LOWBBIDOE
In railroad parlance, a ^ow bridge'* la
one so low as to prevent those engaged upon
box cars in the fireight service from passing
mider the same in a standing position. Kel-
ler V. Chicago, St P., M. & O. By. Oo., 129
N. W. 220, 221, 118 Minn. 178.
LOW jroiHT
A "low Joint" in a railroad is where a
tie underneath that joint has been pounded so
many times by wheels passing over it that
there is a little space underneath that tie,
80 that the rails will give when the wheels
go over it Chicago^ M. & St P. R. Oo. v.
Benton, 132 Fed. 460, 461, 66 a a A. 66a
LOW-WATEB MARX
Ordinary Low- Water Mark.
The *low-water mark" which under Act
Aug. 19, 1749, is the boundary line between
York and Lancaster counties, is the line to
which the water recedes at ordinary states
of low water, and not the lowest line the
water has ever been Imown to reach. Appeal
of York Haven Water Power CJo., 62 AtL 97,
98, 100, 212 Pa. 622.
Where in ejectment the location of a
•low-water mark" of tidewater on the east-
erly side of a creek is involve, it can-
not be assumed without proof that that mark
was not west of the center line of the creek,
since one bank may have fallen sheer, and
the other have been a shoal very nearly the
whole widfli of the creek. ISelney v. Nolan,
67 AtL 1008, l(to9, 75 N. J. Law, 897.
"Low-water mark" of natural fresh wa-
ter rivers is the water's edge at its lowest
stage. City of Peoria v. Central Nat Bank,
79 N. E. 296, 299, 224 111. 43, 12 L. B. A.
(N. B.) 687.
Fresh riven not subjeet to tide may rise
and fall at oertaln seasons a&d thus have de-
fined high and low water marks. The "low-
water mark" is the point to. whicb. the river
recedes at its lowest stage, while the ''high-
water mark" is the line which the river im-
presses on the soil by oonrerlng it fbr suffi-
cient periods to deprive it of vegetation and
to destroy its value for agricnltureu State
ex reL OltixeBs' Slectilc Titghting ft Power
Co. V. LongfeUow, 69 & W. 374, 877, 169 Mo.
109 (citing Gould, Waters [3d Bd.] | 45).
rme margin of Che bed of a Hver which
lies between high and low water mark is
called the "beaai*' or ''shore," which is actu-
ally a part of the bed of the river, and, when
the river is at its full flow, whether caused
by the tide or by the natural increase of
waters by rains, floods, and the like, flUing its
natural bed to its highest readi of flow, it
marks its high-water, while its lessened
range of flow by summer heats shows its
low-water, mark. Son Dial Ranch v. liay
Land Co., 119 Pac 758, 762, 61 Or. 206.
Z.OW WOMAM
The statement of a person of another
that she is & 'low woman" and 'lialf ne-
gress" does not impute a want of chastity.
Kenworthy v. Brown, 92 N. Y. Supp. 84, 85,
45 Misc. Rep. 292.
LOWERMOST POBTIOH
The words ''beginning from the lower-
most portion thereoT' should be construed as
meaning from the lowermost portion of the
bed of stream; not from the lowest depths
of some hole or sudden depression therein,
but from the lowermost part of the general
contour of the channel. Krause v. Oregon
Iron & Steel Co., 77 Pac. 833, 835, 45 Or. 378.
LOWEST BIDDER
A single bid for public work made under
due advertisements for bids, pursuant to an
ordinance requiring such method of letting
contracts, authorizes the city council to con-
tract with the bidder; the term "lowest,"
in such connection, being used in its logical
and practical, rather than its grammatical,
sense. Hager v. Melton, 66 S. B. 13, 17, 66
W. Va. 62.
The expression "lowest bidder" necessar-
ily implies a common standard by which to
measure the respective bids, and that com-
mon standard must necessarily be previously
prepared specifications of the work to be done
and materials to be furnished. Where an
equipment of an automatic fire alarm office
for a city, as designed by the city electriciaii,
LOWEST BJm^OVaiBlM BIDDER 196
JiUCID mnSKVAL
wwB aothorlzed by oMimn^e, ft sobsequeDt
notice to bldiflers, riifter eall for bUto had bem
published, which abrogated the specifications
and established In lien thereof an equipment
which the board and city electricians might
deem adeonate, render^ the bids void nndifer
the requirements of the dty charter that ptrtn
lic ImproTements made by contract should
be let to the "lowest bMdW and tbat the
contracts and specifications most at that time
be on file subject to publie inspeotlon. Gob-
hert T. Seattte, 107 Pac. 866, 882, 57 Wash.
646.
U>WBST BBSPOHWBLC! BUftDBR
The expression 'aowest bidder^ neoessaiw
lly implies « -oenmoB standard by whAch to
measure sespeetiTe bids, whieh standard nrast
neceesarily be previously prepi»ed spedfloa*
tlons of me9k to be done and materials to be
furviisjied ; .spedficatlQais <fredy aeoeaslble to
all who may desire to compete, on which
alone theAr resQiectlye bids lavst be based.
By the phcase "lowest respoaaible bladder,**
as used In a /Statu^ velatftiiK ito school build-
ings, it was not iiatended to Umlt the power
of the board to the simple ezajnination of the
different bids tendered without r^^fenee
from whom they came, and that they should
blindly select one solely from the iionsldera-
tion that it was lowest in |»:ice, but it ve-
quired the board to seileet <that bidder who,
all things being considered, had ability to
respond to the requirements uf the contract
haying fiuU regard te tbe sul^eot^matter.
The word ^'responslhle,'' as employed in the
act when ailt>li<ed to ooptraots requiring for
their ezeontlon not only pecmilary ability,
but also judgment and skill, Imposes not
merely a ministerial duty on the dty au-
thorities, but also duties and ];K>wer8 deliber-
ate and discretionary. Hannan r. Board of
Education of Oity of Lawton, 107 Paa 646,
660, 654, 25 OkL 872, SO L. B. A. (N. S.) 214
(ddng Mazet ▼. aty of Pittsburgh, 20 AtL
683, 187 Pa. 546 ; Oommonwealtii ez rel. Sny-
der T. Mitchell, 82 Pa. 8^.
The statute requiring that a)ntracts for
public improvements shall be let to the low-
est responsible bidder does not require the
letting of oonttacts to the lowest bidder, on
ascertaining his finandal' responsibility only,
but the term "responsible'* includes the abili-
ty to respond by the discharge of the con-
tractor's obligations in accordance with what
may be ^expected or demanded under the con-
tract, and where the board of local improve-
ments has ^erdsed its discretion in the
award of a contract for a public improve-
ment, the presumption prises that its action
was legal, and the party asserting the contra-
ry has the burden of overcoming the pre-
sumption by proof that the board acted with-
out jurisdiction or fraudulently. Hallet v.
City of SSIgiu, 98 N. Jffi. 580, 682, 254 111. 348.
The word "responsible** In the phrase
'lowest re^ponsihle bidder," as used in Qen.
8t 1900, I 1017, profviding for competitive
bids befiore awarding coatraets tov public
improvements, impUes skill, judgment, and
integrity necessary to a faithful performance
of the contract, bm well as sufficient financial
reaouroes and ability. Williams v. City of
Top^ka, 118 Pac. 864, 806, 85 Kan. 857, 38
14. B. A. (N. 8.) 672, Ajul Cas. 1913A, ^7.
Where one whose bid for county road
work was the lowest as to part of tbe work
failed to submit samples of material to be
tested as reasonably reguested and the bid
of the one to Whom the contract was award-
ed was the lowest on all the work, such lat-
ter bid could be regarded and accepted by
the county commissioners as the "bid of the
lowest responsible bidder,** as Tequlred by
statute. Baburban I»r. Ooi. ▼• Hyde^ 65
South. 76, 78, 61 FUl 609.
LUBfilCATOR
See Force Feed Lnbilcatoz;
LUCK) INTERVAL
The court wa^ well wtthin the mle Udd
down by text-writers and cases, in instruct-
ing that by the term "ludd interval'* is
meant that period of time during whidi the
person concerned, had so far regained the po-
sition of her faculties as to be of sound and
disposing mind and memory as deflned there-
in, and .that it dpes aot mean thait there has
been a simple diminution in her insanity, but
that her mind has been temporarily restored
to. sanity» and sufficiently restored to quali-
fy her to make a will as a person of sound
and disposing mind and memorj. King v.
Gilson, 90 8. W. 367, 870, 191 Ha 807.
'^A ludd interval,' under the dvil law, is
not an apparent tranquility or seeming re-
pose. It is not a simple diminution or re-
mission of tb» disease, but a temporary
cure— an intermission so clearly marked that
it perfectly resembles a return to health.
And, as the nature of the interval cannot be
ascertained in an instant, it must contlnae
during a length of time suffldent to give tbe
certainty of the temporary return to reason.
The time must in all cases be considerable;
« • • OSie Roman jurisconsults distin-
guished two dasaes of insane persons. One
class they called furiosos' ; the other, 'mente
eaptos.' ^ * ^ All the Roman laws which
speak of 'hidd tntervais' have ezdusive ref-
erenee to the first dass. For instance, tbe
Law 89, Digest ide JTudidis, auAhorteed the in-
sane of the first dass to disduuipe judicial
functions during ludd intervals. But this
was never permitted in cases of simple in-
sanity." Succession of Morere, 38 South. 435,
437, 114 La. 506 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in Aubert v. Aubert, 6 La. Ann. 108,
Quoting from Ooin-D^iale, Donations e% Tear
tameuts, p. 829*
LUCID USmORVAJj
187
I/UIIBSB
"By 'lucid intervals' to meaal:, not mereljr
a cesBttioo of tlie Tlolent aymptoms of tlie
disorder, but a teiuporary restoration of rea-
son such as to create responsibility f6r acts
done dnrlag its continuance. Still, restora-
tion of tbe mental faculties to tbelr original
coBidlttoik is not necsflBaiy. It Is soffldtnt if
there be svcb lestoratioa tliat tbe peison is
able, beyend devM, to €«ini»tiieiid and to
do the act wftdi maOx reasen, memory, and
Judgment as to make it a legal act" Team
▼. Bryant, 61 S. B. 148, 100, 71 & a 88L
LUCRATIVE OFFICE
The deputy auditorshlp of a county to ft
*lTicTatiye office" within BumuT Ann. St 1908,
I 9039, providing that no person holding a
lucratiye position shall be a notary public,
and his acceptance of such office shall vacate
Ms appointment as notary. Sharp t. State
and.) 90 N. B. 1072, lOTC.
▲ "lucrative office" to one wheee pay to
affixed to tbe peffoimsace of its duties; and,
when the duties of tbe office aire Axed by
statute, it to tmrnatsvial tbat tlie cempensa-
tion of the officer to fixed by some other board
or officer. The office of deputy sheriff, wheth-
er entitled to the compensation fixed by con-
tract between the sheriff and the deputy, or
entiUed to the fees allowed by law, to a lucra-
tive office, within Const art 2, § 96, dectoxing
tbat no person shall lield more than one
lucrative office at the same time. State v.
Blagle, 89 S. W. 826, 827, US Tom. 888 (cit-
ing State ex ret Piatt v. Kirk, 44 Ind. 401,
15 Am. Rep. 289 ; CSiambers v. State eac rel.
Barnard, 26 N. B. 898, 127 Ind. 865, U U B.
▲. 613).
Rev. St n. 8. §1 1246-1269, provide for
the retirement of army officers. Seotten 1289
authorises the assignment of retired officers
to doty at the Soldiers' Home, and by subse-
quent enactments retired officers may be de-
tailed for service with the militia of tlie sev-
eral states or in colleges and military achooto,
and to time of war may be employed on ac-
tive duty other than in command of troops.
Act Kerch 2, 1908, c. 975, 82 Stat 927, 982 ;
Act AprU 28, 1904, a 1485, 88 Stot 259 ; Act
Not. 3, 1893, c 18, 28 Stat 7; Act Aug. 6,
18H c. 228, 28 Stat 223, 2 Supp. Bev. St
U. S. 226; Act April 21, 1904, c. 1408, 38 Stot
225. Held, that a retired army offleer to not
by reason of su^ retirement holding an
office wtlhJa State Const art 4, 1 90, making
any person hdidlDg any lucrative office under
the IFidtsd SUtes in^gibto to any ctvU office
•f profit under the state. Beed v. Sehon, 88
Pac. 77, 78, 2 OaL Ayp. 66.
LUGGAGE
See Ordinary Luggage; Persoual Lug-
See, atoo^ Banage.
LUMBEff
See Dressed Lumber; FlreProoCsd]
ber; Logs, Lumber, and Otker Tlmbof ;
Sawed Lumber.
Merchantable lumber, see Merdtantabls.
Tbe word "lumber" to in oomason use ts
describe both trees suitable to saw and tie
products Into wfaMi they ave sawed. Wkers
a deed of standlBg lumber and trses sultaMe
to saw tots lumber stiputoted tbat tbe loaiber
remaining on Che premises at tbe «id of a
specified time should revert to tbe grantor,
but not flttggesttng tbat the tsees were to be
sawed <m the presatoes, it was held that tlie
focfdtuve ctouse ^applied only to standing
trees, and the sawed iiuober which remained
on tbe iH?omifles after oKpiratlon of tbe sped-
fled time did not revwt to tbe grantor. Tnttto
V. D. W. PiniPBee Co., 78 AtL 407, 4^6, 76
M.H.28&
Tbe meaning of tbe word 'lumber^ to
vague and indefinite, and it has different
eensss aoeording to tbe context In wtdcb it
to used or tbe nature of tbe transactions to
which the parties refer. Bfost often it des-
ignates matertoto of wood used in construct-
ing bouses, fences, and other like structures
— wooden building matertol. The Stondard
Dictionary defines it as '^timber sawed Into
merctantable form; especially boards;''
I9ie 0entui7f ns '*timber sawed or split for
use, such as Jotots, boards, planks, stoves,
hoops, and tbe like;'* Webster's Unabridged,
as "timber sawed or split into the form of
beams. Joists, boards, planks, stoves, hoops,
etc.; espectoUy that which to smaller than
heavy timber." Plaintiffs, Who were regular
rtdppers of "dumber,** ties, and piling, wrote
to defendant rallfoad, asking the rate on
'lumber." £>efendant replied, guaranteeing
a rate to tbe point of delivery to a connect-
ing carrier. Plaintiff shipped ties, for which
defendant charged and collected a greater
rate than agreed on in ito letter to plain-
tiff. Defendant's toriff Sheet did not in-
filnde ties witbin tbe term "lumber," and
there was no evidsnoe tbat defendant un-
derstood or could have been reasonably ex-
pected to bave understood, when applied to
by ptointifl, that tiie totter intended to sbip
ttee, wben he asked the rate on "lumber."
Held, that the letter written by defendant
did not asMMint to an agreement to carry ttoe
on tbe rate specified tberein. Greason v. St.
Louto, I. M. lb 8. By. Go., 88 8. W. 722, 729,
112 Ma App. 116.
Wben ptokitttr applied for ears far tbe
transportotion of oak cross-ties, one of de-
ftodant carriers bad a Joint rate to Kansas
points, including the destination of the tios,
applying to "lumber, car loads, all kinds," of
24 cents per 100 pounds. The other defend-
ant carrier had a simitor rate on 'lumber,
all kinds," but uaither oanler bad a specific
rate on cross^tiesL Held, tbat "Inmber" being
generally defined to include '*any timber saw-
XUMBEB
198
UJNAOT
ed or spilt for use," whether by manl, wedge,
or the use of machinery in a mill, anything
manufactured out of a log with saw, ax,
maul, wedge, or machine, for building houses,
bridges, fences, or railroads, after the prod-
uct leaves the log for commercial use, it in-
cluded the cross-ties within such Joist-rate
schedules. Classification of railway crosa-
ties in a different class from 'lumber," impos-
ing on them a higher rate, constitutes un-
just discrimination. American Tie & Timber
Co, V. Kansas City Southern By. Co., 175
Fed. 28, 32, 09 O. O. A. 44.
Key. St 1908, c. 93, { 46, proyides that
whoever labors at cutting, hauling, rafting,
or driving logs or lumber shall have a lien
thereon for the amount due for his personal
services and the service performed by his
team. Held, that in view of the original
provision in the statute (Laws 1848, c. 72),
providing a lien for "cutting, hauling, or
driving logs, masts, gpars, or other lumber/'
meaning other lumber ejusdem generis, in a
condition similar to logs» masts, and spars,
that is, felled but not manufactured, but de-
signed for ultimate manufacture, as are logs,
or not to be manufactured, as are spars and
masts, the word "lumber" in section 46 is not
used in its broadest meaning as including
both the manufactured and the unmanufac-
tured product ; but no lien Is given for cut-
ting or hauling manufactured lumber.
MUchell V. Page (Me.) 78 Atl. 570, 571.
LB goods, wares
See Goods.
and meroliaiidlBo
Loss or timbev dlstjngnished
"Lumber" is to be distinguished from logs
or timber, and in common pariance, as well,
means more than ordinary logs. Oaze v.
Alabama State Land Ck)., 46 South. 479, 480,
155 Ala. 431 (citing definition in Webst Diet).
As meroliandlse
See Merchandise.
Timber asmoBymovs
Where, in a suit by attachment the affi-
davit set up a Uen for stumpage, under Code
1907, t 4814, for timber sold, and the com-
plaint charged for lumber sold, but also
claimed under a Hen for stumpage under the
statute, which gives a lien for timber sold,
the word "lumber," as used therein. Is syn-
onymous with "timber," when considered in
connection with all the averments of the com-
plaint and the affidavit, as against an objec-
tion that there was a fatal variance between
the pleading and proof, since it can reasonably
be construed to harmonize with the affidavit
and evidence showing a sale of timber, as
distinguished from lumber. Sligh v« Frix, 51
South. 601, 602, 165 Ala. 230.
LUMBER AND TIMBZSR
Slabs are not included- in the material
designated as "lumber and timber" in the
statute giving a Uen .on the lumber and tim-
ber for services in cutting logs. Bngi r. Har-
deU, 100 N. W. 1046, 1048, 123 Wis. 407.
LUMBER DEALER OR BCEROKAHT
As engaged in mercantile pursuit, see
Mercantile.
One engaging in the business of keeping
and selling lumber in considerable quanti-
ties is properly called a "lumber merchant"
Jackson v. Town of Union, 78 AtL 778, 774,
82 Ck>nn. 266.
LUMP SUM
Code 1899, c 54, I 26, relating to con-
tracts with building and loan associations, de-
mands "that the extent of payment of premi-
ums be definite, and to answer that demand
there must be a lump sum,' but « « *
it may be taken out in advance, or be dis-
tributed in stated periodical payments; but
such lump sum need not in words be speci-
fied, and then distributed, because if the pe-
riodical payments be fixed in amount and
number, they make up a lump sum.' " Ta-
haney v. Washington Nat Bldg. ft Loan
Ass'n, 68 8. B. 791« 69 W. Va. 296L
LUMPER
See Lumping.
LUMPING
A charge in the items of a mechanic's
lien is not a "lumping^ one, where it in-
cludes only lienable items which are the sub-
ject of an express contract for a given price,
which, in case of a subcontract, is also shown
to be the reasonable value thereof. Holland
V. Ounliff, 69 S. W. 737, 740, 96 Mo. App. 67
(citing Hilliker r. Francisco, 65 Ma 698;
Deardorff v. Boy, 50 Mo. App. 70).
The term "lumping," in the vernacular
of members of a trade union is used to desig-
nate a method of doing work where the con-
tractor is only the figurehead of the owner
who purchases the material and assumes all
the responsibility in connection with the con-
tract and the "lumper" merely furnishes the
labor and acts as superintendent upon an
agreed compensation for his services. People
V. Welnselmer, 102 N. X. Supp. 579, 681,
117 App. Div. 603.
LUNACY
The words "lunacy^ and "unsound mind"
have been bent out of their technical sense
in some instances, a legislative constructiOD
being given thereto in harmony with the
broad views of courts that they include ev-
ery phase of unsound mind rendering one
incapable of caring for himself or his prop-
erty. In re Strelff, 97 N. W. 189, 191, 119
Wis. 666, 100 Am. St Rep. 903.
Under section 7, Statutory Construction
law, the terms "lunatic" and "lunacy** iadude
LUNACY
199
LYING OB BSINa WITHIN
erery Und of imfloimdxiefls of mind except
Idiocy. Schoenberg ft Oo. ▼. Ulman, 99 N. Y.
Supp. eSO, 652, 61 Misc. Rep. 88.
Under Statutory Construction Law (Laws
1892, p. 1487, c. 677) I 7. defining "lunacy"
to include every kind of unsoundness of mind
except idiocy, the word "lunacy** in Code Civ.
Proc S 2335, providing that, where a petition
alleges that the person with respect to whom
it prays for the appointment of a committee
is incompetent by reason of "lunacy,** the in-
quiry with respect to the competency must be
confined to the question whether he is in-
competent at the time of the Inquiry, includes
all phases of incompetency including imbe-
cility arising from old age. In re Preston's
Will, 09 N. Y. Supp. 312, 313, 113 App. Div.
732 (citing Matter of Schrodt, 67 N. Y. Supp.
244, 32 Misc. Rep. 540; Matter of Clark, 67
N. Y. Supp. 681, 57 App. Dlv. 6).
LUKATIO
As natural person, see Natural Fersoa
As person, see Person.
Under section 7, Staatory Construction
£4aw, the terms "lunatic^ and 'lunacy" In-
clude every kind of unsonndness of mind ex-
cept idiocy. Schqenberg ds Co. ▼. Ubnan, 99
N. T. Supp. 650, 652, 51 Misc. Rep. 83.
Rev. Laws, c. 87, §{ 6, 79, places the bur-
den of support of insane persons on the state.
Rev. Laws, c. 8, ( 5, d. 6, provides that, in
eoDstrulng statutes the words "insane per-
son** and "lunatic" shall include every idiot,
non compos, lunatic, and insane and distract-
ed person. Held, that persons committed to
the School for Feeble-Minded are not insane
persons, and hence the state is not liable for
their support Chapin v. City of Lowell, 80
K E. 618, 619, 194 Mass. 486*
LUNAR MONTH
As month, see Month.
LUNCH WAGON
As boilding, see Building.
LUTHERAN
The name "Lutheran" is a distinguishing
characteristic of the churches adhering to
and adopting certain writings in and short-
ly after the time of Martin Luther as conclu-
dve expression of the creed, and inerrant in-
terpretation of the Scriptures, and rejecting
certain other writings which are adopted by
what are called the "German Reformed
Chnrch" jbm correct interpretation of the
Scriptures. The Lutherans prescribe certain
books as necessary to be used in Sunday
school and confessions of faith, and the like,
and yield almost inspirational authority to
the writings of Dr. Luther. Marien v. Evan-
gelical Creed Congregation of Milwaukee, 113
N. W. 66, 67, 132 Wis. 650.
LUXURIES
Food supplies ordered by the master of
a fishing schooner, who was also managing
owner, for the use of the crew on a fishing
voyage, under the usual lay oontracts, In the
absence of any showing of bad faith on his
part, will be presumed to be supplies "neces-
sary" for the employment of the vessel, with-
in the meaning of the Maine statute giving a
lien for such supplies, and the court will not
undertake to determine that certain of the
articles were "luxuries" for which the vessel
is not liable. The term "luxuries" is an en-
tirely relative term. The Mary F. Chishohn,
188 Fed. 598, 60a
LYCHEE
Dried lycfaee as edible fruit, see Edible
Fruit
LYiNQ
IiTXHG BETWESH PXEBB
Where an insurance policy on a Tsnel
provided that the company should not be lia-
ble for injuries in consequence of ice except
when the vessel was "lying between piers,"
the exception should be construed as requir>
ing that the vessrt should be placed between
piers sufficiently near to each other to afford
protection from floating ice on both aides;
and hence, where the piers between which
the vessel was moored at the time of her in-
juries were 2,200 feet apart, she was not "^-
ing between piers" within the policy. Hunt-
ley v. Providence Washington In&,Co., 79 N.
Y. Supp. 35, 36» 77 App. Div. 196.
LTIKG nr WATT
"Lying in wait" means hiding In am-
bush or concealment It does not necessarily
refer to the attitude of the body, but rather
to its location, and the purpose of taking the
person attacked unawares. It is the mental
poise of the wild beast in quest of prey, and
necessarily Implies malice, premeditation, de-
liberation, and the willful intent If a per-
son, armed with a club, was hiding in the
darkness with the purpose of assaulting an-
other when unaware of danger, he was,
though standing, technically "lying in wait"
State V. Tyler, 97 N. W. 983, 985, 122 Iowa,
125.
LTIHG OB BISING WITUIH
Const art 8, fi 5, declares that all rail-
road property within the limits of any city
shall bear its proportionate share of munic-
ipal taxation, and, if not previously render-
ed, the city authorities shall have power to
require its rendition and collect the usual
municipal tax thereon. Section 8 declares
that property of railroad companies shall be
assessed and taxes collected in the several
counties in which the property is situated,
including so much of the roadbed and fix-
LTKCBnra
2M
LTNCBINO
tares as shall be In each coonty; and that
the rolling stock shall be assessed In gross
tn the county where the principal office of
the company is located, and the connty tax
paid on it shall be apportioned by the comp-
troller in proportion to the distance the road
may run through any such county among the
several counties through which the road
passes, as a part of their assets. Held that,
under Rer. St. 1896, art 6068, proriding for
the general taxation of the rolling stock of
railroad corporations, and article 600,. pro-
viding that only property situated within the
limits of a city is taxable by it, a city con-
taining the principal office of a railroad com-
pany was not, for that reason, authorised to
levy municipal taxes on all the railroad's
rolling stock, only a small portion of which
would necessarily be within the city on the
1st day of January of each year; the term
"lying or being within the limits of any dty
or incorporated town," etc., when applied to
tangible movable property, meaning only such
property as is actually and physically with-
in the limits of the dty. City of I^ler v.
Coker (Teoc.) 124 8. W. 729, 780,
LYNCHINQ
**The word lyndiing* has bean defined by
legal BM well as other lezioograpben, and ac-
cording to such ddlnitiona, and as the term
is generally understood, the Ulegal aete com-
monly termed lyndiing' cannot be eomadtted
by a single individual Yet oee penon alone
eould be guilty of the orime of breaking and
entering a Jail with latent to kill under this
statute. 'I^Bobiag' is defined by Baplje A
Lawrence as 'mob vengeance upon a person
suspected of crime.' taw Dictionary, 778.
It is 'a term descriptive of the action of un-
offidal persons, organized bands, or mobs,
who seize persons charged with or suspected
of crimes, or take them out of the custody of
the law, and inflict summary punishment on
them, without legal trial, and without war-
rant or authority of law.' Black's Law Dic-
tionary, p. 737. *A common phrase used to
express the vengeance of a mob inflicting in-
Jury and committing an outrage upon a pei^
son suspected of some crime.' Worcester
and Webster define the word as the inilictlon
of punishment without legal trial by a mob
or by unauthorteed persons. The word de-
rives its origin, according to Worcester, from
a Virginia farmer named Lynch, who, having
caught a thief, instead of delivering him to
the ofCloers of the law, tied him to a tree and
flogged him with his own hands. Lynching
has no technical legal meaning. It is merely
a deseripdve phrase, used to signify ttie law-
less acts of peraons who violate established
law at the tlaoe they commit the acts^ and la
univenally understood to signify tiie Illegal
infliction of punishment by a oombtnatioD of
persons for an aUeged crime." gtate v. Lew-
is, 66 & BL d00» 610, au» 142 N. a 820, 9
Ann. Casi 861 (iiuotiiilg Bouv. Law Diet 287.
See, also, State v. Alar, 20 a Bw 686, 89 W.
Va. 668).
MAOiJXAJl.
201
liACHnM
M
MACADAM
The word *^acadatn** hta a Yartely ot
meanings. TlniB, wtiere plaintiff contracted
to furnish for two jeara all tha oruabed
stone needed by defendant la construction
and repair of Its streets, defendant agree-
ing to use said crashed stone in all street
construction work and all repair work done
by it where the improTement is made with
"macadam,** the contract was ambiguous,
and plaintiff might show that the parties,
when making the contract, understood that
the word included river and mining gravel
as well as crashed stone. Viernow v. City
of Carthage, 128 S. W. 67, 68, 139 Mo. App.
276.
MACADAMIZE
According to tlie Standard Dictionary,
to "macadamize*' is ''to cover or pave, as a
path or roadway, with amaU broken stone,
on either a soft or a hard substratum.** Jih
didally speaking, the word '*macadamlging"
bas a fixed and definite meaning, and refers
not only to the kind of material to be used
in covering the street or road, bot also to the
manner in which it ia to be laid. It means
to cover a atreet or road by a process Intro*
daced by Macadam, which comista of the use
of small stones of a unif ora size, conaolidat-
ed and levelled by heavy rollens. Jones v.
Plummer, 118 8. W. 100, 111, 1S7 lio. App.
337.
A "nucadamized roadway" does not
mean one made up of a mixture of day,
gravel, limestone, and alag, that will not sus-
tain an ordinary load in wet weather. In
the oomiMUi praotftce and understanding such
a roadway bas been regarded aa one covered
with small, broken atones, ao as to form a
smooth, hard, convex snrfaee, capable of sus-
taining ordinarily heavy traffic. Qage v. Peo-
ple, 65 N. £. 1084, 1086, 1066, 200 lU. 432.
Complainants conveyed certain land to a
dty for a street, the city agreeing to grade
and ''macadamize'* the street which was in
ftn outlying district where It was well known
to both parties that the city was in the habit
of macadamizing only the center of the street
to a width of from 14 to 16 feet, for a drive-
way. Held, that the contract should not be
construed to require the dty to macadamize
the street to its full width, but only in ac-
cordance with its recognized custom. City of
Versailles v. Brown (Ky.) 96 S. W. 1108, 1109.
The term "pave** In its generic sense
means to place some sabstanoe <m the atreet
80 as to form an artificial roadway or wear-
ing surface which shall change the natural
condition of the street The word is much
more comprehensive than the tenn ''macad-
amize,** but it embraces aU tlMt the term
"macadamise'* covers. Eooa t. Ckita% II 8.
W. 1107, U09, 186 Ma 338.
See EQghway*
MACHINE
See Elevating Machine; Reanteg
chine; Slot Machine; Sticker)
Traversing Parts of a Machine ; Ifl^
nowlng Machine.
Other machine, see Other.
"The term 'machine' indndea every ae-
cbanical device or combination mechanical
powers and devices to perform some function
and produce a certain effect or result" A
"machine** is a concrete thing cons! sting of
parts, or of certain devices and combination
of devices, and a machine is not a principle
or an idea. The mere function or operation
of a machine or other device, as dtlstingatah-
ed from the machine or devtoe itself, ia not
patentable. American Steel ft Wire Co. v.
Denning Wire & Fence Co., 160 Fed. 108,
111, 112 (quoting and adopting deflnitionB in
Ck>ming V. Burden, 15 How. [56 U. S.] 252, 14
U Bd. 683; Burr v. Durgee, 1 WaU. [68 U.
SJ 531, 17 L. Bd. 650).
In patent law, a "nwchlne^ la a eon*
Crete thing consisting of parts or of certain
devices, or combination of devices. ''A ma-
chine is not a principle or an idea." United
States Gonsol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. S^ma
Fruit Co. (U. S. C. 0. A.) 195 Fed. 264, 276,
115 C. C. A. 234.
Bitoaastt mllvr»y
A new method of handling passengers to
secure rapid transit in a large dty, termed a
'^bitranslt railway system," is not a "ma-
chine** within the patent law, and the patent
therefor is void for lack of patentable nov-
elty. Fowler v. New York, 121 Fed. 747, 58
C. C. A. 113.
The term "machine** includes every me-
chanical device or combination of mechani-
cal powers and devices to perform some func-
tion and produce a certain effect or result.
A crane used to lift molten metal in a manu-
facturing establishment, and operated by
hand, is a "machine** within the factory act
(Acts 1899, p. 234, c. 142, i 8; Burns' Ann.
St 1901, i 70871), requiring the operator of a
nuinufacturing estat^diment to guard vats,
cogs, belting, «bc., or machinery. Crawford
ft McCdnunon Co. v. Oose (Ind.) 82 N. EL
984, 985 (Quoting and adopUng tbe definition
in Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 262, 14 L. Bd.
683; Green v. American Oar 4 Foundry Co.,
71 N. £. 268, 168 Ind. 135).
aCAGHINS
liACHINX
Drop
The teim "macbine" indndes erery me-
chanical device^ or combination of median!-
eal powers and devioea, to perform some
function and prbdnoe a certain effect or re-
sult A steel hammer of 1,500 pounds, rest-
ing In the centor of the floor, within four
large upright posts, with attachments to a
power for the purpose of hauling it to the
top of the frame and letting it drop, is a ma-
chine, within the meaning of Burns' Ann.
St 1901, I 7067, relating to the duty of an
employer, and requiring that all vats, pans,
saws, and machinery of every description
shall be properly guarded. Qreen v. Ameri-
can Oar ft Foundry Co^ 71 N. E. 268, 270,
163 Ind. 135 (citing Ck>mlng v. Burden, 56
U. S. [16 How.] 262, 14 L. Ed.
A "drop,** a device consisting of a fixed
derrick which raises a large steel ball to a
considerable hieight and allow it to fall upon
scrap iron, etc, for the purpose of breaking
it, is a ^'machine." Inland Steel Go. r. Kach-
winski, 151 Fed. 219, 221, 80 a 0. A. 671.
Eatery belt
An emery belt, used In a ftictory to pol-
ish metal, is a "machine," within Bums'
Ann. St. 1901, | 70871, requiring machinery
of every description in factories to be prop-
erly guarded. La Porte Carriage CJo. v. Sul-
lender (Ind.) 71 N. B. 922, 924. See, also,
Pein V. Miznerr, 83 N. B. 784, 786, 41 Ind.
App. 256, overruling La Porte Carriage Go.
V. SuUender, 76 N. E. 277, 166 Ind. 29a
Maehiaery dlstincuislied
See Machinery^
Xaiigle
"A 'machine' is a medianical device or
combination of medianical powers and de-
vices to perform some function and produce
a certain effect or result" A laundry mangle
is within the scope of the factory act pro-
viding that ''all vats, pans," etc., and "ma-
chinery of every description," shall be prop-
erly guarded. Pein v. Miznerr, 83 N. E. 784,
786, 41 Ind. App. 255.
Pile driver aad enghkm
As used in Civ. Code, ( 1970, providing
that an employer shall be liable for injuries
to a servant sustained through the employ-
er's negligence or the default of a co-employ6,
employed on a machine or other appliance
than that on which the employ^ Injured was
employed, the word "machine" means an in-
strument composed of one or more of the
mechanical powers, and capable when set in
motion of producing by its own operation
certain predetermined physical effects, be-
ing distinguished from all other mechanical
instruments in that its rule of action resides
within itself, and hence, where a servant
employed to steady piles in front of a pile
driver was injured by the negligence of the
engineer operating the engine by which the
hammer was lifted* the pile driver and the
engine being connected only by a rope by
which the power was transmitted to the ham-
mer, plaintiff and the engineer were not
working on the same machine within sudi
section. Korander v. Penn Bridge COi» 116
Paa 884, 386, 16 CaL App. 249.
Pvoeess disiiiicvlslied
"A 'machine' is a thing. A 'process' is
an act or a mode of acting. The one \b
visible to the eye, an object of perpetual
observation. The other is a conception of
the mind, seen only by its effects when be-
ing executed or performed. Eith^ may be
the means of producing a useful result"
Expanded Metal Go. v. Bradford, 29 Sup. Ct
652, 657, 214 U. S. 866, 53 L. Ed. 1034; Eastr
ern Extracting Oo. v. Greater New York Ex-
tracting Co., 110 N. T. Supp. 738, 739, 128
App. Div. 928 (quoting Cochrane v. Deener,
94 U. S. 780, 24 L. Ed. 139; Tllghman t.
Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 26 L. Ed. 279) ; Kirch-
berger v, American Acetylene Burner Co.,
124 Fed. 764, 776.
The term "madilne" includes eveiy me-
chanical device or combination of mechani-
cal powers and devices to perform some
function and produce a certain effect or re-
sult But where the result or effect is pro-
duced by chemical action, by the operation or
application of some element or power of na-
ture, of one substance to another, such
modes, methods, or operations are called
"processes." A new process is usually the
result of a discovery; a machine, of inven-
tion. But the term "process" is often used in
a more vague sense in which it cannot be
the subject of a patent Ttoa we say that a
board is undergoing the process of behig
planed, grain of being ground, iron of being
hammered or rolled. Here the term is used
subjectively or passively as applied to the
material operated on, and not to the method
or mode of producing that operation, which
is by mechanical means, or the use of a
machine, as distinguished from a process.
In this use of the term it represents the
function of a machine, or the effect produced
by it on the material subjected to the action
of the machine. But it is well settled that
a man cannot have a patent for the function
or abstract effect of a machine, but only for
the machine which produces it Denning
Wire & Fence Co. v. American Steel & Wire
Co., 169 Fed. 795, 796, 95 O, a A. 259.
Bailroad switoh
A railroad switch Is not a "machine" for
the construction of waterworks, within the
statute providing that persons furnishing;
machinery to erect waterworks may have a
lien thereon. Potter Mfg. Oo. v. A. B. Mleyer
& Co., 86 N. B. 837, 839, 171 Ind. 613, 131
Am. St Rep. 267.
As struotttre
See Structure
MACHINE
203
MAOHIN£BT
Traat railroftd
A tram rallnmd Is not a "JMehlne,"
within Rev. St 1889, I 848e» taxing manu-
f^ctnrera on tools, machinery, and appli*
anoea State ez leL. Western Tie ft Timber
Co. T. PolUman, 135 S. W. 443, 444, 283 Mb.
229.
KAGHIHi: imriBR
The term ^'machine finished" Is nsed In
the manufacture of paper to represent sized,
glazed, and snpercalendered paper. Jadcson
y. Grissom, 94 S. W. 268, 264, 196 Mo. 624.
MACHIlfSRY
See Dangerous Machinery; Defective
Machinery; Domestic Machinery ; Pat-
terns for Machinery; Steam Machin-
ery; Ways, Works, Maclilnery, or
Plant
9ther maddnery, see Other.
A mortgage trust deed covering the "ma-
chinery" belonging to a cotton print works
company included the copper roUs on which
the designs to be printed on the cloth were
engraved, which were not a part of the print-
hig presses, but were purchased In the mar-
ket separate from the presses for use there-
in, and were m^vailable for use except in
the presses. According to Bouvier's Law
Diet, ''machinery** is a more comprehensive
term than **machine" and includes the ap-
purtenances necessary to the working of a
machine. According to Webster's Interna-
tional Dictionary, second definition^ "ma-
chinery" is the working parts of a machine,
engine, or Instrument. According to the Cen-
tury and the Standard Dictionaries, "ma-
chinery" Is the parts of a machine considered
collectively, or any construction of mechan-
ical means designed to work together to ac-
complish a given end. Doty v. Oriental Print
Works Co., 67 Ati. 586, 591, 28 B. I. 872
(citing Seayey v. Central Mut Fire Ins. Co.,
Ill Mass. 540; Buchanan v. Exchange Fire
Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 26, 33; Brewer v. Ford, 12
N. T. Supp. 621, 59 Hun, 17 ; State v. Avery,
44 Vt 629 ; Brower v. Locke. 67 N. B. 1015,
31 Ind. App. 353, 358).
As all macliliiery
The word "machinery," in Labor Law
(Laws 1897, c. 415) I 81, imposing on the
owner or person in charge of a factory the
duty to properly guard specified parts of
"machinery,*' including shafting by name
and "machinery of every description," means
machinery which needs to be and can be
Snarded for the safety of the employes.
Poole V. American Linseed Co., 103 N. Y.
Supp. 1047, 1048, 119 App. Dlv. 136.
The factory act, providing that "all
vats, pans," etc, and ''mac^dnery of every
description," shall be properly guarded, re-
^res all dangerous ma<dilnery to be guard-
ed, Including a laundry mangle; the quotp
ed phrase not being limited by the enumera-
tion of vat9» pans» etc., since that enumera-
tion Is not an ^lameratlon of machines, and
the genus of those words is not of the same
nature as of ''machinery of every descrip-
Uoa" Pein v. Misnerr, 83 N. B. 784, 41
Ind. App. 255, overruling La Porte Carriage
Co. V. SuUender, 76 N. E. 2TT, 281, 165 Ind.
290.
A "machine" consisting of rollers and
knives revolving at a high rate of speed, and
set immediately below an opening in a floor,
and used for the purpose of mixfhg sawdust,
damp clay and dirt thrown into the opening,
is not within the factory act, providing that
in all manufacturing establishments "all vats,
pans, saws, planers, cogs, gearing, belting,
set screws, and machinery of every descrip-
tion therein" shall be guarded. National
Fire Proofing Co. v. Rdper, 77 N. B, B70-
372, 38 Ind. App. 600.
Castlacs
Iron castings from 10 to 24 feet In
length, known as "sill castings or channels,"
were furnished to a tobacco company with
the necessary bolts for use in Its factories,
to support tobacco presses. Most of them
were used for supporting presses or tables
connected therewith, without being fastened
to the floor and without being put under all
the presses. Some were used for other pur-
poses, such as skids, and "dunnage"; that
is, were put under goods to raise them above
the floor. Those under presses and tables
could be readily removed, and were In tatct
taken from one building to another. There
was no proof that they were customarily tfiiis
placed in tobacco factories, or were in any
way necessary to carry on the work, or that
it could not be done as well without them.
Held, that the castings were not "material"
or "machinery," within Rev. St 1899, i
4203 (Ann. St 1906, p. 2277), giving a lien
to a person furnishing the same for a build-
ing. Banner Iron Works v. Mtna Iron
Works, 122 S. W. 762, 763, 143 Mo. App. 1.
GonTeyor
A conveyor, consisting of a long, cylin-
drical, rotating rod, fo which flanges are
attached, is a shafting or "machinery," with-
in the factory act (Acts 1899, p. 234, c. 142,
8 9; Bums' Ann. St 1901, f 70871), providing
that all shafting and "machinery" shall be
guarded. United States Cement Co. v.
Cooper (Ind.) 82 N. B. 981, 983.
Onuie
Under Code Supp. 1907, | 4909a2, re-
quiring "ma^lnery" in factories to be guard*
ed, a traveling crane is a machine, and. If
injury is reasonably to be apprehoided there-
from to those working in its vldnlty, It
should be provided with proper guards. Mc-
Camey v. Bettendorf, Axle Ck>« (Iowa) 186 R
W. 920, 925.
Derrick and appUmnoes
Where, on the sale of a derrick, the
president of the seller corporation wrote the
buyer, "We fully guarantee matiilnery, and
MAOHINBRT
264
HACHDnar
ir tbe Mitte gives out throogli any favlt of
oun, we will replace It,** the term ^^maohin-
eiT** was mactontly heoAd to Incinde the
whole of the defrlok and appliances foiv
ntehed by the seller. Mffler ▼. F. R. Patch
Mfg. Co., 91 N. T. Snpp. 870, 871, 101 App.
Dlv. 22.
Cmery wheel
An emery wheel used as a part of a
factory equipment to grind tools is not with-
in the phrase "machinery of every descrip-
tion," In the factory act (Acts 1899, p. 234.
c. 142, I 9; Bums* Ann. St 1901, f 7087i),
providing that "all vats, pans, saws," etc.,
and "machinery of every description," shall
he properly guarded. National Drill Go. v.
Myers, 81 N. ». U03, 40 Ind, App. 322 (cit-
ing La Porte Carriage Co. v. SuUender, 75
N. EL 277, 165 Ind. 290,
A hammer used by a track hand on a
railroad was not a part of the "machinery'*
of the railroad company within the meaning
of a statute declaring that such a company
shall be liable for any damage done by the
running of the locomotives or cars or other
machinery thereon. Williams v. Garbutt
Lumber Ck)., 64 S. B. 65, 70, 132 Oa. 221
(quoting Georgia Railroad ft Banking Co. v.
Nelms, 9 a. EL 1049, 83 Ga. 70, 20 Am. St
R^ 308).
The harness of a horse attached to a
delivery wagon which an employ^ was driv-
ing was not a part of the employer's "ma-
chinery," within Rev. Laws, c. 106, S 71, cl. 1,
giving an employ^ the same right of action
against his employer for personal injuries
by a defect in the ways, works, and machin-
ery connected with the employer's business,
as if he had not been an employ^; "machinery",
only including such machines or mechanical
devices as are in use, and such appurtenances
thereof as are used incidental to the use of
the machine. Murphy v. O'NeU, 90 N. E. 406,
407, 204 Mass. 42, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 146.
Seatims; boiler
Ky. St S 2463, provides that a person
who furnishes materials in the erection or
repairing of a house, or for any fixture or
machinery therein, or for the improvement of
real estate by contract with, or by the writ-
ten consent of, the owner, contractor, sub-
contractor, or authorized agent, shall have a
lien thereon, etc. Held, that a heating boil-
er purchased by a contractor and installed
in defendant's residence constitated a "fix-
ture" and "machinery," within the statute,
and also an improvement of the property,
within the section, 00 as to enhtle the seller
to a materialman's lien therefor. Menne v.
American Radiator Co., 150 a W. 24, 25,
160 Ky. 151.
As improTeBieBt of
i Bee ImpTOTemeat
Kiln doors
Whcie a contvacO to fttmiah ^^machinery
aa follows* anuaaefatas among other articles
kiln doors, such doors are "ma<diinei7f" far
the parposes of the contract Thomas C^ilna
C3a r, C. W. Raymond Co., 136 Fed. 25, 29,
67 O. 0. A 629.
HaohiM dlstiasiilshod
The word "machinery,** in a fire poli-
cy insuring a laundry and machinery, in-
cluded the boiler, pipes, and fittings; steam
being used, not only as a motive power, but
for providing heat for drying purposes, etc.
According to Webster's International Dic-
tionary a "machine" is aj^ mechanical con-
trivance, while "maehinery" is the means and
appliances by which anything la kept in ac-
tion or a dealred resuU is obtained; a com-
plete system of parts adapted to a purpose.
More narrowly and technically, ''machinery"
is said to be the working parts of a machine,
engine, or instrument arranged and con-
structed so as to apply and regulate force.
Tubbs V. Mechanics' Ina Cto., 108 N. W.
324, 326, 131 Iowa, 217.
As porsonal pv#portr
See Feraonal Property.
Bailroad track i
Labor Law (Laws 1897, p. 480, C 415, i
81) requires that all vats, pans, saws, plan-
ers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set
screws and "machinery of every description"
shall be properly guarded. Held, that other
mechanical appliances constituting similar
hazards were included in the words "machin-
ery of every description," but that they
did not include a railroad track some three
feet above the floor of a gallery In a ma-
chine shop, on which trucks were operated;
there being no inherent danger in the track,
nor reasonable ground to believe that an em-
ploye in falling would be injured by putting
his hand in front of the wheel of a truck
which was being operated on the track.
Wynkoop v. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 89 N. E.
827, 828, 196 N. Y. 324, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 36.
Water nudiui and plves
Pipes and water mains of waterworks
company are not taxable as "machinery em-
ployed In manufactures," within Rev. Laws,
c. 12, f 23, providing for the taxation of such
machinery within the state. Coffin v.
Artesian Water Co., 79 N. B. 262, 263, 193
Mass. 274.
MA0HIKI8T
The term "machinists" does not Include
plumbers, painters, plasterers, and such like
artisans. Hence a plumber furnishing the
labor and materials to eonnect a soda fbun-
taln, gas dmia, and generator, etc., la n<A a
"machinist" within Laws 1906, p. 1S7, c 72,
paovldlng that every machinist wlio expends
labor, skill, and materials on any chattel
shall have a lien for his servioea. Modem
Plumbing & Heating Co. ▼; American Soda
HACHIKIfiPT
205
MAD»
Fountain Co., 106 Pftc. 026, 929^ 07 Wash.
148, 135 Am. St Rep. 976.
In an action by a passenger against a
street car company, wllere the declaration al-
leged that plaintiff was a maphlnist when lie
was injured, the fact that the evidence show-
ed that he was a tool maker did not prevent
btm from recovering damages for decreased
earning capacity as a skilled workman, the
proof showing that tool makers were machinr
ists, as the word ''machinist'* was broad
enongh to cover skilled machinists. FllUnip-
bam v. Michigan United Bys. Ck>., 117 N. W.
635, 636, IM Mich. 233.
MACKEREL
Evidence la admissible to show a trade
custom conatmlng the word 'Mackerel" to
mean clear and not rusty mackereL Procter
V. Atlantic FlBh CkMk, M N. B. 281, 208 Mass.
351.
MADE
See Duly Givoi or Made; Dvly Madik
Sea, al0o, ICaka
The words "k> made," in Code, i S49
(Gen. St 1897; c. 96, | 099; Gen. St 1899, |
4S43), which after providing fiDr the making
and service of the case and the suggestion of
amendments, provides that the case, **when
80 made,** shall be settled, certtfled, and sign-
ed by the Judge, making no mention of the
service of the case, evidently include all the
preliminary steps to the presentation of
the case to the judge fbr settlement But-
ler V. Scott, 76 Pac. 496,-497, 68 Kan. 612
(citing Chicago, B. & Q. By. (3o. T. Guild, 69
Pac 283, 61 Kan. 213).
Oeaiplaition Imported
The word "made»" as ordinaxtly used,
"applies to completed transactions but not
necessarily so." A father's guaranty to a
bank against any loss on personal loans
"made*' to his son or on account of any busi-
ness paper discounted to amounts dei^gnated,
at a time when the bank had already made
personal loans to the son and discounted
paper for an amount less than that fixed by
the guaranty, was a continuing guaranty cov-
ering not only past but future transactions.
National Bank of Chester County v. Thomas,
69 Ati. 813, 814, 220 Pa. 360.
DeUrevy laiported
A conveyance is ''made or given^" within
iectlon 67e of the bankruptcy act of July 1,
1S98, relating to conveyances made within
four months prior to the filing of a petltloii,
when it is delivered. Underleak v. Scott, 134
N. W. 731, 732, 117 Minn. 136.
Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St | 2198, pro-
vides that the board of appraisers or commla-
sioners of pubUc lands may review and re-
consider any of Its official acts relating to
lands of the state lintil such time as the
leaae or CMitract for any of svdilasdB- shall
have* been ma«e> eateeated, aad signed by tbe
oenmlsslofier of public lands, or^ by tbe board
lt»alt and PferosTs Cede 1909, f 8178a (Lam
1903, p. 113, c. 7^, dedarea that any sale or
lease of state lands made by mistake, or not
in accordanoe with law or made by mlsrep-
resentMlonr shall be volA Beld tkat^ wliere
affidavits alleging fraud in the sale of certadn
tide landa were presented to the board of
public land comnUssionera, after the execu-
tion of a deed but before its delivery, the
board had power to suspend the delivery of
the deed, and investigate the charges. The
court said: "Respondent contends that the
expression 'made, executed, and signed* is
equivalent to the words 'made, executed,
and delivered,' which are commonly found In
deeds of conveyance, and urges that the deed
is not 'made and executed' until it is 'draft-
ed, signed, acknowledged, and delivered,' and
that it was not the intention of the Legisla-
ture to deprive the ofllcera of the state of the
power to deal with the subject as long as the
deed was not actually delivered. Whether
this contention of respondent can be upheld
in its entirety, we are not now called upon to
decide; but we think that his position is
tenable, to the extent that ISie land commis-
sioner or tbe board of state land commission-
ers nmy at any time refuse to deliver a deed
wtken matters are brought to his or their at-
tention whi<^ give reason to believe that
said deed is being obtained by means of
ftraud." State ex rel. Shores t. Boss, 87 Pac.
262, 268, 44 Wash. 246.
As oommiuaioAted
"Made" signifies action: but, when a
pcprson has "oommunicated* to anuther a
written stateoeilt by reading it to him and
delivering it to him, that statement has been
"made te^' such otber peMon, within the
meaning of the law. Hie words "made to"
do not necessarily imply that the one com-
municating and using the statement also
composed it or made it up. '*Make known"
is a synonym of "communicate," according
to Soule's Dictionary of BagUsb Synonyms,
84. Tbe verb "make" has many significa-
tions and conveys many meanings, among
which is "to pot forth; giv^ out; deliver/'
Also, "to biform; apprise." Century Dic-
tionary. Thus when a person seeking credit
hands to a merchant a materially fiUse writ-
ten statement concerning his financial condi-
tion, no matter who composed and signed it,
if it be one calculated to deceive, and then
reads it to sucb merchant, and thereby ob-
tains property from him on credit, he has
oMiained property on credit upon a material-
ly false statement iU' writing "made to" such
person. In re Aldrigde, 168 Fed. 93, d8, 99.
Acettiesed «m do«toe
Under Pen. Code, 1 1428, revolving a joa-
tice of the peace to keep a docket in which
most be entered eacb acttoa and all proceed-
VADB.
206
MAQISTRATB
IngB therein, an order holding accused to an-
swer is in fact and law "madTS" when it is
entered on the Justice's docket, so that a
failure to indorse the same on the complaint
or depositions does not deprive the order of
Its validity nor affect def«idant's substantial
righta People v. Sacramento Butchers* Pro-
tective Aas'n, 107 Paa 712, 716, 12 Oal^ App.
471-
As filed
The word "made," in the statute provid-
ing that where the term does not continue
longer than 30 days the motion for new trial
must be "made" during the term, is synony-
mous with "filed,** and the word "made** can-
not be construed as meaning simply to pre-
pare and present to the Judge such motion,
and a motion which has not been so filed must
be dismissed, though the Judge before whom
the case is tried may have granted a rule
nisi during the term and within the term
fixed by law for filing the motion, and this is
true though counsel for the successful party
may have consented to a continuance of the
hearing of the motion ; the same having been
returnable in vacation. Hilt v. Young, 43 S.
B. 76, 77, 116 Ga. 708.
The word "made," as used in Gbde Civ.
Proc f 1296, providing that the superior court
of that county in which application for the ap-
pointment of an administrator is "first made**
has exclusive Jurisdiction of the settlement
of the estate, has reference to the time of
filing the application with the derk of the
superior court Dungan v. Superior Ck>urt of
Fresno County, 84 Pac 767, 760, 149 Cal. 98,
117 Am. St Rep. 119.
As maintained
As used in Act Cong. Feb. 25, 1886, c.
149, i 1, 23 Stat 321 (U. S. Comp. St 1901,
p. 1524), declaring illegal all indosures made,
erected, or constructed on lands to any of
which the person making the same had no
claim at the time the indosure was made,
and declaring unlawful "the maintenance,
erection, construction or control of any such
Inclosnre,*' the word "made" has a more com-
prehensive meaning than the words "con-
structed** or "erected." A person ''makes*'
an indosure so long as he maintains it
Since the statute was violated, where a per-
son maintained the indosure of land to
which he had no claim, an indictment charg-
ing such an indosure was not defective for
failure to allege that, at the time the indo-
sure was made, defendant had no claim or
color of title to the land made or acquired in
good fUth or a right thereto asserted with a
view to entry. Birdier v. United States, 160
Fed. 589, 691, 96 a O. A. 87.
As sworn to
Act March 4, 1904, c 394, providing tiiat
proofs, afildavits, and oaths required under
the public land laws may be made before
any United States Commissioner, and that
the fees for entries and for final proof»
when made before hUn shall be for each affi-
davit 25 cents, for each deposition of claim-
ant or witnesses when not prepared by the
officer 25 cents, and for each deposition pre-
pared by the officer |1, and making it a mis-
demeanor to demand or receive a greater
sum, fixes the fees of United States Commis-
sioners for administering the oath and atr
taching the Jurat to affidavits required under
the land laws, but it is not part of their duty
to draft affidavits, in whole or in part and a
United States Commissioner who drafts an
affidavit 6t any part thereof, or who com-
pletes the application part of -a combined
application and affidavit under the land laws,
may charge compensation therefor as serv-
ices beyond his offldal duty ; an affidavit be-
ing "made'* before an officer when subscribed
and sworn to before him by whomsoever
drafted. In re James, 195 Fed. 981, 9S3.
MADE AOQUAHTTED
A certificate of acknowledgment of a
married woman that she was "made ac-
quainted'* with the contents of the deed Is
equivalent to a certificate that the contents
were made known and explained to her.
Chauvin v. Wagner, 18 Mo. 681, 644.
MADE OUT IK ITEMS
Civ. Code 1902, { 806, requires that all
claims against counties shall be "made out
In items,** and section 808 provides that no
claim shall be valid and payable unless it be
presented to and ffied with the county board
during the fiscal year in which it is contract-
ed or the next thereafter. Held, that a
claim is not properly "made out in items"
which does not indicate the year in which it
arose, so as to indicate that it accrued within
the period prescribed. State ex rel. People's
Bank of Greenville v. Goodwin, 62 S, IS. 1100,
1105. 81 S. C. 419.
MAGAZINE
"Magazines" are defined by Webster as
pamphlets published periodically, containing
miscellaneous papers or compositions. They
are "periodical publications*' entitled to the
privileges of second-class mail matter.
Houghton V. Payne, 24 Sup. Ct 690, 692,
194 U. S. 88, 48 L. Ed. 88&
MAGIC
Healer by magic as physician, see Phy-
sician.
MAOIC I.A1ITEBN
Not dutiable as optical instruments, see
Optical Instrument
MAGISTRATE
Removal of magistrate as special pro-
ceeding, see Special Proceeding.
MAQISTRATB
207
HAIL ORDSB
A "magtstrate** Is an "officer liaTlng
power to isstie a warrant for the arrest of a
person diarged with a public offense." Peo-
ple V. Swain, 90 Pac 720, 722, S (M. Ap^.
421 (Citing Pen. Code, i 807).
"A 'magistrate' \a an officer having pow-
er to issue a warrant for the arrest of a per-
son charged with the commission of a crime.
The following persons are magistrates: (1)
The justices of the Supreme Court; (2) the
judges of the Circuit Court; (8) the county
Judges and justices of the peace ; (4) all mu-
nicipal officers authorized to exerdse the
powers and perform the duties of a justice
of the peace.** Wallowa County r. Oakes,
78 Pac 892, 46 Or. 88.
The clerk of the county court having no
antborlty to issue a warrant for a misde-
meanor is not a **magistrate'* within Sny-
der's Comp. Laws, f 6575, providing that a
''magistrate'* is an officer having power to' is-
sue a warrant for the arrest of a person
charged with a public offense. Bowen v.
State, U5 Pac. 876, 6 Okl. Cr. 605.
The word "Magistrate,** as used in Rev.
St e 138, I 17, providing for appeals from
the decisions or sentences of magistrates, in-
cludes judges of municipal courts as well as
trial justioesL Bprague r. Inhabitants of An-
droscoggin County, 71 AtL 1090, 1091, 104 Me.
352.
Code 1907, I 7519, providing that judges
of dty courts, etc., are "magistrates," within
the meaning of the chapter ("Proceedings to
Preserve the Peace"), and authorized to re-
quire persons to give security to keep the
peace, etc., refers only to affidavits and war-
rants under that chapter, and not in prosecu-
tions for illegal liquor selling. Herring v.
State, 48 South. 476, 477, 158 Ala. 81.
IMstriet attoMey
The district attorney to whom a confes-
sion is made is not a magistrate before whom
accQsed is brought for a judicial hearing,
and required by Code Or. Proc. 9f 188, 196,
to advise him that he is entitled to the aid
of coonsel, and to inform him that he has
the right to make a statement in relation to
the affair. People v. Randazzio, 87 N. B.
112, 116, 194 N. Y. 147.
At Jndse
See Judge.
Hotary publle
Where a notary public was authorized
by state law to issue a warrant of arrest for
misdemeanor, and on sudi affidavit the gov-
ernor of the state had instituted 'requisition
proceedings, the notary was a "magistrate**
within Rev. St | 5278, governing interstate
extradition, and providing that the same
Diay be based on * magistrate's warrant
Compton V. State of Alabama, 29 Sup. Ct
W, 606, 214 U. & 1, 58 L. Ed. 885, 16 Ann.
Caai098.
MAGNETISM
See IBlectfo— Magnetism.
MAHOGANY
Bee San Domingo Mahogany.
MAIL
See By Mail; Fast Mail; Fraudulent
Use of the Mails; Send by MaiL
Service 1^ mall, see Service (In Prac-
tice).
Use of, as commerce, see Commerce.
*The term 'mail* is perhaps tmiversally
comprehended as being that over which the
government has the management for the
purposes of conveyance and distribution.**
Searight r. Steves, 8 How. 151« 185^ U L.
Ed. 637.
iSAWT. OABBIE&
As dvil officer, see Civil Officer.
As officer, see Officer.
Tiff ATT. OIiEBX
As passenger, see Passenger.
MAH. MtATTEB
A post office superintendent discovered
a misboxed letter, which had been placed in
a "dead" pigeonhole at the top of the case,
where defendant, a clerk, was engaged in
sorting mail. OThe letter was removed by the
superintendent and handed to a post office in-
spector, who took it to the addressee, and,
without delivering it, obtained permission to
open it He then returned it to the post office,
unsealed the letter, and took from it an ex-
press order for f2, a statement of account,
and a letter from the sender of the money
order. After making a copy of the letter, he
placed it in the envelope with two marked (1
bills, and forwarded the money order and the
statement to the addressee. The envelope
containing the letter and bills, having been
duly sealed, was returned to the dead pigeon-
hole, and a short time thereafter was embes-
zled by defendant Held, that the letter at
the time it was returned by the inspector to
the dead pigeonhole had not ceased to be
"mail matter/' and that defendant was there-
fore properly convicted of embezzling a let-
ter containing indosures, in violation of Rev.
St I 5467. Ennis v. United States, 154 Fed.
842, 843, 83 C. a A. 478 (citing Montgomery v.
United States, 16 Sup. Ct 797, 162 U. S. 410,
40 L. Ed. 1020 ; Scott v. U. S., 19 Sup. Ct 209.
172 U. S. 343, 43 I* Ed. 471; Goode v. U. S.,
16 Sup. Ct 136, 159 U. S. 668, 40 U Ed. 297).
MAIL OBDER
The chief element of the "mail order"
method of doing business consists in dealing
directly with the customer or c<msumer by
means of placing in his hands a printed cata-
logue containing a description of the articles
of merchandise otfered for sale and the price
l^ILED
208
MAIN UNA
thereof. An association of retail dealers can
lawfully agree aiAong tbemselves ttiat they
will not purchaae iimfffiannUnn fcom whole-
salers and Jobbers who sell to mall order
houses and to Inform each other aa to what
wholesalers and Jobbers do sell to such
houses. Montgomery Ward A Oo. v. South
Dakota Betail Merchants' & Hardware Deal-
ers' Ass'n, 160 Fed. 413, 410.
Whe wo«a ''iBailad," 9B used In tlie speci-
fications on which a contract for the sale
of coal was mad«» raQulring notice of a fail-
ure to deliyer to be "mailed," being used in
its ordinary sense, referred to mailing in ac-
cordance with the ordinary method of busi-
ness, and did not contemplate the sending of
a notice by registered mail* so that the mere
delivery to the postal authorities and regis-
tration of a notice did not put the seller in
default Price ▼. City of New Yodc, 93 M.
Y. Supp. 067, 9(70, 104 App. Dlr. 108.
The general statement of one that he
*'malled" a letter to another is sufficient evi-
dence that he did everything necessary to
raise the presumption that it was received In
due course of mail, and thereby show that
the addressee had notice of matters therein
stated. To be properly -mailed" a letter
must be addressed, stamped, and deposited in
the proper place for the receipt of mail, and,
since the word "mailed" implies the doing of
all these acts, a general statement that a let-
ter was ."mailed" is sufficient. Ward v. D. A.
Morr Transfer & Storage Co., 05 S. W. 064,
065, 110 Mo. App. 83 (citing Pier v. Helnrichs-
hoffen, 67 Mo. 163, 20 Am. Hep. 501; Rolla
State Bank v. Pezoldt, 95 Mo. App. 404, 60
S. W. 51).
Prepayateat «f p<»8iA8e
The word "mailed," when applied to a
letter, means that it was properly prepared
for transmission by mall, and was placed
in the custody of the officer whose duty it
was to forward the mall. Southern Engine &
Boiler Works v. Yaughan, 135 S. W. 018, 915,
98 Ark. 888, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1062.
In testimony that a letter containing a
notice was mailed, the word "mailed" Implies
the payment of the necessary postage. City
of Omaha v. Yancey, 135 N. W. 1044, 1047,
91 Neb. 261.
The single Word "mailed," as used by a
notary In his certificate, is held to imply that
the requisite iwstage was preimld. Cutting v.
Harrington, 71 Atl. 374, 377, 104 Me. 96, 129
Am. St Rep. 378 {citing Rolla State Bank v.
Pezoldt, 69 a. W. 51, 95 Mo. App. 404).
MAIM
"Maiming" te to deprive a person of s<Hne
member of his body. Cooper v. State, 132 S.
W. 355, 366, 60 Tex. Or. B. 411«
In an affidavit, ^kich chareed that de-
fendant unlawfully, wantonly, or mallclouBly
mUed or maimed a cow, followed the Code
form lior an Indictment for wanton and mali-
cious Injury to animals (Code 1007, If 6230,
7161, form 71), except that the word "maim-
ed" was substituted for the word "injured,"
the word "malm" Implied a deprivation of a
necessary part, a crippling, disabling, or per-
manent Injury, and was more than equivalent
In meaning to the word 'injure," and includ-
ed the meaning of the word "injure." Hence
the affidavit sufficiently charged the statu-
tory offense. Richmond v. State, 58 South.
073, 074, 4 Ala. App. 130 (citing 5 Words
and Phrases, p. 427Q.
To "malm" an animal, within the mean-
ing of a statute making it an offense to kill
or malm cattle, is to be understood in its
technical signification, and the person who in-
filets upon an animal injury of a character
less than that which would deprive it of or
render useless one or more of Its useful mem-
bers, is not guilty of an offense under the
statute, and the owner of the animal Is re-
mitted to his action for damages. But one
who injures one of the nsefal members of
an animal, such as its members of locomotion,
or sach as are useful to the owner of the ani-
mal, violates the statute. Brown t. State,
66 8. E. 405, 406, 127 Ga. 287.
White's Ann. Pen. Ck>de, art 612, pro-
vides that **to malm" Is to willfully deprive
a person of the hand, arm, finger, toe, foot,
leg, nose, or ear; to put out the eye, or de-
prive a person of any member of his body.
Article 614 provides that "to disfigure" is to
willfully place any mark on the face or other
part of the person. Article 604 provides a
punishment for assault with intent to com-
mit the offense of maiming or disfiguring.
Held, that a charge of maiming and disfigur-
ing carries with it a charge of assault with
intent to maim and disfigure. Pool v. State,
129 S. W. 1135, 1136, 50 Tex. Or* B. 482.
MAIN
MAIN OHAHiraX
The "main channel" of the Mississippi
river means the princ^Md navigable and nav-
igated channel, the one customarily followed
in steamboat navigation. Frandni v. Lay-
land, 07 N. W. 409, 602, 120 Wis. 72. See,
also, State v. Muncie Pulp Oa, 104 S. W. 437,
442, 119 Tenn. 47.
IffAIir I.XNE
The words "main line," In municipal or-
dinances granting, respectively, the right to
construct a small extension to the Garden
Street branch of the (Cleveland street railway
system and the right to lay a second track
on a portion of that branch, to terminate
with the expiration of the grant for the
main line, must be deemed tp refer to the rest
of the Garden Street branch, and jiot to the
HAIK BRA
809
UAIX 8TXM
KucUd Aremie line. Cleveland Clectilc Ry.
Co. T. City of Gleveland, 27 Sop. Qt 202-210,
204 U. S. U6, 81 Ll Bd. SOO.
"Malii sea** and ''hl^ sea** are synony-
mous. United States t. Newark Meadows
Imp. Co^ 173 Fed. 426, 428.
MAJM VWMXT
She wi»d ^^haft," as ased In connection
with or api^Ued to Victories, Is a revolving
btrto convey tbe force which Is generatsd by
some pdne morer to the different working
machines, and a ^llne or main shaft" is a
bar of considerable length, and nsoally bear-
ing a nomber of pulleys by wliidi power is
transmitted to countershafts. Hobenstein-
Harmets Furniture Co. v. Matthews, 92 N. B.
196, 109, 46 Ind. App. 6ia
XAXa STEM
The term *'maln stem,** as used In the
New Jersey statute relatijog to taxation of
railroads, is expressly defined to include the
niadbed not exceeding 100 feet in width with
its rails and sleepers and structures thereon
not Including passenger or freight boildlnsi.
The original statute made passenger depots
a part of tbe main stem. United New Jersey
R. k Canal Co. v. Parker, 69 AU. 289, 248» 75
N. J. Law, 771.
Under Act 1888 (Oen. St p. 8825, i 214)
as amended (P. L. 1006, p. 220, c. 122), de-
fining the "main stem" of a railroad for pur-
poses of taxation as *'the 'roadbed' not ex-
ceeding one hundred feet in width with Its
rails and sleepers, and all structures erected
thereon and used in connection therewith,
not including, however, any passenger or
freight buildings erected thereon,** does not
extend beyond the ''roadbed," although such
loadbed" be less in width than lOO feet
Tbe court said: " 'Boadbed' signUes the bed
or foundation upon which rests the super-
structure of rails and sleepers. Qiving doe
effect to the word 'main' in the phrase 'main
stem,' tbe 'roadbed' that is to constitute 'main
stem' must be deemed tbe bed or foundation
of the principal tracks of ttie railroad at the
place in question. The width of 100 feet, as
used in the statute, is a measure of Umita-
tioQ, not of extension; and the fact that a
railroad company at any place on its Hoe
owns land of the width of 100 feet or more
docs not extend *niaiB stem' to the width of
100 feet, unlecB the IXMidbed' of its principal
tracks at the place in question extends to
that width." In le New York Bay B. Co.,
67 AtL lOtt, 1061, 76 V. J. Law, 880 (quoting
and adopting deflnAtlon In re United New Jer^
■sy BaHroad 4 Canal Co., 67 Aa 1075, 75
N. J. Law, 886).
The act of 1888 (Gen. St p. 3325, pax.
214), relating to the taxation of railroad and
canal property, declares that the *'main stem"
3 Wos.4 PJ2o SSB.— 14
of a .railBo^d, the assessment of whioh shall
be made by tiie state authorities, shall Include
"the ^NMLdbed; not exceeding 100 feet in
width with its rails and sleepers, (and) depot
building used for passengers connected there-
with." A supplement to such act (P. L. 1806,
pi 226) dedaiee that "main stem" shall here-
after be held to include the "roadbed*' not
exceeding 100 feet In width with its rails
and sleepers, and all structures erected there-
on and used in connection therewith, not in-
cluding, jbowerer, any passenger or freight
buildings erected thereon. The term "road-
bed" is of plain import and signiflcance, the
bed or foundation on which rests the super-
structure of rails and sleepers. By giving
due effect to the word "main" in the phrase
"main stem," the "roadbed" that is to con-
stitute "main stem" must be deemed the bed
or foundation of the principal tracks of tbe
railroad at the place in question. In re Unit-
ed New Jersey R. & Canal Ck>., 67 Atl. 1075,
1076, 75 N. J. Law, 385.
Act April S, 1906 (P. L. 1906, pp. 122,
220), proYlding a method for the taxation of
railroad property, defines the "main stem" of
a railroad as the roadbed, "not exceeding
100 feet in width, with its rails and sleepers,
and all structures erected thereon and used
in connection therewith, not Including, how-
ever, any passenger or freight buildings
erected thereon." The statute has made a
distinction between the strictly essential right
of way of a railroad, the existence of which
is indispensable to its operation and the re-
maining land of the company used for rail-
road purposes, and this distinction rests upon
the ground, not that these different classes of
property are put to different uses, but upon
the dependence of the seyeral companies up-
on local police protection, and, as compensa-
tion for that protection, the local municipal
governments are permitted to tax that part of
the railroad property not Included within the
"main stem" of the railroad. Central R. Co.
of New Jersey v. State Board of Assessors,
67 Aa 672, 674, 680, 681, 76 N. J. Law, 120.
A "main stem," as the term is used in
P. L. 1884, p. 142, as amended by P. L. 1888,
p. 269, providing for the taxation of rail-
roads, includes the roadbed not exceeding 100
feet in width, with its rails and sleepers, de-
pot buildings used for passengers connected
therewith, and must always exist in every In-
corporated railroad operated for the trans-
portation of freight and passengers, or either.
Jersey City v. State Board of Assessors, 68
AtL 227, 228, 74 N. J. Law, 720.
Land on which railroad tracks are main-
tained, which originally formed a part of tbe
main line, and which were left out of the
main line by a straightening of tracks, but
are continised in opesation for isilnMid pur-
poses, do not form parts of tbe "main stem"
of the principal line of the railroad, and are
not branch railroads having their own main
MAIN TRACK
210
MArNTAlW
stem, but are in contemplation of law tlie
same as a "sidlnif." Jersey City v. State
Board of Assessors, 60 AtL 200, 201, 75 N. J.
Law, STL
XAIirTRAOK
A short piece of railroad track nsed only
for freight, to which defendant's trains were
deflected by a switch, admitting them to de-
fendant's freight depot, and ending at a post,
was not defendant's "main track," within
Laws 1907, p. 475, ( 1, relating to railroad
crossings, and providing that any railroad
company desiring to cross the main track of
another railroad company should, before con-
structing any such crossing, apply to the rail-
road and warehouse commission for permis-
sion so to do, and comply with certain pro-
ceedings therein specified. Chicago, P. & St
L. Ry. Co. V. Jacksonville Ry. ft Light Co.,
91 N. B. 1024, 1027, 245 lU. 155.
In the Revenue Act, | 89 (Laws 1903, pp.
414r^l8, c 73), relating to assessment of rail-
roads, and providing that the valuation of
each mile shall be determined by dividing the
whole value by the number of miles of the
''main track" of each road or line, the words
"main track" are clearly used to distinguish
from side or second track, and turnout, spur,
and warehouse tracks, and not to distinguish
the main line from the branch line. State
ex rel. Platte County v. Sheldon, 118 N. W.
208, 210, 79 Neb. 455.
MAIHUUrD
The word "mainland," in Revisal 1905,
( 3474, forbidding anchoring of a floathouse
for fishing or hunting wild fowl in shoal wa-
ter not more than 300 yards from the main-
land on the west side of Currituck Sound,
means the principal land, as opposed to is-
land. State V. Barco, 63 S. B. 673, 674, 150
N. O. 792.
MAINS
Water mains as personal property, see
Personal Property.
By the word "mains," in Laws 1890, c.
566, p. 1148, § 65, providing that any owner
or occupant of any premises within 100 feet
of any main laid down by any gas light cor-
poration may require it to supply him with
gas, were intended those pipes through which
the company distributed the gas that was
designed to be taken therefrom into the
buildings to be lighted. Moore v. Champlaln
Electric Co., 85 N. Y. Supp. 37, 89, 88 Aw).
Dlv. 289.
MAINTAIN
Bee Establish and Maintain.
Keep and maintain, see Keep.
The word "maintain" has been defined as
meaning to support that which has already
been brought into existence. Kendrick &
Roberts ▼. Warren Bros. Co., 72 AtL 461, 464,
110 Md. 47.
"Maintain" is defined to mean to hold or
ke^ in a particular state or condition, eege-
cially In a state of efllciency ; to support, sus-
tain, not to suffer to decline. Kovachoff v.
St Johns Lumber Co., 121 Pac. 801, 803, 61
Or. 174.
The power to "maintain and operate^
waterworks and electric light plants is not
necessarily incident to or implied in tiie
power to "purchase or construct" waterworks
or electric light plants. The word "main-
tain" does not mean to provide or ooostruct,
but to keep up and preserve. State ez r^
City of ChiUicothe t. Wilder, 98 S. W. 46S,
467, 200 Mo. 97.
Where a boom company agreed with a
riparian owner, during the continuance of a
license granted such company by the owner
to use the river and maintain therein piles
and booms convenient in its business and
releasing the company from all claims for
future damages to plaintiff's land by acts of
defendant in the management of its business,
to maintain a boom of logs along the bi^nk
on the owner's land to protect the banks from
injury, the word "maintain," as used in the
contract, meant to keep up in a particular
state or condition, and did not bind the com-
pany to indemnify the landowntf against
loss, where such maintenance became impos-
sible for a time because of an unprecedented
fiood, which carried away the boom, where the
company had constructed a boom and exercis-
ed due care in its maintenance, and renewed it
within a reasonable time after the flood.
Coleman v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom
Co., 131 N. W. 641, 642, 114 Minn. 443, 35 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1109.
Civ. Code, I 651, which provides that no
canal can be laid out, constructed, or main-
tained so as to obstruct any public highway,
and that the one so maintaining or using such
a canal must repair the bridges, etc., was en-
acted in its present form in 1906. Before
that it provided that every water or canal
corporation must construct and keep in good
repair at all times for public use across their
canal, fiume^ etc., all the bridges that the
county may require. This section was based
on prior statutory provisions, passed nearly
half a century 'before. Pol. Code, | 2694, pro-
vides that when highways are laid across
canals on public lands those using the canals
must prepare them so that the highway may
cross without danger, and section 2737, pro-
viding penalties for obstructing or injuring
highways, contains provisions for bridging
ditches which cross pre-existing highways-
Held that, in view of these provisions the
original act did not impose upon the owners
of canals the duty of bridging them whenever
the public should lay out a road over them,
and that the present section does not impose
that duty, for the word "maintain," which is
MAINTAIN
2U
MAINTAIN
tbe basis of fhe daini, sboiild be eonstmed
merely as a proMbition against maintaining
a canal In sacb a way that it would injure
an existing blgbwaj. City of Madera ▼. Ma-
dera Canal & Irrigation Co., 116 Pac 030»
938, 150 CaL 749.
As elMUi
The cleaning of streets is "^epairing^ ox
''maintaining" them within Laws 1883, p.
262, c. 264, authorizing the street and park
commissioners to build, construct, repair, and
maintain highways in the city, in view of
Laws 1803, c 59, requiring towns to keep
their highways in good repair, suitable for
travel thereon, and creating a liability for
fine and responsibility for damages sulfered
by travelers from defects in highways; tor
tbe presence of rubbish, dirt, and ashes in a
street may cause it to be in a bad state of re-
pair and in an unsuitable condition for trav-
el, and any act that is reasonably necessary
to put or keep the street in good repair suit-
able for travel thereon is ^'repairing^ or
"maintaining" the street Connor v. Ctiy of
Manchester, 00 Atl. 4S6» 487, 73 N. H. 233.
As e—fB— am aetlom
The word "maintained" In the Bmploy-
ers' liability' Act, providing that no action
for injuries thereunder shall be ''maintained"
nnleas notice of the time, place, and cause of
injury is given to the employer, is synony-
mous with the word *'begun" or "commenced"
and tbe statute makes the giving of such
notice a condition precedent to the bringing
of an action under it Grasso v. Holbrook,
Cabot A Daly Contracting Co., 92 N. Y. Sopp.
101, 103, 102 App. Div. 49 (citing Burbank
V. Inhabitants of Auburn, 31 Me. 500 ; Boutil-
ler V. Steamboat Milwaukee, 8 Biinn. 97, 105
[GIL 72]; Smith v. Lyon, 44 Conn. 178;
Byera v. Bourret, 04 CaL 73, 28 Pac. 61;
Merta v. aty of Brooklyn, 11 N. Y. Supp. 778,
aflirmed 128 N. Y. 617, 28 N. B. 253).
The word "maintain" in a statute in ref-
erence to actions comprehends the institu-
tion as well as the support of the action,
though it may be used to express a meaning
corresponding to its more restricted defini-
tion. National Mines Co. v. Sixth JudicUl
Dist Court Humboldt County, 116 Pac. 906,
1000, 34 Nev. 67.
A prohibition against "maintaining" an
action impUes a prohibition against beginning
it, for the beginning of the action is one of
the necessary steps in maintaining it A for-
eign corporation, incapacitated from suing at
the time of an Institution of a suit by it on
the ground that it has not obtained the li-
cense required by Rev. St 1890, H 1025, 1026
(Ann. St 1906, pp. 888, 890), cannot cure the
incapacity by thereafter taking out a license.
Amalgamated Zinc A Lead Co. v. Bay State
Zinc Min. Co., 120 S. W. 31, 34, 221 Mo. 7, 23
U B. A. (N. S.) 402.
As eomtlauie am aotleK
The word ''maintained,'* as used In sec-
tion 64, c. 66^ R. 8., means to prosecute to a
conclusion an action already begun. Shurtr
leff V. Bedlos, 82 Aa 64fi, 648^ 109 Me. 62.
The verb 'Maintain" in pleading has a
distinct technical signification. It signifies
to support what has already been brought
into existence. Under a statute requiring
partnerships transacting business under a
designatiou not showing the persons interest-
ed to file a certificate stating the names of all
the members, and to publish it once a week
for four weeks, etc., and providing that per-
sons doing business as partners contrary to
the statute shall not maintain any action
until they have filed the certificate and made
the publication therein required, where an
action is brought by a partnership, the firm
name of which does not indicate all the part-
ners, failure to file the required certificate is
matter of defense, and must be set up in the
answer by way of abatement; but if the
requirement as to the filing and publication
are complied with before the defense is in-
terposed, it will be sufficient, even though
the publication was not completed at tbe
time the action was commenced. Nicholson
V. Auburn Gold Mln. A Mill. Co., 92 Pac. 651,
6 Cal. App. 547 (quoting California Savings
A Loan Soc. v. Harris, 43 Pac. 625, 111 Cal.
133, 138).
The statute requiring foreign corpora-
tions to file a designation of a person on
whom process may be served within 60 days
after commencing business within the state,
and providing that unless it does so it shall
not "maintain" any action in the courts of
the state, does not deprive foreign corpora-
tions of the right at any time to commence
an action for the protection of its property
or the enforcement of its rights, and It is
within its power at any time after the com-
mencement of the action to comply with the
statute and thereafter maintain such action.
Black T. Vermont Marble Co., 82 Pac. 1060,
1062, 1 Cal. App. 718.
It was held in Ckrson-Band Co. v. Stem,
31 & W. 772. 129 Mb. 381, 32 L. R. A, 420.
that the word "maintain" meant literally *'to
hold by the hand," and in its ordinary use,
"to uphold." "to sustain," "to keep up"; and
in pleading it means "to support what has
already been brought Into existence." Tri-
State Amusement Co. v. Forest Park High-
lands Amusement Co., 90 S. W. 1020, 1022,
192 Mo. 404, 4 L. R A. (N. S.) 688, 111 Am.
St Bep. 511, 4 Ann. Cas. 806.
Under a statute providing that "no ac-
tion shall be 'maintained' " by a foreign cor-
poration so long as It fails to comply with
the law, when considered In connection with
other provisions of the act imposing penal-
ties on ofilcers and corporations for failing
to comply with the law, and providing that a
failure to comply shall not affect the valid-
MAINTAIN
212
MAINTAIIf
Ity of contracts made by sacb oorporatloxis,
an actfon hf m flofeign eoiporatton mwt be
stayed during tbe peziod. of ita noncompli-
ance with the law» on DOBOompUaace being
properly pleaded in abatement; the word
"maintain" carrying a different meaning
from "institate" or "begin," and implying
that an action has been begun before it can
be maintained. National Fertilizer CSb. v.
Fall River Five Gents Sav. Bank, 82 N. SL
671, 672, 106 Mass. 458, 14 lU R. A. (N. SO
561, 13 Ann. Gas. 510.
The worda ''may mgtntihi an acttoB,"
as generally used, mean may soeceasflilly
maintain an action. Qreentiee v. Wallace,
83 Pac. 696, 58», 77 Kan. 149 (citiBg and dto-
tinguishing In re Ma«ey, 42 Pac. 866, 66
Kan. 120).
As liaTliic eoatrol and onstody of plaee
A hotel porter who, for a gnest of the
hotel, receiyed and stored in a room of the
house a barrel of bottled beer belonging to
the guest, and who afterwards, as required
by the guest, iced the liquor and served it at
the guest's room, where it was drunk by him
and his friends, was guilty of maintaining
a place where persons were permitted to re-
sort for the purpose of drinking intoxicating
liquor as a beverage, contrary to the provi-
sions of Laws 1901, c. 232, f 1 (Gen. Stat
1909, I 4387). State V. Boss, 121 Pac. 906,
909, 86 Kan. 799.
As •veetioB
The word "maintain^ ordinarily means
to preserve something which is already in
existence; but, considering that, by the use
of the words "unless one of than chooses to
let his land lie without fencing," Giv. Gode,
I 1301, declaring that coterminous owners
are mutually bound equally to maintain the
boundaries and monuments between them
and the fences between them, unless one of
them chooses to let his land lie without fenc-
ing, applies to land not fenced, it is compre-
hensive enough, in the light of the subject-
matter, to include the erection, as well as the
maintenance, of the fences. Hoar t. Hen-
nessy, 74 Paa 452, 464, 455, 29 Mont 253.
Xeo]^
See Keep.
As keep la repair
Where plaintiff, under a contract with
abutting property owners, constructed a
pavement and agreed to "maintain and keep
it in repair" for a period of five years, and
after the pavement was completed it was
torn up and damaged by the bursting of a
water main beneath the surface of the street,
plalntiff*s contract to "maintain and keep
in repair" did not impose on it the duty of
repairing a damage of the kind in question,
but merely contemplated such repairs as
use and wear ml^t render necessary. Hence
in repairing the pavement plaintiff was a
mere volunteer and could not recover dam-
ages of Uie dty. Gteen Blver AspHalt Co.
y. aty of 9t Loola, 87 & W. 986, 966^ 188
Ho. 576.
The word "maintain,** within Gen. St
1902, i 888, requiring widows to "maintain"
and keep in repair the property set apart to
them as dower, does not mean "to provide"
or "construct," but means to "keep up, not
to suffer to fftil or declihe"; 'Hteep in repair"
and "maintain** as used in the statute being
synonymous. Ferguson v. Rochfeid, 79 Alt
177, 178, 84 Cbnn. 202, Ann. Gas. 1912B. 1212.
The word "maintain" la practically the
same thing as "repair," which means to re-
store to a sound or good 8tate» after decay,
injury, dilapidation, os partial deetroction,
aad, when used in lefereace to railroad right
of way, Inolndea the idea of keeping the right
of way in soeh a condition that It can be
used for the purpose for which it waa In-
tended. MLwouri, K. A T. R« Go. of Texas v.
Bryan (Tax.) 107 S. W. 672, 676 (citing Yer-
din y. aty of St Louis [Mo.] 27 & W. 447).
See Make.
As operattoar
The word "matntain,** as need in a con-
tract by which the owners of an adjoining
office building agreed od a common entrance
and hallway on the center line dividing the
premises, and to pay the expense of keeping
up and "maintaining" common conveniences
including an' elevator, was held to Inctnde the
operation of such elevator, and not simply to
mean to put it in and have it stand idle at
the behest of one of the parties, which was
contrary to the constmetion given the con-
tract by sharing the expense of operation.
Globe Ins. Go. v. Wayne, 80 N. B. 13» 18,
76 Ohio St 461.
PennaaeBoe
Defendant railroad in May, 1848, cove-
nanted with plaintiffs' predecessors, their
heirs and assigns, to construct and maintain
a turnout and side track at Dorse/s Run, to
take up and set down at the siding by de-
fendant's passenger cars all persons going to
and from the farm then occupied by the first
parties and to leave at the siding to be un-
loaded all freight weighing at least 3,000
pounds shipped to the first parties on which
the cost of transportation had been paid at
the place of loading. Defendant complied
with its covenant until 1907, when it con-
structed a cut-off on its main stem by which
a large part of the right of way over plain-
tiff's land was abandoned, when it discontin-
ued the turnout, and refused longer to main-
tain a station at tliat point Held, that the
word ''maintain" as used in such covenant
did not require defendant to continue the
turnout and station permanently, and that
the length of time during which the covenant
had been complied with constituted a sub-
stantial performance thereof^ so that the
MA INTAIK
213
HAIKTEVrANCV
railroad cempany was not tffthle for dam-
•gee tor Its breach. Whalen ▼. Baltlmoro
AO. R. Co., 76 Aa lee, lar, xn Ud isr.
As retaild or roeosstmet
The word ^'maintain** in a ooiitraet for
tbe exteDfilon of a railway biaach from a
railroad company's railroad to the minea of
a mining company, whereby the mining com-
pany agreed to construct the sabstracture^
and the railroad company to lay the track of
the branch railroad, and to "maintain** and
operate tt% same, leqaires the railroad com-
pany to reconstruct a bridge oonttnieted by
tbe mintng company after the bridge was
washed away by an eztraoidlnaiy flwshet,
thoogh the bridge would become the mining
company'a property after being completed
under the contnict whtch coatemplated that
the stmctnre shonld remain the mining com*
pany's property. LonlsTille ft N. R. Ck>. v.
United States Iron Go*. 101 8. W. 414, 419,
118 Temi. 194.
As sapplyias feed
Laws 1906, p. 14t & IS, approprlaftlng
money tor *^ahitalBlng^ the ezeentive real*
dence, does not authorise the employment of
any part of the anm so appropriated for the
pnrduLse of provisions to be used these.
Bailey ▼. Kelly, 79 Pac 788, TO Kan. 809.
XAimfEifAJfOB
The Kingston dty charter created a
board of water connnlfistoners, with power,
with the consent of the common conndl, to
constmct and maiptain a waterworks sys-
tem. Section 98 provided that the monaya
derived therefrom should be applied to the
payment of the cost of maintaining, operat-
ing, and extending the waterworks, and to
the payment of prlnoJipal and Interest on
bonds as they fall due. The board, by section
d9, was given power to keep the system in
operation independent of the city council,
aod to fix and collect water ratea^ and make
and enforce rules and regulations. By sec-
tion 101 the moneys derived from water rates
and penalties were required to be paid to the
dty treasurer, to be credited to the water
fund and applied to the payment of expenses
of ordinary maintenance and management,
the balance, if any, to the payment of prin-
cipal and interest on bonds, and any surplus
still remaining to be used for any lawful
city purpose. Held, that additional filters,
requiring an expenditure of $16,235, was not
an ordinary "maintenance** expense, and that
the board had no power to incur such ex-
pense without the consent of the city council.
Coykendall v. Harrison, 134 N. Y. Supp. 440,
450, 150 App. Div. 46.
Oreatiom of wmmd
Const art 8, | 9, provldlBg that the Lep-
ialatm-e may pass local 1b\vs tor the ^'mainte^
nance^ of public roads wifhont the local no-
tice ordlaafrtly required fbr special Ikws, is
APPUcaMe* to thw Shelby oounty special road
law, which provides for the creation as well
aa maintenance of a road aystoOL Be parte
Cboks (Tex.) 186 8. W. 180, UL
BstaMlshme&t of liiclkwar
Oonst art 3, 1 56, snbd. 6, dedares that
the Legislature shall not, excetpt as other-
wise iMPOvlded In the Oonatltution, pass any
local or speoial laws authoilxlng the laying
out, <q;>enlng, altering, or maintaining of
roads. Artlde U, | 2, doclatw that tbe lay-
ing oat» constructing, and repairing oC county
roads shall be provided for by general lawa
Article 8, i 9, declares that the Legislature
may authorize an additional ad valorem tax
for the further maintenance of the public
roads, and that the legislature may pass
local laws for the maintenance of public
roads or highways without the local notice re-
quired by special or local laws. Section 9,
art 8, was added to the other provisions by
amendment Held, that the word "mainte-
nance" as used in article 8, i 0, Induded
the laying out and constructing of roads, and
hence Acts 24th Leg. (Laws 1895) p. 213, c.
132, creating a road system of Dallas county,
was not unconstitutionaL Dallas County v.
Plowman, 91 8. W. 221. 222, 99 Tex. 509.
As relnUld om veeoAstmot
Ky. St i 1840, giving the ilaeal cowt
power to appropriata county funds Ihnr the
maintenance of hlgbwaya, and aeetton 4806»
giving the fiscal court general diarge and
supervision of tKb pubtte roads with anttier-
Itgr to repair samh, the fiscml court had power
to raeoBfllaiiet a turnpike road* Hanlon v.
Gleary, 181 & W. 968, 964^ 142 Ky. 46.
State iAsUtutiom
The provision for ''maintenance," In
Laws 1907, p. 18, c. 28, maklag appropria-
tions for the Institution of the Feeble-Minded
at Grafton, does not Include employe's wages,
fhel, etc., for which spedflc sums were ap-
propriated, but does Include the cost of food
and clothing of inmates; there being no spe-
dflc appropriation for these items. State v.
Lewis. 119 N. W. 1037, 1039, 18 N. D. 125.
MAHrTBH AHOB (Of Kaaual Trainliig
Seliool)
A will recited that it was the purpose of
the husband of testatrix to found an institu-
tion wherein sound business principles might
be taught, and where pupils might be fitted
for maimfxturing and- buslnesB careers, and
that to carry out his wlshea she made a do-
nation to prepare^ construct, and maintain a
manual training school to teach cooking, sew-
ing, and domestic economy to girls, and all
things of mechanical and other technical
work to young men, and to teach both boys
and girls such things as are usually taught
in modern manual training schools, and re-
quired the dty to raise a specified gum fbr
the purpose, and provided that thereupon the
property should be transferred to the dty to
perpetually matotalo the school. WM, that
MAmXENANCE
214
MAINTEKAKOB
the will contemplated the "maintenance of
a manual training scboor' within St 18d8, |
496b, as amended by Laws 1007, c. 503, and
the charter of the city (Laws 1891, c. 59), au*
thorlzlng the maintenance of schools of man-
ual training, so that the dty could accept
the donation and comply with the conditions.
Maxcy r. aty of Oahkosh, 128 N. W. 899,
905, 144 Wis, 238, 81 L. E. A. (N. S.) 787.
BCAniTENAirOB (Of OAee)
Under Stock Corporation Law (Consol.
Laws 1909, c. 59) ( 33, which provides that
every foreign stock corporation, having an
office for the transaction of business In the
state, shall keep therein a stockbook, con-
taining the names of stockholders, the num-
ber of shares held by them, and the amounts
paid thereon, which shall be open for the In-
spection of stockholders, Judgment creditors,
and certain authorized state officers, and
that. If any such foreign stock corporation
has a transfer agent, such stockbook may be
deposited with such agent, to be open to the
same Inspection, subject to a penalty on re-
fusal, Imposes such duty only upon stock
corporations having an office for the trans-
action of business In this state; and the
mere fact that a foreign corporation, whldi
does not own, rent, or occupy an office of Its
own within the state, has a transfer agent
for the convenience of stockholders, does not
constitute "the maintenance of an office for
the transaction of business," and hence the
transfer agent is not subject to a p^ialty up-
on refusal to allow Inspection of the stock-
book. Wadsworth ▼. Equitable Trust Oo.
of New York, 138 N. T. Supp. 842, 153 App.
Dlv. 737.
MAINTENAKOE (Of Persona)
Klrby's Dig. § 3803, requiring a guard-
ian to give bond to faithfully conduct a sale,
etc., applies only to sales for reinvestment,
and a sale to discharge a mortgage on other
land was not a sale for reinvestment, though
the petition and order for sale designated it
as such; the words "education" and "mainte-
nance" In another statute authorizing sales
being broad enough to authorize a sale to
protect the ward's estate. Harper v. Smith,
116 S. W. 674, 675, 89 Ark, 284, 131 Am. St
Rep. 93.
Testator devised land to her husband,
with power to sell and to have the proceeds,
but charging the land or its proceeds with
the maintenance of a nephew, 14 years old
when, the will was made, and with the ex-
pense of preparing him for "any profession
he may wish" or testatrix's husband might
"think best," and reciting that it was suppos-
ed that the charge would take ail the land or
its proceeds, but that, If it did not, the re-
mainder was left to the husband to give to
the nephew or "to dispose of as he may
wish." Held, that the husband took a fee-
simple title subject only to the charge for the
nephew's maintenance and education; that
the nephew took no Interest in the surplus
proceeds; that the "maintenance" contem-
plated was maintenance during the nephew's
minority; and that he, having reached his
majority before testatrix's death, is only «i-
titled to such part of the proceeds of the land
on the husband's death as may be necessary
to educate him for a profession, if he in
good faith desires to be so educated. Knlgbt
V. Collins (Ky.) 118 S. W. 181, 133.
PerauuM&t alimony symomymoaji
" 'Maintenance' and 'permanent alimony'
are synonymous terms and mean an allow-
ance in money to be recovered on decree of
divorce from the party in fsvlt for the sup-
port of the Innocent party." Huffman v.
Huffman, 86 Pae 598, 095^ 47 Or. eiO, U4
Am. St Rep. 948.
As support
The "maintenance'* of dependents is such
support as consists In the furnishing of food,
clothing, lodging, or education. ''Bfalnte-
nance^' in the matter of clothing does not re-
fer to occasional gifts of dotiilng, but such
a regular supply of Nothing as may be rea-
sonably necessary to make the body oomfortr
able. Western Oommerdal Travelers' Ass'n,
V. Tennent, 106 8. W. 1073, 1077, 128 Mo.
App. 541 (quoting Alexander v. Parker, 83
N. B. 183, 144 riL 855, 19 Ia R. A« 187).
MAIHTEKJJfOE <Of Suits)
See, also, Champerty.
Maintenance is an officious intermed-
dling in a suit that in no way belongs to ooe
by assisting either party, with money or oth-
erwise, to prosecute or defend. It is said
to be an offense against good morals, in that
it keeps alive strife and perverts the remedial
powers of the law into an engine of oppres-
sion. Lacey v. Davis (Iowa) 98 N. W. 366,
367 (quoting 6 Cyc p. 850) ; Smith v. Hart-
seU, 63 S. E. 172. 174, 150 N. C. 71, 22 L. R
A. (N. S.) 203; Qelo v. jPflster & Yogel Leath-
er Oo., 113 N. W. 69, 70, 132 Wis. 575 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Andrews t.
Thayer, 30 Wis. 228, 233) ; Mud Valley Oil
& Gas Co. V. Hitchcock, 81 N. B. Ill, 112, 40
Ind. App. 105 (citing Anderson's Law Diet;
4 Black. Ck)mm. 135). 'rThe terms of this
definition obviously do not Include all kinds
of aid in the prosecution of defenses of an-
other's cause, and it has therefore always
been held not to extend to persons having an
interest in the thing in variance, nor to pe^
sons acting in the lawful exercise of their
profession as counsel or attorneys at law.
Nor does the doctrine of the common law as
to maintenance apply to persons who either
have a legal interest in the suit prosecuted by
them, or who act under the bona fide belief
that they have." Qelo v. Pflster & Yogel
Leather Co., 113 N. W. 69, 70, 132 Wis. 575
(quoting and adopting definition in Davles v.
Stowell, 47 N. W. 870, 78 Wiai 336, 10 L. B.
mahttenakgb
21fi
MAJORITY
A. 19(9. Such contractB are unenforceable at
common law, as theiy tend to perTert the pro-
cess of the law Into an engine of oppression.
Mod YaXksy OU 4 Gas Oo. ▼. Hltcboodk, 81 N.
IL lU, 112, 40 Ind. App; lOB.
Satire want of iatorest
''Maintenance'* is an offidoua intermed-
dling in a suit that in no wise belongs to one,
by maintaining or assisting either party with
money or otherwlae» to prosecute or defend
it ''Champerty/' which la a ^ecies of main-
tenance^ iB the unlawful maintaining of a
suit in consideration of some bargain to hare
a iHurt of the thing In dispute or some profit
out of it ; the champertor agreeing to carry
on the suit at hla own expense. Where^ how-
evtf, the person promoting the suit of an«
other has any interest in the subject-mattert
he is Justified in participating and la not
guilty of oflicious intermeddling within the
definition of "champerty" or "maintenance."
Finlen ▼. Ueinze, 73 Pac. 123, 127, 28 Mont
548.
Ohaatpevty dtoilaiisvielied
'Maintenance" is d^taied as an ''officious
intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs
to one, by assisting dther party, witiH money
or otherwise, to prosecute or def^id." The
offoise nuiy be committed by stepping in aft-
er litigation has been begun, as by encourag-
ing and aiding ita origin. "Champerty" is
generally treated in connection with "main-
tenance." The champertor has in yiew a
profit to himself in a share of the spoils ot
the litigation. The maintalner is more of a
voluntary intermeddler and stirs up the
Btrife for the love of it He is described as
an officious intermeddler. In other words,
he interferes where he has no business.
Breeden y. Frankford Marine, Accident ft
Plate Glass Ins. Co., 85 S. W. 930, 931, 110
Mo. App. 312 (citing Duke y. Harper, 66 Mo.
51, 37 Am. Rep. 314).
Aldlas poov aaa
The law of "maintenance," as I under-
stand it, upon the modem construction, is
confined to cases where a man improperly,
tor the purpose of stirring up litigation and
strife, encourages others either to bring ac-
tions or to make defenses which they haye
no right to make. To giye financial aid to
a poor suitor who is prosecuting a meiltoil-
ous cause of action does not constitute
"maintenance," in the absence of any bar-
gain to share the recoyery, and is not yiola-
tive of law or public policy. Jahn y. Cham-
pagne Lumber Co., 157 Fed. 407, 418 (citing
Davles y. Stowell, 47 N. W. 371, 78 Wis. 334,
338^ 10 Ia B. A. 190).
MAJOR LEAGUE
0%ree organicationa, the National League,
the American League, and the National
Association, include In their membership
practically eyery professional baseball dub
In ih» United States. The first two are
known as the "ma|Jor leagues," and the last
as the "minor league." Kelly r. Herman,
155 Fed. S87, 888.
MAJORITY
See Requisite Majority.
SeOb also. Votes Cast
By the word "majority'' la meant the
greater number; more than half of the whole
number or a glyen number or group. A ma-
jority of yoters is a greater part of sudi
yoters. MUls y. Hallgren, 124 N. W. 1077,
1079, 146 Iowa, 215.
L. O. L. I 4052, subd. 14, authorizing
selection of a school building site by a *'ma-
Jorlty of the yoters pre^nt" at a school meetr
Ing, requires a yote of more than one-half
of those present, and not a mere plurality.
Baxter y. Davis, 113 Pac. 438, 58 Or. 109
(citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4286).
Whereyer the words **the council for
the time being shall, by a majority vote of
all the members elected," or words of like im*
port, occur In the charter of a municipal
corporation, relatlye to the membera of the
common council thereof, they will be con*
strued to mean a majority of the whole num-
ber of members to which the common coun-
cil is entitled under the charter. Wood y.
Gordon, 62 S. E. 261, 262, 58 W. Va. 321 (dis-
tinguishing Osburn y. Staley, 5 W. Va. 85, 13
Am. Rep. 640).
In a will devising property to four trus-
tees named "and to the survivors of them,"
and empowering them to act, "or the 'major-
ity* of them," "the term 'majority* has ref-
erence to a majority of the survivors and not
to a majority of the full number of trustees.**
Bascom v. Weed, 105 N« Y. Supp. 459, 466,
58 Misc. Bep. 496.
Under chapter 841, p^ 624, Laws 1889,
the word "majority** means a majority of all
votes cast at tiie caucus, including blank bal-
lots. State ex rel. Dietrich y. Patterson, 96
N. W. 1185, 119 Wis. 62.
As majority of entiro body
As used in Ky. St 1903 (Charter of Clt-
ies of the Second Class) i 3044, providing
that a majority of members elect of both
the board of aldermen and the general coun-
cil shall constitute a quorum for the transac-
tion of business in Joint session, a "majority
of both boards** means a majority of the
members taken as a whole, and not a majori-
ty of each board considered separately. Dav-
is y. Clans, 100 S. W. 263, 265, 125 Ky. 4.
As autjovity of tikoso aotliis as m body
im sossioa
. Where a city charter provided that the
mayor should nominate all appointive officers,
and that his appointment should be final un-
less within five days thereafter a "majority
of the common council** should file objections
MAXORITT
216
MAJORITY
In wiitiug, the term "majority ci tbe conunoa
councir' did not mean the common council
acting aa a bo<l7 in session, but the prorlsion
was satisfied by the filing of objectloiM by a
majority of the body without reference to
the time or manner of their action. State
ex rel. Panlette t. Bandel, 97 S. W. 222, 223,
121 Mo. App. 616.
The statute authorizing majority of the
board to hii* a teacher means a majority
acting at a legal meeting, and not a majority
of the directors acting separately. Johnson
T. Dye, 127 S. W. 413, 414, 142 Mo. ^p. 424.
As majority of those entitled to Toto
The words '^majority of the Qualified
voters and taxpayers of any school district,'*
as used in Rey. St 1899, S 9772 (Ana St 1906,
p. 4488), providing that when a majority of
the qualified voters and taxpayers of any
school district, at any annual or special meet-
ing called for that purpose, shall deem it
necessary to have additional ground for
sdiool purposes, the board of directors may
proceed to condemn, eta, meant that tiie
proposition must receive a majority of all
the qualified voters and taxpayers of the dis-
trict and that a mere majority of all those
present, unless it also be a majority of all
the qualified voters and taxpayers of the dis-
trict, is insufficient School District Mo. 3 v.
OelUen, 108 8. W. 629, 530, 209 Mo. 464.
As majoritj of losal TOtes oast
Under St 1912, c. 659, pt 3, i 1, revising
the charter of the city of Salem, which pro-
vided that the act should be submitted to the
registered voters at the state election in 1912,
for a vote primarily on the question whether
the present charter should be repealed, and
secondarily on the question whether, If it was
repealed, the new charter should be plan 1 or
plan 2, and that if, on a "majority of the bal-
lots cast," the votes should be for a repeal,
the plan receivinir the largest number of
votes cast should be adopted as the city char-
ter, the ballot on which the questions were
printed contained, besides tiie names of a
large number of candidates for state and
national offices, questions upon the adop-
tion of constitutional amendments, and the
total number of ballots cast was 6,966, of
which, on the question of repealing the char-
ter 1,676 were blank, 2,240 were against re-
peal, and 3,050 were for repeat Held that.
In view of the legislative i)olicy to make an
acceptance of a dty charter turn upon the af-
firmative votes of a majority of those voting
on the question, the word "ballots" was syn-
onymous with "votes," and that only the
ballots carrying votes on the question of re-
peal vfera to be eounted, and hence that, «s
there was a "majority of the iMillets cast" in
favor of repeal, the old charter was repealed,
and the plan receiviBg the larger number of
votes was adopted as the new charter.
Cashman v. Bntwiatle, 100 N. B. 68^ 69, 218
Mass. 163.
ne **nkajorlty of ballots" necessary, un-
der Rcrr. St 1898, | 866, to determine the
question of tecorporatiosi of a village means
the majoEitj of the legal ballots cast on tho
proposition and not a majority of those who
vote or attempt to vote but whose ballots are
properly rejected because illegal. State ex
rel. Town of Holland v. Lammers, 86 N. W.
677, 679, 89 N. W. 601, 113 Wis. 398.
Am 9naJo«l*y of aworutt
Under a by-law of a sooifil oovporation
proividing that aa assessment eoold be made
by a majority of the executive oommittee,
which consisted of 20 members, 6 of whom
constituted a quorum, by a "majority of the
committee^* was meant a majority of the
whole connulttee, and not a majority of a
quorum of 6. Rogers v. Boston Club, 91 N.
B. 321, 322, 826, 206 Mass. 261, 28 U B. A.
(N. B.) 748.
Where an orphan asylum claimed, for
support of children committed to Its care by
a county after the adoption of a resolution by
a majority vote of a quorum of the board of
supervisors, that such children be removed
therefrom, and, after demand for the children
and refusal to surrender, no recovery could
be had, since Laws 1895, c 267, t 2, authoris-
es a county, by a majority vote of its county
board of supervisors, to remove such children,
to the support of which it contributes, and
Rev. St S 665, declares that a majority of the
supervisors entitled to a seat constitute a
quorum for the transaction of business, and
make all questions determinable by a majori-
ty of the supervisors present, unless other-
wise provided. St ^milianus Orphan Asyl-
um V. Milwaukee County, 82 N. W. 704, 705,
107 Wis. 80.
As majority of those present and vot-
ins
Rev. St 1899, § 9750, subd. 11 (Ann. St
1906, p. 4470), providing that in each case a
"majority vote of the voters who are resident
taxpayers" of the district shall be necessary
to remove a site nearer the center of the dis-
trict means a majority of the taxpayers of
the district present and voting in the elec-
tUHL Tucker v. McKay, lU & W. 867, 868,
131 Mo. App. 72&
As majority of those Totias
The phrase "majority vote of legal vot-
ers," in Sp. Act Feb. 26, 1903, providing that
it shall take effect when approved by a ma-
jority vote of the legal voters within the dis-
trict, means, according to Act March 18,
1903, a majority vote of the legal voters vot-
ing. Ii'oy V. Gardiner Water Dist, 56 Atl.
201, 202, 98 Me. 82.
"A majority of the registered voters of
the dty," as used in Acts 1889, c. 8963, S 12,
means a majofity of tiifr qualified electors
who actually voted at the election in ques-
tion, and not a majortty of all the voters wbo-
had the right to vote; those voters who are
MAiORlTT
MT
MAJORITY
fiilent being supposed to assent that the ^ech
tion shall be determined by those who vote.
Bell ▼. atj of Ocala, 60 Sooth. 68S, 684, 62
Fla. 431.
OonBt art 10, t Ot does not provide the
procedure for levying a tax for sdiool dia-
trlct pnrpoaea In excess of five mills on the
dollar, and not exceeding ten additional
mllla, bat leates tiie same to be provided for
by tbe Legislature, provided that a tax In
excess of five mills shall not be levied except
on condition that a majority of the voters
of the district voting at aa election of the
district vote fer same. Ckmst art 10^ t ^
does not require that a levy in excess of five
mills on the dollar in any year for scheol
district porpoeae, not exceeding fifteen mills,
shall receive a majority of the votes of the
voters in the district, but only a majority
of said voters voting at the election. Tllley
V. Overton, 116 Pac 945, 948, 29 Okl. 292.
Const f 41, providing that no county
leat shall be removed except by a "majority"
▼ote of the qualified electors of the county,
does not mean a majority of all the qualified
electors, but merely a majority of the votes
cast Bz parte Owens, 42 South. 676, 148
Ala. 402, 8 Ia B. A. (N. S.) 888, 121 Am. St
Rep. 67.
Oonst art IS, | 6, provides that no coun-
ty shall incur any indebtedness or liability
for a single purpose to an amount exceeding
$10,000 without the approval of a majority of
the electors, voting at an election to be pro-
vided by law. Rev. Codes, | 2983, declares
tbat county boards shall not borrow money
for any single purpose to an amount exceed-
ing $10,000 without the approval of a major-
ity of the electors of the county and without
first having submitted the question of a loan
to a vote of such electors; and section 2067
declares that, if a majority of the votes cast
are in favor of the loan, then the board may
make the loan and issue the bonds. Hild,
that the amctmeiit ef section 2988 was not
httended to add any raquirement to that pre-
■erlbed by tbe Oonstitutlon, and that the
words "majority of the electors of the ooun-
ty," as uaed therein, sboold toe censtmed to
mean "a nuijority of the votes cast" Merse
V. Granite County, 119 Pac. 286, 891, 44
Mont T&
As Mftjevity vetliic en pAvtiewlav Issue
Where the language of an act is "a ma-
jority of the votes cast," or ••a majority of
all votes cast," it meani a majority of the
votes cast on the question submitted; and
that, Aether the votes are cast at a general
or special Section. Territory ex rel. Mc^
Otilre V. Board of Trustees for High School
«f Logan County, 76 Pac 166, 167, 18 Ckl.
606.
As used hi Const | 111, providing that
county emrtB shall have Juilsdictien of cer-
tahi civn and ertminal causes ^'whenever
tbe voters of any caantr having a pepulatioB
of two tlieasand or over shall dedds by a
majority vote that they desire the Jurisdic-
tion of that court increased," the words "ma-
jority vote^ mean a majority of all votes cast
on the question of increased Jurisdiction, and
not a majority of all the votea east at the
election. State v. Fabrkk, 121 N. W. 66, 66,
18 N. D. 402.
As used in Const f 168, providing that
changes in the boundaiiee of organised coun-
ties Shan be submitted to the electors of the
county or counties to be affected, and be
adopted by a '%iaJority of all the legal votes
cast" at such election, the phrase "votes
cast" means the total of the separate votes,
or expressions of voters^ preference for or
against such a Aange, and should be limited
to mean the votee cast on that propositiOfL
To effect such dbange requires merely a ma-
jority of the votes cast upon the question of a
change, and not a majority of the highest
number of votes cast for any candidate, or
upon any proposition voted upon at the elec-
tion, since to hold otherwise would be to
give as mudi effect to the act of an elector
who did not vote on such change as that of
one who voted in the negative. State v.
Blaisdell, 119 N. W. 860, 861, 18 N. D. SI.
Pub. Laws 1903, p. 327, I 73, provides for
submission to the voters of a dty, at the next
principal election after a resolution of the
city council for issue of bonds, of the ques-
tion of approval of the resolution, and states
that the election ofBcers shall report the num-
ber of votes in favor of Issuing the bonds
and the number against such issue, and that,
if it shall be found that the resolution has
been approved by "a majority of the voters
voting at such election," the bonds may be
issued. Gen. Election liaw (P. L. 1806, p.
319), 1 185, provides that, when the approval
of a "inajority of the legal voters" is re-
quired by a statute before a proceeding un-
der it tfiall be lawful, the meaning of the
wards 'lepd voten" in the etatvte ahaU be
"persona entitled to vote and who do vote
* * ^ on the queatton or proposition sub-
mitted," and that the persons who do not
vote at such eleetkm shall not be considered
on the question of what Is a majority of the
legal voters with respect to the propositton
sQbmitted. Held, that "a majority of the
voters voting at such election" required for
approval of a resolution for bond issue means
only a majority of the persons voting on so^
proposition, and not a majority of the per-
sons voting at sucft Section on that and other
queetlons. Mnrpliy ▼. City of homg Branch
(N. J.) 61 Att. 693, 694.
By "majority" le meant a majeaity of the
whole number of electors voting at the elec-
tion, and not a majority of the votes recorded
for or against license. In re BHection Con-
teet, 186 N. W. 1031, 1062, 118 ^iinn. 871.
Where a qucattois la rsquiied to be sub-
mitted at a certain regular election, and ia
UAJOBITT
218
MAKS
mad^ to det>end on a "majority of the YOtes
cast iEit such election," a majority of all the
votes cast at the election Is meant* and not
merely a majority of the votes cast on that
particular question. Santa Rosa v. Bower,
75 Pac 829, 830, 142 CaL 289.
The words *'8uch election," as used in
the section of the Constitution which pro-
vides how constitutional amendments shall be
passed through the General Assembly for sub-
mission to the people, and for publication
for at least six months 'Immediately preced-
ing the next general election for Senators
and Representatives, at which time the same
shall be submitted to the electors of the state
for approval or rejection, and, if a majority
of the electors voting in such election adopt
such amendments, the same shall become a
part of the Constitution,*' evidently refer to
the general election for Senators and Rep-
resentatives, and the "majority" necessary
to adopt an amendment must be the major-
ity of electors voting at the general election
for Senators and Representatives, and not
a mere majority voting on the subject of the
amendment Rice v. Palmer, 96 S. W. 396,
400, 78 Ark. 432 (citing Knight v. Shelton,
134 JFed. 423; State ex rel. McClurg v. Pow-
ell, 77 Miss. 645, 27 South. 927, 48 L. R. A.
662).
Laws 1905, p. 669, c 397, { 10, providing
for submission of the proposition of establish-
ing county high schools, and that, when "a
majority of the voters voting" in any coun-
ty shall be in fb.vor of such proposition, the
provisions of that act shall apply thereto,
requires, where the election is a general one,
a majority of all the voters voting on any
office or proposition at such election. Board
of Education of City of Humbolt v. Klein,
99 Pac 222, 223, 79 Kan. 209.
As determined Iby easting vote of pre-i
■tdlns officer
Stamford City Charter (18 Sp, Laws, p.
1152), I 8, creates a board of appropriation
and apportionment for the condemnation of
land required by the dty, consisting of eight
members; the mayor being a member ex
officio and president of the board, with pow*
er to vote only in case of a tie. 14 Sp. Laws
1905, p. 858, I 6, provides that the taking of
land for park purposes shall be by a "ma-
jority" vote of all the members of the board,
both present and absent. Held, that, in
case of a tie, when all the members of the
board were present and voted, the mayor's
vote was sufficient to make a majority. Bo-
hannan v. City of Stamford 67 Atl. 872, 878,
80 Conn. 107.
HAJORTTY OF 8TOOKHOX<DEB8
An election to be held by a "majority
of stockholders" means a majority in Inter-
est In re P. B. Mathiason Mfg. Co., 99 S.
W. 502, 504, 122 Mo. App. 437 (quoting and
adopting definition in 2 Cook Corp. [5th Ed.]
i 608).
MAKE
See, also. Made.
As laalntaln
A covenant in a conveyance of land for
a right of way that the railroad would *'make
and maintain" a wire fence on both sides of
the land conveyed, "and also make" a farm
crossing, in pursuance of which the railroad
did supply, maintaiUt and keep in repair a
crossing for a number of years, obligated the
railroad not only to make, but also to main-
tain, the crossing. Pittsburg, C, a & St L
By. Co. V. Wilson, 72 N. B. 666^ 668, 34
Ind. App. 324.
Compel synoiiymovui
Where defendant's mother stated that de-
fendant's brother said he would "make" de-
cedent apologize, an instruction that defend-
ant was guilty of murder if he armed him-
self with the Intention of "compelling" dece-
dent to apologize, and on his failing to do
so killed him, was not erroneous; "com-
pelled" being substantially synonymous with
"make." Pipkins r. State, 97 S. W. 61, 63,
80 Ark. 617.
A book
See Bookmaklng.
Effort
Where defendant accepted plaintiff^ of-
fer to make ice cans at a certain price, on
condition that they were made and shipped
within 30 days, and plaintiffs accepted the
order and promised to "make every effort"
to have the cans delivered at the time indi-
cated, the assurance must be construed as
the expression of purpose to comply with
the s^ongly emphasized requirement for
shipment in 30 days, and not as a modifica-
tion thereof. Wall v. St. Joseph Artesian
Ice & Cold Storage Co., 87 S. W. 574, 575,
X12 Mo. App. 659.
FiOse entry
Concealment by the president^ of a na-
tional bank firom the bookkeeper of facts nec-
essary to enable the latter to make accurate
entries in the books of the bank, by reason
of which fact he made false entries, does tiot
constitute the making of false entries by the
president which is made a criminal offense
by Rev. St i 5209. United States v. McGUr-
ty, 191 Fed. 523.
Falae writing
There is a distinction between falsely
making a certiflcate of acknowledgment and
•'making a false certificate." The former
term contemplates a certificate which is not
genuine, while the latter Importo a genuine
certificate, the contento or allegations of
which are false. Territory y. Gutierres, 84
Pac. 526, 626, 13 N. M. 312, 6 L. R. A. (N. &)
875-
"Make", lias many signiflcatlonB 4ind con-
veys many meanings, among which is "to put
forth; give out; deUver;" also "to inforim
MAXX
MAKIKG SALES
apprise." Cent. Diet Thus wben a^^person,
seeking credit, bands to a merchant a mate-
rially false written statement concerning his
financial condition, no matteir who coii4>osed
and signed it, if it be one calculated to de-
ceive, and then reads it -to such merc^nt,
and thereby obtains property from him on
credit, he has obtained property on credit up-
on a materially false statement In writing
''made to^' such person. In re Aldrlgde^ 168
Fed. 03, 96, 99.
Fromttlc»te distinguished
The word ''make," as used in Act Cong.
Maidi 3, 1906, c 1496, 13, which requires the
Secretary of Agzicultnre to "make" and ''pro-
mulgate^' rules and regulations foyemlng the
method and manner ef shipment, inspection,
and dellTery of cattle from quarantined ter-
ritory, is not synonymous with '*promulgate,"
and means only the writing and official sign-
ing of such rules; the '*promulgation" of
tliem rsquiilng notice to the officers of trans-
portation companies, etc., and their publica-
tion In the selected newspapers within the
aflTected district United States y. LouisTille
& N. R. Co., 166 Fed. 936, 939.
In a trial tor murder, the court instruet-
ed that It is the duty of one engaged in a
quarrel to avoid an attack, and not to be-
come the aggressor, unless other means are
onavailable, and that if defendant, after be-
ing engaged in a quarrel with deceased, de-
scended to the street, knowing that deceas-
ed was in the street, with intent to continue
the quarrel, and in order to make "his quar-
rel effective,'* took witii him a dangerous
weapon, and sought out deceased, and stab-
bed him, his action was not Justiiiable hom-
icide, though deceased drew a reyolver, was
not ernmeous, whether the phrase "making
the quarrel effective" meant that defendant
took the weapon with intent to take the life
of deceased, or meant, if defendant renewed
the quarrel, whether with or without in-
tent to take life, the killing was not justifi-
able; People ▼. Filippelli, 66 M. B. 402, 406,
173 N. Y. 600.
Where a clerk of a Circuit Court makes
and certifies a record In response to a writ of
error or appeal, he is not merely making a
transcript or copy, but is "making a record."
within Rev. St i 828, providing that a clerk
of the Circuit Court shall be entitled for
making a record to 15 cents a folio. Hoys-
radt V. Delaware, L. & W, E, B., 182 Fed.
880,882. .
Rale
In Act Cong. March 8, 1906, a 1496, | 8,
requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to
"make"^ and "promulgate" rules governing the
inspection, delivery, and shipment of cattle
from a quarantined state into any other
fitate, and section 1 requiring publlcati(m of
notice of quarantine and the giving of notice
to the proper officers of carriers doing business
in any quarantined state, the words "make"
and "promulgate" are not synonymous, and
the duty to "make" rules was sufficiently
accomplished by writing them and signing
them officially, but to "promulgate" them re-
quired the giving notice thereof to the offi-
cers of carriers, etc., and their publication in
the selected newspapers within the affected
district. United Stotes v. LouisvUle & N.
R. Co:, 165 Fed. 936. 939.
The words "to sell" or "to make a sale,"
as used in a communication from the owner
of real estate to a broker with respect to
the sale thereof, are often used as meaning
to negotiate or arrange for a sale. Brown
V. Gilpin, 90 Pac 267, 271, 76 Kan. 778.
SiCMtwe
Under a statute making a writing, not
signed in the presence of witnesses, invalid
as a will, unless testatrix acknowledged the
"making thereof," the phrase quoted refers
to the making of the signature in the pres-
ence of the witnesses. Manners t. Manners,
66 Aa 683, 684, 72 N. J. Bq. 864.
Of note
See Accommodation Maker; Comaker;
Joint Maker ; Principal Maker.
Indorser distinguished, see Indorser.
"One not before a party to a note, who
signs his nayne on the back of it in blank, is
prima facie a 'maker,' and assumes the same
obligation as if he wrote his name upon the
face of the instrument" Lyndon Savings
Bank V. International Co., 62 Atl. 50, 52, 78
Vt. 169, 112 Am. St Rep. 900 (quoting and
adopting definition in Lyndon Savings Bank
V. International Co., 64 Atl. 191, 76 Vt 224).
Where a note reciting, "I promise to
pay," was signed on the face by two persons,
they were both "makers." UUery v. Brohm,
79 Pac. 180, 20 Colo. App. 389.
The transferror of a nonnegotiable writ-
ten contract does not, by signing his name
on the back of it, make himself liable as
"maker," "guarantor," or 'indorser," within
Rem. & BaL Code, i 6250, providing that
the discounting of commercial paper, where
the borrower makes himself liable as maker,
guarantor, or Indorser, shall be considered as
a loan for the purpose of the dbapter relating
to usury. Thomson v. Koch, 113 Pac. 1110,
1111, 62 Wash- 438.
MAxnro
''Making* is defined as the action of one
Who makes. Town of Checotah v. Town of
Eufaula, 119 Pac. 1014, 1017, 81 Okl. 85.
XAKnro
See Salesmen Making Sales.
MAUPJBASANCOi
MAL
See Petit HaL
MAJLA VIBS PU»0HA8S&
"A person who purchases an estate, al-
though for a valaable consideration, with no-
tice of a prior equitable right, makes himself
a *mala fide purchaser,' and will lilmself
even be held a trustee for the b^iefit of the
person whose right he sought to defeat*'
Mansfield v. Wardlow (Tex.) 91 & W. 869,
863 (citing Pom. Bq. Jur. | 669).
See C!ontract8 Mala In fie.
A distinction is nade between acta which
are "mala in se," which are goierally re-
garded aa absolutely Told, In tha senae that
no right or claim can be derived from them,
and acts which are mala prohlblta, which
are void or yeldable^ according to the na-
ture or effect of the act prohibited. Pet-
terson y. Berry, 125 Feu. 902, 906, 00 O. O.
A. 610 (citing Bwdl v. Daggs, 2 Sup. Gt 408,
106 U. S. 148, 27 L. Bd. 082); In le T. EL
BrnvAi €k>., 180 Fed. 619, 82T.
MAJLA PROHIBITA
See Mala in Se.
MAiuLBMunarnAnoir
Aa applied to public offloera, ''maladmin-
istration" Is not in ordinary use distinguish-
ed from mlsadmlnistratlon. Territory t.
Sandies, 94 Pac 964, 966» 14 K. M. 49S, 20
Ann. CsLB. 109.
MAXiOOHBirOT
The reoeption of Illegal yotea at an elec-
tion for a public office is not "malconduct"
on the part of the election, officers, within
Oode dr. Proa S 2010, authorizing an elector
to contest an election for malconduct on the
part of the Judges of election, but constitutee
a separate ground for contest under the ex-
press provisions of the section. Ck>leman t.
Kerr, 83 Pac. 398, 804, 83 Mont 196.
An officer who violates his public obliga-
tion, and betrays his trust by selling his offi-
cial Influence or vote. Is guilty of "malcon-
duct In office." Btzler v. Brown, 50 South.
416, 41T, 68 Fla. 221, 188 Am. St Bep. 118.
MAUmA
"Malaria" is "a morbid condition produc-
ed by exhalations from decaying vegetable
matter in contact with moisture, girlng rise
to fever and ague and many ether symptoms
characterized by their tendency to recur at
Jefiolte and usually uniform intervals." City
of St Louis V. Qalt, 77 8. W. 876, 879, 179
Mo. 8, 68 L. B. A. 778 (qoodng WetNiter
Diet).
MALE
SaeHdia Uatab
MALFEASANCE
" 'Ualfeaaanoe^ la the unjust perftyrmanoe
of some act which the party bad no fig^t, or
whi<A he bad contracted not to do." Dudley
V. Flemingsburg, 72 S. W. 327, 116 Ky. 6, 60
li. R. A. 575, 106 Am. St B^. 263, 1 Ann.
Gas. 958.
"MaU^aaanoa" is the doing of am act
which a person ougbt not to do at alL
Where an «aoer either tbtongb Igneranceb
inattention, or maUoe ieea that wtaicfa he
baa no legal light to do at all, or acta with-
out any authority wfaaterer, or eKeeeta, Ig-
norea, or abvaes his powera, he la guilty of
'"malfeasance." State, to Uae ot Oasdln, v.
McCl^Uan, 86 S. W. 267, 268, US Teon. 610.
8 Ann. Gaa. I
The taking of the property of one, by a
coroner, on a writ against another, la a '"mal-
feasance in ofilce," constituting a breach of
his bond given for ''the faithful peiformance
of the duties of bis oflloe^" Harrla ▼. Hanson,
11 Me. 241, 246.
Permission by a sheriff to a prisoner to
escape is "malfeasance," within Kirby's Dig.
I 7993, providing for removal of county of-
ficers on conviction of an offense amountlDg
to malfeasance. Houpt v. State, 140 8. W.
294, 297, 100 Ark. 409, Ann. Gas. 1913Q 690.
While to oonvlet an oAcer of the felony
denounced by Oomp. Lawa 1907, I 4068, pan-
iahing every person who with intent to de-
fraud, preaents for allowance and payment a
fraudnleBt dalm, the proof moat abow that
he presented the claim with intsnt to de-
fraud, yet aucfa ivoef la not caaeBtial to sos*
tain a conviction fbr malfeaaanoe In a pro-
cocding Ibr his removal vmAer section 4666;
the tern "malfeasance^' meaning the oom-
miaslon of an act whicb la poalttvely unlaw-
ful. Law V. Smith, 98 Pac 800, 807, 84 Utah,
894.
"WhUe 'malfeasance In office' is defined
generally to be the wrongful or unjust doing
of some official act, which the doer has no
right to perform, or which he has stipulated
by contract not to do. It ia essential that an
evil intent or motive must accompany tbe
act, or that it must have been done with such
gross negligence aa to be equivalent to fraud."
An indictment of a county clerk for unlaw-
fully issuing a license to sell liquor in a
local option precinct, which f&ila to aner that
hia actiou was froaa a corrupt motive or
fraudulent, or that he knew at the time that
It was unlawful for him to issue the Uoense,
ia iasufflcient CommonweaKh v. Wood, 76
S. W. 842, 843, 116 Ky. 748 (citii« Bishops
New Or. Law, H 972, 884|.
HAIil^EASANCB
fit
MAUCflB
"MaJf eastmce** i» the doing of «n aet
wUch is positiyely onlawfal or wrongful
wiiich one ongbt not to do at alL It la an
act wholly wrongful and unlawful. It la
taid that misconception of one^s rights af-
fords no ground for a conclusion of malfoa-
sanoe. It Is not malfeasance In office, for
whicb, under Highway Law, N. T. (OonsoL
Laws 1909, c. 25) { 30, a county sBperUitend-
ent of highways may be removed by the
county flupervisora, that he presents to a
town, and has paM, a personal Mil ftor pie-
psiing, under emj^oyment by it, plaas and
spedflcstloBs for an arenue therein, ttie work
mx which was done by his prirate employes
In his bustnesB of eiril ^iglneer, as not
only under sections 88, 48, relatlTe to his du-
ties, is the county superintendent under no
absolute duty to do such work, but, even tf
he cannot legally present a claim against the
town, such aetien would be wrongful to the
town only, wheveas the malfeasance justify-
ing his removal must be such as aftects his
perfonnanee as county superintendent, and
he having at most misconc^ved his rights,
in supposing there was no legal objection to
his rendition of the aocount, which affords
no ground for a conclusion of malfeasance.
JPeople ex reL Seaman v. Cocks, 134 N. T.
8npp. 808, 810. 140 App. Div. 883 (citing Omt
Diet; BeU y. Josselyn, 8 Gray [00 Mass.]
309, 63 Ant Dec 741; Ooite t. Lynes, 33
Conn. 100; Stokes y. Stokes, 48 N. T. 8um>.
722, 23 App. Diy. 668).
Hoaf easaaee dl^tlaguisl&ed
'There is a distinction between non-
feasance and misfeasance or malfeasance;
and this distinction is often of great impor-
tance in determining an agent's Uabillty to
third persons. In this connection, 'nonfea-
sance' means the total omission or failure of
an agent to enter upon the performance of
some distinct duty or undertaking, wl^ch he
has agreed with his principal to do. 'Misfea-
sance' means the improper doing of an act
which the agent might lawfully do, or, in
other words, it is the performing of his duty
to his principal in such a manner as to in-
fringe upon the rights and privileges of third
persons; and 'malfeasance' is the doing of
an act wliich he ought not to do at all. It is
not every omission or failure to perform a
dnty that will constitute a nonfeasance, but
only an omission to perform such di^nct
duties as he owes to his principal, as distin-
gnldied from those which he owes to third
persons, or the public in general as a member
of society. Nonfeasance does not extend to
the omission or failure to do some act, where-
in a tiitrd person is injured after he has
once entered upon the performance of his
contractual obligations. For example, if an
•gent undeitakes tx> petf orm cestain acts for
another, and he reDuses or flails to enter upon
iDdi performance, it Is nonfeasance; but if
ke once begins the performance of such acts,
tnd in doing so fails or omlta to do certain
acta w^dh he should have dona, wherelur a
third person is injured. It Is not a nonfea-
sance^ but a misfeasance. Blisfeasance may
involve the omission to do something which
ought to be done, as where an agent engaged
In the performance of his undertaking, omits
to do something which it is his duty to do
VBdcr tho dvcumslanoes, as when he does
not exaiclse that degree of care which due
reganl for the Tights of others requires."
Ovcntt y. Century Bldg. Co., 00 S. W. 1082,
1068, 201 lao. 424, 8 Ia R. A. (N. 8.) 929
(quoting and adopting deflnitlon in Olark &
Skyle% Law of Agency, | 609.
MALICE
See Constsuetlye Malice; Espnm Mal-
ice; Implied Malice; Premeditated
Malice; Universal MaHee; With Mal-
ice Aforethought; Without Previoua
MaUce.
Absence of, see Voluntary Manslaughter.
Implied from willful or willfully, see
Willful— WUlfully.
As known to the law, "maUce" la a
wrongful act done IntentionaUy, without just
cause or excuse. Lea veil v. Leavell, 99 S. W.
460, 401, 122 Mo. App. 654; Hathaway v.
Commonwealth (Ky.) 82 S. W. 400, 402; Oon-
nell V. States 81 S. W. 746. 747, 46 Tex. Or.
R. 259 ; London Guarantee & Accident Co. v.
Horn, 69 N. E. 626, 530, 206 111. 493, 99 Am.
St Rep. 186; Schonwald v. Regains, 122
Paa 203, 2U, 82 OU. 223, 80 L. &. A. (N. S.)
864; MdTadden v. Lane^ 60 AtL 806, 367, 71
N. J. Law, 624.
<«Malice" Is not necessarily personal hate
or ill will, but la a state of mind which is
reckless of law and the legal rights of dti-
sens. Bowles v. Lowery, 69 South. 606, 697,
5 Ala. App. 655.
"Malice" in law does not, as is generally
understood, meui spite or ill will, but means
the Intentional doing of a wrongful act Wil-
liams T. WUliams, 111 S. W. 837, 888, 132
Mo. App. 200.
An instruction defining "malice" as the
doing of a wrongful act Intentionally is cor-
rect Butdier v. HofTman, 78 S. W. 266, 268,
90 Mo. App. 239.
"'Malice' has always been divided Into
two kinds: Implied malice, or malice in law,
and express malice, or malice in fact" Lau-
der V. Jones, 101 N. W. 907, 915, 13 N. D.
525 (quoting and adopting Gambrill t. School-
ey, 52 Aa 500, 608, 95 Md. 260, 63 L. R. A.
427).
"MaUee" la not necessarily personal hate,
but Is rather an intent and dIapoaitiMi to do
a wrongful act greatly Injurious to another.
Chicago, ft. I. 4 P. By. Oo. v. Whltten, 119
S. W. 836, 837, 90 Ark. 462, 21 Ann. Oas. 726.
"MaUce" oompcehenda Ul will, a wicked-
nesB of (Hspoaitigp, croelty« cecklessness, a
^▲LIOE
MALIOfi
mind regardleiss of social duty. Brett r.
State, 47 Soutb. 781, 783, 94 Miss. 669.
"Malice" is the expression of a widted
and depraved heart and mind and of a cruel
disposition. State v. Harmon (Del.) 00 Atl.
860-868, 4 Pennewill, 580.
"Legal malice*' is defined as an act grow-
ing out of the wicked or mischlerous inten-
tion of the mind; an act showing a wanton
inclination to mischief, an intention to injure
or wrong, and a depraved Inclination to dis-
regard the rights of others. Morasca v.
Item Co., 52 South. 565, 560, 126 La. 420,
30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 315.
"Malice" in a trespass need not be HI
will or hatred; it being sufficient that the
trespass be intentional and in known viola-
tion of the owner's rights. Southern Ry. Go.
V. McEntire, 63 South. 158, 159. 109 Ala. 42.
"Malice" implies wickedness, or the will-
ful and intentional doing of a wrongful act,
without just cause or excuse, and is implied
from an unlawful act, willfully done, till the
contrary is shown. State v. Murphy, 08 S.
B.570, 80 8. 0.208.
"Malice" Is Implied by law from every
deliberate cruel act committed by one person
against another, no matter how sudden such
an act may be, as the law construes that he
who does a cruel act voluntarily does it ma-
liciously. State V. Mills (Del.) 09 Atl. 841,
842, 0 Pennewill, 497.
Hatred, ill will, or actual malice towards
the injured party is not a necessary ingredi-
ent of legal malice as applied to torts, nor
is it necessary that the act complained of
proceed from a spiteful, malignant, or re-
vengeful disposition. If it be wrongful, un-
lawful, and intentional, and the natural and
probable result of the act is to accomplish
the injury complained of, "malice" is im-
plied. Flandermeyer v. Ooper, 98 N. B. 102,
108, 85 Ohio St 327, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 300,
Ann. Oas. 1913A, 983.
"Legal or implied malice," as distin-
guished from ill will or malice in the vernacu-
lar sense of the word, is defined to be the
intentional doing of a wrong act without just
cause or excuse. Ickenroth v. SL Louis
Transit CJo., 77 S. W. 102, 100, 102 Mo. App.
597.
Where the court charged that "malice"
meant wickedness, and that, when a man did
a thing with a malicious heart, it meant a
heart devoid of social duty and fatally bent
on mischief, a charge defining malice as the
willful and intentional doing of a wrongful
act by one knowing the act to be against the
law, and by one doing it willfully, was not
objectionable as insufficiently defining "mal-
ice." State V. Orosby, 70 S. R 440, 442, 88
S. a98.
"Malice," in the law, means the inten-
tional d(Hng of a> wrongful act without Justi-
fication or excoae. A ••wrongful act,** within
the meanfog of this definition, is any act
which, in the ordinary course, will infringe
upon the rights of another to his damage, ex-
cept it be done In the exercise of an equal
or superior right Brennan v. United Hatr
ters of North America, Local No. 17, 05 AtL
105, 171, 73 N. J. Law, 729, 9 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
254, 118 Am. St Rep. 727, 9 Ann. Oas. 098.
"la 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4298, 'mal-
ice' is defined as follows: 'Malice, in com-
mon acceptation, means ill will against a per-
son; but in Its legal sense it means a wrong-
ful act done intentionally without just cause
or excuse.' Bouvier defines malice as b^ng:
*A wicked. intention to do an injury.' Web-
ster defines the word to mean: 'Extreme en-
mity of heart; malevolence; a disposition to
injure others without cause, from mere per-
sonal gratification, or from a spirit of re-
venge,' etc" I^nch v. People, 187 XU. App.
444,440.
In general a malicious act Involves all
that is usually understood by the term "wUl-
ful," and is further marked by either hatred
or ill will toward the party injured or by
such utter recklessnss and disregard of the
rights of others as denotes a corrupt or ma-
levolent disposition. It is true that "malice"
may be and is often implied or presumed
from the willfulness of the wrongful act
State V. WilUng, 106 N. W. 855, 850, 129
Iowa, 72.
"Lawful competition that may injure the
business of another, even though successfully
directed to driving that other out of business,
is not actionable. Nor would competition of
one set of men against ^another set, carried
on for the purpose of ga&, even to the extent
of intending to drive from business that oth-
er set, and actually accomplishing that re-
sult, be actionable unless there was actual
malice. 'Malice,* as here used, does not mere-
ly mean intent to harm, but means an in-
tent to do a wrongful harm and injury. An
intent to do a wrongful harm and injury
is unlawful, and, if a wrongful act is done to
the detriment of the right of another, it la
malicious, and an act maliciously done with
the intent and purpose of injuring another is
not lawful competition." O'Brien v. People
ex rel. Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., 75
N. B. 108, 115, 210 111. 354, 108 Am. St Bep.
219, 3 Ann. Gas. 900 (quoting and adopting
definition in Doremus v. Hennessy, 52 N. E.
924, 925, 170 lU. 008, 43 L. R. A. 797, 88 Am.
St. Rep. 203) ; Everett Waddey CJo. v. Rich-
mond Typographical Union No. 90, 53 S. E.
273, 270, 105 Va. 188, 5 L, R. A, (N. S.) 792,
8 Ann. Ca& 79a
Whatever is done willfully and purpose-
ly, whether the motive is to injure accused, to
gain some advantage to prosecutor, or
through mere wantonness or carelessness, if
at the same time wrong or uiilawf til within
MALICB
223
UA^m.
tbe kiipwl^dge of the actor, is done jnaUdons-
ly, and personal ill will or decdre for revenge
is not essential to the existence of "malice."
Gulsby ▼. Louisrille ft N. R. Co., 62 South.
382, 394, ler Ala. 122.
"Malice/* in legal proceedings, does not
necessarily mean personal 111 will or spite.
It means a wrongful act done intentionally
without Just cause or excuse. Pittsburg, J.,
E. & E. R. Co. y. Wakefield Hardware Co.,
50 S. E. 571, 573, 138 N. 0. 174, 3 Ann. Oaa.
720.
An instruction, defining legal "malice" as
where a party has ill will toward another,
bad feeling, bad blood, something of that
kind, held proper. State 7. Reeder, 61 S. £.
702, 703, 72 S. C. 223.
The term "malice," in its ordinary sense,
hnplies hatred, spite,, or ill will ; but in legal
parlance it is frequently used in a different
sense, depending on the connection, and may
mean "a wrongful act done intentionally
without just cause or excuse." In legal par-
lance, malice "may be actually implied when-
ever there is a deliberate intention to do a
grleTous wrong without legal Justification or
excuse. In ciyil controversies, the very es-
sence of malice is a disposition or willful-
ness to do a wrongful act greatly injurious
to another." Kavanaugh v. Mclntyre, 112 N.
Y. S. ©87, 990, 128 App. Div. 722 (quoting 5
Words and Phrases, p. 4298 et seq.).
Any malice w^ich is an ingredient in
a tort consisting of an act the direct object
of which is to injure another's property is
malice in law; that is, the intent to injure,
as distinguished from the intent to do an
act which may incidentally injure. Albro J.
Newton Co. v. Erickson, 126 N. T. Supp. 949,
953, 70 Misc. Rep. 291.
"Malice" in common acceptation means
ill will against a person, but in its legal sense
it means a wrongful act, done int^itionally,
without Just cause or excuse. . McGu^k v.
Cronenwett, 85 N. E. 576, 577, 199 Mass. 457,
19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 561.
The term "malice,^' as used la Hurd's
Rev. St 1905, c. 72, S 2, authorizing the dis-
charge of persons arrested in civil actions
except when '^malice" is of the gist of the ac-
tion, signifies a wrong inflicted on another
with an evil intent or purpose. Kellar, Et-
tinger & Fink t. Norton, &L N. S. 1087, 1036,
228111. 366.
''Malice"' excludes passion, and passion
presupposes the absence of malice. State v.
Edmunds, 104 N. W. 1115, 1116, 20 S. D. 135.
"By 'malice' or 'malicious' . is meant a
wish or desire to vex, harass, or annoy an*
other." Kerley V. Qerinscheid, 106 N. W. 136,
137, 20 8. D, 3^.
"Malice^ -arises troxn the yokintary do-
ing or saving something without Just cause or
acuse,, whi<di. If^ Hktiif to inj.ure another, and
which jShows a. spirit lacking in proper re-
gard for social duty and the rights of others,
even when said or done without particular
ill wiU. Israel v. Israel, 84 S. W. 453, 456,
109 Mo. App. 366.
In an action of tort, an instruction de-
fining "malice" as "the doing of any act" in-
jurious to another without Just cause is er-
roneous for omitting the word "intentional"
before the word "doing." Hanley v. Blandino
(Tex.) 89 S. W. 1108, U09.
To make the conduct of a fraternal as-
sociation, in expelling a member, actionably
malicious it is not necessary that "malice"
in the sense of hatred or ill will, on the part
of the defendant toward appellant, be shown.
"Malice" in such case would be sufficiently
shown if it were proven that they acted
knowingly apd willfully in the violation of
the rights of appellant and to his injury.
Thompson v. Grand International Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers, 91 S. W. 834,
839, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 176.
"Malice," as usually understood, has its
foundation in ill will, and is evidenced by an
attempt wrongfully to vex, injure, or ahnoy
another. This is "malice in fact," and is that
referred to in Pen. Code, § 7, subd. 4, declar-
ing that the words "malice" and "malicious-
ly" Import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure an-
other person. There is another sort of mal-
ice, the presumption of the existence of which
isi raJbed by the law in certain cases on cer-
tain proofs, and this is the malice described
in the same section as "an intent to do a
wrongful act, established either by proof or
presumption of law." This is a malice of
pleading and proof made necessary hy the
exigencies of definitions of offenses against
the law, and may exist with malice in fact,
but may also exist independent thereof, and
in some instances is conclusively presumed
against a defendant, while in others the pre-
sumption is rebuttable. Davis v. Heatst, 116
Paa 680, 537, 160 Cal. 143.
As Jnstlfyias pwdtlre damages
I^egal malice, as distinguished from actu-
al malice, will Justify an awa;cd of punitive
damages. The "malice" which would Justify
an award of punitive damages merely implies
the intentional doing of a wrongful act with-
out Just cause or excuse, Lamport v. Judge
& Dolph Drug Co., 141 S. W. 1095, 1098, 238
Mo. 409. 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 533, Ann. Cas.
1913A, 351.
"Blalice" essential to justify pnnitlve
damages does not mean ill will against a per-
son, but a wrongful act done intentionally
and without Just cause is done with malice.
McMiUen v. Blder, 140 S. W. 917, 919, 160
Mo. App. 399.
S3xemplary damages are allowed in en-
hancement merely of ordinary damages, the
propriety of allowing the same depending en-
MAlilOR
iu
MALICA
tirely on the malice or wantomieflt of tb% de-
fendant, '*mallce" In thBt nense meaning not
general malice, nor malice exhibited in other
matters or at other times, but malice in the
very matter he ia found liable for. Moore t.
Duke, 80 AtL 194, 197, 84 Y L 401.
The term "malice," as used in tiie rule
that, wherever an injury complained of had
been inflicted with malice or wantonly and
with circumstances of contumely or indig-
nity, the Jury are not limited to the ascer-
tainment of a simple comp^raatlon for the
wrong committed against the aggrieved per-
son, is not merely the doing of an unlawful
or injurious act, but the word implies that
the act complained of was conceired in a q^ir-
it of mischief or a criminal indifference to
eivil obligation* Philadelphia* B. ft N. B.
Go. y. Qreen, 71 Atl. 966, 989, UO Md. 32.
In order to Justify the imputation of
"malice," within the rule of punitiye dam-
ages, the injury must have been oonceiVed in
a spirit of mischief and partake of a crim-
inal or wanton nature. Baxter y. Campbell,
97 N. W. 386, 387, 17 S. D. 475.
For the purpose of determining wheth-
er exemplary damages are properly allowed,
the word '^malice" means that tiie act done
must hare been without right or justiilable
cause. Smith y. Morgautown Ice Ck>., 74 S.
E. 961, 963, 159 N. <3. 151.
"Malice," in 2 «ap. ft L. Law Diet p.
784, is defined as follows: * 'Malice,' in com-
mon acceptation, means ill will against a
person; but, in its legal sense, it means a
wrongful act done intentionally, without Just
cause or excuse." In 2 Bony. Law Diet
(Bawle^s Ed.) p. 296, it is defined as fol-
lows: "A malicious act is a wrongful act
intentionally done without cause or excuse."
In defining "malicious," Black, in his Law
Dictionary (page 746), says: "Byincing mal-
ice; done with malice and an evil design;
wiUfuL" An instniction that "by 'mali-
cious,* as used in this instruction, is meant
a doing of • the wrongful act without legal
right" was wrong as authorizing exemplary
damages fbr any entry without legal right
on the premises of another. The instruction
should have used the word "intentional."
Ohio Valley Tel. Oo. v. Meyer (Ky.) 56 S. W.
678, 674.
In an action by a street car passenger
for injuries caused by an assault by the con-
ductor, the charge that, if. the jury found
for plaintiff, then, in assessing damages, they
were not limited to physical injury inflicted,
if any, but in addition thereto, if they found
that the wrongful acts of the conductor were
"malicious" (t e, the intentional doing of
a wrongful act without eauae or excuse),
they might allow sudi punitive damages as
would be a punishment and a wholesome
warning to others, in the absence of a re-
quest fbr a more specfflc instruction on t3ie
measure of damages^ was not objectibnable as
misleading. Mlllk v. MetifopeHtan 8t Ity.
Co., 137 S. W. 1006» 1007, 157 ICo. App- 529.
la sUeMAtUa of afleetieM
"The term 'malice,' as applied to torts,
does not necessarily mean that whi4fli must
proceed from a spiteful, malignant, or re-
vengeful disposition, but a conduct injurious
to another, though proceeding from an ill-
regulated mind, not sufficiently cautious be-
fore it occasions an injury to another."
Hence the law implies malice, where de-
fendant unwarrantedly alienated the affec-
tions of plaintiiTs husband. SIckler v. Man-
nix, 93 N. W. 1018, 68 Neb. 21 (citing Weck-
erly v. G^er [Pa.] 11 Serg. & R. 89).
In an action for alienation of a wife's
affections, the term "malice" does not neces-
sarily mean tbut wldch must proceed from
a spiteful, malignant, or revengeful dispo-
sition, but; if the conduct was unjustiflable
and actually caused the injury, malice in
law will be implied. Bolaad v. Stanley, 115
S. W. 163, 166, 88 Ark. 562, 129 Am. St Repi
114.
Xb iMULkraptey act
The provision of the bankruptcy act, ex-
cepting from the operation of a discharge
Judgments for ''malicious injuries," etc, con-
templates something more restricted tban
"malice" in the broader sense. Flanders v.
Mullin, 66 AtL 789, 80 Vt 124, 12 Ann. Gas.
1010.
The term "malicious,** as used in Bankr.
Act July 1, 1898, c 541, | 17, 30 Stat 550,
providing that a discharge in bankruptcy
shall relieve the banjcrupt from all his prov-
able debts, except Judgments in actions for
willful and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another, means nothing more
than that disregard of duty which is involv-
ed in the intentional doing of a wrongful
act to the injury of another. McOhristal r.
Glisbee, 76 N. & 611, 190 Mass. 120, 3 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 702, 5 Ann. Ca& 769.
The word 'NHllful,'' as used in Bankr.
Act July 1, 1898, c 541, t IT, as amended
by Act Feb. 5, 1968, a 487, | 5, 82 Stat 796
(IT. S. Oomp. St Sopp. 1907, p, 1026), provid-
ing that a disciiarge in bankruptcy shall re-
lieve the bankrupt from all pirowble debts
exc^ liabUHieB for obtaining property bf
false pretenses, or iklse representsrtbons, or
for "wlllfal and malidlbus^ injuries to the
person or property of another, means nothing
ntore than intentional; wUle the word "msl-
ioe," as there used, is intended to ioqdy
nothing more than a disregard of duty whlcb
is involved in the intentional doing of a will-
ful act to the injury of another. fi!avanaugb
V. Mclntyre, 112 N. Y. Supift. 087, 990, 128
App. 0iv. 722.
Where a lessee assigned his lease to Us
wifb with the consent of the landlord, and
the landlord subsequently instituted summt-
ry proceedings to dispossess tHe lessee' witb-
MALIOB
MALICS
out making the wife n parky, and nndet
the judgment of dispossession ttie landlord,
through agents, took possession of the prem-
ises and removed the wife's property and for-
cibly removed the wife, a judgment for the
wife for damages for the actf^.of the land-
lord was based on "willful*' and "malicious*'
acts, within Bankruptcy Act July 1, 1888, c.
541, S 17, providing that a discharge in bank-
ruptcy does not release the bankrupt from
judgments for willful and malicious injuries
to the person or property of another; the
word "wiUfnl" meaning nothing more than
^tentional," and the word "maUoe^* in its
legal sense meaning a wrongful act done in-
tentionally, without just cause or excuse.
In re Munro, 196 Fed. 817, 828 (citing 5
Words and Phrases, pp. 42d8-4312).
"Malice, in common acceptation, means
ill will against a person; but in its legal
sense it means a wrongful act, done inten-
tioDally, without just cause or excuse. If I
give a perfect stranger a blow likely to pro-
duce death, I do it of malice, because I do
it intentionally and without just cause or
excuse. If I malm cattle without knowing
whose they are, If I poison a fishery without
knowing the owner, I do it of malice^ be-
cause it is a wrongful act and done inten-
tionally. If I am arraigned of felony and
willfully stand mute, I am said to do It of
malice, because it is intentional and without
Just cause or excuse. If I traduce a man,
whether I know him or not, and whether I
intend to do him an injury or not, I appre-
hend the law considers it as done of malice,
because it is wrongful and InteotionaL It
equally works an injury, whether I meant
to produce an injury or not." The law will
imply that degree of malice in an act of
criminal conversation which is sufficient to
bring a judgment for damages therefor with-
in the exception mentioned in Bankr. Act
Jnly 1, 1898, c. 541, S 17, subd. 2,* 80 Stat
650, declaring that judgments for willful
and malicious Injuries to the person or prop-
erty of another shall be exempted from a
discharge in bankruptcy. Tinker v. Colwell,
24 Sup. Ct 505, 606, 193 U. S. 473, 48 L. Ed.
751
Ib erttnliial law
"Malice" is an essential Ingredient of
the crime of murder of either degree, and It
is a condition of the mind or heart, not be-
ing restricted to spite or malevolence toward
the particular person slain, but also includ-
ing that general malignity and reckless dis-
regard of human life whidi proceed from a
heart void of a just sense of social duty and
ffttally bent on mischief. State v. Underbill
(Del.) ^AU. 880, 882, 6 Pennewill, 491; State
V. Wiggins (DeL) 76 Atl. 632, 684, 7 Penne-
wiU, 127; State v. Brown (DeL) 61 Atl. 1077,
1078, 5 Pennewill, 389; State v. Watson
a>eL) 82 AtL 1086, 1087; State v. Tilghman
Qkl) 63 AtL 772, 773, 6 Pennewill, 44; State
3 WDS.& P.2D SSB.— 15
V. Jdhns (Det) 66 AIL 763, TSi, f PmiifewlU,
174; Stote v. Honey (Del.) 65 AtL 764^66,
6 Pennewill, 148; State v. PoweU (Del.) 61
AtL 966, 971, 5 Pennewill, 24 ; SUte v. Brown
(Del.) 80 Atl. 146, 149, 2 Boyce, 406; State
V. Bell Pel.) 62 AtL 147, 148, .5 Pennewill,
192; Stete v. Roberts (DeL) 78 Atl. 305, 309,
2 Boyce, 140; Stete v. Russo pel.) 77 Aa
743, 745, 1 Boyce, 538; State v. Reese (DeL)
79 Atl. 217, 220, 2 Boyce, 434; Stete v. Todd,
92 S. W. 674, 676, 194 Mo. 377; Stete v. Mc-
Oarver, 92 8. W. 684, 686, 194 Mo. 717.
•*l&[aUce*' is the ingredient that cbarao-
torizes murder, and distinguishes It from
homicide of other grades. It is express when
admitted or asserted, or may be impUed from
any unlawful acte of the assailant which In
iteelf denotes a wicked heart fatelly bent on
mischief, or a reckless disregard of human
Ufe. Stete V. De Paolo (Del.) 84 Aa 213,
214.
In criminal law "malice" may denote
that condition of the mlnd'^hlch is manifest-
ed by the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse. Alt v. Stete^
129 N. W. 432, 436, 88 Neb. 259, 36 U B. A.
(N. fl.) 1212.
"MaUce," as used In the law of homicide,
means a wrongAil act done Intentionally
without just cause or excuse. Stete ▼. Kin-
der, 83 8. W. 964, 969, 184 Mo. 276.
'*MaUce*' is a deliberate Intention unlaw-
fully to take human life. Robinson ▼. State,
68 8. B. 642, 848, 129 (H. 886.
Legal "malice" is the Intent unlawfully to
teke human life in cases where the law nei-
ther mitigates nor justifies the killing. Mann
V. Stete, 53 S. B. 324, 326, 124 Ga. 760, 4 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 934 ; Tucker v. Same, 66 8. D.
250, 251, 133 Ga. 470.
"Malice," which is a necessary element of
murder in the first and second degrees, means
a killing without legal excuse, and is pre-
sumed from kllllDg with a deadly weapon.
Stete V. Roberson. 64 8. B. 182, 186, 150 N. C.
837.
The law Implies malice, where there is a
homldde with a deadly weapon, and there
are no c&rcumstanees of mitigation, justifica-
tion, or excuse. Glardy ▼. Stete, 131 8. W.
46» 47, 96 Ark. 62.
"Malice," in homicide. Is a condition of
the mind or heart, and is not restricted to
spite or malevolence toward decedent, and in-
cludes that general malignity and reckless
disregard of human life which proceeds from
a heart fatelly bent on mischief. Stete v.
Brooks (Del.) 84 Aa 225. 227.
"MaUce," legally speaking, in relation to
murder, Is a conscious violation of law to
the prejudice of another ; evil design in gen-
eral ; the dlctetes of a wicked, depraved, and
maUgnant heart United States v. Hart, 162
Fed. 192, 194. '
UAXslOE
HAhicm
/:: . Tbfmgti one's beatt omy be tpfji of sIb,
jit Is not legally malicious^ unless it prompts
tbe willful or Intentional doing of a wrongful
act witbont Just cause or excuse. State t.
Ferguson, 74 S. B. 602, 005, 91 8. G. 235.
"Legal malice," as applied to bomidde,
Is not HI will or batred, but is an unlawful
intention to kill witbout Justification or miti-
gation existing at tbe time of killing. Tbe
intention need not exist for any lengtb of
time before tbe killing, and a man may form
tbe intention to kill, do tbe killing instant-
ly, and regret tbe deed as soon as' done.
Long y. State, 66 S. E. 444. 446, 127 6a. 350
(citing Bailey v. State, 70 6a. 617 [29];
Weeks v. State, 3 S. £.323 [4], 79 6a. 87).
"Malice," in bomidde, includes not only
anger, batred, and revenge, but every otber
unlawful and unjustifiable motive. Malice
is not confined to ill will towards an individ-
ual, but is intended to denote an action flow-
ing from any wicked and corrupt motive, a
tbing done witb a wicked mind, wbere tbe
fact bas been attended witb sucb circum-
stances as evince plain indications of a beart
regardless of social duty and fatally bent on
miscbief. Malice is implied from any delib-
erate or cruel act against anotber, however
sudden, wbicb sbows an abandoned and ma-
lignant beart Parsons v. People, 76 N. E.
993, 996, 218 IlL 386.
"Malice" in law does not necessarily
mean bate or ill will, but is tbat mental con-
dition wbicb prompts tbe willful doing of an
unlawful act; and so, in a prosecution for
killing an ofilcer, an instruction tbat if tbe
accused, being subject to arrest, merely kill-
ed tbe ofilcer to escape arrest tbe killing is
malicious, is proper. McGuflin v. State (Ala.)
59Soutb. 635,636.
"Malice" in common acceptation means ill
will against a person, but in its legal sense
it means a wrongful act done intentionally
witbout Just cause or excuse. Bromage v.
Prosser, 10 E. 0. L. 321. In law "malice"
is a term of art, importing wickedness, and
excluding a Just cause or excuse. State v.
Doig (S. G.) 2 Rich. 182. Tbere can be no
doubt tbat malice is presumed from an inten-
tional killing, tn tbe absence of facts or cir-
cumstances in evidence tending to sbow want
of malice. State v. McDaniel, 47 S. E. 384,
387, 68 S. C. 304, 102 Am. St Rep. 661.
"Malice" is not restricted to spite or
malevolence toward tbe deceased in particu-
lar, but in its legal sense it is understood to
mean the general malignity and recklessness
of tbe lives and personal safety of others,
which proceed from a heart void of a Just
sense of social duty and fatally bent on mis-
chief. Malice is implied by law from every
deliberate, cruel act colnmitted by one per-
son against anotber, no matter bow sudden
.such act may be ; . for the law considers that
be who does a cruel act voluntarily does it
malidouidy. State v. Brinte:(I>el;) 68 Aa
^58, 262, 4 Pennewill, 551.
In the statute declaring it murder in the
first degree for any person to purposely and
in bis deliberate and premeditated malice
kill another, "malice" is not confined to ill
will toward an individual, but it is intended
to denote an action flowing from any wicked
and corrupt motive. A thing done with a
wicked mind, and attended with such drcum-
stances as plainly indicate a heart regardless
of social duties and fully bent on miscbiet
indicates malice, within tbe meaning of the
law. Malice may be either expressed or im-
plied. Express malice may appear from all
the evidence and circumstances of- the alleged
killing. ImpUed malice may appear where
there is no Just cause or excuse of tbe al-
leged killing. State v. Undgrind, 74 Pac.
565, 566, 33 Wash. 440.
"MaUce," which is a condition of the
mind, and is not restricted to spite or malev-
olence toward a particular person, but in-
cludes general malignity and reckless disre*
gard of human life, is an essential to the
crime of murder. State v. Short (DeL) 82
Atl. 239, 241, 2 Boyce, 491.
"'Malice' in homicide does not mean
mere spite or ill will, as generally under-
stood, but signifies an unlawful state of the
mind, and such state of the mind as one is
in who intentionally does an unlawful act."
State v. Brown, 79 S. W. 1111, 1112. 181 Mo.
192.
"Malice," in homicide "does not mean
mere spite or ill will, as it is ordinarily un-
derstood, but means tbat condition of the
mind which prompts one person to take the
life of another without Just cause or Justi-
fication, and it signifies a state or disposi-
tion which shows a heart regardless of so-
cial duties and fatally bent on miscbiet"
State V. Atchley, 84 S. W. 984, 989, 186 Mo.
174.
" *Malice' is a condition of tbe mind or
heart." As used in the definition of murder,
the term is not restricted to spite or malevo-
lence toward the particular person slain, but
includes that reckless disregard of human
life which proceeds from a heart void of a
Just sense of social duty and fatally bent on
mischief. Wherever the fatal act is done de-
liberately or without adequate cause, tbe law
presumes that it was done with "maUce,"
and the burden is on the prisoner to show
that the act was not so done. State v. Powell
(Del.) 61 Atl. 966, 971, 5 Pennewill, 24.
"Malice," in law, is manifested by the in-
tentional doing of a wrongful act to tbe in-
Jury of another, without Just cause or ex-
cuse; and in tbe law of homicide It may
mean either an intent to do either serious
bodily barm or to take life. State v. SUverio,
76 Atl. 1069, 1072. T9 N. J. Law, 482.
"Malice" is the chief and disthiguish-
ing chacacteristic of murder, is either express
MALICB
227
MAIiIOB
or implied, sod may be proven by a deliber-
ately fonned design to kill, by tiie prepara*
tion of tbe weapon or other means for doing
great bodUy harm, by drcunstances of bra-
tality attending tbe act, or by previous hos-
tility, or threats and dedazatlons of Inten-
tion to kill, or to do serious Injnry. Bster-
Une V. State, 66 AU. 269, 270, 105 Md. 629.
The ''malice" ess^itlal to constitute
murder Is not restricted to spite or malevo-
lence towards decedent, but means that gener-
al malignity or recklessness which proceeds
from a heart devoid of a jnst sense of social
dnty and fittaUy bent on mischief, and Is tan-
plied by law from every deliberate cmel act
committed by one person against another;
and where the act from which death ensues
asypears prima fade to have been committed
deliberately, the law presumes that it was
done in malice, and accused must show that
the offense is of a mitigated character and
does not amount to murder. State v. Black-
Jmrn (Del.) 75 Ati. 636, 539, 7 Pennewlll, 479.
Undor the statute making any person
who wllifull/ and xnalidously bums any
dwelling house, etc., guilty of arson, etc^ the
malice Intended by the law signifies the In-
tent from which flows the unlawful act. com-
mitted without legal Justification ; and when
the act constituting the attempt is proved
to have been done, and to have been done will-
fully, it is then Inferred to have been done
maliciously. State v, Lockwood (Del.) 74 Atl.
2, 3, 1 Boyce, 28.
The ''malice" which would mftke an act
murder may be proved by direct evidence, or
may be implied from any unlawful act, in-
dicating a wicked heart bent on mlsehlet or
a reckless disregard of human life, such as the
deliberate selection and use of a deadly weap-
on. State T. Jackson (DeL) 82 Atl. 824, 825.
In a prosecution for murder, "malice"
may be implied from any unlawful act denot-
ing a wicked heart bent on mischief, and so
tbe deliberate selection and use of a deadly
weapon upon another is evidence of malice.
State V. Stockley (DeL) 83 AU« 1078, 1079.
Where a killing is accomplished with a
deadly weapon, malice is presumed, In the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary. State v.
Primrose (Del.) 77 AtL 717, 719, 2 Boyce,
164; Same v. Busso (DeL) 77 Aa 743, 745, 1
Boyce. 638.
Wherever murder Is done deliberately or
without adequate cause, the law presumes
tbat it was done with malice; and the
burden is on the prisoner to show that the act
was not malicious. State v. Brown (Del.)
80 Aa 146, 149, 2 Boyce, 405; Same v. Bell
(DeL) 62 Aa 147, 148, 5 PennewlU, 192;
Same v. Primrose (Del.) 77 AtL 717, 719,
2 Boyce, 164; Same v. Roberts (DeL) 78 Atl.
305, 309, 2 Boyce, 140 ; Same v. Busso (DeL)
77 Aa 743, 745r 1 Boyce, 538.
^'MaHoe," essential to murder of the sec-
ond degree, is implied by law from every un-
lawful and cruel act committed by one person
against another, so that, where the killing is
done with a deadly weapon likely to produce
death it Is presumed to have been done
maliciously. State v. Roberts (DeL) 78 Atl.
305, 310, 2 Boyce, 14a
"Malice,** in the law of homicide, is a
condition of the mind or heart, which may be
shown by the deliberate selection and use of
a deadly weapon, or by antecedent menaces
or threats, such as disclose a purpose on the
part of accused to commit the act charged.
Malice, in the law of homicide, may be im-
plied from any unlawful act, such as in it-
self denotes a wl<^ed heart fatally bent <m
mischief, or a reckless disregard of human
life, mr from an act from which death ensues,
unaccompanied by dzeumstances of Justifica-
tion, excuse, or mitigatton, and on such act
b^ng shown it is incumbent on accused to
show to the satisfaction of the jury that tbe
killing was not malicious. State v. Johnson
(IM.) 78 Aa 606, 6061 2 Boyce, 48.
"Malice" may be implied when an act
which produces death is attended by such
circumstances as are the ordinary symptoms
of a wicked and depraved spirit, or from atp
tending circumstances of atrocity and cruel-
ty, or ftom the unlawful use of a deadly weap-
on; and, where an unlawful homicide Is
shown and no circumstances of mitigation
or excuse appear, malice win be presumed.
State V. Kritchman (Conn.) 79 Atl. 75, 77.
"Under Pen. Code, art 4, I 7, defining
tbe werds 'malice^ and 'malieiously' as im-
porting a wish to veac, anm>y, or injure
another person, or an intent to do a wrongful
act established eiaer by proof or presump-
tion of law," where a defendant was on trial
for assault in the first degree, the crime in-
volved a specific intent as the gist of the of-
fense, and it was error for ae court to
Instruct aat, when an unlawful act is shown
to have been deliberately committed for ae
purpose of injuring another, it is presumed
to have been committed with a malicious and
guilty intent, and the law presumes that a
person intends the ordinary consequences of
any voluntary act committed by him. State
V. Schaefer, 88 Pac. 792, 793, 35 Mont 217.
A charge defining murder substantially
as it is defined in Pen. Code, S 188, and stat-
ing that malice does not necessarily mean
that the accused must have entertained to-
ward the deceased feelings of spite, hatred,
or ill will, but that the word meant more
under the statute, and that there might be
legal malice where there was no spite or
hatred or ill wUl, and explaining that an
unlawful act done Intentionally, without
just cause or excuse^ is an act, in the con-
templation of law, done with malice as that
word is understood in criminal judicature,
MAUQB
228
MALICB
was not Brroneona. People r. IfcBoberta, 81
Pac 734» 736» 1 GaL App. 25.
Where, In a prosecution for homicide,
the court defined "malice,'* as an element
of murder, as a deliberate intention unlaw-
fully to take away the life of a fellow crea-
ture, without provocation or under drcum-
stances showing an abandoned or malig;nant
heart, as provided by statute, defendant was
not prejudiced by the fact that the court also
stated that "malice" imported a wish to vex»
annoy, or injure another, or an intent to do a
wrongtul act, as provided by section 7;
though such definition was inapplicable to
"malice" as an element to murder. People y.
Waysman, 81 Pac 1087, 1 Cal. App. 246.
Rev. St 1898, f 4053, defines "malice" and
"maliciously'* as importing a wish to vex,
annoy, or injure another person, or an in-
tent to do a wrongful act SectUm 4427 pro-
vides that every person who willfully, un-
lawfully, and maliciously administers any
poison to an animal, the property of another,
is punishable. Under such sections, the fact
that the owner of a dog polsoncSd by defend-
ant was unknown to defendant did not pre-
clude a finding that the poison was adminis-
tered maliciously. State v. Ck)Ieman, 82 Pac.
465, 466, 29 Utah, 417.
On the subject of murder, and in defin-
ing "malice," the court properly (diarged that
it was a wicked condition of the heart, a
wicHed purpose, a performed purpose to do a
wrongful act without sufficient legal provoca-
tion, . State V. QaUman, 60 S. B. 682-686, 79
S. C. 229.
" 'Malice' is implied when an act danger*
ous to others is done so recklessly or wan-
tonly as to evince depravity of mind and dis-
regard of human life." Where two persons
fought with firearms in a public place, their
reckless disregard of law amounted to mal-
ice, rendering both guilty of murder. State
y. liliiston, 54 S. B. 427, 141 N. O. 857, 115
Am. St Rep. 705.
An instruction that malice has been de-
fined to be a term of art importing wicked-
ness and excluding Just cause and excuse is
not erroneous, on the ground that it leads the
Jury to beUeve that mere wickedness is mal-
ice. State V. Miller, 53 S. B. 426, 427, 73 S.
a 277.
An instruction was held proper which
defined "malice," as applied to assault with
intent to kill, as "the intent to take human
life unlawfully, where there are no circum-
stances of Justification or mitigation for the
act if the life should be taken as intended.
It means the deliberate, intentional use of a
deadly weapon for the purpose of taking
human life, from whatever motive it springs,
if there are no circumstances surrounding
the transaction which mitigates or Justifies
the act" Napper v. State, 51 S. B. 592, 593,
123 Ga. 571.
On a tvial for murder, an InatrnctloB
that "maUce ia the intenUonal killing of a
person, knowing It to be wrong, intending to
do it, knowing it to be wrong;" without legal
excuse, is not wror, eapedaUy Allien followed
by a full statement of the law as to man-
slaughter. State V. Byrd, 51 S. B. 542, 644,
72 8. 0. 104.
After defining murder and malice, ex-
press and implied, in the language of the
Penal Code (sections 60-62), it furnished no
ground for reversal that the court added that
malice was an unlawful intention to kill,
without Justification or mitigation. Leonard
V. States 66 S. B. 251, 253, 133 Ga. 435.
It is not «ror to charge that, wbenevtf
a person kills anotiier with an intent to kiU,
that intent is malice, if it is a deliberate in-
tuition unlawfully to take human life.
Rhodes v. State, 66 S. B. 887, 188 Ga. 723.
Where a homicide was committed by ac-
cused with an instrument which the Juiy
found was a weapon likely to produce death,
the law, from the use of such weapon, pre-
sumes malice and an intent to kill; there
being evidence to authorize the finding of
homicide unaccompanied with circomstances
of mitigation. Flanagan t. State, 60 8. E.
171, 172, 135 Ga. 221.
In a murder trial where there was evi-
dence furnishing a basis for implied malice,
an instruction: "Malice is not confined to
ill will toward an individual, but is intended
to denote an action following from any wick-
ed and corrupt motive— a thing done with a
widced mind— where the fact has been at-
tended with such drciimstancea as evince
plain indications of a heart regardless of so-
cial duties and flatally bent on mischief;
hence malice is implied from any deliberate
and cruel act against another, however sad-
den, which shows an abandoned and malig-
nant heart" — was correct People v. Lucas,
91 N. B. 659. 664, 244 IlL 603.
It was held proper to instruct the Jury
that "'malice,' in its legal sense, denotes
that condition of mind which is manifested
by the intentional doing of a wrongful act
without Just cause or excuse. It means any
willful and corrupt, intent of mind, and as
applied to this case, if you should be satis-
fied by all the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant without Just cause
or excuse committed the ofTense diarged in
the manner and form as charged in the in-
dictment then it was done with malice or
maUdously." Gate v. State, U4 N. W. 942,
944, 80 Neb. 611.
An instruction defining "murder in the
second degree" as the killing of a hunmn
being "willfully, premedltatedly and with
malice aforethought," and then defining
"willfully" to mean intentionally, not by ac-
cident "premedltatedly" to mean though t of
beforehand for any length. of time, iiowever
HALICB
229
MALIGB
Abort; ana stating that "milllee*' did not
mean mere hatred or dislike, bat that condl*
tion of mind whlcb prompted a person to
intentionally take the llf^ of another, and
that *'mallce aforethought** meant malice
with premeditation, properly defined ''mur-
der in the second degree.*' State y. Myers,
121 & W. 181, 185, 221 Mo. 598.
''Malice" means that condition of the
mind which prompts one to do a wrongful
act Intentionally, and to take the life of an-
other without legal justification or excuse.
It does not mean mere spite, hatred, or ill
wlU, but'it signifies the state of disposition
which shows a heart regardless of social
duty and fktally bent on mischief. Malice
may be presumed from the intentional use
of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to
prodace death. State v. Vaughan, 98 8. W.
2. 5, 200 Mo. 1.
In a prosecution for murder, the court
charged that '^malice is also necessary to
murder hi the first degree. The distingulsh-
hig feature, so ftir as malice is concerned, is
that, in murder of the first degree, malice
must be proTen to your satisfaction beyond
a reasonable doubt as an existing fact, while
in murder of the second degree malice will
be implied from the iAct of an unlawful kill-
hig.** Held that, If the instructions stood
alone, the latter part of the paragraph might
be erroneous, but as it was followed by an
iDstructlon defining malice .as being that
which the law infers from certain acts, how-
ever suddenly done, as when the fact of an
uilawful killing is established and the facts
do not establish maUce beyond a reasonable
doubt, though they tend to excuse or Justify
the act, then the law implies malice, and the
murder is murder of the second degree, and
also that if the killing is unlawful and done
with implied malice aforethought, it would
be murder in the second degree, the instruc-
tioQg taken together were correct Bggle-
8ton T. State (Tex.) 128 S. W. 1106, 1109.
The term "malice*' does not mean mere
hatred or HI will, as the term is commonly
miderstood, but it means the intentional do-
hig of a wrongful act, and signifies that
state of the mind or disposition that would
prompt one man to take the life of another,
or do him some great bodily harm, without
Just cause or excuse. State ▼. Bond, 00 S.
W. 830, 831, 191 Mo. 555.
The distinguishing feature in the degrees
of murder, so far as the element of malice is
concerned, is that, in murder in the first de-
gree, "malice" must be proved to the satisfac-
tion of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
as an existing fact, while in murder in the
second degree "malice" will be implied from
the fact of the unlawful killing. McLln v.
State, 90 S. W. 1107, 1108, 48 Tex. Cr. K. 549.
"Malice," as used in defining murder,
does not memn mere q;>ite or Ul will, as gener^
ally understood, but signifies an unlawful
state of the mind, and such state of the mind
as one is in who intentionally does an unlaw-
ful act State v. Hottman, 94 8. W. 237, 239,
196 Mo. 110.
"Malice" does not mean mere spite or
ill will, as the term is commonly understood,
but means the intentional d<^g of a wrong-
ful act, and signifies that state of mind or
disposition which would prompt one person
to take the life of another or do him some
great bodily harm without just cause or ex-
cuse. State T. Tetrick, 97 S. W. 564, 565, 199
Mo. 100.
Where one intentionally, willfully, with-
out justification or excuse, and while his
mind was cool enough to realize the nature of
his acts, shot another with intent to kill, he
was actuated by "malice." Williams v. State,
135 S. W. 552, 553, 61 Tex. Gr. R. 589.
"Malice," as an ^ment of murder, con-
templates wickedness and excludes a just or
legal cause of excuse. It is "expressed"
where there is positlTs direct evidence show-
ing that at the time of the killing, it was
really entertained and "implied," where the
evidence does not directly show that the mal-
ice was entertained at that time but is neces-
sarily indirectly implied from the circum-
stances and facts which have been proved.
State Y. Lee, 60 S. E. 524, 525, 79 S. G. 223.
▲ charge on a trial for murder that mal-
ice included not only anger, hatred, ill will,
and desire fbr revenge, but every other un-
lawful and unjustifiable motive ; that a thing
done with a wicked mind and attended with
su<di circumstances as plainly indicated a
heart regardless of social duty and fully bent
on mischief indicates malice within the mean-
ing of the law; and that the existence of mal-
ice is inferred from acts committed or words
spoken — was not erroneous, nor was the sub-
stltuUon of the word "fully" for "fatally"
prejudicial. Maynard v. State, 116 N. W.
53, 57, 81 Neb. 801.
As respects the offense of willfully and
maliciously burning property of another,
the "malice" must have as its object some
person, ordinarily the owner of the property,
and not the property itself ; but it Is not nec-
essary that the offender knew who the own-
er was, it being enough that he was bent on
mischief against the owner, whoever he might
be. State v. Leslie, 115 N. W. 897, 898, 138
Iowa, 104, 128 Am. St Rep. 160.
In a prosecution for assault with intent
to kill, a charge that if the jury believed
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that accused intentionally and maliciously
shot at prosecuting witness with a gun with
the intent to kill her, he should be convicted,
and defining malice as including not only an-
ger, hatred, and revenge, but every unlawful
and unjustifiable motive used by a person in
the commission of an act was not erroneous
MAUOB
230
MALIOB
Id vievr of Snyder's Comp. Laws 19O0»1 230T,
providing that every person who intentionally
and wrongfully shoote, shoots at, or attempts
to shoot at another with any kind of a fire-
arm, with intent to kill any person, is punish-
able, Bartell v. State, 111 Pac, 669, 670, 4
Okl, Cr. 135.
''Malice" in law does not necessarily
mean hate or ill will, but is defined as any
unlawful act, willfully done, without Just
cause or legal excuse. It is that mental
state or condition which prompts the doing of
an unlawful act without legal justification or
extenuation. Patterson v. State, 47 South.
52, 54, 156 Ala. 62.
An instruction that "malice** signifies a
condition of the mind void of social duty and
fatally bent on mischief, or an unlawful in-
tention to kill or do some great bodily harm
to another without just cause or excuse, is
correct State v. Forsha, 88 S. W. 746, 751,
100 Mo. 296^ 4 U R. A. (N. S.) 576.
Where the court at the request of the
jury In a homicide case, returning for further
instructions, read a definition of "malice** in
a law book as not necessarily hatred or ill
will, but as an intentional doing of an un-
lawful act, and that malice, as an ingredient
of murder, was the killing of a human being
without justification, excuse, or extenuation,
and then stated that malice, as an Ingredient
of murder, did not necessarily mean hatred or
ill will, but was the unlawful and willful kill-
ing of a human being without any legal ex-
cuse or justification, the definition adopted by
the court was proper, and the definition read
from the law book was not calculated to con-
vey to the jury the impression that it was
adopted as a part of the definition requested.
Coates V. State, 56 South. 6, 8, 1 Ala. App. 85.
The "malice" essential to convict of mur-
der may be ascertained from previous threats
and measures taken in preparation, and it
may also arise suddenly and be implied from
circumstances, as from the intentional use at
the outset of a deadly weapon. Brown v.
State, 54 South. 305, 98 Miss. 786, 84 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 811.
"Malice" essential to constitute murder,
as distinguished from manslaughter, includes
all those states of the mind In which a homi-
cide is committed without legal justification,
extenuation, or excuse, and where an unlaw-
ful homicide is shown to have been commit-
ted, and its attending circumstances disclose
nothing to mitigate, extenuate, or excuse the
act, "malice" on the part of the slayer is
presumed. State v. Marx, 60 Atl. 690, 692,
78 Ck>nn. 18.
In libel and alaadev
"Malice** in the law of slander is used in
a popular sense. Hubbard v. Allyn, 86 N. E.
350, 359, 200 Mass. 166, 22 U B. A. (N. S.)
780.
While it Is true that in slander "oial-
ice" Is the gist of the action, yet the term
"malice** is always used In such cases in a
legal sense. Weller v. Western State Bank
of Waukomis, 00 Pac. 877, 882, 18 Okl. 47&
The word "maUce,** as used in the law of
libel and slander, does not mean hatred or ill
will, but the want of legal excuse for the pub-
Ucation. Sheibley v. Nelson, 121 N. W. 458,
460, 84 Neb. 893.
"Malice" in ftict may be defined as a
spiteful or rancorous disposition which caus-
es an act to be done for mischief. Implied
malice Is sufllclent to support an action for
slander, where the other elemaits exist
Proof of express malice authorizes punitive
damages. Where one diarges another with
larceny, the law imputes malice. Lee v.
Orump, 40 South. 609, 610, 146 Ala. 655 (quot-
ing and adopting definition In Ghilders v. San
Jose Printing & Publishing Co., 38 Pac. 903,
105 Gal. 284, 45 Am. St Rep. 40).
"'Malice' is presumed from the making
by one person of derogatory statements with
reference to another in regard to his compe-
tency or fitness for his trade or profession,
and such derogatory language Is slanderous
per se.*' Vial v. Larson, 109 N. W. 1007, 132
Iowa, 208 (citing Newell, Slander & Libel [2d
Ed.] 182, 898).
Malice, as used in cases of slander and
libel, does not necessarily imply actual evil
intent but rather the want or absence of
any legal excuse for the speaking or publi-
cation of the injurious words. Where slan-
derous words are actionable per se, malice is
presumed. McDonald v. Nugent, 98 N. W.
506, 508, 122 Iowa, 651.
Where words are spoken which are slan-
derous per se, malice is presumed; but the
malice which Is thus presumed is known aa
legal malice, as distinguished from actual or
express malice, or malice in fact In an ac-
tion for slander, the absence of actual malloe
will not defeat the action, and the party in-
jured may recover his actual damages; but
where actual malice is charged in a com-
plaint, and more than compensatory dam-
ages are claimed for the injury, the actual
motive or intent with which the publication
was made becomes an important fact from
which to determine the amount of damages
to be awarded. Wrege v. Jones, 100 N. W.
705, 707, 13 N. D. 267, 112 Am. St Rep. 679,
3 Ann. Gas. 482.
"The term *mallce,* as employed in the
definition of libel per se, is often misunder-
stood by the general reader, and is sometimes
misapprehended by lawyer& It does not
necessarily mean personal hatred or ill will
toward the person at whom the libel is di-
rected. Legal malice in the publishing of a
libel is not inconsistent with honesty of par-
pose and good motive. * * * In other
words, malice Is the want of legal «zcii8e tat
MAUOB
231
MAIilOB
an act done to the injtiry of another. Who-
ever glvefi currency to libelous matter (not
protected as being privileged) must be pre-
pared to prove its truth, tf he would avoid
liability to the party hijured." Morse ▼.
Times-Republican Printing Oo^ 100 N. W.
867, 871, 124 Iowa, 707.
Where, In libel for newspaper articles,
some of which did not refer to plalntifT, and
some of which were not libelous per se, there
was no averment of extrinsic facts that the
articles referred to plaintiff or any innue'hdo
from which it could be inferred that they
charged plaintiff with such ccmduct as to ren-
der it libelous per se, an instruction that
"malice'* means the intentional doing of k
wrongful act without excuse, and that if the
articles published were libelous in whole or
in part, and were published concerning plain-
tiff, and were not true, the law presumed
that tbey were published maliciously, and it
was not necessary to i>rove any malice to
warrant a verdict for plaintiff, was erro-
neous, because it did not confine the presump-
tion of malice to the articles which were
libelous per se. Flowers v. Smith, 112 8.
W. 490, SOO, 214 Mo. 08 (citing and adoptiag
Mitchell ▼. Bradstreet Co., 22 & W. 802, 116
Ho. loc. cit 240, 20 Ia B. A. 188, 88 Am. St
R^ 602).
An averment of "malice," in an action
for libel, is not equivalent to a charge that
defendant wrote the libel knowing it was
untrue. Dickinson v. Hathaway, 48 South.
136, 137, 122 La. 644, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33.
"The unprivileged publication in writing
or print of a fiilse charge that another is
gnilty of a crime, or of a false charge'which
tends to expose another to public hatred or
contempt, entitles the person thus defamed
to recover of the publisher full compensa-
tion in damages for all the injury to his
reputation, business, and feelings which the
defamatory publication caused. A written
or printed article of this character is libel-
ous in itself. From its publication the con-
clusive presumption of actual damages to
its victim, and of 'legal malice* (that is to
say, of 'an act done wrongfully without legal
justification or excuse*), at once arises. The
fact that the publisher was without malioe,
in the popular acceptation of that term (that
la to say, without ill will, bad motive, hatred,
or intent to injure his victim), constitutes no
defense to the latter's claim for compensa-
tory damages, and no evidence to mitigate
or reduce their amount, because the actual
damages to the party libeled are the same
whether they are inflicted by the publisher
with a good or an evil intent, and the victim
is as clearly entitied to full compensation for
a wrong inflicted with a laudable motive, or
through mistake or inadvertence, as for one
perpetrated with a diabolical purpose or in-
tend The intent or purpose with which such
a publication is made is immaterial in the
trial of the claim for the actual or compensa-
borr damages whldh Che party liijtired may
seek. It is important only when a claim for
exemplary damages is to be considered."
Post Pub. Co. V. Butier, 137 Fed. 723, 726,
71 01 G. A. 800 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion given in Palmer v. Mahen, 120 Fed.
737, 741, 67 C. a A. 41, 45).
'^By 'legal malice,' as explained by Bay-
ley, J., in Bromage v. Prosser, 4 B. & C. 28S
(E. O. Ly R. vol. 10), is meant no more than
the wrongful intention which the law always
presumes as accompanying a wrongful act,
without any proof of malice in fact • • •
In a legal sense, any act done willfully and
purposely to the prejudice and injury of an-
other, which is unlawful, is, as against that
person, malicious. It is not necessary, to
render an act malicious, that the party be
actuated by a feeling of hatred or ill will
towards the individual, or that he entertain
and pursue any general bad purpose or de-
sign^ On the contrary, he may be actuated
by a general good purpose, and hav€ a real
and sincere design to bring about a reforma-
tion of manners ; but if, in pursuing that de-
sign, he willfully inflicts a wrong on others,
which is not warranted by law, such act is
malicious." Star Pub. Ck>. v. Donahoe (Del.)
68 Ati. 613, 617, 66 L. R. A. 980 (quoting and
adopting deflnitlon in Oommonwealth v.
SnelHng [Mass.] 16 Pidc. 340).
The kind of "malice^* which ''overcomes
and destroys the privileges is, of course,
quite distinct from that which the law, in
the first instance, imputes with respect to
every defamatory charge, irrespective of mo-
tive. It has been defined to be an 'indirect
and wicked motive which induces the de-
fendant to defame the plaintiff.'*' Denver
Public Warehouse Oo. v. Holloway, 83 Pac.
131, 183, 34 (}olo. 482, 8 Ii. R. A. (N. &) 696,
114 Am. St Rep. 171, 7 Ann. Gas. 840 (quot-
ing and adopting Hemmens v. Nelson, 84
N. SX 342, 138 N. Y. 624, 20 L. B. A. 440;
Odgers, L. & S. 267).
Pen. CSode, | 242, defines criminal libel
as a malicious publication, section 244 pro-
vides that a publication having such tend-
ency is deemed malicious if no justification
or excuse is shown, and section 718, subd. 3,
provides that the terms "malice" and "ma-
licious** each import an evil intent, wish, or
design to annoy or injure another. Held,
that a corporation may be convicted of crim-
inal libel; the evil intent of its agents who
published the libel being attributed to it
People V. Star Co., 120 N. Y. Supp. 408, 600,
136 App. Div. 617.
Cttv. Code, I 47, defines a "privileged
communication*' as one without malice, to a
person interested ther^n, by one who iff. al-
so interested; one who stands in such rela-
tion to the person interested as to afford a
reasonable ground for supposing the motive
innocent, or who is requested by the person
interested to give the information; and seo-
ICAIilOS
232
MAUCB
tion 48 declares that the ''malioe" so referred
to is not inferred from the communication
or publication. Held, that "malice" as used
in section 47 meant malice in fact, or a libel
published with an actnal, malicious intent
Davis T. Hearst, U6 Pac. 580, 540, 160 Oal.
143.
"By 'malice* is not meant, necessarily,
spite or ill will, but it is also meant the do-
ing of a wrongful act Intentionally, without
Just cause or excuse; and if an article com-
plained of was published of and concerning
plaintiff, and was not true, and was a libel
on him, then the law presumes it was pub-
lished maliciously. * ** Only legal mal-
ice is exacted, and on analysis this sinks in-
to a myth or fiction, for so much malice as
is necessary to afford compensation for ac-
tual damages is inferred from the fact that a
false writing was published concerning plain-
tiff, although in truth the publisher felt no
ill will, and believed he was telling the tiruth.
This result elimtnates malice from actions
for libel, as a practical factor, save as a
reason for awarding more than compensative
damages or overcoming the defense of priv-
ileged communication." What is meant by
^'malice" in these actions is that the publi-
cation of the false matter was without legal
excuse, or, to present the rule in a perfectly
definite and intelligible form, that it was un-
privileged. If it was a privileged communi-
cation, no malice is inferred from the publi-
cation, and the case fails, unless malice is
otherwise proved, and where, through a mis-
take as to identity, plaintiff's picture was
published in connection with an actide which
was false and libelous as to him, it was ma-
licious. Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub.
Co., 87 S. W. 565. 568, 113 Mo. App. 2ia
In malloloiis mischief
^fallce, as an element of malicious mis-
chief, is not restricted to ill vdll or revenge
against the owner or possessor of the prop-
erty injured ; but a willful or wanton injury
to property, under circumstances Indicating
a malignant spirit or mischief, is sufi^dent
to constitute malicious mischief, and such
malice may be either expressed or implied.
State V. Wrfght (DeL) 70 Atl. 399, 400, 2
Boyce, 393.
On a trial for malicious mischief in vio-
lation of Rev. Pen. Code, § 712, an instruc-
tion that such acts in relation to the property
of another as evince a disposition of wan-
ton deviltry and reckless disregard of the
rights and property of another are, in law,
malice, together with the charge that to Jus-
tify a conviction the Jury must find not only
that accused willfully and intentionally, but
that he wantonly and in a spirit of revenge,
injured the property of another, sufficiently
describes "malice," as defined by section 811
as importing a wish to annoy or injure an-
other. State V. Tarlton, 118 N. W. 706, 708,
22 S. D. 495.
Za malieiMU proa^eutlos
"Malice" is a wrongful motive which
prompts a wrongfol act The institution of
criminal proceedings .with any oth«r motive
than that of bringing a guilty person to Jus-
tice is a malicious prosecution. Bulison v.
CoUins, 82 S. W. 748. 750, 5 Ind. T. 282
(quoting and adopting definition in Addison,
Torts [Wood's Ed.] i 853; Johns v. Marsh,
52 Md. 323; Garvey v. Wayson, 42 Md. 178;
Harpham ▼. Whitney, 77 IlL 32).
* The malice required to be shown is the
wrongful motive prompting the prosecution,
and may be established by proof of any
motive other than that of bringing a guilty
party to Justice. Moneyweight Scale Ca v.
McCormick, 72 AtL 537, 540, 109 Md. 170.
In an action for malicious prosecutioD, a
definition of malice as a "disposition to do
the person prosecuted a wrong without legal
excuse" was not prejudicial to plaintiff.
Gaither v. Carpenter, 65 8. B. 625, 626, 143
N. 0. 240.
The malice essential to sustain an action
for malicious prosecution, does not mean per-
s<mal ill will, but a wrongful act, knowingly
and intentionally done, without Jnst cause,
constitutes malice. Stanford v. A. F. Mes-
sick Grocery Co., 55 8. B. 815, 817, 143 N.
C. 419.
"Malice** need not indicate anger or vin-
dictiveness, but it imports bad taltti in a
malicious prosecution, or the want of sincere
belief that the tSLCtn and circumstances Jus-
tify the prosecution. Griswold ▼. Griswold,
77 Pac. 672, 678, 143 OaL 617.
The fact that an action was commenced
and prosecuted without probable cause may
be considered by the Jury on the question of
malice. Actual. malicious purpose or personal
ill will is not essential to constitute the legal
malice which must be shown to support an
action for malicious prosecution. The malice
required to support the action may be infer-
red by the Jury from the want of probable
cause. Connelly v. White, 98 N. W. 144, 145,
122 Iowa, 391.
"MaUce," in law, is the intentional doing
of a wrongful act without Just cause or
excuse. It is not sufficient, to sustain an
action for malicious prosecution, to prove
that the afildavit upon which th^ arrest was
made was false. It must also appear tbat
the affiant either knovra it was false, or did
not have reasonable and probable cause to
believe it to be true. Izzo v. Viscount, 64
Atl. 953, 954, 74 N. J. Law, 65 (quoting and
adopting McFadden v. Lane, 60 AtL 867, 71
N. J. Law, 630).
"Malice,** in its legal sense, aa used in
actions for malicious prosecution, "is not to
be considered in the sense of spite or hatred
against an individual, but of mains animus,
and as denoting that the party is actuated
MALlCff
333
MAIilOB
by Improper and Indirect motives,*^ or, as
defined by Newell, Mai. Pros. c. 71, | 7, p.
239, it means •% general wickedness of In-
tent; a depraved Inclination to do harm, or
to disregard tbe rights or safety of mankind
generally." CampbeH ▼. Baltimore ft O. H.
Co., 55 Atl. 532, 97 Md. 841 (quoting Johns
r. Marsh, f52 Md. 828).
"Legal malice," as distinguished from
"express" or "actnal malice," and which Is
sufficient to support an action for maliciously
suing out process, but not to support an
award of punitive damages, consists in a
wrongful act intentionally done, without just
and lawful cause or excuse. Wright ▼. Har-
ris, 70 8. E. 489, 492, 160 N. O. 542.
In an action for malicious prosecution,
an instruction that: •• 'Malice' is defined as
any indirect motive of wrong; • • •
and, in the legal sense, any unlawjPuI act,
which is done willfully and purposely to the
injury of another, is, as against that person,
malicious; and by malice is meant not the
act, but the motive which prompts the act
It consists of a bad motive, or sudi recklesB
disregard of tbe rights of others as to show
evil intent It is an action based upon an
Improper motive, and does not necessarily
presuppose persMial hatred, ill will, or re-
venge. The improper motive or want of
proper motive inferable from a wrongful
act, based upon no reasonable ground, con-
stitutes of itself all the malice deemed es-
sential In law to the maintenance of the
action. The malice necessary to be shown
in order to maintain this action is not nec-
essarily revenge or other base and malignant
passion; whatever is done willfully and
purposely, if it be at the same time wrong
and unlawful, and that known to the party,
is, in legal contemplation, malice. If, how-
ever, the accused is in fact guilty of the
offense charged, that would be a complete
defense in this action, and it would be im-
material whether the proceedings complained
of were malicious or not" — was correct.
Miles V. Walker, 92 N. W. 1014, 1016, 68
Keb. 728.
"Malice," as an element of malicious
prosecution, does not necessarily mean anger,
wrath, or vlndlctiveness, but, while any such
ill feeling may constitute malice, it need be
no more than the antithesis of bona fides, and
hence particular malice or malicious or
wrongful purpose, in the sense of personal 111
will or malevolence existing toward the per-
son prosecuted by the prosecutor is not re-
qnlred. Downing v. Stone, 68 S. B. 9, 10,
152 N. C. 525, 136 Am. St Rep. 841, 21 Ann.
Gas. 753.
Under Civ. Code 1910, i 4451, providing
that malice may consist in personal Sl;)lte,
or in a general disregard of the right con-
sideration of mankind directed by chance
against the individual injured, a charge, in
an action for illegal arrest and malicious
prosecution, that to constitute malice It
would not be necessary to show HI will or
hatred to the person injured, but that malice
may be inferred from any offensive act, or
any act of an offensive nature, which would
show disregard of the person injured and
a violation of proper consideration of him,
was too broad, and made the definition turn
rather on whether the act was offensive to
the person injured than on the intent, pur-
pose, or state of mind of the actor. McPher-
son ▼. Chandler, 72 8. B. 948, 949, 187 Oa.
129.
In an action for malicious prosecution,
held, that it was proper to instruct the Jury
that: "*Malice' in law means an act done
wrongfully and willfully without reasonable
or probable cause, and not necessarily an
act done from ill feeling or spite or a de-
sire to injure another. It is enough if de-
fendant be actuated by improper or sinister
motives. * * * If the purpose of the
arrest was anything else than to vindicate
the law and punish crime, then they might
infer that defendant had a malicious motive
in causing the same." Hackler v. Miller, 114
N. W. 274, 276, 79 Neb. 209.
HecUSMoe 4latla««Uh#d
The doing of an act without that ordi-
nary prudence and discretion which persons
of mature mind and sound Judgment are
presumed to have constitutes "negligence,"
but will not alone warrant an Inference of
'^malice." Malice is distinguishable from
mere negligence in that it arises from some
purpose, while negligence arises from ab-
sence of purpose. The characteristic of neg-
ligence Is Inadvertence or an absence of an
Intent to injure. This does not imply that
the act was done Involuntarily or uncon-
sciously, but merely that the person doing
It was not conscious that the act consti-
tuted a want of reasonable care. Jenkins
V. Gllligan, 108 N. W. 237, 238, 131 Iowa,
176, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1087 (citing Pickens
V. South Carolina & G. R. Co., 32 S. E.
567, 54 S. C. 498).
ZAok of prolmUe eaiue distinguished
"'Malice* and 'lack of probable cause'
are not convertible terms. Neither follows
as a legal presumption from the other. The
jury may infer malice as a fact from proof of
want of probable cause; but they cannot
infer a lack of probable cause from proof of
malice. Both must be proved. Honesty of
purpose precludes malice. Malice Is auy im-
proper or siuister motive for instituting the
suit It need not spring from any spirit of
malevolence, or be prompted by any malig-
nant passion." While many authorities hold
that probable cause is a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances suffi-
ciently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious person in the belief that there were
grounds for the attachment, the better rule
and the one approved is that belief and rea-
MALICE AFORETHOUaHT
234
MAIilOE AFORKTHOTJaHT
sonable grounds must unite to cbnstitate
probable cause. However, the distinction
may be more metaphysical than real. Foster
y. Pitts, 88 8. W. 1114, 63 Ark. 887 (citing to
the quotation Lemay y. Williams, 82 Ark«
166; Oooley, Torts, p. 185; Spengler y. Da-
vy, 15 Grat. [56 Va.] 881; Burkhart y. Jen-
nings, 2 W. Va. 242 ; Commonwealth y. Snell-
ing, 16 Pick. [32 Mass.] 837; Mitchell v. Wall,
111 Mass. 492; Stewart y. Sonnebom, 96 U.
S. 187, 25 Ia Bd. 116; Williams y. Hunter, 14
Am. I>ec. 597, note; Bozeman y. Shaw, 87
Ark. 160; Frowman y. Smith, 12 Am. Dec
265, notes; and citing to the rule approved
King y. Colvin, U B^ L 582, 584; NeweU,
Mai. Pros. p. 2CK2).
MAUCE AFORETHOVOHT
As applied to murder, "malice afore-
thought" is a condition of the mind which
shows a heart regardless of social duty and
fatally bent on mischief, the existence of
which is inferred from acts done or words
spoken. Oonnell v. State, 81 S. W. 746, 747,
46 Tex. Or. R. 259.
The term "malice aforethought" involved
in second-degree murder, within Code, {4727,
providing that whoever kills any human be-
ing with malice aforethought is guilty of
murder, does not necessarily require an in-
tent to murder, and may be implied where
there is no intent to kill, such as an intent
to commit a felony from which death results.
State V. Gibbons, 120 N. W. 474, 475, 142
Iowa, 96.
Under Code, | 4728, providing that all
murder perpetrated by means of poison is
murder in the first degree, the administration
of poison to another unlawfully, and with
bad intent, constitutes malice aforethought,
without a specific intent to kill; and hence
an Instruction that, if defendant, with bad
intent, caused poison to be taken by deceased,
which caused her death, he was guilty of
murder in the first degree, otherwise he was
not guilty, was not objectionable on the the-
ory that such act might constitute man-
slaughter. State v, Thomas, 109 N. W, 900,
902, 135 Iowa, 717.
The use of the words "malice of fore-
thought" in place of the words "malice afore-
thought,'* as provided by the form set out in
the Code, does not impair the validity of the
indictment as charging murder in the first de-
gree, under Code 1907, | 7136, declaring the
use of words conveying the same meaning as
those in the statute sufficient Flowers v.
State, 56 South. 98, 100, 2 Ala. App. 65.
The malice which is an essential element
in the offense of murder has always been
described as "malice aforethought." It ia
descriptive of the state of mind of the slayer
preceding and at the4nstant of the unlawful
act of kilUng. Although no definite or appre-
ciable space of time in law is required to be
shown for the existence of malice, yet it
must be aforethought; that is, it must be re-
lated to the unlawful act in the nature of
cause and effect An indictment for murder
in the second degree, charging that defend-
ant "unlawfully and with malice aforethought
did, etc.," was objectionable for failure to
charge that the act was done with "malice
aforethought" Etheridge v. State, 87 South.
837, 141 Ala. 29.
The phrase "malice aforethought" was
properly defined as "the voluntary and intui-
tional doing of an unlawful act, with the pur-
pose, means, and ability to accomplish the
reasonable and probable eonsequoioes of it,
done In a manner showing a heart regardless
of sodal duty and fatally bent on mischief,
by one of sound mind and discretion, the evi-
dence of which is inferred from acts commit-
ted or words spoken." Barr v. States 120 S.
W. 422. 56 Tex. Cr. B. 872.
A charge in question requiring the homi-
cide to have been committed "unlawfully, and
with a mind which shows a heart regardless
of sodal duty and fatally bent on mischief,
the existence of which may be Inferred from
acts committed or words spoken and In the
perpetration of robbery, and with 'malice
aforethought,' " etc, embraces suffidoitly the
definitions of ''malice aforethought" Jones
v. State, 96 S. W. 980, 931, 50 Tex. Gr. R.
329 {citing Martines y. State, 16 S. W. 767.
30 Tex. App. 129, 28 Am. St Rep. 895; Hed-
rick V. States 51 S. W. 252, 40 Tex. Or. E.
582; Rupe v. SUte, 61 S. W. 929, 42 Tex. Cr.
R. 477).
"'Malice aforethought' means a thing
done with a wicked and corrupt motive. It
is not confined to anger, hatred, and revenge
by one against another, although it evidences
a thing done through anger, hatred, or re-
venge. It also evidences any other unjusti-
flable motive with which the act is done.
Hence malice is not confined to ill will which
one individual holds toward another, but it
is intended to denote any action fiowing from
a wicked and corrupt motive. A thing done
with a wicked mind, when the act has been
attended with such drcnmstances as evince
plain indications of a heart whidi regards
not its sodal duty, and which is fatally bent
on mischief, is done with malice." State v.
Wetter, 83 Pac. 341, 846, U Idaho, 438.
The mere fact that a killing has he&i
accomplished by means of poison does not
show "malice aforethought," within the def-
inition of murder as the unlawful killing of
a human being with "malice aforethought"
State V. Phlnney, 89 Pac. 634, 13 Idaho, 307,
12 li. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 12 Ann. Cas. 1079.
"Malice," within the definition of murder
in Pen. Code, 1 187, as the unlawful killing of
a human being with "malice aforethought,"
may be express or implied. People y. Frank,
83 Pac. 578, 579, 2 CaL App. 283.
MALICE AFOBJSTHOVOBT
235
MALICE ▲TORETHOUGBT
D«U%er«tlom •v pr«ai«dit»tlom implied
"Malice aforethoiii^t" means that the
act was done with malice and premeditation.
State y. Yanghan, 96 & W. 2» 5, 200 Mo. 1.
The i>hra8e ''malice aforethought^' means
a predetennlnation to do the act of killing
without legal ezcnse, and it Is immaterial
how suddenly or recently before the killing
such determination was formed. Hill ▼.
Commonwealth (Ky.) 91 8. W. 1128, 1124
(quoting and adopting the definition in Clark
y. Cbmmonwealth [Ky.] 03 S. W. 740).
"'Malice aforethought means in law
that it has been thought of beforehand, so
that, to constitute murder, the eyidence must
show that the defendant thought of it be-
for^iand, but as to the length of time it is
immaterial." Green y. United States, 104 S.
W. U69, lieo, 7 Ind. T, 733,
"Express malice aforethought" is shown
where one person kills anotiier with a sedate,
deliberate mind and formed design. State y.
Watson (DeL) 82 AU. 1086» 1087.
"MaUce aforethought,** as it ezlsta in
mnrder, is a deliberate and formed design
to kill, which may be manifested by a Ijring
in wait, antecedent threats, former grudge,
iU will, spite, hatred, or any circumstances
that show the accused's intent toward his
victim at the time of the killing. SUte v.
Primrose (DeL) 77 AtL 717, 719, 2 Boyce, 104.
In a prosecution for murder, it was er*
ror, in attempting to define "malice afore-
thought," to charge the Jury: "If the thought
came to the mind (of the defendant), 'I will
kUl,' and he did kUl Immediately after that,
it is thought of beforehand ; that is, 'malice
aforethought' " — si^nce it made the confltelous
act of the defendant malicious, regardless
of the fact whether he was acting In self-de-
fense or otherwise. Green y. United States,
101 Pac. 112, 114, 2 Okl. Cr. 55.
To constitute an "assault with intent to
murder" within Gen. St 1140, the assault
must be made with malice aforethought, and
when an assault is actuated by malice, no
matter how short a time it existed preyious
to the forming of the intent to kill, the malice
is '"malice aforethought" State y. McGuire,
80 AtL 701, 766, 84 Oonn. 470, 38 Ia B. A.
(N. S.) 1045.
An instruction, defining "malice afore-
thought" as a predetermination to do a
wrongfol act without lawful excuse, and
that it was immaterial how suddenly or how
recently such predetermination was formed
is the mind, was not objectionable as includ-
ing a predetermination to do a wrongful act
in general without requiring that the wrong-
ful act be to kill decedent Howard v. Ck>m-
monwealth, 189 S. W. 844, 845, 144 Ky. 644.
The phrase "malice aforethought" as
Qsed in an indictment charging willful mur-
da and in the instruction defining willful
murder and yoluntazy manslaughter, means
a predetermination to do the act of killing
without legal excuse, and it is immaterial
at what time before the killing such a de-
termination was formed. Ball y. Ck)mmon-
wealth, 101 S. W. 950» 960, 125 Ky. 601.
On a trial for murder, it is proper to ad-
yise the Jury that "malice aforethought"
means a predetermination to do the act of
killing without a legal excuse, and it Is im-
material as to what time before the killing
such a determination was formed. Burns
y. Conmionwealth, 124 S. W. 409, 412, 136
Ky. 468.
On a trial for murder, the court should
instruct that the words "malice afore-
thought" mean a predetermination to do the
act of killing without legal excuse, and that
it is immaterial how suddenly or recently
before the killing such determination formed.
Ewing y. Commonwealth, 111 8. W. 852» 865,
129 Ky. 287.
An instruction that the words "with mal-
ice," as used in the instruction, denoted a
wrongful act intentionally done, and tha£ the
term "aforethought" as used, meant a prede-
termination to do the act, howeyer suddenly
or recently formed before the act was done,
sufficiently defined "malice aforethought," es-
pecially when taken in connection with an-
other instruction defining "feloniously" as
meaning to proceed from an evil heart or pur-
pose, done with the deliberate intention to
commit a crime^ though tke definition of
malice aforethought did not require that the
act be done "without legal excuse." Pot-
ter y. Commonwealth, 134 S. W. 462, 142 Ky.
378.
The phrase "malice aforethought" in an
instruction declaring that where the act of
killing is done willfully, fielonlously, and with
malice aforethought, accused is guilty of mur-
der, means a predetermination to do the act
of killing without legal excuse, and it is im-
material how suddenly or recently before the
killing such determination was formed.
Combs y. Commonwealth (Ky.) 112 S. W. 658,
660.
Bey. Laws, c. 207, 1 1, declares that mur-
der committed with deliberately premeditated
malice aforethought or in the commission
or attempt to commit any crime punishable
with imprisonment for life, or committed
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, is murder in
the first degree, and punishable with death,
In a prosecution for such offense, the court
charged that the words "deliberately pre-
meditated malice aforethought" meant simply
"thought upon, resolyed upon beforehand, not
a thing done suddenly, not a thing that comes
into the mind of a sudden, and is done before
there is time to think about it, but a thin^
thought upon or planned some time before, or
thoui^t upon long enough before the act is
done so that it can reasonably be said to haye
become a purpose of the mind," that "no par-
ticular length of time- Ifl necessary" and 11-
MALICE AFOBBTHOUGHT
MALTCB IK LAW OR FACT
Instrated the same by stating that If a rob-
ber with a dirk or pistol turns a corner and
meets a bank messenger with a roll of bills,
and determines in one moment to get It, and
the next shoots or stabs the messenger dead,
takes the package, and flees, his malice was
deliberately premeditated, though it occupied
only a few seconds to accomplish. Held,
that both the definition and illustration were
proper. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 76 N. E.
127, 138, 140, 141, 189 Mass. 457, 7 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 105e.
An instmction, in a prosecution for
murder, that "malice aforethought" means
with malice and premeditation is correct
State V. McCarver, 92 S. W. 684, 686, 194
Mo. 717.
"Malice aforethought," as it exists in
murder, is a deliberate and formed de^gn to
kill, which may be manifested by a lying in
wait, antecedent threats, former grudge, ill
will, spite, hatred, or any circumstances that
show the accused's intent toward his victim
at the time of the killing. State y. Primrose,
(Del.) 77 Ati. 717. 719, 2 Boyce, 164.
m wtU impUed
"Malice aforethought," either expressed
or implied, is manifested by the doing of an
unlawful and felonious act intentionally and
without legal cause or excuse. It does not
imply a pre-existing hatred or enmity toward
the individual injured. People ▼. Balk well,
76 Pac. 1017, iei9, 14S Cal. 259.
The Intent essential to constitute an "as-
sault with intent to murder*' relates to the
condition of the mind of accused, and it may
arise from improper motives, as from hatred
toward the person assaulted, or from an evil
design in general, a wanton and depraved
spirit, a mind devoid of social duty and fa-
tally bent on mischief. To constitute an "as-
sault with intent to murder" within Gen. St
§ 1146, the assault must be made with in-
tent to kill, and when an assault Is actuated
by malice, no matter how short a time it ex-
isted previous to the forming of the intent
to kill, the assault committed is assault
with intent to murder. State v. McGuire, 80
Ati. 761, 84 Conn. 470, 88 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1045.
"Malice aforethought'* is manifested by
the doing of an unlawful or felonious act in-
tentionally and without legal cause or excuse.
It does not imply a pre-existing hatred or
enmity towards the individual injured. Peo-
ple V. Fallon, 86 Pac. 689, 690, 149 Cal. 287.
Malloioiuly distiiiBnialied
In a prosecution for mayhem, a request
for a charge that before the accused could be
convicted, the jury must be satisfled beyond
a reasonable doubt that the act was done un-
lawfuly, intentionally, and with malice afore-
thought, was properly refused, since the term
"malice aforethought" is not necessarily syn-
oo^mous with "maliciously/' as used by the
statute defining mayhem. Green v. State, 44
South. 194, 195, 151 Ala. 14, 125 Am. St Rep.
17, 15 Ann. Cas. 8L
"MaUdously" and ""maUce aforethought**
do not mean the same thing. Malice com-
prehends ill will, a wickedocM of disposition,
cruelty, recklessness, a mind regardless of
social duty, etc., while "malice aforethought"
or "premeditated" design has a more intoise
meaning. They comprehend, not only what is
included within the term "malice," but in ad-
dition thereto mean "premeditated malice.**
Butt V. State, 47 South. 781, 783, 94 Miss. 669
(citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4304; 1
Bish. Cr. Law [8th Ed.] p. 261 ; Patterson v.
State, 66 Ind. 185; Tutt v. Commonwealth,
46 S. W. 675, 104 Ky. 299; State v. Green, 7
South. 793, 42 La. Ann. 644 ; State ▼. Curtis.
70 Mo. 58^ ; Cravey v. State, 35 S. W. 658,
36 Tex. Cr. R. 90, 61 Am. St Rep. 833).
icAuoE nr I.AW on faot
Malice in law is not personal hate or ill
wiU of one person towards another. It refers
to that state of mind which is reckless of law
and the legal rights of the citizens in a pe^
son's conduct towards that dtiaen. Foley v.
Northrup, 105 S. W. 229, 230, 47 Tex. Gr.
App. 277.
"Malice in fact** is a spiteful or rancor-
ous disposition which causes an act to be
done for mischief, and is always a question of
fact for the jury. Walker y. Cbanslor, 91
Paa 606, 606, 153 Cal. 118, 17 L. R. A (N.
S.) 455, 126 Am. St. Rep. 61.
In an action for slander, "malice in
law*' may be implied from facts proved, while
•malice in fact" is actual malice. Davies v.
Starrett, 55 Ati: 516, 618, 07 Me. 668.
"Malice in fact,*' in common acceptatioii,
means ill will against a person, while malice
In law is a wrong done against a person in-
tentionally. An instruction, in an action for
malicious prosecution, that there are two
kinds of malice, malice In fact and malice in
law, that the former means ill will against
a person, and the latter means the doing of a
wrongful act intentionally, and that if de
fendants or eltiier of them were moved by
ill will against plaintiff, or the prosecution
of him was wrongfully caused or maintained
by them, the Jury should find that the prose-
cution was malicious, was not err^meous, as
permitting a recovery if the prosecution was
wrongfully maintained, where the petitioD
claimed damages for the malicious continu-
ance of the prosecution. Carp v. Queen Ins.
Co., 101 S. W. 78, 97, 203 Mo. 295.
''Malice,'* as usually understood, has its
foundation in ill will, and is evidenced by an
attempt wrongfully to vex, injure, or annoy
another. This is "malice in fact,** and is
that referred to in Pen. Code, i 7, sabd. 4,
declaring that the words '^malice** and "ma-
liciously** import a wish to vex, annoy, or in-
jure another person. Thereis another sort of
MALICE IN LAW OR FACTT
287
MALICIOUS
mflUce, the presumption of the ezlstenoe ot
which is raised by the law in certain cases on
certain proofs, and this la the malice describ-
ed in the same section as '*an intent to do a
wrongful act, established either by proof or
presumption of law." This la a malice of
pleading and proof made necessary by the ex-
igencies of definitions of offenses against the
law, and may exist with malice in fact, but
may also exist independent thereof, and in
fiome instances is conclusively presumed
against a defendant, while In others the pre-
sumption Is rebuttable. Davis v. Herirst, 116
Pac. 630, 687, 160 OaL 14&
**Mallce which Is presumed,'* or ''malice
in law,** as distinguished from "malice In
fact,*' 'is not personal hate or 111 will of one
person toward another; it refers to that
state of mind which is reckless of law and
of the legal rights of the citizen In a person's
c nduct toward that citizen." Shoemaker ▼.
Sonju, 106 N. W. 42, 44, 15 N. D. 518, 11
Ann. Cas. 1173.
One has an Inherent right to dispose of
his labor, which can only be lawfully inter-
fered with by one acting in the exercise of an
equal or superior right which comes In con-
flict therewith, and an Intentional interfer-
ence with such right without lawful Justifi-
cation is "malicious In law," even if it springs
from good motives and is without express mal-
ice. Berry v. IXonovan, 74 N. E. 608, 604, 188
Mass. 353, 5 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 899, 108 Am. St
Rep. 499, 8 Ann. Cas. 738.
In an action for alienation of a husband's
affections, malice Is a Jury question of fact,
and not one of- law. Kelso v. Kelso, 86 N. B.
1001, 43 Ind. App. 115.
MAUOIOVS
"The legal meaning of the term 'mall-
dons' is the unintentional doing of a wrong-
ful act without just cause or excuse." Mc-
Namara v. St. Louis Transit Co., 81 S. W.
880, 881, 182 Mo. 676, 66 L. R. A. 486.
Whatever is done >vlllf ully and purpos^y,
be it at the same time wrong and unlawful,
is, in legal contemplation, malicious. Ander-
son V. International Harvester Ck>. of Ameri-
ca, U6 N. W. 101, 102, 104 Minn. 49, 16 L. B.
A. (N. S.) 440.
Any unlawful act, done willfully and
parposely, to the injury of another, as against
that person is "malicious" in a legal sense, as
such term is used in the law of malicious
prosecution. Plunimer v. Collins (Del.) 77
Aa 750, 751, 1 Boyce, 281.
Kirby's Dig. i 1655, provides that if any
person shall maliciously gr contemptuously
disturb or disquiet any congregation assem-
bled in any churoh for religious worship, etc.,
he shall, on convlc^bn, be fined, etc. Held,
tluit th^ words "mallck>^"^and "eont^ptu*
ous^ refer to* the manner of disturbance, find
not to the intent with .which tte disturbance
was effected. Walker v.. State, 146 B. W.
862, 864, 108 Ark. 886.
Under the Bankruptcy Act excepting
from liability released by a disdiarge in
bankruptcy those Incurred for "malicious" in-
jury to the property of another, a judg-
ment for taking cattle without the consent of
the owner and appropriating them to the
bankrupt's own use is not released. Bever v.
Swe<ter, 116 N. W. 704, 705, 706, 138 Iowa,
72L
In a legal sento, malice lias a meaning
different from its popular signification. Acts
willfully and designedly done, which are un-
lawful, are "malicious" in respect to those
to whom they are injurious. One may pros-
ecute a laudable purpose with an honest in-
tention, but in such a manner, and in such
disregard of the rights of others, as to render
his acts unlawfuL Prosecutions may be in-
stituted and pursued with pure motives, to
suppress crimes, but so regardless of estab-
lished forma of law, and of judicial proceed-
ings, as to render the transactiona Illegal and
malidoua. The general motive may be up-
right and commendable, while the particular
acts in reference to others, may be malicious,
in the legal acceptation of the term, so that
an act may be malicious in a legal sense,
which is not prompted or characterteed by
malevolence or corrupt design. Page v.
Cushing, 38 Me. 523, 526.
In a prosecution under a statute making
willful and malicious misconduct in office
a misdemeanor, the cHulsslon of the word
"malicious" from the information is immate-
rial, when the acts complained of neeessarily
Involve a willful disregard of the obliga-
tions owed by the officer to. the public. State
V. Dlxen, 103 Pac ISO, 131, 80 Kan. 650,
Pen. Code, | 242, defines criminal libel
as a malicious publication, section 244 pro-
vides that a publication having snch tendency
is deemed malicious if no justification or ex-
cuse is shown, and section 718, subd. 8, pro-
vides that the terms "malice" and "mali-
cious" each import an evil intent, wish, or de-
sign to annoy or injure another. Held, that
a corporation may be convicted of criminal
libel ; the evil Intent of its agents who pub-
lished the libel being attributed torit Peo-
ple V. Star Co., 120 N. Y. Supp. 498, 500, 135
App. Dlv. 517.
"The term 'malicious,' used In this con-
nection [procuring a breach of contract], is
to be given a liberal meaning. The lict Is
malicious when the thing done is with the
knowledge of the plaintiff's rights, and with
the intent to interfere therewith. It is a
wanton interference with another's contrac-
tual rights. Ineffective persuasion to Induce
another to violate his contract would not of
itself be actionable, but if the peiuuasion be
used for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff
or benefiting the defendant at the expense of
the plaintiff I with a knowledge of the subsist-
MALICIOUS
239 MALICIOUS ABUSE OF PROCESS
«ace'of the contriict, it beoomes a maUdoas
act, and, if injury en^nes from It, a cause
of action accrues to the injured party." Em-
ploying Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co.,
60 S. E. 363, 356, 122 Ga. 509, 69 L. R. A
90, 106 Am. St Rep. 137, 2 Ann. Cas. 694.
The word "malidous," in Rev. St 1899,
1 1959 [Ann. St 1906, p. 1325], which makes
it a misdemeanor for any one to "willfully
and maliciously, or wantonly and without
right," enter the premises of another and de-
stroy any tree, etc., means an unlawful act,
willfully or purposely done to the injury of
another, and to authorize the conviction of one
for willfully and maliciously injuring trees
of another, the malicious intent must he
found. State v. Graeme, 108 S. W. 1131,
1133, 130 Mo. App. 138.
The word "malicious," as used in Or.
Code, div. 1, I 203 (Kurd's Rev. St 1908, p.
762, c. 38), prohibiting the malicious wound*
Ing of any domestic animal, the property of
another, is not used in the sense of "wrong-
fully, intentionally and withont just cause
or excuse," but as importing actual malice
towards the owner, as distinguished from
a spirit of cruelty toward the animaL Peo-
ple V. Jones, 89 N. E. 752, 756, 241 111. 482, 16
Ann. Cas. 832 (citing 6 Words and Phrases,
p; 4307).
Under Rev. St 1887, | 7153, making the
"malicious" killing, maiming, or wounding of
a dog an offense, the word "malicious," as
used, is not equivalent to the word "wrong-
ful," as used in the law of torts. The former
word means more than the latter. It neces-
sarily involves crime, while the latter does
not necessarily do so. State v. Churchill, 98
Pac. 863, 867, 15 Idaho, 645, 16 Ann. Cas.
947 (citing Chappell v. State, 35 Ark. 345;
State V. Hussey, 60 Me. 410, 11 Am. Rep. 209 ;
2 Wharton's Crlm. Law, §| 1068-1070; State
V. Phipps, 64 N. W. 411, 95 Iowa, 491; Unit-
ed States V. Gideon, 1 Minn. 292 [Gil. 226] ;
State V. Rector, 34 Tex. 565).
"Willful," hi a statute against libel, is
covered by "malicious" in an indictment;
the latter meaning all that the former does,
and more. Glover v. People, 68 N. B. 464,
466, 204 111. 170 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in 1 Bishop, (Mm. Proc. [3d Ed.] i 613).
Under section 245 of the Penal Code,
providing that any malicious publication by
picture, effigy, or sign, which exposes a per-
son to contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, is a
libel, "maliclouc^' means simply "intention-
al and willfuL" Roberson v. Rochester Fold-
ing Box Co., 64 N. B. 442, 448, 171 N. Y.
538, 59 L. R. A 478, 89 Am. St Rep. 828.
The word "malicious," as ordinarily em-
ployed in criminal statutes, is the equivalent
of wrongful, intentional, and without Just
cause or excuse; but, as used in many stat-
utes directed against the unlawful destruc-
tion of property. It is held to have a restrict-
ed meaning peculiar to such statutes, imply-
ing that the act to which it relates must have
resulted from actual 111 will or revenge. The
special meaning noted had its origin in Eng-
land In prosecutions under the "Black Act"
(St 9 Geo. I, a 22), enacted in 1722, so caUed
because it was designed to repress the depre-
dations of marauders calling themselves
"blacks." The act provided that, if any per-
son or persons shall unlawfully and mali-
<:liously kill or wound any cattle, etc., sodi
persons shall be adjudged guilty of felony.
It was ^eld that in prosecutions under this
act for injuries to cattle, in order to bring
an offender within the law, the malice must
be directed iagainst the owner of the cattle,
and not merely against the animal itself.
In the United States most statutes prescrib-
ing a penalty for the malicious destruction of
property are sufficiently like those of England
to warrant the inference that they were mod-
eled on them, and for this reason they have
generally, but not always, been given the
same constructioa But the effect of Crimes
Act, I 112 (Gen. St 1901, { 2105), providing
that every punishment and forfeiture impos-
ed on any person maliciously committing any
offense prohibited by the provision of pre-
ceding sections shall equally apply and be in
force, whether the offense shall be committed
from malice conceived against the owner of
property in respect to which it shall be com-
mitted or otherwise, is to take from the word
"malicious" the specific meaning that had
been attributed to it in laws against the de-
struction of property, and restore it to the
usual sense in which it is used In criminal
statutes. State v. Boic«, 74 Pac. 680, 68 Kan.
167, Ann. Caa 491.
BCAI.ICIOV8 ABV8E OF FBOGE8S
See, also. Abuse of Process.
Malicious prosecution distinguished, see
Malicious Prosecution.
Begular use of civil process does not be-
come an actionable malicious abuse of process
by being used with a bad intent TO es-
tablish actionable malicious abuse of dvll
process, there must appear an ulterior par-
pose and the improper use of process. K^th-
ley V. Stevens, 87 N. E. 875, 876, 288 Dl. 199,
128 Am. St Rep. 120.
The "malicious suing out of an attach-
ment" contemplates a wrongful motive in the
securing of the issuance of the attachment
from want of probable cause or other reasoo,
while an *'abuse of process" contemplates the
use of it after its issue for a wrongful pur-
pose, and a party cannot have damages for
the latter offense unless the process issued
was perverted to a purpose not intended or
contemplated by the law. Wright v. HarilB,
76 S. B. 489, 492, 160 N. C. 642.
The regular i^nd legitimate use of pro-
cess, though with a bad intent is not a
"malicious abuse of procesa" Two elements
MAt/ICHOITS AB08B OF PROOfiSS 23a
MAUOIOOS ntOBBODTIOH.
are oecessair to constitate malidons abuse
of legal process : First, tbe existence of an
ulterior purpose; and, second, an act In the
use of a process not proper In the regular
prosecution of the proceeding. To constitute
''malicious abuse of process" lawftOly issued,
it must be used for a purpose not intended
by law. Ingalls ▼. Christopherton, 114 N.
W. TOi, 706^ 21 & D. 674 (quoting 1 CkH>l^.
Torts E3d Bd.] 954).
An action for "malicious use of process'*
lies, though the process was lawfully Issued
on a valid judgment for a Just cause, and is
ralid in form; the wrong being the illegal
and malicious abuso of the power conferred
by the Judgment and the writ Gonsouland
r. Rosomano, 176 Fed. 481, 486, 100 O. C. A.
97.
KAUOIOUS AOT
In general a malicious act InvolTes all
that is usually understood by the term **will*
fal," and is further marked by either hatred
or 111 will toward the party Injured, or by
snCh utter recklessness and disregard of the
lights of others as denotes a corrupt or
maleyolent dlqpocitlon. State ▼. Willing, 106
N. W. 356^ 856» 129 Iowa, 72.
KALICXOnS ▲TTAGHMEKt
"Malldoufl attachment*' of corporate prop-
erty is not a personal tort, but gives rise to
a cause of action for injury to property,
which passes to the trustee in bankruptcy of
the corporation. Hansen Mercantile Co. v.
Wyman, Partridge & Co., 117 N. W. »26. 927,
105 Minn. 491, 31 L. B. A. (N. S.) 727.
MAUCXOVS HrjURT
See willful and Malicious Injury.
To constitute an offense under Rev. Pen.
Code, i 712, punishing the *'maliclous injury
or destruction of property," the act must not
only be done willfully, but for the purpose of
avenging some wrong sustained by the per-
son charged with the offense. One who, on
becoming angry without cause, destroyed
without Justification and in a spirit of wan-
touiess the property of another, violated Rev.
Pen. Code, | 712, punishing the malicious In-
jury or destruction of property. Stete y.
Tarlton, 118 N. W. 706, 708, 22 S. D. 495.
A willful act is one done subject to the
volition and will of the doer and intentional-
ly, and a willful or malicious injury is one
caused by design. Willfulness and malice
alike import intent, and the characteristic
element of "willful" or "malicious injury*'
Is tbe design to injure, either actually en-
tertained or to be Implied from the conduct
and circumstances. Sharkey ▼. Skilton, 77
AtL 950, 951, 83 Conn. 503.
XALICXOUS mSCHIBF
Malice in malicious mlschlet see Malice.
Malicious mischief Includes all malicious
physical injuries to the righto of another,
whl^ imilair utlHty or materially diminish
value. Malice, express or implied, is a nec^
easary ingredient of the offense of malicious
mischief, though the malice need not be
spedflcally to the owner of the property de-
stroyed or injured. Willful or wanton cruel-
ty, or injury to or destruction of property,
ffltminftted under such circumstances as to
indicate a malignant spirit of mischief, is
suffldent to oonstltuto the offense of mall-
douB mlschlet In a prosecution for mall-
clous mischief, malice may be shown by proof
of willful and wanton acts, or it may be in-
ferred from attendant facte and drcumstanc-
ea. The sawing down of telegrai^i poles by
defteidante themselves, or by some unknown
person through their procurement, would
constitute malicious mischl^; but if they, ei-
ther aa principal or accomplice, did not de-
stroy or injure the poles or wires of the com-
pany, acte of resistance or interference^
which they may have committed, would not
be sufficient to constitute the offense. State
V. McCalllster (DeL) 76 Aa 226» 229, 7 Penne-
will, 301.
Under Revisal 1906, | 8621, making It a
felony for one to maliciously assault another
with a deadly weapon by waylaying, etc., and
section 3291, defining a misdemeanor as an
offense not punishable by death or imprison-
ment in the stete's prison, and Acte 1870-71,
p. 94, e 48, punishing by flue or imprison-
ment a person convicted of an assault, with
or without intent to klU, a prosecution for an
assault with a deadly weapon with Intent to
kill is a prosecution for a misdemeanor, and
not for malicious mischief; deffned by section
2676 as willfully injurii^^ personal property
with malice to the owner, and is barred in
two years by section 8147, providing that all
misdemeanors, except for ''maUclous mis-
chief, and other maHdous misdemeanors,"
diall be presented within two years after the
commission of tiie same, the words ''other
malicious misdemeanors" being Intended to
describe an off^se of which malice is a
necessary ingredient, as in the case of mali-
cious mischief. Stete v. Frisbee, 66 8. E.
722, 724, 142 N. a 67X
KAIiZCXOnS PR08ECIJTI0K
Malice in malicious prosecution, see Mal-
ice.
"Malicious prosecution,*' as a ground of
action, must be both malicious and without
probable cause. Kendrick v. Cypert, 10
Humph. (29 Tenn.) 291, 294; Hegan Mantel
Co. V. Alf ord (Ky.) 114 & W. 290, 29L
A malicious prosecution is one begun in
malice without probable cause to believe that
it can succeed, and which finally fails.
Schmidt V. Medical Society of New York
County, 127 N. Y. Supp. 366, 867, 142 App.
Dlv. 635; Burt v. Smith, 73 N. £. 495, 496,
181N. Y. l«2An|],0as. 576. .
KALTCSOUfl J»OS0OUTIOIC:
340
MALICIOUS PROSEOUTIOH
' To iecotet tor malieioaB proselctitionf' U
must be averred aUd proved that tbe pro^iecv-
tion was instituted maliciQusly and without
probable canae. Webmeyer v. MalvibUl, 130
S. W. 681, 683, 150 Mo. App. 107.
To constltdte malicious prosecution, the
arrest complained of mnst^bave been made
by legal process and the prosecution must
have been Instigated by malice and without
probable cause. Melntosb v. Bullard, Eam-
heart & Magness, 120 £k W. 80, 87, 96 Ark.
22T.
In order to recover in an action for
"malicious prosecution," plaintiff must allege
and prove that there was a prosecution; that
it terminated in his favor; that defendants
Were the prose<?utors; ' that they were actu-
ate by mailice ; that theve was want of proba-
ble cause, and the damages sustained by
plaintiff. Russell v. Chamberlain, 85 Pac
026, 927, 12 Idaho, 209; 0 Ann. Oas. 1173.
To maintain an action for malicious
prosecution, plaintiff must show that the
prosecution was instigated by defendant,
that it has been determined in plaintiff's fa-
vor, tiiat there was no probable cause,- and
that defendant acted from malice. Orefice
V. Savarese, 118 N. Y. Supp. 175, 176, 61 Misc.
Rep. 88.
To sustain a motion for ''malicious pros-
ecution," plaintiff must show that he was
prosecuted for a criminal offense at the insti-
gation of defendant, who had no probable
cause for the prosecution, and who acted
with malice, and that the prosecution termi-
nated in an aoanittaL A sufficient termina-
tion of the prosecution in favor of plaintiff
is established when he is discharged by a
magistrate, either because of insufficiency of
evidence,- or because defendant withdrew the
prosecution or failed to make any complaint
or to appear. Lack of probable cause is not
shown by the abandonment of the prosecu-
tion, by the dismissal of the charge by the
prosecutor, by the voluntary discontinuance
of the prosecution^ or by the dismissal for
want of prosecution. Sasse v. Rogers, 81
N. B, 600, 591. 40 Ind. App. 107 (citing Cott-
rell V. CJottrell, 25 N. E. 906, 126 Ind. 184;
Sayles v. Briggs, 4 Mete. [45 Mass.] 421;
Moyle V. Drake, 6 N. E. 520, 141 Mass. 238;
Brown v. Randall, 36 Conn. 56, 4 Am. Rep.
35 ; Cockfleld v. Braveboy [S. C] 2 McMul.
270, 30 Am. Dec. 123; Flickinger v. Wagner,
46 Md. 580).
"In an action for 'malicious prosecution,'
it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to show
that there was no probable cause for the
prosecution, and also that the defendant was
actuated by malice in instituting such prose-
3Ution. There must he want of probable
cause and malice. If probable cause is
shown, then the question of malice becomes
immaterial, because, there being probable
cause, one of the essential elements neces-
sary to maintain the action is disproved."
Miller v. Lai, 71 Atl. 63, 77 N. Jw Law^ 135.
'Malicious proseeution'' i» '*a wanton
prosecution made by a prosecutor in a crim-
inal jproceeding, without probable cause, by
a regular process and prooeeding, which the
facts do not warrant, as appears by the re-
sult" Harrington v. Tibbet, 76 Paa 816,
817, 148 GaL 78 (quoting Bouv. Diet [Bawles'
Revised Ed.]).
Proof, or evidence tending to prove the
following facts, is essential to auttiorixe the
submission of a cause for "malicious prosecu-
tion" to a jury : First, the institution or pros-
ecution by the defendant of the proceedings
complained of; second,, that the proceedings
have finally terminated in favor of the plain-
tiff; third, want of probable cause on the
part of defendant to believe plaintiff guilty
of the offense charged ; fourth, malice on the
part of defendant in instituting or continu-
ing the prosecution. Where a street car pas-
senger tendered a defaced nickel, which was
all the money he had, and the conductor re-
fused to receive it, and started to eject him,
and the passenger, on reaching tiie door, of-
fered resistanoe and prevented his removal
by a scuffle, but without fighting or oitering
to fight, or violent language, and the cou-
ductor called a policeman and had the pas-
senger arrested upon the charge of disturb-
ing the peace, the question of legal malice,
which might be inferred from the fact that
the prosecution was intentional, wrongful
and without Justification or excuse, was for
the Jury. Ruth v. St. Louis Transit Co., 71
S. W. 1055, 1068, 08 Mo. App. 1.
"Malice and. the want of probable cause
must both c6n(:ttr to support the charge of
'malicious prosecution.' Neither is alone suffi-
dent" A verdict for exemplary damages
for a wrongful sequestration is authorized
only where the writ was sued out wrongful-
ly, maliciously, and without probable cause.
Lynch v. Burns (Tex.) 79 S. W. 1084, 1086
(quoting and adopting definition in Culbert-
son V. Cabeen, 29 Tex. 256).
Malice and want of probable cause ar^
essential elements which must concur in an
action for ''malicious prosecution," although
the former may be an inference from proof of
f^cts establishing want of probable causa
Jordan v. Chicago A A, Ry. Co., 79 S. W.
1155, 1158. 105 Mo. App. 446 (citlrig Stubbs
V. Mulholland, 67 S. W. 650, 168 Mo. 47;
Sharpe v. Johnston, 50 Mo. 557).
"Malicious prosecution" has been defined
in England as '*the malicious Institution
against another of criminal, bankruptcy, or
liquidation proceedings without reasonable
and probable cause," and not confined to the
malicious institution of proceedings strlctlj
criminal. K^ing v. D. Sullivan & Co. (Tex.)
92 S. W. 51, 52 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in Eraser, Torts, 121).
To maintain an= action for ^malicious
prosecution," thrf>e things are necessary to
be made out by, the plaintiff : First, a want
ICAUOIOUB PROSEGfUTION
341
HAI4ICIOU8 PROaiSOUTIOl^
of proWible cause; second, maUoe of the de-
fendant; and, tliird, damage to plaintiff —
and tbat malice may be implied from the
want of probable cause, but this implication
maj be explained and repelled by facts and
ctrcnmstancea. Jones ▼. Lonlstflle ft N. B.
Co. (Ky.) 96 S. W. 703 (dtlng Wtied ▼. Weir
[Ky.] 5 B. Mon. 544).
Halioe and want of probable cause must
coexist to warrant an action for '^malldoas
proeecntion/' and, where it is shown that
the prosecutor consulted the prosecuting at-
torney in good faith, communicated to him
all the ascertainable facts, and acted on his
advice in instituting the criminal proceeding,
he should be exonerated. Pinsen v. Gamp-
bell, 101 S. W. 621, 624, 124 Mo. App^ 260.
To support an action fOr '"malicious pros-
ecntlon/' plaintiff must show that the one
procuring his arrest not only acted mali-
ciously but without probable cause. Malice
may be inferred from want of probable
cause, but probable cause cannot be inferred
from anything else. Where one, before pro-
curing the arrest 6t another, laid all ' the
facts on which he based his prosecution be-
fore a competent attorney, obtained his ad-
vice that the prosecution was legal, and in
good faith acted on the advice, it is a com-
plete defense to an action for malicious
prosecution. National Life & Accident Ins.
Co. V. Gibson (Ky.) 101 S. W. 805, 897, 12
L. R. A (N. S.) 717.
To Justify an action for "malicious pros^
ecatiori," it must be shown, not only that
there was a lack of probable cause for the
criminal prosecution complained of, but that
it was instigated maliciously. Van Meter v.
Bass, 90 Pac. 687, 638, 40 Colo. 78.
In a suit for malicious prosecution, the
essential elements are the commencement or
continuance of a criminal or dvil proceed-
ing, that defendant caused it to be instituted
or continued, its bona fide termination in
favor of plaintiff; the absence of probable
cause, the presence of malice, and damages to
defendant Sawyer v. Shick, 120 Pac. 681, 30
Okl. 353.
In an action for malicious prosecution,
plahitiff is bound to prove that there was a
prosecution instituted against him by de-
fendant as alleged, that it was malicious and
without probable cause, that It terminated in
plaintiff's f^vor, and that by reason thereof
he sustained damage. Plummer ▼. Collins
(Del) 77 Atl. 760r 751, 1 Boyce, 281.
FalM imprlsoiiment distinguished
There is a well-marked distinction be-
tween an action for false Imprisonment and
an action for "malicious prosecution." An
action for false Imprisoiuuent may be main-
tained wh^n the imprisonment is without le-
gal authority, but, where there Is a valid or
apparently v^lid power to arrest, the remedy
is by an action for malicious prosecution.
8 WDS.dc; P.2d Sbb.— 16
The want of lawful authority is an essen-
tial element in an action for false imprison-
ment Malice and wan^ of probable cause
are the essentials in an action for malicious
prosecution. Roberts v. ThomaSr 121 S. W.
961, 062, 135 Ky. 63, 21 Ann. Caa. 4fia
The distinction between '^Ise imprison-
ment" and '"malicious prosecution" is nhat
'falae imprisonment' is some interf^:«noe
with the personal liberty of the plaintiff
wlii^ is absolutely unlawful and without
authority. 'Malicious prosecution' is in pro-
curing the arrest or prosecution under law-
ful proceos on the forms of law, but from
malicious motives and without probaible
cause." A presiding judge of an election,
who, without autliority, arrests and detains a
voter, is liable for false imprisooment, though
he is a judidai ofldcer and has a judicial dia-
cfetton wltbla prescribed limita. Smyth v.
Stote, Mtt 8. W. 880, 001, 61 Tez. Cr. R. 406
((luotlng and adopting the definition in Her-
zog T. Graham, 9 Lea [77 Tenn.] 102).
An amendment of a count of a complaint
for "malicious prosecution" by striking out
an allegation that plaintiff was arrested on
a warrant, and substituting an allegation
that she was arrested and held without a
warrant, changed the cause of action stated,
under the law of Alabama, from one in case
for "malicious prosecution" to one in trespass
for "false imprisonment," and rendered the
charge of the court,' based on the theory
that the count was for ''malicious prosecu-
tion," misleading and erroneous. Western
Union Telegraph Go. v. Thompson, 144 Fed.
678, 680, 75 O. 0. A. 334.
"False imprisonment" is distinguished
firom "malicious prosecution" in that it is, as
defined by Pen. Code, { 236, an unlawful vio-
lation of another's personal liberty, an un-
lawful arrest or detention of one without
warrant or by an illegal warrant, or a war-
rant illegally executed, while if the iVnprlson-
ment is under legal process, but the action
has been commenced and carried on mali-
ciously and without probable cause. It is a
malicious prosecution. Donati v. Righetti,
97 Pac. 1128, 1129, 9 Cal. App. 46.
Where a peace officer arrests a person
without process and takes him before a magis-
trate, before whom be files a written com-
plaint against the prisoner, describing no of-
fense against the law, and after bearing the
person is set at liberty, an action for "ma-
licious prosecution" does not lie, but the par-
ty has immediate cause of action for false
imprisonment. Ilackler v. Miller, 112 N. W.
303, 79 Neb. 206.
The two actions ai "fUse imprisonment"
and "malicious prosecution" are quite die*
tlnct and different. "False Imprisonment is
the unlawful violation of the personal liber-
ty of another" (Pen. Code, i 236), the inter-
ference with the personal liberty of the plain-
tiff in a way wpldoL is absolutely unlawful
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
242
MAIilCIOUSIiY
and without authority. "Malidons proseca-
tlon" to procuring the arrest or prosecution
of another under lawful process, but from
malicious motives and without probable cause.
The provocation, motive, and good faith of
the defendant, in an action for tnlBe impria-
onment, constitute no material element in
the case, and can be considered only where
punitive or exemplaiy damages are asked,
and then only as affecting the meajsure of
such damages. On the other hand, malice
and want of probable cause are the gist of
the action for malicious prosecution. With-
out allegation and proof of both, the action
will faiL No one can recover damages for a
legal arrest and conviction. Therefore, in
cases of malicious prosecution, it becomes
necessary to await the final determination of
the action. But the same principle does not
apply to an action for false imprisonment,
as the form of action is based upon an illegal
arrest, and no matter ex post facto can le-
galize an act which was illegal at the time it
was done. From this it will be seen that
one of the essential elements of a complaint
for malicious prosecution is that the pro-
ceeding upon which it is based has finally
terminated in favor of the plaintiff, while
it is equally apparent that this is not a nec-
essary or proper allegation In an action for
false imprisonment Neves v. Costa, 89 Pac
860, 863, 6 CaL App. lU.
MaUoiovs ftlmse of prooess dlstlnf-
snlslied
An action for "malicious prosecution"
Is distinguished from one for abuse of pro-
cess in that, in the former, malice* want of
probable cause, and termination of the form-
er proceedings must be shown, and in the
latter none of these, but an ulterior purpose
and an act in the use of the process not
proper in the regular prosecution of the pro-
ceeding, must be shown. Pittsburg, J., E. &
E. R. Co. V. Wakefield Hardware Co., 55 S.
E. 422, 423, 143 N. C. 64 (citing Pittsburg, J.,
E. & E. R. Co. V. Wakefield Hardware Co., 50
S. B. 671, 138 N. a 174, 3 Ann. Cas. 720 ; 1
Cooley, Torts [3d Ed.] 354 ; 1 Jaggard, Torts,
I 203 ; Hale, Torts, 9 185 ; Mayer v. Walter,
64 Pa. 283; Jackson v. American Telephone
A Telegraph Co., 51 S. B. 1016, 139 N. C. 356,
70 L. R. A. 738) ; Pittsburg, J., B. & E. R.
Co. V. Wakefield Hardware Co., 50 S. B. 571,
573, 138 N. C. 174, 8 Ann. Cas. 720.
There is a clear distinction between the
malicious prosecution of an action so as to
interfere with another's property or business,
and the malicious abuse of process, which is
the willful and wrongful use of the process
itself, and does not require a termination
of the suit in which the process issued to be
available as a cause of actioa Ludwick v.
Penny, 78 S. B. 228, 231, 158 N. C. 104.
The principal distinction between an ac-
tion for malicious abuse of process and one
for malicious prosecution Is that, while the
former lies for an Improper use of' process
after It Issues, the latter is grounded on a
malicious suing out of the process without
probable cause. Brantley r. Rhodes-Haverty
Furniture Co., 62 8. B. 222, 225, 181 Ga. 276.
MAUmOVB SETBR.AHOE FBOK
FRBSHOIiD
The words "malicious severance from the
freehold," in Kirby's Dig. 1 1901, prohibiting
the malicious severance from the freehold of
another of anything attached thereto, do not
cover the act of a tenant in removing from
the outside of a window a for rent sign plac-
ed there by the landlord, but the words refer
to the severance of things attached to the
freehold as a part thereof, sach as produce
of the soil, timber, structures, or fixtures
thereto. Whipple v. Gorsuch, 101 8. W. 735,
737, 82 Ark. 252, 10 I^ R. A. (N. 8.) 1133, 12
Ann. Cas. 38.
BCAI.ZOZOV8 TRESPASS
8ee Injury and Malicious Trespass to
Property.
'^Malicious treBDaaa^ or injury to prop-
erty has been defined by the Legislature to
mean a wrongful, intentional, and willful in-
Jury, and is not confined to cases where the
ofl^ender is actuated by an evil animus against
the owner of the property or the property
itself (Rev. St 1809, ( 1989, Ann. 8t. 1906. p.
1332). State v. McKee, 104 8. W. 486, 487,
126 Mo. App. 524.
Crimes Act, 1 107 (Gen. 8t 1901, I 2100),
defining "malicious trespass," reads: "Eveej
person who shall willfully, unlawfully and
maliciously break, destroy or injure the door
or window of any dwelling house, shop, store
or other house or building, or sever there-
from or from any gate, fence or indosure, or
any part thereof, any material of which it is
formed, or sever from the freehold any prod-
uce thereof, or anything attached thereto,
or shall pull down, injure or destroy any
gate, post railing, or fence or any part there-
of, or cut down, lop, girdle or otherwise in-
jure or destroy any fruit or ornamental or
shade trees, being the property of another,
shall, on conviction, be adjudged guilty of
a misdemeanor." State v. Boies, 74 Pac. 630,
68 Kan. 167, 1 Ann. Caa. 491.
KAUOIOVSLY
"Maliciously" means and implies an in-
tention to do an act which is wrongful, to
the detriment of another. State v. Van Pelt,
49 S. B. 177, 187, 136 N. a 633, 68 L. R. A.
760, 1 Ann. Cas. 495.
By the word "maiiciously,** as used In an
Indictment for slander by imputing to a wo-
man a want of chastity, is meant. that the
words must have been so uttered as to imply
by defendant an evil intent or legal malice,
or without reasonable grounds for Ijelieving
that the words uttered were true. Rainwa-
ter V. State, 81 S. W. 88, 89, 46 Tex. Cr. R
49a
MALICIOUSIiT
243
HALICI0U8LT
Where, soon after a strike was declared,
the employer secured^ men to take the place
of the strikers^ and has ever since had an
adequate force, and is not taking any new
meD« and of the eleven men who left the env*
ployment eight soon secured other employ-
ment in the same kind of work, and three
bave left the commonwealth, and the interna-
tional organization with which the strikers'
labor nnion was affiliated ceased to aid their
efforts any farther, the strike was ended so
that thereafter driving a wagon through
the streets, bearing a placard announcing
the existence of a strike, was manifestly
intended to tn)ure the employer, and was
done "malicioasly*' within the legal meaning
of that word. M. Steinert ft Sons Ck>. v.
Tagen, 03 N. B. 684, 686, 207 Mass. 804, 82
U R. A. (N. 8.) 1018.
Bev. St 1896, | 4053, defines "maUce"
and ''maliciously'* as importing a wish to vex,
annoy, or injure another person, or an intent
to do a wrongful act Section 4427 provides
that every person who willfully, unlawfully,
and maliciously adniinisters any poison to an
animal, the property of another, is punish-
able. Under such sections, the fact that the
owner of a dog poisoned by defendant was
unknown to defendant did not preclude a
finding that the poison was administered ma-
liciously. State y. Coleman, 82 Pac. 465, 466,
29 Utah. 417.
Under a statute providing that every per-
son who shall maliciously administer or
cause to be administered or taken any de-
structive substance, with intent to cause
death, shall be punished, etc, and who shall
use or cause to be used any instrument with
the intention to procure a miscarriage shall
be imprisoned, etc., the word "maliciously^
is not applicable to the offense of abortion as
thei^ defined. Johnson v. People, 80 Pa&
133, 135, 33 Ck>lo. 224, 108 Am. St Rep. 85.
"Under Pen. Code, art 4, | 7, defining the
words 'malice' and 'malidoualy' as importing
a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another
person, or an intent to do a wrongful act
established either by proof or prestunption
of law," where a defendant was on trial for
assault in the first degree, the crime involved
a specific intent as the gist of the offense,
and it was error for the court to instruct
that, when an unlawful act is shown to have
been deliberately committed for the purpose
of injuring another, it is presumed to have
been committed with a malicious and guilty
intent, and the law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of any
iroluntary act committed by him. State v.
Schaefer, 88 Pac. T92, 793, 35 Mont 217.
The term "maliciously injuring," within
Wis. St 1898, I 4466a, which imposes pun-
ishment or fine on any two or more persons
who shall combine for the purpose of will-
fully or "maUdoosly injuring" another, etc.,
is intended to add something to the word
"wtUfidly^'* and imports doing a harm ma-
levolently for the sake of the harm, as an end
in itself, and not as a means to some further
end legitimately desired. Aikens v. Wiscon-
sin, 25 Sup. Ct 3, 6, 195 U. S. 104, 49 L. Ed.
154.
"The word 'maliciously' imports 'an in-
tent to do a wrongful act,' " and its absence
from an accusation under Pen. Code, § 415,
for disturbing the peace, is fully supplied by
the charge that defendant willfully and un-
lawfully disturbed the peace by fighting. La-
rue V. Davies, 97 Pac 903, 904, 8 CaL App.
750.
Where a statute provides that every per^
son who shall willfully and maliciously kill,
maim, or disfigure horses, etc., shall be pun-
ished, the word "maliciously" Imports a crimi-
nal motive, intent, or purpose. Roberts v.
United States, 126 Fed. 897, 903, 61 C. C. A.
427 (citing Commonwealth v. Brooks, 9 Gray
[75 Mass.] 303).
''Maliciously,'* as used in Acts 1897, p.
267, c. 106, making it a felony for any one
to "maliciously" cut and remove timber, for
the purpose of marketing, from the lands of
another without the owner's consent, does not
mean actual malice toward the owner, but
is used in the broad legal sense of criminal
intention to define that state of mind of a
person who does a wrongful act intentionally
or willfully and without legal Justification
or excuse. The word "feloniously" fully cov-
ers the meaning of "maliciously" as so used,
and "feloniously,'* as defined in the Century
Dictionary, means "with deliberate Intent to
commit a wrongful act the act being in law
such as constitutes a crime of the class term-
ed 'felonies,'" and in Webster's Dictionary.
"In a legal sense, done with the intent to
commit a crime." In comparing the Judicial
definitions of the words "felonious" and "fe-
loniously" in Words and Phrases Judicially
Defined, vol. 3, p. 2731 et seq., with the defi-
nition of the word "malicious," in volume 5
of the same work, at page 4307, It Is found
that the words are often construed to have
the same meaning, namely, "with criminal
intent," or "with intent to commit crime."
State V. Smith, 105 S. W. 68, 69, 70, 119 Tenn.
521.
In an action by an employ^ against a
third party for wrongfully causing plaintifTs
discharge in violation of contract, the decla-
ration must show that defendant knew of the
existence of such contract and such fact
cannot be inferred from an allegation that he
"maliciously" caused plaintiff's discharge,
which means no more than he acted willfully
and intentionally. McGurk v. Cronenwett
85 N. B. 576, 577, 199 Mass. 457, 19 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 561.
"Maliciously" in the law means *1nten-
tionally." It is aot sufficient, to sustain an
action for malicious prosecution, to prove
that the affidavit upon which the arrest was
MALIClCjUSLY
244
MALPRACrriCB
made was false. It must also appearthat the
affiant either knows it was ftilse, or did not
have reasonable and probable cause to be-
lieve it to be true. Izzo v. Visconnt, 04 AtL
95S, 954, 74 N. J. Law, 95.
The words "willfully," "unlawfully,"
"feloniously," and "maliciously" import only
that criminal intent which is the necessary
part of every felony, or other crime, but they
<lo not necessarily include the specilic "pur-
pose" to do the act which is an element of
the crime charged, Whether the Indictment
is on a statute or at the common law, it
is a rule universal and without exception
that every intent, like everything else, which
the law makes an element of the offense must
be alleged, for otherwise no prima facie case
appears. Newby r. State, 106 N. W. 1009,
1100, 75 Neb. 88.
Under 1 Mills' Ann. St |i 1424, 1425, pro-
viding that, if any person shall maliciously
drive cattle from their usual range, he shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be lia-
ble to the party injured, the word "ma-
liciously" means wrongful act done intention-
ally, without just cause or excuse. Richards
V. Sanderson, 89 Pac. 709, 771, 89 Colo. 270,
121 Am. St Rep. 107.
Under Rev. St 1899, providing that it
shall not be necessary to show, in the trial
of an offense for malicious injury to prop-
erty specified in that article, that the of-
fense was committed from malice conceived
against the owner of the property or against
the animal or property itself, but, if the act
was wrongfully, intentionally, and willftilly
done, it may be inferred it was done mali-
ciously, the state is relieved from proving
that malice was held toward either the owner
or the property, but in both secticms 1988
and 1989 (Ann. St 1906, pp. 1332, 1833) gen-
eral malice is retained as an element and,
though it may be inferred from certain facts,
it is not necessarily to be so inferred, and
the prohibited offense is not "willfully and
maliciously" committed unless the animal is
maimed, beaten, or tortured from an evil im-
pulse springing from a state of mind render-
ing the perpetrator indifferent to the suffer-
ings of the animal and the wrongful quali-
ty of the act State v. Prater, 109 S. W. 1047,
1049, 130 Mo. App. 348.
ni will impUed
Rev. Codes 1905, | 9315, provides that
every person who maliciously injures, defac-
es, or destroys any real or personal property
not his own is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Held, that the word "maliciously," as so used,
should have a restricted meaning, and im-
ports actual ill will or revenge and an intent
to annoy the owner of the property injured.
Stote V. Minor, 117 N. W. 528, 17 N. D. 454,' 19
L. R. A. (N. S.) 278.
As wiili malloe aforetfcouglit
In a prosecution for mayhem, a request
for a charge that, before the accused could be
convicted, the jury must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the act was done xm-
lawfuUy, intentionally, and with malice afore-
thought, was properly refused, since the term
"malice aforethought" is not necessarily
synonymous with "maliciously," as used by
the statute defining mayhem. Oreen v. State,
44 South. 194, 195, 151 Ala. 14, 125 Am. St
Rep. 17, 15 Ann. Cas. 81.
"Maliciously" and "malice aforethought-
do not mean the same thing. Malice compre-
hends ill will, a wickedness of disposition,
cruelty, recklessness, a mind regardless of so-
cial duty, etc., while "malice aforethought"
or "premeditated" desipi has a more intense
meaning. They comprehend, not only what
is included within the term "malice," but in
addition thereto mean "premeditated malice."
Brett V. State, 47 South. 781, 788, 94 Miss. 068
(citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4304; 1 Bish.
Cr. Law [8th Ed.] p. 261; Patterson v. State,
66 Ind. 185; Tutt v. Commonwealth, 46 S. W.
675, 104 Ky. 299; State v. Green, 7 South.
793, 42 La. Ann. 644; State v. Curtis, 70 Mo.
594; Cravey v. State, 35 S. W. 658, 86 Tex.
Cr. R. 90, 61 Am. St Rep. I
MALIGNANT PUSTULE
As disease, see Disease.
"Malignant pustule" is the result of an
infection from coming in contact with poison-
ous animal matter. Delaney v. Modem Acci-
dent Club, 97 N. W. 91, 94, 121 Iowa, 528, 63
L. R. A. 603 (citing Bacon v. United States
Mut Ace. Ass'n, 25 N. £. 399, 123 N. X. 304,
9 L. R. A. 617, 20 Am. St Rep. 749.
MALINGER
The term "malinger" means to f^gn or
induce sickness, and a malingerer is one who
feigns or induces illness to avoid service or
shirk duty, especially a soldier or sailor.
Wells V. Missouri-Edison Electric Co., 84 S.
W. 204, 207, 108 Mo. App. 607.
MALPOSITION OF THE JAW
See Correction of Malposition of the
Jaw.
MALPRACTICE
Attorney
Under Code Civ. Proa I 67; providing
that any attorney guilty of any deceit, mal*
practice, crime, or misdemeanor shall be dis-
barred, an attorney who, to secure his fee,
settles with a party against whom he was re-
tained to enforce claims, and assigns his con-
tracts with his clients to enforce such claims,
and notifies them to settle directly with the
other party, agreeing to facilitate any settle-
ment that such other party may desire to
make, is guilty of "malpractice." In re Clark,
77 i^. E. 1,HM64 N. Y. 222. ^
MALPRAOTICB
24S
MALT LIQUOR
An attorney yfho persuades a client, wlio
cannot nnderatand BngHah, to repndiate a
settlement in an action and to rerlfy a reply
eettlns up the settlement, when tlie attorney
had no reasonable expectation of supporting
the pleading with proof, and before judgment
is rendered against his client brings a gar^
nlshment suit against the cUent* who does
not learn of the suit until Judgment is taken
against him, is guilty of "malpractlGe.'' In
re Thatcher, 190 Ted. 969, 1010.
FhyslelAm
"'Malpractice' is the had, professional
treatment of disease or bodily injuries, from
reprehensible ignorance or carelessness or
with criminal intent" Where a patient, be-
fore an operation, is not suffering f rmn a dis-
location of the hip, and the physician diagno-
ses the patlait*s trouble as a partial dislo-
cation and treats her for such dislocation,
thereby causing great pain and permanent in-
jury, the physician is quUty of "malpractice."
Grainger v. StlU, 85 8. W. 1114. 1119, 187
Mo. 197, 70 L. R. A. 49.
MALT
MALT UQXrOB
See Fermented and Malt Li<]iion; Sub-
stitute for Malt Liquor.
See, also, Spirituous Liquors.
Where a beyerage contained no alcohol,
preservatives, or saccharine, and was nonin-
tozicating, but did contain 6.73 per cent malt»
it was a "malt liquor," within Acts 1908, c.
115> 1 1. prohibiting the sale within the state
of any vinous, alcoholic, malt, intoxicating,
or spirituous liquors. Purity Bxtract & Tonic
Co. V. Lynch, 56 South. 316, 100 Miss. 660.
Ky. St 1909, ( 2557, making it unlawful,
after a local option election resulting in a
▼ote against sale of "spirituous, vinous, or
malt liquors," to sell any such liquors, is not,
in view of prior judicial construction of the
words in prior statutes on the subject violat-
ed by sale of malt liquor containing less than
2 per cent of alcohol, and nonintoxlcaiing in
the largest quantity in which it may be
di^nk. City of Bowling Green v. McMullen,
122 S. W. 823. 1S4 Ky. 742, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
m.
The words **malt liquor** are words in
common and ordinary use and did not re-
quire definition in a prosecution for selling
intoxicating liquors. It was not necessary, in
prosecution under a statute forbidding sale of
malt liquor, to prove that malt liquor was
Intoxicating. State v. O'Connell, 58 Atl. 59,
60, 99 Me. 61.
Under a statute imposing a tax upon the
business of trafiOcking in spirituous, vinous,
malt, or other intoxicating liquors, "malt liq-
uors," whether inroxicatiug or not, are sub-
ject to the tax. La Follette v. Murray, 81
N. £. 294, 295, 81 Ohio St. 474.
"Mal^ Bquors" include nonintozicating,
as well as intoxloating, liquors. Common-
wealth T. Goodwin, 64 & n. 64, 66^ 109 Va.
The generic term ''malt liquors'* in-
cludes liquor containing any percentage of
alcohol as the product of malt brewing,
whether the product is intoxicating or not.
La FoUette v. Murray, 91 N. B. 294, 295, 81
Ohio 8t 474.
"Malt rose** is a beverage made to Imitate
lager beer, having the same general color,
taste, and appearance, and containing from
.74 to 1.18 per cent, of alcohol. It is a fer-
mented or malt liquor within liquor tax law
(Laws 1897, p. 207, c. 312), regulating the
sale of fermented or malt liquors. People v.
€ox, 94 N. Y. Supp. 526, 529, 106 App. Div.
299.
The term "malt liquors,** as used in Acts
1910 (Ex. Sees.) No. 4, to define the meaning
of the term "grog or tippling shop,** in prohi-
bition districts, includes only malt liquors
that are intoxicating. State y. Maroun, 55
South. 472, 473, 128 La. 829.
"Malt liqttors** are the iwoduct of a pro-
cess by which grain is steeped in water to the
peint of germination, the starch being thus
converted into saccharine matter, which is
kiln dried, then mixed with hops, and by a
further process of brewing made into a bever-
age; porter, ale, beer, etc, being embraced
within the expression. Marks v. State, 48
South. 864, 868, 159 Ala. 71, 133 Am. St
Rep. 20.
The term "malt liquors,** as used in the
provision of article 229 of tlie (Constitution,
whidi reads, "This restriction shall not apply
to dealers in distilled, alcoholic or malt liq-
uors,** and whereby political corporations,
throughout the state, are left free to impose
license taxes upon the dealers thus mention-
ed, without regard to the action or nonaction
of the state in such cases, must be regarded
as applying to malt liquors which are, or may
be, used as beverages, and which are intoxi-
cating, and as having no application to malt
liquors which are not, or may not be, so used,
and are not intoxicating. City of Shreveport
V. Smith, 57 South. 652, 653, 130 La. 126.
Act Sept 5, 1908 (Acts 1908, p. 1112), pro-
viding a revenue for the development and
conduct of the penitentiary system, and to
buy farm lands and equipment as needed in
the management, control, and employment of
convicts by requiring a license of all persons
manufacturing, selling, or distributing any
imitation of beer, ale, wine, whiskey, or other
spirituous or malt liquors, as used In that ar-
ticle providing that the tax on malt liquors
shall be devoted to the support of the common
schools, has referrence to and is intended to
Include only such malt liquors as are intoxi-
cating in their nature. Carroll v« Wright, 63
a E. 260, 268, 131 Ga. 728.
MALT LIQUOft
249
MAN
St. 1898, c 1565c, prohi^biUngtOkB sale of
any spirituous, malt, ardent, or into^lcatliig
liquors or drinks in no-llcense territory, wben
considered in connection with section 1565,
as amended by Laws 1905^ p. 520, c. d41, pro-
viding tbat proof of the sale of any malt,
spirituous, Tinous, or distilled liquor shall be
deemed proof of the sale of intoxicating liq-
uors, etc, is violated by a sale of malt liq-
uors or drinks which are the product where
the alcohol, produced by fermentation, of
which malting is a preliminary process, re-
mains in the liquor drawn off from the malt,
or by a sale of spirituous liquors or drinks
which are the product where the alcohol Is
separated by distillation so that the liquor
separated contains a percentage of alcohol,
or by a sale of ardent liquors or drinks, or by
a sale of intoxicating liquors or drinks, and
hence a sale of malt liquor containing alcohol
is an offense, though the beverage is a non-
Intoxlcant. Pennell v. State, 123 N. W. 116,
116, 141 Wis. 35.
Under Ky. St i 2557, prohibiting the
sale of spirituous, vinous, and malt liquors
in local option territory, a sale of malt liq-
uor whether it intoxicates some people or
not or is only a mild intoxicant, or whether
accused believed that it was an innocent soft
drink, is an offense. Flanders y. Ck>mmon-
wealth, 180 S. W. 809, 811, 140 Ky. 88.
Byrd Law (Acts 1908, pp. 27&-287, c. 189)
i 23Hf defines "malt beverage'' a nonintoxi-
cating liquor, and requires the manufacturer
to pay a special license tax and give a bond.
Section 28 provides that the act shall not af-
fect municipal charter provisions respecting
licenses. Manassas Charter (Acts 1901-2, p.
216, c 215; Acts 1906, p. 204, c 128) i 14,
requires the payment of license to sell "malt
liquors.'' Held, that "malt beverage" is a
malt liquor within the charter provision, and
that compliance with the Byrd law does not
avoid necessity for complying with the char-
ter provision. Commonwealth v. Qoodwin, ({4
S. E. 64, 56, 109 Va. 82a
The term "beer" being presumed to refer
to a malt liquor, a charge of illegally selling
malt liquors is supported by evidence of the
sale of beer, although the specific kind of
beer is not shown. Wilson v. State, 57 South.
503, 3 Ala. App. 158.
The courts will take Judicial notice that
lager beer is a "malt liquor," the sale of
which is prohibited by statute. Purcell v.
State, 66 South. 847, 848, 61 Fla. 43.
The term "malt liquor," as used in the
Uquor tax law (Laws 1897, p. 207, c. 312),
regulating the sale of malt liquors, includes
lager beer. Cullinan v. McGovern, 94 N. Y.
Supp. 526, 526.
Common beer is a malt liquor within Ky.
St I 2557, prohibiting the sale of malt liq-
uors in local option territoiy, and its sale Is
prohibited irrespective of the label on the
bottles or the name adopted. Flanders v.
Commonwealth, 130 S. W. 609, 811, 140 Ej.
sa
An affidavit diarging accused with the
nnlawfol sale of a "pint of beer'* snfflcientlr
alleged a sale of malt liquor so as to render
the afildavit sufllcient; "beer" being a f^r-
mented liqnor or a malt liquor made from
malted grain or hops or other bitter flavorsL
Turner v. State, 93 N. B. 225, 226, 175 Ind. L
Under an indictment for the illegal sale
of "malt liquor," where tlie testimony of a
witness was that he bought "beer," it suffi-
ciently appeared that the word was used by
the witness in the sense of malt liquor.
Locke V. Commonwealth (Ky.) 74 8. W. 654,
656; State v. Gibbs, 128 N. W. 810, 109 MiDO.
247, 26 L. E. A. (N. &) 449.
Older
ader is not a "malt liquor.** Malt liq-
uors are intoxicating but cannot be classed as
sjplrltuous. Donithan t. Commonwealth, 61
S. E. 1050, 109 Va. 846.
As iatozieAtliiC liqtunp
See Intoxicating Llqaor«
See Liquor.
MAIiT B08E
As liquor, see Liquor; Malt Liquor.
MALUM IN SE
Acts "malum in se^' are generally regard-
ed as absolutely void in the sense that no
right or claim can be derived from thenu In
re T. H. Bunch Co., 180 Fed. 519, 627.
MAN
See Confidence Man; Reasonable Man;
Signal Man.
Bilan in charge of train, see (Conductor.
Men as meaning one, see Men.
"Man" is a term to designate a male per-
son over 21 years of age. Hartsell v. State,
116 S. W. 1159, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 889; White
V. Same (Tex.) 161 S. W. 826.
An instruction, on the trial of a man for
murder, that to establish the defense of self-
defense it must appear that the drcumstanc-
es were sufficient to excite the fears of a
reasonable "man** or one reasonably coura-
geous and reasonably self-possessed, and not
of a coward, is not erroneous for the use of the
word "man/' which is used in its generic
sense. Anderson v. State, 43 S. B. 835, 836,
117 Ga. 266.
Minor
Under Pub. St 1901, c. 278, i 16^ provid-
ing that, if any man shall unlawfully and
carnally know any woman child undo: the
MAK OF OTBAW
247
MAXAOBMXNT:
age of 16 yean» he sliall be ImiiriflOBed, ete.»
tbe word "man** tnclndes persoDe of tbe male
sex who are capable of eommitting rape, and
la not limited to adult males. 8tate t. Burt,
71 Aa 30^ 75 N. H. 64, Ann. Oaa. 1912A, 282.
KAH OF 8TBAW
See Straw Man.
MANAGE
See InTeet and Manage; Mismanage —
Mismanagement
The general power to "manage" their
**real or personal estate as if sole " given to
married women by Rev, St c. 61, i 1, in-
cludes that of submitting to arbitration a
question of damages for the flowage of their
s^mrate lands, and of covenanting to abide
the award. Daren t. QetcheU, 66 Me. 2il»
248.
The phrase "managed and cared for by
them*' hi a will whereby testator gave his
lesidaary estate to his son to be held in
trust by his execntors and "managed and
cared for by them" for his son's benefit, un-
til he arrived at a designated age, eta, im-
plies that the executors should receive the
rents and profits. Higglns v. Downs, 91 N.
Y. Supp. 087, 038, 101 App. Div. 110.
As eoadvet ov earry on
The words "manage, control, invest and
reinvest" as used in a will whereby testator
conferred on his executors power to "man-
age, control, invest and reinvest" the resid-
uaiy estate and the Income thereof, and sell
or convey all or any part thereof, with or
without covenants, in their discretion, did not
warrant the executors in carrying on the
business of a corporation in which testator
had invested, so that he owned nearly all
of its stock and bonds, especially in view of
a codicil commanding the executors to incur
no debts except in liquidation of debts ou^
standing at testator's decease. In re Gor-
bin's Will, 01 N. Y. Supp. 707, 700. 101 App.
Dlv.25.
As eomtvol
Under Civ. Gode^ i 857, subd. 1, author-
izing a trust to sell realty and apply or dis-
pose of the proceeds, in accordance with the
trost instrument where a trust deed, besides
empowering the trustee to sell the property
to obtain money for the payment of the in-
debtedness, also emi)owered him to manage
tlie same, the word "manage" gave only such
control of the property as was proper in the
lawful execution of a trust created as securi-
ty for an indebtedness. Younger v. Moore,
103 Fac..221, 223, 155 CaL 767.
The word "manage" means to direct con-
trol, govern, administer, or oversee. Under
ClT. Code, i 857, subd. 3, authorizing the
cieatlon of a trust to receive rents and prof-
its of real property and pay them to or apply
them to the use of apy person, and section
883, proHAing that when a trust is created
the whole estate is vested in the trustee^ snb>
Ject to. the trust a trust may be created to
'^manage" property and to collect the income,
issues, and profits thereof and pay them to
specific persons, though the word *'manage"
is not mentioned In the section authorizing
the creation of the trust In re Heywood's
Estate, 82 Pac 755, 757, 148 CaL 184.
MANAGEMSarr
See Exclusive Management and Ck)ntrol;
Fraud in Management; Sole Manage-
ment; Under the Ck)ntrol, Management
or Operation.
Intrusted with management see Intrust
Since a conviction of a violation of Act
April 26, 1000 (Laws 1000, c. 106), punishing
one who shall engage or assist In operating or
managing any house of prostitution, cannot
be had unless it is shown that accused had
control of and conducted or assisted in the
management and operation of the affairs of
the house in some manner, or that he was
able to bring about or assist In bringing
about prostitution, a charge that If accused
in any manner aided or abetted a third pei^
son In the management of the house he is
guilty is erroneous; the word ''management"
meaning the act of managing; the manner of
treating, directing, carrying on, or using for
a purpose. Trozzo v. People, 117 Pac. 150,
154, 51 Colo. 823.
Managft'ient aad emtrol
The words "management and control,"
as used in Rev. St 1887, i 2408, relating to
the management and control by a husband
of his wife's separate property, have a well-
defined meaning, and under the provisions of
section 15 must be construed according to
the context and approved usage of the lan-
guage. The power to manage implies the
power to controL To manage money is to
employ or invest it The word "control"
means to have authority over a particular
matter or thing, and the phrase "manage-
ment and control" implies the possession of
the thing managed or controlled, or the right
to the possession thereof. Sencerbox v. First
Nat Bank of Idaho, 03 Pac. 360, 371, 14 Ida-
ho, 05 (citing 2 Words and Phrases, p. 1540;
5 Words and Phrases, p. 4317).
Maumgeiaent of Tessel
The unloading of cargo in the port of
discharge by stevedores has no relation to the
"management of the vessel" within the mean-
ing of the third section of the Barter Act
(Act Feb. 13, 1803, c. 105, 26 St 445), not being
an act done with any view of such manage-
ment, but relates to the care or delivery of
cargo within the meaning of the first sec-
tion. The Germanic, 124 Fed. 1, 4, 5,^50 C. G.
A. 521.
The negligent failure of the master of a
vessel to make proper use of the ventilating
apparatus during the course of a 9ye months'
UANAaEMSNT
248
ICANAOEE Tt
Toyag€, by rea^n of which, and^the pres-
ence in the cargo of a large quantity of coke,
the wicker or straw coverings on a large
nnniber of wine bottles were sweated and
ruined, was not a fault or error in the man-
agement of the Tessel, within the meaning of
Harter Act Feb. 13, 1893, c. 106, § 3, but
''negligence, fault, or failure in proper
♦ ♦ • care of ♦ ♦ ♦ merchandise or
property" within section 1, for which the
owner of the vessel is liable. The Jean Bart,
107 Fed. 1002, 1005.
Where a ship was at the commencement
of a voyage in all respects seaworthy and
properly manned and supplied^ damage to a
sugar cargo from fresh water which escaped
into the hold where the sugar was stowed
wliile the cargo was being discharged, by rea-
son of a valve having been improperly left
open while water from the river was being
pumped into the engine tank, was due to a
fault in the "management" of the vessel, for
which she is exempt from liability by section
3 of the Harter act (Act Feb. 18, 1803, c. 106,
27 Stat 446, providing that, if the owner of
any vessel transporting merchandise or prop-
erty to or from any port in the United States
shall exercise due diligence to make the ves-
sel seaworthy and properly manned, equip-
ped, and supplied, neither the vessel, her
owner or owners, agent or charterers, shall
be responsible for the damage resulting in
the management of the vessel. The Wild-
croft, 130 Fed. 621, 627, 06 C. 0. A. 145: Id.,
124 Fed. 031, 037.
The action of the master of a vessel in
permitting whale oil, which leaked from bar-
rels, to remain in the bilges, with the object
of saving it at the end of the voyage, did not
pertain to the "management of the vessel/'
within section 8 of the Harter act (Act Feb.
13, 1803. c. 105, 27 Stat 44^9; but injury to
other cargo from such oil arose from "failure
in proper care of the cargo," within section 1,
for which the vessel was liable. The Per-
siana, 185 Fed. 806, 397, 107 G. G. A. 416.
The tipping of a vessel by the head by
the master while discharging cargo for the
purpose of examining her propeller, and hav-
ing nothing to do with the discharge of the
cargo, was an act of management of the ship
within section 3 of the Harter act (Act Feb.
13, 1803, c. 105, 27 Stat 445), and, where the
owner had complied with the requirements
of said section at the commencement of the
voyage neither he nor the vessel Is liable for
% resulting injury to the cargo. The Indra-
ni, 177 Fed. 014, 915, 101 G. G. A. 194.
Operation and control •jnonjia.onm
In an action against an abutting owner
for injuries from defects in the cover of a
coal hole. Where the complaint predicates
negligence of the defendant in the manage-
ment, operation, and control of the sidewalk,
and in keeping the coal hole in defective or-
der, and in failing to provide proper warning
as to the defective state of the coal hole cov-
er, there is no legal differentiation between
the terms ''management" "operation,'* and
"control," and any <m^ of them would be suf-
ficient to Justi^ the admission of testimony
to sustain a delinquency intended to be cliarg-
ed. Maldosky ▼• Germania Bank, 127 N. Y.
Supp. 202, 208.
MANAGER
See General Manager; Mine Blanager.
Since a conviction of a violation of Act
April 26, 1000 (Laws 1900, c. 196), punishing
one who shall engage or assist in operating
or managing any house of prostitution, can-
not be had unless it is shown that accused
had control of and conducted or assisted in
the management and operation of the affalr»
of the house in some manner, or that he was
able to bring about or assist in brlnglug
about prostitution, a charge that if accused
in any manner aided or abetted a third per-
son in the management of the house he Ls^
guilty is erroneous; the word ^'management"
meaning the act of managing; the manner
of treating, directing, carrying on, or using
for a purpose; and the word ^operate^' mean-
ing to put into or to continue in operation or
activity; the word ''manager" meaning one
who has the conduct or direction of anything:
and the phrase *'to carry on," when applied
to business, meaning to prosecute, to help for-
ward, to continue, etc. Trozzo v. People, 117
Pac. 150, 154, 51 Colo. 323.
Sess. Acts 1001, p. 210, I 1, requires tbe
owner, proprietor, lessee,. or "keeper" of of-
fice buildings, etc., more than three stories
high, to provide fire escapes. Section &
makes the owner, proprietor, lessee, or "man-
ager" of a building, required to be equipped
with fire escapes, who neglects for 60 days
after the act becomes effective to comply
with the act guilty of a misdemeanor. Acts
1003, pp. 251, 252, repealed the first three sec-
tions of the act and enacted new sections in
their place, but section 1 of the act as amend-
ed required the owner, proprietor, lessee or
keeper of such buildings to provide escapes
as in the original act. Section 2 provided
that, if a fire escape was found upon inspec-
tion to be unsafe, the owner, proprietor, les-
see, or keeper should repair it, and section 5
remained unchanged. Held, that the words
"manager of a building" did not necessarily
mean the same as '^keeper of a building," or
denote any particular duties in relation to
the building, and one charged as manager of
a building with violating the act could not
be convicted, In the absence of evidence
showing that his duties made him a keeper
of the building. State ▼. Gook (Mo.) 128 S.
W. 212, 213.
Condnetor and manager
The words "conductor" and "manager,"
used in Ky. St i| 705-800, requiring segre-
gation of white and negro passengers, and re-
quiring the conductor or manager to see tbat
MANAGSR
fi49
MANAGING ▲GBNT
the statute is obeyed, mean the same person,
except where one not designated as condoc-
tor Is in charge of a train. Lonis^ille ft N.
IL Go. y. R^ifro's Adm'r, 135 S. W. 266^ 268,
142 Ky. S90, 83 L. R. A. (N. S.) 138.
As eatployt or laborev
See Etoploy^; Laborer.
As mi»Mg<«g ftSMtt
See Managing Agent
As olftoer of oorporatlom
See Officer (OC Corporation).
As workauia
See Workman.
ger of oovporatlom
The word "manager" imports agency,
control, and authority presumptively soffl-
cient to bind a corporation on a bond given on
certiorari to review a Judgment of a Justice
of the peace. The term ''manager/' as ap-
plied to a private corporation, Indicates one
who has the general direction and control of
its affairs, ancl, when used in connection
with the seal. Imports authority to sign in
behalf of the corporation. American Inv.
Go. V. Gable Co., 60 S. B. 1037, 1038, 4 Ga.
App. 106.
The president, treasurer, and secretary
of a stodc corporation governed by General
Corporation Law (Consol. Laws 1000, a 28)
fi 3, 34, 43, and Stock Corporation Law
(Consol. Laws 1909, c. 09) I 30, vesting the
management of such corporations In a board
of directors with authority to appoint officers
with defined powers and duties, are not In
the absence of evidence of their powers and
duties, within Pen. Code, i 246, making every
manager of a corporation by which a libel is
published chargeable with the publication
thereof, though under sections 242 and 244
it may be conceded that the intent to publish
a libelous article constitutes the criminal in-
tent essential to constitute criminal liability,
for the term "manager" does not embrace the
officers of a corporation as sudi with au-
thority to pi^vent a libelous publication and
to publish a disavowal thereof. People ex
reL Carvalho v. Warden of City Prison, 128
N. Y. Supp. 837, -840, 144 App. Div. 24.
The term "manager" is defined as •'a
person appointed or elected to manage the af-
fairs of another. The term is applied to
those officers of a corporation who are au-
thorized to manage its affairs." State v.
Eyermann. 90 S. W. 1168, 1169, 116 Mo. App.
ceo.
Laws 1901, p. 73, provides that the man-
ager, etc., of any building or establishment
from which dense smoke is emitted shall l>e
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Held, that
one who was the secretary and purchasing
agent of a company, and who had charge of
its manufacturing department, and exercised
BQperrislon over the engine room, and who
was regarded by other employes and officers
as a de facto president, was ''manager^ of
the concern within the statute. State v.
Hemenover, 87 8. W. 482, 188 Mo. 381, 483.
Managw of tkeater
A ticket taker at a theater is not a *'per-
son who manages the theater" in part with-
in Pen. Code, I 290, declaring a person who
permits to remain in any theater owned, kept,
or managed by him in whole or in part any
child under the age of 16 years, unless accom-
panied by its parent, guilty of a misdemean-
or. People ex rel. Jacques v. Flaherty, 107
N. Y. Supp. 415, 416, 122 App. Div. 878; Id.,
84 N. E. 1118, 191 N. T. 625.
PvUlskev syaonymoi&s
The fact that a person making an affida-
vit of publication of process in a newspaper
signs himself ''publisher" instead of "editor,**
"proprietor," or "manager," does not make
proof of publication defective, though the
statute requires that the proof shall be made
by the "editor," "proprietor," or "manager"
of the newspaper; the word "publisher" be-
ing used in the sense of proprietor or man-
ager. Stuart V. Cole, 92 S. W. 1040, 1042, 42
Tex. Civ. App. 47&
MAMAODie
See Running, Conducting, or Managing.
MAXAODIO AOBMT
"Managing" means to have under control
and direction; to guide; and employes in
charge of the stopping and starting of a train
are "managing" it, within Mills' St i 1608.
Whittle V. Denver k R. O. R. Co., 118 Pac
971, 972, 61 Colo. 382.
Where a domestic corporation has onl,\
one agent residing in this state, he will bv
held to be its "managing agent" within Rev.
St § 2637, subd. 10, providing that in an ac-
tion against a domestic corporation the sum-
mons may be served on its managing agent
Wickham v. South Shore Lumber Co., 61 N.
W. 287, 288, 89 Wis. 23.
Service on one as managing agent of a
corporation not authorized to receive service
is void, regardless of whether he delivers the
process to the corporation, and defendant
may insist that it will not be bound thereby,
especially where it promptly repudiates such
service. Kramer v. Buffalo Union Furnace
Co., 116 N. T. Supp. 1101, 1102, 132 App. Div.
415.
A "managing agent" of a foreign corpora-
tion for purpose of service of process must
be some person vested by the corporation
with general powers involving the exercise of
Judgment and discretion, as distinguished
from an ordinary agent or attorney who acts
in an inferior capacity, and under the direc-
tion and control of superior authority, both
in regard to the extent of his duties and the
manner of executing it Ritchie v. Illinois
Cent R. Co., 128 N. W. 35, 37, 87 Neb. 631
(quoting 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4320).
MANAOINO AGBNT
260
MANAGIXa AG£NT
Where a foreign corporation has an of-
fice In the state, in charge of the person who
acts for the corporation, doing business for it,
he is a "managing agent," within Code Civ.
Proc. i 432, on whom service of process could
be had. Russell y. Pittsburgh Life & Trust
Go.» 115 N. Y. Supp. 950, 953, 62 Misc. Rep.
403.
One who succeeded to the business of a
firm, and in Its name corresponded and main-
tained business relations with a foreign cor-
poration without Its ever having heard of
him, he renting and maintaining his own of-
fice, and merely, transferring to the corpora-
tion bucket shop business which he was un-
willing or unable to handle, was not its man-
aging agent, within Code Civ. Proc. Neb. §1
73, 75, authorizing service of process on sudi
an agent Swarts v. Christie Grain & Stock
Co., 166 Fed. 338, 844.
The term "managing agent," as used In
section 4144, Rev. Codes, relating to the serv-
ice of process on domestic corporations, is a
generic term, and does not refer to any par-
ticular person or officer, like the words "pres-
ident," **Becretary," etc. Densel v. Atlanta
Mercantile Co., 106 Pac. 2, 3, 17 Idaho, 432.
An employ^ of a foreign corporation en-
gaged in the sale of merchandise under a
mall order system, with the duty of deliver-
ing such orders to manufacturers and Jobbers
in New York City as are transmitted to him
from the home office and who receives the
mall of the corporation at Its New York office
and transmits it to the home office, and who
has no supervision over the correspondence or
over the business, and who is employed on a
weekly salary paid by check from the home
office, Is not a "managing agent" of the cor-
poration within Municipal Court Act (Laws
1902, c. 580) i 31, providing that service of a
summons on a corporation may be made by
delivering a copy to the president, secretary,
cashier, or "managing agent" Doykos v.
Montgomery, Ward & Co., 127 N. Y. Supp.
227, 22&
A "managing agent" must be in charge,
and have^the management of some depart-
ment of the corporation's business, the man-
agement of which requires the exercise of an
Independent Judgment and discretion. While
he may be under the general direction of the
corporation, yet, in the management of his
particular department, he should have au-
thority to manage and conduct it as his Judg-
ment and discretion direct He must be In
the exclusive and Immediate control and man-
agement of that department or of the entire
works conducted at the place where he is in
charge. Federal Betterment Co. v. Reeves,
84 Pac. 560, 562, 73 Kan. 107, 4 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 460.
An agent of a foreign corporation, whose
contract of agency demands of him the exer-
cise of Judgment in the business matters of
his principal, and who has charge of the
business of his principal In the territory cov-
ered by his contract, is a "managing agent "
within the meaning of sections 1074 and 1076,
Cobbey'8 Ann. St 1903^ providing for the
service of summons upon the "managing
agent" of a foreign corporation. Ord Hard-
ware Co. V. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co.,
110 N. W. 551, 563, 77 Neb. 847, 8 L. R. A
(N. S.) 770 (dtlng Words and Phrases. 4321).
To constitute a "managing or business
agent" upon whom service of summons could
be made, the agent must be one having in ef-
fect a representative capacity and derivative
authority, and not one created by construc-
tion or Implication contrary to the intention
of the parties. Kams v. State Bank & Trust
Co., 101 Pac. 664, 565, 666. 31 Nev. 170 (quot-
ing Doe v. Springfield Boiler & Mfg. Co., 101
Fed. 687, 44 O. O. A. 130).
The term "managing agent," as used in
Code Civ. Proa 1 411, providing for service of
summons in a dvil action against a foreign
corporation doing business in the state and
having a managing agent within the state, by
delivering a copy to such agent, means the
agent who Is managing that business. While
plalntilf was In Oregon, he received a letter
from the S. Saw Co. writt^i from San Fran-
cisco in the name of the company signed by
J. S., who was president of that corporation,
offering employment as a traveling salesman
for goods carried by the company. The offer
was accepted. The S. Saw Co. was a dealer
in manufactured articles of various kinds,
which it purchased from different manufac-
turers ; the 8. Saw Co. was one. Goods pur-
chased by the Saw Co. from the manufactur-
ing company became the Saw Company's
property and was sold by it for its own ac-
count, and plaintiff was employed by it to
sell them for Its account, and he accounted
to it for whatever sales he made. His salary,
however, was paid by the S. Mfg. Co., be-
cause, as it was explained, the Saw Co.
might to that extent be aided in meeting the
expenses of pushing the S. Mfg. Co.'s goods.
Letter heads of the S. Saw Co. bearing a Ust
of articles of different manufacturers in
which it dealt, and underneath the name of
the S. Mfg. Co. was the word "agendes," be-
neath which there were several places of ad-
dress in different states, the last of which
was S. Saw Co., San Frandsco* Cal. Held,
that the facts stated did not constitute a do-
ing business In the state by the S. Mfg. Co.,
for "while it might be held that a traveling
salesman engaged in selling goods for a for-
eign corporation for its account would be re-
garded as a transaction of business by such
corporation, the employment under a delegat-
ed authority from such corporation to act as
such salesman would not of Itself be regard-
ed as doing business by the corporation.*^
Jameson v. Simonds Saw Co., 84 Pac. 289,
200, 2 CaL App. 582.
General asent distl]isiiisk«d
See General Agency or Agent;
MAafTAQIKO AGENT
261
MAKAGINO A»ENT
A director, by or throngb the authority
of his office, is not a "chief officer" or **man-
agLDg agent*' of a domestic corporation, with-
in the meaning of section 6604, Gomp. Laws
1909 ; hence service of summons on the cor-
poration cannot be had by the delivery of a
copy of the sunmions to such director. Okla-
homa Fire Ins. Oo. t. Barber Asphalt Paving
Co., 125 Pac 784^ 7d9, 34 OkL 149.
rfwncilml eorrespondemt
Under the statute authorizing service on
a foreign corporation by delivering a copy to
one of its officers, or '*a managing agent
thereof, if within the state, doing business
for defendant," held, that the term ''manag-
ing agent" does not include a financial corre-
spondent of an Insurance company, whose
business is strictly confined to soliciting and
procuring applications for loans, drafting of
mortgages and notes, etc., and collecting such
notes and mortgage loans; the insurance
commiasioner of the state having also been
appointed the agent of such company for
service of process In the state. Bauer v. Un-
ion Central Life Ins. Co., 188 N. W. 988, 990,
22 N. D. 435.
Foremam
A foremaji acting under the direction of
the superintendent of a corporation is neither
an "officer** nor a "managing or local agent"
of the corporation, and is not a person on
whom service of summons on the corporation
can be made. Simmons v. Defiance Box €k>.,
<t2 S. E. 435, 436, 148 N. 0. 344.
Where a foreman has charge of a local
milk station or cheese factory owned by a cor-
poration in the absence of any superior cor-
porate authority, and Is vested with powers
of nuinagement, though he occasionally re-
ceives directions from the principal ofiice and
the corporate officers, but ezerdsee discre-
tion in transacting business, he is a "manag-
ing agent" within €k)de Civ. Proc. I 481, au-
thorizing the service of process by delivery
to the managing agent of a corporation.
Wesley T. Beakes Dairy Co., 131 N. Y. Supp.
212, 213, 72 Bfisc. Rep. 200.
Manager
Under Rev. Codes, | 4144, providing that
summons must be served on a domestic cor-
poration by delivering a copy to the presi-
dent, or other head of the corporation, secre-
tary, cashier, or managing agent, where
proof of service recites that the summons
was served on the '^manager" of the corpora-
tion named. It was prima facie evidence of
service on the corporation ; it being presum-
ed that the manager was the "managing
agent*' thereof Densel v. Atlanta Mercantile
Co., 106 Pac. 2, 3, 17 Idaho, 432.
Bailroacl eompany
Code Civ. Proc. | 73, provides that sum-
moBs against a corporation may be served
upon its chief officer, ar if he is not found
in the county then upon its n^naglfig^ ajgehft,
etc. Section 75 provides that, when defend-
ant is a foreign corporation, having a man-
aging agent in the state service may be up-
on hiuL Comp. St 1909, e. 72, art. 1, i 4,
proTides that service upoa railroad com-
panies may be made as on other corpora-
tions, or by living a copy of the summons
with a station agent, or other officer of the
company, within the state, etc. Held, that
a railroad company selling a coupon ticket
in the usual form, authorising the buyer to
travel over the seller's line, from a point
within the state to a point in an adjoining
state, and thence over the line of another
railroad, the connecting line having no
part of its track witliin the state, nor any
place of business, nor agency, the railroad
selling the ticket was not a "managing
agent*' of such connecting Une u^n whom
service of summons on such connecting lin^
could be made: Ritchie v. Illinois Cent R
Co., 128 N. W. 35, 38, 87 Neb. 631.
Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902, c 580)
i 31, provides that in actions against cor-
porations the summons must be served on
the president, etc., or 'Managing agent"
Held, that a mere salesman, who solicited
and received orderef and sold merchandise
on behalf of defendant, was not such "man-
aging agent,** within the meaning of such
section. Oleich v. Ontario Button Co., 129
N. T. Supp. 407, 408.
Bolioitor
A soUdtor who had been, but at the
time of service of process upon him had ceas-
ed to be, a solicitor of applications in a com-
pany which sold sick, accident, and funeral
benefits, was not "a managing agent" of such
company, within the meaning of the Ohio
statute authorizing service of process upon
the managing agent of a foreign corporation.
Splker V. American Relief Soc, 103 N. W.
611, 612, 140 Mich. 225.
TmTeUac acea*
Under the statute permitting service ot
process on a "managing agent," where a for-
eign corporation is doing iHisSness in the
state, no fixed rule or criterion can be laid
down for determining who are and who are
not managing agents; but where a foreign
corporation has appointed no agent on whom
service may be made, has no fixed place of
business in the state, and does no business
in the state except that of selling machinery
on orders receired by maU, or such as may
be taken by their traveling agent, the court
should certainly hohl, tf possible, that such
agent, being the only person in the state
through whom the company does business, is,
for the purpose of litigation growing out
of such business transacted within the state,
a proper agent for the service of papers.
Ohristlerson v. Hendrie ft Bolthoff Mfg. Sup-
ply Co., 128 N. W. <93, 604^ 600, 20 S. D. 5ia
ICANDAMUS
262
MANDAMUS
MANDAMUS
Return to wilt, siee Retnm.
Writ, return, or demurrer m pleading,
see Pleading.
The office of a writ of mandamus la to
require a lower court or Judge to act, and not
to correct error or reverse judicial action,
though it may be Issued to enforce a dear
right. Ex parte Dickens, 00 South. 218, 221,
162 Ala. 272.
To authorize the Issuance of a writ of
"mandamus," the petitioner must show:
First, a legal right in himself to have the
act done which is sought by the writ; and,
second, that it is the plain legal duty of de-
fendant to perform the act, without discre-
tion to do or refuse. State ex rel. Gibson v.
Malheur County Court, 81 Pac. 368, 869, 46
Or. 519.
The ofDce of a *Vrit of mandamus" is to
compel the performance of a duty resting up-
on the person to whom the writ is sent The
duty may have <Higinated in many ways;
but, no matter out of what facts or relations
the duty has grown, what the law regards,
and seeks to enforce, Is the personal obliga-
tion of the individual to whom it addresses
the writ. If he be an officer and the duty be
an official one, still the writ is aimed ex-
clusively against him as a person, and he
only can be punished for disobedience. The
writ does not reach the office and cannot be
directed to it It is therefore, in substance,
a personal action and rests upon the averred
and assumed fact that defendant has neg-
lected or refused to perform a personal duty,
to the performance of which by him the re-
lator has a clear right State ex rel. Stran-
ahan v. Board of State Canvassers, 79 Pac
402, 32 Mont 18, 4 Ann. Cas. 73.
The function of a "writ of mandamus"
is to compel the performance of a plain min-
isterial duty. It is not the plain ministerial
duty of the board of assessors to assess a
tract of land as belonging to an individual,
and as having a certain measurement and
as having certain boundaries, when the title
exhibited by him falls to show that he owns
any property answering such description.
State ex rel. Burke v. Sewerage ft Water
Board, 37 South. 878, 880, 113 La. 924.
The "writ of mandamus" does not super-
sede legal remedies, but rather supplies the
want of a legal remedy. Hence two requisites
must exist to warrant a court in granting
this extraordinary remedy: First, it must
appear that the relator has a clear, legal
right to the performance of particular duties
by the respondent; and, second, that the
law affords no other adequate or spedflc
remedy to secure the performance of the
duty which it is sought to coerce. State ex
rel. Ellis V. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 44
South. 230, 231, 63 Fla. 711.
A 'Mandamus" proceeding I0 one In
court, as contradistinguished from a proceed-
ing before the Judge at chambers, and it is
so framed that an issue of fact therein may
be tried by a Jury, and a money Judgment
for damages awarded as a part of the relief.
It is a Judicial investigation, the object of
which is a determination of dvU rights, the
same as any ordinary proceeding. State ex
rel. BllllngB v. Lamprey, 106 Pac. 601, 602,
67 Wash. 84.
"Mandamus" is an appropriate remedy at
the hands of superior courts to set in motion
the machinery of inferior courts. It does not
direct how such courts shall act or to what
effect they shall exercise their powers, but
merely compels action when they refuse to
act at all, and have come to a standstill
State ex rel. McDonald ▼• Stelner, 87 Pac.
66. 67, 44 Wash. 150.
The word "mandamus" implies superior
power, the power of a superior authority
to compel an official or inferior Judicature
to act The writ issues only from a superior
court to an inferior court to do those acts
which clearly pertain to their duty. When
duties are imposed on a Judge of a superior
court as an official, another Judge of the
superior court has no power to issue a man-
damus compelling performance of such du-
ties. Shreve v. Pendleton, 58 S. B. 880, 881,
129 Ga. 374, 12 Ann. Cas. 563.
"Mandamus" and certiorari rest on dis-
tinct and opposite principles. The former
compels an unperformed ministerial duty, the
latter reviews a performed Judicial duty,
while neither operates to control discretion.
The former never goes to control Judgment,
while the latter never goes except to review
and control Judidal Judgment State ex reL
RawUnson v. Ansel, 57 S. BL 185, 192, 76 S. C.
395, 11 Ann. Cas. 613.
The primary object of the writ of "man-
damus" is to compel action. It neither cre-
ates nor confers power to act, but only com-
mands the exercise of powers already ex-
isting, when it is the duty of the person or
body proceeded against to act without its
agency. While it may require the perform-
ance of a purely ministerial duty in a par-
ticular manner, its command is never given
to compel the discharge of a duty involving
the exercise of Judgment of discretion in any
specified way, for that would substitute the
Judgment or discretion of the court issuing
the writ for that of the person or persons
against whom the writ was issued. In such
cases, the sole function is to set in motion
without directing the manner of perform-
ance. People ex reL Besserer y. Collier, 67
N. B. 309, 311. 175 N. T. 196 (quoting Peo-
ple ex rel. Harris v. Commissioners of Land
Office, 43 N. B. 418, 149 N. Y. 26).
The writ of "mandamus" is in the nature
of a final writ issuing out of the court of
law after a trial by the court, to an executive
MAKDAMU3
SS3
VANPAM08
oflloer commanding him to do an official act,
which It Is claimed he has wrougfuUj refused
and neglected to do. Hager v. New South
Brewing Go. (Ky.) 90 8. W. e06k 609.
"Mandamus** is a command Issuing from
a court of law, in the name of ibe state, di-
zected to some inferior court, officer, corpora-
tion, or person, requiring the doing of a par-
ticalar thing specified« which appertains to
their office or duty. Macholdt v. Pender-
gast, 128 N. X. Supp. 1069, 1071. 144 App.
IMt.252.
A writ of ''mandamus'* to an Inferior
court issued by a court of appellate Jurisdic-
tion is in the nature of an exercise of ap-
pellate Jurisdiction. "In England the writ
of mandamus is defined to be a command
issued in the king's name from the Court of
King's Bench, and directed to any court or
corporation or inferior court of Judicature
within the king's dominions, requiring them
to do some particular thing therein specified
which appertains to their office and duty and
which the Court of King's Bench has pre-
viously determined, or at least supposes to
be consonant to right and Justice." Black-
stone adds: "That it issues to the Judges of
any inferior court commanding them to do
justice according to the powers of their office
whenever the same is delayed; for it is
the peculiar business of the Court of King's
Bench to superintend all other Inferior tribu-
nals, and therein to enforce the due exercise
of the Judicial or munidpal powers with
which the crown or Legislature have invested
them, and this not only by restraining their
excesses, but also by quickening their negli-
gence and obviating their denial ot Justice."
"A mandamus to an officer is held to be the
exercise of original Jurisdiction, but manda-
mns to an inferior court of the United States
is in the nature of appellate Jurisdiction."
State ex reL ISuhanks v. Cole, 109 Pac. 736,
742, 4 OkL Oi. 26 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in Re Crane^ 5 Pet. 190, 8 L. Ed. 92; 8
Black. Com. Jur.).
"The action of ^mandamus,' as well as ev*
ery other civil action, should under the stat-
utes of Kansas, where no special provision is
otherwise made^ be brought and prosecuted
hi the name of the real party in interest
* * * At common law the proceeding by
Inandamus' was in no sense an action by
the relator. Neither the writ nor the re-
turn was in any case nor in any sense a
pleading. No issues of fact were raised by
the writ and the return. No trial could be
bad in the case, and no final Judgment could
be rendered therein between the parties — ^the
relator and the respondent The writ, wheth-
er alternative or peremptory, was merely a
writ, and nothing more. It was purely a
prerogative writ soldiy within the discretion
of the court (never a writ of right), and
was issued in the king's name, or in the name
of the sovereign authority, commanding some
particular act to be done. The return was
merely an answw made by the respondent to
the writ, stating that he had performed the
act, or giving some excuse or Justification
why he had not performed it It was never
a pleading, and could never be traversed or
controverted by the relator, or by any one
else, but was always taken as absolutely
true, however false it might be in its state-
ments of fact The only remedy that the
relator had when he wished to controvert the
truth of the return was to institute a sepa-
rate and independent action on the case for
a false return. In such an action the rda-
tor became the plaintilt, the req;)ondent be-
came the defendant the proper pleading»
were filed by the parties, the proper issues
were made up, the proper trial was had, and
the proper Judgment was rendered in the
action between the parties. If the Judgment
was for the plaintiff, he recovered his dam-
ages and costs, • • • and the court then
issued a peremptory writ of mandamus
against the defendant If the Judgment wan
for the defendant he recovered his costs.
* ^ ^ But this old common-law mode or
procedure for mandamus has been materially
changed by statute, not only in Kansas but
in nearly every other state, and in England.
The present action of mandamus is not only
the old common-law proceeding of mandamus,
but it is also the old common-law action on
the case for the ftilse return. It is the two
proceedings combined. The alternative writ
is now not merely a writ as formerly, but it
is also a pleading. The return is now not
merely a response to the writ as formerly
(which return could not formerly be traversed
or denied), but it is also a pleading; and
the facts therein stated may now be con-
troverted the same as they may on any other
pleading. Issues are now made up by the
writ and the return. A trial may be had on
sudi issues, and Judgment rendered for the
plaintiff, or for the defendant the same as
in any other civil action; and the action is
now considered almost an action of right aa
any other civil action, • • • Our stat-
utes everywhere seem to recognize the pres^
ent proceeding by mandamus as a dvil ac-
tion, with the relator as the plaintiff, and the
respondent as the defendant'* State ex rel.
Atchison, T. ft S. F. R. CJo. v. Jefferson Coun-
ty Com'rs, 11 Kan. 67. 68, 69 (citing and
adopting State ex rel. Wells v. Marston, 6
Kan. 524, 532; Napier v. Poe, 12 Ga. 170, 178;
Harrington v. Berkshire County Com'rs, 22
Pick. [39 Mass.] 263, 268, 33 Am. Dec. 741;
Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. U. S. 100; Arberry
V. Beavers, 6 Tfex. 467, 464. 65 Am. Dec. 791:
Tidd's Prac. 949; Bacon's Abr. Mandamus:
Oomyn's Dig. Mandamus; Stephen's Nisi
Prius, Mandamus; and Jacob's Law Diet.).
A "proceeding in mandamus" is a judl
cial investigation, the object of which is the
determination of civil rights, the same as iu
ordinary proceeding— not only the determina-
tion of rights, but their determination in
MAKDAMM
264
IfAKDAMUd
sacli a way as to culminate In an effective
jndgrment In tlie WasMngton practice man-
damns is nothing more than one of the forms
of procedure provided for the enforcement
of rights and the redress of wrongs, and the
procedure has in it all the elements of a
dyil action. The right to sue out the writ is
not made to depend on the character of the
dispute, but on what answer is given to the
question: Can the ordinary courts of law
afford a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy?
If such a remedy is furnished, the writ will
not issue; otherwise, it will. It was to avoid
circuity of action, thus doing away with the
necessity of resorting to more than one pro-
ceeding for the enforcement of a right, that
the law was framed. State ex rel. Brown
V. McQuade, 79 Pac 207, 208, 86 Wash. 679.
As un aiMilllary proeeediss
Mandamus is a legal proceeding, and a
mandamus issued, after judgment against a
county, to compel the levy of a tax to pay
the same, la in the nature of an execution
to enforce satisfaction. Carter County v.
Schmalstig, 127 Fed. 126, 127, 62 C. O. A.
78 (citing Ri^s V. Johnson County, 73 U. S.
[6 Wall.] 166, 18 L. Bd. 768; Heine v. Levee
Com'rs, 89 U. S. [19 Wall.] 665, 22 U Ed.
22a).
As a disovetlimavy writ
"Maadamus" is a discretionary writ, is-
suing only in the exercise of a sound Judicial
discretion. Automatic Weighing Mach. Co.
V. Carter, 128 S. W. 557. 668, 95 Ark. 118;
Drew ▼. Sdiool Township of Madison, 125
N. W. 815, 837, 146 Iowa, 721; State ex r^.
Porter v. Hudson, 126 S. W. 733, 740, 226
Mo. 239; State ex rel. Mary Frances Realty
Co. V. Homer, 130 S. W. 510, 612, 160 Mo.
App. 826.
"Mandamus" is a discretionary writ and
will he allowed in furtherance of Justice upon
a proper case presented, but vrill not be al-
lowed where the relator has instigated, au-
thorized, approved, or brought about the
very state of things of which he complains.
State ex rel. Donovan v. Barret, 81 Pac 349,
350, 30 Mont. 203.
"Mandamus" is not a writ of right, but
the granting of it rests largely in the discre-
tion of th/d conrt, and it will not be granted
when it will work injustice, or introduce con-
fusion and disorder, nor where, if issued, it
would prove unavailing. Bibb y. Gaston, 40
South. 936, 937, 146 Ala. 434.
The writ of "mandamus" is a discre-
tionary VTTit, and where an information for
larceny was quashed after the Jury on a trial
had disagreed, and where it did not appear
that a different result would be reached on
another trial, "mandamus" to compel the
court to set aside the order quashing the
information would be denied. Clute v. Ionia
Circuit Judge, 102 N. W. 843, 844, 139 Mich.
837.
Whether a writ of "mandamus be re-
garded as a prerogative writ or a writ of
tight, it will only be granted in the exercise
of sound legal discretion. State ex reL Crow
V. BoonviUe Bridge Co., 108 S. W. 1062, 1066.
1067» 206 Mo. 74.
Mandamus lies, in the discretion of Uie
court, to compel performance of a ministerial
duty clearly imposed by law in behalf of one
whose right to its performance is legally es-
tablished and unquestioned, where there is
no other adequate remedy. Dennett ▼. Acme
Mfg. Co., 76 Ati. 922, 923, 106 Me. 476.
Am aa extraordlmaary remedy
"Mandamus" is an extraordinary writ,
and can be resorted to only when other rem-
edies fail. State v. Thompson, 102 S. W.
349, 351, 118 Tenn. 571, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1
(citing B3x parte Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 131 V. S. dxxx, appx., 26 L. Bd. 561; 2
Spelling, InJ. & Other Extra. Rem. H 1368,
1369; High, E2xtra. Leg. Rem. [3d Bd.] { 39).
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
writ, to be issued, not to vindicate a merd
abstract right, but only when necessary to
secure some substantial relief or benefit Bd-
wards Mfg. Co. v. Farrington, 66 AtL 300,
310, 102 Me. 140.
Mandamus is one of the extraordinary
remedies. The writ may issue in those cases
only "to compel the performanoe of any act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station,**
but "it cannot control Judicial discretion.''
Davis T. Jewett, 77 Pac. 704, 706, 69 Kan.
661.
Mandamus is an anergency writ, and its
purpose is to furnish a speedy remedy for
some apparent wrong. It must be issued in
all cases where there is not a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law. State ex reL Beach v. District
Court, Department No. 1, Lewis and Clarke
County, 74 Pac. 498, 501, 29 Mont 266.
"The writ of mandamus is an extraor-
dinary remedy, to be applied only under ex-
ceptional conditions, and is not to be extend-
ed beyond its well-established limits. It lies
to compel the performance of a public duty,
or one Imposed by public authority, and for
the nonperformance of which there is no oth-
er specific or adequate remedy at law, bat
not for the enforcement of merely private
obligations, such as those airiring from can-
tracts." Lahiff V. St Joseph's Total Absti-
nence & Benevolent Sodety, 67 Atl. 692, e&8,
76 Conn. 648, 65 L. R. A. 92, 100 Am. St
Rep. 1012 (citing Hartford v. Hartford St
R. Co., 60 Ati. 393, 74 Conn. 194; Bassett ▼.
Atwater, 32 Aa 937, 65 Conn. 356, 32 L E.
A. 576 ; Tobey v. Hakes, 7 AtL 661, 64 Conn.
274, 1 Am. St Rep. 114; Parrott y. aty of
Bridgeport, 44 Conn. 180, 26 Aul Rep. 439;
American Asylum for BSdtitcation and Instnic-
tion of Deaf and Dumb v. President, etc., of
Phoenix Bank, 4 Conn. 172^ 10 Am. Dec 112).
MANDAMUS
MANDAMUS
"Mandaipne** is a remedy only to be ap-
plied in extraordinary cases where there Is
DO other adequate remedy, and, where the
applicant has an adequate remedy by action,
the writ will not be allowed. It lies to com-
pel the performance of a public duty pre-
Bcilbed by statute and to keep subordinate
and inferior bodies and tribunals, exercising
public functions, within their jurisdiction,
and to compel in proper cases the perform-
ance of specific duties imposed by law. The
writ will not be issued to enforce the per-
formance of a contract wnAi as the contract
of an educational institute to grant a di-
ploma on fulfillment of certain conditions by
a student for which an action for breach of
contract will lie. State ex rel. Burg t. Mil-
waukee Medical College, 106 N. W. 116, 118,
128 Wis. 7, 3 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1115, U6 Am.
St Rep. 21, 8 Ann. Oas. 407.
Injvmetloii dUtiasuUhed
"An Injunction' is essentially a preven-
tiTe remedy; 'mandamus** a remedial one.
The former is usually employed to prevent
future injury; the latter, to redress past
grievances. The functions of an injunction
are to restrain motion and to enforce inac-
tion ; those of a mandamus, to set in motion
and to compel action. In this sense an in-
junction may be regarded as a conservative
remedy; mandamus, as an active one. The
former preserves matters in statu quo, while
the very object of the latter is to change
the status of affairs and to substitute action
for inactivity. The one is therefore a posi-
tive or remedial process; the other a nega-
tive or preventive one. And since mandamus
is in no sense a preventive remedy, it cannot
take the place of an injunction, and will not
be employed to restrain or prevent an im-
proper interference with the rights of relat-
ors. * ^ * Mandamus and injunction
should not be confounded. The latter is used
to prevent action, to maintain affairs in statu
quo. The former is compulsory, commanding
something to be done. An injunction is pre-
ventative and protective merely, and not re-
storative. It interposes between t&e com-
plainant and the injury he fears or seeks to
avoid. If the injury be already done, the
writ can have no operation, for it cannot
be corrective so as to remove it It Is not
used for the purpose of punishment, or to
Gomp^ persons to do right, but simply to
prevent them from doing wrong. • • •
Mandamus is, however, compulsory, and re-
(piires doing the act" Gallagban v. McQown
CTex.) 90 S. W« 319, 324 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in High, Bxtraordinary Legal
Remedies [3d Ed.] I 6).
An injunction is a preventive writ which
restrains motion and enforces inaction, while
mandamus is a remedial writ which compels
action and coerces the performance of a prop-
tt ATigt^Tig diity, and hence a writ whereby
persons were restrained from Intruding them-
selves qn U^e county committee of the Demo-
crattc party, and members ot the committes
were restrained from attempting to include
the intruders as members, is an injunction.
Ware v. Welch (Tex.) 149 8. W. 203, 264.
As maadftte
See Mandate.
As » p«««oK»tiTe wHi
"The 'writ of mandamus' was originally
a prerogative writ, which the Ckiurt of King's
Bench was wont to Issue to any part of the
realm for the prevention of disorder, from
failure of justice or defect of poUce." Ham-
lin V. Higglns, 67 Aa 625, 628, 102 Me. SIO.
"Mandamus" is not a prerogative writ
running in the name of the sovereign, but is
an ordinary process, available to any private
citizen, to protect a private right when it is
an appropriate remedy, and therefore the use
of the name of the state In such cases is a
mere form, and may be treated as surplusage.
State ex rel. Watts v. Cain, 58 S. E. 937, 938,
78 S. C. 848.
The writ of "mandamus" is of most an-
cient origin. It issued from a common-law
court to afford extraordinary legal relief in
cases where the ordinary remedy at law was
inadequate. Originally it was a prerogative
writ, so called from the fact that it proceed-
ed from the king himself, in his Court of
King's Bench, and was granted where one
was entitled to an office or function and there
was no other remedy. It stiU preserves many
of its prerogative features in England, but
in this state it is a writ of right Southern
Ry. Co. V. Atlanta Stove Works, 57 S. E.
429, 433, 128 Ga. 207 (citing High, Ex. Leg.
Rem. i 9).
"Mandamus" is a prerogative writ of a
remedial nature, and it is issued in all cases
where the party has a right to have anything
done and has no other spedflc means of com-
pelling performance, and it lies to restore one
to the enjoyment of an office or position of
trust of a public nature from which he has
been wrongfully removed; but one cannot
by mandamus litigate and determine title to
an office. State ex reL Guion v. Miles, 109 S.
W. 595, 606, 210 Mo. 127.
" *BCandamu8' is no longer treated as a
purely prerogative writ In its use in an
original proceeding in modem practice the
writ has come to be considered as merely an
action at law between the parties. The right
to the writ, and the power to issue it, has
ceased to depend upon any prerogative power.
It is nothing more than the ordinary process
of a court of justice to which every one is
entitled where it is the appropriate process
for asserting the right he claims. • • •
Mandamus, although it is an extraordinary
legal remedy, is in the nature of an equitable
interference, supplementing the deficiencies
of the conmion law. It will ordinarily be is-
sued where a legal duty is established and
no other sufficient means exists for enforcing
MANDAMUS
256
MANDAMUS
It • • •" Where one has a snbstanttal
right to protect or enforce, and there is no
other adequate remedy at law, he Is entitled,
aa a matter of right, to mandamus, or, at
least, it is an abuse of discretion to refuse it
The courts of the state will entertain an
action of mandamus by a foreign private cor-
poration against one of its officers, resident
of this state, of whom it cannot obtain Juris-
diction in its own domicile, to compel such
officer to turn over books, papers, etc., belong-
ing to the corporation notwithstanding the ti-
tle to the office may be incidentally involved.
Potomac Oil Co. v. Dye, 102 Pac. 677, 678, 10
Gal. App. 634 (citing and adopting Marbury
V. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 176, 2 L. Ed. 60;
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12
Pet 524, 616. 9 L. Ed. 1181; Kentucky v.
Dennlson, 24 How. 66, 08, 16 L. Ed. 717 ; Unit-
ed States ex rel. Riggs v. Johnson County,
6 WalL 166, 198, 18 L. Ed. 768).
"Mandamus" is not a creative remedy,
and does not call into existence any new lia-
bility or duty, and. never commanded the per-
formance of an act which was unauthorized
in the absence of the writ The origin of this
ancient writ is very obscure. It has un-
dergone many changes during the generations
in which it has been in use. It was original-
ly a high prerogative writ, and the king's
prerogative was part of the common law of
England. It was the aggregate of the king's
special powers and privileges — ^what Brac-
ton calls "privilegla regis," and Britton "le
droit le roy** — the personal rights or powers
of supreme character exercisable without
question and without responsibility. In re
Lauritsen, 109 N. W. 404, 408, 99 Minn. 813.
The ancient wilt of "mandamus" was a
writ prerogative of the king, and issued only
at his pleasure. It was an attribute of sov-
ereignty, and a citizen could not as a right
invoke its aid ; but even at common law its
scope became enlarged, and it could be in-
voked by the private citizen to compel the
performance of a legal duty on the part of
the courts and other tribunals ; but the defi-
nition of the ancient writ is inapplicable
under the Code, which prescribes the use of
the writ and makes it simply one of the
methods of procedure for the enforcement of
rights or the redress of wrongs. State ex
reL Barto v. Board of Drainage Com'rs, 90
Pac. 660, 46 Wash. 474.
Formerly "mandamus" was regarded as
a prerogative right and issued, not as of
right but at the pleasure of the sovereign or
state and in his or its name as an attribute
of sovereignty; but we say the writ is not
in any sense a prerogative writ or a writ to
be issued at the discretion of the court It
is a procedure under the Code, and any per-
son who. has a cause that calls fbr its in-
vocation has the same right to sue out the
writ as he has to commence a civil action to
redress a private wrong. State ex rel. Chea-
lander v. Carroll, 106 Pac. 748, 750, 57 Wash.
202 (quoting and adopting deihiftion In State
ex reL Brown ▼• McQuade, 79 Pac 208, 36
Wash. 679).
"Originallj the writ of mandamus was a
prerogative of the EDgllsb crown, and issued
in its name from the Court of King's Bench,
requiring the performance of some specified
duty which that court had previously deter-
mined, or at least supposed, to be consonant
to right and justice. In modem times it is-
sues as a judicial process in actions, oftiien
between private parties, in which a court of
competent jurisdiction has previously ad-
judged or commanded the performance by
the defendant therein of some qiedfled duty,
which under the law he should perform, and
is the means by which such judgment or coio-
mand is enforced." A Circuit Court of the
United States is without jurisdiction, ^ther
original or by removal from a state court of
an action for a V^ilt of mandamus, which is
not necessary for the exercise by it of a ju-
risdiction which' it has otherwise previously
acquired; the writ of mandamus not behig
a suit of a dvil nature at law or in equity,
within the meaning of the acts of Congress
creating the Circuit Courts of the United
States and defining their jurisdiction. Mys-
tic MlUing Co. V. Chicago, M & St P. By. Co.,
132 Fed. 289, 291.
As a civil aetioa or proeeedisff
As suit of civil nature^ see Suit of GivU
Nature.
Mandamus is a '^rsonal acdon* withhi
Rev. Code 1852, amended to 1893, p. 787, c
106, S 2, declaring that all personal actions
with specified exceptions shall survive, and
is a suit at law within Const art 4, | 26,
providing that no suit at law shall abate at
the death of a party where the cause of ac-
tion survives. State v. Jessup & Moore Pa-
per Co. (DeL) 80 Aa 850, 351.
Mandamus is a common-law action.
People ex reL Bauman v. Gest 1^ HL Apik
560, 565.
**Mandamqa^ proceedings are dvil a^
tions within Pub. Acts 1906, p. 483, No. S09,
providing for changes of venue in such ac-
tions. Woodworth v. Old Second Nat Bank,
107 N. W. 906, 144 Ifich. 338, 8 Aim. Oas.
310.
A proceeding in mandamus is a dvil
proceeding which may be in the name of tbe
state at the relation of an individual or sim-
ply in the name of an individual as plaintiff.
Rader v. Board of Education of Beaver Dist.
60 S. B. 240, 242, 67 W. Va. 220.
A "mandamus" proceeding is an action
at law, and under the practice in this state
the complaint takes the place of the alterna-
tive writ the answer takes the place of tbe
return, and subsequent pleadings wUI be bad
until an issue is Joined for trial on the me^
its, and the complaint answer, and subse-
quent pleadings are governed by the rules of
XAKPAMT3S
267
UAJStDAUVB
the common law and must contain In aub-
itance the easentlala of good pleading in an
ordinary action at law. Clement ▼. Oraham,
63 Aa 14e, 160. 78 Yt 290» Ann. Gaa. 1918E,
120a
^'Statntea everywhere. aeem to recognise
the present proceeding by 'mandamna* as a
dTil action with the r^ator as the plaintiff
and the respondent as the defendant" State
ez reL Atchison, T. ft S. F. R. Co. ▼. Jeffer-
son Connty Corn'ri* 11 Kan* 67, 6fi^ 6II»
ProliiUtlom coiiipmre4
See Prohibition.
As speetol;
See Special Proceeding:
Blasts — foFsealils
Mandamus lies to compel the perform-
ance of an act which the law spedfically «i-
Joins as a duty resulting from an office. Bell
T. Thomaa, lU Pac. 76, 78, 49 Colo. 78, 81
U R. A. (N. 8.) 684.
A writ of ''mandamus" is a '^wrlt Is-
toed in the name of the state to an Inferior
tribunal, a corporation, board, or person
commanding the performance of an act
which the law espedaUy enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station."
State ex reL Irvine ▼. Brooks, 84 Pac. 488»
^1, 14 Wyo. 398, 6 L. E. A. (9. 8.) TOO, 7
Ann. Oaa. U08 (quoting Ber. St 1899, i 4194).
The office of a writ of mandamus is to
compel spedflc action in the exercise of pure-
ly ministerial functions. If the performance
of an official act inyolves discretion, courts,
although they have power to demand action,
have no right to say that it must be In a
particular way. People ex rel. Qulnn v.
Voorhla, 100 N. T. Supp. 717, 721, 115 App.
DIv. 118.
Under the statute, ''mandamus*' la in-
tended to compel performance of any act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station.
It is intended as a speedy remedy, and may
be granted by the court In term time or by
the judge at chambers. Beadles v. Fry, 82
Pac. 1041, 1042, 15 Okl. 428, 2 L. B. A. (N.
S.)85S.
At common law the writ of "mandamus"
ifl a writ of right every day made use of to
oblige Inferior courts to do Justice but it
wlU not be made use of to control the exer-
cise of discretion. In general, it lies where
one has been refused admittance to or turned
out wrongfully from any office or franchise.
Matney v. King, 98 Pac. 737, 746, 20 OkL 22.
nie remedy by "mandamus," though ap-
propriate to compel the performance of a
legal duty, canhot be invoked to compel one
to complete the making of a contract Put-
nam Foundry ft Machine Co. v. Town Coun-
cil of Town of Barrlngton, 67 AtL 788, 786,
28R.I. 422.
8Wn0.ftP^8XB.— 17
To support the remedy of "mandamiis"
a plain and unambiguous duty which It is
designed to enforce must already have been
imposed by law. Where any person has a
right to demand the exerdse of a pnbllc
function, and there la an ofla4ser or set of of-
tc«a^ authorised to exerdae that function,
there the right and the authority give rise to
the duty; but when the right depends upon
the grant of the authority, and that author-
ity Is diseretionary, no legal duty la im-
posed. Cav^ v. Coleman» 101 S. W. 199, 200,
100 Tex. 467 (citing Carr v* Northern Liber-
tle0» 85 Pa. 824, 78 Am. Dec. 842).
The writ of "mandamua" will not lie ex-
cept to compel performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty, re-
sulting from an office, trust, or station, and
it will not lie to comp^ a district Judge to
enter of record in the district court of a
certain county in his district an alleged or-
der admitting defendant to ball, where It
appears that the same ia not there properly
entitled to record. State ex rel. Stevenson v.
RusseU, 96 Pac 468, 1 OkL Cr. 165.
Bev. St 1899, | 4194, defines "manda-
mus" aa a writ iasnad in the name of the
state to an inferior tribunal^ corporations,
boards, or persons* commanding the perform-
ance of an act which the law specially en-
Joins aa a duty resulting froman office, trust,
or station. State ex reL Wyoming Agricul-
tural College V. Irvine, 84 Pac 90, 91, 14
Wyo. 318.
The writ of "mandamus" is an order of
a court of competent and original Jurisdic-
tion, commanding an executive or ministerial
ofilcer to perf<Mrm an act, or omit to do an
act, the performance or omission of which la
enjoined by law; and It la granted on the
motion of the party aggrieved, or of the com-
monwealth when the publie Interest la af-
fected. It is not a proper remedy to compel
a telephone company to install an instru-
ment. Williams V. Maysvllle Tel. Co., 82 S.
W. 095, 996, 119 Ky. 33 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in Civil Code of Prac. | 477).
The object of a "mandamus" is ta en-
force spedflc relief, and it is the inadequacy,
rather than the absence of, other legal
remedies, coupled with the danger of a fail-
ure of Justioe without the aid of a manda-
mus, which lysually determines the propriety
of relief by mandamus. Mandamua is the
proper remedy for enforcing performance by
a traction company of ita duty to pave a
street pursuant to the terms of the ordinance
granting to its predecessor the right to lo-
cate tracks in such street Borough of
Butherford v. Hudson Blver Traction Co., 63
Aa 84, 90, 73 N. J. Law, 227.
Under the express provisions of Code
Civ. Proc § 1066, "mandamus" can only be
issued to compel the perfonnanoe of an act
required by law, or to compel the admiasfton
G^Wt^I*' ^^tf^t^k aW
*99S
J«4WA^«
ot a party 't9.)tlie eujoynrenl} of a .rist^t or
office to. .which he is entitled and from which
he I9 unlawfully excluded. Maxwell v.
Boaid iof Fire Copi*i» of City and County of
San Fran^co, 72 Pac. 806, 997, 189.0aL 229.
Under Rev. 8t 1899, i 4194, defining
"mandamus" iad a writ issued in the name of
the state to an inferior tribunal, eorpora-
tion, board,- or persons, commanding the per-
formance of an act which the law specially
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, and section 4197, providing
that the writ must not be issued where there
Is a plain and adequate • remedy 1^ law,
"m^jdamus" to compel an officer of a pri-
vate corpowktiop ,to permit the inspection of
books, papers, and effects in his possession
and control, is the proper form of remedy
to enforce the right of stockholders to in-
spect the books and records of the corpqra-
tion, where the officer having the custody
denies the stockholder accesis thereto. Wyo-
ming Coal Min. Co. v. State ex reL Kennedy,
87. Pac. 984, 985, 15 Wyo. 97.
Mandamus Uesr tp compel an inferior
board or person to do or not to do an act,
the performance or oniission of which the
law enjoins as a dVity from an office, trust, or
station, and, when discretion is left to such
board or person, mandamus may compel it to
act in some way; but cannot control such dis-
cretton under the- express provisions of Code,
i 4341/ State^ v: Parker; 126 N. W. 866, 864,
147 iowa, 69.'
**The province of a writ of mandamus is
to afford^ redress where a party has a right
to have anything done and has no other sp€f-
^fic means of compelling its performance.
Th^* writ is also applicable in certain' cases
whbre a duty is imposed by statute for the
benefit of an individual.'? Staiie' ex rel.
Guenther v:- Charleston Light ft Wat»r Co.,
47 S. B. 979, 988, 68 S. C 640.
"The modem writ of mandamus may be
defined as a command issuing from a com-
mon-law court of competent Jurisdiction, in
the name of the state or sovef elgn, directed
to ioine corporation, officer, or inferior court,
requiring 'the performance of a particular
duty therein specified, which duty results
from the official station of the party to whom
the writ is directed,: or from operation of
-law.^' Mllster v. City Council of Spartan-
burg. 47. S. E. 141, 68 S. C. 248 (quoting High,
Bxtr. Leg. Rem. 4); State ex rel. Huebler v.'
•Board of Police Comers, 82 S. W. 960, 962,
108 Mo. App. 98.
The statutory duty of the trial judge
to settle and sign a bill of exceptions may
be enforced by "mandamus," where he
arbitrarily refuses to act, though he cannot
be required to' perform the duty in a particu-
lar r manner by sign^ig a particular bilL
State, ex rel. Columbus St. Ry. &. lA^t Co.
Vv t>eup]»e, 81 N. B. 678, 679, 40 Ind* App.
^ 9ode^ i' ]^7| provides that the board c^
supervisors shall direct the treasurer to re-
fund any tax. erroneously or illegally exacted
or- paid, with', all . interest actually paid
thereon. Section 4341 defines "mandamus"
as an action to compel an inferior board to
do 'an act, the performance of which the law
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
and provides that mandamus cannot con-
trol discretion. Held, that there could be
no recovery in mandamus to compel a board
of supervisors 'td' order the payment of in-
terest on taxes erroneously exacted founded
on section 1417; the section providing mere-
ly for the return of interest paid; and the
word "refund" meaning to pay back, . to
restore. Home Sav. Bank v. Morris, 120 N.
W. 100, 141 Iowa, 660. •
"The function of 'mandamus la to com-
pel the pefformance of a legal duty, to
command action, not to review action, to
complete the unfinished. It is the remedy
for nonfeasance. * * ^ It doea not lie
to correct mistakes that have been made or
to remedy wrongs that have been done."
Kenney v. State Board of D^tistry, 59 Aa
932, 933, 26 R. I. 638 {quoting Corbett v. Nay-
lor, 67 AtL 304, 25 R. I. 622).
"'Mandamus* will not enforce the per-
formance of official duty, unless the duty
sought to be oiforced is clearly within the
scope of su<A officer's duty." Where twto peti-
tiona are pending asking for the sale of the
same tract of school land, one of which re-
quests that it be sold as leased land, and
the other to an actual settler, and appraisers
are appointed and qualified to appraise the
land as leased land, they cannot be compel-
led by mandamus to act as appraisers under
the other petition. Wilson v. Winfrey, 84
Pac. 123, 72 Kan. 468.
"Mandamus" is a writ issuing in the
name of the people* originally instituted for
the purpose of correcting oflicial inaction
and to compel the performance of some legal
duty; and although it has been extended by
the court from time to time, and has been
held to lie where formerly it was thought
not to apply, it has not been, nor should it
be, extended to obtain property or to fumlsli
evidence of title to property, that the owner
may be more certainly possessed of it, or
that it may be more conveniently transferred
by him. People ex rel. Rottenberg v. Utah
Gold & Copper Mines Co., 119 N. Y. Supp.
862, 863, 136 App. DiT. 418.
"Mandamus" does not lie against a pri-
vate citizen. In other words, where the writ
is sought to be invoked, the proper inquiry
is: Does the duty sought to be enforced
clearly result from an office^ tmat, or sta-
tion? If so, the writ should run; otherwise
not. This is the common Ittw and is em-
bodied in Wilson's Rev. 4 Ann. St 1903, I
(4884) 686, which is as follows: "The writ
of .maii^ai^jis^ay be issued by the Supreme
Court or the district court, or any Justice or
ilANt>A&itM
2S9
UAisa>xiiOB
jiidgii tiiereM, during: term oir at «hliiiibers, to
any inferior tribunal, oortwration, t)oard or
person, to compel the performance of any
act which the law specially enjoins as a
duty, resulting from an office, trust or ata-
tlon. • • ••» Eberle V. King, 93 Pac. t4»,
753. 20 OkL 49 (citing 26 Cjrc. pp. 1«3, 1(54).
According to IDer. . St 18d9, i 4194,
" ^mandamus* la a writ issued in the name of
the state to an inferior tribunal, a corpora-
tion, board, or persohs, demanding the per-
formance of an act which the l^w specially
enjoins as a duty resulting frona an office,
trust or station," and, according to 'section
4197, **the writ must not be- issruM in a
case when there is a plain and adequate rem-
edy in the ordinary course of the law.** Wy-
omhig Coal Mining Co. ▼. State ex rel. Ken-
nedy, 87 Pac. 887, 338, 15 Wyo. 97, 128 Am.
St Bep. 1014.
It is the special office of the writ of
"mandamus" to compel a ministerial officer
to perform the duties of his office, and the
writ will lie though the duties of the officer
are of a quasi judicial character, and con-
sist of a discretion which cannot be review-
ed by the courts, where the object sought is
to compel an exercise of the discretion.
State ex rel. Howe v. Kendall, 87 Pac. 821,
822. 44 Wash. 542.
''Mandamus" is a l^^al remedy, and lies
for the enfioroonent of legal rights onlj, and
ander Bums'. Ajul St 1908, § 12^, provid-
ing thi^t wTil^ of ma9d^tc( ids^ bo Issued
to any inferior tribunal, corpozBtion, board,
or person, to compel the performance of an
act which the law specially enjoins, or a
duly resulting from an oQce, trust, or sta*
tion, to justify the issuance of the writ it is
essential that the relator have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded, and that it be
the imperative duty of the respondent to
perfonn the required act. State ex rel. Hat^
field V. Cummins, 85 N. S. 359, 360, 171 Ind.
112, 36 U E. A- (K. S.) 945.
In Ohio "mandamus" is not used for the
redress of pfivate wrongs, but only in mat-
ters relating to the public. The writ is
the proper remedy to restore a party to the
possession of an office from which he has
been illegally removed. State ex rel. Moyer
T. Baldwin, 83 N. B. 907, 908, 77 Ohio St.
532. 19 L. R. A. (N. S^ 49, 12 Ann. Cas. 10.
Bums' Ann. St 1901, | 1182, provides
that "writs of mandamus may be Issued
to any Inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person, to compel the performance of an
act which the law specially enjoins, or a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station.'*
This statute Is substantially declaratory of
the common-law doctrine. •'Mandamus" is
in no sense an equitable proceeding, but is a
coQunon-law remedy to compel performance
of a legal duty, and the relator must have
a clear legal right to the thing demanded,
&nd it must be the Imperative duty of the
reepdndent to' pertornr' the a<5t required. It
either the right or the duty be doubtful, the
writ will hot be issued. A duty arising out
of statute must not be- merely |>ermi8sive oi'
discretionary; but the statute must require
the act to be dbn^, Or It #111 not be enforced
by mandamus. State ▼• Jackson, 81 N. B.
^ «3, 168 ma 884.
A ''writ of mandamus" Is a command
issuing from a court of law of competent
Jurisdiction, in the name of the state, direct-
ing some inferior court, officer, corporation,
or person to some particular thing therein
spedfled #hich pertains to his office >or duty.
It wUl not lie against one who does not oc-
cupy jan official or quasi official position,
but it will lie not only against public officers,
but against private officers in certain cases,
and against pvbUc and private corporations.
It will lie to enforce a public duty, and tbe
officials of a railroad company can be com-
pelled to perform certain duties by manda-
mus on the theory that they owe those
dutiea to the state and are subject to its
visltorlal powers. Gas, water« and telephone
companies can -also be competed by manda-
mus to discharge their duties to\the public.
Rouse V. Thompson, 81 N. El 1109, 1120, 228
111. 522 (citing Mechem, Public Officers v&
Agents, i 920; People ex rel. Hempstead v.
Chicago 4 A. R. Ck)., 55 IlL 95, 8 Am. Rep.
681 ; Chicago d: A. R. Co. v. Suffern, 21 N.
B. 824, 129 IIL 274; People ex rel. Cantrell
V. St Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co., 62 N. B. 292,
176 nL 512, 35 LL R. A. 656; LUehfleld & M.
Ky. Co. V. People, 78 N. B. 589, 222 111. 242;
People V. Chicago, I. ft L. Ry. Co., 79 N. B.
144, 228 lU. 581, 7 Ann. Cas. 1; 2 SpelUng,
Injunctions & Other Bxtraordinary Reme-
dies [2d Bd.] i 1592).
Though '^mahdamus'* will not general-
ly lie to compel performance of a power, the
exercise of which is in the discretion of
the officer against whom the wilt is sought,
the remedy is available if the action of the
officer is capricious, arbitrary, unreasonable,
or based on false Information. People ex rel.
Empire City Trotting Club v. State Racing
Commission, 82 M. B. 723, 190 N. Y. 81.
"Mandamus" cannot be rightfully in-
voked to settle a doubtful claim to an office,
or to have the title to an office adjudicated
upon as between adverse claimants, but 'In-'
formation in the nature of a quo warranto**
affords the proper remedy! Where the re-
lator holds a prima facie and uncontested
title to the office, or his title has been ad-
judicated upon and finally established by a
competent tribunal, a writ of "mandamus"
may be Issued to put him in possession of
the office as well as of the books, papers, and
other property pertaining to it. Hoy v. State
ex rel. BUchisinan, 81 N. B. 509, 512, 168 Ind.
506, 11 Ann. Cas. 944 (citing Mannlx v. State
ex rel. Mitchell, 17 N. m 565, 115 Ind. 245).
"Mandamus" does' not lie to compel the
payment of an unliquidated unadjudicated
MANDAMUS
260
MANDAMUS
clainr tbat Is disputed. Howell t. State ez
rel. Edwards, 45 South. 458, 454, 54 Fla. 199
(citing Whitesides y. Stuart, 20 S. W. 245,
91 Tenn. 710; Hicka y. Board of Auditoia of
Wayne Ck>a]it7, 57 N. W. 188, 97 Mich. Oil;
State Board of Bducatlon r. West Point, 50
Miss. 088).
''Mandamus," as defined by Oiy. Code
Prac. i 477, and the courts, is a writ com-
manding the performance of some duty, in
the performance of which the applicant for
the writ is interested, or by the nonperform-
ance of which he is aggrieyed or injured.
Louisyille Home Telephone Go. y. City of
LouisyiUe, 118 S. W. 855, 857, 130 Ky. 611.
Mandamus may not be inyoked to reyiew
a judicial or quasi Judicial decision. Hie
primary object of the writ of mandamus is
to compel action. It neither creates nor con*
fers power to act, but only commands the
exercise of powers already existing; whoi It
is the duty of the person or body proceeded
against to act without its agency. While it
may require the performance of a purely
ministerial duty in a particular manner, its
command is neyer giyen to oon4>el the dis-
charge of a duty inyolying the exercise of
Judgment or discretion in any specified way,
for that would substitute the Judgment or
discretion of the court issuing ttie writ for
that of the person or persons against whom
the writ wa3 issued. People ex rel. McCabe
V. Matthies, 87 N. Y. & 196, 198, 92 App.
Diy. 16 (Citing People ex reL Harris y. Ck>m-
missioners of Land Oflice, 48 N. H 418, 149
N. Y. 26).
Ky. St i 3855, requires a personal repre-
sentatlye of a decedent's estate to return an
inyentory within a certain time after qualify-
ing. Section 8857 provides that any person-
al r^resentatiye f&iling to return an in-
yentory within six months after qualifying
shall be fined by the county court, and be
required to make such inyentory upon a day
fixed by it, and upon failure to do so, shall
be fined for each subsequent delinquency, and
section 3858 requires eyeiy personal r^re-
sentative to haye his accounts settled, and
all settlements and voudiers returned to the
county court within a certain time, and as
often thereafter as the court requires, dy.
Code Prac. i 477, defines the "writ of manda-
mus" as an order of a court commanding an
executiye or ministerial officer to perform or
omit an act, the performance or omission
of which is enjoined by law, which shall be
granted on the motion of the party aggrieved
or of the commonwealth when the public
interest is affected. Held, that the duty of a
county Judge to require executors and admin-
istrators to file inventories and make settle-
ments was mandatory, and not a matter of
Judicial discretion which could not be oiforced
by mandamus. Commonwealth y. Peter, 124
S. W. 896, 897, 136 Ky. 689.
"The 'writ of mandamus' is in form a
command in the name of the state, directed
to some trilnmaL corporation, or public of**
fleer, requiring them to do some particular
thing therein specified, and which the court
has previously determined that It is the duty
of such tribunals or other person to perform.
^ * ^ It does not lie to correct the errors
of inferior tribunals by annulling what they
have done erroneously, nor to guide their
discretion, nor to refrain them from exer-
cising power not delegated to them ; but it
is emphatically a writ requiring the tribunal
or person to whom it is directed, to do some
particular act appertaining to their public
duty, and which the prosecutor has a legal
right to have done. • • • The 'writ of
mandamus' is the counterpart of the writ of
prohibition, and is so designated in some
states by statute. 'Mandamus* is a legal
remedy to compel action in accordance wltk
legal duty, while ^prohibition* is a legal reme-
dy to restrain action in excess of legal au-
thority." State ex reL Pelton v. Roes, 81
Pac 865, 867, 39 Wadi. 899 (quoting and
adopting the definition in Dunklin County
y. Dunklin County District Court, 28 Mo. 454).
** 'Mandamus* is a command Issued from
a court of law of competent Jurisdiction in
name of the state directed to some inferior
court, olficer, corporation, or person requir-
ing them to do some particular thing ther^
spedfled, which appertains to their office or
duty." It lies in cases involving merely the
performance by a county ofllcial of his plain,
ministerial duty of payment of a warrant
drawn by lawful and proper authority upon
a fund In his custody, legally applicable to
its payment, and requiring the exercise of no
official discretion on his part In view of
Rev. St 1899, c. 49, prescribing the pleading
and procedure in mandamus, but not enlarg-
ing the scope or ampIU^ing the application
of the remedy, such a proceeding cannot be
converted into an equitable suit by the re-
spondent, a county treasurer, answering that
he holds the fund subject to the conflicting
claims of relator and others and an order of
court requiring such other claimants to ap-
pear and answer. State ex rel. Hixon v. Ne^
zy, 79 S. W. 993, 991, 995, 105 Mo. App. 45&
rrhe writ of ^mandamus* beHng Justly
regarded as one of the highest writs known
to our system of Jurisprudence, it issues only
where there is a clear and specific legal right
to be enforced, or a duty which ought to be
and can be performed, and where there is no
other specific and adequate legal remedy.
Since the object of a mandamus is not to
supersede legal remedies, but rather to sup-
ply the want of them, two prerequisites must
eidst to warrant a court in granting thi*
extraordinary remedy: First, it must be
shown that the relator has a clear, legal right
to the performance of a particular act or
duty at the hands of the respondent; and,
second, it must appear that the law affords
no other adequate or specific remedy to se-
cure the enforcement of the ^ight and the
MAKDAHU8
861
MANPATX
perfonnanee of ^e duty wbich it Is sonfl^t
to coeioe. The test to be applied* therefore,
In detenniiiliig upon the rlfi^t to relief by
mandamuB, is to inquire whether the party
aggrieved has a clear, legal rii^t, and wheth-
er he has any other adequate remedy, since
the writ belongs only to those who have legal
rights to enforce, who find themselvee with-
out an appropriate legal remedy." State ex
reL Qleeson ▼. Jumbo Ki tension Mining Ck).,
U Pac 74. 7d, 30 Nev. 102, 188 Am. St Bep.
715^ 16 Ann. Cas. 896 (quoting and adopting
deflnitloQ In High, Bxtraordinary Legal
Remedies, p. 9).
It is a fundamental principle that ''man-
damus" lies to compel the performance of a
purely ministerial duty, involTing no discre-
tionary right and not requiring the ezerelse
of Judgment It does not lie where perform-
ance of a trust is sought whidti is discretiOD-
ary, or Involyes the exercise of jugdment It
is also elementary that the writ cannot usurp
the functions of a writ of error, or take the
iHace of an appeal, nor will it lie against a
court, unless it be deaiiy tihown that Bach
court has refused to perform some manifest
duty. Under a statute proTidIng that the
writ of mandamus may be Issued to an in-
terior tribunal to compel the performance of
in act which the law specially enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, mandamus
out of the district court would not Ue to com-
pel the county court to enter a judgment in
a dlYoiee proceeding different from the Judg-
ment which had been rendered; this being an
attempt to review, annul, and modify the
judgment, and being in this regard an at*
tempt to usurp the functions of an appeal
from or writ of error to such Judgment, and
also an attempt to control the discretion and
judgment of the county court Llndsey ▼.
Carlton, 96 Pac. 997, 999, 44 Colo. 42.
"'Mandamus' lies to compel an inferior
court to hear and determine a cause or ma^
ter properly triable before it, which the lower
court fails or refuses to try on the ground
that it has no Jurisdiction, or that the Judge
1b incompetent, or for other reasona'* Hence
mandamus Is the proper remedy to compel a
county court to take Jurisdiction of and
hear a proceeding by the state revenue agent
for the reassessment or back assessment of
taxes on the property of a street railway.
State y. T^iylor, 104 8. W. 242^ 246, 119 Tenn.
229.
The process of "mandamus" will not is-
*ne against a public officer, unless to compel
the performance of an act clearly defined and
enjoined by law, and which Is therefore min-
l«terlal in its nature and neither inyolyes the
•xerdse of discretion, nor leaves any alter-
native. Oayen y. CJoleman (Tex.) 96 8. W.
^4, 776 (citing Glasscock y. Commissioner of
General Land Office, 8 Tex. 61 ; Arberry y.
Beavers^ 6 Tex. 467, 66 Am. Dec 791; San-
som y, Mercer, 68 Tex. 492, 6 8. W. 62, 2
Am. 8t R^. 60C9.
While election Inspectors cannot be com-
pelled by mandamus to make their return in
any particular manner, they may be compel-
led to make a true return of the result ac-
cording to their count, if the return made
was incorrect, irrespective of the provisions
of the election law; "mandamus" being th«
proper remedy to oompel a pubUc official to
perform his official duty, where he ffeiils to
do so. Pe<H>lo ex reL Henness y. Douglass,
126 N. T. Supp. 908, 909, 142 App. Div. 224.
MANDATARIES
A '^mandatary" whose engagement la
mer^y gratuitous Is bound only to ordinary
negligence, and liable only for gross neglect
or breach of good faith. Marshall v. Nash-
vtlle By. ft light CJo., 101 8. W. 419, 420, 118
Tenn. 264, 9 U B. A. (N. 8.) 1246, 12 Ann.
Gas. 670.
MANDATE
See Special Mandate.
The word "mandate," la Civ. Code^ art
298(^ relating to personal mandate, whereby
one person appoints another his special ag^t,
or whereby one person gives power to an-
other to transact fdr him and in his name
one or several affairs, does not refer to the
business of agency carried on under a char-
ter adopted under the act of 188a State ex
rel. Le Blanc ft Bailey y. Michel, 86 South.
869, 870, 113 La. 4.
MAHDATB (Im Pvaetiee)
Bxeo«ti<Mi
An execution on a Judgment is a ''man-
date," as provided by Code Civ. Proc. I 3343,
and the only mandate by which a Judgment
creditor Is entitled to enforce it Belfer v.
Ludlow, 126 N. Y. Supp. 180, 18% 69 Misc.
Bep. 486.
The "writ of mandate,** as defined by
Bev. St 1898, H 8640, 3641, denominating the
writ of mandamus a writ of mandate, and
authorizing its issuance to any Inferior tri-
bunal to oompel the performance of an act
specially enjoined by law, is designed to
compel action where the law enjoins it, and
the tribunal refuses to act in accordance
therewith. Hoffman v. Lewla, 87 Paa 167,
170. 81 Utah, 179.
By CkKle Oiv. Proc. i 1086, the "writ
of mandate" Is issued by any court, except
a Justice's or police court, to any inferior
tribunal, oorporatlon, board, or person, to
compel the performance of an act which the
law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station. Howe v.
Southrey. 78 Paa 260, 144 CaL 767.
HCANDATB
MANDATORY INJCTKCTION
Under Code Civ. Proa | 3343; subd. 2,
deflning the word "mandate*' to Include a
writ Issued out of a court, commanding an
officer to do or to refrain from doing an act
therein specified, and Greater New York
Charter (Laws 1901, c. 466) | 1001, authorlz-
Ing the court, on application of any person
to whom an award has been made In proceed-
ings to acquire land, to require the comptrol-
ler to pay the award, and to enforce the man-
date as other mandates are enforced, the
court may by mandamus compel the comp-
troller to pay an award, and the fkct that
costs are more than they would be If the
applicant for mandamus had been content
with an order Is a matter which may not be
considered, when he wag denied the award,
to which he was legally entitled. Macholdt
▼. Prendergast, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1069, 1070,
144 App. Dlv. 252.
The word ''mandate^" In Wilson's Bey.
& Ann. St 1903, $ 1882, providing that in aU
cases In the probate court the probate judge
shall have power to allow Injunctions, "man-
dates," writs of prohibition, etc., is not syn-
onymous with the word "mandamus" in the
Organic Act of the territory conferring on
the Supreme and district courts power to
grant writs of mandamus and habeas cor-
pus in all cases authorized by law, and in
section 4884, providing that the writ of man-
damus may be issued by the Supreme Court
or the district court, or any justice or judge
thereof, during term or at chambers, etc.,
and the probate courts of the territory are
not authorized to hear and determine origi-
nal proceedings in mandamus. Starkweath-
er T. Kemp, 88 Pac. 1045, 1046, 18 OkL 28.
Bemittitnr
The word "remittitur," used In Supreme
Court rule 34 providing that, when a judg-
ment of a District Court of Appeal becomes
final therein, the remittitur shall not be is-
sued until after the lapse of 30 days there-
after, unless otherwise ordered, designates
the judgment of the appellate tribunal which
is authenticated to the court from which the
appeal is taken, and corresponds to "man-
date," used in the practice of the United
States Supreme Court Noel v. Smith, 88
Pac 167, 169, 2 Cal. App. 158.
SubpOBAA
Code Civ. Proc S 8, authorizes a court to
punish for criminal contempt one guilty of
willful disobedience of its lawful mandate.
Section 3343 provides that the word "man-
date" Includes a writ, process, etc., made pur-
suant to law by a judicial officer, and com-
manding the person named therein to do the.
act therein specified, and Code Cr. Proc. |
619, provides that disobedience of a subixsna
may be punished as for a criminal contempt
Held, that a subpoena issued by the district
attorney requiring a witness to appear be-
fore a grand jury was a "mandate," within
section 8, so as to make one willfully advis-
ing disobedience guilty of criminal contempt
People ex reL Drake ▼. Andrews, 90 N. B.
347, 848, 197 N. Y. 08, 18 Ann. Oaa. 317.
MANDATORY
Directory statute distinguished from
mandatory statute, see Directory Stat^
ute.
A mandatory provision of a statute la
one the omission to perform whldi renders
proceedings void; whUe a directory provi-
sion is one the observance of which is not
necessary to the validity of proceedings.
Bond V. City of Baltimore, 84 AtL 258, 2G0,
118 Md. 159.
A statute providing that appointment of
a special administrator may be made at any
time, and must he made by entry upon the
minutes of the court spedtying the powers
to be exercised by him, was not '^mandatory"
as to entry of a minute order, and the ap-
pointment was complete when the order was
signed, and failure of the clerk to enter it
on the minutes would not invalidate it Mc-
NeU V. Morgan, 108 Paa 69, 71, 157 Cal. 373.
The term "mandatory" is applicable al-
most entirely to statatory requirements In-
tended for the protection of the citizen and
to prevent a sacrifice of his property, and
by a disregard of which his rights might be,
and generally would be, injuriously affected.
It does not apply to statutory requirements
intended for the guide of officers In the con-
duet of business devolved on them and de-
signed to secure order, system and dljq[Mtch
in proceedings, and by a disregard of which
the rights of the parties cannot be injuriona-
ly affected. French v. Edwards, ft WalL 506,
[80 U. S.] 511, 20 L. Ed. 702.
MANDATOBT INJUNCTIOll
Injunctions are "mandatory" or pre-
ventive, according as they command the de-
fendant to do or refrain from doing a par-
ticular thing. The issuance of a "mandato-
ry injunction" Is exercised with extreme
caution, and is confined to cases where conits
of law are unable to afford adequate redress,
or where the injuiy cannot be compensated
in damagea In determining whether to
grant relief by way of "mandatory injunc-
tion," courts of equity wUl take Into consid-
eration the relative convenience or Incon-
venience which would result to the parties
from granting or withholding relief, and will
be governed accordingly. Mason v. Byrley
(Ky.) 84 S. W. 767, 770 (citing High, Inj. |
A "mandatory injunction" is one which
compels affirmative action by defendant It
an injunction compels one affirmatively to
surrender a possession which under the facts
alleged by him he is entitled to hold, it Is a
'•mandatory.** Clute v. Superior Court of
City and County of San Francisco, 99 Pac.
8C2, 368, 155 CaL 15, 132 Am. St Rep. 54.
MANBATOKT INJUNCTION
MAN7FESTLT INTEND
It Is error, on an Interlocatorr liearing
of an equitable petition seeking frpeciflc pex^
fonsanee and injunction, to order tbe deliv-
ery by defendant of tbe personal property
in controversy to the petitioner ; such order
being in legal effect a mandatory injunction.
Rudolph Wurlitzer Co. t. Jaduon, 67 S. B.
879, 880^ 134 6a. 333.
A ''mandatory injnnotion*' compels the
afilnnatlye performance^ while a prey^itiTe
injunction restrains the commission of an
act Carver v. San Pedro, etc, B. Co. 161
Fed. 334, 33a
MANGANESE
See Borate of Ifanganese,
1CAHOANE8E AXXOT
See Iron and Manganese Alloy.
MANGE
''Mangel' is a cattle disease, otherwise
known as splenic or Spanish fever. State v.
Missouri Pac B. Co., gl Pac 212, 213, 71
Kan. 613.
MANGLE
As machine, see Machine.
A *^angle" is a large roller, used in a
laundry, through which the clothes are run.
Rosfr-Parls Co. v. Brown, 90 S. W. 568, 121
Ky. 82L
MANHATTAN COCKTAIL
See Cocktail.
As intoxicating Uqnor, see Intoxicating
Liquors.
MANHOLES
A "manhole^ is a round opening Into a
sewer large enough to permit a man to enter
for the purpose of cleaning or repairing.
Comstock V. City of Eagle Grove, 111 N. W.
51, 52, 133 Iowa, 589.
MANIFEST
The word "evident" means ''clear to the
▼ision, especially dear to tbe understanding,
and satisfactory to the Judgment." Its syn-
onyms are: ''Manifest; plain; clear; obvi-
oTw; visible; apparent; conclusive; indu-
bitable; palpable; notorious." State v.
KanlTman, 108 N. W. 246, 20 8. D. 620 (quo^
ing with approval from Webster's Diet).
MANIFEST I>AHO£B
Even if the claims of the plaintifC weie
of such a diaracter that the property in eon-
troversy was either legally or equitably
charged with their payment, the fact that
the building is insured, and in the event of
its destruction by fire the land could not be
sold for a sum sufficient to pay the amount
dafmed by the plaintiff, does not constitute
such a ^'manifest danger of loss or destruo
tion" of the property as would warrant the
appointment of a receiver to take charge of
the same and impound the rents therefrom.
Ray V. Carlisle, 54 8. B. 119, 120, 125 Ga. 81&
MAHI7E8T EBBOB
A manifest clerical error in a liquida-
tion made within one year after original en-
try cannot be corrected more than one year
after such entry, because not within the pro-
vision in Customs Administrative Act June
10, 1890, c 407, I 24, authorizing the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to correct such errors
''within one year from the date of such entry,"
as the term' "entry," as there used, refers to
the document filed by the importer on entry.
Inasmuch as Customs Administrative Act
June 10, 1890, c. 407, I 24, relating to the
correction of "manifest clerical errors," Is
the latest deliverance on that subject and re-
lates most specifically thereto, it controls
over Act June 22, 1874, c 391, | 21, relative
to the "settlement of duties," and Act March
3, 1875, c 136, 1 1, relative to the "correction
of errors in liquidation." Where, in liquida-
tion, the clerk miscalculated the number of
square yards in an imported fabric, this con-
stituted a "manifest clerical error," within
the meaning of Customs Administrative Act
June'lO, 1890, c. 407, fi 24. United States v.
F. R Vandegrlft ft Co., 175 Fed. 772, 773,
99 C. C. A. 598.
Section 16 of the oounty law (Consol.
Laws. c. 11), providing that the board of
supervisors could correct any "manifest cler^
leal or other error*' in any assessment, and
cause to be refunded taxes illegally or im-
properly assessed, refers to such errors as
are manifest from an inspection of the as-
sessment roll itself without argument or evi-
dence. In re Trustees of Village of Delhi,
124 N. y. Supp. 487, 489, 139 App. Div. 412.
lCAHirESTI.T
The term **manife8t]y*' is a common
word whidi may be assumed to be under-
stood in the common meaning by an ordinary
jury without definition. Commonwealth v.
Bnckley, 86 N. E. 9ia, 911, 200 Mass. 346,
22 L. B. A. (N. S.) 225, 128 Am. St Bep. 425.
KANIFESTLT DAKGEBOUS
That one has committed homicide and
been acquitted on the ground of insanity
justifles the cpnduslon that he is *'manif estly
dangerous," within BalUnger's Ann. Codes
& St. 1 6959 (Pierce's Code, | 2208), providing
for the commitment of persons who are deem-
ed manifestly dangerous after having been
acquitted of crime on the ground of insanity.
State ex rel. Thompson v. Snell, 89 Pac. 931,
938, 46 Wash. 827, 9 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1191.
MANZFBSTLT UTTEND
Section 70 of the Georgia Penal Code of
1895 Justifles tbe killing, in defense of one's
KANIPULATB
264
MANKJCB
peiBon, of one who is "maxilfestly Intending"
or endeaTorlng by violence or surprise to
commit a felony on the person of the slayer.
"To 'manifestly intend* an act implies more
than mental resolution to do the act The
mental resolution must find some form of
expression before it becomes manifest In
cases involTing force, the slightest manifes-
tation of intent to do the act would be an
attempt in the accomplishment of the act"
Taylor ▼. State, 48 S. B. 808, 807, 121 Qa.
348.
MANIPULATE
Where a petition in an action for in-
juries to a servant by defects in an elevator
alleged that the cable would often catch
and become fast so that it would not re-
spond to the usual and proper force neces-
sary to move it, that at the time of the in-
Jury plaintiff found the cable fast, and while
attempting to "manipulate** it the cable, be-
cause of the elevator's defective condition,
suddenly became loose, and caused the eleva-
tor to suddenly and violently start, etc., the
term "manipulate" should be construed as in-
cluding both the ordinary pull first applied
by plaintiff in his effort to move the elevator
and the more forcible one which followed, so
that an Instruction that if, when plaintiff un-
dertook to use the elevator, the cable had be-
come caught owing to its defective condition,
so ihat it became necessary for him to pull on
the cable, and while so pulling the cable sud-
denly loosened and moved, causing him to
fall, etc., was not erroneous as presenting
issues not specified in the petition. Zongker
V. People's Union Mercantile Co.* 86 8. W.
486, 488, 110 Ma Appi 382.
MANNER
See Best Manner; Due Manner; Forci-
ble Manner; Good and Workmanlike
Manner; In a Manner; In Due Man-
ner; Same Manner.
Any manner, see Any.
In Uke manner, see like Manner.
No general definition of the word "man-
ner," as used in a contract or statute, can be
framed. Its meaning must be determined
in the light of the particular contract or stat-
ute in which it is used. "The 'manner' of
doing a thing has reference to the way of
doing— to the method of procedure — and the
element of time does not seem to be in-
volved.** Melsheimer v. Mci^iiight, 46 South.
827, 829, 92 Miss. 886 (quoting definition in
Bankers* Life Ins. Ck). v. Bobbins, 80 N. W.
484, 59 Neb. 170).
"The word 'manner* is usually defined
as meaning 'way of performing or execut-
ing, method, custom, habitual practice,* etc.*'
Livesley v. litchfleld, 88 Pac 142, 143, 47
Or. 248, 114 Am. St Be|K 920 (quoting and
adopting People ez r^ Ahrens t. English,
29 N. B. 678, 189 ni. 622, 15 L. B. A. 131).
Amendatory Act of 1872, No. 81, p. 79,
prescribing the ^'manner" of adopting chil-
dren, was intended to cover the whole sab-
ject-matter. It says so expressly in its title,
''An act proyiding for the manner of adopt-
ing children." Succession of Dupr6, 41 Sooth.
824, 826^ 116 La. 109a
The use of Uie word ''manner," in Laws
1907, p. 426, c. 267, 1 1 (Qen. St 1901, | 6974),
empowering the board of railroad commis-
sioners to determine whether there Is any
necessity for a railroad crossing by a street
car line and, if so, the place thereof, and
in other respects the "manner" of such cross-
ing, fairiy implies the right to make any
reasonable requlremeat having relation to
the safe crossing of both roads. State v.
Parsons St Ry. ft Electrical Ck)., 105 Pac.
704, 705, 81 Kan. 430, 28 L. B. A. (N. &) 1082
(citing 88 Gyc. p. 296).
Under Bev. St Ohio 1880, H 8270, 3281,
8288, which invest railroad companies direct-
ly with the right to appropriate and use
the streets of a dty for railroad purposes
by condemnation proceedings, unless the com-
pany and the municipal authorities agree
"upon the manner, terms, and conditions
upon which the same may be used or occu-
pied,*' construed in the light of the settled
rule in Ohio that municipal corporations pos-
sess such powers only as are expressly grant-
ed by statute or are implied as essential to
the exercise of granted powers, and of sec-
tion 8875, authorhdng railroad companies
for hauls of less than 30 miles to receive sach
rates as may be from time to time fixed by
the company or by law, the power given to a
municipal corporation by section 3283 to
agree upon the manner, terms, and conditions
upon which streets may be used is limited
to such agreement as relates directly to such
use and occupation, and a provision in an
ordinance prescribing rates to be charged by
a belt line road for hauls over its entire
line, less than 30 miles long, as a condition
to granting right of way over the streets
for a part of its line, is ultra vires and void.
T. B. Townsend Brick ft Oontracting Go. v.
Central Trust Ck>. of New Tork, 187 Fed.
68, 67, 109 a a A. 881.
As extent
The term "extent" does not ordinaziU
mean "manner." Hence under Laws 1901, p-
294, c. 125, S 8, providing that, if any pQ^
chaser of public land shall tsM to reside np-
on and improve it in good fiiith, he shall for-
feit it and all paymoits to the same extent
as for non payment of interest, the mere fail-
ure to reside on and Improve the land does
not work a forfeiture ipso facto, as was bad
under Laws 1895, c. 47, | 11, p. 67, providing
that, if Mich purchaser shall fall to reside
upon and improve in good faith public land
purchased by him, he shall forfeit It in the
ICAKKER
ICAmnCB
same maimer as tor noDpeyment of Inter-
est Adama ▼. Terrell, 107 S. W. 687, 688»
101 Tex. 381.
Ai aetlLod or way
The word "manner'* In the Australian
ballot law, regulating the "manner*' of hold-
ing elections, has the ordinary meaning of
mode, method, way of effecting a result.
Getty v. Holcomb, 09 Pac. 218, 219, 79 Kan.
224.
In Ck>n8t art 7, | 6, proriding that each
county may sell or dispose of its lands in
whole or in part in manner to be provided
by the commissioner's court of the county,
** 'manner' is the controlling word in the
phrase and designates what the commission-
er's court might provide for. Webster de«
fines 'nuinner' as *mode of action, way of
performing or effecting anything, method';
and the courts have given to that word its
slgniflcation as defined by Webster." Logan
▼. Stephens County, 83 B. W. 866, 367, 98
Tex. 283 <citLng People ex rel. Ahrens v.
EDgUsh, 29 N. E. 678, 139 III. 629, 15 L. R. A.
131 ; Wells V. Bain, 75 Pa. 54, 15 Am. Rep.
563; Brown v. O'Connell, 86 Conn. 447, 4 Am.
Rep. 89).
Rev. St 1899, | 5496, provides that it is
not permissible to question the correctness of
the action of the grand jury in finding a bill
of indictment, or of a petit Jury In the trial
of a case, or of any court or judge while
acting within their legitimate province in a
lawful manner, by habeas corpus. Held,
that the word "nuCnner" had reference to
the method of acting, and not to the degree
of perfection or correctness in the results
arrived at, unless the judgnient pronounced
was absolutely void. Hovey v. Sheffner, 93
Pac. 305, 308, 18 Wyo. 254, 15 L. B. A. (N.
S.) 227, 125 Am. St. Rep. 1037, 15 Ann. Cas.
318.
Webster defines "manner" as: "Mode
of action; way of performing or effecting
anything; method; style; form or fashion."
The Century Dictionary, as: "The way in
which an action is performed ; method of do-
ing anything; mode of proceeding in any
case or situation; mode; way; method."
In a statute the expression in permitting in-
troduction of an instrument whether proved
or acknowledged in such "manner" or not
was intended to have the same force and
effect as the same expression had in an old
Btatste which was superseded, where it had
been held to apply not only to the formal-
ity of certifying what was done by the officer
but as well to the power of the officer to take
the acknowledgment Bledsoe v. Haney,
122 S. W. 455, 457, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 285.
The word "manner," in a will authorize
log testator's daughter by her will to dispose
of a fand to and among his grandchildren
In sQch shares and in such manner as she
shall think right and proper, does not imply
a power of sheeting, but has reference to
tbe way in which it shall be enjoyed, wheUi-
er diisctly int in trust. Immediately or at a
postponed date, and other like matters, and
hence the provision of her will excluding
two grandchildren in a per capita distribu-
tion of the fund was invalid. Cameron v.
Crowley, 65 Atl. 875, 877, 72 N. J. Eq. 681.
The word "manner" means tbe handling
of a thing, and, as used* in the constitutional
provision which directs the allowance of ap-
peals from Justifies "in such manner as may
be prescribed by law^" means that appeals
from judgments of justices shall be allowed
by such handling of the subject as may be
prescribed by law. Duncan v. Baltimore ft
O. R. Co., 69 8. B. 1004, 1006. 68 W. Va. 2»3,
Ann. Cas. 1912B, 272.
The petition in an action for injuries to
a servant by derailment of a train alleged
that plaintiff's injuries were caused by de-
fendant's negligence, in that the engine and
train were old, worn, out of repair, and un-
suited for the purposes for which they were
being used, and also in the manner and way
the engine and cars were being operated
Held, that the words "manner and way"
imported either the speed of the train, or
something connected with the management
and operation thereof, and that the words
"were being operated" necessarily referred
to that which was being done by the em-
ployte on the engine and cars at the time
of the accident, so that such allegations were
insufficient to justify the submission of an
issue of negligence on defendant's part in
directing the train to be run over the road
as fast as 10 miles an hour. Missouri, K.
ft T. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Poole (Tex.) 133
S. W. 239, 240.
The word "manner," in the specifica-
tions of an article sought to be patented that
"in making brushes by my improved method
above described, the brush-back or frame
may be made of any desired material and in
any known 'manner,'" refers to the form
and shape of the brush-back or frame when
completed, and not solely to the way in
which it is made. Universal Brush Co. v.
Sonn, 146 Fed. 517, 520.
An information charging that defendant
unlawfully, in the presence and hearing of
D., did curse and swear at him, and did abuse
him "in a manner" reasonably calculated to
provoke a breach of the peace, suffldeutly
diarged an offense under Pen. Code 1895,
art 509, prohibiting any person from abus*
ing another, "under circumstances" reason-
ably calculated to provoke a breadi of the
peace. Tresevant v. State, 84 S. W.. 828, 47
Tex. Or. R. 502.
Of appointment or expulsion
The legislative authority given by Const
Or. art 6, § 7, td prescribe the time and
"manner" in which municipal officers may be
elected or appointed, does not Include the
power to determine the qualifications of a
ICAKNEE
ICAKNXB
l€gal TOter authorized to vote toi svdi offl-
cere. Llyesley y. Litchfield, 88 Paa 142, 144,
47 Or. 248, 114 Am. St Bep. 920.
In insurance law, i 70, providing that
the charter of an insurance company shall
state the mode and "manner" in which its
corporate powers are to be exercised, the
"manner" of electing its directors, officers,
etc, the word "manner/' while more com-
prehensire In its meaning and uses than
either the word "method" or "mode," may
with much reason be held to mean in that
connection the procedure of electing directors
and officers, rather than a definition of the
classes in whom the suffrage should lie.
Lord y. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 96 N. Y.
Supp. 10, 27, 109 App. Div. 252.
Oen. St 1901, i 7502, proyides that all
property not expressly exempted shall be sub-
ject to taxation "in the manner proyided in
this act" Laws 1907, c. 408, S 1, defines
the word "property" as used in the act re-
lating to taxation to include eyery kind of
property subject to ownership. Held, that
the clause 'In the manner proyided in this
act" relates to the method of imposing taxes
upon property already declared to be subject
to taxation, and does not limit the taxation
to the kinds of property specially named in
the act, and the finished product* of manu-
facturers, not being exempted, is taxable
though not mentioned in the act State y.
Holcomb, 106 Pac. 1030. 1033, 81 Kan. 879,
28 L. U. A. (N. S.) 25L
Am applieaUe to time
The word "manner," in Court and Practice
Act 1905, p. 139, § 490, providing that notice
of the filing of bills of exceptions shall be
giyen to the adverse part "in such manner"
as the court shall by rule prescribe, is broad
enough to include "time." Court and Prac-
tice Act 1905, p. 139, § 490, provides that no-
tice of the filing of bills of exceptions shall
be given to the adverse party '*in such man-
ner" as the <x>urt shall by rule prescribe, and
section 34 authorizes the Supreme and su-
perior court to promulgate rules regulating
practice in matters not expressly provided for
by law. Superior Court Rule 32 declares
that notice in writing of the filing of a bill
of exceptions shall be given by the party
filing the same to the adverse party within
two days thereafter, which shall be served
on the adverse party's attorney of record in
the manner specified. Held, that a failure
to serve notice of the filing of a bill of excep-
tions within the time prescribed by rule 32
was a jurisdictional defect justifying a dis-
missal of the bill under section 491, p. 140,
declaring that in any case of deil^ult in tak-
ing such procedure, judgment shall be enter-
ed or sentence imposed as if notice of in-
tention to prosecute a bill of exceptions had
not been filed. Smith v. William H. Haskell
Mfg. Co., 65 AtL 610, 611, 28 B. L 91.
In rsonit II 15, 16, art 7 (Sunn's Ed. H
167, 188), proTidlxig that appeals shall. be
taken' from the county court to the Supreme
Court in the same "manner" as appeals from
the district court, the word "manner" as so
used, as well as in different provisions of
the Constitution and* the statutes, may mean
"time" or would include "time." Atchison,
T. k S. F. By. Co. v. Love^ 90 Pae. 1061,
1086, 28 OkL 192.
Whether the word "manner" or the
phrase in the same manner may include the
elements of time has been answered by the
courts both in the affirmative and in the
negative. The word as used in the phrase
"in the same manner," in Act Cong. March 3,
1905, c. 1479, I 12, does not include the ele-
ment of time. Porter t. Brook, 97 Pac 645,
647, 648, 21 OkL 885.
The phrase "manner of performance" as
used in the labor law (Laws 1906, p. 1395,
a 506) i 3, limiting a day's work on public
work by or for municipal corporations to
eight hours, and prohibiting municipal offi-
cers from paying "for work done upon any
contract, which in its form or manner of
performance violates the provisions of said
section, refers among other things, to the
number of hours per diem that laborers aie
allowed to work. People ex reL Williams
Engineering & Contracting Co. y. Metz, 85
N. B. 1070, 1078, 193 N. Y. 148, 24 L. R, A
(N. S.) 201, order affirmed on rehearing
(1909) 86 N. £2. 986, 194 N. T. 145.
Act Cong. Feb. 20, 1907, c 1134, I 2, pro-
vides for the exclusion from the United
States of various classes of persons, includ-
ing idiots, insane persons, beggars, persons
afflicted with dangerous contagions diseases,
persons having been convicted of crime or
misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, po-
lygamists^ anarchists, prostitutes, or persons
coming into the United States for the pur-
pose of prostitution, and persons who are
supported by or receive part of the proceeds
of prostitution. Section 8 in the original act,
and as amended (Act March 26, 1910, c. 128,
8 2), relates ezdusively to the importation of
aliens for the purposes of prostitution, or
other immoral purposes, tlie holding of such
persons for such purposes in pursuance of
such importation, and aliens found inmates
of houses of prostitution after they have
entered the United States, or who derive
benefit from the earnings of the same. Sec-
tions 20 and 21 provide that such persons
shall be deported if proceedings therefor are
begun within three years, and both sections
2 and 8 contain the remedy to be applied,
viz., deportation "in the manner provided"
in sections 20 and 21. Held, that the words
"in the manner provided" did not include the
three-year limitations contained in sections
20 and 21, and. Congress having eliminated
such limitation from section 8, aliens within
such aection were subject to di^ortation.
MAKNBR
96T
MANSLAyC^HTEi^
thoagb arrested after they bad been In the
country more than three years. Cbamel y.
Inited States, 102 Fed. U7, 118, 112 0. a A.
161.
Of Totlas
Th/i constitntloniil authority given the
Legislatare to prescribe the "time and man-
ner" in which municipal officers may be
elected or appointed does not include the
power to determine what shall constitute a
legal Yoter. lirestey y. litchfleld, 83 Pac.
U2, 143, 47 Or. 248, 114 Am. St Rep. 020.
MAHHEB OIBSOTED OB PBESORIB-
ED BTUkW
Under Oode ld04, art 08, | 88, which de-
clares that In granting administration with
the will annexed the residuary legatee or
legatees shall be perferred, and directs the
orphans' court to proceed in the manner di-
rected by law with respect to executors with-
in the state before administration with the
will annexed shall be granted to any other
person, the phrase 'In the manner directed
by law" relates to the provisions of sections
32 and 33, relative to notice; and, where
the executor named in the will declined to
act the residuary legatee was the person
next entitled, and a person who> in addition
to a bequest of the residue of the estate after
the death of another, was given a remainder
hi a spedflc pert of the estate, is a "residu-
ary legatee," and hence on petitions by such
legatee and by a creditor the court could not
grant administration to the creditor. Mc-
Canghey v. Byrne, 80 Atl. 663, 654, 115 Md.
85.
The term ''manner prescribed by law," as
used in the Constitution of Washington, giv-
ing the owner of property sought to be con-
demned the right to have the amount of his
compensation determined by a Jury, unless a
Jury be waived, as in other civil cases, in the
'Wnner prescribed by law,** means that the
law in force at the time the condemnation
proceedings are instituted, and not that in
force at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitntlon, is to be resorted to in determining
whether a Jury trial is waived or not. Che-
lan County V. Navarre, 80 Pac. 845, 847, S8
Wash. 684.
MANSLAUGHTER
See Assault with Intent to Oomndt Man-
slaughter; Involuntary Manslaughter;
Voluntary Manslaughter.
Willful manslanghter, see Willfal— Wlll-
fuDy.
See, also, under the Inunediate Influence
of Sudden Passion.
"Manslaughter" Is the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice, either ex-
press or Implied. State v. Bmory (Del.) 68
Aa 1036, 1038, 5 PennewiU, 126; State v.
Ireland, 83 Pta lOSO, 1038» 72 Kan. 265;
State V. Reese (Deh) 79 Atl. 217, 221^ 2 Boyce^
434 ; l^&te v. Collins (Del.) 62 Atl. 224, 226,
5 PennewiU, 263; State v. Bell (DeL) 62 AtL
147, 148, 6 PennewiU, 192; State v. Brown
(Del.) 61 Atl. 1077, 1079, 6 PennewiU, 339;
State V. Miele (Del.) 74 Ati. 8, 10, 1 Boyce,
33; State v. Tinkler, 88 Pac 830, 831, 72
Kan. 262 ; SUte v. Phinney, 89 Pac. 634, 18
Idaho, 307, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 12 Ann.
Cas. 1079; State v. Uzzo (Del.) 65 AU. 775^
777, 6 PennewUl, 212 ; State v. Lance, 63 S.
E. 198, 200, 149 N. C. 551; State v. Short
(Del.) 82 Atl. 239, 242, 2 Boyce, 491 ; Mixon
v. State, 68 S. E. 315, 316, 7 Ga. App. 805.
"Manslaughter" is defined to be the un-
lawful kllUng of another without malice, ei-
ther express or implied, and without premed-
itation. SUte V. Brinte (Del.) 58 Aa 258^
262, 4 PennewUl, 551.
The term '^manslaughter^ has become A
generic term, covering two specific offenses or
degrees of homicide, punishable, the one un-
der the statute by confinement in the peni-
tentiary, and the other under the common
law, by fine and imprisonment in Jail. The
common-law learning of the text- writers upon
the' offense of "manslavghter" can have no
place in the definition of the two degrees of
homicide which have been carved out of man-
slaughter by the effect of our statute, how-
ever apt Bucb learning may have been under
the ancient practice* when the punishment of
both grades was a matter resting in the dis-
cretion of the Judge. Brown v. Common-
wealth, 92 S. W. 542, 544, 122 Ky. 626.
Rev. St. 1899, | 1825, declaring any one
who shaU administer drugs to, or shall em-
ploy an instrument on, a pregnant woman,
with intent to destroy the foetus or child of
said pregnant woman, guilty of manslaugh-
ter, is invalid in so far as it attempts to de-
clare manslaughter, which necessarily im-
ports a homicide to have been committed,
when the death of neither the chUd nor the
mother results from the act charged. State
▼. Hartiey, 84 S. W. 910, 185 Me. 669, 106
Am. St Rep. 608.
As f eloBiou kemlelde
See Felonious Homiddei
Voluntarj kllHiig
"Manslaughter" is the unlawful klUing
of a human being without maUce either ex-
press or implied, and must be voluntary upon
a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provo-
cation apparently sufl)cient to make the pas-
sion irresistible. Duckworth v. State, 97 S.
W. 280, 281, 80 Ark. 360 ; State v. Primrose
(Del.) 77 Atl. 717, 719, 2 Boyce, 164 ; State
v. Brown, 60 S. E. 945, 946, 79 8. C. 390;
State V. BorrelU (Del.) 76 Aa 605, 607, 1
Boyce, 849; Commonwealth v. Ourdo, 60 AtL
792-794, 216 Pa. 880; State v. Farter, 45 8.
B. 1, 3, 66 S. C. 469.
"Mauiiiaughter" is where one person kills
another without maUce, as In a sudden af-
MAKSLAtFGHTEB
268
HANSLAUdfiTER
fray, \n the heat of blood, or In a tansport
of passion, without cooling time or time for
reflection. Stete ▼. Russo (Del.) 77 AtL 743,
746, 1 Boyce 538; State ▼. Roberta (Dd.) 78
Atl. 305, 310, 2 Boyce, 140 ; State v. Adams
(Del.) 05 Ati. 510, 511, 6 Pennewill, 178;
State V. Underbill (Del.) 09 Atl. 880. 882, 6
Pennewill, 491; State ▼. Jackson (Del.) 82
AU. 824, 826.
"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice, express
or implied, and without any mixture of de-
liberation wbatever. It must be voluntary,
upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a
provocation apparently sufficient to make the
passion irresistible. In "voluntary man-
slaughter" there must be a serious and high-
ly provoking Injury inflicted upon the per-
son killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible
passion in a reasonable person, or an at*
tempt by the person killed to commit a serl-
Qus personal injury on the person killing.
The killing must be the result of that sud-
den, violent impulse of passion supposed to
be irresistible. People v. Bissett, 92 N. B.
949, 951, 246 lU. 5ia
Where the act of killing another is done
in sudden heat and passion, or sudden affray,
and without previous malice and not in nec-
essary self-defense, accused is guilty of man-
slaughter. Combs y. Commonweath (Ky.)
112 S. W. 658, 659.
"Manslaughter" is voluntary homicide
committed under the immediate influence of
sudden passion arising from an adequate
cause, but neither Justified nor excused by
law. Sue V. State, 105 S. W. 804, 809, 52
Tex. Cr. R. 122.
A homicide in sudden passion excited by
sufficient provocation without malice is "man-
slaughter," not because the law supposes
that the passion made the slayer unconscious
of what he was about to do, but because it
presumes that passion disturbs his reason.
McBryde v. State, 47 South. 302, 305, 156 Ala.
44.
Every killing upon a rash and incon-
siderate impulse is not "manslaughter" ; an
adequate cause rendering the mind incapable
of cool reflection being essential to reduce
an unlawful killing to manslaughter. Potts
V. State, 118 S. W. 535, 538, 56 Tex. Cr. R.
39.
To reduce a killing which would other-
wise be murder to manslaughter, there must»
under the statute, have been both passion
and adequate cause to produce it Hatchell
V. State, 84 S. W. 234, 236, 47 Tex. Cr. R.
380.
Und^ Pen. Code, I 264, homicide is
^manslaughter^*' when perpetrated without a
design to effect death, and in heat of pas-
HlOh: State v. Stumbaugh, 132 N. W. 666,
668,28 & D. 00.
A killing wholly the result of passion
and without malice is manslaughter. Brew-
er y. State, 49 South. 836, |39, 160 Ala. 66.
If there was a sadden, impulsive killing,
due to passion suddenly aroused — ^furor brev-
is— it was "manslaughter." SUte v. Taylor,
50 8. Q. 247, 252, 57 W. Va. 228.
Manslaughter is where the homicide is
willful and unlawful, but is committed un-
der such circumstances of provocation or al-
leviation as to rebut the implication of mal-
ice. State V. Harmcm (Del.) 60 AtL 866-868,
4 Pennewill, 58a
"The distinguishing quality of 'man-
slaughter* is that the mind most be so agi-
tated by reason of the conduct that it is in-
capable of cool reflection." Venters v.
State, 83 S. W. 832, 886, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 280.
"Manslaughter** is defined by the stat-
ute in Indian Territory as a voluntary act
upon a sudden heat of passion caused by
provocation apparently sufficient to make the
passion irresistible, and it is further describ-
ed as a killing in the commiis^on of an un-
lawful act without malice or in the prosecu-
tion of a lawful act without due caution and
circumspection. Carney v. United States,
104 S. W. 606, 7 Ind. T. 247.
"Intentional killing is 'manslaughter' it
it is committed under and by reason of a
passion caused by what the law deems suf-
ficient provocation. The law does not mere-
ly look to see if a man was provoked and en-
raged, and, if 80, reduce his crime to man-
slaughter; but it also looks at the provoca-
tion, and does not excuse him at all if it was
inadequate to excite his passion. The provo-
cation must be sufficient, in the eye of the
law, or it is murder." State v. White, 51 S.
E. 44, 50, 138 N. C. 704 (quoting and adopting
definition in Clark, Cr. Iaw, p. 198).
An instruction that "manslaughter** is
the unlawful killing of another without mal-
ice, express or implied, and that the per-
son committing the act must not be in fault,
is not erroneous, where the Judge further
charged, in other words, that the killing
must be on sufficient provocation. State v.
Reeder, 51 S. B. 702, 703, 72 S. C. 223.
"Manslaughter^ is the killing of another
in the heat of passion without malice by the
use of a dangerous weapon without authority
of law and not a necessary self-defense.
This was the definition given by the trial
court and held not erroneous on appeal
Moore y. State, 88 South. 504, 606, 86 Miss.
160.
Where one, under the influence of sud-
den passion arising from some adequate
cause, and not actuated by malice, while nof
acting in self-defense, and intending to kill
another, kills a different person, the offense
is manslaughter. Mc(Dullough v. State, 136
S. W. 1055, 1056, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 126.
MANSLAUaHTBR
20
MAKBLAJJOWrtM
Unaer Pen. Oode 1911, art 1128, de-
flnisg '^manslfttighter^ as rolmitary bomldda,
committed under the immediate inflnenoe
of sudden passion arising from adequate
cause, tf either sudden passion or adequate
cause, is lacking, the homicide la not man-
slaughter. Bums ▼. State CTex.) 145 S. W.
356, aei.
The tnie nature of ""manalaiigliter^ la
that it la a homicide mitigated oot of tender-
ness to the frailty of hnman nature. Brery
man, when assailed with Tlolence or great
rudeness, la insfpired with a sadden impnlae
of anger, which puts him upon reslatanoa
before time for cool v^lection. If daring
tbat period he attadca his aasailant with a
weapon likely to endanger life, and death
ensues, it la regarded aa done through heat
of blood, and violoice of anger and not
through malice. The same rale applies to a
bomidde in mntoal combat, which la attrib-
uted to sadden and violent anger occasioned
by the comhat, and not to mallee. Where
two meet, not intending to qnanel, and angry
words suddenly arise, and a conflict springs
up, in which blows are given on both aides, it
Is a mutual combat, without much regard
to who Is the assailant ; and if no unfUr ad-
vantage be taken In the outset, and an occa-
sion Is not sought for the purpose of gratify-
ing malice, and one seizes a weapon and
strikes a deadly blow, it is regarded aa hdmi-
dde in the heat of blood, and under our stat-
ute is manslaughter in the flrst degree. Rob-
inson V. Territory, 86 Pac. 451, 466^ 16 Okl.
24L
In a prosecution for homicide, where the
court discuased at length the difference be-
tween murder and ''manalanghter'* resulting
in def enae of one's dwelling, and gave numer-
ous illustrations so that the Jury could not
have been misled, an Instruction that "it is
'manslaughter* if sudden heat and passion
be aroused because of the wrongful trespass
of another upon his home, and if he slays in
sudden beat and passion that is 'manslaugh-
ter/ " if not technically correct, is harmless
error. State v. Klbler, 00 S. B. 438, 440, 79
8. C. 17a
One who provokes a difficulty without
any Intention of killing or doing any aeiious
bodily harm, and suddenly and without de-
liberation and under the immediate influence
of sodden passion arising from an adequate
cause kills another, la goilty of '*manslaugh-
ter." OomelluB v. State, 112 S. W. 1050,
1066, 54 Tez. Or. R. 178.
A. charge defining "manslaughter" as
voluntary homicide committed under the im-
mediate influence of sudden passion arising
from an adequate cause, but neither Justified
iK»' excused by law, defining the meaning of
its phrases, and stating what was neoessary
to reduce voluntary homicide to the' grade of
manslaughter, is not erroneous. Pratt v.
State, 127 S. W. 827. 881, 60 Tex. Or. R 167.
'Vanslaughter" waa properly defined as
"the unlawful kUUng of iT huhian being with-
out malice, without that black condition of
the heart, ^ ^ * but in. sudden heat of
passion, on a legal provocation offered by
deceased. That la to say, if deceased as-
saulted defendant, and defendant became
hot and passionate, and in that condition of
the heart he struck and killed deceased, in
sadden heat and passion, the law denomi-
nates that sort of killing 'manslaughter.'"
State V. Hunter, 88 8. B. 685, 687, 82 8. a
108.
'Offanslsugtitet^ exists where one per-
son unlawfully kills another without nuUice^
aa where one in a sudden affray, in the heat
of blood, or in a transport of passion, with-
out malice, inflicts a mortal wound, without
time for reflection or for the paaslon to cooL
State V. Brehiwskl (DeL) 84 Aa 900, 962.
Where the evidence showed that accused
struck deciedent, riding in a wagon, with a
six-foot binding pole, and that decedent was
either knocked off the wagon or fell from it
and was fatally injured by a wheel running
over him, the court properly charged on man-
alaughter in the language of the statute, and
that the jury could convict accused if they
believed that he stnu& decedent and knock-
ed| him off the wagon, or caused decedent to
fail ftom the wagon, and that a wheel ran
over him, and that he. died in oonaequenoe
ct such strikiiig and being nm over. Gil-
more V. State, 122 8. W. 488, 484, 92 Ark.
206.
In the prosecution of an officer for kill-
ing deceased while resisting arrest, an in-
struction that if defendant in good faith her
lieved that he had a right to execute a capias
pro fine under which he waa seeking to ar-
rest deceased on Sunday, then they should
find defendant guilty of mantfaughter, was
erroneous. Kammerer v. Oonunonwealth, 126
8. W. 783, 724, 187 Ky, 816.
An instruction that if accused was in
such a state of excitement that his reason
was dethroned, that he was driven by an un-
controllable impulse so that he was not taio-
rally or legally accountable for his conduct,
so that he did not realize his crime or what
he was doing or where he was, and had gone
some' distance from the scene before he waa
able to recover himsetf and his senses, then
he would be guilty of no higher crime than
manslaughter, was erroneous, as the degree
of mental disturbtance required was equiva-
lent to insanity^ People v. Poole, 128 N. W.
1093, 1094, 169 Mich. 860, IM Am. St Bep.
722:
Under Bev. 8t XT. 8. I fSSH, declaring
that every, person who uitlawfully and will-
fully but without malice shoots at or other-
wise injures another, of which- 'sliooting or
other injury the pwaoh diss, iis guilty of
manslaughter, an .inatrhctkm AsfliUng man-
aOaughter and omitting the isenL' *%iuailly"
KAKSLA^UdHTJSR
8f«
MANSliUlrUOHTPII
wasf >erroneoii& O'Barr v : - United : BMmft 105
Pac. 988, 989, 8 Okl. Or. 819, 139 Am. St.
Rep. 959.
" A charge on 'nsknslaugbter In tbe Ian-
gtrage of the statute that every person who
shall unlawfully kill'iany human being, with-
out mallei, express or implied, either volun-
tarily upon-' a. sudden heat or InvoluntArUy,
but in the commission of some unlawful act,
shall be guilty of manslaughter is sufficient;
the statute containing no tilctmical terms,
and being plain and unambiguous, and easily
understood by a juror of ordinary Intelli-
gerice. State v. Quinn^ 105 Piic. 818, 821, 56
Wash.. 295.
Defendant,, a fraU feeble man 62 years
pf age, after having been severely beaten by
deceased, went to his residence, obtained a
liistol, and, returning, fired two shots, the
se<»nd of which struck deceased while he
was advancing. Deceased took the pistol
away from defendant, and beat him with it
into InsensibiUty, after which deceased died
from his wound. Held, that an instructloB
that if defendant with a deadly weapon or
instrument reasonably calculated to produce
death by the mode or manner of its use, in
a sudden transport of passion aroused .by
adeauate caiise, and not in defiense of him-
self against an unlawful attack. £^sonably
producing a rational fear or expectation of
death or serKous bodily harm, shot deceased
as charged, he was guUty of manfilaughter,
wai ptdpet'tLoA warraiited by the evidence.
Sartin v. State, 103 S. W. 875, 876, 51 Tex.
Or.'-R.-6Tlv :.;-► cr; ^ . . - ■• • • • • : -
• Defeddaaat, keeper of a bagnio, had trou-
ble with a man therein, and he went out, be-
!iig Immediately followed by deceased and his
iJarty. The testimony' for the state was
'that the defendant then called for a pistol,
aimed it towards the party, and fired, tuiy-
Infc **RuD you • ♦ • run," and that on
her going inside, being asked if they ran,
^he said, "Yea." She and her witnesses tes-
tiHedlthat no sfiQt.was fired from the, house.
Held, that "negligent homicide" was not in
the case, but ''manslaughter," of which she
was convicted, wjas the lowest grade of homi-
cide of which she could be found guilty, so
that any error in the instruction thereon Was
harmless. Clifton v. State, 84 S. W. 237,
239, 47 Tex. Gr. E, 472.
The mere belief by defendant thi^t .he
was in danger of having some, injury inflict-
ed upon him,' witbovt any rec^soiuible grounds
fi^r entertaining such belief, has never been
recognized by the courts of this sti^te or any
other state to which our attention has been
called as beUig suffidoit to re^ce the grade
of the crime from /'murder^ iii the first or
second degree to ''manslaughter.**' State v.
Clay, 100 S. W. 439^ 442, 201 Mo. 679.;
**Maniaau|^ter," as defimed by the stat-
utes of the United States, consist»:ln thet un-
lawful and.wiUfuL'kiUing of another. by: strik-
lag, sM^bbingt wounding, shootiiig, .or other-
wise injuring 'him, resuting in his death,
without malice. State v. Collingsworth, 92
N. B. 22. 8^2 Qhio St 154,. 28 L. R. A. (N. S.)
770, 137 Am. St Rep. 776; Miller ▼. State.
107 Pac. 948, 8 Okt Cr. 575.
Saaie— CooUkc time ••
^'Manslaughter" Is the unlawful killing of
a human being wiOiout malice, -jeither ex-
I^ress or imi^ed, and Is; eomniitted when the
death wound is given \hy accused without
maIi<Qe, on sudden provocation, in the heat o£
blood or in a tranfKK>rt of passion, on suffi-
cient provoeation without tipie tor reflectioo
and deliberation and. for the blood: to cool
State V. Moore (Del.) 74 AU. 1112, .U14, 1
Boyce, 142.
If thete idiould appear to liave been an
interval between the assault or prorocatioD
given and the killing sufficient for the voice
of reason to be heard, the killing shall be at-
tributed to deliberate revenge, and punished
as murder. People v. Bissett 92 N. E. 949,
951, 246 lU. 516. •
In determining whether a homicide is re-
duced from murder to maiislaughter, the
question is not only whether accused's pas-
sion, engendered by a sufficient provocation,
did in fact cool, but also whether the time
intervening between the giving of tbe provo-
cation ^nd the killing was sufficient for tbe
passion pf a reasonable man to cool; an af-
firmative, answer to either question preclud-
iDji a Reduction to manslaughter. A killing
coinmilted upon a provocation given 9 or 10
months before is not reduced to manslaugb-
tef by the passion engendered by sndi provo-
cation. Ex parte Fraley, 109 Pac 295, 296, 3
OkL Cr. 719, 139 Am. St Bep. 988.
To reduce homicide from the degree of
murder to that of manslaughter it must have
been committed upon A sudden quarrel or
heat of passion, and, where a person who Is
su^dently wronged by another to arouse Ib
him that heat of passion which, if life wero
taken immediately, would make the crime
manslaughter, after sufficient cooling time has
intervened, kills deceased, the homicide. will
be deemed the result of deliberation; and
where defendant was informed by his wife
that she had committeid adultery with de-
ceased, the first time under violence, search-
ed for deceased, took a journey by train to
his home, and shot him 17 hours after he
had been first informed, there had been a
sufficient cooling time and his acts could wA
be said to have been Cbmmittedta such 'iieot
of passion*' as would reduce the homicide to
manslaughter. People v. Ashland, 128 Pac.
798,: 80i; 20 CaL App. 168.
8im!D--Iiitemt : -
To reduce homicide to manrtaoghter, tf
is not necessary th^t the.int^t to kill be
formed in a sudden transport of .passion, op
adequate cause, but it is enoqgb that t)^
jDifi^M.^cited and not capable of cool re-
momuioaBPtKm
SL
mactier ▼. Static lIU & W. SB8, 2tt, 01 TUl
The rule is well settled that to confttittite
'*maiidaiighter''^lt Is not necessary tliai the
perpetrator should ha^e Intended and witted
the death of the person killed. OnewliowUl-'
folly uses a deadly weapon upon anotiier
will be deemed to Intend tiie neoeasaiy and
probable eonswiuences of his act The text-
writers dMde manstetighter Into two'de>
gree9, Yolnntaxy and Inyolnntary. Tyner ▼.
United States, 108 Paa 1057, 1068, » OkL Oc
688.
Int^t Is not an essentlali element of the
sUtntory definition of ''manslaughter" when
committed by culpable negUgence, and charg-
es predicated upon the theory that intent is
in ev^ry case essential to the statutory crime
of "mansUughter** are properly refused.
Kent T. State, 43 South. 77^ 774, 53 Fla. 51.
Sand, ft H. Dig. | 1060, providing that the
killing of a human being without design to
effect death* in the heat of passion, but in a
cruel and unusual manner, unless it be imder
circomstances that would constitute excusa-
ble or justifiable homicide, shall be adjudged
manslaughter. Is not applicable to a Idlling
with a pistol; the statute being evidently in-
tended to cover a case of homicide committed
anintentionally, but with itch wanton sav-
agery and cruelty, and in such an unusual
manner, as to imply recklessness of design.'
In one sense, it is true, all killing Is cruel ;
but, in the sense of this statute, killing with
such a common or effective instrument of
death as a pistol cannot be regarded as cruel ;
still less is this manner of death unusual.
Tanks v. State, 75 a W. 851, 852, 71 Ark.
459.
In "manslaughter" there may be an In-
tent to kiU ezlating in the mind of the slayer
at the time the fatal shot is fired. Kelgans
▼. State; 41 South. 880, 887, 52 Fla. 67.
Where the intent was merely to inflict
chastisement, and death results from some
peculiarity in decedent's constitution or oth-
^r unexpected incident, the killing is man-
slaughter only. Hosemond v. State, 110 S. W.
229, 230, 86 Ark. 100..
"ManalaughteE" Is the unlawful killing
of another without malice, and under certain
conditions this crime , may be established,
though, the killing has' been both unlawful
and Intentional. State v. Baldwin, 68 S. SI
148, 151, 152 N. a 822,
If the Intfltttion to km was formed in
defendant's ndnd, through passion, with ade-
quate cause, and tiie homielde oecuered while
Uie mind was in that condition, it was no
hi^er olf&se than manslaughter. Dixoi^ v.
State. 103 S. W. 390, 401, 51 Tex. Cr. H. 565.
" ICanslaughter* is voluntary homicUte
tommlttsd tOider the Inunedlate lnflnance..of
UAHBLAJMXBOm
.^^uslsn, aiMng from^aa jidequa^
causes bat neither > Justified nor' excused by
law. BythaexiHMstoa under 'fho^iosnediate*
iiiflii«doe or'AiHldsii'passtim.ir^nefmtr 0)
Thait tXto peovocatfim must arlsetit the same-
time of the commission of thst offense» a«d
that the pasaion is not the result ot a, former
provo^tidn. (2) That the act must be di-
rectly caosed by the passion arising out of
the provocation. It is not enough that the
mind is merely agitated by passion arising
from some other pixivocation. (8) The pas-
sion intended is'.ei^ther of tbe emptions of tliei
mind known aa. anger, rage, sudden resent-
n^nt, or terror Tendering it incapable of cool
reflection." Sue v. State, 105 S». W. 80i, 800,
52 Tex. Cr. BC122. *
" 'Manslaughter' is where one persoin un-
la^wfuUy kills another without malicei In
order to reduce the crime to manslaughter,
the provocation must be vefy great — so great
as to produce such a transport of passion as
to render the person for the time being deaf
to the voice of reason." State v. Powell
(Dei) ei Att 966, 071, 5 PannewlU, 24^ State
V. TDghman (DeL) 68 AH 772, 778, 6 Fenn^
win, 54; State v. Johns (DeL) 65 AtL 768,
766, 6 Pennewlllt 174; State v. Wiggins (DeL)
76 AQ. 682, 636, 7 PennewOl, 127.
'To 'redtce tinUwftU' killing from *mar-
deif to *nuunlaaghtisr,' two thing»ittcuft con-
tat.: First, conditions must be iliown to ex*
ist wMch. w0ul4 \i0 icalculated to'prOduce» in
the mind of a 'iferson of -ordinary prbdenoe
and self-control, such rage, fury, or terror as
would render the mind of the defendant in-
capable of forming a premeditated design to
effect tlw deaHi of the persoin alliln, bf «t an#
other htmuin beifig; second, it most also be
shown that the defendant was In fact, at tibe
time of the homicide, laboring under such
rage, fury, or terror.^ Bx parte Smith, 90
Pae. 803, 900, 2 OkL Or. 24.
To reduce t homicide ttoth murder to
"manslaughter,'' it must be committed in a
heat of passion, on a reasonable provocation,
without maUCe and without premeditation,
and under drcumstanoes ttiat will not be Jus-
tlfiable.or excusable homicidei. Tlie passion
which win reduce taonddde to -the degree of
nmnslaui^ter lean exelted sfista of mind pro?
dueed by some lawful provocation, such as^a
blow or an assault of any kind upon the per*
mm. ''Mansiaiii^iter,*' In the fovrtti degree*
Includes every Itomidde not Justifiable or el->
cnsable wUleh «^ laanslaiii^ter iit common
law, and which Is not excusable or Jnatifia-
ble, or declared by statute to be manslaugh-
ter in some other degree. State v. Weakley,
77 S. W. 525, 527, 178 Ma .413 (auoOng and
adopting the definitions 1^ Bev. 3t 1899, i
3477), -
j^Ulpg,' the ranilt off 9aMeii:.yrodiiced
by Ugltit; Is ^inamrtangtiter" if thSe person up*
on .whQm.:iA assaiA is made with' Violence
resent it immidlafiay.:by:JkIlliag.«htt aggree-
KAlTOLAUaHTEK
2X2
UARSLAJSQBTmm
0or, and acitherem In heat of Uaodiand imt
exclnalT^ In hla own detaiae. State ▼.
QoK^ M & n. i68» lea, ii(k iso n. c. 820
Cdtlng Stater. MUler. 17 &B. ie7yll2 N. a
878t State T. Gran«» 96 K. 0. 61A; State t.
Tackett, 8 N. a 210).
Hie mere belief by defendant that he
waa in danger of having some injury Inflicted
npon. him, without any reaJBOnable grounds
for entertaining such belief, has never been
recognized by the courts of this state or koj
other state to which our attention has been
called, as being sufficient to reduce the grade
of the crime from ''murder'* in the first or
second degree to '^manslaughter.** State v.
aay, fob S. W. 439, 442, 201 Mo. 679.
., A slight assault does not excuse the.kiU-
ini^ 6f an assailant with a deadly weapon, ao
as .to reduce the offense from the grade of
murder to that of manslaughter. State v.
Wiggins (DeL) 76 AtL 632, 635. 7 Pennewill,
127; Same v. BorreUi (DeL) 76 Aa 605,
607, 1 Boyce, 349.
When words of decedent are accompa-
nied by acts showingr a purpose to commit vl*
olence On accused, aa by raising and pointing
at him a gun, accused is entitled to an in-
struction on manslaughter. State v. Oraw-
ford, 66 S* B. 110, 1J5, 66 W. Va. U4.
If tli» prisons Willingly engagied ill a
fight with the deceased, and the deceased
threw his .hand to hia hip pocket, and ad-
vanced, upon the prisoner in a threatening
manner, and the .prisoner« being willing to
fight, seUsed a pistol, and shot the deceased,
and the deceased died from the wound then
inflidted by the prisoner, the prisoner would
be guilty of "manslaughter,** provided the ap-
pearance and manner of the deceased were
such as to cause the prisoner to brieve that
the deceaised was armed with a deadly weap*
on, and that the prisoner did believe he was
armed with a deadly weapon and was about
to harm him with it State V- Exum, 56 S. EL
283, 289, 138 K. 0. 599.
If a convict, while attempttng to prevent
his punishment by the warden, which amount-
ed to an aissault, slew a fellow convict aiding
the warden, who was the warden's abettor
in coDunittIng the assault, the homidd^ may
be reduced to voluntary maiislaughter ; and
it was error to omit to cliarge on tikatoffense
in a prosecution of the convict for' murder.
Westbrook v. Stiate, 66 S. E. 788, 791, 138 Ga.
578, 26 L. B. A. (N. S.) 591, 18 Ann. GaS. 295.
Where decedent slapped accused, but did
not accompany the act by angry or insulting
words, a charge, on inanslaughter that, if ac-
cused killed decedent under the immediate
fnfluence of sudden passion arising from the
act of decedent rendering the mind of accus-
ed tnoapabSe of cool refleetton, he was guilty
of mansiaugliter only, property submitted the
issue of manslaughter. Best v^ States 125 S.
W. 900, 928, i» l^x. Cr. B. 827.
ProToeatfon caused by words only is not
saflScient. tc^ rsdnoe a hoviidde fkom murder
to '"manslaughter.*' Petty v. SUte, 89 S. W.
465» 467, 76 Ark. 61&
TestimoDy of a statement made by de-
ceased to defendant and to some of defend-
ant's alstera, wlio were present, that they
were hitches, or damn bitches, does not raise
the issue of insulting conduct toward a fam-
ily relative of defendant Jirimson v» States
84 «. W. 884, 826, 47 Tex. Cr. B. 623.
^ Where accused killed another under the
immediate Influence of passion arising in his
mind from information given him by his wife
to the effect that deceased had used insulting
language to her, defendant believing and in
good faith acting on th^ information, such in-
formation was to him an adequate cause, re-
ducing the crime to manslaughter, whether
the insults had been in fact offered or not
Melton V. State, 88 S. W. 822, 824, 47 Tex. Cr.
B.451.
In a prosecution for manslaughter, where-
in it appeared accused killed deceased while
endeavoring to gain possession of a house oc-
cupied by the deceased, there was evidence
that accused, just before the killing, sent hia
wife to demand possession, and that when
she did so deceased asked her if she was going
to take the place of her husband, or it she
was attending to his business, and said that
there was no law that could put him out, and
that then her husband called her, and de-
ceased and his brother followed her, cursing
accused and calling him vile names. Held
not to raise the issue of manslaughter by
reason of Insulting conduct towards her, so
as to require a charge thereon* Gay v. State,
125 S. W. 896, 901, 58 Tex. Cr. H. 47i
In a prosecution for homicide^ an instruc-
tion was erroneous which required that, be-
fore defendant would be entitled to a reduc-
tion of Ms offense to mansiaui^ter, the jui7
must believe both that he was led to commit
the homicide from learning that decedent had
insulted his wife, and also that the decedent
had used violent language to and threatened
him with bodily harm, since, where the law
makes any given fact, adequate cause for
homicide, a defendant is entitled to an un-
equivocal Instruction that^ if sudi fact is
proven, it is adequate cause, and where any
one or more issues are raised by the evidence,
either of which. If found to be true, would as
a fact constitute adequate cause, the Jury
should be so instructed, and it is error to
blend the two and require tliat the affirmative
of both be proved. Barbae v. State, 124 S.W.
961, 967, 58 Tex. Or. B. 129.
Where a person committing a homicide
did so in the belief that decedent had insulted
defendant's sisters, the homicide was **man-
slaughter," if conunitted upon the lint meet-
ing after defendant was apprised of the out
rage, whether decedent actually coDuatttei
XAKSlftAVOHXEa
ST8
lfAK8X4AUOHT]BB
tbe limit or not* if tbe liomielde wm oommlt-
ted Willie cJufepdanl: was acting under the be-
lief tliat decedent was guilty and wlille labors
Ing under a passion aroused by that belief
wbich rendered his mind incapable of cool re-
flecdon* QiUespie y. SUte, 109 S. W. 166.
159, 53 Tex. Or. R 167.
It when lie Idlled decedent, accused was
Incapable of cool reflection because of deoe*
denVs insulting language and conduct toward
accused's wife, knowledge of which had just
come to hiffl, or if the unwarranted ejection
of accused from decedent's house, accompa-
nied by UdKS from decedent, infuriated ac^
cosed beyond cool reflection, resulting in the
kiUlBg, the killing was "manslaughter." Hoi-
comb y. State, IJLg S. W. 7H 750^ M Tex. Or.
B.486.
'If a husband finds his wife commlttlas
adultery and under the proyocatlon instanOj
takes her life, the homicide is only 'man-
slaughter.' " Thomas y. State, 43 8outh« 371,
374, 150 Ala. 31 (citing Hooks' Case, 13 South.
767, 99 Ala. 166; McNeiU y. State, 15 South.
352, 102 Ala. 121, 48 Am. St Bep. 17; Dabney
V. State, 21 South. 211, 113 Ala. 88, 59 Am. St
Rep. 92; Williams y. State, 30 South. 484»
130 Ala. 107, 112).
A Charge that to reduce e kUling to
"^manslaughter,** where passions haye been
suddenly aroused on a sufficient proyocatlon,
it must haye been done under the influence of
passion promptly acted upon, is not errone-
ous. Harrison y. State, 40 South. 068, 670,
144 Ala. 20.
The unlawful killing of aaother without
malice is "manslaughter," as wheie one kills
another in a sudden quarrel. In the heat of
blood, or in a tramq;K>rt of passion, without
malice, inflicts a mortal wound, without Ume
for reflection or for the passions to cool; but
to reduce the offense to manslaughter the
proyocatlon must be yery great, so great as
to produce such a transport of passion as to
raider the person for the time being deaf to
the voice of reason. State y. Brooks (DeL) 84
Aa225, 22&
Vol«mtarj o» lByol«ntery kllllag
"Manslaughter^' Is the unlawful kWing
of another, without malice, upon a sudden
heat, or Inadyertently, but in the commission
of some unlawful act Bocbe y. State, 122 N.
W. 72» 76, 84 Neb. 846.
"Manslaughter^ Is the unlawful killing of
another without malice, either express or im-
plied, and without premeditation, and is ei-
ther yoluntary or inyoluntary. State y.
Blackburn (DeL) 76 AU. 636, 639, 7 PennewlU,
479; State y. Morahan (Del.) 77 AU. 488, 488^
7 Pennewill, 494; State v. Woods (Del.) 77
AtL 480, 401, 7 Pennewill, 499.
"Manslaughter,^ as defined by Bey. St |
6341, is the offense of unlawfully and will-
fully, but without malice, striking, stabbing;
8 WDS.& P.2d SKa.~18
wounding, or shooting at ar otherwise Injur-
ing another person in any fort, arsenal, etc,
of which striking, etc., such person dies.
"'Manslaughter* has been defined to be the
killing o( another without malice, exprjess or
implied, which may be yoluntary upon sudden
heat or involuntary in the commission of
some lawful act Any unlawful and willful
killing of a human being without malice la
manslaughter, and thus defined it includes a
negligent killing which Is also wiUfuL 'Man-
slaughter' occupies the middle ground be-
tween excusable, or justifiable, homicide on
the one hand, and murder on the other.**
United States y. Hart, 162 Fed. 192, IM, 196.
Gross carelessness in the handling of fire-
arms which results in killing a human being
is at least "manslaughter." State y. Clardy,
63 S. S. 483, 600, 73 S. 0. 340*
Under Pen. Code, defining "raanslangh*
ter^ as the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice and diyiding it Into two kinds:
(1) Voluntary, upon a sudden quarrel or heat
of passion; (2) inyoluntary in the commission
of an unlawful act not amounting to a fel-
ony, or in the commission of a lawful act
which might produce death in an unlawful
manner or without due caution or circum-
spection— in a prosecution for assault in the
first degree, It was error to instruct that, if
the jury beileyed that defendant would haye
been guilty of manslaughter in case death
had resulted, then they should find him guilty
of assault In the flxet degree, since Intent is
not always a necessary element in the crime
of manslaughter, but Is the essence of the
crime of assault in the first degree. State
y. Schaefer, 88 Pac. 702, 793, 86 Mont 217.
"Manslaughter" is the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice, and is of
two kinds — yoluntary (that is, upon a sudden
quarrel or heat of jmssion); involuntary, in
the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, or in the commission
of a lawful act, which might produce death,
in an unlawful manner, or without due cau-
tion and circumspection. The instruction was
in the language of Pen. Code, | 192. People
y. Lee, 108 Pac. 738, 739, 13 Cal. App. 48.
"Manslaughter," as defined by Pen. Code,
1 192, is the unlawful killing of a human be-
ing without malice, first, voluntary, upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion; second, in-
voluntary, in the commission of an unlawful
act which might produce death in an unlawful
manner or without due care and circumspect
tion. The causing of death while attempting
to commit an abortion does not constitute
manslaughter under the statute. Huntington
V. Superior Court of City and County of San
Francisco, 90 Pac. 141, 144, 5 CaL App. 288.
l%e approved definition of "manslaugfti-
ter" as the killing of another witboot mailoa,
either express or implied, "either unlawfully
upon a sudden quairely or unintentionaUy
MANSLAUGHTER
274
itAimhAtdtthM
while the slayer is In the unlawfur commis-
sion of some act not amounting to a felony/*
authorizes an lustmctlon that If defendant
struck the blow that killed the deceased, and
intended only to make an assault and battery
upon his person, or to inflict great bodily in-
Jury thereon, but that, as a result of the
assault, the deceased died without defendant
having Intended to kill him, defendant would
be guilty of manslaughter. State ▼• Walker,
110 N. W. 925, 928, 133 Iowa, 489.
Where the violation of a penal ordinance
of a municipality causes a death, the death
is not an unlawful killing wlthl^ a statute
defining the crime of "manslaughter" and
providing that if any person shall unlaw-
fully kill another without malice he shall be
guilty of "manslaughter." State v. Collings-
worth, 92 N. a 22, 23, 82 Ohio St 154, 28
L. R. A. (N. B.) 770, 187 Am. St Rep. 775.
"If the killing be In the commission of
an unlawful act without malice and without
means calculated to produce death or the
prosecution of a lawful act done without
due caution or circumspection, it sliall be
•manslaughter.' •• Ackers v. State, 83 S. W.
909, 73 Ark. 262 (quoting Sand. & H. Dig. |
1657).
Under Balllnger's Ann. Ck>des ft St S
6840, providing that an information shall
contain a statement of the acts constituting
the offense so as to enable a person of com-
mon understanding to know what is intend-
ed, an Information charging that accused,
representing himself as a physician, advised
a mother employing him to give the child no
food except water and the Juices of fruit
and such other nourishment as he might di-
rect and that acting under such instruction
the mother withheld all food and nourish-
ment except as directed by accused, and
that the child died as a result of starvation,
does not charge "manslaughter," defined by
section 7042, punishing one who shall kill an-
other without malice in the commission of
some unlawful act because it fails to show
a connected chain of facts showing starva-
tion as the necessary result of the directions.
State V. McFadden, 93 Fac. 414, 415, 48
Wash. 269, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1140.
Under Mansf. Dig. S 1532 (Ind. T. Ann.
St 1899, S 875), defining "manslaughter" as
the unlawful killing of a human being, with-
out malice or deliberation, section 1533, pro-
viding that it must be voluntary under a sud-
den heat of passion caused by a provoca-
tion apparently sufficient to make the passion
irresistible, and section 1534, describing the
killing to be manslaughter if It be in the
commission of an unlawful act without due
caution, there is no such thing as involun-
tary manslaughter. Gasney ▼. United States,
104 8. W. OOe, 7 Ind. T. 247.
An indictment for manslaughter charg-
ing, in the language of the statute, Chat de-
fendant did "feloniously kill Iqid slay'' the
deceased cannot support a conviction for ieis-
sault and battery. The formnla did *felo-
nlously kill and slay'* cbfarges niaimlaughter
of either voluntary or inroluntary diaracter,
and Involuntary manslaughter may be com-
mitted without criminal assault and battery.
State V. Thomas, 48 AtL 1007, 1006^ 65 N. J.
Law, 698.
Mnrder distlns^iilslied
"Murder" and "manslaughter'' are dis-
tinguished, in that malice is essential to the
former offense, and by absence of premedita-
tion or deliberation in the latter. Reed v.
State, 145 S. W. 206, 208, 102 Ark. 626.
The unlawful killing of another with mal-
ice is "murder," as distinguished from "rnaii^
slattghter," which is an unlawful killing with-
out such malice. Stat» t. liee, 60 S. fiL 624,
526, 79 S. C. 223.
If the slayer provoked the combat or
produced the occasion in order to have a pre-
tense for killing Ills adversary, or doing him
great bodily harm, the killing will be "mur-
der," no matter to what extremity he may
have been reduced in the combat But if he
had no felonious intent intending, for in-
stance, an ordinary battery mer^, the final
killing in self-defense would be "manslaugh-
ter" only ; the distinction being between the
right of perfect and the ri^^ht of imperfect
self-defense. State v. Kelleher, 100 S. W. 470,
475, 201 Mo. 614 (citing State v. PaiUow, 4
S. W. 14, 90 Mo. 608, 69 Am. Rep. 81).
"'Homidde^ is murder unless it be at-
tended with extenuatiBg circumstances, which
must appear to the satislactiou of the Jury.
If A. assaults B., giving liim a severe blow,
or otherwise making the provocation great
and B. strikes him with a deadly weapon,
and death ensues, the law, in deference to
human passion, says this is 'manslaughter.'
* ^ * If the provocation be slight and it
can be collected from the weapon used or any
other circumstances that the prisons intend-
ed to kill or do great bodily harm, and death
follows, it Is 'murder.' " State v. White, 51 S.
E. 44, 48, 138 N. O. 704 (quoting and adopting
deflnitioiL in State v. Smith, 77 N. 0, 488).
While, in one sense, murder and man-
slaughter are separate crimes, yet, in a broad-
er sense, they involve but one crime and are
only degrees of felonious homicide. Rhea t.
Territory, 106 Pac. 814, 816^ 8 OUL Or. 280.
In an instruction correctly deflnlhg mur-
der and manslaughter, the statement that
"You see by these definitions that in murder
malice must exist but that manslaughter is
the killing of a human t>elng without mal-
ice," made only to dlsMnguish the two, Ifi not
reversible error. Prince v. United States, 109
Pae. 241, 242, 3 OkL Or^ 700.
Manslaughter Is' distinguished from mur-
der by the absence Of malice as a contingent
MilNSIiAUaHrCR
2TS
MAl^SIiA^GHTER
eleftient. If, under the lnilu«noe'o£ some rlo-
l^nt emotion, a sn<lclen intent vas formed,
which on ad^uate psorocation 6(Terwhelmed
the rea»Qii of the appellant, then the killing
was not murder, but manslaughter, ooiy.
State y. Clark 77 Pac 287, 288, 69 Kan. 676.
The chief distinction between ''murder*'
and ^'manslaughter" is deliberation and mal-
ice in murder and the want thereof in man-
slaughter, and, where the issue was whether
accused or a third person in^flicted the fatel
wound, the error In an ihstruction that if
accused killed decedent without authority of
law and not in necessary self-defense he was
guilty of manslaughter, arising from the
omission of the words "without malice and
in the heat of passion,'* was not prejudicial.
Quest y. State, 52 South. 211, 212, 96 Miss.
871.
Generally it is not ^'murder," but "man-
slaughter," to kill an officer, or other person,
to prevent an illegal arrest. Consequently,
shooting at an officer without killing him, if
done to prevent an illegal arrest, is prima
fade not an assault with intent to murder,
but the statutory crime of shooting at anoth-
er, described in Code 1882, | 4370. Jenkins v.
State, 59 S. B. 435, 436, 3 Ga. App. 146 (quot-
ing, with approval, from Thomas v. State, 18
S. £. 305, 91 Ga. 206).
Under Pen. 'Code, H 187, 189, defining
murder as the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought, and defining
murder In the first and second degreed, and
section 192, defining manslaughter as the un-
lawful killing of a human being without
malice, and dividing manslaughter into vol-
untary and involuntary manslaughter, and
section 274, making it a felony to perform a
criminal abortion, an unlawful killing with
malice aforethought is "murder," and is also
"manslaughter,'^ because it is the unlawfdl
killing of a human being, though it cannot be
logically classed as voluntary or involuntary
' manslaughter, and under a charge of murder
by attempting a criminal abortion, a verdict
of manslaughter may be returned. People y.
Huntington, 97 Pac 760, 762, 8 Cal. App. 612.
"Manslaughter" Is an unlawful kilUng,
which becomes "murder In the second degree"
when it has the added element of maUce.
State y. Fowler, 66 S. B. 567, 151 N, C. 73L
''Manslaughter" consists oi the unlawful
killing of a human being vdthout malice, and
so, in a prosecution for assault with intent
to commit murder, the accused cannot be
convicted if, had his victim died, his crime
would have only been' manslatghter. ' State v.
Stockley (Del.) 82 Ati. 1078, 1080.
'^Manalaogbter" is a homicide distin-
guished from murder in that it Is the unlaw-
ful kllltng of another with malice, as in sud-
den affray, in the heat of blood, or la a transr
port ofi-paaaieii,. wiltoont tUne. loor delibera-
tion, refiectiUm,' or for the p«u9SioxiS:^to cooL
State V. De Paolo (Del.) 84 AtL 213, 215w
'^Manslaughter" ^is an unlawful killing
in anger .withotit malice. Proof of prior prov-
ocation may exclude the idea of malice in
the homlciae, but does not exclude the idea
of unlawfulness. ^ It merely substitutes the
element of anger without malice for the ele-
ment of malice, thus distinguishing man-
slaughter from murder. C!ole v. State, 59 S.
B. 24, 26, 2 Ga. App. 734. .
Murder in the second degree consists of
the killing of another without a formed de-
sign to take life, and without provocation to
reduce the offense to '^manslaughter," and
under the influence of a wicked or depraved
heart, or with cruel and wicked indifference
to human life. " 'Manslaughter' is where one
in a sudden affray, in the heat of blood, or
in a transport of passion, without malice, in-
flicts a mortal wound, without time for re*
flection or for the passions to cool. It is
where one person unlawfully kills another
without malicQ. In order to reduce the crime
to 'manslaughter,' the provocation must be
yery great, so great as to produce such a
transport of passion as to render the person
for the time being deaf to the voice of rea-
son. While jnurder proceeds from a wicked
and depraved heart ^d is characterized by
malice, 'manslaughter' results, not from mal-
ice, but from unpremeditated and unreflect-
ing passion." State v* Ctephus (Del.) 67 Atl.
.X50/ 151, 6 Pennewlli, 160.
When a killing is intentional and is not
lawful, it to generally "murder"; but, under
dreum^tances of provocation, or of mutual
combat, it may be reduced to "manslaughter."
State v. Ooldsby, 114 S. W. 500, 503, 21^ Mo.
48 . (citing 2 Bishop's (Drim. Law [6th BdJ
I
"Murder" is where a person of sound
memory and discretion unlawfully kills any
human being under the peace of the state,
with malice aforethought, either express or
implied. The chief characteristic of this
crime distinguishing it from "manslaughter"
and every other kind of homicide, and diere-
fore indispensably necessary to be proved, is
flialioe preconceived or aforethought Staite
y. Brinfie (Del) 68 AtL 258, 262, 4 Penne-
wlli, 661.
A charge that, where an ofl!cer is shot
and killed by one whom he is seeking legally
to arrest, the offense is "murder" and not
"manslaughter," was not erroneous when tak-
en in connection with the evidence which was
sufficient to show that defendant was violat-
ing the law in the presence of the officer and
that upon an effort to arrest him he drew a
pistol and shot the officer. Johnson v. State,
160 S. B. 160, 161, 130 Ga. 27.
If two persons deliberately agree to fight
with deadly weapons. on a subsequent day at
a deOiUta Um^ JOAd plac^.a^^^b^th,. being
MANSIiAUGhttTER IK FIRST DEGREE 27<( MAKSLAUGHTBR IN FIRST DEGREB
armed, meet by chance near the appointed
place and near the appointed time, and with-
out any fresh cause of a quarrel or other al-
tercation one slays the other without Justlfl-
cation, the crime is murder, and not volun-
tary "manslaughter.** Bundrick ▼. State, SA
S. B. 688, $85, 125 Qa. 768.
MAHSLAUOHTEB IX FXRST BEOBSE
«*Afans]aughter in the first degree" Is the
unlawful killing of a human being without
malice ; that is, as the unpremeditated result
of passion-heated blood caused by a sudden,
sufficient provocation. Thomas t. State, 86
South. 734, 735, 139 Ala. 80.
To oonstltate "manslaughter in the first
degree," there must be either an intent to
kill or to do an act of Tiolenoe from which
ordinarily death or great bodily harm will
result Reynolds v. State, 45 South. 894,
895, 154 Ala. 14; Fowler y. Same, 49 South.
788, 789, 790, 161 Ala. 1.
Penal Code, 1 189, defines "manslaughter
in the first degree" as manslaughter commit-
ted without a design to effect death either
(1) by a person engaged in committing, or
attempting to commit, a misdemeanor, af-
fecting the person or property, either of the
person killed, or of another; or (2) in the
heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual
manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon.
People V. Stacy, 104 N. Y. Supp. 615, 619, 119
App. DlY. 743 ; Same ▼. Huson, 79 N. B. 835,
187 N. Y. 97; Same v. Darragh, 126 N. Y.
Supp. 522, 526, 141 App. DIy. 408.
Rev. St 1899, | 1822 (Ann. St 1906, p.
1266), providing that one deliberately assist-
ing another in the commission of self-mur-
der shall be guilty of manslaughter in the
first degree, changed the common-law rule
that if one counsels another to commit sui-
cide, and such other by reason of the advice
kills himself, the adviser is guilty of mur-
der as an aider and abetter, provided he is
present when bis advice is carried out State
v. Webb, 115 S. W. 998, 1000, 216 Mo. 378, 20
U R. A. (N. S.) 1142, 129 Am. St Rep. 618,
16 Ann. Caa. 51&
"Manslaughter in the first degree," under
Grimes Acts, | 12 (Gen. St 1901, | 1997), is
defined as the killing of a human being with-
out a design to effect death, by the act, pro-
curement or culpable negligence of another,
while such other is engaged in the perpetra-
tion or attempt to perpetrate any crime or
misdemeanor, not amounting to a felony, in
cases when such killing would be murder at
the common law. It has been held that the
act c^ offense which the accused commits or
attempts to commit at the time of an unin-
tentional killing includes an assault and bat-
tery, and that intentional violence to the per-
son is not excluded. If one, without any de-
sign to effect death, assaults another with
an ifitent only to commit assault and battery
upon him, and with the use %f a tin can.hie
unintentionally kills such person, the crlxne
would fUl within this definition and consti-
tnte "manslaughter in the first degree."
State ▼. MeAnamey, 79 Paa 187, 139, 70
Kan. 6T9.
Under St 1893, | 2066 (Wilson's Rev. «
Ann. St 1903, | 217Q), defining homicide to
be "manslaughter In the first degree" when
perpetrated without a design to effect death,
and in the heat of passion, in a cruel or juk-
usual manner, or by means of a dangerous
weapon, homicide is '^manslaughter in the
first degree" when perpetrated without a
design to tf eet death and in a heat of pas-
sion, and in a cruel and unusual manner, and
when committed without a design to effect
death, but in a heat of passion, and by means
of a dangerous weapon. Rarker v. Territory,
78 P. 81, 83, 15 OkL 22.
Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St 1903, | 2175,
defines ''manslaughter in the first degree" as
follows: "First, when perpetrated without a
design to effect death by a person while en-
gaged in the commission of a misdemeanor.
Second, when perpetrated without a design
to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but
in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means
of a dangerous weapon, unless it is commit-
ted under such circumstances as constitute
excusable or Justifiable homidde." Under
such definition, the crime of manslaughter
in the first degree could not exist where the
crime was committed by lying in wait and
shooting deceased, and the shooting was
willful and deliberate, resvlting in . death,
and the only defense was that of alibi. Tbe
language of the secornd subdivision of the
statute, defining "manslaughter in the first
degree" perpetrated without a design to ef-
fect death, would not authorize an instruc-
tion submitting defendant's guilt of man-
slaughter in such degree on such fdcts. Reg-
nier v. Territory, 82 Pac. 509, 15 Okl. 652.
Rev. St I 2276, defines ''manslaughter In
the first degree" as where a homicide is per-
petrated without design to effect death by
a person while engaged in the commission of
a misdemeanor, and in the heat of passion,
but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by
means of a dangerous weapon, or perpetrated
unnecessarily either while resisting an at-
tempt by the person killed to commit a crime
or after such attempt shall have failed. Tur-
ner V. State, 126 Pac 452, 458, 8 OkL O. U;
Kent V. Same, 126 Pac 1040, 1042» 8 OkL Gr.
188.
Pen. Ck)de, I 2, declares that no act or
oBiission shall be denned criminal or punish-
able save as prescribed by Hie Code, by some
statute which it continued, or by such laws
as are not in oonfiict with the Code, and sec-
tion 241 defines manslaughter in the first de-
gree as a killing perpetrated without a design
to effect death and in a heat of passion, but
in a cruel and unusual manner or by means
of a dangeroiis weapon, milesB committed
under such dxeomstonoes astto coatititnta a*
IfANSLAUGHTBBINSBGONDDEGBBnD 277 MANBLAUOHTEB IK FOURTH MlORfilS
cosable or jnstiflable homicide. Held, tliat
tbe phrase "when perpetrated without a de-
sign to effect death and in a heat of passion"
was employed to express the distinction be-
tween homicide In the first degree and mur-
der, and where one kills another in a cruel
or unnsnal manner, without excuse or Justifi-
cation, or by means of a dangerous weapon
under circumstances which do not excuse or
Justify the killing, the crime is at least man-
slaughter in the first degree. State y. Bd-
munds, 104 N. W. 1116, 1116, 20 S. D. 136.
KAHflnLAUOHTBR T« 8EOOMD DEOR£B
Manslaughter in the second degree is the
unlawful, involuntary killing of a human
b^ng. Neilson ▼. State, 40 South. 221, 222,
146 Ala. 683.
"Manslaughter in the second degree" is
the unnecessary killing of another either
while resisting an attempt by such other per-
son to commit any felony or to do any un-
lawful act after such attempt shall have fail*
ed. State y. Steyenson, 86 Pac. 707, 706, 74
Kan. 103.
Under St 1803, 1 2000, every killing of a
human being by culpable negligence which
under the chapter on homicide is not murder
or manslaughter In the first degree, nor ex-
cusable or Justifiable homicide, is mamAatii^-
ter in the second degree. Barker v. Territo-
ry, 78 Pac. 81, 88, 16 OkL 22.
St 1808, I 4361, makes it manslaufshter
in the second degree to unnecessarily kill an-
other while resisting an attempt of the other
to commit an unlawful act. Pollock v. State,
U6 N. W. 851, 854, 136 Wis. 136.
Rev. St 1800, I 1826 (Ann. Bt U006, ^
1267), defines manslaughter in the second de*
gree to be the killing of a human being with-
out a design to effect death in a heat of pas-
ilon in a cruel or unnsaal manner. State v.
ColWn, 126 8. W. 448, 466, 226 Mo. 446.
Where there is a want of intention or
willfulness in the doing of the unlawful act
causing death, resulting from a mental sta-
tus Incapable of forming an intent or purpose
to do the act, though produced by dmnken-
uess, the homicide is reduced to manslaugh-
ter in the second degree. Heninburg v.
State, 43 South. 050, 060, 151 Ala, 26.
Under Pen. Ck>de, f 170, defining homicide
as the killing of one human being by the
act, procurement, or omission of ''another,"
and section 180, providing that homicide is
cither murder or manslaughter, and section
193, subd. 3, making a homicide manslaugh-
ter in the second degvee when due to the act,
procurement, or ctdpable negligence of any
*t)erBon" which doed not constitute murder or
manslaughter in the first degree, a ocnrpora-
tion may not be indicted for manslaughter,
ilnee the word '^another" means another
human b^ng, and since the word "person"
does not include a corporation. People v.
Bochester By. A Light Co., 88 N. a 22, 24,
105 N. T. 102, 21 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 008, 138 Am.
St. Rep. 770, 16 Ann. Oas. 887.
Gomp. Laws 1000, § 2280, defines "man-
slaughter in the second degree" as every kill-
ing of one human being by the act, procure-
ment, or culpable negligence of another,
which, under the provisions of the statute,
is not murder or manslaughter in the first
degree or excusable homicide. Turner v.
State, 126 Pac. 462, 460, 8 OkL Or. 11 ; Kent
V. Same, 126 Pac. 1540, 104S, 8 OkL Or. 188.
maxbzjilUqhte& zk third deoree
Under Rev. St 1000, § 4462, defining
manslaughter in the third degree as the kill-
ing of another with the design to tf ect death
by a dangerous weapon, there can be no
manslaughter in the third degree where the
killing was with the design to effect death
and was intentional, but one may be guilty
of manslaughter in the third degree, when in
the heat of passion he struck and killed the
adversary with a dangerous weapon under
circumstances authorizing a finding that he
did not intend to kill the adversary by the
blow. State V. Hanson, 182 S. W. 245, 248,
281 Mo. 14.
St 1808, I 4354, declares that any per-
son who shall kill another in the heat of
passion without a design to effect death, by a
dangerous weapon, in any case except such
wherein the killing of another is declared to
be Justifiable or excusable, shall be deemed
guilty of manslaughter in the third degree.
Duthey v. State, 111 N. W. 222, 224, 131 Wis.
178, 10 L. R. A. (N. fl.) 1032; Bradley v.
Same, 124 N. W. 1024, 1026, 142 Wis. 137.
MAHSI.AUOHTEB IX TOURTK 0E«
ORSE
Where the killing is intentional, ''man-
slaughter in the fourth degree" is defined
as the intentional killing of a human being
in the heat of passion on a reasonable prov-
ocation, without malice and without pre-
meditation, and under circumstances which
wHl not render the killing as justifiable or
excusable homicide. State v. Sebastian, 114
S. W. 522, 528, 215 Mo. 58 (citing State v.
McKenele, 76 S. W. 1015, 177 Mo. loc. dt 712 ;
State V. Hermann, 28 S. W. 1071, llV Mo. loc.
dt 687 ; State v. Sumpter, 66 S. W. 76, 153
Mo. 486; State v. Meadows, 66 S. W. 878, 166
Mo. 110; State v. Brown, 64 Mo. 367; State
y. Diller, 70 a W. 130, 170 Mo. 1; State
v. Ashcraft,70S. W. 806, 170MO. 400; State
V. Kindred, 4» S. W. 846, 148 Ma 270; State
y. Qartifell, 71 S. W. 1046, 171 Mo. 480);
State v. Darling, 07 a W. 602, 600, 100 Mo.
168; State y. Oreave^ 147 9. W. 078, 075,
248 Mo. 640. As a general rule it takes an
assault, with personal vlc^ence^ te constitBto
such provocation. State v. Todd, 02 a W.
674, 670, 104 Mo. 877 (qooCing and adopting
definition in State v. McKentie, 76 S. W, 1015,
177 Bfo.. 600). . VBCanslaughter in the fourth
degree," under the statutes of this state. Is
MANSLAUGHTBB IN FOURTH DBGRBB 278
MAKUAXi LABOR
tlie intentional killing of a hiima9 Jl>eing in
the heat of passion, oa a reasonable provoca-
tion, without iualice and without premedita-
tion, and under circumstances which will not
render the provocation Justifiable or excus-
able homicide, and as a general rule it takes
an assault with personal violence to consti-
tute such provocation. State v. Kelleher, 100
S. W. 470, 475, 201 Mo. 614 (quoting and
adopting definition in State v. McKenzie, 76
S. W. 1019, 177 Mo. 712). Where deceased
pursued and attacked accused, who had fled
after striking deceased with a stone, accus-
ed's act in killing deceased who had assault-
ed him and struck him was manslangrhter in
the fourth degree, the assault and battery
being sufl9cient provocation to reduce the
homicide to that offense. State v. Wilson,
147 S. W. 08, 104, 242 Mo. 481.
Gen. St 1901, § 2011 (Crimes Act, | 16),
defines "manslaughter in the fourth degree'*
as the involuntary killing of another in the
heat of passion, by means neither cruel nor
unusual. State v. Knoll, 83 Pac 622, 623, 72
Kan. 237; Same v. Moore, 100 Pac 629, 630,
79 Kan. 688.
"Manslaughter in the fourth degree" is
the involuntary killing of another in the heat
of passion, or any homicide which would be
manslaughter at common law, and which is
not excusable nor Justifiable, or is not de-
clared to be manslaughter in some other de-
gree. State V. Goldsby, 114 S. W. 500, 5a3,
215 Mo. 48 (citing 2 Bishop's OriuL Law [6th
Ed.] § 695).
An instruction that: "If the defendant
shot and killed deceased while in the heat
of passion aroused by the striking of him
with a stick produced in evidence, and with-
out malice or premeditation, • ♦ • and
not in necessary selMefenae, then he is guil-
ty of 'manslaughter In the fourth degree'
• • • "—was faulty in that it did not re-
quire the Jury to find that defendant inten-
tionally shot and killed deceased. State v.
Elsey, 100 S. W. 11, 14, 201 Mo. 561.
A killing resulting from an intentional
shot, though Tvithout design to effect death,
is not Involuntary, within Rev. St 1898, H
4362, declaring that involuntary killing in the
heat of passion, etc, shall be deemed "man-
slaughter in the fourth degree." Johnson v.
State, 108 N. W. 55, 58, 69, 129 Wis. 146» 6
L. R. A. (N. S.) 809, 9 Ann. Cas. 923.
Where accused shot his wife with a pis-
tol in an alleged Insane frenzy, resulilng from
her alleged nodsconduct, the case did not pre-
sent a killing within St 1898, | 4368, declar-
ing that every other killing of a human being
by the act, procurement, or culpable negli-
gence of another, where sudi killing is not
justifiable or excusable, or is not declared to
be murder or manslaughter In some other
degree, shall be deemed manslaughter in the
fourth degree. Duthey v. State, 111 N. W.
222, 224, 131 Wis. 178| 10 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1032.
MANUAL DELIVERY
"Dominion,* as applied to a conveyance,
means "to pass the instrument of wiitiDg
from one man to another, as symbolic of hia
transferring the land to the person to whom
it is delivered. Now the delivery must be
made. It must be had. If a man draws a
deed, and intends to deliver It, but never
does, it is never a deed, because it is not con-
summated by delivery, and that delivery must
be an actual delivery; that is, the maker of
the deed must intend to pass it over to the
grantee, the person to whom it is made His
dominion and right to the control over the
property as set out in the deed passes with
the delivery. Sometimes it is called 'manu-
al delivery,' handing it over to him." Lan-
caster V. Lee, 51 S. B. 139, 141, 71 S. C. 2S0.
MANUAL GIFT
A "manual gift," which Is defined by
the Louisiana Code as the giving of corporeal,
movable effects accompanied by real delivery,
may be free, onerous, or remunerative, and,
when the donor makes such a gift omniom
bonorum on condition that the donation shall
maintain him for the rest of his life, it will
be dealt with as an onerous donation and not
as a commutative contract Ackerman y.
Lamer, 40 South. 581, 587, 116 La. lOL
MANUAL UBOR
Hie term "manual labor,'* in Its ordi-
nary and usual meaning and acceptation,
means labor performed by and with the hands
or hand, and it implies the ability for sudi
sustained exerdse and use of the hands or
hand at a labor as will enable a person there-
by to earn or assist in earning a livelihood;
Being able to temporarily use the hands or
hand at and in some kind of labor, but witb-
out ability to sustain such ordinary exerdae
and use of the hands at son^e useful labor
whereby money may be earned to substan-
tially assist in earning a livelihood at some
kind of manual labor, does not constitntd
abiUty to perform manual labor. Grand
Lodge Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen t.
Orrell, 09 N. B. 68, 69, 206 la 208.
When a person is employed to work wltii
his h^nds, as well as to exercise superintend-
ence, the line must be drawn somewhere be-
tween what are acts of superintendence and
what acts of "manual labor," or all that he
does must be regarded as superintendence or
as manual labor, which manifestly would be
unjust Though the principal duty of an
employ^ at a stone quarry was that of supe^
intendenoe, his putting a can of powder on
the edge of the pit, whence it was acddenl-
ally kaocked into the idt* causing an explo*
sion, is not an act of superintendence, so ai
to render thd maatar liable for injury to a
workman from the explosion. Riou v. Rock<
port Qranit« Co., 50 N. £. 525, 171 Mass.
KAKUAIi LABOH
279
KAKUFAOTUBX
162 (ddng McCanley ▼. Norcioss, dO K B.
464, 155 Mass. 684; Gashman v. Chase, 81
N. B. 4, 156 Mass. 342; O'Brien v. Rldeont,
36 N. B. 792, 161 Mass. 170; Dowd t. Bo8t<Hi
ft A B. Co., 38 N. B. 440, 162 Mass. 185;
CNeU y. O'Leaiy, 41 N. B. 662, 164 Mass. 387).
The owner of horses, who hires them to a
contractor, the latter nsing the horses in
aid of hauling and banking logs, and the
owner performing no "manual labor or other
services^ In connection with the logs, is not
entitled to a lien on such logs, under Bev.
Laws 1905, | 3524. McKinnon y. Bed Biver
Lumber Co., 188 N. W. 781, 782, 119 Minn.
479, 42 L. B. A. (N. S.) 872.
Any prooeas by which cmde oi»iiim Is
converted into a product fit for smoking oonsti-
totes a ''manufiicture" of smoking opium witli-
in the meaning of the Internal Reyenoe Act
Oct 1, 1880, c. 1244, U 36-iO, which ln«K)se
a tax upon all opium manufiictuied for smok-
ing purposes in the United States, and pre-
scribe regulations for such manufacture to be
observed under penalty of criminal prosecu-
tion. Marks y. United States, 196 Fed. 476^
478, 116 a a A. 250.
MANUAL TRAINING SCHOOL
See Maintenance of Manual Training
School.
MANUFACTORY
CaitiiiiC sad storlnsr lea
A for^gn corporation carried on a retail
ioe business in a town where it had Its office
and transacted all its business. It sold only
such ice as It cut and stored. It owned seyer-
al ice houses on the shores of a pond in an-
other town, where it had a steam engine used
for cutting and storing Ice there. It trans-
acted no business in the latter town, except
what was essential for the cutting and storing
of ice and the deliyeiy under orders from its
office. Held, that the corporation did not
"hire or occupy a manufactory, store, or
shop" in the latter town, within Rey. Laws
1902, c 12, I 23, cL 1, proyldlng for the taxa-
tion of personal property in the municipality
in which the owner hires or occupies manu-
factories^ etc.; but ttie steam engine, boiler,
and ice stored in the latter town were taxa-
ble under St 1908, p. 448, c. 437, | 71, pro-
Tldhig that eyery foreign corporation shall be
snbject to taxation on its machinery and mer-
chandise by the municipality in which such
property is situated. HlUiard y. Fells Ice
Co., 86 N. £. 773, 774, 200 Mass. 331.
Bteaaa aad sas plants
Under Bums' Ann. St 1901, | 7255 (Acts
lSd9, p. 569, c. 255), proyldlng that contrac-
tors, etc, and all persons performing labor,
etc, for the erection, altering, repairing, etc.,
any house, mill, manufactory, etc., may haye
a lien on .the house, mill, manufactory, etc.,
a bnilding equipped with machinery for the
generation of steam to be distributed under
a municipal franchise through pipes laid in
the streets, and supplied for heating purpos-
es, is a ''manufactory.'* A gas company Is
also a mannfiictory within such act Wells
y. Christian, 76 N. B. 518, 519, 165 Ind. 662
(citing Bates Mach. (3o. y. Trenton & N. B.
B. Co., 58 Ati. 935, 70 N. J. Law, 684, 103
Am. St. Bep. 811; Burke y. Mead, 64 N. B.
880, 169 Ind. 252, 260; Commonwealth y.
liOweU Gas Light 0>., 12 Allen [94 Mass.] 75).
MANUFACTURE
See Building for Trade or Manufacture;
Place of Manufacture.
Any trade mannfticture or btislness, see
• Any.
As to specUlc industries wlilch are eft-
gaged In manufacture, see Subtitie
ManafSctorer.
Gontxact of sale or manufftctore, see
Contract of Sale.
Manufacture or otherwise, see Otherwise.
What constitutes manafactared articles,
see ManufMtnres and Manufactured
Articles.
The word **manufacture" is not a tech-
nical word, but has a common, ordinary
meaning. Sharpe y. Hasey, 114 N. W. 1118,
1119, 134 Wis. 618.
To manufacture is to modify or to change
natural substances, so that they become ar-
ticles of yalue or use. Baltimore k O. S. W.
B. Co. y. Cavanaugh, 71 N. E. 239, 241, 35
Ind. App. 32.
The process of manufacture is supposed
to produce some new article by the applica-
tion of skill and labor to the raw material.
The broad Interpretation which the courts
haye always giyen the word "manufacture"
must include the construction of buildings
and bridges. In re Niagara Ck)ntracting Co,^
127 Fed. 782, 783.
The Century Dictionary defines ''manufac-
ture" as the production of articles for use
from raw or unprepared materials by giying
these materials new forms, qualities, proper-
ties, or combinations, whether by manual
labor or machinery. State y. G. H. Tichenor
Antiseptic Co., 43 South. 277, 278, 118 La.
685.
Rolllnc elgarettes
The word "manufacture," as used in the
anti-cigarette law, is used in the sense of
'to engage in and carry on the business of
manufacturing." It is the manufacturiog
for traffic that is prohibited. Hie act of
"rolling cigarettes" from one's own materials
and for one's own use is so connected with
the use as to be a part of such use^ and this
it was not intended to prohibit Dempsey
y. Stout, 107 N. W. 235, 76 Neb. 162.
Bslins eotion
The word "manufacture," as defined in
Worcester's Dictionary, is a process of uiak*
UA^fnOFACTUBS
KANUFACTURSB
log anjrthing by art or reducing materlaJB
Into a form fit for use, by hand or by ma*
cfalnery, and in tbe Standard Dictionary la
"the making of wares or other products by
hand or by machinery or by other agencies."
Under these definitions, a cotton press, the
effect of the operation of which is only to
compress, rebind, re^sover original bales of
cotton so as to diange the form, size, and
condition of the bales to make them more
convenient for transportation, is not con-
sidered a "manofactare." City of Memphis
v. St Louis, & S. F. E. Oo., 183 Fed. 629,
638, 106 O. a A. 76.
Liqiiov
The word /'mannfactnre" as nsed in act
March 2, 1009 (26 St at Large, p. 60) § 1,
prohibiting the manufacture of liquor, means
the process of making by art, or reducing
materials into form fit for use, by hand or
machinery. State ▼. Bavan* 74 & £. 600,
601, 91 S. a 266.
MAVUFAOTUBiai
See Sole Manufacturer.
A "manufacturer^ is one engaged in
making materials, raw or party finished, in-
to wares suitable for use. Chattanooga Plow
00. V. Hays, 140 «. W. 1068, 1069, 126 Tenn.
148 (citing And. Law Diet; Webst Diet).
A corporation which makes something
for profit is a "manufacturer" of that some-
thing within the meaning of Bankr. Act July
1, 1898, c. 641, § 4b, and it makes no differ-
ence whether the thing so made or manufac-
tured is affixed to the realty or a part of the
realty or is a mere chatteL In re Church
Ck>nst Co., 167 Fed. 296.
Code 1887, | 2486, provides that "all per-
sons furnishing supplies to a mining or man-
ufacturing company, necessary to the opera-
tion of the same, shall have a prior lien,"
etc. A corporation was empowered by its
charter to acquire and operate "the works,
property, franchise, stock and bonds, rights,
privileges, and immunities of any individual-
firm, or corporation, operating or owning
a machine shop, dock, or shipyard, or manu-
fficturing railroad or marine equiiMnoit, or
machinery of any description." The corpora-
tion owned a large plant composed of vari-
ous departments and shops, in which many
kinds of machinery were used. The plant
consisted of a machine shop, in which ma-
chinery and tools of different sorts were
made and fitted for use; a punch shop, in
which plates were sheared and punched for
riveting; a pattern shop, in which all sorts
of patterns were made from wood ; a black-
smith shop, containing large steam ham-
mers, and also a number of smiths' forges,
for the forging of billets and the perform-
ance of all sorts of smith work; a furnace
shop, for the bending and shaping of frames
and plates; a carpenter shop, in whidi many
kinds of woodwork was done ; a Joiner shop^
equipped with special machineiy, in wbidi
furniture was mannfactared and the finer
woodwork done; a paint shop, in which
paints were mixed; a copper shop^ in which
sheet copper was manufactured into pipe,
steam connections, ventilators, brass and
copper castings, and other forms, and where
galvanizing was done; a boiler shop, for the
manufacture of boilers; a foundry, in which
iron and brass castings were made out of
raw materials. Large quantities of raw ma-
terials of all sorts were purchased by the
company and converted into finished prod-
ucts. The company manufactured ships of
all sorts and sizes and all necessary fittings
and furniture therefor, and it also did a con-
siderable amount of original and repair work
for other manufacturing oonoems. The word
^•manufacture" is defined by Webster's Dic-
tionary: **Tb make [wares or other products]
by hand, by maehinery, or by other agency.
To work, as raw or partly wrought materials,
into suitable forms for use." By the Stand-
ard Dictionary: 'To make or fashion by
woricing on or combining material. To form
or produce by some industrial process; fash-
ion by hand or machinery, especially when
done in considerable quantities and r^ular
business. To work or fashion by labor into
useful or desirable forms." And the Century
Dictionary: "To make or fabricate anything
for use, especially in considerable quantities
or numbers, or by the aid of many hands,
or by machinery; work materials into the
form of." Held, that the corporation was
engaged in the manufacturing business, with-
in the meaning of the statute. First Nat
Bank of Richmond v. Wm. B. Trigg Co., 56
S. E. 158, 161, 106 Va. 327, 7 L. B. A. (N. S.)
744.
The term "manufacturing," as used in
the bankruptcy act of 1898, authorising in-
voluntary bankruptcy against corporations
engaged in manufacturing, embraces only
such corporations as are engaged in manu-
facturing as a business and selling their
wares on the market, doing those things usu-
ally done by those who not only manufac-
ture their wares and goods, but place them
on the market for sale either by wholesale
or retalL Walker Boofing & Heating Oo. t.
MCerchant & Evans Go^ 173 Fed. 771, 773,
d7 a a A. 4d6.
Evidence held to show that a corporation
was principally engaged in manufacturing,
and hence was subject to adjudication as a
bankrupt In re Georgia Mfg. & Public Serr-
ice Ca, 166 Fed. 964, 968.
Under Bankr. Act July 1« 1898, c. 641,
providing that any corporation engaged prin-
cipally in ''manufacturing" or mercantile pur-
suits may be declared a bankrupt, a corpora-
tion organised for the purpose of manufactur-
ing paper from wood pulp, which had pur-
chased woodland and other pnqperty for tb«
commencement of its business, was subject to
bankruptcy proceedings, within the statute^
MAKUFACTUREB
881
MANX7VA0TUBBB
though it had never In fftct started its Vic-
tory; the intent being that *% corporation
pnnoing, through its formative stagea, a traai-
ness of the kind described by the sUtote
shonld be anbject to the operation of the
law.** In re White Mountain Paper Ck>^ 127
Fed. 180» 182.
The term '^engaged principally/' aa used
in Bankrupt Act, providing that any corpora-
tion engaged principally in ''mannfftctoring"
poisnita may be adjndged an involuntary
iNuiknipt, refers not to the objects of pnrsait
set oot In the charter bat to those tn which
the company was actually oigaged. In re O.
Moeneh & Sons Co., ISO Fed. 686, 086, 66 a
C. A. 37.
In the phrase "engaged in manufactur-
ing,** as used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1866, c.
541, S 4b, the word "engaged" means occu-
pied, employed, busy, and the word "manu-
fiicturing" means the making of an article,
either by hand or machinery, into a new form
capable of being used in ordinary life, or the
fashioning of raw materials into a change of
fonn for use; and a corporation which al-
though authorised to manufacture an article
of commerce^ has not the means for such
manufacture^ and has taken no step in the
process of manufacturing, is not engaged in
any proper sense in the manufacturing of
rach article, and is not subject to adjudica-
tion as an involuntary bankrupt under said
section. In re Toledo Portland Cement Co.,
186 Fed. 88, 86.
Dealers sad atereliABts distJagulshed
The term "manufacturer,** in its ordinary
acceptation, denotes one who, through bis
skill and labor, shapes or combines material
into a new product, the term, under various
statutes, such as tax laws, being named to
include others for the purpose of such laws,
and where a firm merely ordered from a for-
eign manufacturer a given quantity of waists
of a certain pattern, a sample of which had
been previously furnished them by the manu-
facturer, the firm was merely a dealer and
not a manufacturer. Remy, Schmidt & Pleiss-
ner v. Healy, 126 N. W. 202, 203, 161 Mich.
266, 29 L. B. A. (N. S.) 139, 21 Ann. Cas. 74.
A "manufacturer" is one engaged in mak-
hig materials, raw or partly finished, into
wares suitable for use. A ''merchant" is dis-
tinguished from a manufacturer, in that he
aells to earn a profit, and the manufacturer
•ells to take profit already earned. Chatta-
nooga Plow Co. T. Hays, 140 S. W. 1068, 1069^
125Tenn.l4&
The words 'Merchants" and "dealers,"
according to common understanding, mean
somethiug different from the word "manufac-
turers.** The former are generally employed
to designate persons engaged in the business
of buying and selling merchandise or other
personal property in the usual course of
trade; the latter to designate those engaged
hi the business of OMking or producing arti-
cles fbr use or sale. Union County I^at
Bank, Uberty, Ind., v. Ozan Lumber Co., 179
Fed. 710, 716, 103 C. a A 684.
«f MtSMS distiacvlshetf
Laws 1912, c 167, prohibiting any person,
firm, or corporation, engaged "in manufactur-
ing or rspalring," to work employes mere
than 10 hours per day, is sufllciently definite;
for '^manufacturing** is the system of indua-
try which produces manufactured articles,
and '^manufacture^ is the production of arti-
des for use from raw or prepared materials,
by giving them new forma, qualities, and
propttrtiea, or combinations, and "lepalzlng"
is the making or restoring of an article or
thing lo its completenesa State v. J. J.
Kewman Lumber Co. (Miss.) 69 South. 923,
926; 46 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 861.
An Information, diarging accused with
having in his possession nonalcoholic drinks
bearing the names of "manufacturers** other
than himself. Is Insufllcient under Laws 1911,
pp. 261, 262, ii 1« 4, nmking it unlawful for
any person to have nonalcoholic drinks bear-
ing, the name or brand of "manufacturers'*
other than himself; "manufactures** and
"manufacturers** not being idem sonans, but
separate and distinct terms with separate
and distinct meanings. State v. Murphy, 147
S. W. 620, 621, 164 Mo. App. 204.
AvtoatoMle repalvlau; eompaay
The conducting by a corporation of a
shop for the repairing of automobiles, which
repairing consisted chiefly in the adjusting of
parts purchased from other persons, was not
a manufacturing pursuit, within the meaning
of Bankr. Act 1898, c. 641, | 4b, which sub-
Jected the corporation to proceedings in bank-
ruptcy. Cate V. Connell, 173 Fed. 446. 447,
97 C. C. A. 647.
Bakevy eoaapaay
A corporation organised to make bakers'
goods and restaurant supplies, and sell same
at wholesale and retail, was organized for
"manufacturing and mercantile" purposes, aa
those terms are uaed in the revenue statute ;
and the act of the state board of equalisation
in assessing its capital stock and franchise in
excess of the valuation of its tangible prop-
erty, which had been assessed by the local
assessors, was unauthorized. H. H. Kohlsaat
A Ca V. O'Connell, 99 N. B. 689, 690, 266 IlL
271.
Brewlas eompaay
A brewing company, which has done
nothing except In preparation for its business
by constructing a brewing plant, taking out
a brewer's license, and hiring a hrewmaster,
although it has never made any beer nor
bought materials therefor, is a "corporation
engaged principally in manufkcturing,*' and
subject to proceedings in involuntary bank-
ruptcy. In re Bloomsborg Brewing Co., 172
Fed. 174, 17&
MAMXTBTACTUBBR
38a
)£AKUFApTyR£B
TliB words "manufacturer," "such manu-
faoturer," and "said niaiiufacturer," as used
in Acts 1908, p. 281, c. 189, § 16, providing
that a licensed manufacturer may sell the
products of his brewing at any place within
the state, except where such manufactory Is
situated in no-license territory, but such man-
ufacturer mny sett the product of his brewing
to be delivered to a common carrier to be
transferred to any place where the same may
be legally sold, and the said manufacturer
may sell the products of his brewing in quan-
tities not less than one gallon at the place of
manufacture, except in no-lioense territory,
mean any manufacturer, whether located In
license or no-license territory; the only dif-
ference between the two classes of manufac-
turers Intended by the statute being that
the manufacturer located in license territory
can sell and deliver not less than one gallon
at the place of manufacture, while the manu-
facturer located In no-license territory can
msike no sale and delivery at such place.
Bobert Portner Brewing CJo. v. Southern Ex-
press Co., 63 S. E. 6, 7, 109 Va. 22.
A corporation which has taken active
steps to engage in manufacturing, and in
pursuit of such business has Incurred debts
and committed acts of bankruptcy, is "en-
gaged In manufacturing," in the sense con-
templated by Bankruptcy Act A corporation
organized to build and equip a brewery and
to manufacture and sell beer was engaged
principally in manufacturing pursuits and
subject to adjudication as a bankrupt before
its plant had been completed or any machin-
ery purchased or Installed, and before any
beer had been made. Bollinger v. Cent Nat
Bank, 177 Fed. 609, 610, 101 CO. A. 235 (cit-
ing In re White Mountain Paper Co., 127 Fed.
180, affirmed in White Mountain Paper Co. v.
Morse, 127 Fed. 643, 62 O. C. A. 369, and In
re Bloomsburg Brewing Co., 172 Fed. 174X
Bulldlns amd oonstmetlon eovk-ptoiieu
The word "manufacture" is ordinarily
used to denote an article upon the material of
which labor has been expended to make the
finished product It is hard to conceive of
any human action more accurately corre-
sponding to tlils description or definition than
the building of a house ; and one of the defi-
nitions of "build," found in the Century Dic-
tionary, is to "form by uniting materials in-
to a regular structure." An allegation in a
petition in bankruptcy against a corporation
that it "is engaged in the business and was
incorporated for the purpose of building
houses," as against a demurrer, is sufficient
to bring the corporation within the scope of
the Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, S 4b, c. 541, as
one engaged in "manufacturing." In re Rut-
land Realty Co., 157 Fed. 296.
A corporation engaged in constructing
houses on its own land was not subject to ad-
judication as a banJIcrupt under Bankr. Act
July % 1898, c 541, § 4b, as amended by Act
Feb. 6, 1903, authorizing an adjudication
against a corporation engaged principally In
"manufacturing," the term "manufacturing"
belAg used in its ordinary meaning, viz., the
making of articles of commerce ordinarily
the subje^ of bargain and sale, which does
not include building or construction. In re
Kingston Realty Co., 160 Fed. 445, 446, 87 a
C. A. 406.
A construction company engaged In con-
structing bridges, wharves, bulkheads, and
driving pltes for foundations for buildings,
etc., cannot be adjudged a|i involuntary bank-
rupt under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, f
4b, as a corporation engaged in "manufactur-
ing, trading, or mercantile pursuits." In re
MacNichol Const Co., 134 Fed. 979, 980.
A eorporation whose principal business is
making and constructing arches, walls, and
abutments, bridges, buildings, etc., out of con-
crete^ in carrying on wMch business it buys
and combines together raw materials, and
supplies the necessary labor, machinery, and
appliances, is a "corporation engaged princi-
pally in manufacturing," within the meaning
of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c 541, § 4b, 30
Stat 547, as amended by Act Feb.. 5, 1903, c
487, § 3, 32 Stat 797, defining the persons or
corporations which may be adjudged involun-
tary bankrupts, although such company
makes its product, and gives it form and
shape, at the place where it is to remain.
Friday v. Hall & Kaul Co., 30 Sup. Ct 261,
^16 tr. S. 449, 54 L. Ed. 562, 26 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 476.
The word "manufacturing" is a generic
term of broad significance, used to include
many species of corporations, and, as used in
section 4b of the Bankruptcy Law (Act July
1, 1898, c. 541, 80 Stat 547, as amended by
Act Feb. 5, 1903, c- 487, § 8, 82 Stat 798), hi-
cludes many species of corporations, and its
comprehensive meaning ought not to be whit-
tled away by fine distinctions. Derivatively
meaning making with the hand, its ordinary
significance is producing a new article of use
or ornament by the application of skill and
labor to the raw materials of which it is com-
posed. Pin makers, pen makers, shoe makers,
furniture makers, steel makers, boot makers,
rail makers, engine makers, and cement mak-
ers are undoubtedly engaged in manufkLctnr
Ing, so also is a corporation which is princi-
pally engaged in building concrete arches
and bridges, and dressing stone is a "mana-
facturing corporation," and may be adjudged
a bankrupt under section 4b of the Bankrupt-
cy Law. In re First Nat. Bank, 152 Fed. 64,
67, 81 C. a A. 260, 11 Ann. Cas. 355 (citing
Columbia Iron Works v. National Lead Co^
127 Fed. 99, 102. 62 C. C« A. 99, 102, 64 L
R. A. 645 ; In re Niagara Contracting Co., 127
Fed. 782; In re Marine Const & Dry Dock
Co., 130 Fed. 446, 64 C. C. A. 648; In re
Matthews Consol. Slate Co., 144 Fed. 737,
738, 75 C. C. A. 603; In re Quincy Granite
Quarries Oo^ 147 Fed. 27^ ; In jre H. B. Leighr
kANUFACTUREB
MANUFAOTURBR
ton & Co^ 147 Fed. 311, 81S; In TO Troy
Steam Laandertiig Co., 182 Fed. 208 ; White
Moantaln Paper Oo. v. Morse & Co., 127 Fed.
M3, 644, 02 O. G. A. 869, 870).
A construction company, whose boBlneflS
U the building by contract of piers and abut-
ments for railroad bridges, made Qt con-
crete, wtai(di is mixed on the ground aa the
w(vk progresses^ with the necessary inciden-
tal work, is not a ''corporation engaged prin-
cipally in manufacturing," within the mean-
ing of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, | 4b^
and is not subject to proceedings in involun-
tary bankruptcy. In re T. SL Hill Co., 148
Fed. 832, 834, 78 G. G. A. 522 (citing Golnmbla
Iron Works y. National Lead Go., fi2 G. 0. A.
99, 127 Fed. 99, 102, 64 L. R. A. 645).
The word "numufacture*' means "to make
wares or other products by hand, by ma-
diinery, or by other agency, as to manufac-
ture doth, nails, glass, etc. ; to work, as raw
or partly wrought materials into suitable
forms for use, as to manufacture wool, cot-
ton, silk, or iron." A corporation engaged In
the business of building bridges, wharves,
bulkheads, and driving pilee, under contract,
which has no plant where it manufactures
bridges for the noarket, but does all of its
work on the ground after contracting there-
for, is not engaged in manufacturing, within
the meaning of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, a 641,
f 4b, 30 Stat 547, and is not subject to be
adjudged an involuntary bankrupt thereun-
der. BuU Y. G. F. MacNichol Gonst Go., 140
Fed. 840, 841, 72 G. G. A. 252 (quoting and
adopting the definition in Webst Int Diet).
A corporation whose business as actually
conducted consists of installing heat and
power plants, constructing conduits, water-
works, and sewers, buying, selling, and erect-
ing steam engines, and occasionally making
reports with reference to the proposed con-
struction of electric light and power plants
ia engaged principally in "manufacturing,
trading, or mercantile pursuits," within
Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, S 4b, as
amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 3, and
may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt
I'nited Surety Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Go., 179 Fed.
55, 57, 102 G. G. A. 623.
Making a paving compound is the pro*
Auction of a new and distinct substance^
which constitutes ''manufacturing," within
tbe meaning of Xaws 1896, p. 857, c 908, |
183, as anoended by Iaws 1897, p. 817, & 785,
exempting from the franchise tax manufac^
taring corporations to the extent of tbe capi-
tal actually employed in this state in mann*
facturing; but the preparation of a street
^or the laying of the pavement and placing
the pavement thereon, is not "manufactur-
es/* within the meaning of such section.
People ex rel. Fruin-Bambridt Par. Oo. ▼.
Kiilght, 90 N. Y. Bupp. 587, 638, 0» App. DiT.
^ (quoting and adopting People ex rel. Bast"
em Bermudez Asphalt Paving Oo. v. Morgan,
70 N. T. 8upp. 516, 61 App. Btv. 873; People
ex r^ Syracuse Imp. Go. y. Morgan, 69 N*
Y. Supp. 268, 59 App. Div. 802).
A paving and construction company in-
corporated to do a manufacturing business
and primarily engaged in making cement and
asphalt floors, pavements, roadways and
structural concrete, is engaged in a "manu-
facturing" business witmn Act June 8, 1893,
exempting from the capital stock tax the cap-
ital stock of a manufacturing corporation.
Gommonwealth v. Filbert Paving & Gonstruc-
tion Go., 78 AtL 104, 105, 229 Pa. 231.
A corporation engaged in constructing
bnildlngs and bridges by contract, furnish-
ing the labor wlille others furnish the mate-
rials, is a manufacturing corporation, and
subject to be adjudged an involuntary bank-
rupt under Bankruptcy Act In re Niagara
Gontractlng Go., 127 Fed. 782, 788.
Canning eompany
One putting up apples in cans for sale Is
a "manufacturer,'* within the rule that where
goods are sold by sample, and the seller is
also the manufacturer, there is an Implied
warranty on his part that they are free from
any latent defects that could not be discover-
ed from examination. Nlxa Gannlng Go. v.
Lehmann-Higglnson Grocer Co., 79 Pac 141,
142, 70 Kan. 664, 70 L. B. A. 653.
Cliemieal eompany
"A 'manufacturer* • • • la one who
gives new shapes, new qualities, new com-
binations, to matter which lias already gone
through some artificial process." ^'Nearly
all artificial products of human industry,
nearly all such materials as have acquired
changed conditions or new and spedflc com-
binations, whether frood the direct action of
the human hand, from chemical processes
derived and directed by human skill, or by
the employment of machinery, • • • are
now commonly designated as 'manufactur-
ed.' •* The Gentury Dictionary defines "man-
ufacture" as "the production of articles for
use from raw or unprepared materials, by
giving these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations, whether by man-
ual labor or machinery." Under these defini-
tions one who, by extracting the medicinal
properties from various drugs and making
a chemical combination in which the ingre-
dients lose their identity, creates a distinct
product, which for years is offered to, and ac-
cepted by, the public for distinct uses, may
be regarded as a "manufacturer." State v.
G. H. Tlchenor Antiseptic Co.^ 43 South'. 277,
278, 118 La. 685 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in city of New Orleans v. T^ Blanc, 34
La. Ann. 596; Gity of New Orleans v. Ernst,
35 La. Ann. 746; quoting Carlin v. (Vestern
Assur. Go. of Toronto, 57 Md. 526, 40 Am.
Rep. 440).
A corporation organised to ''plant, har-
vest, storey purchase, manufactare, market,
MAKUFACTUKER
284
MANUFAOTUBBB
sell, and deal In ehlcory" is a "mannfactnrlng
corporation.*' Bolton y. Nebraska Chicory
Co., 96 N. W. 148, 09 Neb. 681.
Oold atoms* eoatpMty
A corporation was chartered 'Yor the
purpose of conducting the business of a cold
storage warehouse, • • « furnishing cold
storage for meats, produce, fruits, and other
perishable merchandise." The business actu-
ally done by it was tiie conducting of a cold
storage warehouse in which produce, etc.,
was preserved for others for hire, by means
of brine circulated through pipes ; and it also
operated a pipe line running through the
street and connected with storage rooms of
others, whidi it refrigerated by means of the
brine pumped through the pipes and circu-
lated in such rooms, returning to the tank In
its own plant For this service it charged in
proportion to the sise of the rooms cooled,
and it constituted the larger part of its busi-
ness. The brine was made in its plant by
mixing calcium chloride in water at a certain
temperature to a certain consistency. The
calcium chloride was a manufactured product
sold in the market, which it purchased in
cases, and the brine was made by ordinary
workmen under direction of a superintendent
Held, that such corporation was not "engag-
ed principally in manufticturlng, trading, or
mercantile pursuits," within the meaning of
Bankruptcy Act, and was not subject to be
adjudged an involuntary bankrupt In re
PhUadelphia Freezing Co., 174 Fed. 702, 703.
Coalyard
A coalyard, wherein coal mined by its
owner is cleaned, assorted, and stored and
from which it is sold, is a ''mercantile insti-
tution or establishment," within Child Labor
Act (Hurd*s Bev. 8t 1911, c. 48), prohibiting
the employment of a child under the age of
14 years in any mercantile institution or es-
tablishment and is also a manufacturing es-
tablishment factory, or workshop, since that
phrase as used in the statute has the mean-
ing given to it by the Child Labor Act of
June 9, 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 90), defining the
words "manufacturing establishment factory,
or workshop" to mean any place where goods
or products are manufactured or repaired,
dyed, cleaned or sorted, stored or packed for
sale. Purtell v. Philadelphia & B. Coal &
Iron Co., 99 N. B. 899, 902, 256 HI. 110, 43
L. B. A. (N. S.) 193, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 835.
Oreosotinc ooatpany
The process of creosoting railroad ties,
which is done by pressing tar and other sub-
stances, whidi are formed into a concoction,
two or three inches into such ties for the pur-
pose of preservation, does not constitute a
"manufacturing" of articles of wood, hut is
a mere process for the preservation of ar*
tides of wood already mannftictured. Shreve-
port Creosoting Co. v. City of Shrevepart 44
South. 325, 327, 119 La. 687.
^An electric light plant is a 'mannfactQ^
ing establishment' " Lucas v. Ashland light,
MiU & Power Co., 138 N. W. 761, 763, 02 Neb.
650 (Qvotlng Lambom ▼. Bell, 82 Pac 989, 18
Colo. 346, 20 L. B. A 241).
One engaged in generating electricity for
distribution and sale is oigaged in '^manuf ac-
tnrlng," within Const | 170, and Ky. 8t f
2980a, authorixlng municipalities to exempt
manufacturing establishments from taxation.
KentudEy Blectric Co. v. Buechel, 143 S. W.
58, 59, 146 Ky. 660, 88 U R. A. (N. a) 907,
Ann. Gas. 1913C, 714.
A corporation engaged in generating
electricity, transmitting it and selling power
or light to consumers, is neither a "manu£ft^
turing" nor a "mercantile" corporation with-
in the meaning of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898,
c 541, I 4b, 30 SUt 647, as amended by Act
Feb. 5, 1903, c. 467, § 8, 82 Stat 797, and f»
not subject to adjudication as an involuntary
bankrupt A gas and electric company, o^
ganized under the transportation laws <rf
New Tork, having a franchise to maintain
pipes and wires ill the streets of a village and
a contract for lighting its streets, wfaidi
manufactures gas and purchases or generates
electricity, both of which it transports or
transmits and sells to its customers, its elec-
trical business exceeding its gas business in
volume and revenue, is not "engaged princi-
pally in manufacturing, etc., pursuits," witli-
in the meaning of Bankruptcy Act In le
Hudson Biver Blectric Power Co., 173 Fed.
934,940.
EngraTsr
In its business of engraving bank bills
the government is a manufacturer and en-
titled to no more consideration than any
other engraver and printer; but is entitled
to no less. Harley v. United States* 39 Ct
0.106,114.
F«rtilisev eompaay
"The word 'manufacturer* has been de-
fined substantially as the operation of making
or producing an article for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving these materials
new form, qualities, properties, or combina-
tions." The capital and other property em-
ployed in the manufacture of fertilizers and
chemicals are exempt from parodiial and
munidpal taxation under the Louisiana Con-
stitution, whether at the establishment of tba
company or at its domicile. Planters' T&>
tilizer & Chemical Co. v. Board of Assessors
for Parish of Ozleans, 40 SoutA. 1088, 116 La.
687.
TiMh eoatpaay
A corporation organised tor carrying on
the business of catching and preserving by
salt and marketing salt water fish, and which
owns and operates a plant for the preparing,
preserving, and paddng <tf such fish, is
'•principally engaged in manufactaring,"
MANUFAOrnilBB
286
MAJbiUFAOXlTBJBlE
within tbe mamhig of Bankr. Act July 1,
1896, § 4b, c. 641, and Is subject to adlndica-
tion as an Involuntary bankrupt In re Alas-
ka-American Fish Co., 102 Fed. 498.
Qmm ea«p««y
A "gas company" is a '^anufftctorlng
corporation'' within the letter as well as the
spirit of Bums' Ann. St 1901, | 7255 (Acts
1899, p. 660, c. 266), proTiding that contrac-
tors, etc., and all persons performing labor,
etc., for the erection, altering, repairing, etc.,
any house, mill, nuurafactory, etc., may baTe
a Uen on tha house, mill, manufactory, ate.
Wells Y. GhiiBtian, 76 N. H 518, 519, 165 lad.
662 (citing Commonwealth t. Lowell Gas
Light Co., 12 Allen [94 Mass.] T9).
lee eempaalea
A corporation organised to buy, gather,
store, and preserve Ice^ to ship and vend the
same, and which carried on Its business by
renting small bodies of water from which It
cat the Ice which It stored, shipped* and sold,
only two or three times in a number of years
buying small quantities of ice when Its own
supply ran short, is not engaged principally
in "mannfiacturixig, trading, or commercial
pursuits,'' within the meaning of Bankr. Act
July 1, 1898, c. 641, | 4b, 80 Stat 647, and
Is not subject to involuntary proceedings in
bankruptcy. In re New York & New Jersey
Ice Lines, 147 Fed. 214, 215, 77 O. C. A. 440
(citing In re Woodslde Coal Co. [D. C] 106
Fed. 66; In re Keystone Coal Co., 109 Fed.
872; In re H. J. Qulmby Freight Co., 121
Fed. 141; First Nat Bank v. Wyoming Valley
loe Co., 186 Fed. 46Q.
ImumAtj OS
A corporation conducting a laundry, the
largest part of its business being the wash-
hig, starching and ironiog» and poHshing of
collars, cuffs, etc, for manufacturers before
they are put on the market, is engaged prln-
dpaUy in manufacturing, within tha mean-
ing of the national bankruptoy act, and is
•abject to proceedings in Involuntary bank-
ruptcy. In re Troy Steam Laundering Co.,
132 Fed. 266, 268.
IfUk deaUvs
The Pioneer Pasteurizing Company, au-
thorized by its articles of incorpomtlon to
engage In the business of buying, manufiic-
taring, and dealing in milk, cream, butter,
dieese, and other dairy i^oducts, and pas-
trarldng and treating said milk, and pack-
hig, storing, handling, and srillng said prod-
acts so pasteurized and treated, is not ex-
dasiv^ a manufacturing or mechanical cor-
poration, within Const art 10, | 88, and its
•toddioldtts are therefore liable for its debts.
Meen v. Pioneer Pastsurizing Co., 9T N. W.
UO, 141, 90 Iflnn. 601.
lOillas
The term "manufacturing^ is aynony*
■tons with "milling." Lucas v. Ashland
light. Hill. ^ Power Go., 138 N. W. 761, 763,
92 Neb. 660 (citing lambom v. Bell, 32 Paa
989, 18 Colo. 346, 20 L. R. A. 241).
MiMmrml water eoatpany
A corporation organized to *'manufac-
ture" and sell mineral and other waters, own-
ing a well firom which mineral water was
pumped, and machinery and appliances for
carrying on the business of bottling the water
and carbonating it so as to form ginger ale,
root beer, etc., was a "manufacturing cor-
poration," within a statute providing that the
directors of a manufacturing corporation
shall have no power to incumber the plant or
madiinery until authorised by a majority of
the stockholders. Carlsbad Water Co. v.
New, 81 Pac. 34, 35, 38 Colo. 889 (dting defini-
tion in Oarlln v. Western Assur. Co. of
Toronto, 67 Md. 615, 40 Am. Bep. 440;
Bchriefer v. Wood, 5 Blatchf. 215, Fed. Caa.
No. 12, 481; Lambom v. Bell, 32 Pac. 989,
18 Colo. 846» 20 L. B. A. 241).
OleomargaHne dealers
Oleomargarine Act 1886 (Act Aug. 2,
1886, c. 840, I 3, 24 Stat 209, as amended by
Act May 9, 1902, | 2, 32 Stat 194) defines a
manufacturer of oleomargarine as any person
wbo sells, vends, or furnishes oleomargarine
for use or consumption by others who shall
add to or mix any artificial coloration so as
to make it resemble butter. Held, that the
actual selling, vending, or furnishing of ole-
omargarine for use and consumption by
others is not one of the necessary components
of a manufacturer as contemplated by such
act, so as to reguire proof of actual selling,
vending, or furnishing of some of the product
to constitute the elCeosa; the term **Bianu-
facturer" as so used brtng oonstmed to mean
one engaged in the business of selling, vend-
ing, or fumiaiilng oleomargarine for consump-
tion of others. Yennont v. United States, 174
Fed. 792, 794, 98 a a A. 600.
Oleomargarine Act Aug. 2, 1886, c. 840,
I 17, providing that any person engaged in
carrying on the business of manufacturing
oleomargarine, who defrauds, or attempts to
defraud, the United States of the tax on oleo-
margarine produced by him, etc., shall be
fined and imprisoned, was applicable to one
who did not manufacture white oleomarga-
rine and therefore was not a manufacturer
within the definition contained in the original
act, but who mixed white oleomargarine with
artificial coloration so as to make it look like
butter and thereby became a "manufacturer**
within the definition as extended by Act
Cong. May 9, 1902, c 784. May v. United
States, 199 Fed. 42, 44, 117 a C A. 420.
Vftper eompaiiy
A corporation organized for the purpose
of manufacturing and dealing In paper and
pulp, which had bought laass tracts of tim-
bfr land and expended some 9500,000 in the
erection and equipment of buildings for pa-
per and.pulp mills, and which had hired cut
MANUFACTUKiai
286
MANDFAOTURBR
several tl^ousand cords of wood in lengths
suitable for tiie usie in the mannfactnre of
paper, was "engaged in manufacturing"
within Bankruptcy Act, and subject to pro-
ceedings in involuntary bankruptcy, though
it had never operated its mills nor completed
the manufacture of either paper or pulp,
where it had engaged in no other business.
White Mountain Paper Ck). v. Morse & Co.,
127 Fed. 643, 644.
Printing and publishing iHimpany
Within a law imposing a franchise or
license tax upon certain corporations and ex-
empting manufacturing companies, a com-
pany organized to carry on the business of
printing and publishing a daily newspaper
and general jobbing, printing, and publishing,
whose capital is wholly employed in publish-
ing a newspaper for circulation, is not a
'*manuflacturing company"; but a company
organized to conduct the business of book
and Job printing, engraving, electrotyping,
and lithographing, whose capital is invested
in the prosecution of that business, and
which manufactures on orders only, is a
"manufacturing company." State v. State
Board of Assessors, 47 N. J. Law, 87, 42, 54
Am. Rep. 114 (citing and adopting Nassau
Gaslight Co. V. City of Brooklyn, 89 N. T.
409; Dudley v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co.,
100 Mass. 183 ; Byers v. Franklin Coal Co. of
Lykens County, 106 Mass. 131 ; In re Chand-
ler, 1 Lowell, 478, 6 Fed. Cas. 443 ; In re Ken-
yon & Fenton, 6 N. B. R. 238, 80 Fed. Cas.
90; In re Capitol Pub. 'Co., 18 Nat. Bank.
Reg. 319 ; Seeley v. Gwillim, 40 Conn. 106).
Befrigeratur ooaipAny
Where a Massachusetts coi^poration was
organized to deal in and manufacture re-
frigerators, reftigerator cars, and accessories,
appliances, etc., but, at the time an involun-
tary bankruptcy petition was filed against It,
it had never manufactured anything, or be-
gun business, beyond authorizing its directors
to make an endeavor to get contracts, it was
not subject to adjudication as a corporation
"engaged principally in manufacturing,"
within Bankruptcy Act, prior to its amend-
ment by Act Cong. June 25, 1910, c 412, 36
Stat 838. In re CooUdge Refrigerator & Car
Co., 190 Fed. 908, 909.
Itostaiirant eonpany
A corporation engaged in operating a res-
taurant is not subject to adjudication as a
bankrupt, under Bankr. Act July 1,.1898, c.
941, 30 Stat. 544, authorizing an adjudication
against any corporation engaged principally
in "manufacturing"; a cook not being regard-
ed as a manufacturer within the meaning of
the term as so used. In re Wentworth Lunch
Co., 159 Fed. 413, 414, 86 C 0. A. 893.
Shingle
Under Sand. & H. Dig. | 6444, relating to
taxation, ahd providing: "Every pers<Mi who
shall purchase, receive or hold personal pr^>-
erty of any descriptioki for the purpose of
adding to the value thereof by process of
manufacturing or by combination of dif-
ferent materials, with a view of making a
gain or profit by so doing, shall be hald to be
a 'manufi^cturer,' " etc. — a company engaged
in making shingles is a "manufacturer.*' Ar-
kansas Cypress Shingle Co. v. Lpnoke Coun-
ty, 84 S. W. 1029, 1030, 74 Ark. 2&
Bliip oonstmotion oonpany
A corporation chartered to construct and
repair vessels, carry on a general shipbulld*
ing and ship repairing business, construct
and operate a marine dry dock, etc.^ and
whose mala business consisted in the building
of large steel vessels and in repairing others,
is a corporation engaged principally in man-
ufacturing and mercantile pursuits, within
Bankrui^tcy Act, providing that such a cor-
poration may be adjudged an involuntary
bankrupt Columbia Iron Works v. National
Lead Co., 127 Fed. 99, 102, 62 0. C. A. 99,
64 L. B. A. 645.
A corporation incorporated to do a gen-
eral manufacturing business, and to manu*
f&cture, construct, repair, and equip, and
buy and sell ships and vessels of all Jdnds^
and parts and furniture therefor, and which
since its organization has carried on the busi-
ness of constructing completed boats, and
parts and furniture for vessel^, such as boil-
ers, masts, tanks, desks* tal^lee^ etc., for. the
most part made from raw material in. its
own shops, Is enga|[Qd piineipally in mano-
i^cturing pursuits wi^in Bankruptcy tAct^
and subject to proceedings in involuntary
bankruptcy. In re Marine Const & Dry
Dock Co., 180 Fed. 446, 447, 64 O. a A. 648.
As anboontittotsv
See Subcontractor.
mMatvioal cofBLprnmy
A corporation organized "^ lease, pro-
duce, and exploit plays and other theatrical
and dramatic productions, to produce and
sell theatrical costumes and properties,** and
which, up to the time a portion was filed
against it, had actually engaged only in pro-
ducing ajplay, is not one "engaged principally
in manufacturing, trading, * ^ . * or mer-»
cantil^ pursuits," \^ithln Bankr. Act Julj 1,
1898, c. 541, § 4b, and is not subject to bank-,
niptoy proceedings. In re J. J. R^slee
Amusegment Co., 171 Fed. 283.
Tool polishing oompany
A corporation engaged in "polishing*'
tools foY t))oee who Ji^ake th^ tools for use or
sale is as much engaged in manufacture tm
those who take the prior sjtoni ia Conning
and shaping the iron and wood into such
tools. The fact that this final touch is called
"polishing*' does not take it out of the realm
of "manufacturii^g.** In te Troy Steam
I^aundering^ Oo;, lSi2 Fed. 206, 268.
, j}fA^P^AGpVBfl;^
287 MANUFAOTJJI^^S-MANIJFACTUKED
Pipe^ and water maUm belosaglng to a
water company are. not taxable ag "macliln-
ery employed Jn manufactures," ifvlthin Bev,
Laws, c. 12, 1 23, providing for the taxation
of such machinery within the state, though
belonging to a foreign corporation. Coffin
V. Artesian Water Co., 79 N. E. 262, 263, 193
Mass. 274 (citing Dudley v. Jamaica Pond
Aqueduct Corp., 100 Mass. 183; Wellington
T. Inhabitants of Belmont, 41 N. W. 62, 164
Mass. 142).
MAHUFACTUBEfll mm. MAKtTTAOTUTLED
ABTIOXJESS
See Completed Manufacture^ Article;
Domestic Manufactures; Mining and
Manufactniing; Principally Bnga^ed.
Other ^articles distinguished, see Other.
Whenever labor la performed upon an
article which results in its assuming a new
form, possessing new qualities or new com-
binations, the process of "manufacturing"
has taken pl&ce, whether the thing produced
be a floftall article of conmierce or a struc^
tore, such as a house, road, or bridge. Do-
lese ft Shepard Go..r. O'.OonneU, 100 N. 10.
230, 236, 257 m. 43.
One definition: of f'manufactoze^' 1b to
make or fabricate, especially, in considerable
quantitie8» or by tho aid of many hands or
mfl<*htnery, .though the t>i^ima]7 meaning of
the word is something made by hand, as
distinguished from the natural growth ; and
a corporation organized to manufacture and
sell bakers' godds was orgftntsed for manu-
facturing purposes, within the tar law. H.
H. Kohlsaat & Co. ▼. O'Connell, 99 N. B.
689, 265 ni. 271.
A "manufacture** is "anything made
from raw Dpiaterials by the hand, by machin-
ery, or by art, as cloths, iron utensils, shoes,
machineiy, saddlery, etc. United States v.
F. W. Myers & Co., 139 Fed. 344, 348 (citing
Webst Diet; see, also, Worcest Diet;
Brandes, Enc. ; Tide Water Oil Co. ▼. United
States, 18 Sup. Ct. 837, 171 U. S. 210, 43 L.
IDd. 189; United States v. Schoverllng, 18
Sup. Ct 24, 146 U. S. 76, 36 I* BJd.
"Ordinarily, the fact that an article in
tbe process of manufacture takes a new
name is indicative of a distinct manufactui^'
• • • A new, manufacture is usually ao-
oompanied by a .change of name, but a
change of name does not. always indicate a
new manufacture. Where a manufactured
article, such as sawed lumber, Is usable for
a dozen different purposes, it does not ordi-
narily become a new manufacture until re-
duced to a condition where it is used for one
thing only.** United States v. Dudley, 19
Sup. Ct 801, 174 U. S. 672, 678, 48 L. Ed.
^129.
The term "manufactured articles" must
be understood In its popular sense, and does
not mean all articles produced from the raw
state by. manual skill or labor, but those ar-
ticles only which are made in what, in popu-
lar language, are called manufactories. To
call a farmer who cultivates his land and
reaps and markets his crops a manufacturer,
as he is in the scientific signification of the
term, would do violence to language in the
construction of a statute. A farm building
commonly called a tobacco shed, and u^ed
by a farmer to dry, cure, and fit for market
tobacco grown on the farm, is not a build-
ing for trade or manufacture, within St.
1898, § 1263, providing that no public high-
way shall be laid out through any building
other than a building used for the purpose
of trade or manufticture. fiharpe v. Hasey,
114 K. W. 1118, 1119, 184 Wis. 618.
"Nearly all artificial products of hu-
man industry, nearly aU such materials as
have acquired changed conditions or new
and specific combinations, ^whether from the
direct action of the human hand, from chem-
ical processes derived and directed by hu-
man skill, or by the employment of machln-
«ry,' ^ * ^ are now comiponly designated
as ^amifactured.' " The Century Diction-
ary defines "maaufbcture*' as "tiie produo
tion of artities for use from raw or unpre-
pared materials, by giving these materials
new forms, qualities, properties, or com-
binations, whether by manual labor or ma-
chinery." State V, G. H. Tlchenbr Antisep-
tic. Co., 43 South. 277, 278, 118 La. GS5 (quot-
ing from Carlin v. Western Assur. Co. of
Toronto, ^7 Md. 526, 4 Am. Rep. 440).
Held, that an article which has been
advanced through one or more processes into
a completed commercial article, known and
recognized in trade by a specific and dis-
tinctive name other than the name of the
material from which it is made, and is put
into a completed shape, designed and adapt-
ed for a particular use to which the material
in its original form is not adapted, is to be
deemed a manufacture, although its com-
ponent materials are unchanged. United
States y. George Meier & Co., 136 F. 764, 765,
69 C. a A. 421 (citing Erhardt T. Hahn, 55
Fed. 273, 6 a C. A. 99; Dejonge r. Magone,
16 Sup. Ct 119, 159 U. S. 662, 40 Ii. Ed. 260;
Qrempler r. United States, 107 Fed. 687, 46
CX CX A. 657; United States v. Blnney, 82
Fied. 992, 27 O. a A. 347; Boker v. United
States, 97 Fed. 206, 38 C. C. A. 114; United
States V. (Leonard, 108 Fed. 42, 47 C. C. A.
181; Marsohing t. United States, IIB Fed.
1006).
Small pieces of soapstone, cut in regular
sizes for gas tips and burners, have been
"manufactured," and are dutiable as un-
enumerated "manufactured" articles, under
Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 6. M.
Kirschberger & Co. v. United States, 166
Fed. 1012, 1013.
Where marble* waste^ a comparatively
valueless material, has been converted into
MANXn^AGTUBES-MAKUFACTDBED 288 MAKUFAOTURES-MAinTVAGTURED
a commodity of use and valae by a special
manafactaring process, whereby it bas ae-
quired a new name and a new use, it ceases
to be a crude mineral and becomes a "manu-
factured" one. United States v. Graser^
Rothe, 164 Fled. 205, 207.
Articles produced incidentally to the
manufacture of other articles, and which are
themselves ready to be used for various puiv
poses without further treatment, are under
the tariff laws subject to classification as
"manufactured,'* rather than as ''waste."
Shallus V. United States, 155 Fed. 213, 215.
Soluble grease, a preparation of tallow
used in the process of dyeing cotton cloth
for softening the fiibrlc after the applica-
tion of the dye, is not dutiable under Tariff
Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule A,
par. 32, 30 Stat 153, as an alizarin assist-
ant, but under section 6 <30 Stat. 205) as an
"unenumerated Manufactured article." Ab-
ram De Ronde & Co. y. United States, 140
Fed. 92, 93.
Orange flower water and rose water
are not dutiable as medidnal preparations,
under Tariff Act 1897, but as "unenum^ated
manufactured articles." * Buler y* United
States, 147 Fed. 765, 766.
Sweet crackers, known as wafers and
biscuits, in which the proportion of the
sweetened centers to the pastry envelopes
is large, but in which flour is used to a sub-
stantial extent, are not dutiable as ^con-
fectionery," under Tariff Act 1897, but are
dutiable as "unenumerated manufactured
articles." United States t. Thomas Meadows
A Co., 147 Fed. 757.
A liquid extract of the coffee bean held
not to be dutiable under Tariff Act July 24,
1897, c. 11. ( 1, Schedule G, par. 283, 30 Stat
172, relating to "articles used as coffee, or as
substitutes for coffee," but under section 6,
80 Stat 205, as an "unenumerated manufac-
tured article." B. C. Hazard & Co. v. United
States, 164 Fed. 907, 908.
Articles of hone stone, which are used
in polishing marble and lithographic stones,
and which are not shown to be known com-
mercially as "hones," are not ftee of duty as
"hones," under the Tariff Act, but are duti-
able as "unenumerated manufactured arti-
cles." R. J. Waddell & Ca v. United States,
135 Fed. 211, 213.
Persian berry extract, which Is used in
staining food products, and also as a dye*
stuff for coloring fabrics, is not dutiable un-
der Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c U, | 1,
Schedule A, par. 58, 30 Stat 154, as a color,
not belonging to the "paints, colors, pig-
ments," etc., therein enumerated, nor, by
similitude, under paragraph 20 or 22, 30
Stat 152, relating respectively to berries ad-
vanced in value and to extracts of barks,
etc., used for dyeing, but is dutiable as an
^'unenumerated manufactured article" under
section 6^ 80 Stat 206. United States v.
Berlin Aniline Wortn, 164 Fed. 025, 926.
The Japanese alchollc beverage known
as sak6 Is dutiable as an ^'unenumerated
manufactured article," under section 6, Tar-
iff Act July 24, 1897, c 11, 30 Stat 205.
United States v. Nishlmlya, 187 Fed. 396^
897, 69 G. O. A. 688.
Fruit in spirits, consisting of cherriei
in maraschino, is not dutiable as "fmlts pre-
served in sirup," but as "unenumerated man-
ufactured articles." Relss & Brady ▼. United
States, 186 Fed. 248^ 249.
As nAterlals
See Materials.
In patests
A house, or a room In a house. Is not t
"manufacture," within the meaning of Rev.
St § 4886, which authorizes the granting oT
patents for "any new and useful art, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of ma^
ter," and a particular form ofoonstructioD
of a room, or portion of a room, in a bouse, ii
not patentabla American Disappearing Bed
Go. ▼. Amaelsteen, 182 Fed. 824, 826, 106 a
G. A. 40.
A saroopbagns monument Is a '*mana-
f^ctnie" within the meaning of Rer. St f
4929, and a proper subject for a design patent
Grier v. Innee, 170 Fed. 824, 826, 95 a a A
508.
Of acate
Small pieces of agate, garnet, etc., ad-
vanced from their natural state by cuttinf
process, for the purpose of fitting them for
use as setting for Jewelry, and known com-
mercially as agates, garnets, etc., are more
spedflcally provided for as ''predous stonef
advanced," under Tariff Act July 24, 1897,
c. 11, i 1, Schedule N, par. 435, than ai
"manufactures of agate, garnet) etc.," under
Schedule B, par. 115, 30 Stat 159. United
States T. Albert Lorsch & Go., 172 Fed. 277.
Small pieces of agate, fitted for use as
scale bearings by being cut, polished, asd
grooved, are dutiable as manufactures of
agate, under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c 11,
I 1, Schedule 6, par. 115, and not as '^n-
clous stones," under paragraph 435, Schedule
N, 30 Stat 192. Smith v. Computing Scale
Go., 147 Fted. 890, 891 (citing Bthardt ▼.
Hahn, 65 Fed. 273, 6 G. G. A. 99; Hahn v.
United States, 40 G. G. A. 622, 100 Fed. 635;
Hahn v. United States, 121 Fed. 152).
The provision for precious stones cat,
but not set, in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, e.
11, 1 1, Schedule N, par. 435, is not limited to
stones used otherwise than for Industritl
purposes; and cut pieces of agate used u
scale bearings are dutiable under said pro-
visions rather than as "manufactures of
agate," under Schedule B, par. 116, 30 Stat
159. United States ▼. Albert Loxsch ft Co,
152 Fed 691. 692.
XAKUFAOTUREfiKMAKUFACrrURED 28^ ICAKUFACTUlUBB-MAinJFACTUlUED
Wliere Congreaa, having provided to gwr
eral terms tor a gionp of artlclM» wblcb in-
dndes many dUCerent sitecies, as. ^^reciomi
Btones,** selects by name one of those qpedes
and prescribes that manafactnres of that
particolar species shaU be dntlable at a dif-
ferent rate, as ''manufactures of agate, not
specially provided for," It has so clearly In-
dicated its Intention to withdraw the article
from the general group as soon as It becomes
a completed manufacture that the absence
of the limiting clause, "not specially provid-
ed for," from the group provision, is not
particularly significant United States v.
Albert Lorsch & Co., 158 Fed. 808, 899, 86
G.C. A84.
Of fAmXh
The article produced by the artificial
precipitation of chalk, and bolting and pack-
ing It in bags, is not "manufactures^ of
chalk, within the meaning of Tariff Act July
24, 1897, c 11. ( 1, Schedule A, par. 18,
but Is chalk itself, and Is dntlable under
the provision In the same paragraph for
-chalk artificially precipitated." While, in
the provision in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c
11, § 1, Schedule A, par. 18, for chalk "pre-
piu^ for toilet purposes," the preparation
referred to is not, perhaps, such as Is nec-
essary to make a completed toilet article,
there must be advancement toward use for
toilet purposes, by the admixture of flavor-
ing or other ingredieots, or oti^rwlse ; and
dialk that has been merely predirftated
artificially, bolted, and packed in bags is not
within that provision. United SImtes v. P.
B. Anderson k Ckk, 170 Fed. 961, 902, 90
a 0. A. 451.
Of eUp
Baskets made of twisted hinoki wood
ihaTlngs held dutiable as "manufactures of
chip," under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11,
i 1, Schedule 'N, par. 449. Morimura Bros.
V. United States, 107 Fed. 687.
Of Mrk
Small pieces of cork, which have been
produced by grinding the refuse «f cork
beik fbr convenioioe in handling, and which
need further pr^iaration before becoming lit
for its ultimate use in the manafbcture of
ttnolenm, etc, is dutiable as "waste," and
not as a "manufacture" of cork. OudewUl
k BncknaU v. United States, 142 Fed. 214.
Ot««ttom
Goods c«Hnposed in part of wool, but in
<^ef value of cotton, are more spedflcally
ennmerated in Tariff Act Oct 1, 1890, c 1244,
i 1, Schedule I, par. 865^ as "manufactures of
cotton** than in the provision in Schedule K,
VI. 892, for "manufactures of every descrip-
tion •♦ ♦ in part of WOOL" A provision
tot '*aU manufactures of ooiton" and one for
"all manufactures of every deecriptioa ^ • •
^ part of wool" are not OQually applieable to
cloth composed in part of wool hot in dUaf
value of cotton; the latter belns lei
8WnMbP.2DSnb-10
than the fermur. Therefore they are not
controlled by the provision in Tariff Act Oct
1, 1800, c. 1244, I 5, that, "if two or more
rates of duty shall be applicable to any im-
ported article, it shall pay duty at the high-
est of such rates." The provision for "manu-
factures of cotton," in Tariff Act Oct 1, 1890,
c. 1244, 1 1, Schedule I, par. 855, held to in-
clude materials composed in chief value of
cotton and in part of another substance.
Benolt V. United States, 150 Fed. 687, 688.
The provision in the Tariff Act for "la-
bels for garments or other articles, composed
of cotton,** does not Include strips of cotton
containing certain words woven therein in
silk, which are intended, when properly cut,
to be attached to the top of shoes. Such ar-
ticles are dutiable as "manufactures of cot-
ton," under said act Herzog v. United
States, 185 Fed. 919.
Cotton damask doilies, napUBs, and table
covers or cloths, in a completed oonditlon,
ready for use, are dutiable under Tariff Act
July 24, 1807, c. U, 1 1, Schedule I, par. 822,
as "manufkctures of cotton not specially pro-
vided for,*' and not under paragraph 821 of
said act as "ootton table dajpuMk." Douglass
& Berry v. United States, 128 Fed. 998, 904.
XleotHelty
Electricity generated for the purpose of
furnishing light, heat, and power is a product
of "manufacture** and a oommerdal com-
modity. IB re caiarics Town light k Power
Co., 188 Fed. 160, 168.
Conceding that Flowage Act (Pub. St
1901, c 142) 1 12, was passed to encourage the
establishment of manufactories operated by
water power, the production of electricity
by means of water power will be deemed a
"manufactured product** within the meaning
of the statute, though the use of electricity
was not contemplated when the act was pass-
ed. HcBCillan v. Noyes, 72 Aa 750, 762, 75
N. H. 258.
Of fw
So-called "beaver strips," whidi are in
the form of rectangular strips or bands of
various sizes, consisting of rabbit fur and
woolen cloth, used in the making of hats, the
fur being the component material of chief
value, are dutiable as a "manufacture of fur,**
under paragraph 450 of the Tariff Act of
July 24, 1807, c 11, | 1, Schedule N, and not
under paragraph 870, Schedule K, as ar-
ticles of wearing apparel composed wholly or
in part of wool, nor under paragraph 482,
Schedule N, as "hats or bonnets or forms
therefor composed in diief value of fur.'*
Herrmann v. United States, ms Fed. 848.
OAA
OM'JU
Of sel«tlm
The provision in Tariff Act July 24, 1807,
o. 11, I It Schedule N, par. 406, for "articles
• • • composed ♦ • • in part of
see anaMiMnadooC • • • getetlii*''
MAVUFACTUKB&kMAKUFACTUKED 290 MANtTFACTCRES-MAKCFACTtTRED
being more spedflc than tbat In paragraph
460, for "mannfactares of gelatin," hat
crowns composed chiefly of gelatin spangles
are dnitable under the former proTlsion. Lou-
la Metzger & Ck>. y. United States, 140 Fed.
132, 76 O. O. A. 568.
Of Klass
In Tariff Act July 24, 1887, a U, | 1«
Schedule B, par. 100, the term "blown glass-
ware" includes articles blown In a mold as
well as freehanded. Articles in chief value
of blown glass, but in part of other glass
or other material, are not within the provi-
sion for "blown glassware" in Tariff Act July
24, 1807, c. 11, I 1, Schedule B, par. 100, but
are dutiable as manufactures of glass under
paragraph 112, 80 Stat 168. In Tariff Act
July 24, 1807, c 11, J 1, Schedule B, par. 100,
the provision for "articles of glass • ♦ ♦
ornamented, decorated, or ground (except
such grinding as is necessary for fitting stop-
pers)," is not limited to articles in which/the
grinding is done for ornamental or decorative
purposes, but includes plain goods ground
for utility purposes only. In Tariff Act July
24, 1897, e. 11, | 1, Schedule B, par. 09, the
term "molded," as applied to glassware, is
synonymous with ''pressed." United States
V. Hell Chemical Co., 178 Fed. 637, 540, 102
C. a A. 47.
Merchandise consisting of thermometers
Is dutiable under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c.
II, i 1, par. 112,' as "manufactures of glass."
United States v. D. S. Hesse & Bro., 141
Fed. 492, 493.
Of India rabliev
Wearing apparel, consisting of dress
shields, and composed in chief value of rub-
ber, and in part of cotton, are dutiable as
manufactures in chief value of India rubber,
under paragraph 460, Tariff Act Oct 1, 1890,
c. 1244, § 1, Schedule K, and not under para-
graph 349 of said act (section 1, Schedule I),
relating to wearing apparel composed of cot-
ton, or in chief value thereof, and to such
wearing apparel "having India rubber as a
component material." Darlington, Runk &
Co. V. United States, 136 Fed. 716, 717.
In Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, | 1,
Schedule J, par. 339, the provision for braids
"wholly or in chief value of ♦ • ♦ cotton,
• * * whether composed In part of India
rubber or otherwise," applies only to braids
in which cotton Is the chief or only compo-
nent Braids in part of cotton and in chief
value of rubber are dutiable under Schedule
N, par. 449, as "manufactures in chief value
of India rubber." Horrax v. United States,
167 Fed. 626,^527, 93 a a A. 22.
liuraranoe
Insurance is not an article of merdian-
dlse, or "manufacture," or one of the the
necessaries of life, within the laws against
engrossing prohibiting oombinations among
dealera in merchandise, or manufacture, or
necessaries of life. Harris v. Ck)mmonwealtli,
78 S. B. 561, 063, 113 Va. 746, 38 L. B. A
(N. S.) 468, Ann. Gas. 1918E, 597.
Of Iron
So-called "iron sand," a completed article
produced by a series of manufacturing iwo-
cesses from cast iron and steel scrap^ Is not
within the provlsl<»i for "all iron In • • •
forms less finished than iron in bars, and
more advanced than pig iron," in Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule C, par. 12i
but is dutiable as "iron manufactured," under
paragraph 193. Harrison Supply Go. v. Uhlt-
ed States, 164 Fed. 155, 156.
In construing the provision in Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c. 11, 1 1, Schedule 0, par. 12i
for "all iron in • • ♦ forms less finished
than iron in bars, and more advanced tbau
pig iron," held, that the test is the degree
of advancement in manufacture, rather than
in refinement or quality, and that iron sand,
a finished manufactured article, Is not within
said provision, but is dutiable as "manufac-
tures of iron," under paragraph 193. Harri-
son Supply Go. V. United States, 171 Fed. 406,
407, 96 G. G. A. 362.
Of Iv
As lumber, see Lumber.
Of metal
The article commercially known as 'Ot-
ters," produced from the thin sheets which
constitute the composition metal of commerce,
by a process of manufacture that makes it no
longer available tot the uses to which oom-
position metal of trade is put, but adapts it
for other uses, is not free of duty as "com-
position metal," under Tariff Act July 2i
1897, c 11. ( 2, Free List, par. 533, but Is du-
tiable as manufactures of metal under para-
graph 193, ( 1, Schedule G, of said act Unit-
ed States V. George Meier & Go., 136 Fed. 7^
765, 69 C. G. A. 421 (citing Erhardt v. Hahn,
55 Fed. 273, 5 G. G. A. 99; Dejonge v. Magone,
16 Sup. Gt 119, 159 U. S. 562, 40 L. Bd. 260;
Grempler v. United States, 107 Fed. 687, 46
G. G. A. 557; United States v. Binney, 82
Fed. 992, 27 G. G. A. 847; Boker v. United
States, 97 Fed. 206, 88 G. a A. U4; United
States V. Leonard, 108 Fed. 42, 47 G. G. A
181; ICarsching v. United States, 113 Fed.
1006)
Slides or buckles, made of steel or a base
metal, some ornamented with rhinestones and
some colored in imitation of precious metals,
and used in ornamenting slippers, are not
dutiable, under the Tariff Act as "articles
commonly known as jewelry," but are dutia-
ble as manufactures of metal, not spedallj
provided for. B. H. Bailey & Go. v. United
States, 135 Fed. 917, 918.
"Manufactures of metal,'* under para-
graph 107, Sdiedule G, | 1, c. 349, Tariff Act
Aug. 27, 1894, would include bronze candela-
bra and bronze statues, and they were not
fMe iiBder paragraph 462, Free List, | 2, of
MANUFACTURES-MANUFAGTUIIEO 291 MANUFAGTUBBfi-MANUPACTUEBD
said act relating to old oopper fit only for
QULBufacture^ dipping from new copper, etc.
Tiffany v. United SUtes, 142 Fed. 282, 283.
Wbtfe steel parts iiave been assembled
and united into complete window sashes, they
baTe been too far advanced in manufaicture
to permit their inclusion within the provision
of the Tariff Act, relating to **stnictaral
sbapes" of iron or steel fitted for nse, but
must be rated as **manufactares of metaL"
Ackerson v. United States, 172 Fed. 808.
Of totlieyf-i^—gl
Tariff Act July 24, 18d7, a 11, 1 1, Sched-
ule N, par. 450, covering "manufactures'* of
mother-of-pearl held to include mother-of-
pearl made into slabs by cutting or grinding,
which are designed for use in the manufac-
ture of knife handles and similar articles.
Morris European ft American Express Go. t.
United States, 100 Fed. 60a
Of aeedles
Needle cases, in which steel needles con-
stitute the element of chief value, should be
considered as "manufactures in chief value
of needles," rather than as "articles com-
posed in part of steel,** under Tariff Act July
24, 1897, c. 11, f 1, Schedule G, par. 193, and
as needles are on the free list, and there is
no tariff provision for manufactures of nee-
dles, such articles are dutiable as unennmer-
ated manufactured articles under section 0.
Dieckerhoff, Baffloer & Oa t. United States,
151 Fed. 957.
Of Biokel
In construing Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c.
11, S 1« Schedule G^ par. 185, relating to
Dldcel, nickel oxide, and nickel alloy, 'in
vAgB, ingots, bars, or sheets,*' held (X) that
only nickel in one of the forms enumerated is
included; (2) that the provision for "sheets,**
therefore, does not include anodes consisting
of nickel plates about 12 indies long, Q\i
inches wide, and less than a half inch thick,
a "sheet" being broad, thin» and expanded;
and (3) that soeh anodes are dutiable as man-
ufactures of nickel under paragraph 193.
Hermann Boker ft Go. v. United States, 152
Fed. 589.
Of oU
The refining process which constitutes
what is called the "manufacture of oil," re-
lating to cocoanut oil of commerce, merely
removes from it the impurities due to the
manner in whi(^ the kernel is handled and
dried and to its partial decay. United States
▼. Oriental American Go., 129 Fed. 249, 251.
Of opium
The mere mixing of smoking opium with
the residue of opium that has been smoked,
and heating the same^ is not a "numufacture
of (9lum for smoking purposes** within the
meaning of Internal Bevenue Act Oct 1, 1890,
c 12M, H 36, 87, 26 Stat 620, 621, imposing
t tax on smoking opiun^ and regulating the
business of its manufactoreK Shelley v. Unit-
ed States, 198 Fod. 88, 89, 117 O. G. A. 294.
Of palaa leaf
As to palm leaves whidi have been sub-
jected to processes that restine their natural
appearance and prevent decay, Imd some of
which have been arsanged in wreaths on
wire frames held that, aa there had be^
no advance in manufacture that destroyed
the original articles or made them useful for
other purposes or altered their trade designa-
tion, they still remained dutiable as 'leaves,**
under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, a 11, | 1,
Schedule N, par. 425, rather than as "manu-
iCactures** of palm leaf, provided for in para-
graph 45a Kreshower v. United States, 162
Fed. 485.
Of paper
Paper bags with incidental printing
thereon are "manufactures of paper,** within
the meaning of Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c.
11, i 1, Schedule M, par. 407. Kraut v. Unit-
ed States, 130 Fed. 392.
Articles composed of cardboard on which
lithographic prints have been pasted, and
which is cut into forms adapted to be folded in-
to pockets to hang on walls, some of them hav-
ing pincushions or calendars attached, are not
dutiable as "lithographic prints,** under Tariff
Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, { 1, Schedule M,
par. 400, but as "manufactures of paper,**
under paragraph 407. Knauth, Nachod A
Kuhne v. United States, 165 Fed. 144, 146.
So-called lace paper doilies, covers, tops,
eta, used in packing confectionery, etc., which
are composed of paper perforated with orna-
mental designs and printed with the names
and addresses of merchants, are not dutiable
ias paper, under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c.
11, I 1, Schedule M, par. 402, but as '*manu-
factures of paper,** under paragraph 407.
United States v. Hensel, Bruckmann & Lor^
bacher, 152 Fed. 578, 579.
So-called duplex lithographic transfer pa-
per, which is used in transferring decalco-
manla designs to pottery, and is produced
by pasting together two sheets of paper, one
coated with a gummy substance and the other
uncoated, is '*paper,*' rather than "manufac-
tures of paper," under Tariff Act July 24,
1897, c. 11, f 1, Schedule M, pars. 403, 407.
B. F. Drakenf eld & Go. v. United States, 167
Fed. 798, 799, 93 G. G. A. 188.
Plain paper was stamped by a single op-
eration into shapes with lacelike effects,
which are known as tops or dollies, and are
used for placing on the tops of packages of
candy, fruit etc, or under finger bowls. Plain
paper might have been used for the same
purpose, exc^t that it would not have been
so pleasing. Held that, as the improvement
of the original material had not interfered
with its distinguishing characteristics, it was
dutiable as "paper,** rather than as *'manu-
factures of paper/' under Tariff Act July 24»
MAKtTFAOTURES-MAKUFAOTURBD 292 MAmTFACTURXS-MANUFACTUREa)
1897, 0. 11, I 1, Sdiedule Bf , pars. 408, 407.
Hamilton y. United States, 107 KM. 796, 798»
93 G. G. A. ISd.
Of FMte
So-called ililDeBtonea, arti<des eompoBed
of metal and paete^ the' latter being the more
valuable component, which are merely naed
to decorate and ornament women's outer ap-
parel, are dutiable as manufactures of paste,
not specially provided for, under the Tariff
Act B. Blumenthal 4 Co. t. United States,
135 Fed. 264.
Tariff legislation having distinguished be-
tween glass and form of It known as paste,
articles in dilef value of paste, cut, are not
within the provision in Tariff Act July 24,
1897, a 11, I 1, Schedule B, par. 100, for
goods in chief value of cut *'glass," but are
dutiable as manufactures of ''paste,'* under
paragraph 112. United States v. New York
Merchandise COb, 167 Fed. 684.
Of vook orystal
In construing the provision In the Tariff
Act for ''precious stones advanced in condi-
tion or value from their natural state by
cleaving, splitting, cutting, or other process,"
in reference to intaglios incised in rock crystal
(a precious stone), which have been attrac-
tively and skillfully painted, the value and
salability of the articles being chiefly attribu-
table to the painting, the words ''or other
process" include such process of painting,
and such intaglios are dutiable under said
provision, rather than as "manufactures of
rock crystal," not specially provided for.
Benedict & Wlamer r. United States, 136
Fed. 242.
Of MUUl
Under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, e. U, i
2, Free List, par. 671, relating to "sand, crude
or manufactured," "crude sand" is such as is
found in nature, and "mani]tfactured sand"
is, though manufactured, substantially the
same asi crude sand; and pulverised corun-
dum, which is not produced from crude sand,
is therefore not sand of either kind within
the meaning of the act F. W. Myers & Ga
T. United States, 155 Fed. 602, 503.
Ground corundum ore, that has been ad-
vanced in value by processes of manufacture
for a specific use, is not a "crude mineral,"
within the meaning of Tariff Act July 24,
1897, c. 11, S 2, Free list, par. 614, nor "man-
ufactured sand," within the meaning of para-
graph 671, but is dutiable as emery by si-
militude, under section 1, Schedule N, par. 419.
F. W. Myers & Go. v. United States, 178 Fed.
462, 463.
Of sUk
A powder made from raw silk, which
is used in the manufacture of wall paper
and artificial flowers, is dutiable under para-
graph 391, Schedule L^ t 1. Tariff Act July
24, 1897, c. 11, as "manufactures of sUk," or
is at least so dutiaUe by similitade^ cinder
section 7 of said act W. W. Thomas & Go.
V. United States^ 145 VML 1028, 74 G. a A.
682.
So-called remanit, in the form <rf rope^
braids, and mats, which has been manufac-
tured from silk produced by carbonising rags
containing silk, held to be a "manufbctore of
silk," within the mflsning of Tariff Act July
24, 1897, c U, « 1, par. 391, Schedule L.
Frank v. United SUtes, 149 Fed. 1022. 79 a
G. A.860.
Silk ribbons, of whkHx some were, and
others were not. In the nature of trimmings,
but which, however used for trimmings, are
required to be further fashioned for sudi
use, and which are not in fact or commercial-
ly within the class of goods known as *'trim-
mings," are not dutiable as "silk trimmings,"
under paragraph 390, Tariff Act 1897, c. U, i
1, Schedule L, but as "manufactures of silk*'
not specially provided for, under paragraph
391, of said act Gartner ft Friedenhelt v.
United States, IBl Fed. 674, 676.
Ribbons composed chiefly of sUk, but in
part of cotton, are not "ribbons ^ * * of
cotton, • • • whether composed in part
of India rubber or otherwise," under Tarlif
Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, | 1, ScAedule I, par.
320, for the word "otherwise" is there used
with the meaning of "nbt,** and not as relat-
ing to other materials than India rubber.
Such ribbons are properly assessed as "man-
ufactures of silk,** under paragraph 391 of
Schedule L. Gartner, Sons 4 Go« r. United
States, 164 Fed. 967, 968.
In eonstruing the provision In Tariir
Act July 24, 1897, e 11, | 2, Free list par.
660, for "silk, raw, or as reeled fh>m the co-
coon, but not * * * advanced In manu-
facture In any way,** held: (1) That the pro-
vision does not cover any form of raw silk
advanced beyond the condition of skeins;
(2) that silk known as 'Isingles'* or "silk on
tubes," which has be«ii wound from the fftetss
onto tubes, tiie effect of this process being to
advance the sUk a stage Ih preparation for
its ultimate use, has been ''advanced in manu-
facture"; and (3) that silk In this form is
not free of duty under this provision, bnt
dutiable, under paragraph 384 (section 1,
Schedule U of said act), as "silk • • •
not further advanced or manufactured than
carded or combed silk." Klots v. United
States, 139 Fed. 606, 607, 71 a a A. 690.
Raw tussah silk, in the same condition
as when reeled from cocoons, except that it
has beean transferred from the large reels on
which it was taken from the cocoons to small
reels, the result of this process not being
any change in the condition of the 8l!k othef
than to adapt the skeins 11ms produced to
American spinning madilnes; is h€Ad not to
be dutiable as "sUk partially manufactured
from cocoons," under paragraph 384, Tariff
Act July 04, 1897, e. 11, | 1, Schedule L, bnt
to be ffee of duty under pitfagraph €60, as
MAKUFAOTURES-MAKUFACTXTBfiD 298 MAKUFAOTUABd-MAiraFAaraBED
*'8Uk, rawt or as re^ed from the cocoob, tmt
not * ^ * advanced In any way** (<diap-
ter 11, S 2, Free Llat). '*By Ihe very langaage
of parasrapli 660 It will be observed that
'manufactored' silk does not refer to the
method or form of puttfng np tlie raw silk«
but refen to doabling or twisting, or some
other process of manufacture whidi (Changes
the character of the silk itself." United
SUtes V. Stewart, 188 Fed. 811, 812 (quoting
from O. A. 6,482).
Of straw
Straw lace sewed with thread which con-
stitutes a substantial element of its cost, and
without which the material could not be held
together or be a merchantable article, is not
within the provision in paragraph 400, Tariff
Act July 24, 1807, c 11, { 1, Schedule N, for
lace composed "wholly" of straw, but is duti-
able as a '"manufacture in diief value of
straw,*' under paragraph 440 of said act
Kurtz, Stuboeck St Ck>. v. United Stotes, 186
Fed. 268, 260.
F*»ai tim vUto
Disks cut as a by-product from tin plate^
which are reduced by the process to only
About one>flfth of the value of the plate from
which they were made, aie not ''manufactur-
ed from tin plate,*' within the meaning of
Tariir Act July 24, 1807, c 11, | 1, Schedule
0, par. 106. '"Manufacture" inplies addition
to, and not subtraction from, and an arti<te
cannot be said to have been manufactured
which results from a process that reduces its
value. Shallus v. United Stotes, 162 Fed.
653, 656, 80 C. 0. A. 440.
Of wrlllvw
Under Olltrifr Act July 24, 1807, e 11, 1 1,
Sdiednle D, par. 206, relating to "willow pre-
pared for basket makers' use, • • ^ man-
ufactures of • • • willow," it was the
intention for the final clause to cover com-
pleted manufactures from the '"prepared" wil-
low enumerated in the preceding clause;
and baskets made from willow chip would be
dutiable thereunder rather than as "manu-
factures of chip" under Schedule N, par. 440.
Theodore Olleshelmer ft Bro. v. United States,
158 Fed. 077, 078, 86 O. a A. 181.
Of wive
In Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c. U, | 1,
Schedule O, p. 137, the provision tot "arti-
cles manufactured from • • • wire"
cannot be restricted to manufactured articles
which contain the round wire in its integrity;
and "steel wool" consisting of filaments shav-
ed from steel wire, and constituting a finish-
ed commercial artU^, is embraced in said
provision. Buehne Steel Wool Go. v. United
States, IfiO Fed. 107, 106, 86 O. a A. 207.
Of WDoa
"Fireproofed lumber" is produced by sub-
jecting ordinary "sawed lumber" to a fire-
proofing process which dianges its chemical
crastruction and flti It far parposes for
Whidi It would not otherwise be suitably
but does not produce a particularly noticea-
ble change In its appearance. Such lumber
is not, however, "sawed lumber," within the
Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c. 11, | 1, Schedule
D, par. 106, but Is a "manufacture of wood,"
as enumerated in paragraph 206. United
States V. F. W. Myers 4 €}o., 180 Fed. 844,
845, 847.
Manicure sUdcs, being completed articles
of wood, several inches long, pointed at one
end and beveled off at the other to form a
cutting edge, are "manufactures of wood,"
and dutiable as such under Tariff Act July
24, 1807, c. 11, I 1, Sdiedule D, par. 208. B.
B. Bates ft Sons v. United States, 176 Fed.
082.
Lumber which has been subjected to a
fireproofing process that largely increases its
value, but which can still be applied to the
ordinary uses of sawed lumber, is not dutia-
ble as "manufactures of wood,'* not spe-
cially provided for, under paragraph 208,
Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c. 11, S 1, Schedule
D, but as "sawed lumber," under paragraph
105. F. W. Myera & Co. v. United Stetes,
147 Fed. 204, 206, 77 0. a A. 480.
Dyers' sti<du of hard wood, whidi have
been trimmed and peeled, and had the rough
edges removed, and the ends rounded, are not
dutiable as "manufactures of wood," under
Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c. 11, { 1, Schedule
D, par. 208, but as wood, unmanufactured, un-
der paragraph 108. United States v. Knlp-
scher & Maas Silk Dyeing Co., 152 Fed. 500,
501.
Under Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c U, «
1, Scbedule Jj, par. 887, providing for ailk
fabrics wtien "in the gum" and when "boiled
off," held, that fabrics which on boiUng lost
from 18 to 27 per cent in weight were classi-
ble under the former, rather than the latter,
dause; H. Mendelson * Co. v. United States,
154 Fed. 88, 84, 88 C. C. A. 146.
The provision for "house or cabinet fur-
niture, of wood, wholly or partly finished,
and manufactures of wood," in Tariff Act
July 24, 1807, c 11, 1 1, Schedule D, par. 208,
is intended to cover all finished manufactur-
ed wooden articles, however different they
may be in natura or appearance from "house
or cabinet furniture"; and wood flour, a com-
pleted product, already prepared for use, is
therefore not to be excluded under the rule
of ejnsdem generis. Nairn Linoleum Co. v.
United States, 151 Fed. 065, 066.
Of wool
Goods of silk and wool, the latter being
the minor component, are within the purview
of Tariff Act August 27, 1804, e. 340, f 1,
Schedule K, par. 207, deferring until January
1, 1805, the reductioin in duties provided in
said act on "manufactures of wool." Bobin-
son V. United SUtes, 148 Fed. 010.
KANUFAOTUBBS-MANUFACrryBBI) Jg94 MANUFACTURING BSTABLI8HMENT
The proviflloii in the silk schednle in Tar-
iff Act July 24. 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule L,
par. dOl, 'that all manufactures, of which
wool is a component material, shall be classi-
fied, and assessed for duty as 'manufactures
of wool,* *' is limited to goods of which silk is
a component, and does not include flaz-wool
fabrics. United States v. Charles A. John-
son & Co., 167 Fed. 754, 755, 86 C. C. A. 147;
Same v. Walsh, 154 Fed. 749 (citing Hart-
ranft v. Meyer, 10 Sup. Ct 751, 135 U. S. 237,
34 L. Bd, 110).
CameVs-hair press cloth is dutiable as
"manufactures of wool'* under Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule K, pars,
366, 383, rather than as "hair press cloth"
under Schedule N, par. 431. Oberle & Henry
y. United States, 165 Fed. 63, 91 C. 0. A. 139.
The provision in Tariff Act July 24, 1897,
c. 11. S 1, Schedule L, par. 891,. "that aU
'manufactures of which wool is a component
material' shall be classified and assessed for
duty as manufactures of wool" is limited to
said schedule, which relates to goods con-
taining silk, and the classification of fab-
rics of flax and wool should be determined
without regard to said provision. United
States V. B. De F. Wilkinson Co., 154 Fed.
751, 752 (citing United States v. Walsh, 154
Fed. 749; United States t. Slaaenger, 113
Fed. 524).
In construing Tariff Act July 24, 1897,
c. 11, 1 1, Schedule L, par. 891, relating to "all
manufactures ^ ^ ^ of which silk la the
component material of chief value," and con-
taining a proviso that "all manufactures of
which wool is a component material shall be
classified and assessed for duty as manufac-
tures of wool," held, that the ordinary rule
should be applied that a proviso at the close
of an independent paragraph like this should
be construed as limiting only what precedes
it, and that the words "all manufactures" in
the proviso have no broader relation than the
same words in the beginning of the para-
graph. United States v. Walsh, 154 Fed. 770,
83 C. C. A. 472 (citing United States v. Q.
Falk & Bros., 27 Sup. Ct 191, 204 U. S. 143,
149, 150, 51 L. Ed. 411).
CSattle-hair goods are dutiable by simili-
tude as "manufactures of wool," under Tariff
Act July 24, 1897, c 11, i 1, Schedule K,
par. 366, being similar in quality, use, and
texture. F. Rosenstern & Co. v. United
States, 171 Fed. 71, 72, 96 C. C. A. 175.
In Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, { 1,
Schedule L, par. 391, the proviso that "all
manufactures, of which wool is a compo-
nent material, shall be classified and assess-
ed for duty as 'manufactures of wool'" is
not limited to the goods containing silk which
are the subject of said paragraph, but ex-
tends to all silk and wool goods; and dress
goods in chief value of silk, but in part of
wool, become, by virtue of this proviso, sub-
ject to the duty on wool goods, rather than
that on silks. United States v. Scruggs, Vaa-
dervoort & Barney Dry CKhmIb Co., 156 Fed.
940, 942, 84 a a A. 44a
KAHUFAOTUBIHG AMD XECHAHIC-
AI. BVUHBBS
A domestic corporation, formed for tbe
purchase of the capital stock, evidences of
indebtedness, and assets of another domestic
corporation, and for the further purpose of
manufacturing and selling implements aud
machinery, is one organized for a purpose
other than that of carrying on any kind of
'^manufacturing or mechanical business," and
is therefore not within the exception as to
the liability of stockholders made by Const
Minn, art 10, { 3, in favor of corporations of
that kind. Bemh^mer v. Converse, 27 Sap.
Ct 755, 767, 206 U. S. 516, 61 L. Ed. 1163.
BCAKITPAOTUBIirG OOBPORATION
See Manufacturer.
See, also. Mechanical Corporation.
MAirorAOTUBIirG ESXABUSHMEirr
A sawmill at which lumber is sawed for
sale on the market is a "manufacturing esr
tablishment," within Ky. St 1903, K 2487.
2488, giving laborers in manufacturing bb-
tablishments a Uen for wages superior to
that of mortgages. Graham v. Magann,
Fawke Lumber Co., 80 S. W. 799, 800, US
Ky. 192, 4 Ann. Cas. 1026 (citing Bogard t.
Tyler's Adm'r, 65 S. W. 709, 119 Ky. 637).
The furnishing of electric light and pow-
er and distributing it is not manufacturing,
within Pub. St 1901, C. 66, { U, providing
that towns may, by vote, exempt for certain
time from taxation any "manufacturing es-
tablishment" proposed to be erected or put
in operation. Williams v. Park, 66 Aa 463^
464, 72 N. H. 306, 64 li. B. A. 33.
Act March 2, 1899 (Acts 1899, d. 234;
Bums' Ann. St 1901, 9 70671; Homer's Ann.
St 1901, i 6169k), declaring that the words
"manufacturing and mercantile eetabllBb-
ments" mean any mill, factory, place of trade,
or other establishment where goods are man-
ufactured, or offered for sale, is not confined
in its operaticm to places where goods are
manufactured for or offered to the public
market, and a machine shop maintained by
a railway company for Its own repairs and
the making of materials for its own use is
within the statute. Baltimore & O. S. W. B.
Co. V. Cavanaugh, 71 N. B. 239, 241, 36 Ind.
App. 32.
A plant for the generation of electricity
is a '^manufacturing establishment," as af-
fecting the owner's liability for death of an
employ^ resulting from his failure to guard
machinery, as required by Bums' Ann. St
1908, ii 8021, 8029. Angola By. & Power Co.
V. Butz (Ind.) 98 N. B. 818, 820.
A flouring mill is a "manufacturing e^-
tabllshmrat," wiJ^n Ky. St 1903, S 2487, glv-
MANUFACTUBlirO ISrrABIiI8HAi£NT 28S
MAKtJFAOTURIira PLANT
log a Boi upon t)ropert3r of bwnen or open-
tors of any rolling mill, foundry, or other
manufacturing establiBhmait aBsigned for
the benefit of creditors, to one famishing
materials or sopplles to ran sadi bvslness.
W. H. Hall & Son r. J. T. Guthrie's Sons
(Ky.) 103 S. W. 721, 722,
A concern engaged In the boslness of
manufitctoring engines, pumps, fans, and the
like is a "manofacturing establishment,*'
within the factory act (Acts 1809, p. 234, a
142, I 9; Bums' Ann. St 1901, | 70671), re-
quiring operators of ^'manufactaring estab-
lishments" to guard machinery. Crawford A
McCrlnmion Ck>. T. Gose (Ind.) 82 N. E. 984,
98S.
In an action fdr injuries to a serrant,
where the complaint alleged that defendant
was engaged in manufacturing brashes, and
had a machine saw, which was connected
with the steam power and revolved with
great speed when in use, and that plaintiff
was injured while operattog the saw, etc., it
directly averred that the saw was operated
in a '*manufiicturing establishment within
the state," and that plaintiff was engaged at
work in a "manufacturing establishmenf
owned and operated by defendant when the
Injury was rec^ved, within the factory act,
which requires a saw used in a manufacture
Ing plant to be guarded. Holcomb v. Nop^
man, 91 N. B. 625, 629, 47 Ind. App. 87.
In a statute making a place where arti-
cles in a raw, unfinished, or incomplete fitate
are converted into a new, improved, or dif-
ferent form a "manufacturing establishment,"
the word "raw" is a relative term, and
means not yet changed by some process of
treatment or fabrication. The words **uafln-
Ished" and "incomplete" likewise refer to a
state or condition not yet attained and mean
not fully fashioned to meet some design.
Factory Act (Laws 1903, c. 356) { 7, provides
that an establishment wherein any natural
products or other articles, in a raw, incom-
plete, or unfinished condition, are converted
iDto a new improved or different form, is a
manufacturing establishment, within the act
Held, that an establishment wherein railroad
iron, old stoves, waste and scrap Iron of
every description, is cut into lengths, known
as grade No. 1, grade No. 2 and busheling
scrap, by machines known as alligator shears,
operated by power, to meet standing specifi-
cations of mills which purchase the product.
Is a manufacturing establishment within the
act Gasper v. Lewin, 109 Pac. 667, 659, 82
Kan. 604.
A gasoline engine, used, in connection
with machinery consisting of belts, pulleys,
and cog-wheels, to pump water through pipes
to supply the inhabitants of a dty, is not a
"manufacturing establishment" or a "mill,"
within the meaning of theee terms in section
4682, Gen. St 1909. Ward v. €ity of Norton,
122 Pac. 881, 86 Kan. 906w
* Pub. Laws 1909, No. 28fc, 1 12, which re-
quires the owner, ag^it, or lessee of any man-
uftictorlng establishment to provide auto-
matic gates for elevator shafts, imposes the
duty upon an ovraer of a building who leases
a floor of the building; the term "manufac-
turing establishment^' as used in the sectioi)
meaning premises on whidi a manufacturing
business is conducted. Barfoot v. White Star
Une^ 136 N. W. 437, 441, 170 IClch. 349.
Under a statute providing that towns
may, by vote, exempt from taxation any
"manufacturing establishment" proposed to
be erected therein and the capital to be used,
the term "manufacturing establishment" re-
fers to the property of the proprietors of the
industry who receive the benefit conferred by
the statute, and not the property of others
having no interest in the prosecution of the
business, and therefore the statute does not
confer authority to exempt an owner of
property who is not entitled to such exemp-
tion from taxation on the same because it is
leased to another who is so entitled. Ports-
mouth Shoe Oo. V. Caty of Portsmouth, 66
Atl. 1046, 74 N. H. 222.
St 1902, c. 435, i 1, as amended by St
1909, a 514, i 48^ prohibits the employm^t U
women and children, except as permitted,
and declares that every employer shall post
in a consfpicuous place in every room in which
such persons are employed a printed notice
stating the hours of labor, etc. The act ap-
plies only to "manufacturing and mechanical
establishments," which are defined by section
17 to include those places popularly known
as "mills" and "shops," where continuously
operating machinery and constant service by
attendants throughout the whole day are not
essential to economical manufacture, and
where ordinary machin^y is stopped for the
noon hour. Held, that such act does not ex-
tend in that reject to stores, or to branches
of industry, where continuity of labor by
some person Is necessary from the beginning
to the end of the woricday; other provisions
having been ma^e for those classes of employ-
ment by chapter 514, H 47, 68-70. Common-
wealth V. Riley, 97 N. B. 367, 870, 210 B£ass.
387, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 388.
MAmnPACTinuxG njkxr
Acts Tenn. 1903, c. 110, i 1, granting au-
thority to any company operating a railroad
in the state to build lateral roads not exceed-
ing 15 miles in length, extending from the
main stem or any branch of its line "to any
mill, quarry, mine, manufacturing plant or
to the bank of any navigable stream, without
the making of any amendment to the charter
of said railroad," does not confer the right
on a railroad company to the exduslon of the
municipal authorities to build a branch track
within the limits of a city to a connection
with the private tracks of a cotton compress
company a quarter of a mile from a river,'
the compress being 500 feet from the river
MANUFACXUBIKO PURPOSES
MARBLB
and having no track connection therewith,
cm the ground that it i« a lati»al road to
the bank of a "navigable stream," nor oa the
ground that the compreBs is a "mannf actur-
Ing plant,** within the meaning of the stat>-
Qte; it not being such a plant within anj
just or recognized definition of the t^m.
City of M^nphis v. St I40UIS ft S. F. B. Co.,
183 Fed. 629, 536, 106 0. a A. 7S.
MANTTFACTUBING PURPOSES
See Water Famished for Manufacturing
Purposes.
The production and control of electric
power by mechanical means, and its adapta-
tion for use upon a trolley system, is a '*man-
ufacturing purpose," within the meaning of
section 8 of the mechanic's lien law. Bates
Mach. Co. ▼. Trenton A N. B. B. Co., 58 AtL
935, 936, 70 N. J. Law, 68i, 103 AuL St Bep.
811.
Where a corporation was organised for
"manufacturing purposes," such term could
not be extended so as to include the power of
the corporation to acquire and convey its own
stock. Maryland Trust Co. v. Naticmal Me-
chanics' Bank, 63 Atl. 70, 74, 102 Md. 608.
MAirUFACTUBIirO FUBSUIT8
See Manufacture.
MANURE
The word '^manure'* has no tedinical
meaning, nor has it acquired a commercial
one differing from its ordinary one. Manure
is a conmion article, well known to all man-
kind, and hence an ambiguity cannot arise
from the use of the term. Where defendant
contracted In writing to remove all the ma-
nure that might accumulate at plaintifTs
stable every day for a year, it was no de-
fense, to an action for breach of sudi con-
tract, that plaintiff changed the (diaracter of
the bedding during the continuance theeof,
by reason of which the manure was less val-
uable to defendant Keyes A Watldns liv-
ery Co. V. Freber, 76 S. W. 698, 699, 102
Mo. App. 315.
MANY
Four persons are sufficient to constitute
"many persons," under Code Civ. Proc. {
448, providing that, "where the question is
one of a common or general interest of many
persons, • • • one or more may sue
• • * for the benefit of all.*' CUmax
Specialty Co. v. Seneca Button Co., 103 N. Y.
Supp. 822, 824, 54 Misa Bep. 152.
As muob
The word "many," in a provision of a
dty charter that notice of the Introduction of
^ ordinance shall be published at least as
many as tea 4Ays before the adoption of
such ordinance, meant the same as though
the word "much" had heem used and required
merely that the notice be pabllahed ten da:pB
before the action was taken, but did not re-
quire that It be published every day for tea
days. Smith ?. Atlanta, 51 & & 741, 742,
123 0*. 877.
MAHT PEBSOirS
See Great Many PersonsL
RAAP
"A 'map^ means not only a dtiineatloB
giving a general idea of the land taken, but
also such full and accurate notes and data
as are necessary to fumlirii complete meaos
for identifying and aacertaintng the precise
position of every part, with courses and dis-
tances, so that every part can be found."
Hollister v. State, 77 Pac 839, 345, 9 Idaho^
651 (quoting Mill. Em. Dom. { U7)»
MAPLE SUGAR
See Imitation Maple Sugar;
MAPLE SYRUP
The popular recognized definition ci
"maple syrup" is, that it is the syrup re-
duced from boiling down the sap that flows,
in the spring of the year, from live maple
treea United SUtea v^ Scanlon, 180 Fed.
485, 486.
MARASCHINO
Fruit In maraschino aa edible fruit, see
Edible PnUt
MARASQUE WATER
The article known as ''marasque water^
or "ean de marasque," which is produced by
distilling the Juice of crushed cherries, di-
luted somewhat with water used in the dis-
tilling process, is not dutiable as cherry juice,
under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, I 1,
Schedule H, par. 299, 80 Stat 174, but as
an unenumerated manufactured article under
section 6, 30 Stat 205. Leerburger Broa y.
United States, 141 Fed. 1023.
MARBLE
Hautevllle stone^ and various other
stones of substantially the same character,
which are susceptible of a high polish and are
used as an interior decorative stone, are not
the kind of limestone that is "marble," with-
in the meaning of Tariff Act July 24, 1897,
a 11, S 1, Schedule B, par. 114, but are duti-
able as "limestone," under paragraph 117.
United States v. a D. Jackson A Co., 175
Fed. 884, 885; Bockmann v. United states,
158 Fed. 807, 86 a a A. 67.
So-called Mexican onyx is dutiable as
"onyx" rather than as "marble," under Tariff
Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, i 1, Schedule B, par.
114. Blochmw Banking Go. v. Blaks^ 168
Fed. 572.
MABE
1897
MARINER'S S15HV1CK
MARE
Under a stetiite making It grand laroeBy
to steal a "maia," tto stealing of a female
eolt is grand laicenj. Miller r. Tenitoiy,
80 Paa. 321, S22, 9 Aria. 128.
"It is a matter of common knowledge
and obserration tbat among our people tbe
word 'mare/ when nsed without a word of
qualification, is imderstood to mean a female
of the horse spedea. We appreheiid that ane
rarely, if ever, hears the expression *a niare
horse' eniployed to describe a ftoiale of tbe
species horse, but that the term nniversally
used in this state for this purpose is the sin-
gle word 'mare.' On the other hand, when
a female of the q;>ecies mule is intended,
the expression nsed is 'a mare niule,* and,
when a finale of the species ass is intended,
the word 'jenny* is used." McLamb ft Go. ▼.
Lambertson, d2 S. B. 107, 109, 4 Ga. App.
095 (qnoting Teal T. States 46 fk B. 0M, 119
Ga. 104).
As horwm
See Horses
MARGIN
"Margin,** as a brokerage term, signifies
a sum of money or its value in securities
deposited with the broker to protect him
against loss in buying or selling for his prin-
dpaL Where a broker was inatmcted to
"hedge when margin about exhaostad," tka
instmctioiis oovezed, not only the partUmlar
margin at the time, but any nuiigln in the
bands of the broker at any time before the
close of the trades. Winston v. F. A. Long-
shore & Oo., 40 South. 517, 518, 116 La. 21
(qnothdg^ and ad<H?tlng definition in Stimd.
Diet).
*^rhe meaning of the word "margins,'
as ordinarily nsed in connection with
stock sales, has long been well understood.
As most frequently employed in this state at
the time of, and for many years prior to,
the adoption of the Constitution, it meant
the sum deposited by the purchaser of stock
with his broker, being a certain percentage of
the purchase price of the stock, the broker
agreeing to advance the balance of the pur-
chase price upon condition that he should
hoM the stock as security for his advance,
with the right to sell it, in case of deprecia-
tion and teilure of the purchaser to keep the
Wtghi* good r ^ * • but it was also em-
ployed to describe deposits made by sellers
and pttrchasers of stock for future delivery
In various ways." Conradt v. Lepper, 81 Pac
307, 311, 13 Wyo. 478 (qnoting and adopting
the definition in Sheehy v. 9hinn, 87 Pac 398,
105 Oal. 878).
XA&enr of KATfiROAP
A deed calling for "the margtn of ttie
railroad'* at a point where there is a cut
tiie topaf tba cot, aad not tbe bass
or a l)olnt midway np it ; and tbe BArgIn of
a railroad where there is ifiut or a fin is
the top of the cut or the base of the fill.
Louisville A N. a. Co. v. EUiston (ff.) 10$
a W. 858, 860.
MARINE
Mercantile Marine.
MABIHE XK8URAH0B
. ▲ "marine insurance" is an insurance
against risks connected with navigation to
which a ship, cargo, freight, or other insur-
able interest in such property may be ex-
posed during a certain voyage or a fixed pe-
riod of time. Soelberg v. Western Assur. Co.
of Toronto, Can., 119 Fed. 23, 28, 55 C. C. A.
601.
A contract for the insurance against fire
of a vessel while lying moored and in use
as a hospital is not maritime, and the meas-
ure of liability for a loss by fire, which par-
tially destroyed the vessel, is not governed
\fy file TQiBS of "marine insorance," but by
Chose ot fire insurance, and is limited to fb^
amount whkdi tte value of the property was
depreciated by the fire, not exceeding 'the sum
sned for. Olty of Detroit v. Gmmmond, 121
Fed. 968, 971, 68 C. O. A. 801.
nrvuBAHOB BuaimM
The business of issuing ordihary fire in-
surance policies upon boats navigating the
Great Lakes and the high seas is "marine
insurance business," within Laws 1896, p.
392, c. 175, relating to the organization of
marine insurance companiea. Dwianell t.
Minneapolis Fire & Marine Mut Ins. Co., 97
N. W. 110, 111, 00 Minn. 383.
MABINS lOLSS
"The log waa invented abont the same
time which inaugurated measuring of the
sea or marine miles, known as 'EQglish
geographical' miles. The sea mile, knot, geo-
graphical, or marine mile measures 6,086.7
feet on the sea, on the scale of 60 geographi-
cal or sea miles to a degree." In the Muscon-
gus Grant by the council of Plymouth in Dev-
on, Bug., made between 1620 and 1635, aft-
er the inauguration of the geiigraphlcal or
"marine mile," granting certain land, etc.,
within thr^ miles of the main land, the
three-mile limit is to be measured by the geo-
graphical or marine mile or knot, and not
by the statute mile. Lazell v. Boardman,
69 Ati. 97, 99, 103 Me. 292, 13 Ann. Cas.
678 (citing Rockland, Mt D. ft S. S. Co.
T. Pessenden, 8 Atl. 550, 79 Me. 140).
MARIirE&*8 SSRTI€»B
See Maritime Service.
Services rendered to a domestic vessel
after- it has been laid up at a wharf for the
winter. In pumping it out, attending to its^
Unes, etc, are aot "mariner's services" and*
MABITAIi
^198
HABITIMB IiIE3r
cannot be made the basis of a maritime lien.
The Jamea T. Fnrber» 157 Fed. 12^ 12&
MARITAL
aCABITAI. OOKPAHIOHBHIP
As property, see Property.
MABITAL BIGHTS.
See^ also, Right Acquired by Marriage.
The rights acquired by marriage of the
gaUty party under a divorce decree, which
are forfeited by Code, { 8181, are not limited
to rights and obligations owed to the guilty
party by his spouse, forfeiture of which
would inure to the benefit of such spouse
alone, and the section has no bearing on ali-
mony. Hamilton ▼. McNeUl, 129 N. W. 480,
485, 150 Iowa, 470, Ann. Oas. 1912D, 004.
MARITIME
BCABimiE BELT
'rrhe ^maritime belt* is that part of the
sea which, in contradistinction to the open
sea, is under the sway of the riparian states,
which can exdtfslTcdy reserve the fishery
within their respective maritime belts for
their own citizens, whether fish, or pearls, or
amber, or other products of the sea." State
of Louisiana v. Mississippi, 26 Sup. Ot 408,
422, 202 U. a 1, 50 U Ed. 018.
MABITIME OA8B
See avil Maritime Casa
KABimiE OOBTBAOT
Where a storage contract is incidental
to the transportation by water of the goods
stored, as where they were stored by the car-
rier for delivery to the consignee. It is "mari-
time." Evans v. New York & P. S. S. Co.,
145 Fed. 841, 842.
A ''maritime contract" must concern
transportation by sea, and relate to naviga-
tion and to maritime employment It must
be one of navigation and commerce on navi-
gable waters. Not every contract having ref-
erence to a ship Is within the admiralty ju-
risdiction, but only such as relate to mari-
time employment, such as pertain to the
navigation of a ship or assist the vessel in
the discharge of a maritime obligation. It is
not enough that the service Is to be done up-
on the sea or with respect to the ship. Bow-
ers Hydraulic Dredging Co. v. Federal Con-
tracting Co., 148 Fed. 290, 293 (citing The
Richard Wlnslow, 71 Fed. 426, 18 O. O. A.
844; In re Hydraulic Steam Dredge No. 1,
80 Fed. 545, 25 C. C. A. 028).
To give the court jurisdiction over a
contract as ''maritime," it must relate to the
trade or business of the sea, or must be
essentially maritime In its character. The
'most enlarged interpretatloju of . the term
"maritime," as applied to JurisdictloB, hat
not been extended beyond subjects or eo-
gagementB which are necessarily connected
with services to be rendered on tide waters,
or supplies furnished to vessels in aid of a
voyage, or labor, or materials, or cash ad-
vanced to obtain such supplle& The Maiy
F. Chisholm, 129 Fed. 814, 817 (dtlng Scott v.
The Morning Glory, 21 Fed. Cas. 845; The
Perseverance, 19 Fed. Ca& 807).
Cktuetmr pmvij
A bond given by the charterer of a ves-
sel to Secure his performance of the condi-
tions of the charter party, which neither re-
quires nor authorizes the surety to perform
such contract in case of the default of the
principal,, but merely to respond In damages
for its breach, is not a "maritime contract
Pacific Surety Co. v. Leatham & Smith T. k
W. Co., 161 Fed. 440, 444, 80 C. a A. 070.
Bepairs tm Teasel
A contract for repairs to be furnished to
a canal boat engaged in navigating the Erie
Canal and Hudson river is a "maritime con-
tract," and proceedings to enforce a Uen for
the repairs furnished are within the exclu-
sive admiralty Jurisdiction of the Xederal
courts, though such repairs were made in dry
dock. Perry v. Haines, 24 Sup. CL 8, 10, 191
U. S. 17, 48 L. Bd. 78.
Wlutrf ace eoatraet
A contract relating to wharfage, as un-
derstood in the laws and usages of maritime
affairs, is clearly a "maritime contract" The
James T. Furber, 129 Fed. 808, 8ia
MABimCE T^Tigy
A "maritime lien" enables a creditor,
without notice to the debtor and without giv-
ing him the protection of the bond for il-
legal proceedings, to attach and seize a ves-
sel, though she is loaded with freight and
passengers and about to proceed on a voyage.
One who makes repairs on a vessel in a fo^
elgn port under a contract with the known
owner then present is not entitled to a mar
Itlme lien therefor, in the absence of a con-
tract for a lien, express or Implied, or a mu-
tual understanding that the repairs were far-
nished on the credit of the vessel, and the
burden of proving such contract of under-
standing resta on the party asserting the lien.
The CUnton, 160 Fed. 421, 422, 87 C. C. A
373.
A provision of a bill of lading issued by
a steamship company that "the carrier shall
have a lien on the goods for all freights,
primages, and charges" does not affect or
change the nature of the lien, which Is sim-
ply the "maritime lien," as understood In the
jurisprudence of the United States, to pre-
serve which the retaining of possession is
essential, although such provision may in
some cases preserve the lien where it would
otherwise be deemed waived by other prori-
sions to the time and mamiar of paying the
MABITfME LISSK
299
1CAEKBB|>
freight. Portland Flouring -MUI0 Co. r. Port-
land ft Asiatic S. S* Co, 145 Fed. 687, 602.
"^pon an ordinary contract of aflr^tat
moit, tbe lien of tbe shipper is a 'maritimo
lien,' and a proceeding in rem to enflorce It
is within the ezcLosiTe original cognizance of
courts of admiralty." John Meonior Oun Ca
y. liChigh VaUey Transp. Co., 101 N. W. 886.
388, 123 Wis. 143 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in The BeUast» 7 Wall 6^ 10 L. Bd.
266).
Credit of Tossel
"Owing to the underlying necessities
of commerce, and to the wandering charac-
ter of a ship, courts of admiralty will infer,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, that,
where supplies necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the ship's voyage are furnished in a
foreign port on the order of the captain of a
flbip, or the ship's ^gent, and even under some
circumstances by the owner, they are fur>
Dished on the credit of the ship. ^ * ^
These fbcts and conditions being proved, are
held ground for the reasonable presumption
of credit to the ship and a consequent lien.
The same presumption is held to arise as to
certain maritime services rendered to a ship,
hidependently of its character as domestic
or foreign. The lien to which the ship is
thus subjected is created, not so much for
the benefit of the creditor, but for tbe bene-
fit of commerce. ^ ^ ^ It would be an
abase of tlie administration of the law of
maritime lien to decree a lien for servioes
not clearly proved to have been entirely mar-
itime and rendered to the particular res upon
which the lien is claimed. A lien does not,
and should not, attach for a supposed credit
given to a vessel, unless the* service or sup^
pUes are clearly shown to have been ren-
dered or furnished to the particular vessel
to which the credit is given." The owner of
a tug which was verbally hired by the day
by the owner of three dredges to "wait upon"
sndi dredges while engaged on certain work,
the services rendered being the carrying of
coal and water to the dredges, the towing of
scows, and of the dredges themselves when
necessary, is not entitled to a "maritime lien*'
on all or any of such dredges for a balance
due on the contract which was not one for
ordinary towage services to the vessels them.-
selves. The Allegator, 161 Fed. 87, 88, 40, 41,
42, 88 O. 0. A. 201.
Pomeasion
In a suit to enforce a Hen against a tug,
the trial court in its opinion, in stating that
a party could not authorize the repair of the
tug In such manner as to give the person re-
pairing it a maritime Uen thereon, used the
words "maritime lieh'" in a general or non-
technical sense as b^ng a lien^ the subject-
matter of whidi was a vessel, and not in its
techmcci seB8e,-a8 dtetbigoished from a eom-
mon-law or ponoceoory lien. The Robert R.
Kirkhind, 153 Fed. 8681 866» 88 a 0. A. 46.
MABimCE SSBVXCS -
. See ICartnera' Servlca.
Services in making repairs on a ship or
vessel, Miether in or out of the water, are
"maritime services.** Simmons v. The Jeffer-
son, 30 Sup. Gt 54, 58, 216 U. & 130, 54 L.
Ed. 125, 17 Ann. Gas. 907 (citing I^eyrouz v.
Howard, 7 Pet [82 U. S.] 824, 8 L. Ed. 700).
MARK
See Distinguishing Mark; High-Water
Mark; Invoiced as Per Gost Mark;
Low-Water Mark; Trade-Mark; Val-
id Voting Mark ; Visible Mark.
As sisBatnve
See Sign>-8ignatura.
As snbsertytiom
See Subscribe— Subscription.
Stook
Under Pen. Gode GaL t 857, making any
one guilty of a criminal offense who marks
or brands, or alters or defaces the mark or
brand, of horses or cattle, with intent there-
by to steal the same or to prevent identifica-
tion thereof by the true owner, one who slit
the ears of a colt owned by another thereby
"marked" the same if the act is done with
intent to prevent its identlficatioh by the
owner, although the mark so placed upon
the animal may not be a conventional one,
indicative of ownership. People v. Strom-
beck, 78 Pac 472, 473, 145 GaL lia
KABX OF PUHCTUATIOV
See Punctuation.
As word, see Word.
MABKEP BALLOT
See Distinguishing Marks.
MARKED COBKER8
"Marked comers" (L e., those clearly
identified, and which are notorious objects)
are the most satisfectory evidence of the
location of a patent Morgan v. Renfro, 99
S. W. 311, 813, 124 Ky. 314.
MABXEDLTKB
Where bearing trees are called for at
the eastern end of a northern boundary line
of a survey and a stake at the western ter-
minus^ there is a presumption that the line
was actually surveyed, and the comers iden-
tified by the bearing trees and the stake
making the line a "marked line." Qoodson
V. FiUsgerald (Tex.) 135 8. W. 696, 698.
MAKKlsn OFF
When a case is "marked off/* it i3 meant
that it would again appear on the call cal-
endar after causes on that calendar had been
disposed of. Hoberman v. Diamond, 130 N.
T. Supp. 13d.
Side lights on a caboose^ showing
in fro9t and red bdiind, are desigaefl as
VARE»
800
MARKET TAIiUB
'markers** for fbe esgineer and front brako-
man, so that, if thB train parts at night, it
can he readily discovered. Texas & N. O.
R. Ck). V. Stewart^ 71 8. W. 830, 3S1, 80 Tez.
Glv. App. 40&
MARKET
See Free Market; Open Market; Prin-
cipal Market
Am puhlie plaee for sale
The term "market" as used in Sanitary
God[e, City of New York, § 82, providing that
no person shall kill or dress any animal or
meat in any market, includes and applies to
any premises exclusively devoted to market
purposes, and hence applies to premises con-
veyed to the city of Brooklyn and known as
the wallabout market lands. Bird y. Grout,
94 N. Y. Supp. 127, 128, 106 App. Div. 159.
A ^)ace under the approach of a bridge,
occupied by fish ];>eddlers pursuant to the
permission of the commissioner of bridges,
In consideration of payments made by them
to the city of New York, is a "market,**
though not formally so declared, as author-
ized by Greater New York Charter, | 47, and
it is under the control of the comptroller and
his. department, as authorized by section 151,
and not under the management of the bridge
commissioner, under sections 595 and 596.
Sorgen v. Prendergast, 123 N. Y, Supp. 765,
766, 68 Misc. Rep. 189.
MARKET. PBXOB
See Current Market Price.
The measure of damages for breach of
contract to deliver bonds of a corporation,
the consideration for which has been paid,
is the value of the bonds at the time they
should have been delivered under the con-
tract with interest, and such value is prima
facie their face value, but "market price"
stands as a criterion of value, and in such
cases what is called the "market price** or
the quotation of the articles for a given day
is not the only evidence of value, and the
true value may be drawn from other sonrcea.
Henry v. North American Ry. Const Co., 158
Fed. 79, 81, 85 C. C. A. 400.
In the absence of a definite agreement in
a contract of sale, the "market prlce^' of
goods to be delivered is the price prevailing
at the time and place of delivery, but, if
there is no market price at the place of de-
livery, the value of the goods should be de^
termined at the nearest place where they
have a market value by the addition or de-
duction of the diifference in the cost of de-
livery. South Gardiner Lumber Co. v. Brad^
street, 63 Ati. 1110, 1111, 97 Me. 165.
The measure of damages for failure to
deliver coal sold by a wholesaler to a re-
taller is the excess, if any, of the whole-
sale "market pries" ofi tha ooal at the place
ot deUvery ait tha date fizAd^r deliveiy, and
tlia prtoe agreed on between the parties^
when tbere Is a wholesale market price at
the place of delivery, which market price is
the wholesale price. Righter r. Clark, 60
Aa 741, 742, 78 Conn. 9, 112 Am. St Rep. 84.
Where plaintiff purchased ooal of de-
fendant, and defendant failed to furnish it
the "market price" was the price at which
plaintiff could have obtained otiier coal of
like kind in that region, and the measure of
damages was the difference between the con-
tract price and this market price of the coal
at the time it should have been delivered,
but, if there was no available market in
which plaintiff could purchase coal of the
same description, on defendant's refusal to
perform plaintiff was entitled to recover the
difference between the price at which he
had contracted to buy the coal and wKat he
was to receive therefor from his vendee.
Wtimoth ▼. Hamilton, 127 Fed. 48, 63, 61
O. O. A. 584.
As- fixed by buyii&s and sellinc
The "market price*' of an article is the
usual standard for measuring its value; it
being worth what it may be reasonably sold
for. Burke Hollow Coal Co. v. Lawson, 151
S. W. 657, 151 Ky. 305.
The market price of an article oom-
monly dealt in is the sum fixed by the con-
sensus of buyers and sellers dealing in the
article, and proof of the price obtained at
an actual bona fide auction sale, though
there is but one bidder, is competent on the
question of market value; fOr tha term
*'maiket" assumes the existenoe of trade,
and price is fixed in trade by the highest
bidder and the lowest offerer. Carey Lith-
ograph Co. V. Magazine & Book Co., 127 N. Y.
Supp. 300, 302, 70 Misc. Rep. 541.
As price In market with open eompetl-
tion
One suing for breach of contract to let
to him a contract to print advertising litho-
graphs,' provided it met the market price,
must show affirmatively that it met the ''mar-
ket price," which is the price fixed by buyer
and seller in an open market in the usual
and ordinary course of lawful trade and
competition. Carey Lithograph Co. v. Maga-
zine & Book Co., 127 N. Y. Supp. 300, 302,
70 Misc. Rep. 541.
MARKET PUBPOSB
The erection and maintenance of a
slaughter house is not a "market purpose"
within the meaning of a conveyance to a
city of land "for market purposes, and for
ships, canals, and piers and other public
works, in connection with such market pur-
poses." Bird V. Grout, 94 N. Y. Supp. 127,
128. 106 App. Div. 159.
MARKET VAIiITB
See Actual Maricet Value;. Oaab Market
. YalUe; Curr^t Mvtket Value; IWr
Mark^ Value; Hltfieat Market Valoa
MABKET YALJm
301
HARKBT VALUX
"rrhe words ^maricet Talne^ haTft a plain,
definite, and well-nndentood meaninc; aa in-
teUiglble to tlie Jury aa to the court" Hance
an attempt by the eonrt to maka tbam dear-
er by d^lnition would tend to ooafoae ratbw
than to enlighten. Atlantic Baggage Co. ▼•
Mizo, 61 8. B. 844, 847. 4 Oa. App. 407.
**Martiet yalne" la no otlier than the
fair yalne of property as between one deelr-
ing to pnrchase and another desiring to selL
Hetland t. BUstad* U8 N. W. 422. 42S» 140
Iowa, 411.
^'Market valne" la said to be siieh sum
of money as the prop^ty Is worth in the
market generally to the persons who would
pay the Just and full Talue for what the
property would bring at a fair sale, where
one party wants to sell and the oilier to
boy. Bedhead Bros. v. Wyoming Cattle Inv.
Co., 102 N. W. 144. 147, 126 Iowa, 410 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Little Rock
Junction By. v. Woodruff. 5 S. W. 702, 40
Ark. 300, 4 Am. St Bep. 51; Low v. Ball-
road, 3 AtL 789. 63 N. H. 6G7; Bsch ▼.
Chicago, M. & 8t P. By. Co.. 39 N. W. 129.
72 Wis. 231; Kansas City. W. & N. W. B.
Co. v. Fisher. 30 Pac 111. 49 Kan. 17; Law-
rence y. City of Boston, 119 Mass. 128).
In Tiew of the difficulty of forming a
proper conception of the word ''ralue" and
of ascertaining what is called ''market val-
ue,** where there is no open market recording
numerous transactions, courts have adopted
as the equiyalent of "market value'* the
phrase 'Vhat the property is worth or wUl
sell for as between <me who wants to pur-
chase and one who wants to selL** Milwau-
kee Trust Co. V. City of Milwaukee. 138 N.
W. 707. 710, 151 Wis. 224.
Since the word "market** conveys the
idea of selling, the term "market value*'
would seem to mean the selling value. It
is the price which an article will bring when
offered for sale in the market It is the
hi^est price which those having the ability
and occasion to buy are willing t6 pay.
Brown v. W. T. Weaver Power Co., 62 S. B.
954, 955. 140 N. C. 333 (citing Little Bock
Junction By. v. Woodruff, 5 S. W. 792, 49
Ark. 381, 4 Am. St Bep. 51).
The "market value" of land is the price
that would in all probability result from fair
negotiation, where the stiler is willing to sell
and the buyer desires to buy. Maxon v.
Gates, 116 N. W. 758, 765, 136 Wis. 270.
The term "market value,** as applied to
goods Is the price at which the goods can be
replaced for money in the market Bosen-
kranz v. Jacobowitz, 99 N. T. Supp. 469, 470,
50 Misc. Bep. 580 (citing W^le v. Havlland,
69 N. Y. 448).
"Bonvtor defines 'market value* as a
price established by public salee in the way
of ordinary business, and in ^loan v. Baird,
56 N. E. 758, 162 K X. 830. tha Court of
Appeals said that the market value of prop-
erty la eatabliahed when other property of
the same kind has been the subject of pur-
ohaae or sale to so great an extent and in
so many instances that the value becomes
fixed.** Ban v. Seidenberg, 104 N. Y. Supp.
798. 799. 53 Misa Bep. 386.
The "market value** of an article of mer-
chandise is the price at which its owner or
producer holds it for sale; the price at
which it ia freely offered in the market to
all the world; such price as dealers in the
artl<de are willing to receive and purchasers
are required to pay. when the goods are
bought and sold in the ordinary course of
trade. Under a clause of a charter party
for a steamer, which required the charterer
to pay for the coal in the vessel's bunkers
at the time of her delivery at the current
"market price.** the price actually paid by the
charterer in the port of delivery for coal
bought in the open market to fill the bunk-
ers, and also for other vessels at the same
time* will be accepted as fixing the market
price rather than the price given the own-
ers on mere inquiries without any attempt
to purchase. Glasoow Steam Shipping Co. v.
Tweedie Trading Co.. 154 Fed. 84, 85 (citing
Cliquot's Champagne, 8 WaU. [70 U, S.] 114,
125. 18 L. Ed. 116).
The "market value" of gooda la the price
at which the owner or producer holds them
for sale; the price at which they are freely
offered in the market; euch pricea aa deal-
ers in the gooda are willing to receive and
purchasers are made to pay when the goods
are bought in the ordinary course of trade.
British & Foreign Idarine Ins. Co. v. Mai-
donado & Co.. 162 F. 744, 748. 106 C. a A.
122.
In an action againat a railroad company
for bumiug plaintiff's grass, a witness testi-
fied that the grass had a "market value" and
that the witness had a ''pretty good idea*'
thereof. He was then asked what the mar-
ket value was, and answered that consider-
ing the number of cattle on the land at the
time and what it was used for and was
going to be used for, the grass was worth
from $1.50 to f2 per acre. He then stated,
after objection, that he wanted to state what
kind of cattle plaintiff had there, and what
he was using it for, and again stated that
under such conditions the grass was worth
from 11.50 to $2 per acre. Held, that such
evidence was inadmiasible aa not showing
'^market value;" Texas A P. B. Co. v. Pem-
berton, 96 & W. 1089, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 291.
In an action against a railroad company
for damages to a shipment of cattle, where
it appeared that cattle of that kind were not,
during the season of shipment, bought or
sold at the point of dellvecy. evidence of the
price paid for the cattle at the point of
shipment is admissible on the question of
their actual value, there being no competent
evidenoe af tb^r "market value/' whldx can
MARKET VAIiCA
302
MARKET YALUV
be established only by showing ikhat cattle
of like quality had been bought and sold at
that place daring the season In sufficient
quantitieB, and often enough to establish a
market price. Houston & T. O. R. Co. t.
Crowder (Tex.) 152 S. W. 183, 184.
In an action for the destruction of a
house by fire from a railroad engine, the court
instructed that, as to the dwelling house,
plaintiff's measure of damages was the "rea-
sonable cash value" of the dwelling When de-
stroyed, and the measure of damages for
destruction of the household goods was the
'reasonable value" of said goods at the time
of the destruction. Held, that the instruction
was not erroneous for using the words "cash
value" instead of **market cash value";
**market value" being the cash value for
which an article wlU sell for in cash on the
market, and reasonable "cash value" being
equivalent to reasonable "market cash val-
ue." Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v.
Murray (Tex.) 150 S. W. 217, 2ia
Where a wholesaler bought coal not for
sale in the retail market, but to dealers only,
the market value was the wholesale price
and not the retail one, as between the parties
to the sale. Tuttle-Ghapman Ooal 0>. v.
Coaldale Fuel Co., 118 N. W. 827, 830, 136
Iowa, 382.
The "market ralu^' of an advertising
contract probably means the net value, or
the difference between the stipulated price
and the cost of d<^g the work. In an ac-
tion against a newspaper for breach of con*
tract for the insertion of advertising matter
to be used in the year as the advertiser
might require, rate cards showing the rates
for advertisements of a given length for a
given number of times, but not showing rates
for such a contract as the one in question,
are inadmissible. Boston Outfitting (3o. v.
People & Patc^ot Co., 63 AtL 229, 230, 73 N.
H. 506.
Since the market value of the land con-
demned should be determined from sales ac-
tually made so as to necessitate a demand,
it was proper for an instruction defining
"market value" to include a demand for the
land as a requisite to the existence of a mar-
ket value. Denver N. W. & P. Ry. Co. v.
Howe. 112 Pac 779, 781, 49 Colo. 256 (dUng
5 Words and Phrases, p. 4383).
The "market value of land^' is generally
based upon its extent, the character of the
improvements, its productive qualities, ^nd
upon sales of property in the vicinity. Reed
V. Pittsburg, 0. & W. R. Co., 59 Ati. 1067,
1068, 210 Pa. 211 (citing Pittsburgh, V. & C.
R. Co. V. Vance, 8 Atl. 7W, 115 Pa, 325).
" 'Market value,' as defined by section 19
of the customs administrative act, shall be
construed to mean the export price whenever
goods, wares, and merchandise are sold
wholly for export, or sold in the home mar-
kets only in limited quantities, by reason of
which fSftcts there cannot be established a
market value baaed upon the sale of such
goods, wares, and merdiandise in usual
wholesale quantittes, packed ready for ship-
ment to the United States." United States
V. Havlland & Co., 167 Fed. 414, 417.
The "market value" of merchandise im-
ported from France, as defined in Customs
Administrative Act June 10, 1890, c 407, {
19, does not include the amount of certain
internal revenue imposts of that country
known as the "octroi tax" and the "droit de
vlUe," which are not general in their appli-
cation, but vary with the locality, and which
are not collected if the merchandise is ex-
ported. United States v. R. F. Downing &
Co., 131 Fed. 653, 654.
The "market valued' of logs was tiie
amount which buyers generally agreed to
pay at the time and place In questlan, though
all logs then being sold at that place were
sold on 30, 60, and 90 days' time and not
for cash. Rurr's Ferry, R. & O. Ey. Co. v.
AUen (Tex.) 149 S. W. 368, 861.
While dogs are regarded as property in
this state, they are not generally placed on
the market for sale, and ordinarily have
no "market value," though they may be in
some Instances of value to the owner. Oult
C. ft S. F. Ry. Co. V. Blake^ 96 & W. 583,
694, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 180.
As pvlee At or near tine or place
"'Market value* is said to mean the
price or sum for whldi an equivalent could
be reasonably and fairly purchased at or
near the place where the property stiould
have been delivered and within a reasonable
time after a refusal to deliver." Redhead
Bros. V. Wyoming Cattle Inv. Co., 102 N. W.
144, 147, 126 Iowa, 410 (quoting and adopting
definition in BuUard v. Stone, 8 Pac 17, 67
Cal. 480; Little Rock Junction Ry. v. Wood-
ruff. 5 S. W. 792, 49 Ark. 390, 4 Am. St
Rep. 51).
The market value of an article at any
given time Is fixed by sales made at or about
that time, and the price as fixed by specific
contracts previously Altered into is inadmis-
sible. Carle v. Nelson, 130 N. W. 467, 468,
145 Wis. 593.
Iiitriiisie vmlwe distlasiiiflhed
WhUe the term "market value" is not
synonymous with '^intrinsic value" — ^the one
meaning the actual price at which the com-
modity Is commonly sold and the other its
true, inherent, and essential value, independ-
ent of accident, place or person, the same ev-
erywhere and to every one — ^yet the latter if
so generally a factor in the former that a
thing which has no intrinsic value Is gener-
ally without market value, and therefore,
where a party was prepared to meet an Issne
as to the market value of animals, the re-
fusal of a continuance to procure evidence
MARKET VALUS
808
ICARKST VAIiUB
to meet an tane m to tbelr Intiliurie Taliie
pres^ited by a trial amendment was not pr^*
udidaL Ghicaso, R. I. A P. By. Co. ▼. Olem-
entB A CanoU. 115 & W. 064^ 006^ 08 Tex.
Civ. ApiK 148.
Pxioe at f oroeA sale
'^The 'market value' of land la naoally
declared to be, not wbat the land would
bring at a forced aale^ but what it would
bring In the hands of a prudent seller,
at liberty to fix the time and conditions of
sale. What property would bring at a fiiir
public sale where one party wanted to sell
and another wanted to buy may be taken as
a criterion of its market valua" Madison-
yiUe, £L A B. B. Co. V. Ross» 108 S. W. 880,
831, 126 Ky. 138, 18 L. R. A. (N. a) 420.
The ''market value'' of land is not the
price it would bring at public auction and
forced sale fbr cash, but such price as could
be obtained for it from the usual and ordi-
nary terms of private sale. Metropolitan St
By. Co. V. Walsh, M & W. 880, 868, 197 Mo.
3d2 (citing and approving the definition in
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Porter, 20 & W. 668,
112 Mo. 869).
Pirioe »t free sales
" 'Market value' means the fair value as
between one who wants to purchase and one
who wants to sell ; not wh^t could be obtain-
ed for it under peculiar circumstances when
a greater than its fair price could be obtain-
ed, nor ite q>eculative value, nor a value ob-
tabied from necessity of another, but ite
present value at a sale which a prudent own-
er would make if he had the power of elec-
tion as to the time and terms." Madlson-
yUle, H. A E. R. Co. V. Ross, 103 S. W. 830,
126 Ky. 188, 13 Ii. R. A. (N. B.) 420 (quoting
and adopting the definition in 15 Cyc. p. 685).
The "market value" of property Is de-
fined as "the price which it will bring when
It is offered by sale by one who desires but
Is not obliged to sell and is bought by one
who is under no necessity of having it"
Guyandotte Valley Ry. Co. v. Buskirk, 60 S.
E. 621, 626, 67 W. Va. 417, 110 Am. St Rep.
785 (citing Stewart v. Ohio River R. Co., 18
a B. 604, 38 W. Va. 438; Lewis, Em. Dom.
478; Pitteburgh, V. ft 0. Ry. Co, v. Vance, 8
Aa 764, 116 Pa. 325; Lawrence v. City of
Boston, 119 Mass. 126; Little Rock Junction
Ry. V. Woodruff, 6 8. W. 702. 49 Ark. 381, 4
Am. St Rep. 51; 6 Words and Phrases, p.
4383) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Chamblin,
60 8. B. 727, 729, 106 Va. 42; Idaho-Western
Ry. Co. V. Columbia Conference of Evangel-
ical Lutheran Augustana Synod, 119 Pac. 60,
62, 20 Idaho, 668, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 497; In
re New York, W. ft B. Ry. Co., 136 N. Y.
Snpp. 234, 239, 161 An). Div. 50; In re Block
Bounded by Avenue A ft First Ave., 122 N.
T. Supp. S21, 383, 66 Misc. Rep. 488; Calor
OU ft <3as Co. V. Franzell, 109 S. W. 328, 882,
128 Ky. 715, 86 L. R. A* (N. S.) 456.
The value which the law giveo tn fixing
damages for the destruction of property is
''market value," which is that reasonable
sum whidi the property will bring on a fair
sale when sold by a man willing, but not
obliged, te sell, to a man willing, but not
compelled, to buy. Allen v. Chicago ft N. W.
Ry. Co.. 129 M. W. 1094, 1096, 145 Wis. 263.
In the absence of proof that articles in
controversy furnished by claimant for dece-
dent's funeral were not sold under fair trade
conditions, or that competition had been sti-
fled or prices otherwise Inflated, their reason-
able value was their ''market value" at the
place where they were sold, by which Is
meant the prices which the articles cus-
tomarily brought at the time. Wagoner Un-
dertaking Co. V. Jones, 114 S. W. 1049, 1051,
184 Mo. App. lOL
Our seneral tax act practleally defines
the "market value of land" aa the price it
would sell for at a fair and bona fide sale
by private contractor." Long Dock Co. v.
State Board of Assessors, 78 AtL 68, 67, 78
N. J. Law, 44.
Piiee in
rket
The "market value" of secondhand goods
is what it will cost one to purchase them in
the open market, and the testimony of a sec-
ondhand dealer that he had examined sec-
ondhand furniture, and that it was worth a
specified sum, when new, and a specified sum
in the condition it was in, without stating
whether he meant what he would give, or
what he would ask for it, does not prove
market value. Souther v. Hunt (Tex.) 141 8.
W. 359, 861.
Code, i 1306, provides that all property
subject to texation shall be valued at its ac-
tual value, which means ite value in the mar-
ket in the ordinary course of trade. Held,
that the market value in "ordinary course of
trade" can have reference to nothing but the
selling value; that is, the sum which in all
probability can be realised therefrom if ex-
posed for sale on the open market First Nat
Bank of EsthervUle v. City Council of Bs-
therviUe, 112 N. W. 829, 832. 136 Iowa, 203.
In the stetement of the rule that, where
a common carrier fails to deliver merchan-
dise within a reasonable time, the measure of
damages is the depreciation in the market
value between the date on which the delivery
should have been made and the date on which
it was made^ the term "market value" means
the value at which the article would be sold
in the open market in the auAntitles as car-
ried, and where the articles shipped are mer-
chandise in large quantities, it is improper
to measure the damages by the market value
of such merchandlBe when sold at retell.
Chicago, R. I. ft P. Ry. Co. v. Broe, 86 Pac.
441, 443, 16 Okl. 25.
"Market value" is the highest price ob-
teinable in the open market for cash, and aji
MAMCfeT VALUB
804
ICABEfiT VAIiCT
Instmctloii tlutt the market TahM of Umd is
the highest price which the land wUl hrtng
in the market regardless of the eanses that
contribute to its value is Incorrect Lands
may bring in the market under peculiar cir-
cumstances and on very favorable terms
much more than a fair cash value. Dadjr v«
Ck>ndit, 70 N. B. 1088, 1002, 209 lU. 488.
▼alne syaLoaymotts
Value as importing market value, see
Value.
The words "value" and "market value"
are often used Interchangeably, and both as
being the equivalent of "actual value" and
"salable value." Hetland v. Bilstod, 118 N.
W. 422, 428, 140 Iowa, 41L
The words "market value," as used in
Pol. Ck)de, I 8627, providing 'that the propor-
tionate value of the stock of domestic cor-
porations for purposes of assessment or tax-
ation should be Its **market value," are syn-
onymus with the terms "value" and "fall cadi
value" as used ^ section 8617. Crocker v.
Scott, 87 Pac 102, 106, 149 Gal. 676.
. "Market value" is synonymous with the
terms "value" and 'Mrull cash value*" defined
by Pol. Ck>de, t 8617, as the amount at which
the property would be taken in payment of a
just debt from a solvit debtor, and the mar-
ket value of stock, fairly represents its full
cash value in absence of exceptional cir-
cumstances giving it an abnormal value, so
that any inference of fraud by the placing of
an excessive valuation on stock, taken as a
basis for assessing a corporate franchise, is
rebutted by a showing that the value of the
franchise was ascertained by the approved
method of deducting from the aggregate mar-
ket value of its stock, the value of its tangi-
ble property, and taking the difference as the
franchise value. City of Los Angeles v. West-
em Union OU Co., 118 Pac. 720, 721, 161 CaL
204.
The expressions "reasonable worth" or
"reasonable value" are not so broad as "mar-
ket value." Alcon v. Koons, 82 N. E). 02, 06,
84 N. B. 1104. 42 Ind. App. 687.
The two expressions "reasonable selling
value" and "market value" are in some meas-
ure synonymous, but the usage of trade has
afilxed a technical meaning to "market vul-
ue." The selling value of an articde is often
equivalent to its actual value, and should be
so regarded in the case of a seller suing to
recover for stoves specially made for a buy-
er, and which the latter refused to accept;
that being necessary in order that the seller
may be reimbursed fully. St Louis Range
Co. V. Kline-Drummond Mercantile Co., 96 B.
W. 1040, 1043, 120 Mo. App. 488.
When applied to property, and no qual-
ification is expressed or implied, "value"
means the price which the property could
command In the market. By the term "value
of stock" is usually meant market valuer
Tezt-wiitsrs use the t«nns '^value^ and "mar-
ket valued' as interehasgeahle, and both as
being equivalents of actual value, salable
viKlue, and, in proper cases, rental value.
In an action against a railroad oompany for
killing horses, plaintiff alleged that at the
time they were killed "they were then and
there each respectively of the reasonable val-
ue as follows, vis.: One • • • was of
the value of $376, and the other • • •
was of the value of $176." Held that, in the
absence of an exception thereto, proof either
of the market value of the horses or of tbe
intrinsic value was admissible, but that in
the absence of any showing that they had no
market value nor real value, and that they
cannot be reproduced or replaced, it was er-
ror to admit evidence as to the value of the
horses to plaintiff. Miaaouri, K. ft T. Ry.
Co. of Texas v. Crews, 120 8. W. 1110^ 1111,
64 Tex. Civ. App. 648 (quoting and adopting
definitions in 8 Words and Phrases, pp. 7278,
7279).
"Market value" is aynonymous with the
actual money value of property. All artides
of personal property, however, do not have
an established "market value" fixed by cor^
rent sales of such property in the ordinary
course of business, so that the price current-
ly realised can be looked to In asoertainmeat
of the actual value. Hie "market value" of
property is established when other property
of the same kind has been the subject of pnr
chase or sale to so great an extent, and in
so many instances, that the value becomes
fixed. Hie damages for wrongful attach-
ment of a stock of goods, so far as they ars
concerned, is not what they brought at the
sale under the attadiment, or what they
would have sold at retail, but their actual
value at the time and place of seizure, which
to the extent that the goods were new, is the
cost of replacing them (that is, their whole-
sale price, plus freight); such cost, however,
being only a relevant circumstance as to the
value of old and shopworn goods, which have
no "market value," so that an instruction fix-
ing the damages at the "market value^" and
defining this as the value of the goods when
sold in the way of ordinary business for cash
in the dty of the seizure, is erroneous. State
ex rel. Clark v. Parsons^ 84 & W. 1010, 1021,
100 Mo. App. 432 (citing State, to Use of Hay-
den, V. Smith, 31 Mo. 666; Walker v. Bo^
land, 21 Mo. 280; Spencer v. Vance, 67 Mo.
427; Watson v. Harmon, 86 Mo. 443; SUte
ex rel. Rogers v. Gage, 62 Mo. App. 464;
State ex rel. Copening v. Ryley, 76 Mo. App.
412, 416 ; Simpson v. Alexander, 11 Pae 171,
36 Kan. 226; 2 Joyce, Damages, S 1086; Gray
V. Central R. Co.. 62 N. B. 556, 167 N. Y. 483;
Sloan V. Balrd, 66 N. B. 752, 162 N. X. ^27).
In an action against a carrier to reco^^r
for damages to a car load of cattie, an <7
struction was given that the measure of dam-
ages proper to be applied was the difference
between the market value of the eattie^ had
UAXKBT VALUl
MABXBTABIJB
flftey Iwea dftU^ered In vmgvr coniMoB, «nd
fbe amkit Yalue 1b Hm oindltloB la wbleh
they wara ^Uvwed. Held, tiiat tbe IsBtnio-
tlOQ was not oioBeous as asliig the tem
'^matket Talae," ftw, aa ai^Uad te cattle, ttie
market Talne la the actual valiie; neither
waa It erreneeve becauee It did not lUnlt tte
Tight of recovery to siich daaages aa were
doe to defBhdanf 8 fault* where there was no
proof that the damagee were not all doe to
defendant* a fault. Oolsch t. Chicago, M. A
St P. Rjr. Co. (Iowa) 117 N. W. 281, 284.
An Instruction that the damages for land
mot taken should be determined by ascertain-
ing tlie "market value" of the part not taken
aa it waa when the remainder was taken, and
deducting therefrom its market yalae after
the taking, which was punuant to Code Civ.
Proc I 1249, except that the quoted words
were sabstltuted for '"actual value** used In
the statute, was not objectionable for utfng
the substituted words; the law holding the
market value as equivalent to the actual val-
ue. Sacramento Scrathem R. Co. v. Hellbron,
104 Pac. 970, 982, 166 Cal. 406.
In condemnation proceedings to obtain
property for a bridge, an instruction — that
the '^market value** of the property means its
actual value. Independent of the location df
plaintiff's bridge and approaches thereon;
that is, the fair value of the property as be-
tween one who wants to purchase and the
one who wants to sell it; not what It could
be obtained for in peculiar circumstances,
when greater than its fair price could be ob-
tained, not its speculative value; not the val-
ue obtained through the necessities of anoth-
er, nor, on the other hand. Is It to be limited
to that price which the property would bring
when forced off at auction under the ham-
mer— Is correct Southern Illinois St M.
Bridge Co. t. Stone, 92 S. W. 476» 477, 194
Mo. 175.
Act Bfay 20, 1890 (Ky. St. 1908, | 3915),
prohibiting trusts to regulate the price of
any article or to limit the amount of any
article, and Acts 1906, p. 429, c. U7, legalis-
ing the pooling of farm products, when con-
strued In connection with Const | 198, re-
quiring the Legislature to pass laws to pre-
vent trusts, pools, etc., to depreciate any ar-
ticle below its '^al value," or to enhance its
cost above its real value, are not invalid be-
cause uncertain, for the standard fixed is
**real value," which is "market value,** at a
sale under normal conditions, unaffected by
any combination or producers or dealers
whose object is to create an abnormal con-
dition In the market, and is susceptible of
proof by proof of pie-existing facts. The
court In distinguishing this holding from a
previous decision declaring a statute prohib-
iting railroads from charging "more than a
just and reasonable rate of toll*' onoonstltu-
tional, because of uncertainty in determin-
ing what would be a Just and reasonable rate
8 Wns.ft P.2o Seb.— 20
of tolL ""Xhare la a aurked dlftetanee be-
tween the qfaalitles of the 'real value' of aa
article^ and 'reasonable compensation' for a
SMiiuj. The latter may depend alone upon
the oplniott of the trier of the fact; the for-
mer is Itself a fact susceptible of proof and
exact ascertainment" Commonwealth v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 115 S. W. 708, 711,
712, 131 Ky. a&l, ISa Am. St B^ 266.
Value tor any use *
In estimating the market value of prop-
erty, all capabilities of the property and all
uses to which it may be applied are to be
considered. Seaboard Air Use By. ▼. Cham-
blln, eO S. S* 727, 729, 108 Va. 42.
'The 'market value of property* Is its
value for any use to which it may be adapts
ed, and in estimatiDg its value all the uses
of which the property is susceptible should
be considered, and not merely the condition
in which it may be at the time and the use
to which it may have been put by the own-
«.'* In re Westiake Ave., 9Z Pac. 279, 281,
40 Wash. 144 (quoting and adopting the def-
Itiition In Seattle & M. R. Co. v. Murphine,
aO Pac. 720, 4 Wash. 448).
**Market value,'* within the meaning of
tlie rule In cKpropriation proceedings by a
railway company that the criterion of value
ia the fair market value of the property at
the date of the Institution of the suit, in
view of any and all uses to which it may be
applied or adapted, exclusive of any increase
in value caused by the construction of the
proposed railroad through the property, does
not mean speculative value, but the fair val-
ue of tbe property as it stands, between one
willing tO' purchase and one willing to sell.
Opelousas, O. A N. E. R. Co. v. Bradford, 48
South. 79, 80, 118 La. 600 (citing Orleans ft
J. R. Co. V. Jefferson A L. P. R. Co., 26 South.
278, 61 La. Ann. 1016; Louisiana Ry. A Nav.
Co. V. Xavier Realty Co., 89 South. 1, 115 La.
Valve detenalaed Vj sttaatioB, oeadi-
While the "market value" of property is
the price for which It may be sold in the
market, it is often difficult to determine
"market value,** because there may be no gen-
eral demand for the property, or it may be
such as is only valuable for a specified pur-
pose because of its formation, location, or
other specific, natural or artificial adaptibil-
ity to a particular use, so that, where no
general market value can be ascertained,
such elements may be considered In arriving
at its general value. Portneuf-Marsh Valley
Irr. Co. V. Portneuf Irrigating Co., 114 Pac.
19, 20, 10 Idaho, 48S.
KABKBTABUB
"Marketable** and ''merchantable^* are
practically synonymous. In an action for
breach of contract to purchase hay, defend-
ants.alleged that plaintiff agreed to sell them
MASKETABIiB TITLE
806
MARKBTABI^B TITLES
merehantable liay, and that the hay shipped
was not as represented. Held, that a request
by plaintiff to an expert witness: "State
whether or not this hay yon saw there is con-
sidered as marketable hay here in Baker
City, compared with other kind that is sold
here" — was not objectionable; the persons
who "considered** the hay merchantable be-
ing himself and tho86 who, according to his
previous testimeny, he had seen purchasing
such hay at Baker City. Eaton v. Black-
burn, 88 Pac. 303, 304, 49 Or. 22 (citing
Webst Int Diet).
BtARKETABIiE TITLE
See Qood and Marketable Title.
A "marketable title*' is one free from
reasonable doubt. Connely t. Putnam, 111
S. W. 164, 105, 61 Tex. Civ. App. 233 ; Cum-
mlngs V. Dolan, 100 Pac. 980, 991, 62 Wash.
496, 132 Am. St Rep. 986; Wadick y. Mace,
103 N. Y. Supp. 889, 893, 118 App. Div. 777;
Sprickerhofl v. Ctordon, 105 N. Y. Supp. 586,
688, 120 App. Div. 748; Russell v. Wales, 100
N. Y. Supp. 785, 788; Howe v. Coates, 107
N. W. 397, 403, 97 Minn. 385, 4 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1170, 114 Am. St. Rep. 723; Wanser y.
De Nyse, 80 N. B. 1088, 188 N. Y. 878, 117
Am. St Rep. 871 (quoting and adopting def-
inition in Fleming y. Bumham, 2 N. JS. 905,
100 N. Y. 1, 10).
A "marketable title" is one that is free
from reasonable doubt; one that a prudent
person with full knowledge of all the facts
would be willing to accept Hubachek y.
Mazbass Security Bank, 134 N. W. 640, 642,
117 Minn. 163, Ann. C^as. 1913D, 187.
A "marketable tiUe" is a title not sub-
ject to such reasonable doubt as would cre-
ate a just apprehension of its validity in the
mind of a reasonable^ prudent, and intelli-
gent person; one that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence, guided by compe-
tent legal advice, would be willing to take
and pay the fair value of the land for. Sum-
my y. Ramsey, 101 Pac 606, 507, 63 Wash.
93 (quoting Eggers v. Busch, 89 N. S2. 619,
164 IlL 604).
A "marketable title** is one that is free
from reasonable doubt There is reasonable
doubt when there is uncertainty as to some
defects appearing in the course of its deduc-
tion, and the doubt be such as affects the
value of the land, or will interfere with its
sale. Qrifflth v. Maxfleld, 39 S. W. 852, 63
Ark. 551.
The books define a marketable title, as
one that is not only good, but indubitable,
Ormsby v. Graham, 98 N. W. 724, 727, 123
Iowa, 202 (citing Swayne y. Lyon, 67 Pa. [17
P. F. Smith] 436; Vought y. WUllams. 24 N.
B. 196, 120 N. Y. 253, 8 L. R. A. 691, 17 Am.
St Rep. 684; Tomlin v. McOhord's Repre-
sentatives, 28 Ky. [5 J. J. Marsh.] 135).
Promise to convey a "marketable titie^*
In an executory land contract ocmtemplates
a title free from reasonable doubt, wUdi is
not only valid in fact, bat which can be again
sold to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged
to a ];)er8on of reasonable pmdenoe. A UUe
will not be considered unmarketable unless
the danger of litigation is real or apparent
and to be apprehended because of some ir-
regularity in l^al proceedings or sale there-
of, or because of some matter of fact the real
truth as to which cannot be ascertained with
reasonable certainly. Cowdery y. Greenlee,
55 S. B. 918, 920, 126 Ga. 786^ 8 K R. A. (N.
S.) 137 (citing Swayne v. I^ron, 67 Pa. 436;
Vought y. Williams, 24 N. B. 195, 120 N. Y.
253, 8 L. R. A. 591, 17 Am. St Rep. 634).
A "marketable titie*' In equity is one In
which there is no doubt involved either as
a matter of hiw or fact A titie need not in
fact be bad in order to make it unmarket-
able, and it is unmarketable if a reasonably
prudent man, familiar with the fkcts and
apprised of the question of law involved,
would not accept the titie in the ordinary
course of business; it being sofflelent that
there was a doubt or uncertainty snlBcient
to form the basis of litigation. In an action
to recover back purchase money for failure
of the vendor to furnish a marketable titie,
where the parties whose possible claims may
affect the titie are not before the court, the
question of law on which the title turns will
not be determined, but the titie will be deem-
ed unmarketable if the question is one on
which it is aiyparent that other courts might
entertain a different opinion. Williams v.
Bricker, 109 Paa 998, 999, 83 Kan. 53, 30 L.
a A. (N. S.) 343.
''A ^marketable titie* is one that is free
from reasonable doubt The purchaser is not
compelled to take property the possession of
which he may be compelled to defend by liti-
gation. He should have titie that will enable
tim to hold his land in peace, and, if he
Ishes to sell, be reasonably sure that no
flaw or doubt will arise to disturb its market
value.'* Hence a titie which depends upon
the part payment of interest on a mortgage
and the bar of limitations is not free from
reasonable doubt. Godfrey v. Rosenthal, 97
N. W. 365, 366. 17 S. D. 452 (dtlng Vought
V. Wmiams, 24 N. E. 195, 120 N. Y. 253, 8
L. R. A. 591, 17 Am. St Rep. 634).
A title is not "marketable," when it ex-
poses the party holding it to litigation.
Russell V. Wales, 100 N. Y. Supp. 785, 788
(quoting Salisbury v. Ryon, 94 N. Y. Supp.
352, 106 App. Div. 448).
As "marketable titie** is one about which
there can be no fair^and reasonable doubt,
a titie in litigation is not a "marketable'*
one. Corbett v. McGregor (Tex.) 84 S. W.
278, 279.
To constitute "marketable titie,** the titie
should put the purchaser in all reasonable
security and protect him against annoying
MABKBTABUS TITLE
80T
MABKBTABIiD TITUS
though tinsnccessfnl salts, and sadi titto as
will enable him not only to hold his land
but to sell it and to be reasonat)ly sore that
no flaw will come np to distnrfo its market-
able yalne. Hewitt v. Parsley, 60 AtL 619»
820, 101 Md. 200.
A "marketable title" is one appearing to
be snch by the recoixi of conveyances or other
public memorial, and not one resting in
paroL I/>ckhart v. Ferrey, 115 Pac. 431, 433,
50 Or. 179.
"A 'marketable title' in equity is one in
which there is no doubt involred, either as
to matter of law or fact'* Where the ven-
dor's title rested upon a deed executed by a
foreign assignee noU^ by virtue of an order
of a court in the state of Iowa, and before
the action was tried the vendor obtained a
judgment quieting his tittle upon service by
publication against the foreign assignor, the
assignee^ and the party to whom the assignee
had conveyed, and asked for specific per-
formance against the purchaser, the title
tendered is not a "marketable tlUe." McNutt
V. l>feUans, 108 Paa 834, 886, 82 Kan. 424.
A title is not "marketable*' where error
in the name of a grantee In the vendor's
chain of title can be proven by paroL
Walters v. MitcheU, 02 Pac. 316, 317, 6 GaL
App. 410.
Where a corporation's deed of real es-
tate, though only prima facie evidence of
title, has remained unquestioned for more
than seven years, it is sufficient to evidence a
"marketable title," since, to render a title
marketable, it is only necessary that it diall
be free from reasonable doubt, and the pur-
chaser is not entitled to demand a title ab-
Bolutely free from every technical suspicion,
but can only demand such title as a reason-
ably well informed and intelligent purchaser
acting upon business principles would be will-
ing to accept Milton v« Crawford, 118 Paa
32, 36^ 65 Wash. 145.
A vendor whose lands were subject to an
easement to another to enter on the land and
construct water ditches or water pipes from
or across the land, under which a water pipe
was maintained across the land, did not pos-
sess a marketable title; "marketable title"
being defined as a term which, when applied
to real estate, is used to designate a title
free from reasonable doubt Where a vendor
agreed to convey "full fe»«imple title to the
land," which he could not do because of the
existence of an easement, the question of
"marketable title" was not involved. Win-
gacd V. Ck>peland, 116 Paa 670, 672, 64 Wash.
214.
A vendor agreed to give a "marketable
title.*^ The premises consisted of a comer lot
in a city on which a building stood. The
lower portion of the building was of stones
The outer surface of tae stonework projected
two inches over the stnet Una and within
that of the sidewalk, which might be with-
drawn from the use of the public. 1'tte eu-
croachment did not affect easements of light,
air, and access possessed by adjoining prop-
erty ownera The building had been standing
for about five years without objection from
the city. Held, that the possibiUty of ac-
tion by the city to remove the encroachment
was so remote that it should be disregarded
in determining the marketability of the titla
Bmpire.Realty Corp, v. Sayre, 95 N. T. Supp.
371, 374, 107 App. Div. 415.
Where one having a leasehold estate
mortgaged the land and thereafter acquired
the fee, and on foreclosure all persons who
could claim under him were made parties
and the surplus was distributed to all en-
titled to It as representing the mortgagor's
interest, the foreclosure title was a "market-
able" one. Hirth v. Zeller, 05 N. T. Supp.
747, 748, 108 App. Div. 198.
A contract of sale of land, requiring a
conveyance by "a good and sufiicient general
warranty deed, in fee simple," is satisfied by
the giving of a good and "mai^etable title,"
which is a title not open to reasonable doubt ;
and such is a title by prescription, with ir-
regularities in the title only prior to the
commencement of the period of limitations ;
and an "indubitable title" — that is, one open
to no possible objection, however trivial — is
not required. Jackson v. Greek, 94 N. B. 416,
421, 47 Ind. App. 541.
Where a vendor tendered title under the
foreclosure of a first mortgage, leaving out-
standing a sheriff's deed to. a third person,
executed on foreclosure of the second mort-
gage, such deed, being a claim under Judicial
sale and not showing its invalidity on its
face, or in connection with its first foreclo-
sure, constituted a cloud, and rendered the
vendor's title unmarketable. Stack v. Hickey,
138 N. W. 1011, 1012, 151 Wis. 347.
The pendency of an action for partition
against vendors under contract to convey real
estate, commenced by service of summons on
them, in which a Us pendens was filed with
a verified complaint, averring that the deed
and will of a former owner through which
the vendors derived title were induced by
fraud and undue infiuence, is a doud on the
title of the vendors, continuing until the time
has expired within which an appeal may be
taken from a Judgment dismissing the action
or until a second action begun before the ex-
piration of that time has been disposed of,
and the purchaser is not bound to accept title
from them at his peril or to seek out the evi-
dence of the validity or invalidity of the title.
Whalen v. Stuart, 108 N, Y. Supp. 355, 357,
123 App. Div. 446.
Under Acts 1896, c. 810, relative to tax-
ation and sales for taxes by a municipal cor-
poration, and requiring that after the sale
and payment of taxes, penalties, and costs,
the treasurer. shall delivsr to the purchaser
MARKBTABI/B TITLE
308
KARBIAOB
ft certificate of purdiafle and the mayor glvo
a deed unless the properly diall be redeemed
within one year from the day of sale and
there is no record of the proceedhiga of snch
sale save the certificate and deed, a title
based alone on such certificate and deed is
not such "marketable title*' at a purchaser
can be compelled to accept in a suit for
specific performance. A mere possibility that
notice of the sale of land for taxes was not
given the o?mer as expressly required by
Laws 1885, p. 699, c. 406, f 7, is not sufiadent
to render the marketability of the title doubt-
ful. Rosenblum y. Eisenberg, 108 N. Y. Supp.
350, 352, 123 App. Dlv. 896 (dting Maupin,
MarkeUbiUty of Tltie, p. 707).
A notice of lis pendens reciting that an
action had been commenced to foreclose a
mortgage on certain land did not render the
owner's title unmarketable, where the con-
tract provided that the property was to be
taken subject to the mortgage sought to be
foreclosed, and where consult to the discon-
tinuance of the foreclosure suit had been de-
livered to the vendor and an order of dia-
continuance entered. Weissberger v. Wal-
lach, 108 N. Y. Supp. 887, 888, 124 App. Div.
382.
The boundary lines of a city lot were lo-
cated as early as 1822, and have since been
acquiesced in by the owners of the adjacent
lots on both sides. For over 60 years the
owners and their predecessors in title have
been in actual peaceable possession of the
entire premises, and during that time no-
body else has claimed any interest to any
part thereof, nor, to the knowledge of the
owners or of a contract purchaser, is there
any person who can have any claim of title
against the owners. Held, that the owners
have a good and marketable title to the prem-
ises, though a deed in 1822 erroneously de-
scribed the lot as one foot narrower than
it really was, and the mistake was repeated
in subsequent conveyances. Taub v. Spec-
tor, 108 N. Y. Supp. 723, 124 App. Dlv. 168
(citing Wentworth v. Braun, 79 N. Y. Sopp.
489, 78 App. Div. 634, affirmed 67 N. B. 1091,
175 N. Y. 515; Well v. Radley, 62 N. Y.
Supp. 398, 31 App. Div. 25, affirmed 57 N.
B. 1128, 163 N. Y. 582; Katz v. Kaiser, 48
N. B. 532, 154 N. Y. 294; Meyer v. Boyd, 4
N. Y. Supp. 328, 51 Hun, 291).
Where a title depended on foreclosure
proceedings, in which jurisdiction of the
owners of the equity was not obtained be-
cause of failure to comply with Code Civ.
Proc. § 442, prescribing the requisites of an
oirder for publication of summons, it was un-
marketable. Fink V. Wallach, 95 N. Y. Supp.
872, 873, 47 Misc. Rep. 247.
As yerfeot titla.
See Perfect Title.
BCARKETERS
The term "marketers,** as tised in an
order for good^i reading, <'If reasonable ^ip
to<mM*row ThuriMiay foar to six loads *mar-
keters,' " is to be construed a« meanizig cat-
tla sudi at the person sending the order
would want to sell to the reti^ trade. The
term distinguishes tlie cattle for that trade
from those which are to be exported. *'Mar^
keters" are supposed to weigh about 1,200
pounds and "exporters" about 1,400 pounds.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. N. Lehman
& Bro., 67 Aa 241, 242, 106 Md. 818| 14 Ann.
Gas. 786.
MARRED PHYSICALLY
The words "marred physically^ mean
the same as the word "disfigurement.'* Cul-
len V. Higgins, 74 N. B. 606-TOO, 21« IlL T8.
MARRIAGE
Bee Celestial Marriage; Oommon-Law
Marriage; Contract of Marriage ; Dar-
ing Marriage; Moral Marriage; Pa-
triarchal Marriage; Plural Marriage;
Polygamous Marriage ; Prohibited Mai^
riage; Putative Marriage; Bight Ac-
quired by Marriage.
See, also, Bonds of Bfotrimony; Matri-
mony.
"Marriage** is the union of opposite sex-
es, and sexual intercourse is the distinguish-
ing feature of the union. Williams y. Wil-
liams, 99 S. W. 42, 44, 121 Mo. App. 349
(quoting and adopting definition In Nelson,
Dlv. & Sep.).
" 'Marriage* being in Its nature p^ma-
nent and the most important of all dvil re-
lations, the law will not lightly allow tbe
inducements which bave led up to it to be
disturbed.'' Wel<di V. Mann, 92 8. W. 98,
101, 193 Mo. 304 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in Cohen ▼. Knox« 27 Pac. 215, 90 CU.
266, 18 li. B. A. 711).
When a man and woman intend to marry
and live together as husband and wife, but
their intention is frustrated by the existence
of some unknown impediment, and after the
Impediment is removed the same Intent con-
tinues and the parties continue to live to-
gethepr as husband and wife, an actual '*mar-
riage" results. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain,
62 AU. 680, 681, 68 N. J. Bq. 736, 8 L^ R. A.
(N. S.) 244, lit Am. St Bep. 658^ 6 Ann. Caa
488.
As a oiril eooLtraet
"Marriage'* is a formal declaration or
contract by which act a man and woman
join in wedlock. Lynch v. Knoop, 43 South.
252, 253, 118 La. 611, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 480,
118 Am. St. Rep. 391, 10 Ann. Cas. 807.
"'Biarriage^ in this state is a dvil con-
tract by one man and one woman compietent
to contract, whereby they are mutually bound
to each other so long as th^ both shall live
for the discharge to each otiier and to the
public of' tha duties and obUgatlona which
MABRIAOB
80B
KARBIAaB
b7 the law flow from said contract** In re
Imbodoi's Estate, 86 S. W. 268, 266^ lU Mo.
App. 220 (dtlng Banks y. Galbraith, 01 8.
W. 106, 149 Mo. 636; State y. Bittick, 15 8.
W. 325, 108 Mo. 188, 11 L. R. A. 587, 23 Am.
St Rep. 869; Dyer ▼. Brannock, 66 Mo. 801,
27 Am. Rep.
Marriage, wbile from its very nature a
sacred obligation, is neyertheless, in most
dvilized nations, a civil contract and nsnally
regalated by law. Upon it society may be
said to be bnilt &nd out of its fmits spring
social relations, and sodal obligattons and
duties, with which government is necessarily
required to deal. In re De Laveaga's Estate,
75 Pac. 790, 795, 142 OaL 158 (citing Rey-
nolds v. United States, 96 U. 8. 145, 25 L. Ed.
244).
Marriage is a civil contract and the wife
owes to the husband the same full perform-
ance of marital duties that he owes to her.
Richardson v. Richardson, 114 N. Y. Supp.
912, 014.
Aa between the immediate parties, "mar-
riage" is, in law, a civil contract Nelson v.
Brown, 51 South. 860, 368, 164 Ala. 897, 137
Am. St Rep. 61.
Code, I 3139, defines ''marriage'* as a
civil contract P^g v. Pegg, 115 N. W. 1027,
1028, 138 Iowa. 572.
As a civftl isMtitatlMi
Marriage is a social institation or status,
in which, because the foundations of the
family and the domestic relations rest upon
it, the commonwealth has a deep Interest to
see that its integrity is not jaopardised.
Coe V. mil, 86 N. BL 040, 060, 201 Mass. 15.
'"Marriage* is an Institution in which
the public have an interest** This is shown
by the safeguard which the statute has
thrown around the contract and its dissolu-
tion. Bacon v. Bacon, 86 N. E. 1080, 48 Ind.
App. 218.
As a etvU relatAra
"The 'marriage contract* onoe entered
into becomes a relation rather than a con-
tract and invests each party with a status
toward the other and society at large, in-
volving duties and responsibilities, whi<di
are no longer matt^ for private regulation
Imt concern the commonwealth.'* Coy v.
Humphreys, 125 8. W. 877, 879, 142 Mo.
App. 92.
As a eliil stains
In (jhristian nations marriage la not
treated as a mere contract to be susp^ided
^r dissolved, at pleasure, but rather as a
status based on public necessity, and con-
trolled by law for the benefit of society at
large. People v. Oese, 89 N. B. 638, 640, 241
111. 279, 25 li. R. A. (N. S.) 578.
Marriage is a status resulting from a
^iontract to marry entered into by a man and
'vomaa a^pable of making auoh a contnct
and cohabitation does not of itself oonstitnte
marriage. Ctompten v. Benham (Ind.) 85 N.
EL 866,867.
Under Ck>nst art 16, f 51, and Rev. St
1895, art 2396, defining a homestead, the
homestead right of a married woman rests
upon the fact that she has the status of a
wife, and that as such she actually used and
occulted the 200-acre homestead for the pur-
pose of a home^ at the time of its attempted
alienation, and did not join in the execution
of the conveyance or in any way assent
thereto; the term "marriage^* meaning the
civil status of a man and woman lawfully
united in the relation of husband and wif^,
and "wifehood" being defined as the state of
being a wtfe. McGradcen v. Ta^or (Tex.)
146 8. W. 693, 695.
Oontraet distlBffaislied
Wilson's Rev. A Ann. St 1908, c 51, art.
1, I ], par. 3482, provides that marriage is
a personal relation arising out of a civil con-
tract differing from all other contracts to
such an extent that the rule that prohibited
contracts are void does not apply thereto.
Hunt v. Hunt 100 Pac. 541, 543. 23 Oki 490,
22 U R. A. (N. S.) 1202.
Wilson's Rev. A Ann. St 1908, c 51, art
1, i 8, par. 3484, prohibits any male under
the age of 18 years, and any female under
the age of 15 years, to marry. Chapter 51,
art 1, I 16, par. 8497, makes it criminal to
solemnise or enter into a marriage contrary
to foregoing provisions. Held, that while a
marriage of a youth of 16 and a girl of 14
was illegal, it was voidable only, and not void.
Hunt V. Hunt 100 Pac. 541, 548, 28 Okl. 490,
22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1202.
ie-<lapaelt7 of yavtiea
"Marriage is not a civU contract SKcept
in so ftir aa the relation is based on the
agreemJBUt of the parties. It is true the stat-
ute (section 7289, BumsT Ann. St 1901) de-
clares marriage to be a dvil contract but
the statute itself takes it out of the clause
of simple contracts by providing that it may
be entered into by persons under age." El-
kenbury v. Bums, 70 N. B. 837, 888, 33 Ind.
App. 69.
In an action by parents to recover for
the death of a child 13 years old, it is un-
necessary to allege that the child was unmar-
ried; Rev. St 1890, | 4311, providing that
marriage is in law a civil contract to which
the consent of parties capable In law of con-
tracting is essential, not giving the right to
parents or guardians to contract marriages
between males under the age of 14 years
and females under the age of 12 yeara Bel-
lamy V. Whitsell, 100 S. W. 514, 515^ 128 Mo.
App. 610.
ImteMsi of stata
Marriage is more than a mese dvil eon-
traet for the estabUabmant and maimbepance
by the parties to It of certain j?elations to
UARBIAaB
310
MABRIAOB
each other. It involves, except at modiflecl
by statate, an intimate personal union of
those participating in it of a character un-
known to any other human relation, and
creates a civil status, the maintenance of
which in its integrity is vital to the moral
welfare of society. Taylor v. Taylor, 69
Atl. 632, 634, 108 Md. 129.
While our law defines marriage as a dvil
contract, it differs from all other contracts in
its consequences to the body politic, and for
that reason, in dealing with it, or with the
status resulting therefrom, the state never
stands indifferent, but is always a party
whose interest must be taken into account
WlUits v. WiUits, 107 N. W. 379, 380, 76
Neb. 228» 5 L. B. A. (N. S.) 767, 14 Ann. Gas.
888.
''Marriage'* is more than a dvil contract,
for it can only be entered into in a manner
recognized by law, and can only be dissolved
in a like manner. The state is the third
party to the contract and has a direct in-
terest therein. Grover t. Zook, 87 Pac. 638,
642, 44 Wash. 489, 7 L. B. A. (N. S.) 582, 120
Am. St Bep. 1012, 12 Ann. Gas. 192 (cit-
ing Blank v. Nohl, 20 S. W. 477, 112 Mo.
167, 18 L. B. A. 350; State v. Bitttck, 15 S.
W. 326, 103 Mo. 183, U L. B. A. 587, 23
Am. St Bep. 869).
The "marriage" contract, once entered in-
to, becomes a relation, rather than a contract,
and invests each party with a status towards
the other, and sodety at large, involving
duties and responsibilities which are no longer
matter for private regulation, but concern the
commonwealth, and in this aspect is a dvil
or sodal institution, being the foundation of
the family and the origin of domestic rda-
tions of the utmost importance to dviliza-
tion and social progress; hence the state is
deeply concerned in its maintenance in pu-
rity and integrity. Coj y. Humphreys, 125
S. W. 877, 879. 142 Mo. App. 92.
Creation of relation— Capacity of par-
ties
"Marriage" is a contract and nothing
else, which presupposes the meeting of two
minds on the subject-matter of it If one of
the parties when the ceremony was per-
formed was so far under the influence of
liquor as to be unable to understand the con-
tracting of such marital relation, then in law
the proceeding amounted to nothing, because
the meeting of minds presupposes suffldent
intelligence to determine whether tiie con-
tract shall be made. Unless there shall be
present this degree of intelligence at the
time the marital relation is entered into,
then there is no contract. Allen v. Allen,
110 N. T. Supp. 303, 305, 126 App. Div. 838.
Under the express provisions of Gode^ §
3139, marriage Is a dvil contract, requiring
the consent of parties capable of entering
into other dvil contracts, and hence without
such consent no marital rights are acquired
nor marital duties imposed* and. If one or
both of ^e parties be insane and therefore
incapable of giving consent, there is no mar-
riage, but in the interest of good order the
courts will assume jurisdiction to decree the
annulment of the union though annulment is
not necessary to clothe the parties with all
the rights of unmarried persons. Floyd
County v. Wolfe, 117 N. W. 32, 34, 138 Iowa.
749.
Under the statutory definition of mar-
riage in Missouri as a dvil contract to which
the consent of parties capable in law of con-
tracting is essential, there could be no mar-
riage in legal contemplation between slaves
in that state, who had no capadty to con-
tract; and hence, where a man and woman,
slaves, "took up with eadi other** in Mis-
souri, with their mistress' consent, accord-
ing to the custom of slaves, the relation be-
ing merely temporary and subject to termi-
nation at any time, dther by tiieir own act
or that of their mistress, there was no sudi
marriage as would permit their diildren to
inherit from their father. In re Oampbdl's
Bstate, 108 P. 069, 673, 12 OaL App. 707.
Same— Consent of state
"A 'marriage' is a dvil contract made
in due form, by which a man and woman
agree to take eadi other for husband and
wife during their joint lives, unless it is an-
nulled by law, and to disdiarge towards each
other the duties Imposed by law upon sach
relation. Bach must be capable of assenting,
and must in fact consent to form this new
relation. If a statute forbids the solemniza-
tion of marriage without a license, still, in
the absence of a dause of nuUity, the mar-
riage will be good, though no license was had.
No particular form of words is necessary to
constitute a common-law marriage. If what
is done and said evidences an intention by
the parties to assume the nuirriage status*
and the parties thereupon enter into the re-
lation of husband and wife» that is suffident,
whatever may be the form of expression
used." Heymann v. Heymann« 75 N. £. 1079,
1080, 218 111. 686.
game "Solemnliation
Marriage la a dvil contract, the consent
of the parties to it being all that is required
by natural public law. It is true that in
most, if not all, of the states of the Union,
there are statutes regulating the manner of
forming the marriage contract, providing for
the performance of ceremonies, and naming
those persons who can perform the ceremo-
nies or cdebrate the rites of matrimony;
but it is held in a number of the states that,
in the absence of positive statutes dedaring
all marriages void that are not performed as
directed by law, any marriage made accord-
ing to the common law would be a valid mai^
riage. Sudi marriage may be proved by r^
utation, dedaratioQs, and conduct of the
parties, and other drcumstanoea usually ao-
MARBIAQJI
8U
MARRIAaS
rwniwmjing tbat rdatioiL Edelatein y.
Brown, 80 8. W. 1Q27» 35 Tex. Civ. Am>. 625.
'TTwo CBscntialg to a valid 'marriage' are
capacity and consent Marriage la a drll
contract, and no ceremonial la Indispensably
re<iQt8lte to its creation. A contract of mar-
riage made per verba de pnes^iti amounts
to an actual marriage and la valid." Trav-
ers V. Beinhardt, 27 Snp. Ct 563, 568> 206
U. 8. 423, 438» 51 h. JSd. 865 (quoting Voor-
heee v. Voorhees, 19 Atl. 172, 173, 46 N. J.
Sq. 411, 413, 414, 19 Am. St Rep. 404, 406).
"Marriage'* in a legal sense Is a civil
contract It Is not Indispensable that a
clergyman sbonld be present to antborize and
confirm the contract to give validity to the
marriage. Statutes which direct that a li-
cense most be Issued, that only certain per-
•ons shall perform the ceremony, that a cer-
tain number of witnesses shall be present,
that a certlflcate of marriage shall be re-
turned and recorded and the person violating
tbe conditions shall be guilty of a criminal
offense, are directory merely, and in no
wise affect the validity of the marriage con-
tract, unless they contain an express pro-
vision to that effect. Reeves v. Reaves, 82
Pac 490, 492, 498, 494, 15 OkL 240, 2 L. R.
A (N. 8.) 853 (citing Gibson v. Gibson, 39
N. W. 460, 24 Neb. 394).
A present agreement between competent
persons to take each other for husband and
wife constitutes a valid "marriage," though
there be no witnesses. Dietrich v. Dietrich,
112 N. Y. Supp. 968, 970, 128 App. Dlv. 664.
"That there may be a valid 'marriage'
without solemnisation by minister, priest, or
officer is not questioned in this cotmtry ex-
cept where the statute forbids, and It once
was so understood in England. • < •
Marriage Is recognized as a status brought
about by civil contract, and it may be con-
tracted by the parties themselves, as any oth-
er contract, without even tbe presence of
witnesses. • • • We have already shown
• • • that It need not be followed by
cohabitation, either In the sense of living to-
gether or of sexual intercourse. Mutual
consent, expressed, is the requisite." ''Mar-
riage," as distinguished from an agreement
to marry and from the act of becoming mar-
ried, is the dvll status of one man and one
woman, legally united for life. "The contract
makes the marriage, and the status Is the
marriage. Hence it is said that marriage
Is a status which arises oat of the contract
* * * That a contract of marriage to
prsesentl is itself a marriage — that Is, produc-
es the marriage status without anything
more— is stated by all commentators on the
common law and by all adjudications ttieie-
of in this oonntry/' Davis v. Stouffer^ 112
8. W. 282, 285, 286, 132 Mo. App. 555 (quot-
ing and adopting Yardley's Estate, 75 Fa.
207; 1 Bishop, Marriage & Divorce^ 1 11, and
and dtlng and adopting Dyer v. Bran-
nock, 66 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 369).
An iBstmctlon that ^marriage" is a dvll
eontraet entered into between a man and a
woman, both of whom are equally competent
to enter Into the relationship, and that it
may be consummated by a form prescribed
by statottt, or by some other formal method,
or by a formal agreement between the par-
ties, and that some of these methods are
necessary to eonstitiite '"marriage," la incor-
rect, since whatever be the form of the cere-
mony or If there be no ceremony, if the par-
ties agree presently to take each other for
husband and wlfb, and from that time on
live profoascdly in that relation, proof of
these fkcts would be snfflcient to constitute
proof of a marriage binding on the parties,
which would subject them to legal penalties
for a disregard of the obligation. Darling
V. Dent, 100 8. W. 747, 748, 82 Ark. 76 <elting
Hntchlna v. Klmmell, 31 MleK. 130, 18 Am.
Rep. 164).
SvUlemee of
•* "Where parties have cohabited together,
and held themselves out as man and wife,
and there are circumstances from which a
present contract may be inferred, the law out
of charity, and in favor of innocence and
good morals, will presume matrimony. The
law in general presumes against vice and im-
morality, and on this ground holds acknowl-
edgment, cohabitation, and reputation pre-
sumptive evidence of marriage. Mere co-
habitation is not usually considered suffi-
cient' Bishop lays down the doctrine that
'cohabitation and the reputation of being
husband and wife are usually considered to-
gether in questions concerning the proof of
marriage; the one being in a certain sense
the shadow of the other. Some of the au-
thorities fftvor the idea that reputation of
itself may be received as sufficient proof
prima fade, but it must be uniform and gen-
eral; if there is a conflict in the repute, it
will not establish the marriage. On the oth-
er hand, its sufficiency in any case has been
denied, unless there be accompanying proof
of cohabitation.' 1 Bishop, Marriage & Di-
vorce (5th Bd.) 483. 'Cohabitation and rep-
utation are at best only presumptive proofs,
and, when one of these foundations is with-
drawn, what remains is too weak to build a
presumption on. There is good sense In the
Scotch law, by whi^ cohabitation alone is
considered insufficient, and which requires In
addition habit and repute, because it is said
that the partlea may eat, live, and sleep to-
gether as mistress and keeper without any
intention of entering into marriage.' It is
well established in this state that a marriage
without observing the statutory regulations,
if made according to the common law, is a
valid marriage, and that by the common law,
if the contract be made per verba de prssentl
it is sufficient evidence of a marriage, or if it
be made per verba de future cum copula* the
MARRIAQX
813
MARBIAOS PfiOMISB
cohabitation is presnmed to be on the flaitli
of the marriage promise. That is, howeyer,
merely a rule of evidence, and it is always
competent, In sach cases, to show by proof
that the fiicts are otherwise. Under our law,
'marriage' is a ciyil contract by which a
man and a woman agree to take eadi other
for husband and wife during their Joint lives,
unless it is annulled by law, and to discharge
towards each other the duties imposed bylaw
upon such relation* Bach must be capable
of assenting and must, in fact, consent, to
form this new relation. When the consent
to marry is manifested by words de
prsesentl, a present assumption of the mar-
riage status is necessary." On the issue as
to a common-law marriage, the woman testi-
fied that viiille she and the man were riding
together he said she was his wife, and that a
marriage ceremony was unnecessary, if they
should hold marriage relations, and that
she agreed to hold such relations, and that
afterwards he acknowledged her as his wife,
but that they did not live openly together
until five months thereafter. It appeared
that subsequently their neighbors and the
woman Insisted that a ceremony be perform-
ed, and that, because of the man*s refusal
to have a ceremony, a difficulty arose between
the man and the woman's son, in which the
latter killed the former. Held that the
facts were insufficient to show a marriage.
Topper V. Perry, 95 S. W. 208, 207, 107 Mo.
631, 114 Am. St Rep. 777 (citing Carglle v.
Wood, 63 Mo. loc. cit 612; State v. Blttick,
16 S. W. 325, 103 Mo. loc dt 191, 11 L, R.
A. 587, 23 Am. St Rep. 809 ; State y. Cooper,
16 S. W. 327, 103 Mo. 271; Dyer v. Bran-
nock, 06 Mo. 391, 27 Am. Rep. 359; Cart-
wright V. McGown, 12 N. B. 737, 121 IlL 388,
2 Am. St Rep. 105; Hants v. Sealy [Pa.] 6
Bin. 406 ; Blzas v. Elzas, 49 N. B. 717, 171 lU.
635).
As used in Rey. Code, | 2611, defining it
as a personal relation arising out of a civil
contract to which the consent of the parties
is necessary, and that consent alone will not
constitute it, but it must be followed by a
solemnization or by mutual assumption of
marital rights, duties, and obligations, was
fully proven by evidence that the parties In
this case had been married by a minister on
authority of a certificate issued by law and
had lived together for 28 years as man and
wife, though Jit the time of the ceremony a
prior spouse of one of the parties was alive;
there being a presumption of divorce. Huff
V. Huff, 118 Pac. 1080, 1083, 20 Idaho, 460.
Civ. Code, I 66, declaring that marriage
is a personal relation arising out of a dvil
contract, but consent alone will not constitute
a marriage, and it must be followed by a
mutual admission of marital rights, does not
modify the requirements of the common-law
rule that the repute and cohabitation neces-
sary to create a presumption of marriage
must be uniform, general, and open, and
there most be evidence that the parties as-
sumed the relation of faasband and wife,
treating each other as married, and so con-
ducting themselves as to have full repute
among their friends and associates to be mar-
ried. In re Baldwin's BsUte, 123 Pac. 267,
276, 162 Cal. 471.
As matter ov tldac
See Matter or Thing.
Ome person sreateA
"Marriage" is a contract by which t
social union is established; and the status
of each spouse, and his or her rights in
tiie common property, are fixed by special
provisions of law applicable to that relation
alone. It will not be lust to say that, because
the personal identity of the husband or wife
is the same after as before marriage, there
has been no loss or surrender of those legal
characteristics affected by the assumption of
the relation. There is in many respects t
complete merger of identities and a total loss
of the separate individual rights that former-
ly existed. Clark y. Brown (Tex.) 108 S. W.
421, 443.
As ¥»lva1ile eoulderatloA
Bee Valuable Consideration.
MABBIAOE BOND BEOOBD
A book known as the "Marriage Bond
Record** is a book kept in the county derks*
offices in Kentucky, containing the names of
persons who obtained licenses to marry and
other evidence touching their age and resi-
dence; Pace r. Cawood (Ky.) 110 8. W. 414,
416.
ICABBIAOE BROKERAGE
A contract based on a money consldeni*
tion to aid a woman in securing a husband,
the services contracted for being in oomiec-
tion with efforts already being made by her
to secure such man, was nothing less than
that known as "marriage brokerage" and
was invalid by common law as against public
policy. Wenninger v. Mitchell* 122 S. W.
1180, 1132, 130 Mo. App. 420.
MARRIAOE PER VERBA BE rUTURA
OUM OOPUIiA
See, also, Common-Law Marriage.
"Marriage per verba de future cum copu-
la" is not consummated, unless the copula is
had in fulfillment ol the future agreanent
An existing agreement between a man and
a woman to marry at a future day concln-
sively negatives the claim of a marriage per
verba de preesenti between the same parties.
Sorensen y. Sorensen, 100 N. W. 930, 033, 6S
Neb. 483.
MARRIAGE PROMIBB
Breadi of as personal injury, see Pe^
sonal Injury.
Seduction induced by, see Seduce— Se-
duction.
MARBIA«£ RELATION
813
MABItHATiINfl- ABBBSB
MABBIAOE BEI.ATI0V
See Property Qrowlng Oat of Marriaffe
Belatioii.
A woman, to be 'Marriageable,*' maflt at
the time be able to bear children to her hue-
band, and a representation to this effect I0
implied in ttie yery nature of tb» contract
Baker ▼. Baker, 13 OaL 87, 106.
MARRTISB WOKAX
As pnblle merchant, see Pablic Merdiaat
As stockholder, see Stockholder.
In Domestic Relations Law (ConsoL
Laws 1909, c. 14) | 81, providing that a
married woman is a Joint guardian of her
children with her husband, the term ''mar-
ried woman'* does not refer to one married
to another than the living father of the
child after divorce from him, but only to the
mother married to the father of the Infant
In re Wagner, 185 N. Y. Supp. 678, 688, 75
Kisc Bep.419.
MATtRTlSTI WOMAM'S flBPAKATS BS-
TATB
See S^arate Batata
KABJIY
As used in Rev. St 1889, i 2169^ dedaiv
ing that every person, having a husband or
wlf^ living, who ''shall marry another pei^
son** without this state in any case whese
such marriage would be punishable, is con-
tracted or solemnised within the state, or
shall thereafter cohabit with such person
within the state, shall be adjudged guilty of
bigamy, should be taken to mean the going
''through" the form and ceremony of mar-
riage with another person, regardless as to
the validity of the second marriage as a mat^
ter of law. State v. Stuart, 92 S. W. 878,
882, 194 Mo. 345, 112 Am. St Rep. 629, 5
Ann. Gas. 963.
XABBTIN O AGAIN
Testator devised real estate described to
bis wife, and gave to another woman named
other described real estate, to be held by her
for the support of herself and testator's chil-
dren by her, and provided that, in the event
of her "marrying again," the gift to her
should become void, and the property should
go to such children. A provision In similar
language was made in fiivor of a third woman.
The woman so named was testator's polyga-
mous wife. Testator and she were members
of the Mormon Church and beUeved in its
doctrines, including the doctrine of polyga-
my. Held, that the words "marrying again"
hidnded the entering into a polygamous mar-
rtage, and the gift to such woman was with-
hi Gomp. Laws 1907, f 2795, providing that a
conditional dlsi^altlon is one whidi dn>ends
on the occurrence of some uncertain event
by whicdi It is either to take effect or be de-
feated, and on bet entering into a polyga-
mous marriage the gift to her terminated.
In re Poppleton's Estate, 97 Pac 138k 140, 34
Utah, 286.
MARSH UND
The drainage act of 1881 (Laws 1881,
pi 286, c. 51) confers the power upon county
authorities to create drainage districts for
the purpose of draining ''marsh or swamp
lands" alone, and does not confer power to
change the channel or divert surface water
drains for the purpose of relieving the lands
of riparian proprietors lower down the
stream trom periodical overflows in seasons
of freshet The term ''marsh or swamp
lands,*' as used in said act, has a wider sig-
nificance tlian the terms "marshes" or
"swamps." The power is conferred by this
act to drain lands which are not strictly
^peaking, "marshes** or "swamps,** but whIdi
are "marsh or swamp lands,** meaning there-
by lands which are so situated as to be ren-
dered difficult or incapable of successful cul-
tivation by reason of retaining in the soil or
carrying on the surface an excessive quantity
of water during certain portions of the year,
even though at other times they may be as
solid, dry, and firm as lands in general.
Campbell y. Youngson, 114 N. W. 415, 417,
418, 80 Neb. 822.
MARSHAL
Aseltr
See aty Offlcec
See Peace Offlcei;
See Person.
MABSHAUVQ ASSBTt
The doctrine of "marshaling assets'* is
defined as follows: "It is a settled principle
that when there are two classes of creditors
and two funds, and one class of creditors
can only go against one fund while t)ie other
can go against both, the court will marshal
the assets, restricting the creditors who have
a double security from touching the fund ap-
plicable to the ilrst class of creditors until
they are paid in full." In re Teruis, 175 Fed.
495, 497.
The rule that he who has two ftmds for
the satisfaction of his daim shall not by
electing to resort to the doubly charged fund,
disappoint him who has that fund only to
resort to, is subject to quaUflcations, and
among them is the Qualiacatlon that both
funds must be within the Jurisdiction and
control of the court except In the rare cases
in which it Is clear that the creditor of the
two funds will sustain no loss, delay, or
additional expense If veaulred to resort first
to the fund without the JurisdicOon. Stem-
iC^BSHALINa ' ASSJCTO
814
UABTSa
berger y. Sussman, eo AtL 195, 196, 60 N.
J. Eq. 199.
Where a creditor of A. has a right to
satisfy his debt out of two funds, X and Y,
to but one of which, Y, another creditor, can
resort, the first creditor must be compelled
to exhaust X before resorting to Y. Where a
mortgagor, as further security, assigned a
claim for money due under insurance policies,
and the mortgagee, without knowledge of a
subsequent mortgagor, and pursuant to a
supplemental agreement with the mortgagor,
applied the money collected on the policies
to a general and unsecured indebtedness of
the mortgagor, the subsequent mortgagee was
not entitled to have the money applied in sat-
isfaction of the mortgage. Weldemann v.
Springfield Breweries CJo., 63 AtL 162, 164,
78 Conn. 660.
The doctrine of marshaling assets will
not be applied in favor of one having an ad-
equate remedy at law. Farmers* Loan &
Trust Co. V. Kip, 85 N. B. 59, 64, 192 N. Y.
266.
MASON
MASOMIO SO0IET7
As charity, see Charity,
MASONBT
See Inspector of Masonry.
A contract sufficiently fixes the date for
the completion of the work where such con-
tract includes excavating, concrete founda-
tions, rubble stone work, pressed brick and
cut stone work, etc., and provides the date
for cdmpleting the "entire masonry," inas-
much as the term "masonry" is generic and
includes all the prior specifications of the
contract as recited. Joseph N. Eisendrath
Co. V. Gebhardt, 124 111. App. 825, 881.
MASS
As public charity, see Public Charity.
As superstitious use, see Superstitious
Use.
"A 'mass' is not peculiarly a part of a
funeral service, like unto the ofilce for the
dead. It is the sacrament of the Eucharist,
and a low mass is one said and not sung.
In the religion of tljie Holy Roman Church
^masses' are celebrated for the good of those
who are dead, but in no sense is a mass so
celebrated necessarily a part of the funeral
service." In re McAvoy's Estate, 98 N. Y.
Supp. 487, 488, 112 App. Div. 377 (citing
Cent Diet).
MASSAGE
As practicing medicine, see Practice of
Medicine^
MASSES OF MEN
The words "masses of men,** in a plead-
ing alleging that the letters "Inc." are an
abbreviation and are 9o understood by the
''masses of men," mean the principal or
main body, and is an admission tliat there
are some men or a portion of the public who
do not so understand it Commonwealth r.
American Snuff Co., 101 S. W. 864, 366, 125
Ky. 850.
MASSEUR
As physician, see Physician.
As practicing medicine, see Practice of
Medicine.
MASTER
The master la the one who has the direc-
tion and control of the servant, and the test
is whether in the particular service the serv-
ant continues liable to the dlrectipn and con-
trol of his master, or becomes subject to the
party to whom he la loaned or hired. Grace
& Hyde Co. v. Probst, 70 N. E. 12, 14, 206
111. 147 (citing Consolidated Fireworks Co.
v. Koehl, 60 N. E. 87, 190 111. 145).
A **master" is one who stands to another
in such relation that he not only controls the
result of the work of that other, but also
may direct the manner in which it shall be
done. McColllgan v. Pennsylvania It Co., ^
Atl. 792, 793. 214 Pa. 229, 6 L. B. A. (N. S.)
544, 112 Am. St Rep. 789.
•*The fact that the party to whose
wrongful or negligent act an injury may be
traced was at the time in the general em-
ployment and pay of another person does
not necessarily make the latter the 'master/
and responsible for his acts. The 'master*
is the person in whose business he is engaged
at the time, and who has the right to control
and direct his conduct" Wleber ▼. New
York Cent & H. R. R. Co., 96 N. Y. Supp.
28, 80, 109 App. Div. 81 (quoting Higgins y.
Western Union Tel. Co., 50 N. E. 500, 156
N. Y. 76, 66 Am. St Rep. 537).
A servant is one who is employed to
render personal service to his employer oth-
erwise than in the pursuit of an independent
calling, and who in such service remains en-
tirely under the control and direction of the
latter, who is called the ''master." Giaco-
minl V. Pacific Lumber Co., 89 Pac 1059,
1060, 5 Cal. App^ 218 (citing Civ. Code, i
2009).
A "master" is one wlio not only pre-
scribes to the workman the end of his work,
but directs or at any moment may direct the
means also, or, as it has been put, retains
the power of controlling the work. Kellog
V. Church Charity Foundation 112 N. Y.
Supp. 666, 569, 128 ^pi Div. 214 (dttag FoL
Torte [4th Ed.] p. 72).
ICASTBR AND SERVAKT
815
MABTBR IN OH AKGBKBT
MASTER AHB SERVAHT
The common onderstanding of the words
''master and servanf * and the legal under-
standing are not the same. The latter Is
broader, and comprehends some cases In
which the parties are master and servant
only in a peculiar sense, and for certain por^
poses — ^perhaps only for a single purpose.
In strictness, a "servants* is one who, for a
valuable consideration, engages in the serv-
ice of another, and undertalies to observe
his directions in some lawful business.
* * * It could not all depend on whether
the noaster was to pay anything, nor wheth-
er the service was permanent or temporary.
His control of the action of the other is the
important circumstance, and the particulars
of his arrangement are immaterial. The
plaintiff not being employed, controlled, or
paid by the defendant, would seem not to be
their servant, so that they would be liable
for his acts, or their liability to him be gov-
erned by the rules applicable as between
master and servant. Where defendant en-
gaged J. to sink a shaft, paying him so much
per foot, and J. hired plaintifT to help him,
and agreed to pay him one-third of the com-
pensation received from defendant, J. hav-
ing the exclusive right to employ, control,
and discharge his helpers, plaintiff was not
defendant's servant Kiser v. Suppe, 112
S. W. 1005, 1007, 183 Mo. App. 19 (quoting
and adopting Cooley, Torts, pp. 681, 582).
The relation of master and servant ex-
ists where the employer has power to direct
the nature of the work and the manner of
dohig it, with power to employ and dis-
charge, and a switch tender, employed and
controlled by defendant, but one-third of
whose wages was paid by plaintiff's company,
which ran over defendant's tracks at the
switches, was not a servant of plaintiff's
company, nor was defendant its servant; the
latter only having the right to complain to
defendant as to the manner of performing
his duties. Yeates v. Illinois Cent B. Co.,
89 N. B. 388, 841, 241 HI. 205.
The doctrine of respondeat superior ap-
plies only where the relation of master and
servant exists between the wrongdoer and
the person sought to be held liable for the in-
jury, and the master is he in whose business
the servant is engaged at the time, and who
bas the right to control and direct the serv-
ant's conduct Harding v. St Louis Nat
Stockyards, 90 N, B. 205, 207, 242 111. 444.
**The relation of 'master and servant'
exists whenever the employer retains the
right to direct the manner in which the
business shall be done, as well as the result
to be accomplished, or, in other words, not
only what shall be done, but how it shall be
done." Atchison, T. A S. F. Ry. Co. v. Dick-
ens, 103 S. W. 750. 753, 7 Ind. T. 16 (citing
Shiger Mfg. Co. v. Rahh, 10 Sup. Ct 175.
132 U. S. 518, 88 L..Bd. 4^; Uppington v.
City of New York, 59 N. E. 91, 165 N. Y. 222,
58 L. R. A. 550; Pow«n v. Virginia Const
Ca, 18 8. W. 691, 88 Tenn. 692, 17 Am. St
Bep. 925; Carlson v. Stocking, 66 N. W. 58,
91 Wis. 482; Robinson v. Webb, 11 Bush [74
Ky.] 464; Harrison r. Collins, 86 Pa. 158,
27 Am. Bep. 699).
The relation of <^aster and serv-
ant" subsists between an accident insurance
company and its medical officer empowered
to examine the person or body of insured in
respect to any injury or cause of death, in
such manner and at such times as he may
require, in the exercise of such right of ex-
amination, and the company is answerable
for injuries resulting from the negligence
or misconduct of the medical officer, and, be-
tween the medical officer and insured, the
law governing the relations of physician and
patient does not apply. Tompkins v. Pacific
Mut life Ins. Co., 44 S. E. 489, 444, 53 W.
Va. 479, 62 L. R. A. 489, 97 Am. St Rep. 1006.
MA8TEB m OKAVCERT
"A 'master in (Aancery* is an offleer ap-
pointed by the court to assist in various pro-
ceedings incidental to the progress of a
cause before it, and is usually employed to
take and state accounts, to take and report
testimony, and to perform sucb duties aa
raqalie compntatlDn of Interest the value
of annuities, the amount of damages in
particular cases, the auditing and ascertain-
ing of liens on property involved, and similar
services. The information which he may
communicate by his findings on such cases on
the evidence presented to him is merely ad-
visory to the court which it may accept and
act upon or disregard in whole or in part
according to Its own Judgment as to the
weight of the evidence. In practice it is
not usual for the court to reject the report
of a master with his findings, where the
matters refer to him unless exceptions are
taken to them and brought to its attention
and on examination the findings are found
unsupported or defective in some essential
particular. Metzker v. Bonebrake, 2 Sup.
Ct 351, 108 U. S. 66, 27 L. Ed. 654; Tllgh-
man v. Proctor, 8 Sup. Ct 894, 125 U. S. 136,
149. 81 li. Ed. 664; Callaghan v. Myers, 9
Sup. Ct 177. 128 U. S. 617, 666, 82 L. Ed.
547. It is not within the general province
of the master to pass on all the issues in an
equity case, nor is it compet^it for the court
to refer the entire decision of the case to him
without the consent of the parties. It cannot
of ita own motion, or upon the request of
one party, delegate its duty to determine by
its own Judgment the controversy presented
and devolve that duty upon any of its offi-
cers; but when the parties consent to
the reference of a case to a master or other
officer to hear and decide all the issues there-
in and report his findings both of fact and of
law, and such reference is entered as a rule
of the court, the master is clothed with ver>
different powers from those which he exer-
cises upon ordinary reference without such
MASTER OF A SHIP
816
MATERIAL AJLLBG^ATIOlf
consent; and bis detormlnatlonB are .not anb-
ject to be set aside and dlsiegarded at tbe
mere discretion of ttie court A reference
by consent of tbe parties of the entire case
for a determination of all its issues, tbongb
not strictly a submission of tbe controversy
to arbitration:— a proceeding wbicb la gov-
erned by special roles — ^is a submission of tbe
controversy to a tribunal of tbe parties' own
selection to be governed in its conduct by
tbe ordinary rules applicable to the admin-
iBtration of Justice in controversies estab-
lished by law. Its findings, like those of an
Independent tribunal, are to be taken as cor-
rect, subject indeed to be reviewed under the
reservation contained in tbe consent and or-
der of tbe court, when there bas been mani-
fest error in the consideration given to the
evidence, or the application of the law, but
not otherwise. The reference of a whole
case to a master < • • has become, in
late years, a matter of more common occur-
rence than formerly, tbougb it has always
been within the power of the court of chan-
cery, with the consent of the parties, to or-
der a reference." Locust v. C^uruthera, 100
Pac 520, 522, 28 OU. 378 (quoting Kimberly
V. Arms, 0 Sup. Gt 855, 120 U. 8. 855, 82 L.
Ed. 764; citing Basey v. GaUagher, 20 Wall.
[87 U. 8.] 670, 22 L. Ed. 452; Quimly v. Gaor
Ian, 104 U. 8. 420, 424, 26 L. Ed. SOO).
MASTER OF A SHIP
As laborer, see Laborer;
MASTER PLTTMBER
Laws N. T. 1896, c. 808, after soaking it
unlawful for any person to carry on the
business of an employing or "master plumb-
er" unless tbe name and address of such per-
son shall have been registered as provided in
section 6, provides that a master or employ-
ing plumber within the meaning of the act
is any person who hires a person or persons
to do tbe plumbing work. Bcbnaier A Co.
V. Grigsby, 113 N. Y. gupp. 548, 549, 61 Misc.
Rep. 325.
**Master plumbers" and "employing
plumbers" are one and the same — those
who do not hold themselves out as personally
doing the work, but as contracting to furnish
the materials and to do the work through
others, while "Journeyman plumbers" are
those skilled in the calling and holding them-
selves out as able and willing to do the work
themselves. Felton r. Atlanta, 61 8. E. 27,
28, 4 Ga. App. 183.
MATE
As laborer, see Laboi6E»
MATERIA
See In Pari Materia,
MATERIAL
"Material" is defined by Webster to
mean something essentiaL Faulkner v. Brid-
get, 86 8. W. 483, 110 Mo. App. 877.
Webster defines '^materiid" to be some-
thing '*of solid or weighty character; sub-
stantial ; of consequence; not to be dispensed
with; important; spedflc; especially law,
sudi as does or would affect the determina-
tion of a case, the effect of an instrumoit,
or the like; constituting a matter that is en-
titled to consideration; such as must be con-
sidered In deciding a case on its merits."
Thompson v. State, 117 Pac. 216, 22S, 6 OkL
Or. 50.
Ck>de Supp. 1007, | 3060al4, provides
that, where a negotiable instrument is want-
ing in any "material particular," the person
in possession has pilma fade authority to
complete it by filling up the blank therein,
etc Held, that the word '^material" was not
there used as synonymous with "necessaiy."
so as to restrict the right to filling in an
omission essential to the completion of a ne-
gotiable instrument, but included all omitted
matter usually found in such instruments.
Johnston v. Hoover, 117 N. W. 277, 278, 139
Iowa, 143.
To Justif;^ a reversal of a conviction on
the ground of error, the error must have
been of a material character, and must have
derived accused of a substantial right, tbe
word ''material" meaning something of
weighty character, substantial, of conse-
quence, not to be dispensed with. Campbell
V, Territory (ArisB.) 125 Pac 717, 721.
Tbe words "material" and **not materW
al" are absolutely contradictory, in that they
exclude all middle ground, and together in-
clude everything thinkable Bennett v. Ware,
61 S. E. 546, 550, 4 6a. App. 293 (dissentbf
opinion by Powell, J.).
MATERXAX. AIXEOATIOV
Under Giv. Ck>de Prac | 126, providing
that material allegations against infants
must be proved, though not denied, and sec-
tion 127, defining a material allegation to be
one necessary to support the action, and sec-
tion 429, requiring a petition in a suit to
settle a decedents estate to state the amount
of debts, the nature and value of the prop-
erly of decedent, and providing that, if tbe
personal property is insufficient to pay debts,
so much of the real property as may be nec-
essary may be sold, a sale of an entire tract
before tbe value of the personal property had
been ascertained, and before it bad been as-
certained, at least approximately, what tbe
claims against decedent's estate amounted to,
and without any showing that the land was
indivisible^ was, as to inf^t heirs, void.
Carter v. Growls Adm*r, 112 & W. 1098, 1009,
130Ejr.41.
ICiLTEBIAIi AIXSOATION
817
MATKRIAL ALTERATKOr
A «teat»lal aU^atfon"* te one wM^ te
for tlie BtateHie&t or soppoft of a
cause of action or detauo. LoulayUl* 4 K.
R. Ck>. y. Paynter's Aclm'x (Ky.) 82 S. W« 412,
413 (qnotiiig and adopting deflnitlons in OKt.
€k>de Praa i 127).
.TXBZAZ. AZiTEBATTOK
Any alteratloa of a witttaa
Is '^material,'* if It aHMs Ilia idantlly of tbt
imtrameiit, or tba rlgbta and obllgatlaitt of
tbe parties to it Widur ▼. lonea, 74 a B.
801, 80S, 100 N. a 108, 40 K a A. (N. 8.)
ea.
The teat wlietber an tnstmment has been
mat^ally altered is wbether tbe <diange or
addition injnrionsly affected the complaln-
ins parties or conld have nnder any proba-
ble Gircomstances enlarged tiielr bnrden.
Hoiaionse ▼. State, 07 N. 11180, 182, 49^ Ind.
App. 17a
^niatever dEianges the legal effect of an
instrument Is a material alteration. 'Tlie
test Is, not whether an alteration increases
or rednces a party's liability, bnt whether
the instrument expresses the same contract
— whether it will hare the same legal effect
and operation after the alteration as before.'*
White T. Harris, 48 S. B. 41, 48, 08 8. 0. OS,
104 Am. St B^. 701.
A material alteration of a written instra*
ment is an intentional act, after it haa been
folly executed by one party without the
consent of the other, which changes the legal
effect of the Instrument in any way. The
cross-marking of a material proTlslon of a
written instrument, after its eancation by
one of the parties, without the consent of
the other, with intent of erasing it, is a ma-
terial alteration. O. N. Bull Ramedy Oa ▼.
Boyer, 124 N. W. 20, 21, 100 Minn. 306, 82
L. R. A. (N. S.) 610, 18 Ann. Gas. 413.
Under Bern. A Bal. Code, | 3R14, provid-
ing that, where a negotiable instrument is
materially alteroil without the assent of all
persons liable thereon, it is ayolded, except
as against a party who made, authorized, or
assented to the alt^ation and subqeqnent In-
dorses, and section 8516, proyiding that an
alteration which (Ganges the number or re-
lations of the parties Is a ''material altera-
tion,'' where, after the indorsement of a
iMyte by an accommodation party, and before
it was negotiated, without hia knowledge or
consent, other parties signed it as maker,
he was discharged of Uabltity thereon. Hand-
nker T. Pedersen, 128 Paa 230, 281, 71 Wash.
218.
As a rule, any ctaanga in the pefsonaUty,
Bomber, or relation of the parties to a wilt-
tttk contract Is a material alteiation there-
of, so as to avoid it as to the nonconsenting
ptrties, so that the erasure of the name of
MM of the obUgors in a contract is a aiate-
Hal alteration. Mataoh i. Jarvla CTex.) 188
8. W. 041^048.
nie addition to a note by the payee with-
out the knowledge of the maker of the words
'*with Interest 6 per cent" is a material al-
teration of the note within Negotiable In-
struments Law (ConsoL Laws 1000, c 88) |
206, subd. 2, declaring that any alteration
changing the sum payable either for inter-
est or principal is material. (Columbia Dis-
tilling Ck>. ▼. Bech, 136 N. T. Supp. 206, 207,
161 App. Div. 12a
It la a material alteration of an instru-
ment to change the time from wliich the In-
terest is to run, either by the insertion, al-
teration^ or erasure of words, whether the
time is thereby accelerated or delayed. Bald-
win T. 6askeU Nat Bank, 133 S. W. 864,866,
104 Tex. 122.
Where, after the delivery of a note con-
taining an unfilled blank for the place of
payment, the payee filled the blank as au-
thorized by Code Supp. 1007, f 30e0al4. such
note was not within sections 3060al24 and
S060al26, providing that any alteration in
the time or place of payment shall consti-
tute a material alteration and that a mate-
rial alteration will avoid the note. John-
ston V. Hoover, 117 N. W. 277, 278, 180 Iowa,
148.
Whether an alteration of a note Is mate-
rial does not depend upon whether it in-
creases or reduces the maker's liability, but
upon whether the instrument after altera-
tion expresses the same contract, and, if the
change enlarges or lessens the liability, it is
materiaL Coaunonwealth Nat Bank of Dal-
las, Tex., V. Baughman, 111 Pac. 332, 333, 27
ML 176.
The altering of the figures in two places
In an order for money, to make it read $38
instead of $30, but leaving the written
amount aa It orlglnaUy was, was a "material
alteration," tending to indicate that it was
thb maker's Intention to pay $38» and waa
therefore apparently capable of effectlag a
fraud. White v. Stats^ 102 8. W. 710, 716,
88 Ark. 86.
Under a statute providing that a mate-
rial alteration of a negotiable instrument Is
one which changes the date, the sum pay-
able, the time or place of payment, the num-
ber or relations of the parties, or the me-
dium or currency in which payment is to be
made, a valid agreement between the holder
and principal debtor for an extension of time
of payment is not a "material alteration"
discharging an accommodation maker of a
note; the statute referring to Changes in the
instrument itself and not the contract Rich-
ards V. Market Exch. Bank Co., 00 N. m 1000.
1005, 81 Ohio St 848, 26 L. R. A (N. S.) 00.
Under a statute providing Oat any al-
teration ^ii«tig<"g the date or any change
whi4ai alters ttoe efflaet of a negotUMe in-
stilment is a "material alteration," ttM
drawing of a hand thronsli the figures **1-
MATBRIAIi ALTERATION
sia
KATERIAIi EVIBENGE
8-^*' in a note written on a blank torm, dat-
ed October 24, 1892, payable one year from
date, reciting that it was due October 24,
1903, and writing above the flguies "1-9-0"
BO as to make the date October 24, 1902, was
not a "material alteration,'' since, as the
written figures control the printed ones^ the
alteration did not change the data Lombar*
do V. Lombardini, 106 Pac. 907, 908, 67 Wash.
352, 32 L. R. A (N. S.) 615.
Under Rev. St f 3176p, declaring that
a "material alteration" of a negotiable in-
stmment consists in an alteration which
changes the date, the sum payable^ either
for principal or interest, the time or place
of payment, the number or the relation of
the parties, the medium or currency in which
payment is to be made, or which adds a
place of payment wher^ no place of payment
was 9)ecifled, or any other change or addi-
tion which alters the eilect of the instru-
ment in any respect, the term is limited to
the alteration of the instrument itself and
was not fulfilled by an extraneous contract
between the holder and the principal maker
extending the time of payment Richards
V. Market Exch. Bank Co., 90 N. E. 1000,
1005, 81 Ohio St 348, 26 L. R. A (N. S.) 99.
MATEBIAI. DEFENDAHT
Under CJode 1907, H 3093, 6110, provid-
ing that bills must be filed in the district in
which the defendants or a material defend-
ant reside, a material defendant being a
necessary or indispensable party, the husband
is the only material defendant to a suit by
a wife for divorce and alimony, and hence
a bill for divorce and alimony cannot be fil-
ed in a district other than that in which he
resides. Puckett v. Puckett, 66 South. 686,
587, 174 Ala. 316.
A "material defendant," within the
meaning of the statute, requiring that an
original bill be filed in the district in which
the defendants or a "material defendant** re-
side, has been held to be a defendant who
is a necessary party, really interested in the
result of the suit and against whom a de-
cree is sought ; one whose interest is antag-
onistic to the complainants and against whom
relief is prayed. ' Railroad Commission of
Georgia v. Palmer Hard;(vare Co., 53 S. E
193, 197, 124 Ga. 788 (citing Gay v. Brier-
field Coal & Iron Co., 17 South. 618, 106 Ala.
615; WaddeU v. Lanier, 64 Ala. 440).
MATEBIAI. DEGREE
One of the meanings of the term mate-
rial is 'in an important degree" (Webster,
Diet), and this is the meaning which would
properly be attached to it as used in an in-
struction that a passenger on a street car
could not recover if she contributed to her
injury in a material degree, and hence the
instruction was erroneous, because import-
ing that there might be a degree of negli-
gence on the part of plaintiff^ contributing
to Che injury, which would not defeat a re-
covery. Root V. Des Bioines Ry. Oo^ 98 N.
W. 291, 293, 122 Iowa, 469.
The words "material degree," in an in-
0truction, in an action for injuries, to the
effect that if the plaintiff was injured as the
direct result of defendant's negligence, and
was "in no manner or to any material de-
gree negligent himseli^ or in no manner or
to any extent contributed to his own injury,**
he was entitled to recover, rriated to the
amount of care reciuired, and not to the ex-
tent of contribution to the injury by reason
of failure to ezercLae such care, and hence
the instruction was not erroneona. Camp v.
Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 99 N. W.
736, 738, 124 Iowa, 28&
MATEBIAI. DEPABTUBB
On September 26th the court ordered
the issuance of a venire of 160 names, re-
turnable on October 5th, and names to that
number were regularly drawn and the venire
issued. On September 30th, the court vacated
the order of September 25th, and directed
that the names in the venire then in process
of being served be restored to the trial jury
box, and that 150 names be drawn from the
trial jury box, and a venire issued for those
persons to attend October 7th to complete
the panel in the case; seven jurors having
been passed. Thereafter on the same date
tlie 160 names were returned to the box, and
the judge and deilL of court drew therefrom
150 names to complete the panel, and a ven-
ire was issued to serve the names so drawn.
Held that, conceding irregularity, there was
not a "material departure*' from the forms
provided by statute, expressly made ground
for challenge to the panel by Comp. Laws
Nev. I 4288; "material departures" being
only snc^h as affect tte substantial ri^ts of
a defendant in securing an impartial jury.
State V. Jackman, 104 Pac. IB, 14| 16, SI
Nev. 611.
MATEBIAXi EVIBEKCE 0& TE8TI-
Momr
Testimony of the accused, in a bastardy
proceeding, that he had not had sexual in-
tercourse with the complainant, held, to be
"material" on his indictment f6r perjury,
although he had also sworn that he was
not the father of the child. State v. Brown,
79 N. 0. 042, 043.
False testimony is ''material,^ ao as to
be the subject of an assignment for perjury,
when it is su<di as to be substantially im-
portant and to have influence on the issues,
especially as distingnished from a mere for-
mal requirement, and capable of properly in-
fluencing the result of the trial. People ▼.
Schweidtiler, 117 Pac. 939, 940, 16 OaL App.
78a
In Code Civ. Proa f 870 et aeq., and
general rule of pradttoe 82, requiring, for
the examination of an adversie party before
KATEKIAL irVIDSNCB
ti»
tf ATERIAIi MATTER
trial, a sbowlng by allldaTlt that the testl-
mony is material and neceesaiy, the words
'*inateriar' and ''necessary" aie not nsed syn-
oDymonsly, even If the word "necessary**
does not mean indispensable to the making
of an lasoe. KopUn t. Hoe, 106 N. Y. Snpp.
e02, 003, 123 App. DlT. 827.
An instruction that the burden of proof
was on plaintiff, and that she could not re-
corer until she showed the facts by a pre-
ponderance or a material part of the evi-
dence, was error because not tte equlTalent
of a "preponderance.** St. Louis, I. M. ft
S. Ry. Ck). V. Woodruff, 115 S. W. 053. 056,
89 Ark. 0.
MATEBIAI. FACT
A fiict is "material" to the risk assumed
by an underwriter when it would have caused
him to have refused the risk if known or
would have been a reason for his demanding
a higher premium. Where an afSdavit of
defense, in an action on a policy of insurance
Issued by a company which insured married
women, alleged that the fact that insured
was pregnant was material but did not allege
in what way it was material nor that the in-
surer would have refused the risk or increas-
ed the premium if that fact had been known,
the affidavit was insuiflcient McCaffrey v.
Knights & Ladies of Ck>lumbia, 08 Atl. 180,
213 Pa. 000.
The law of England, as of other coun-
tries, requires an applicant for marine insur-
ance to make a full disclosure of all the ma-
terial tSLCts known to him at the time af-
fecting the risk which the insurer is to as-
sume, but he is not required to disclose facts
unknown to him at the time, nor immaterial
facts, nor matters of common and general
knowledge among those engaged in the insur-
ance business at the place of the contract
"Material facts*' are only such as are likely
to influence the mind of a reasonable under-
writer in deciding whether to accept the risk
and in fixing the rate of premium to be charg-
ed, and the question of materiality is one of
fact to be decided upon consideration of all
the circumstances and oonditionB affecting
the transaction. Northwestern 8. 8. Co. v.
Marithne Ins. Co., 101 Fed. 100, 178.
The existence of an unfiled chattel mort^
gage on a stock of goods as security for a
guaranty of a debt of the mortgagor is a fact
material to the risk in a contract to insure
goods, though the instrument contains a
clause that it shaU not be valid until filed.
Where an unfiled <diattel mortgage on the
itock of goods exists, and the applicant for
Insurance, when asked whether the property
is mortgaged or incumbered, answers in the
negative, it is a concealment of a material
fact, within a policy providing that it shall
be void if insured had concealed or misrepre-
sented any material fact concerning the in-
surance^ and avoldB the eontraot • Madaen v.
Fhrmehi' it Merchants' Ins. Ca, 120 N. W.
1060, 1088, 87 Neb. 107, 20 L. B. A. (N. S.) 07,
Ann. Ca& 1012A, 08S.
As used in the law relating to fraud, re-
quiring that false representations, in order
to be actionable must relate to "material
facts," means a fact or facts necessarily hav-
ing some bearing on the value of the subject
of the negotiation. Champion Funding &
Foundry Co. v. Heskett, 102 8. W. 1050, 1054,
125 Mo. App. 510.
Under the rule that the Jury may reject
the whole or any part of a witness' testimony
if they believe such witness has sworn falsely
as to any material fact, by the term ''mate-
rial fact" is meant any fact which tends to
prove or disprove the defendant's guilt or
innocence. State v. McCarver, 02 8. W. 084,
087, 104 Mo. 717.
During a trial to a Jury the legal suf-
ficiency of the '^material facts" — ^L e., the
facts constituting a part of plaintiff's case as
he presents it-— put in issue by allegations of
the complaint and denials of the answer, can-
not be questioned. Elie v. C Cowles A Co.,
73 Aa 258, 250, 82 Conn. 230.
Where a person conducting a business re-
quiring a license, but who is not alleged to
be the owner of one, pays money to a person
not shown to have any official relation to the
bureau of licenses of New York, or to any
person employed in such bureau, such fact is
not ''material" within Pen. Code! N. Y. | 00^
relating to perjury on an investigation under
Greater New York Charter, f 110 (Laws
1001, p. 40, c. 400), by the commissioner of ac-
counts, into the methods of the ofllce of said
bureau. People v. Tillman, 118 N. Y. Supp.
442, 03 Misc. Rep. 401.
MATEBIAIi FRAUD
The term "material," in the phrase "^at
fraud to be actionable must be material,"
means that without the fraud the transaction
would not have been made, and means a
statement of an alleged existing fact or facts,
and not merely of some future or contingent
event, or an expression of opinion, and the
person to whom the statement is made must
rely on its truth and must have the right aa
a person of ordinary business prudence to
rely on it Boulden v. 8tilwell, 00 Atl. 000,
010, 100 Md. 543, 1 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 25&
MATBBIAIi MATTEB
Only contradictory statements as to "ma-
terial matters'* can be used tor the purpose
of impeachment, and by "material matters"
are meant matters competent to prove one
side or the other of the issue, and admissible
for that purpose. Luke v. Cannon, 02 8. E.
110, 112, 4 Qa. App. 538.
False testimony by defendant, in a civil
suit in support of a set-off tor money loaned,
that no negotiable note was given or accepted
MATERIAL MATTSB
S20 MATBBIAli BSPKSBENTATION
therefbr, !b testUnony *^ a material nuLt^
ter/* within Ray. 8t a 123, f 1, and la per-
jury. Where a person charged with perjnry
because he set up a claim for money loaned
In defense to an action by way of set-off, and
testified in support of It, and the testimony
was false, the fact that he need not hare
done so, because of another available defense,
did not make the claim Immaterial matter.
State V. Berllawsky, 76 AU. 938, 039, 106 Me.
606.
The words '*material matter,** as used in
Rev. St § 5392, which denounces as perjury
the stating or subscribing to any material
matter which the person does not believe to
be true after he has taken oath, etc., apply to
nonjudicial matters in the same general sense
as to judicial matters and import some issue
or right to which the oath relates rather than
to a mere inquiry or investigation to be made
for the detection of violattons of law by
third persons, and aa the requirement of
Oleomargarine Act May 2, 1902, f 6, that
wholesale dealers shall keep such books and
render such returns as the commissioner of
internal revenue may, by regulation, requixe
under prescribed penalties for its violation,
has no relation to the tax to be assessed on
sudi dealer, It is not such a "material mat-
ter" that a false return will support a prose-
cution for perjury though an oath is required
thereto. United States v. Lamson, 165 Fed.
80,84.
MATEBIAIi mSBEPRESEKTATIOX
A misrepresentation, as the basis of re-
scission, must be material; but it can be
material only when it is of such a character
that, if it had not been made, the contract
would not have been entered Into. The mis-
representation, it is true, need not be the
sole cause of the contract ; but it must be of
such nature, weight, and force that the court
can say, "Without it the contract would not
have been made." Oppenhelmer v. Clunie,
76 Pac. 899, 901, 142 CaL 313 (citing Colton
V. Stanford, 23 Pac. 16, 28, 82 Gal. 351, 399,
16 Am. St Rep. 137).
Whether a misrepresentation is material
to the risk essential to make the same avail-
able as a defense to a policy, as provided by
Act Pa. June 23, 1885 (P. L. 184), d^[)ends
on whether it was of such substantial im-
portance that the insurer, but for the mia-
representation, would not have made the con-
tract Miller V. Maryland Casualty Co., 193
Fed. 343, 349, 113 0. O. A. 267.
MATEBIAI. PABTICUUkB
In Code Supp. 1907, f 8060al4, provid-
ing that, where a negotiable instrument is
wanting In any ''material particular," the
person in i)os8ession has prima facie author-
ity to complete it by filling up the blank
therein, etc., the word '^matertaT was not
used MS synonymoua with '^necessary'* so as
to restrict the right to filling in an omiasion
easentlal to ttie eoaiAellon of a ntgotiable
instrument, but ineloded all omitted matta
usually found la audi iastnunentfl^ and where
a negotiable note waa deUverad to the payee
complete, except lor the filling of a blank
left for the place of payment^ the payee had
prima fade authority, before indorsing it to
a bona fide holder, for value before maturity,
to fill the blank so as to make the note pay-
able at a place other than that where the
maker resided. Johnston v. Hoover, 117 2L
W. 277, 278, 139 Iowa, 143.
MATERIAX POBTIOK OF WHX
In Civ. Code 1910, i 3919, providing thai
the intention to caned a will will be presum-
ed from the obliteration or canceling of a
material portion of the wlU, "material" does
not mean easentlal^ but means important;
more or lesa necessary ; having influence or
effect; going to the merits; having to do
with matter, aa distinguished from form.
Hartz V. Sobel, 71 S. B. 996, 1001, 136 Ga. 565^
38 U a A. (N. 8.) 797, Ann. Caa. 1912D, 165.
MATEBIAI. KBPBE8ENTATIOK
The word "material," aa used in 2 Re-
vlaal, f 4646, providing that no repres^ta-
tion, unleas '^laterial,'' aihall prevent a re-
covery on an insurance policy, is not restrict-
ed to a misr^reaentation as to a defect
which contributes in some way to the loss or
damage for which the tademnlty is daimed,
but a representation is ''material" where it
would naturally affect the Judgment of tiie
insurer in accepting the risk. "Bvery fact
untruly asserted or wrongfully suppressed
must be regarded as 'material' If the knowl-
edge or ignorance of it would naturally infla-
ence the judgment of the underwriter in mak-
ing the contract at all, or in estimating tbe
degree and character of the risk, or in fixing
the rate of premium.'' Fishblate v. Fidelity
A Casualty Co., 63 & B. 354, 356, 140 N. a
689.
Within the meaning of Ky. St i 63^
providing that no representations in an ap-
plication for an inaaraAce policy, unless "ma-
terial" or fraodnlent, shall prevent recovei7t
a representation la material when the policy
would not have been iasued if the truth had
been known. United States Casualty Co. t.
OimpbeU, 146 S. W. 1121, 1123, 148 Ky. 664.
A statement In an application for life tor
anranoe that applicant had never had any
disease of the kidneys is a "material repre-
sentatloir within Bev. N. O. 1905, i 4808, as
such representation undoubtedly haflueooed
the action of the company in accepting tbe
risk. Alexander v. MetropoUtan Life loa
Co., 64 B. B. 432, 438, 160 N. C. 086.
The aasuced's statement of his age» efen
though not a warranty, is, aa a matter of
law, a mateilaL representatiQA In an applica-
tion fur an afiddant InauxaiMa policy* Oea-
MATERIAIi REPKSSBMTATIOH 321
MATBRIAIi VARIANCE
ml Aec. Ins. Oo. t. Spenee^ 128 IlL App.
32, 45.
A statemmit that ixurored had nerer had
cancer is a statement material to the risfc*
and its falsity a good defense to the policy.
Brison ▼. Metropolitan Life Ins. Oo. (Ky.)
115 S. W. 785, 788.
''Representations'' of the sdler of a oaiOi
register that the same will sare the expense
of a bookkeeper, and that books can be k^t
thereapon in half the time that the books
could otherwise be kept, and tliat the ma-
chine can be operated by any one of ordinary
hitdUgenoe^ are not ''representations as to
material fhcts," and, thoogh false, are not
groimd f6r a resdstion by the bnyer of the
contract of sale. National Cash Register Cio.
T. Townsend Grocery Stoie, 00 8. B. 808, 807,
187 N. C. 862, 80 8. B. 808, 70 U R. A. 848.
XATBRZAX. BIOKV
The right of a defendant to challenge
peremptorily is a '^material right" Betts
T. United States, 182 Fed. 228, 228, 285^ 86
a G. A. 452.
MATEBZAX VABXANOB
A yariance Is not ''material** nnless it is
BO misleading as to prejndioe the party in
maintaining his action or defense on the mer-
its. Ostrom T. Woodbury, 122 Pac^ 825, 827.
A complaint by an injured brakeman
alleged that the WiBeer negligently, and
without any warning, applied the steam, and
violently Jerked the slack out of the train,
causing plaintiff to miss his footing, whereby
he was thrown between the cars, etc, and
that when the engineer started the train he
was working on top in the act of stepping
from one car to another, and that as the
train was started and the cars were Jerked
apart he fell between them and was injured.
Held, that there was no Tarlanoe between the
comi^int and evldenoe that the enginer
started the train at a high rate of speed, and
that if there was it was immaterial, in view
of Rerisal 1905, | 515, providing no variance
shall be deemed material unless the adverse
party is actually misled to his prejudice in
suing on the merits. Coore v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry. Co., 88 S. B. 210, 152 N. O. 702.
The variance betweoi an Indictment
charging the forgery of a deed of trust set
out according to its tenor, and the deed of
trust offered in evidence, consisting of cleri-
cal inaceoracies, such as describing the land
in one instroment as ^eighty (80) acKs" and
in the other as "80 acres," the use of the
words "party of the first part" in one instru-
ment and the words "flnt party" in the oth-
er, and the word "fails" in one instrument
and the word "failed" in the other, is imma-
terial within Rev. 8t 1908, | 5114, providing
that variance between the Indictment and
the evidenoe in spedfled cases shall not be
ground for an acquittal nnless the court shall
8 WDS.ft P.2n Sbb.— 21
find that the variance Is material and pr^-
didal to the defense^ State v. Wltherspoon,
188 & W. 828, 828, 281 Ma 708.
The variance between an information al-
leging a sale to "F. H. LesUe'* and the evi-
dence of a aate to "Frank W. LesUe" is not
material or prejudicial, within Oomp. St
1010, I 8188, f oibidding an acqniteal for a
variance, unless found by the court to be "ma-
terial" to the merits or "preiudicial" to de-
fendant Bggart T. State, 118 Pac 454, 465,
19 W^o. 286.
Plaintiff alleged that while she was a
passenger in defendant's cab defendant neg-
ligently so managed its team and cab tliat
the team took fright and ran with the cab,
and, on account thereof, she was thrown
down in the cab, and was injured in her an-
kle, ba<^ etc. The answer was a general
denial, with the plea of contributory negli-
g^ce. Plaintiff introduced evidence without
objection showing that, after she entered the
cab, the team became frightened and started
to run with the cab, but the testimony did
not show whether the injury was caused by
being thrown from her seat to the floor of
the cab or while trying to get out of the cab
while the team was running away, her testi-
mony showing that she made an attempt to
get out of the cab while the team was run-
ning, and that her injury might have been
caused thereby. Rev. St 1899, i 658 (Ann. St
1908, p. 874), provides that, when the vari-
anoe between pleading and the proof is not
material, the court may direct the fscts to be
found according to the evidence, or may order
an immediate amendment without costs.
Held, that the vailanoe between the allegation
that she was injured by being thrown down
in the cab and the evidenoe that she was in-
jured while attempting to get out of the cab
was immateilal, and that dataidant by ftUI-
ing to object to the testimony waived his ob-
jection to ftt, so that a charge forbidding re-
covery if plaintiff was injured while attempt-
ing to get out of the oab while the team
was running away was error. Daley v. Bed-
bum, 127 S. W. 924, 925, 148 Mo. App. 653.
In an action against a carrier to recover
for the death of one alleged to have been a
passenger, there can be no recoveiy on the
ground of ordinary negligence of defendant
in injuring a person not a passenger. Where
a complaint alleged that plaintiff's decedent
at the time of his negligent killing by de-
fendant carrier was in the discharge of his
duties as a railway mail clerk, a recovery
may be had, though the evidence establishes
that decedent at the time of the fatal ac-
cident was not in the discharge of his du-
ties as a mail derk, but was a gratuitous
pass^ger, as a carrier owes the same degree
of care in the transportation of a gratuitous
passenger as in the case of a passenger for
hire; and hence the variance was not ma-
terial within the meaning of Oomp. I4iws
1907, II 8001-8008, providing that no vari-
Mi^TSElAIi i^ARIA^gB
<^S^ flAT^niAULT WAlJBa$ STAT^SMEKT
finco between. tto:aUegatloii8. and <be. proof
is to be deeine^ materiai unless It tms actual-
iy misled th^ adyevse .party to his prejudi^
Schuyler v. Southern Pac. Coi, 109 Pac. 458,
465, 37 Utah, 681.
The variance between a oomplaiot setting
forth a cause of action on an open, corrent,
and mutual account, and tl^e piroof of a stat-
ed account, was Immaterial within Code Cly.
Proe. I 460, providing that no variance be-
tween the pleading and the proof shall be
deemed material unless it has actually mis*
led the adverse party, where defendant was
not misled as disclosed by his answer in
denying the existence of the account made a
part of the complaint, but merely tendering
an issue on the question whether the account
was mutual, open, and current between lilm*
self and plaintiff's assignor. Culver v. New-
hart, 123 Pac. 975, 978^ 18 CaL App. 614.
MAUBBIAIiITT
The test of "materiality" is whether the
statement made could have IniBiuenced the tri-
bunal upon the questibn at Issue before It
Any statemejQts made in a Judicial proceed-
ing for the. purpose of affecting the deci-
sion, and upon whidi the Judge act^, are ma-
terial. McLaren v. State, 62 S. fi. 138, 139,
4 (^a. App. 643 (citing 6 Words and Phrases,
pp. 5309, 6310).
BaLATEBIAIXT
"Materially" is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary as "immediately; more or less
necessary; having influence or effect; going
to the merits; having to do with matter as
distinguished from form;** An instruction
that> one may recover for injury, the prozi'
mate result of the negli^^^nce of another,
providing he himself did not contribute there-
to, materlallx by negligence, .is not erroneous
because of the use of the word ''nUaterialiy."
Indianapolis & M. Rapid Transit Co.. v. Ed-
wards, 74 N. B. 683, 534, 86 Ind. App. 202.
A court may at any time correct a Judg-
ment as to immaterial matters occasioned by
inadvertence; but this right does -not exist
where such am^idment materially affects the
rlghtif of litigants objecting thereto, using
the word "materially" to mean affecting the
rights of objecting litigants. OaUdns v. Mon-
roe, 119 Pac. 680, 17 Cal. App. 324.
In Instructing upon a city's liability f6r
damage to property by the overflow of a
stream by changing the grade of a street, it
is usual to instruct that the volume of water
niust have been "materially and unduly" in-
creased ; "unduly" meaning disproportionate-
ly, and not being synonymous with "materi-
ally." Waltei-s V. City of Mal-shalltown, 120
N. W. 1046, 1048, 145 Iowa, 457, 26 L. R, A.
(N. S.) 199. ..
, The error, if aoy, in the admission of a
deposition, on the ground that the pari:yi offer-
ing ^it, had failed to show the nontesld^nce of
fb^ wiitnQSSy was harm^esii; ^ where his testi-
mony only tended to prove a fact otherwise
established by competent ^n(l uncontroyerted
evidence, and the error dlh hot "materially"
affect the merits of the action, and the court
could not, under Rev. St 1899, f 865, reverse
the Judgment on that ground. O'Keefe t.
United Rys. Co. of St Louis, 101 S. W. 1144,
1147, 124 Mo. App. 618.
BSATISBIAIXT TAJLBB BTATBMEHT
A banltmptj wtio obtained credit for ad-
ditional goods on a materially false state-
ment of his financial condition, and who sub-
sequently to the purchase ef the additional
goods on credit made payments on earlier
purchases^ so diat the amount owed by him
at the time he went into bankruptcy was less
than the amount of his indebtedness at the
time ^f thft maldng of the false. statesneDt,
was guilty of making a materially false state-
ment, defeating his il^t to a 'discharge in
ba2ikTu|»tcy; tmder Bankruptcy Act July 1,
1896, c. Ml, I 14b, as amended by Act Feb. 9,
1903, c. 487, I 4. In 1^ Arenson, 195 Fel
609, 610.
A ''materially false statement**' wlthls
thQ meaning, of Bankr. Act 1898, | 14b (3)
(Act July X, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat 550, as
amended by Act Fob. 5, 1903, c. 487, I 4, 32
Stat 79*0, which makes it a ground for denj-
ing a discharge to a bankrupt that he has
obtained propei*ty on credit from any person
on a materially false statement in writing
made to such person for the purpose of ob-
taining such property on credit must hat%
been made with knowledge that it was untroe
and with fraudulent intent; and a statement
made by on^ partner from facts stated to
him by his copartner, who was to furnish the
entire capital for the bus)ness» although In
fact untrue, will not defeat the right of tb^
partner making it to a discharge, where the
untruthfulness of the material statements so
made was not known to him. W. S. Peck Go.
V. Lowenbeln, 178 Fed. 178, 180, 101 0. a A
49a
The torm "materially false statements in
writing," as used in Bankr. Act July 1, 1S98,
c. 641, § 14b, subd. 3, as amended by Act Feb.
5, 1903, c. 487, f 4, which bars a discharge
where the bankrupt obtained property on
credit trota any person on "a materially false
statement in writing"' made fbr the purpose
of obtaining such property on credit ^
plies a statoment knowingly false or made
recklessly without an • honest belief in its
truths and with a purpose to mfsleafl or de-
ceive and thereby obtain property upon credit
from the person to wbon) it Is inade. Drafts
drawn by the assistant t^ashlor oif a bapkrapt,
operating a private bank, after he was insol-
vent and without his knowledge, and whicb
were not paid in accord with the bankrupt's
custom to exchange drafts with another bank
on daily settlements, do not constitute a
Immaterially'! false statement in writing wIUh
UATEBIALMAK
MATEBIAIiMAK
in the baiikriiptcy act Vtreitoiia t. Harvey,
174 Fed. 574, 577.
MATERIALMAN
The mechaiiic's lien act of 1888 (Acts
1888, p. 140, d 116) and amendments there-
to (Barns' Ann. dt 1908, H 8295-^07;
Bnms' Ann. St 1901, |§ 7255-7267), giving a
Qefn to ''mechanics, laborers, and material-
men," does not give a Uen to contractors or
subcontractors. Fleming y. Greener, 87 N. B.
719, 90 N. B. 73, 75, 178 Ind. 260, 140 Am.
St R^. 254, 21 Ann. Ofts. 950.
The tens "materialman" does Include a
snbcontEactor who es^cavated the cellar of a
bonding with his teame and laborers at a
specified price- per cubic yard. McNab A
Harlin MXg. Go. ▼* Paterson Bldg. Go. <N. J.)
63 AtL 709, 717.
lien Law (Laws 1897, p. 516, c 41$) | 2,
defines a "subcontractor" as one who enters
into a contract for the Improvement of real
property with a contractor, and defines a
"materialman" as. any person other than a
contractor who furnishes material for the im-
provement field, that one agreeing with con-
tractor to install a system of temperature
regulation In a building, involving both the
performance of labor and furnishing of ma-
terials, was a subcontractor wUhin the stat*
nte. A company which merely sold steam ra-
diators to the coDtracton; bat performed no
work on the building, was a **materialmaiU^
and not a "sebeontiaetor," within Lien Law
(Uws 1807» p« 516^ a 418) | 2, defining those
termsL Heiman A Grace ▼. Olty of New
York, 114 N. T. fitapp. 1107, 1112, V» App.
Dlv, 681. •
A Written' o)rder tor oak flooring, placed
with defendant by the general 'contractor,
otttaiiiA the Wbnfla ^'Cbarge oontraet 1,981—
G-^,** and another oid^r to d^fehdaat ssi^
dted that tt catered the fnmlshdlig aiid de-
livery St the ownei'g switch of oak lioorlng
for a contract knbwn^ln the contractor's of-
fice as '*1,981«" wbldi ^as the contract be^
tween the general contmctor and the owner.
Uen Law (Laws 1807, p. 516, c 418) | 2, de-
fines a *'8Ubconitractor" i[b one who' toters Into
a contract \Mth a ^ntradtokr for the Improve^
ment of real property, and defines a "materi-
alman** as apy person other than a contractor
wbo furnishes material for such.- imiprove-
ment Held,, that defendant was a.material-
tnan, and not a subcontra!ctor ; the, mere
knowledge that the material Was U9ed by
the contractor in the perforn^ance of a cer-
tain contract being insufficient tp make him
a subcontractor. . Hedden, Const Ca v., Proc-
tor & Gamble Co., 114 K,'t. Supp^ llQa,.U06,
62 Misc. ^^. IS^ • ,'^
Where complainant conttaeted.Wltlilde*
fendant, the owner of certain premises, to
famish mining machinery, 'af^pflanced, 'and
mteriala».^uiA.il«iMI Ib^Mweiln a nttl to
be erected at defendant's mines and ooi>*
ctmcted by defendant, without any other con-
tractor, h6 was an original contractor, and
not a ''materialman,*' within Cutting's Ck)mp.
Laws Neb., | 3885, and therefore was enti-
tled to 60 days within which to file his claim
for a lien. Salt Lake Hardwai-e Co. v. Chain-
man Mining A Electric Co., 128 Fed. ,509, 510.
UndMT Laws N. Y. 1897, p. 514, c. 418, | 8,
giving a lien to a "eontractor, subcontractor,
laborer, or materialman, who performs labor
or fomlAeB material fOr the Improvement
of real property," the terms ''contractor,"
"soboontfactoi;'' "labomr,** and "material-
man," while they refer primarily to the man
who has a formal contract with the owner,
or a subcontractor, with the contractor, or
who performs manual labor or furnished ma-
terial, also embrace the man who buys the
labor and material which enter into the im-
provement Kerwln v. Post, 104 N. Y. Supp.
1005, 1007, 120 App. Dlv. 179.
A contract for the carpenter work of a
building required "Davis or other equal steel
stitfeners" for window frames. The contrac-
tor sublet the contract for the installation of
the window frames, and relator agreed to
furnish, but not to install, the stiffeners in
accordance with measuremente furnished him
by the subcontractor, and not in accordance
with the specifications of the original con-
tract Held, that relator was a "material-
man," and not a subcontractor, and was
i therefore entitled to recover on the contrac-
tor's bond given under Comp. Laws, Sf 1074^-
10745, requiring contractors of public build-
ings to give security for the payment of ma-
terial furnished therefor. People, for Usq of
Davis, V. Campfleld« U4 N. W. 659, 6bO, 150
Mich. 675.
Code Oly. Proa 1 1188, provides that eon«
tracts between the owner and the contractor
for Improvements exceeding $1,000 in co^t
shall be.in writing and filed In the oflke uf
the county recorder, otherwise the contraot
shall be void, and no recovery shall be had
thereon by either party^ Plalntiif contracted
with a lessee. to raise a number of old buUdT
ings above the street level and remodel then^
and "furnish i^U <^ the nee^Bfi^j labor. ani4
material to be used to fully complete , tb^
work," plaintiff to receive the actual cost of
the materials ant labor, plMT' 10 t^r cent and
the reasonable Value of the work, to be^idib-
termliied by the amount of work and labor
dene when It we» comifieted. Held, that the
labor to be perfiormed was not mer^ inCF^
dMitai ^ the famishing of the aiateriais^ afid
hen<ie plaintiff was an origlnkl contractoi'
wHhln the meaning ot the irtatute, and not a
materidUndn; and was not entitle to a me^
ehanlc's lien where thcf contract was not Is
writing and filed with the ceimty recorder;
the fact tha% the contract did ndt qM^ify the
price or total valne of the labor and: mate*
rials no* excusLng the;partlea firona redndag.
HATERIALMAK
824
MATBRIAIiMAJT
it to wrtOiig, it b^ng appartot that the cost
of the work would ezoeed «1,000. Petenon
r. Freiermuth, 121 Pac. 299, 800» 17 OaL App.
e09.
One contracting with the agent of the
owner erecting a building for decoratiye plas-
ter work, supplying both labor and material,
is not a materialman within Bern, ft BaL
Code, 1 1138, requiring a materialman to send
to the owner a duplicate statement of the ma-
terials furnished to the contractor, which only
covers a situation where three persona are
involved, and where the owner has no con-
tractual relatLoA with the one fomisUnc ma-
terials.
A materialman who delivers materials to
the owner under a contract with him through
his agent need not send to the ownef the du-
plicate statement required by Rem. ft BaL
CkMle, I 1183. Architectural Decorating Co,
V. Nicklason, 119 Pac. 177, 66 Wash. 19&
Under lien Law (Ck>n8ol. Laws, c. 83) I
2, defining a contractor as one entering Into a
contract with the owner of real property for
the Improvement thereof, and defining a ma-
terialman as any person other than the con-
tractor furnishing materials for such im-
provement, and defining the term "improve-
ment" as Including the erection, alteration,
or repair of any structure on real estate, and
any work done on the property or materials
furnished for its improvement, a contract re-
quiring one to furnish all the window frames,
sash, glass, and trim in and to buildings in
course of construction for a lump sum, pay-
able in installments as the work progressed,
and requiring him to make a large part of
the materials according to plans, is a con-
tract for the permanent improvement of real
estate within the lien law, and he is entitled
to a li^i for the materials famished and work
done. Western Sash, Door ft Lmnber Cow t.
Gaul Ck>nBt Ca, 126 N. Y. Bnw. UIO, lUl.
One furnishing to a contractor sashes,
doors, and glass for a building is not a sub-
contractor, but is a "materialman,** within
Laws 1969, c 45, requiring persons furnishing
materials to a contractor to deliver to the
owner a duplicate statement of such mate-
rials. Finlay t. Tagholm, 113 Pac 1683, 1684,
62 Wash. 341.
Oode Civ. Proc 1 3414, makes a laborer's
or materialman*s lien prior to a oontractor*s.
Lien Law (ConsoL Laws, e. 38) | 2, definea a
"contractor" as one who ccmtracts with an
owner of land to in^rove it, a "materialman*'
as one, other than a contractor, who fundsl^
es material for such improvement, and an
"improvemoit*' as including work done on
property or "materials furnished for its per-
manent improvement" Held, that the lien of
one who installed plumbing, of one who fur-
nished trim fbr the building under contract
with the owner, and of one who sold brick
and mason's building materials to the owner
for use in the bulling, are all on equality,
being entitled to preference in the order of
time. Jackson t. JEgm, 94 N. B. 211, 266 N.
Y. 496.
Laws 1969, c 267, I 1« requires any mu-
nicipal council contracting for city work to
take from the contractor a bond with sure-
ties for the performance of the contract and
for the payment of all subcontractors and ma-
terialmen. Section 2 provides that a failure
to require such bond shall make the dty lia-
ble to the persons mentioned in section L
Held, that the statute requiring municipal
corporations to take such bonds from its con-
tractors is an independent enactment and
that Mechanic's Lien Law <Law8 1969, c 45)
I 1, providing that the materialman shoold
deliver or mail to the owner of property t
duplicate statement of the material furnish-
ed or contracted for, had no application. Gate
City Lumber Co. v. City of Montesano, 111
Paa 799, 866, 66 Wash. 586.
One who furnished galvanized iron and
solder to a manufacturer, which was made
by the latter into guttering and spouting, and
delivered to a contractor, for a building,- was
not a "materialman" within the meaning of
a condition of the contractor's contract and
bond requiring him to satisfy the dainos of
laborers and "materiahuen.** Berger Mf^. Ca
V. Lloyd, 91 8. W. 468, 469, 113 Mo. App. 205.
Under Llea Law, Laws 1897, pi 515. e.
418, 1 2, defining a materialman to be one otb-
er tiian a contractor who fumirtieB materialfl
for an imisrovement, persons who contracted
directly with the owner, though solely to fa^
nish Huiterials, aoe original independent con-
tractors, and not ''materialmen," entitled to
a preference under section 18. Hall v. Thom-
as, 111 N. Y. Supp. 979, 962.
Materialmen, as used in Meehantes* Lien
Law (P. L. 1898, p. 638), is hot limited to one
who has fnmislied materials only, that Is,
who simply supplies to the b^MlDjg materials
which some one else Is to incorporate by bis
labor, but includes as well one who furnish-
es both labor and materials combined, or who
furnishes materials installed in the building,
including the labor of installation. Beckhard
V. Rudolph, 68 AtL 766, 766, 68 N. J. Bq. 74a
Subcontractors, such as plumbers, plaste^
ers, and painters, who supply the material
and put it into the building, are not "mate-
rialmen** within the meaning of Laws 1898, V-
638, c. 226, i 8, providing that when a con-
tractor shall refuse to pay any person who
has furnished materials for the erection of t
building, for which contract has been filed, It
shall be the duty of such ''materialman" to
give written notice, etc., in order to procon
aUen. Beckhard v. Rudolph, 69 AtL 253, 256b
68 N. J. Bq. 816.
As eontraetov
See Ck>ntractor;
UATKAIAIA
826
MATBBIA116
MATEfflALS
See Borate Material; Bidldiiif Material ;
Claim for Labor or Material; Forest
Material; Labor and Material ; Light-
er Material; Single Oomponent Mate*
rial.
Famishing materials, see Famish.
Kind of material, see Kind.
Other good material, see Other.
Other material, see Other.
Raw material, see Raw.
Similar mattflal, see Similar.
Under the Uen laws* generally, ''mate-
lial" is deemed to be something that goes In-
to, and becomes a part of the finished strac*
tare, soeh as lumber, nails, glass, hardware*
etc., which are necessary to the completion of
a building. Gilbert Hunt Co. y. Parry, 110
Paa 541, 648, 69 Wash. 646, Ann. Gas. 1912B,
225.
The word "material," as used in a statute
declaring that every person famishing mate<
rials has a lien thereon for the same, has a
well defined and onderstood lagal significanoe.
It is deemed to be something that goes into
and becomes a part of the finished structnre^
such as lamber* nails, glass, iiardware, and
a tboosand other things that might be meant,
which are necessary to the completed elec-
tion of a boUdlng oje stractare. Webster de-
fines the word as the sabstanee <Mr matter of
which anything is made or may be made.
The word supplied Is broader than the word
"materials,** bat It cannot py any fair eon-
stroction be oonstroed so as to indade ma-
terials famiabed. Tsatakawa ▼« Kamameto*
101 Pac. 869, 870, 871, 58 Wash. 281.
"Materials,'' within lien Law (Oonsol.
Laws 1909, c. 88) § 6, glTlng a lien for ma-
terials ftimlshed to a municipal contractor,
means matter intended to be need In the crea-
Uon of a mechanicsl strnctnre; the sabstanee
of which anything is made (citing Words and
Phrases Jodidally Defined). Fsople es reL
Troy Pablle Works Go. t. Qlty of TonkesSp
129 N. T. Snpp. 920* 921, 146 App. DIt. 62T.
Tbe wc^ ''materials**' In a bond of a gor-
eroment contractor onder a contract for the
coDstmetlon of a sewer, . conditioned, as re-
quired by act of Oongress, on his making
payment to an persons supplying 1dm '^bor
tnd materials^* in the prosecution of the
vork, does not Incliide posts, lumber, and
snTel famished hlm;^ the same being eqoip'
loeats osed In the performance <tf the con-
ttact United States to Use of Lanham t.
Jacoby (DeL) 61 AtL 871, 6 PennewiU* 676^
''Material** is tiie substance or matter of
which anything is made or to be made. The
ommeratlon In paragraph 11, TarllT Act July
24. 189T, c. 11, of ••other borate material," re-
fen only to borate materials fbond in natare
in a raw condition, soch as the "borates of
Ume or soda" Inclnded in the same proTl-
•ion, and does not embrace borate of man-
ganese, or bormangan, widdi Is a manufac-
tored article made firom manganese and
borates of lime or soda, and which is held
to be dutiable as a chemical compound or
salt under paragraph 8 of said act Hemp-
stead ▼. Thomas, 129 Fed. 90T, 908, 64 C a
A. 889.
The word ''material" has a well defined
and understood legal significance. Under the
lien laws generally "material** is deemed to
be something that goes into and becomes a
part of the finished structure, suA as lum-
ber, nails, l^lass^ hardware, and a thousand
other things that might be mentioned, whUA
are necessary to the omiplete creation of a
buUdlag. Webster's definition of "matertal**
Is "the substance or matter of wlileh any-
thing Is made or BMty be made." Material
has not the same significance as proTlslons,
which is defined by Webster aa a stock of
food collected or stored, and Laws 1893, p.
82, c. 2i I 1, entitled "An act creating and
providing for the enforcement of liens fbr
labor and material," whereby a lien is glT-
en fbr proTlslona famished to a contractor
<m a railroad, etc., is void, under Gonst art
2; 1 19, providing that no bill shall embrace
more than one subject, which shall be ex-
pressed Ih the title. Armour A Go. t. West-
em Constmctlon Co^ 78 Pac 1106, 1107, 36
Wash. 629.
Act Aug. 18, 1894, c 280, 28 Stat 278, r^
QUIres a contractor for a poblic building to
gtre bond to promptly pay for all labor and
materials sopped to him for the work. A
contract provided that the contractor should
furnish "materials for the construction of*
certain buildings for the United States gov-
ernment, "all in accordance with the plans
and spedflcations'* made a part of the agree-
ment The condition of the contractor's bond
was for performance of the covenanta and
agreementa In the contract and for the
prompt payment for all labor or materials
supplied to the contractor for the work.
Held, that the bond contained two distinct
ooveoantfl^ one tor the performance of the
contract and the other for the protection of
persons supplying labor and materials, and
the latter should be interpreted in the light
of the former, and the meaning of the "ma-
terials" in the bond should be ascertained
from the contract, incldding the QMcifica-
tions, construed in view of the work to be
performed and, in the light of the drcum-
stanees surrounding the transai^on. United
iStates, to Use of BUas Lyman Coal Oa, v.
United States Fidelity A Guaranty Go., 71
Aa 1106, 1107t 82 y t 94.
Rev. Laws, c. 104, 1 1, authorising certain
dties, for the prevention of fire, to regulate
the inspection, materials, construction, altera-
tion, and use of buildings, does not authorize
an ordinance prohibiting reshingling of a
roof, since the section does not comprehend
repairs ; the word "constmctlon" being used
to mean the erection of a new building or an
KATBBIALS
826
UAIEHIULB
additioa to an old one, the word ''alteration."
to denote a change or substitution in a par-
ticular of one iNirt of a building for a build-
ing different in that particular, the word
"use" indicating the purpose for which the
building maj l^ occupied, and the word "ma-
terials" being a word of general signiflca-
tion, and necessarily ancillary to the other
more definite terms employed in the statute.
Commonwealth v. Hayden, 97 N. B. 783, 784,
i!ll Mass. 296.
Appliamees
There is a wide dtstilnction between
^material" and "applianoe." The term '*ap*
plianoe" refers to machinery and all the in-
struments used in operating it "Materials"
include everything of wUch ahything la
made. A master must use 'ordinary care In
instructing a serrant as to the-nse of materi-
als furnished and is only required to uae or-
dinary care in furnishing materlalB to be
manufactured. Oallman t. Union Hard-
ware Mfg. Co., 48 S. D. 524, 625, «0 & CL
192 (citing in support of deflrittton Bodle ▼•
Charleston tft W. C. Ry. Co., 89 8. m. 716, 61
a C. 480).
Electrical appliances furnished to a
light and power plant are not "materials,**
within Revisal 1905, i 2016, giving a lien for
materials furnished in the brectloi;i and re-
pair of buildings, where none of the appli-
ances ever became any part of the plant, and
where transformers and wires supplied were
merely strung on electric light polea Palp
& Linville T. KemersYllle Light & Power Co.,
72 S. B. 869» 167 N. C. 167.
Aroliltect'fl plavis a^tui speolfloatlons
Plans and specifications drawn by an ar-
chite<^ for the erection of a building are not
"materials,** within the purview of Revisal
1905, I 2016, giving a mechanic's lien upon
buildings for materials furnished. Stephens
V. Hicks, 72. S, E. 813, 315» 156 N. a 239, 36
L. R. A. <N. S.) 354, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 272.
Oasttacs'
Iron t;astlngs from 10 to 24 feet in
length, known as "sill castings or diannels,'*
were furnished to a tobacco company wltii
the neces^ry bdlts for use In its factories,
to support tobacco presses. Most of them
were used for supporting presses or tables
connected therewith, without being tiofstened
to the floor and without being put under all
the pres^fes. Some were ' used foir other pur-
poses, such as skids, and '^dunnage**; that
is, were put under goods to ralsie them above
the floor. Those under presses and * ta-
bles could be readily removed, and were in
fact taken from, one building to i^Qother.
There was np proof that they wer^ .custom-
arily thus placed in tobacco factories, or
were in any way necessary to carry on the
work, or that it could not be done as well
without them. Held^ that the castings were
not "material** or "machinery," within Rev.
^t 1899, S 4203 (Ann. St,. 1906, P.. 2277)» givr
ing a lien to a person fnmis|itng t^e same
for a building. Banner Iron Works v. Mtna.
Iron Works, 122' & W. 762, 763, 143 Ma
App. 1.
Coal and oil
Coal used by a building contractor to
heat buildings, covered by speriflcations re-
quiring him to proYlde fuel for heating while
the work Js going on, is "material,** within
the implied terms of the contract, which he
is bound to furnish, and hence within the
scope of his bond, required by the federal
statute (Act' Aug. i3, 1894,' c 280, 28 SUt
278K for the protection- of persons supplying
materials. United States, for Use. of Blias
Lyman Coal Coi, v. United States Fidelity &
OBaranty Co., 76 Aa 280, 281, 88 Vt 278.
A contract with the United States go?-
emment tq furnish all labor and materials
necessary for buildings at a fort prorided
that all materials should be subject to the
acceptance or fejectlon of an ofllcer in
(Hharge, and any materihl rejected riiould be
^t'Once removed and replaced by the con-
tractor. The contractor gave bond for per-
fbrmanee of tiie contract tod for the prompt
payment for all labor ot materials supplied
to him for the work, as expressly required
by Act Aug. 18, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat 278.
Held, that coal fnrnished fbr use in the heat-
ing t)lants and in certain <tf the buildings for
heating purposes white work of plastering,
laying floors, paintlngj and ▼amishlng was
b€^ dbhe wa^ not '^materialai** within tte
bond or the statute. United States, to Use of
Blias tiyman- Ooal Co., v. United States |!l-
dellty ft Guaranty Co., 7i AtL 1106, 1108, 82
Vt 94.
Where a' csntractor for the construction
of a water reservoir for a city entered Into
a IxHid coadStlDned that all ciainis fbr labor
and materiEBls fundsheaand supplied or pe^
formed in and about the work should be
promptly paid, the slgnos of the bond were
not UaUa on a claim for coal fttmished to
a sabcoiftractor and used in g^ierating steam
to ran a steam *sh<Wel aiid locomotive used in
making excaivi|tlons. City of Philadelpbia
y. Malone-, 63' AtL CSSi, 641, 214 Pa. 90.
Conpumablie supplies furnished to a ves-
sel, siiich as gas<Hiae for a motor boat, are
not.witbtD Oode Pub. Gen. Laws MA. 1904,
an^ 63, I 43, giving a lien on domestic ves-
sels "for materials fnrnisbed er work done
in the buUding, repairing or eqnipplng tbe
same.!' The PriAces8» 186 Fed. 218, 219.
•V < A claim against a railroad for furnish-
ing'deal and oil and'toola wa^ not within
Styles;. %i(. Civ. St art.3294,glringaliento
the furnisher of ''material'* for the construc-
tion or repair of ^^ railroad. ..WateFS-Pleroft
on Co. v« United States & Mej^can Trust Go,
99 S. W. 212, 214, M Te^s. GLv. AW- 397.
A person fumishtng coal oonsnmed bi
the operation ol a: steam shovel used by s
cpAtiraetpr la the; ooostcnction of. a..iBiiroad
IfATERIAia
S27
MATKRIAILS
is not entitled to a lien o» the rl|^ of way
and fraiK^ilaea of tfie railroad company, un-
der Bams' Ann. St 1901, 1 7266, giving audi
lien for labor or "mateaiala*' used in tbe con-
struction or repair of any railroad* Clpcin-
oaU, B, ft M. B. B. T. Sbera, 73 N. B, 2B6, 86
Ind. AW" 315.
"Materials,** as nsed in a statnte giving
a lien on the property of railroads for ma-
terials famished fat the conetmction of ttie
road, does not include gasoline, gasoline
torches, and coal oil used for Hghtlng a
railroad tonnel while in process of constmc-
Uon, packing, cotton waste, electric light
supplies, carts, tools, shovels, spades, black-
smith tools, wagons, scrapers, plows, ma-
chines, machinery, dfirrickg, derrick crabs,
cables, and repairs for all these. The te^t is
not wliether the article furnished was -con-
smned in its use^ either instantly, as in ease
of explosivea, or by degrees from long and
hard use. If lien ie ^owed for tools and
machinery^ and horses t^id mulee, for, ccon-
plete destruction, on the 8ai;ne principal It
should be allowed for deterioration in value
pro tanto, when not completely destroyed.
S. B. Luttrell A Ck). v. Knoxvllle, Ia. « J. B.
Co., 106 8. W. 565^. 671,. 119 Tenn- 492.
Dvatp ears aad deirlolui
Dump eu» aad derrkkg are In the na-
ture of to<^ and apyUances used by a een-
tnictor for hia own convenience in executing
the contract and are not ^'materials" wUhia
the provision of a contractor's bond. City
of Philadelphia ▼• Malone, 63 AtL 689, MO,
214 Pa. 90 (citing United filtates v. Morgan,
lU Fed. 474).
A claim for rental of scrapers is neither
for "labor performed" nor '^material furnish-
ed,'' within Ballinger's Ann. Codes A St I
5902, giving one who, at the owner's request,
grades, etc., land or a street in front thereof,
a lien for the labor performed and the mate-
rials furnished. Hall y, Cowen, 98 Paa 670,
671, 51 Waah. 296.
Under Revisal N. O. 1905, | ^16, which
gtves a lien on a vessel for all debts contract-
ed '*for woA done on the same or material
famished," one who furnished an engine to
be installed in a gas boat, relying on the cred-
it of the vessel, is entitled to a lien therefor
as "material,*' on compliance with the stat-
ute as to recording; and it Is. immaterial
that by the contract it reserved title to the
engine until paid for* The Pead, 189 Fed.
640,542. '
EzploslTes
A municipal waterworks contractor's
bond to secure payment for "material" under
St 1904, c 349, covers dynamite used in the
work and fuses used to explode it. B. I. Du-
pont De Nemours P^w^r Co. ▼. Oulgln-Pace
Oontracting 06^ 92 N. B. 102% 1025^ 206
Maaa 686. .
Explosives Used fa blasting rock in grad-
ing and tunneling for a railread are ''mate-
rials** fior Which the furnisher is entitled to a
lien under Acta 1883, p. 296, c. 220, as amend-
ed by Acts 1801, p. 216, c. 98. Bercules Pow-
der Ca- V. Knoxvine Ia ft J. B. Co., 88 S. W.
354, 857,. 118 Tenn. 882, 67 L. R A. 487, 106
Am. St Rep. 836 (citing Rapauno Chemical
Co. V. Greenfield A N. R. Co., 69 Mo. App. 6;
Simmons v. Carrier, 60 Mo. 681; Hazard
Powder Co. t« Byrnes [N. Y.} 21 Bow. Prac.
189; Wood F. Donaldson [N. Y.] 17 Wend.
660; McDermett t. Palmer, 8 N;. Y. 388; Key-
stone Mining Co. r. Gallagheiv 6 Colo. 23;
Blliott, Railroads, p. 1697, I 1068; Giant
Powder Oo. v. Oregon Pac. By. Co., 42 Fed.
474, 8 L. B. A« 790).
' I^d« liaws 1897, p. 616, c. 418 (Gen.
Laws, c 49), providing that "a contractor,
isubcootractor, laberer, or materialman who
performs labor of furnishes material for
improvwnent of real property with the con-
sent or at the reiiuaBt of the owner thereof
« t . ^ sbaU have a Uen. ^ ^ « " A
.lien is authorised for dynamite ftmished to
and nsed by a auboontractor for blasting leck
for the excavation a&d building' of a roadbed
of a railway, aa tiiat is- included in tbe term
''materials." Explosives used tor such pur-
pose enter into and form a part of the perma*
nent stfdcture, as well as the earth, rails,
ties, coirerls, anft hsidgis. . Sdiaghtiooke
Powder Co. v. Greenwich A J. By. Co., 76 N.
B. 153, 164, 166, 183 N. Y. 306, 2 L. B. A. (N.
S.) 288, 111 Am. St Bep. 761, 6 Ann. Cas. 443.
Blasting powder, dynamite, fuse, and
caps, necessarily used by contractors In build-
ing a sewer, are "materials,"' within the
meaning of a guaranty that the contractors
would pay fbr material used in the work.
Kansas City, to Use of Kansas City Hydrau-
lic Press Brick Co. r. Youmans, 112 8. W.
228, 282, 218 Mo. 16L
The word "materials," in Pub. St 1882,
c 16, I 64, requiring the contractor for a
public work, on which. Uens might attach for
materials if it was for 4L private owner, to
give bond for payment for such materials,
and chapter 191, | 1, giving a lien for mate-
rials used in the erection of a structure, etc,
Includes gunpowder used by a contractor for
an aqueduct for a water supply in blasting
for the trench, where the greater part of the
material excavated was used in the construc-
tion of the aqueduct, but does not include coal
burned in engines used on the work. George
H. Sampson Co. v. Commonwealth, 88 N. B.
911, 912. 202 Masa. 326.
Bxplosives used in grading a tunnel for
a railroad are materials for which the fur-
nisher is entitled to a lien, under the act
conferring a lien for work and materials fur-
nished in the construction and repair of rail-
roads (Acts 1888, p. 297, C. 220, i 3, as amend-
ed by Acts 1891, p. 216, ci 98, i 1), giving such
lien to materialmen "for the delivery of ma-
MATSRIALS
828
MATERIALS
teriar to a mibcontractor "who peif orms any
part of the work in grading any railroad com-
pany's roadway, or who constmctB or aids in
the construction or repairs of its CQlrerts or
bridges, « • • or who aids in the laying
of its triK^** 8. B. Lnttrell ft Co. t. Knoz-
TUle, L. ft J. B. Ck>.. 105 & W. 066, 070, 119
Tenn. 402.
Feed
Neither an article of necessity famished
for the use of the family, nor feed for horses
set apart as a part of the homestead, is ''ma-
terial famished for the benefit of the home-
stead" within the constitational provision
that homestead property may be sold for
material famished therefor. McLamb ft Co.
▼. Lambertson, 02 8. B. 107, 100, 4 Ga. App.
553.
Under Ber. 8t 1900^ | S208, providing
that a person fumishing materials for the
construction of a railroad shall have a Hen
for the payment of the same on such rail-
road, the term "materials," as therein used*
includes snch articles only as are famished
for the construction of the road, and a per-
son who famishes feed to a contractor for
the keep of teams employed in working on
such railroad is not, within the meaning of
the section, famishing materials. Pennsyl-
vania Co. V. Mehalfey, 80 N. S. 1T7, 170, 75
Ohio St 482, lie Am. 8t B^^ 746^ 0 Ann.
Cas. 305.
OrmTol
The charter of Low^l created a depart-
ment of supplies, with a chief elected annual-
ly, and section 9 requires all materials and
supplies for the city to be purchased by the
head of such department, subject to the may-
or's approval, and provides that, so far as
practicable, such purchases shall be made
after public advertisement and under con-
tract approved by the mayor. Section 6 pro-
vides that heads of departments shall have
general charge of matters relating thereto,
and shall execute all contracts, except for pur-
chase of material and supplies; and section 7
forbids the dty council, or any committee or
member, from making contracts, purchasing
material, etc., or expending public money,
except to defray inddental expenses of the
council. Held, that the provision relating
to purchase of supplies and material in sec-
tion 3 could not be constraed so as to limit
the word •'purchase" to a purchase for mon-
ey, the word ''supplies" to artides of food,
or the word "material" to that which the dty
has on hand for manufacture of other things,
BO that pnrdiase of gravel, to be removed by
the dty and used on the streets and paid for
by other filling deposited on the lot from
which it was taken, was a purchase of mate-
rial, which, under section 6, the superintend-
ent of streets had no authority to make.
Bartlett v. City of Lowell, 87 N. B. 105, 106,
201 Mass. 151.
Bay aad sraim
Bev. St 1906, I 8211, ^irtille it, in terms,
extends the provisions of the above section
8208, to such persons as famish hay, grain,
etc;, on the order of a contractor or sabcon-
tractor, for their use or for use of persons em-
ployed by them, or either of them, wlille fa^
nishing material and labor for or in the
oonstmction of such railroad, does not extend
or enlarge the meaning of the word "materi-
als"; nor does it impose upon the railroad
company* a personal liability for the artides
thus furnished, if no lien therefor be taken
and perfectsd. Pennsylvania Co. v. Mehaf-
fey, 80 N. B. 177, 180, 76 Ohio 8t 432, 116
Am. 8t Bep. 746, 9 Ann. Cas. 805.
The lighting of a candle wrapped with
paper and com husks, and placing it in some
hay in a bam with Intent to set fire to the
hay and bum the bam, but which never set
fire to the bam itself or anything in the barn,
was a setting fire to "material" within Bev.
6t 1860, f 4227, declaring that if any per-
son set fire to any building, etc., or to any
material with intention to bum any sach
building, he shall be punished. Hence a
count so alleging charged a crime. State v.
Johnson, 19 Iowa, 281, 282.
Hire of tmmma
The hire of teams ftonislied a sabcoo-
txactor for use in repairing a railroad is not
within Kirby's Dig. i 6661, giving a person
who famishes any "material, madiinery, flz-
tures, or other things" towards the con8t^l^
tion or equipment of a railroad a lien. St
Louis, I. M. ft & By. Co. T. Love, 86 S. W.
395, 397, 74 Ark. 528.
Mutvf aetmred soods
Ky. 8t i 2487, provides that, when tbe
property of the operator of a manufadurlng
establishment shall be assigned for the benefit
of creditors, persons who shall furnish mate-
rial and supplies to carry on the business
shall have a lien on the assets therefor. The
bankrapt was a leather manufecturer, and
also conducted a Jobbing business in the same
line as another department, in which it
bought and sold leather goods. Held, that
manufactured goods so purchased for resale
were not "materials and supplies" for ca^
rying on the bankrapt's manufactuiing busi-
ness, and hence the creditors furnishing tbe
same were not entitled to a lien therefor. In
re Starks-UUman Saddlery Co., 171 Fed. 83i
835, 96 a a A. 506.
Btatioaevr aad priatlac
A claim for stationery and printing is
not a daim for "materials," within V. S. 3803
(P. 8. 4888), relating to preferred creditors.
Bell V. 8t Johnsbury ft li a B. Co., 56 Aa
105, 76 Vt 42.
Steam shovel
Lien Law (Consol. Laws 1909, e. 83) 1 6,
giving a lien for labor or "materials" fur-
nished a municipal contractor, does not give 4
MATHEBiAtlCAL DSMONBTRATIOM 320
MATTK&'IK DWPXrtm
lien for the charge for a steam shovel. Troy
Public Works Co. v. Olty of Tonkers, 1M N.
Y. Supp. 020, 921, 146 App. DiT. 027.
MATHEMATICAL DEMONSTRATION
A "mathematical demonstration" la whol-
ly different from a "moral certainty/' Bvl-
denoe of demonstration relates to necessary
truths, truths as to which the supposition of
the contrary Involves not merely what is not
and cannot be true, but what is also absurd,
whereas moral evidence is the basis of con-
tiiigent truth. It follows obviously that the
convictions which these distinct and dissim-
ilar classes of evidence are capable of produc-
ing are necessarily of very different natures.
In the one absolute certitude is the result, to
which moral certainty, the highest degree of
assurance of which truths of the latter class
admit, is necessarily inferior. Wills, Cir.
Et. 5. Moral certainty is that full and com-
plete assurance which admits of no degrees,
and induces a sound mind to act without
doubt upon the conclusions to which it natu-
rally and reasonably leads. 2 Stewart's Ele-
ments, c. ii, I 4. It is apparent, then, that
the precision attainable in the one case Is of
a nature of which the other does not admit
Bowman v. LitUe, 01 AtL 1084, 1080^ 101 Md.
27a.
MATRIMONY
See Bonds of Matrimony.
See, also, Marriage.
"Matrimony^ contemplates a mutual per^
formance of tihe correlate duties which the
law saperinduces upon the marriage, and,
while one does his part, the other Is not au-
thorized to withdraw and live in separation.
Uassey v. Massey, 81 N. B. 782, 788, 40 Ind,
App. 407 (citing Bishop, Marriage A Pivorce).
MATRON
As offioer, see Officer.
MAUER
See Collateral Matter; County Matters;
Immaterial Matter; Mail Matter; Ma-
terial Matter; Printed Matter.
All probate matters, see All.
Any other matter, see Any Other.
Other nsatter, see Other.
Code Civ. Proc. | 46, forbidding a Judge
to dt or take part in the decision of a "cause
or matter" in which he has been an attorney
or counsel, refers only to actions or special
proceedings in which a Judge might take
part; the word ''cause" meaning a cause of
actloQ, and the word "matter** referring to
Home jndlcial proceeding which, under the
("^t is in<duded in special proceedings for
tlie enforcement of dvil rights. Keeffe v.
TWrd Nat Bank of Syracuse, 00 N. B. 008,
504, m N. Y. ao&
MATT&BS ASMOXG SUBSBHUSmr TO
within the rule that Mills* Ann. St I
2484, avftherlidUig a claimant of an irrigation
priority at any tioie within four years from
a final 'decvee in a statntory adjudication
proceeding to bring a suit hitherto allowed
by tile proper court to determine the pcioElty,
antherisee such an action by parties to that
proceeding only when their right of action ac^
crues out of "matters arising ssbseiiuent to
the decree," the quoted phrase means claims
of priority for an appropriation made subse-
quent to the lowest appropriation Included
in the decree. Broad Run Inv. Co. v. Deuel
O. Snyder Imp. Co., 106 Pac 700, 7S8, 47
Colo. 073.
ICATTER nr ABATEMEXT
The defense that plaintiff, a foreign cor-
poration, has not complied with Gen. Laws
1890, c. 258, I 37, by appointing, by written
power of attorney, a competent person re-
siding in the state as its attorney on whom
to serve process, is strictly ''matter in abate-
ment,*' and, having been pleaded in bar, can-
not be considered. Russia Cement Co. v
Whitmarsh ^ Brown (R. I.) 87 Atl. 400 (citing
Weaver Coal k Coke Co. v. Rhode Island Co-
operative Coal Co., 01 AtL 420, 27 R. I.
104).
BSATTEB nr oomntovmuBT
The words "matter in controversy,'* as
used in Hurd's Rev. St 1905, c 110, ( 88, au-
thorizing the appellate court to recite in its
final decree the facts as found by it, where
the final determination of a cause "shall be
made by the appellate court as the result
wholly or in part of the fludlng of the facts
concerning the 'matter in controversy,* differ-
ent from the finding of the court from which
such cause was brought by appeal, or writ of
error," means the matters of fact in con-
troversy. Oilmore v. City of Chicago, TO N.
B. 590, 008, 224 IlL 480.
KATTEB nr DUFVTB
"By 'matter In dispute* is meant the sub-
ject of llttgatlon--the matter f6r which the
suit Is brought— and upon which issue is Join-
ed, and in relatfom to which Jurors are called
and witnesses examined." Or, 'the ^matter In
dispute,* within the meaning of the statute,
is not the principle involved, but the pecnn-
lary consequence to the individual party,
dependent on the litigation.** Shewalter v.
Lexington, 143 Fed. 101, 108 (quoting Lee
V. Watson, 1 WalL [08 U. S.] 339, 17 U Bd.
507; Whelessv. Bt Louis, 21 Sup. Ct 402, 408,
180 U. S. 870, 882, 40 L. Ed. 588); McDanlel
V. Traylor, 123 Fed. 888, 339 (quoting and
adopting definition in Lee v. Watson, 1 WalL
[08 U. 8.1 337, 17 L. Bd. 067); Oallagher v.
Asphalt Co. of America, 56 Atl. 259, 209, 85
N. J. fiq. 268 (quoting Lee v. Watson, 1 WaU.
[08 U. S.] 837, 17 L. Ed. 067); Baltimore ft
IMTTSR .I« J^SBUTMi
380
MATTBB IK iaW]B
O. R. Oo. T. Bjan, .68 N. B. 928» 934, 81 lud.
App. 687 (qnotiog Lee ▼. Watson, 1 WalL 887,
17 L. Bd. 657).
In n sQlt to enjoin railroad companies
from estabUsMng a nmr echedule of rates,
the matter in dispute is the ri^t of the de-
f endants to enforce soch proposed rates, and,
where the Talne of sndi right exceeds ^000,
a federal court has Jurisdiction. Northern
Pac By. Co. ▼• Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs.'
Ass'n, 185 Fed. 1, 11, 91 a O. A. 89.
The right to remove an action, wherein
a money Judgment is demanded, to the fed-
eral court is determined by the sum de-
manded as appears by the record at the
time the petition for remoral is filed; and,
where an amendment is made, the sum last
demanded is "the matter in dispute." Mc-
Oulloch y. Southern By. Co., 62 8. B. 1096,
1097, 149 N. C. 305.
"By 'matter in dispute*, is meant the
subject of litigation, the matter upon which
the action is brought and issue is Joined, and
in relation to which, if the issue be one of
fact, testimony is taken. It is conceded that
the pecuniary value of the matter in dispute
may be determined, not only by the mon-,
ey Judgm^it prayed, where such is the case,
but in some cases by the increased or dimin-
ished value of the property directly affected
by the relief prayed, or by the pecuniary re-
sult to one of the parties Imme^^tfij from
the Judgment Thus a suit to quiet the ti-
tle to parcels of real property, or to remove
a cloud therefrom, by which their use and
enjoyment by the owner are Impaired, is
brought within the cognizance of the court,
under the statute, only by value of the prop-
erty affected." Way v. Clay, 140 Fed. 352,
853 (quoting and adopting the definition of
Justice Field in Smith v. Adams, 9 Sup. Ct
566, 130 U. 8. 167, 32 L. Ed. 898).
''By 'matter in dispute' is meant the
subject of litigation, and the matter upon
which the action is brought and issue is
Joined and in relation to which, if the issue
be one of fact, testimony is taken. It is
conceded that the pecuniary value of the
matter in dispute may be determined, not
only by the money Judgment prayed, where
such is the case, but in some cases by the
increased or diminished value of the proper-
ty directly affected by the relief prayed, or
by the pecuniary lesult to one of the par-
ties immediately from the Judgment" In an
action to recover a piece of land on which a
railroad had located its depot the value of
the land to the railroad company, according
to its present situation and use, is the val]qe
to be considered in detennining whether the
amount involved in the litigation is su^-
cient to oonfer Jurisdiction on the federal
courts. King v. Southern B. Co., 119 Fed.
1016, 1017 (quoting definition in Smith v,
Adams, 9 Sup. Ct 666, 130 U. 8. 167, 82 L.
Bd.895).
The lArase "matter ip dispute," as used
in the Code of the District of ColombU (Act
March 3, 1901, e «54, | 238 (81 Stat 1227),
providing that any final Judgment of the
Court. of A|ipealB may be re-examined aod
aflirmed, reversed, or modified by the Sa-
preme CX>urt of the United States, on writ of
error or appeal, in all cases in wliich tbe
paatter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shaU
exceed the sum of $5,000, means money, or
some right the value of which can be esti-
mated and ascertained in money, and whldi
appears by the record to be of the requisite
pecuniary value; and, assuming tiiat tiie
term ''matter in dispute^ may embrace a
right to have a daim against a foreign gov-
ernment presented through the political de-
partment of the United States, and that tiie
value of BuCfa a right may be gauged by tbe
possible pecuniary injury which may be sus-
tained if no such action is taken, it is evi-
dent that a claim for damages from the C^-
man Empire in redress of an alleged wrong-
ful imprisonment in that country is one hav-
ing a merely conjectural value. Hence the
value of the matter in dispute in a proceed-
ing to compel by mandamus the Secretaiy
of State to seek to obtain $500,000 damages
from the Qerman Empire jln redress of peti-
tioner's alleged wrongful Imprisonmtot while
on a visit to that country dbes not exceed
the sum of $5,000. United States ex rel
fiolzendorf v. Hay, 24 Sup. Ct 681, 682, 194
U. S. 378, 48 L. Ed. 1025.
MATTEB ZH ISSUE
The ^'matter in issue** in a former ac-
tion is that on which plaintUts* cause of ac-
tion is based, and which defendant denies by
his pleadings. Kerr v. Blair, 118 S. W. 191*
783, 55 Tex. Ov. App. 349.
The issues in a cause are the points 1b
dispute between the parties on which they
put their cause to trial, and the matter in is-
sue is that matter on which plaintiff proceeds
by his action, and which defendant contro-
verts by his pleading. Bowen v. W. 0. Ea-
ton ft Co., 80 N. E. 061, 964, 46 Ind. App. 65.
Tile first essential of the rule of res in-
dieata is tiie identity of the '^matter in is-
sue," which Is defined to be that matter on
which plaintiff proceeds by his action, and
which dtfendant controverts by his plead-
ings. Leroy v. Collins, 180 N. W. 685, 636,
166 Mich. 380.
The matters which plaintiff must allege
in his declaration and the defendant deny
in his plea are necessary ^'matters in Issue."
In an action on a liquor dealer's bond, wheth-
er the dealer's failure to comply with the
provisiona of the statute in applying for a
license was a "matter in issue** is to be de-
termined by deciding whether the licensee's
faUiire. .to. comply with the provisions is a
matter the state must allege and the licensee
MATTBBS nr STATUTE
S81
M ATTXB OF FOBM
State T. CoxTon. 62 AtL 1044^ lOBOit
73 N. H. 494i 6 Ann. Ga& 489.
MATTEBS HI B^AtUTB
As nsed.ln Const art 4^ | id» proY^ding
that eveiy act shall '*embraoe but one aub-
ject and matters properly connected there^
with, wblch subject shall be expressed In
the UUe," the word "subject" indicates the
thing about which the legislation Is had, and
the word "matters" the incident or second-
ary things necessary to provide .for its com-
plete enforcement iBoard of Com'rs of Ma-
rion County T. Scanlan, 98.N. fl. 801, 802,
178 Ind, 142.
As Qse^ la a constlkutioiial rwrnisemeat
that every act ^lall embrace but <me subject
and matters properly oonnected ther«dth,
which subject shall be expressed in the title,
the word "subject" refers to the thing about
which the legislatioa is had* and. the word
"matters" includes sabordipate and indden*
tal things relating to the same general sub-
ject The title of an act was ^'An^ act to
ameDd sections 1, 4, and (S, of an act entitled
*An act ecmceming street railroad companies,
granting additional rights and powers there*
in specified and matters relating thereto, and
declaiing an emergency.' ^ * ^" It em-
braces the general subject of street railroad
companies and gave power to acquire ground
for the construction of lines for the trans-
mission of electricity for light, beat and
power, and was not vlolatiye of the consti-
tutional proyision. MnU y. Indianapolis A O.
Traction Co., 81 N. K 667, 659, 169 Ind. 214
{citing State y. Gerhardt 44 N. B. 469, 145
Ind. 439, 33 L. R. A. 313; Maule Coal Co. y.
Partenhelmer, 85 K. E. 751, 57 N. B. TIG, 155
Ind. 101 ; Parks y. State, 64 N. B. 863^ 159
Ind. 211, 59 L. R. A. 190).
XATTiat or ADMiinsTRATioar
The power to compel an administrator to
fulfill a contract of conveyance of real estate
of his Intestate ih a '^matter of administra-
tion/' wltliln the Constitution, defining the
JQrisdlctlon of the probate court. Servls
y. Beatty, 82 Miss. 52, 87.
New York Charter (Laws 1897, p. 1, c
378), creating a number of departments,
among which was the department of high-
ways, by section 458 (page 160) proyides that
the commissioner at the head of each depart-
ment "may organize such bureaus as he shall
from time to time deem necessary." Great-
er New York Charter (Laws 1901, p. 166; c.
466) i 388, yested in tlie dty of New York aU
the powers and duties c<mferred oa the com*
mlssioner of highways of the city of l4ew
York by the charter of 1897, and deyolyed
npon the pteeidsnt at the borough aa "matter
of adminiatratloD'* certain powers and duties
to be executed pursuant to the provlaionB of
the act Laws 1901, p. 686, c 46B, | 1043,
proyides that no head of a bureau, holding
a position In the <dasslfled municipal ciyll
serytoa ,s«bject to oompetitiye ^^aminatlonj
shnll be remayed, unless he has been allowed
an importunity o{ making an explanation.
Bieldt that the ebarter of li901 conferred on
the piMidMikt cft the fogrongh- of Manhattan
the same powers possessed by the commis-
sioner of highways under the charter of 1897;
that the organization of bureaus U "matter
of adfidnistFation'' within the meanHIng of the
chartar •f ;1901, ^and under such charter the
piwldent. ^f the boreugh of Manhattan had
power to ocgante a bureau of highways, and
t» appolot a head tbetefor; and that one
aiH;x>lnted as bead of such bureau was not
subject to remoyml, exeept under the restrict
tions of section KM8. People ex m. Collins
y. Ahearn, 86 N. B. 474, 475, 198 N. Y. 441.
j|CATT£B OF OOWtBACT
The term "matters of contract," as used
in Const art 7, I 40, which declares that
Justices of the peace shall haye Jurisdiction
exclusiye of the circuit court, In all matters
of contract where the amount In eontroyersy
does not exceed $100, embraces an action for
unliquidated damages for a breach of con-
tract Smith y. rr^ylor, 134 8. W. 684, 97
Ark. 424.
MATTSB OF OOUXTSBOIiAIM
Under a pIsa of payment In an action
for piioe- of piintinff defendant oannot show
what, under a lease, was due him fh>m plain-
ttff fbr.exctts power furnished; this, under
Code Cty. Proc. || 600, 601, being ''matter of
e^unterclaim," to be pleaded as audi. T. J.
Hayes Printing Co. y. Springer,. 123 N. Y.
Supp. 240, 242.
BSATTEB OF FAOT
. The word '*fact,'' as used In the propo-
sition that representations must consist of
"mattezB of fact," distinguishes '"fact" from
mere matters of opinion. Brown y. South
JopUn Lead A Zinc Mhi. Co., 92 Sw W. 699,
704, 194 Mo. 681.
MATTEB OF FOBV
The dellyery of an indictment to the
court by the foreman of the grand Jury in
the absence of the other Jurors, tf a defect
at all, is "in matter of form on^,** within
the meaning of V. S. Rey. Stat f 1025, pro-
ylding that no Indictment presoited by a
grand Jury shall be deemed InautDdent nor
the trial, Judgment, or other proceeding there-
on be affected by any su^i defect which ahall
not tend to the prejudice, of the defendant,
it not being disputed but that the indictmrat
was found and returned into court as a true
bill. Breese y. United States, 38 S. Ct 1*
8, 226 U. S. 1, 57 L. Ed. 97.
The omission of the signs for dollars and
eents, in th» reeltals of aUeged false entries
in reports, and misnomer of the reports in
an iBdlotment oharging dlfeetof»e< a nation-
al banking association with making false en-
tries ifi a PH>ort to the Comptroller of the
MATTBB OF IMPRB88ION OB OPINION 382
MATURITT
Currency, within the denunciation of Rev.
St § 5209, are matters of form within' the
meaning of Bev. St 1 1025, for whkdi the in-
dictment la not to ^be deemed inaufBdent'*
United States ▼. Potter, 66 BM. 88, 95. .
BSATTEB OF IMPBE88IOV OB OPXX-
lOK
"Bvidenee which la diaracteariaed aa
'matter of opinion' is predicated upon the ex-
istence or nonexistence of a fact, while 'mat-
ter of impression' or 'understanding' is only
a deduction drawn from the assumption of
that fact, so that, while the former may rise
to the standard of evidence^ the lattw is
universally rejected as sutdL" Cross ▼. Aby,
46 South. 820, 822, 66 Fla. 311 (quoting and
adopting the definition in Chaires ▼. Brady,
10 Fla. 808; citing 1 Wigmore, By. H 658,
726-728; 4 Words and Phrases, p. 8444;
Tait ▼. Hall, 12 Pac. 881, 71 GaL 149).
BSATTEB OF IXDUOEMEVT
See Inducement
MATTER OF UkW
Befusal of a judge sitting in bankruptcy
to sanction an arrangement between the
bankrupts and certain of their creditors and
persons who had reoeiyed preferential trans-
fers of the bankrupts' proper^, in the legit-
imate fexerdse of discretion, did not present a
"matter of law" reyiewaUe on a petition for
review authorised by Bankr. Act July 1,
1898, c. 541, I 24b, 80 Stat 658. Mtflford y.
Fourth Street Nat Bank, 167 Fed. 897, 85
O. a A 225.
BSATTEB OF LEOAI. AVOIDANCE
The term "matters of legal ayoidance,**
as used in the statement that a recognizknce
is in the nature of a conditional Judgment,
subject only to sucdi matters of legal ayoid-
ance as. may be shown by plea, ot to su<di
matters of relief as may induce the court to
remit or mitigate a forfeiture, refers to such
matters as are entirely consistent with the
truth of the facts stated In the record and
furnish a legal excuse for the failure of the
defendant to appear according to the con-
dition of his recognizance. The sureties, for
example, show, in answer to the scire facias,
the death of the principal before the time for
his appearance had arrived, or that he had
been arrested under otiier process issued at
the instance of the state, or that he had be-
come insane. All pleas of this kind are not
only consistent with the truth of what is
af erred in the record, but they are predicated
on the assumption of such truth. State y.
Morgan, 48 S. B. 604, 606, 136 N. 0. 593.
MATTER OF FB|>9A^
"The proceeding to establish or prove
the claim against the executors is esBenlially
aA independent suit inter partes and not a
'matter of pure probate Jurisdiction.'"
Farmers^ Bank of Cub* CUty« Wi&» t^ Wright,
168 Fed. 841, 860 {citing and adopting Broder-
ick's Will, 21 Wall. [88 U. &] 608, 22 L. Kd.
599: FareU v. O'Brien, 25 Sup. Ct 727, 199
U. S. 89, 110, 60 I^ Bd. 101).
Code Civ. Proc i 1678, authoriring t
court of probate to order distribution of a de-
cedent's estate, though some of the heirs,
legatees, or devisees had conveyed their
shares, applies only where no question arises
on the distribution as to the conveyanosB
having been made; and, where the fact of
conveyance ia disputed or its validity is In
issue, the question is not within probate Ju-
risdiction; '*matter« of probate" including
the determination of the persons succeeding
to the estate of a decedent, either aa heir,
devisee, or legatee, the amount to which each
is entitled, and the construction of the will,
but not including a determination of daima
against heirs or devisees for their portion
arising subsequent to decedenf a death. In
re Howe's Bstate, 118 Pac. 616^ 617, 161 CsL
162.
Code Civ. Proc. 1 1639, providing that on
the death of an executor his accounts may be
presented to and settled by the court In whlcb
the estate of which he was executor ia being
administered, and that upon petition of his
successor such court may compel tb.0 person-
al representatives of the deceased executor to
render an account of the administrator of
their testator, and to settle such account ss
in other cases, is a "matter of probate," Ju-
risdiction of which may, under Ccmst art
6, I 6, be conferred upon the superior conr^
sitting in probate. King v. Chase, 116 Pac
207, 209, 169 Cal. 420.
MATTER OF F0BI.IO OOVOBBV
See Public Concern.
MATTEB OB THlliO
Within the rule that a court has no
power to acquire Jurisdiction of a party by
service of notice outside its territorial limits
except where the court is dealing with some
''matter or thing" within its territorial Ju-
risdiction, it has been held that marriage ia
such a "matter or thing," so that, if a sponse
is a bona fide resident and the other sponse
is absent, the court may require Jurisdiction
by extraterritorial service. Watkinson v.
Watkinson, 58 Aa 384. 389, 67 N. J. Eq. 142.
MATURED
ICATtJBIHO
See Debt Maturing in the Tear.
BSATTTRITT
See Prior to Maturity.
Defendants, In payment of property
bought of plaintiiff, transferred bonds ma-
tzirlng November 27, 1913, and secured by a
trust deed of Iowa property, and by a con-
tract of guaranty agreed '*if said bonds were
not paid ht maturity/' and the tsuat deed was
MATURITY
838
MAT
foreclosed, to be present at the sale and Ud
a specified amount for the property. In the
bonds was a reservation of the rli^t to pay
them before maturity, and in the trust deed
it was provided that, if default was made in
the payment of interest, the piiacipal, as wall
as the interest, should become due at the
election of the trustee. On the back of ihs
bonds was a trustee's certificate that the
bonds were issued in conformity with the
trust deed. The word ^'maturity,'* as used
In the agreement, was the maturity as fixed
by the trust deed, and not the one specified
in the bonds. Bins t. Hyatt, 96 8. W. 687,
200 Mo. 299.
A note payable with interest from ma-
turity contained a blank spaos after the
word "maturity/* and the payee after ezecu-
tion filled up such space by writing therein
the word "date," so thst the note called for
Interest after ''maturity date.** Held, that
the alteration was not a material change
which would prevent reeoTery on the note.
''Maturity" and ''maturity date^' mean the
same thing. Baldwin ▼. Haskdl Nat Bank
(Tex.) 124 a W. 44S.
Where a note bearing a given date was
payable f6ur months after, it readied its
"maturity" four months after date. Beabury
V. Sibley, 66 N. B. 608, 188 Mass. lOCk
MATUBITT l>Am
See Maturity.
MAUSOLEUM
As tmprovenwnt
provement
of veal estats^ ssa Im-
MAXIM
A "maxim," says Goke^ 'is so called be-
cause its dignity is chlefest, and its author-
ity the most certain, and because it is univer-
laUy approved by all.'' Ooke, litt 11a.
Again he says : "A maxim is a proposition to
be of all men confessed and granted with-
out proof, argument, or discourse." Id. 67a.
"Haxlms," says Sir James Mackintosh, "are
the condensed good sense of nations.*' Chris-
man V. linderman, 100 S. W. 1090, 1092, 202
Ho. 006, 10 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1206, 119 Am. 8t
Rep. 822.
"A 'maxim' is a proposition to be of all
men confessed and granted without proof,
argument, or discourse." Felver v. Central
Electric By. Co., 115 S. W. 980, 968, 216 Mo.
Id5 (quoting Lord Coke).
Justinian said that the "maximk of the
law'* are ^ese : "To live honestly, to hurt no
man, and to give every one Ms due" City
Trust, Safe-Deposft A Surety Co. of Phila*
delphla V. American Brewing Co.* 67 N. E.
«2. 174 N. y. 486.
MAXIMUM
Tbe word ^'maximum"' la defined as
nwanlng the greatest, superlative of great;
the greatest quantity or value attainable in
a given case. Manaca v. Ionia Circuit Judge,
110 N. W. 76, 77, 146 Midi. 60T.
The term ^*nmximum rate,** as used in
a statute authorizing the fixing of a **maxi-
mum rate^ to be charged for gas and elec^
tricity, means a '^reasonable rate with per-
mission to tilie party famishing the service
to do business at an kuidequats profit or at
a loss, if he desires." Trustees of Village of
Saratoga Springs ▼. Saratoga Qa% Bleetric
Ught ft Powar Co., 107 N. Y. Supp. 841, 861,
122 App. tHv. 206 (dtsssnttng opinion of
Judge Kellogid-
MAY
Must construed as may, see Must
Shall construed as may, see ShalL
The word "may** is usually only permis-
sive or discretionary. State v. Stepp, 59 8
B. 1068, 1070, 68 W. Va. 264.
The word "may" means "^ust" when-
ever third persons or the public have an In
terest in having the act done or have a claim
de Jure that the power shall be exercised.
Smalley t. Paine, 116 B. W. 88, 89, 102 Tex.
804.
"The word 'may' is construed to meau
'shall*' whenever the right of the public or
third persons depends upon the exercise of
the power or performance of the duty to
which it refers." Montgomery v. Henry, 3U
South. 507, 509, 144 Ala. 629, 1 L. R. A (N.
S.) 656, 6 Ann. Cas. 965 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in Wheeler v. Chicago, 24 111.
106, 76 Am. Dec. 786).
"May" does not mean "Aall," and is not
so construed in private contracts. It is only
In the case of statutes by which public rights
are involved that this construction is some-
times adopted ex debito Justitis. Northwest-
em Travellug Men's Ass^n v. Crawford, 126
ni. App. 468, 480.
It is true tliat "may" oftentimes means
"must," but it always retains its primitive
meaning unless common fairness and the
rights of the parties litigant demand that it
be supplanted by "must," or unless it is used
in a sentence which creates an exception in
favor of the public Chicago, W. A V. Coal
Co. V. People, 114 lU. App. 75, 112; Id., 73
N. E. 770, 214 IlL 421.
In a contract for the oonstmctlon of
part of a sewer, a daugs pnwided that "if
an emergency demands * ^ * he (the en-
gineer in charge] may make alterations in any
part of the work." Held, that this clause was
for the benefit of- the oonnaonwealth alone.
MAT:
884
MAT
and that the word "may" was to be.oonstraed
according to Its usual meaning, and not to
mean "shcHl."^ Kationai Contracting GO. y.
Commonwealth, 06 N. D. 689,; 640; 64JU 188
Same— Deed
A bargain and sale deed to a half Interest
in a mine in consideration of |1 and tb6 do*
ing of necessary assessment work to hold the
claim at the grantees' expense alao provided
that the grantees might wortc and develop
the mine at their own cost, and that all gold
or proceeds taken therefrom for 20 years
should be divided equally among the parties;
that is, each to have dne-third thereof. Held,
that the provision for working the mine
apart from the doing of the assessment work
was a mere license to be. exercised by the
grantees, or not, at their election ; the word
*'may" not being construed to mean "must"
Shaw V. Caldwell, U5 Pac. 941, 942, 16 CaL
App. 1.
Oh the satne day that a testator executed
his will he made a deed to a trust company,
executor under the will, conveying all of |iis
real estate on certain trusta The ninth
clause of the deed provided that after the
testator's death the trustee "may" uae as
much of the income from the property, or the
proceeds of its sale, as may be necessary in
defending any proceedings hrought to invali-
date the trust. The will was made subject
to the provisions of the deed, with a scheme
for the disposition of the property conveyed
by the deed if it should be set aside. Testa-
tor had a substantial amount of personal
property which was disposed of by the wiH.
No proceedings were brought to set aside the
deed, except so far as its validity was involv-
ed in the controversy as to the validity of
the will. Held, that a contention that items
in the executor's account for payments made
by the executor for expenses of defending the
estate from claims which were deemed unjust,
of proving the will, and resisting an attack on
it, should not be allowed out of the personalty,
because the word "may" in the ninth clause
of the deed means '*must," reQuiring such ex-
penses to be paid from the trust estate, Is un-
tenable, in view of other clauses of the deed,
in which the grantor drew distinctions be-
tween "may" ax^d "shall." Hampden Trust
Co. V. Leary, 72 N. E. 88, 89, 186 Mass. 577.
A provision in the constitution and laws
of a mutual benefit association that a certain
amount shall be paid on the death of a mem-
ber of a'cettain grade, and one-half of the
amount '^ay"' be paid to a member of that
grade who shall become permanently disabled
from attending te his business or gaixiing a
livelihood, and. Is destitute of means of sup-
port when he shall arrive at the age of ez-
pectanoy, Is mandatory as te the payment of
the permanent disability benefit ; . the word
•<maQ^" to be ceadr aa "shalLV flupieme Coun-
cil Catholic Benevolent Legion v. Grove, 96
N. E. 159, 162, 176 Ind. 356, 36 Lu B. A. (N.
S.) 913.
An Instruetloii, in on action to reo>ver
an aeddent benefit, that mn accidental cauae
is sileh as "may" happen by dumee is er-
roneous, as suggesting that chance Is not tl<
ways necessary. Smouse t. Iowa State Tcav-
^ng Men's Ass'n, 92 N. W. S8, M, 118 Iowa,
«6.
The word "may," In an Instruction in
a personal Injury case that the' jury may al-
low plaintiff for pain. Inconvenience, or im-
pairm^it of enjoyment for such time as the
same may continue In the future as shown by
the evidence is capable of being construed by
the jury to. mean '*might," and therefore tn*
thorlsed them to allow plaintiff for pain, in-
convenience* and impairment of the enjoy-
ment whldi the evidence showed might coo-
tinue in the fotnre, which was merely possi-
ble,, not. fcMT what the evld^ice ^owed was
reasonably certain to continue. ; Such- an in-
structl(« Is erroneous. Haas t. 8t Lonls &
S. By. Co., 90 S. W. 1155, 1157, lU Mo. App.
706 (following Ford v. dij of Des Moines, 75
N. v. 630, 106 loWa, 94).
The word '"may," in an Instruction oo
the measure of damages for personal Injuries
that the jury will award plaintiff such sum
as shall compensate him for the mental and
bodily pain and suffering* endured by him con-
sequent on the injury and for the mental and
bodily pain which "may" be suffered by him
in the future by reason of such injuries, it
any, and for any permanent injuries suffered
by- plaintiff, It he has eufleied any sueh per-
manent Injury, means "must^V.and the in-
struction does not permit the jury to award
compensation for future pain and permanent
injury, unless the same is reasonably certain
to follow aa a. result of the injury. O'Keefe
V. United Rys. Co. of St Louis, 101 S. W.
1144v 1147, 124 Mo. APP. 613.
Where, in a personal injury caaev the evi-
dence shows tbat plaintiff will be wholly dis-
abled from performing the work in the basl-
nees In which he was engaged at the time ot
the aeddent, an Instruction that plaintUE, if
^titled to recotver, is entitled to compensa-
tion for loss of time in l^is business wbicb
"he may hereafter lose, if. any, by reason or
the injuries, is proper, for the word "niay" i
means "shall" Caplin v. St Louis Transit
Co., 89 S. W. 338, 339. 1 14 Mo. App. 256. j
PossiUUty indieated
" 'May' comprehends the fdea of probabil-
ity, and aliso the thought of what is, witb
more or less certainty, to be expected." It
also comprehends, in one of its usable sens-
es, the Idea of possibility* &nd» so qs^ be-
comes efiualvalent to the ewreasion "mlgbt
possibly"; hence an instruction anthoriziag
a rejcov^ry for suffering "which plaintiff nugr
hereafter suffer and endure^" • if any, "as
ilAt
S85
ITAT-
shown by the erldenee on account of hts said
iojuries,** was not obJectlonaMe ou tim ground
tbat the word ''may*' based tho recovery on
p6sstt>le Instead of probable suffering. Dean
V. Kansas City, St L. ft G. R. Oo., 07 8. W.
910, 918, 109 Mo. 886 (onotlng Reynolds ▼.
St Louis TilEUiflIt Co., 88 8. W. I$D, 188 Mo.
loc. dt 421, 107 Am. St R^. ISM)).
In an action for injuries, an instruction
authorizing tte Jury to award damages re-
sulting from sue)! suffering as the injuries
"may" cause plaintiff was not erroneous by
the use of the word *'may*'; the same being
definitiTe of the proper rule that such dam-
ages may be allowed as are reasonably cer*
tain to follow the injury. Halley ▼. 8t Jos-
eph Ilc^t, Heat ft Power Co., 91 8. W. 168,
115 Mo. Am>. 662.
In an action for injuries, an instruction
allowing damages for such pain and anguish
as plaintiff had Already suffered, and which
"he may hereafter suffer,*' was not erroneous
by reason of the use of the word '*may," on
the ground that it gave room for speculation
and conjecture. Robertson y. Hammond Pack-
ing Go, 91 a W. 161, 162, 115 Mo. App. 520.
An instructton tiiat plaintiff, tf she estab-
lishes her right to recover, will be Entitled to
recorer such damages "as she may have re-
ceived," is not erroneous in the use of the
word ''may" ; it being used by the judge to
express the possibility of the existence of
snch damages, not including any element of
probability. Henry v. Omaha Packing Oo.,
115 N. W. 777, 780, 81 Neb. 237.
The word "may,** used as an auxiliary
rerb, has a wide scope of meaning, into which
the idea of mere possibility enters; but it
also comprehends the idea of probability, and
also the thought of what is with more or less
certainty to be expected, and whether it is
to carry the one thought or the other often
depends on the context In an action for in-
juries, an instruction that in estimating the
damages the Jury may coivsider plaintiff*s
diminished capacity for earning money, if
any, and on account thereof make such allow-
ance as may be fidr and just for any loss
they may believe from the evidence he has
sustained in the past by reason thereof, and
for any loss they may believe he may sustain
in his future earnings by reiason of su<A di-
mlDlshed earning capacity. Is not erroneous,
for the reason that "may" means ''possibly
might," so as to authorise a recovery for loss
. of time, and also for dimiuished earning ca-
pacity during the same period, and for loss
of what he *'may'* sustaih in the future.
Reynolds v. 8t Louis Transit =Ck>., 88 S. W.
50. 03^ 189 Mo. 406, 107 Am. St Rep. 860.
An instruction in a personal injury ac-
tion that the jury, in assessing the damages,
may consider the character of the injury, if
any, sustained by plaintiff, the pain and Of-
fering, If any^ -endured, and *'which will .be
ettdared*** if itayv as the result of tiia injuries;
if any, etc., properly limits a recovery for the «
suiEering endured, and for auch. suffering
as the; evidence discloses he will endure in
the future, since the word ''will,^ as em-
ployed in the instruction, must have been
understood in its proper sense as referring
to the unconditional existence of the fact
and not in the sense of "may,^ which im-
ports a mere possibility. Scally v. W. T.
Garrett ft Oo^ lOi Paa 825, 826» 882, 11 tiaL
App. 188.
MAT (fm OoBStttnttoms as PermlssiTe or
Xaadatory)
In . constitutional proviaious,. "mayV
should \» ^sead "must" wlien the^inteption so
requires, and should be^ interpreted as |nan<
datory and not directory. Henry v. State, 30
South. 858, 883k 87 Miss. 1.
The word "may," as used in Oonst 8. D.
art 5, 1 18, providing that writs of error and
appeals may be aUowed under such regulii-
tions as may be prescribed by law, was eyi-
dently used, in |ts proper sense, aa perml^-
sive^ and not in the sense of must or shall.
Mau V. Stoner, 83 Pac. 218, 220, 14 Wyo. 183
(citing McCffaln v. WiUiiims, 78 N. W. 72,
10 8. D. 882, 48 L. B, A. 287, 289).
Const art 4, f 25%, prp^vidlng ttiat the
Legislature "may** provide tor ihe divisiop of
the state into fish and game districts and
"may" enact appropriate lectsUtkm fdr the
protection of fish and game therein, is man*
datory, and conunands the lisgislatare to
enact necessary legislation toiiddag the care
and custody' of game with reference to local:
conditiona. wliich require special legislation
fior particular localities. Bx parte Prlndle,
^ Pac. 871, 873, 7 Cal. Unrep. Gas. 223.
Const I 188, provides that each county
having a dty of 20,000 and a population, in-
cluding the city, of 40,000 or more may con-
stitute a judicial district; and when its pop'
ulation. reaches 75,000 the General Assembly
may provide that it shall have an additional
judge, and such district may have a judge for
each additional '50,000 above 100,000. Held,
that the word "may," as used in such section,
was not to be construed "must," so as to
make the section mandatory ; the Legislature
being required, in creating a new district un-
der such section, to haVe due regard to the
business, as well as the territory and popula-
tion. Scott T. McOreary, 147 S. W. 803, 004,
148 Ky. 791.
The words "shalT and "may,** as used in
the Utah Constitution, providing Oiat certain
officers *^hall be conservators of thepeaosk
and may hold preliminary examinatfuns,"
are used advisedly, and each is to be under-
stood in its usual and ordinary sense, and a
statute conferring jurisdiction on other of-
ficers to' act as committing magistrates is not
in conflict with-th^x:oii8tituCion. State v.
Shockley, 80 Pac. 886, 868,' 28 Oftah, 25, 110
MAT
S86
MAY
Am. St S«p. 680 (quoting and adopttag 8
Qye p. 58<9.
Tbe word ''may," where it appears in tiie
Const art 10, H 223-22(^ relative to tbe
penitentiary and prisons, forbidding tbe leas-
ing or biring of convicts, anthorlzlng tbe em-
ployment of convicts on public works, and
providing tbat tbe legislature "may place
tbe convicts on a state farm or farms and
bave tbem work, tbereon under state super-
vision exclusively • ♦ ♦ and may buy
farms for that purpose^" is not mandatory,
and tbe Legislature is not required to place
convicts on a state farm noif to buy a farm
for tbat purpose, and it is within Its power
to work tbe convicts on leased lands. State
V. Henry, 40 South. 152, 154, 158, 87 Hiss.
125, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340.
MAT (Ib Statutes mm PermlssiTe or
datorr)
Tbe word "may," when used in a Btat>
ute, is sometimes construed as mandatory,
but more frequently as directory. State ez
reL Coleman v. Blair, 151 S. W. 148, 151,
245 Mo. 680.
Wb^ the word "may" is in a statute
made for the benefit of persons, it is not
simply permissive but mandatory or com-
pulsory. Trail V. Trail, 49 S. E. 43i, 434, 56
W. Va. 594.
The word "may" in statutes usually in-
dicates that the act to which it refers is dis-
cretionary, rather than mandatory, and will
be so construed, unless tbe context indicates
a different meaning. Halfacre v. State, 79
S. W. 182, 188, 112 Tenn. 609.
Whenever third persons or the public
have an interest in having done tbat which
is prescribed by the Legislature, then tbe act
is mandatory, even though words permissive,
as ''may," are used. Instead of words man-
datory, as "shall." Lapsley v. Merchants'
Bank of Jefferson aty, 78 S. W. 1095, 1096,
106 Mo. App. 98.
The word "may" when used in a statute
means "must," whenever third persons or tbe
public have an interest In having the act
done, or bave a claim de jure that the power
shall be exercised. Smalley v. Paine, 116 S.
W« 88, 89, 102 Tex. 804.
Where permissive words, such as *lt
shall be lawful," or "may," are used In a
statute in respect to courts and officers, such
words will be regarded as imperative, in cas-
es where the public or Individuals have a
right to demand the exercise of the power con-
fenred. Bx parte Young, 96 S. W. 98, 102, 49
Tex. Cr. R. 536; (citing Lewis' Sutherland,
Stat Const f 636; Tarver v. Commissioners*
Court of Tallapoosa County, 17 Ala. 527;
MitcheU V. Duncan, 7 Fla. 13 ; David ▼. Levy,
24 South. 689, 119 Aku 241; Smith's Petition,
5 Pa. Dist B. 465).
The word "may" is peremptory, when
in a statute where the public or an in-
dividual has a rigtit de jure, that the powers
conferred by the act should be exercised.
Graham v. City of Tuscumbia, 42 South. 400,
401, 402, 146 Ala. 449 diuoting and adopting
Tarver v. Commisslontf s* Court of Tallapoo-
sa County, 17 Ala. 527).
Ordinarily the word "may'' is employed
in a statute to express the idea that a dis-
cretion may be exercised, and that tbe perfo^
manoe of tbe act Is not imperative^ or tbat
the power or authority conferred is not ex-
clusive, but cumulative and permissive; and
whether it is to be construed as mandatory U
to be determined from the apparent inten-
tion; but the word "may" will be constraed
to mean "shall" whenever the rights of the
public or third persons depend on the exercise
of the power or tbe performance of tbe duty
to which it refers, and such is its meaning in
all cases where the public interests and
rights are concerned, or a duty is imposed on
public officers and the public or third persons
have a claim de jure that tbe power shall be
exercised. Demtng v. Metropolitan Bnglneer-
ing ft Construction Co., 186 S. W. 740, 742,
154 Mo. Ai^. 540 (citing 5 Weeds and Phras-
es, p. 4421).
"May" sometimes is equivalent to "must*'
or "shall," and is then mandatory, but it
usually denotes permission or discretion. To
decide between these meanings in any given
case, the context and whole leglslatiTe
scheme must be taken into consideration.
Bass V. Doughty, 63 S. B. 516, 517, 5 Ga. App.
458 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4420, et
seq.).
The words ''authorize" or "may," as used
in a statute, are sometimes construed as man-
datory in effect, though permissive In form, as
where a statute provides for tbe doing of
some act required by Justice or public duty;
but, where they confer or recognize a dis-
cretionary power, a mandatory constrnction
will not be given to them. Whltiey v. State.
68 S. B. 716, 723, 134 Ga. 758.
Tbe word ''may*' should primarily be
taken In its ordinary meaning and be regard-
ed as permissive only, but its meaning is to
be determined in each case from tbe appar-
ent Intent of the statute in which it is em-
ployed, so that in al^ remedial statutes, or
whenever tbe rights of the public or of third
persons depend on the exercise of tbe power
of a court or public officer or the performance
of a duty and a claim de Jure that the power
may be exercised exists, it should be oon-
strued to mean "shall," State ex reL Mcom-
en Boom Co. v. North Shore Boom A Driying
Co., 103 Pac. 426, 429, 55 Wash. 1 (citing 5
Words and Phrases, p)p. '4420--1447).
"May," as primarily and ordinarily used
in a statute, la permissive, and not peremp-
tory; but it may be given the imperative
HAT
887
MAY
meuiliig If that wms the ob^kma intentloa.
State y. School Dist* No. 1, Edwards Oonxity,
lOB Pac 136, 80 Kan. 667.
While the eonrta hare hotot hesitated to
coDBtnie "may^ as "must," or "shall," when
the context and policy of the law demanded
that Interpretation, the legislatiTe Intention
mnst plainly appear before each Judicial
correction wHl be madei Ostrander y. Oity
of Richmond, 101 Pac. 462, 468, 166 Cal. 46&
Ordinarily the word "may," in constru-
ing the statute, is permisslye, but it is often
coQstraed to \ie mandatory, and generally so
when it is employed to delegate a power, the
exercise of which is important for the protec-
tion of public or priyate interests. Queeny
y. Higgins, 114 N. yf. 61,'l36 Iowa, 673.
The word "may" in a statute will be con-
strued to mean "shall," wheneyer the rights
of the public or third parties depend on the
exercise of the power or duty to which It re-
fers, and such is its meaning in all cases
where public interests and rights are concern-
ed, or a public duty is imposed on public offi-
cers, and the public or third persons haye a
claim de jure that the power shall be exer-
cised. Binder y. Langhorst, 86 N. B. 400, 402,
234 III. 583.
Where neither the dear intent of the
Legislature nor public policy requires that
the language of a statute shall be glyen a
mandatory construction, the word "may"
therein is not equiyalent to "must" Town
of Hempstead y. Lawrence, 122 N. Y. Supp.
1037, 1040, 138 App. Diy. 478.
Words like "may." "must," "shall," etc,
are constantly used in statutes without in-
tending that they shall be taken literally, and
In their construction the object eyidently de-
signed to be reached limits and controls the
literal import of the terma and phrases em-
ployed. Fields y. United SUtes, 27 App. D.
a 433, 440.
The word "may" ordinarily denotes per-
mission and not command. But where used
hi a statute concerning the public interest, or
affecting the rights of three persons, it will
be construed to mean "must" or "shall."
Georgia, F. ft A. R. Go. y. Sasser, 60 8. E.
907, 130 6a. 304 (citing Birdsong y. Brooks,
7 Ga. 88; Weems y. Farrell, 33 Ga. 419).
In constmini; statutes, the term, "may"
may be considered as mandatory and as
meaning "shall" or "must," and "shaU** or
"most" may be construed as directory only,
hi order to effectuate the leglslattye latent
In re Ghadboume's Estate, 114 Pac. 1012,
1014, 16 CaL App. 363 (citing Estate of Bal-
lentlne, 45 GaL 600; Hayes y. Gounty of Los
Angeles, 33 Pac 766, 09 Gal. 74; Suth. St
Const 684; Wallace y. Feeley [N. Y.] 61
How. Prac 225; Merrill y. Shaw, 5 Minn.
148 [GIL 113]; In re Thurber's Estote, 56
K. S. 631, 162 N. Y. 244; Stone y. Pratt, 35
N. Y. Supp. 610, 90 Hun, 30; First Nat Bank
3 WD8.A P.2n Skb.— 22
of Sweca y. X^man, 58 Pac 120, 09 Kaa 410;
Gooke y. Spears, 2 GaL 409, 56 Am. Dec. 348 ;
People ex reL Cfalperfleld y. Sanitary Dist of
Ghlcago, 56 N. E. 953, 184 111. 597).
In a statute the word ''may" may be con-
stmed In a mandatory sense only where sudi
construction Is necessary to glye effect to the
clear policy and intention of the LeglslatUK :
and, whtfe there is nothing in the connection
of the language or in the sense or policy of
the proyision to require an unusual interpre-
tation, its use is merely permissive and dls*
cretionary. Where^ by the use in other pro-
yisions of the statute of the word "shall" or
"must,** it appears that the Legislature in-
tended to distinguish between these words
and "may," "may" will not be construed as
imperatiye. Garlin y. Freeman, 75 Pac. 26,
27, 19 Golo. App. 884.
Adoptiom of bytJawt
The word *'may," as used in Hordes Bey.
Stat 1908, p. 478, | 6, proyldlng ttiat the di-
rectors or managsrs of a corporation "may
adopt by-laws for the goyemment of the oiB-
cers and affairs of the company," means
"must"; the words "may" and "shall" are
frequently used interchangeably in order to
express the leglslatiye intent; and one may
be used for the other, if, by so doing, the
legislatiya Intention can be determined.
Manufiictnrers* Exhibition Bldg. Go. y. Lan-
day, 76 N. B. 146, 148, 219 111. 168 (dttng
Wabash, St L. ft P. By. 0>. y. BInkert, 106
IlL 298).
Appotmtatent to
As used In Laws 1903, p. 202, c. 118, f 4,
providing that city goyernment shall be yest-
ed in a mayor and ooundl, to consist oi five
members, a clerk, treasurer, marshal, and po-
lice Ju4ge, who "may" be one of the Justices
of the peace of the precinct in which the
town is situated, the word "may" should not
be construed to mean "shall" or "must"
Henoe the mayor of a dty of the third class
was not limited to the elected Justices of the
peace for his selection of a police Justice.
State ex reL Pnrdin y. Oault, 106 Paa 242,
243, 56 Wash. 140 (dting 5 Words and
Phrases, p. 4420).
The word "may," as used in Bankr.
Act July 1, 1808, c. 541, | 45, providing that
trustees may be (1) indiyiduals who are re-
spectiyely competent * * * and reside
in or have an office In the Judicial district
within which they are appointed, or (2) cor-
porations • * • haying an office In the
Judicial district, etc., is equiyalent to "shaU,"
in the sense that the section allows a trustee
to be chosen from but two classes, yia., per-
sons of a certain sort or corporations, making
the proyisions mandatory. In re Seider, 163
Fed. 18&
Ky. St I 4313, proyldlng that the fiscal
court of any county wherein the roads are
worked by taxation "may," at Its first regu-
5^AY'
388
m>a¥'
lat term after the act takes effei^ knd every
tvo years thereafter, appoint n Bupervlsor of
rbads^ does not make the appointment of the
supervisor mandatory, bnt leaver the matter
to the discretion of the fiscal court, which
discretion cannot be controlled hy mandamus.
O'Connor ▼. Weissinger, 184 S. W. 1127, 1129,
142^ Ky. 462.
The word *'may,'' as used in OIt. Ck)de
Praa | 298, providing that the appointment
of a receiver "may" be done on motion of a
party to an action who shows a right to* the
property involved, and that it is in danger of
being lost or removed, is not equivalent to
"must- McClure t. McGee, 108 S. W. 841,
842, 128 Ky. 464.
Bicban^s Prlma^ry Bill (Laws 1911, c
201) S 112, provides that any party elector
wishing to become a candidate for an ap-
pointive government position may file his
written appUcation for the official party in-
dorsement with the secretary of state sSt&t
any primary election date and before the fol-
lowing general election date. Section 118 re-
quires the secretary of state to keep a record
of such applications, and prepare and mall
lists thereof, within 10 days after the gen-
eral election date, to each member of the
party state central committee. Section 114
requires the party state central committee
to meet on the second Tuesday of December
to determine who shall receive the official
party indorsement for appointive positions,
and certify such indorsement to the appoint-
ing officer and the secretary of state. Held,
that the provision of section 112 that any
candidate may file his application before the
general election date is mandatory, and a
party committee cannot give the official party
indorsement to a candidate filing his applica-
tion after the general election, or who files
no application, since the provisions of the
law are not for the benefit of candidates,
but to promote and protect the public wel-
fare; and "may" means "mustf' when third
parties or the public have an interest In
having the act done authorised by the per-
missive language. State ex rel. Cook v. Pol-
ley, 139 N. W. 118, 121, 30 S. D. 528.
▲sseuments on stock
The word "may,*' as used in Rev. Code, |
2750, providing that the directors of any cor-
poration formed or existing under the laws
of the state, after one-fourth its capital stock
has been subscribed, may, for the purpose of
paying expenses, conducting business, or pay-
ing debts, levy and collect assessments upon
the subscribed capital stock thereof, etc.,
does not mean "must." Wall v. Basin Mln.
Ck)., 101 tac. 738, 738, 16 Idaho, 313, 22 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1013.
Assignment of mortgage
"In a statute the word *ma3P;' can be con-
strued only in a mandatory sense, where such
construction Is necessary to give effect to the
policy and Intention of the Legislature; and,
where there is nothing In connection with the
language nor in the sense or poit^ of the
provision to require an unusual Interpreta-
tion, its use Is merely permlaBlve and discre-
tionary." B. ft O. Gomp. f 5362, provides
that mortgages '*may" be assigned by an
instrument in writing, and reoorded, etc
Section 5367 provides that a note secured by
a mortgage on real property ean be transfer-
red by indorsement, and. If the mortgage was
recorded, the same, on i>ayment of the note,
may be transferred of. record by the owner
of the note by proving the fact to the satis-
faction of the recorder, and delivering the
note to such officer. Section 5368 provides
that no mortgage shall be satisfied except
by the person appearing on the records to
be the owner thereof. Held, that the use
of the word ^may," In section S862, showed
a design not to repeal section 6867; the a^
tion simply prescribing. In section 5868, the
method for recording assignments by sepa-
rate writings. Barringer v. Loder, 81 Pac
778, 780. 47 Or. 228.
▲ntborUing anlt
The word "may," used in Code Civ. Proc
I 782, providing that any person aggrieved
"by waste may bring an action therefor, is
not a mandatory term, except when it is con-
strued to mean "must"; and it in never thus
construed where there is nothing in the con-
nection of the language or in the sense or
policy of the provision to require an unusual
interpretation. Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co.,
.74 Pac 204, 140 Cal. 678.
In Act AprU 10, 1879 (P. L. 17) | 5, pro-
viding that in case of nonpayment of install-
ments of stock, premiums, dues, or interest
by borrowing stockholders for six months,
their payment may be enforced by proceeding
on their securities according to law, the word
"may" should be construed as a word of per
mission. Workingman's Loan & Building
Ass'n of Altoona v. Heaton, 82 Atl. 78, 80,
283 Pa. 178;
Appeal
"May" should be construed in a manda-
tory sense in a statute providing that any
person aggrieved by a decision or order of the
board of school directors may, within 30 days
after the rendition of the decision or order,
appeal to the county superintendent, and such
appeal is a condition precedent to the right of
a teacher to sue for breach of his contract
by the board of directors. Van Dyke ▼.
School Dist No. 77 of Lewis Oountyr 86 Pac.
402, 403, 43 Wash. 235.
ThjB word "mayi" in Cokle, i 254, provid-
ing that the judge, on accused showing his
inability to pay for ^ transcript on appeal,
"may" order the same at the exp&ose of the
county, should be read "mlist," in view of the
change made in the farmer statute as embod-
ied in Code 1888, f Sp29, by («nittlng the
words "if in the opinion pf the judge Justice
will be thereby proihoted," and the judge
¥AT
S89
MAT
must order the transcript at the expense of
the county on accused sbowlng bis inability.
State y. GoodeeU* 113 N. W. 826, 827, 136
Iowa, .44^.
Calllnc immnj meetlasr
Under article 1341 of tlM Ofvil Code» le-
fenlnff to the family meeting to be lield lo fix
on behalf «f minors tbe teems of sale, and
providing that, at the Instance of the tutors
and cnrators of each minors, the judge may
call a family meeting; the fact that the Judge
''may" at the instance of the tntorB and cura-
tors, caU the meeting was not Intended as
exduding antliority in the Jndge to do so at
the instance of othor parties in intesest or
of bis own motion. ToUn ▼« United States
Safe Deposit * SaTincs Bank, 30 Sonth. 33,
35, 115 La. 36a.
Compensatiom f ov services aaid expemdi**
Under a statute prorldlng tiiat the guar-
dian ad litem for an Infant party ^may" be
allowed compensation for his services and
necessary expenditures in litigation, to be
fixed- by the court, and to be paid out of the
body of the estate or property in controversy,
if the Infant has no ayailable property out of
which such payment can be directed by the
court, the word ''may** should not be con-
strued as "must," but should be held to confer
on the court a broad discretion as to whether
an allowance Aould be made and to what
extent In le McNaughton's Will, US N. W.
907, 1004, 138 Wis. 179.
The goieral rule that; where public au-
thorities are authorized to perform an act for
the benefit of the pvbUc, or for an individual
who has a right to its performance, the word
"may" is Interpreted as meaning ''must" has
no application to Gen. Laws 1901, | 8024,
providing that eounty treasurers shall be
allowed by the board of county commis-
sioners of their respective* counties, as full
compensation for their services for the coun-
ty, the following salaries, etc., provided, that
the county <K>mmis8ioner8 "may** allow the
following sum or as much as they deem nec-
essary for clerk hire, where a county treas-
urer employed a deputy to assist him, as
the question of public benefit through an ap-
propriation for clerk hire can be determined
by nobody but the board of county commis-
sioners. Both V. Board of Com'rs of Ness
County, 77 Pac 694, 69 |:an. 667 (dtlng
Phelps V. Lodge, 66 Pac. 840, 60 Kan. 122).
Costs
The word "may," as used in New York
Code Civ. Proc. i ^247, making the person
beneficially interested, in an action brought,
liable for costs to the same extent as if plain-
tiff, and providing that, where costs are
awarded against plaintiff, the court may by
order direct the person so liable to pay them,
means the same thing as the word "shall,**
and the liability of the person beneficially in-
terested for costs is absolute. NeUigan v.
Grotli, no N. Y. Supp. 610, 620, 126 App. DlT.
444 (citing People v^ Board of Sup'rs of Otser
go County, 51 N. Y. 401).
Detnehatemt of mimicipal territory '
A statute providing for detaching unplat-
ted land from the corporate limits of a city,
which provides that, if the codrt shall find
the existence of the necessary facts and con-
ditions, it "may" grant the decree, "falls
within the rule that, whenever public inter-
ests or individual rights call for the exercise
of a i>ower given to courts or other public
officers, the language used in conferring the
power* although perndssirve in forip, la in ef-
fect mandatory/* Hunter v. City of Tracy,
116 N. W. 922, 924, 104 Minn. 378.
Dismissal of aetlom
'TThe word 'may' is sometimes permissive
only; sometimes it is imperative. Legisla-
tive intent determines whether it Is directory
or mandatory. According to its natural and
usual signification, the word 'may' is enabling
and permissive only, and so It must be inter-
preted where no right of or benefit to the
public, nor right of persons other than the
one upon whom the permission is conferred,
depends upon giving to it the obligatory
meaning; but the word is interpreted to
mean 'shair or 'must* whenever the rights
of the public or of third persons depend upon
the exercise of the power or performance of
the duty to which it refers. In those cases
where the public or persons possess the right
to require that the power conferred by the
word 'may* be exercised, the word is impera-
tive and mandatory, being the equivalent of
•shall' or 'musf' Code Oiv. Proc. Mont
1895, 1 1094, subd. 6, providing that an action
'^may" be dismissed by the court, when, after
verdict or final submission, the party entitled
to Judgment neglects to demand and have it
entered for more than six months, is manda-
tory. State ex reL Stiefel v. District Court,
96 Pac 337, 338, 340, 37 Mont. 298 (quoting
and adopting definition in Montana Ore Pur-
chasing Co« ▼. Undsay, 63 Pac. 715, 25 Mont.
24).
DiToree
Th^ word "may," as used in section 18, c.
64, Code 1906, providing that in certain cases,
where divorce from bed and board is decreed,
an absolute divorce **may" be granted after
certain requirements are fulfilled, means
"shalL" Chapman v. Chapman, 74 8. E. 661,
664, 70 W. Va. 622 (citing 5 Words and Phras-
es, 4420).
HmtortiMM orders of eoatmisslom
In a statnte providing that the .orders
of a commission "may" be enforced by man-
damus, and that, upon proof tliat an order has
been made and has not been complied with
after notice thereof, the court "may" issue a
mandamus to enforce It, the word "may"
means "must." Trustees of Village of Sara-
toga Springs V. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light
& Power Cto., 107 N. Y. Supp. 341, 366, 122
MAT
340
MAT
Apj). Dlv. 208 (dissenting (V>lnlo]i of Judge
Kellogg).
lanboldev's license
An innholder*s license, granted In May
instead of the month of April, is valid ; the
provisions of Rev. Laws 1902, e 100, I 12,
and chapter 102, | 4, providing that licenses
'*may" be granted in April, to take effect on
the Ist of May, being directory. Cheney v.
Goughlin, 87 N. B.. 744, 745, 747, 201 Mass.
204.
Rev. St 1898, | 1962, provides that life
insurance companies whose members are en-
titled to share in the surplus cumulations
"may" make distribution thereof annually or
once in two, three, four, or five years, and in
determining the amount of surplus to be dis-
tributed there "shall" be reserved an amount
equal to the net value of the outstanding poli-
cies. The section is the same as Laws 1870,
p. 107, c. 59, i 14, the purpose of which, as
appears from instructions to the legislative
committee which reported the bill, was to
afford proper "protection to policy holders'*
by safeguard against insolvency of insurance
companies by requiring the cumulation of the
reserve fund. Held, that the use of the word
"shair in the section in relation to the re-
serve fund is imperative, while "may" in re-
lation to distribution of the surplus is per-
missive, and having been so construed by
the state officials and insurance companies
for more than 30 years, the license of an
insurance company will not be revoked for
deferring the distribution of the surplus more
than five years. Equitable Life Assur. Soc
V. Host. 102 N. W. 579-TO4, 124 Wis. 657, 4
Ann. Cas. 41B.
Jury trial
Rev. Laws, c 189, I 16, in its literal
wording plainly leaves the option of a Jury
trial to the discretion of the court But when
read in connection with its legislative origin,
supplemented by the practice that prevailed
under the original statute^ if a Jury trial is
seasonably claimed, "may" should be con-
strued to mean "shaU." Hubbard *v. Lam-
bum, 75 N. B. 707, 709, 189 Mass. 296.
The word "may," In the borough act of
April 24, 1897 (P. L. p. 291), providing that
in all cases where a fine or penalty shall ex-
ceed (20, eta, there may be a trial by Jury,
is mandatory in effect, and not permissive
only. Borough of Vineland v. Denoflio, 65
Atl. 887. 838, 74 N. J. Law, 326.
Iiioenso to praotloe profession
The right to practice law given by Code
1906, c. 119, is not a de Jure right, and the
word "may" employed therein, in the provi-
sion that the Supreme Court "may on pro-
duction ot a duly certified copy of the order
of the county court grant a license," win not
be construed as synonymous with "shall,"
and, whete on application it is shown on ob-
jection thereto that applicant Is not of good
moral character, his applicaticHi will be de-
nied. In re Application tot license to Prac-
tice Law, 67 S. E. 597, 601, 67 W. Ya. 2ia
In Rev. Codes, | 1842, as amended by
Laws 1909, p. 182, providing that the board
of medical ^uuninera may, either with or
without examination, grant a license to any
physician Ueensed to pvactlce by a shnllar
board of any other state^ who tiolds a certi-
ficate of registration showing that an examiii;
ation has been made by the proper board of
any state in whidh an average grade of not
less than 80 per cent was awarded, and trtio
Is the holder of a diploma from a medical
college In good standing, the word "may" is
not to be construed as equivalent to '^ust"
Barton v. Schmershall, 122 Pae. 386^ 888, 21
Idaho, 562.
The word ''may," as used In Revised
Anoended Greater New York Charter, i 1Q89
(Laws 1901, p. 1774, c. 718), providing that
at the dose of a teacher's third year of cod-
tlnuous socoessful service the dty superin-
tendent "may" make a license permanent,
is not used in the sense of "must*' It Is used
In a permissive and not a mandatory saisa
People ex rel. Flnlgan v. Board of Education
of aty of New York, 94 N. Y. Supp; 61, 62,
106 App. Dlv. lOL
The word "may^ in P. L. 1898, p. 122,
I 6, as amended by P. L. ik 896, | 2, providing
that the State Board of Registration and
Examination in Dentistry shall register as
licensed dentists all persons who shall snc-
cessfully pass the examination, and that tlie
board "may" also without examination isBoe
Its license to any applicant furnishing satis-
factory proof that he has been duly Ueensed
in any state after full compliance with its
dental laws. Is not synonymous with the word
"shall," but Is permissive, and whether the
board will license an applicant without tn
examination Js discretionary. Saxenmeyer
V. State Board of Registration and Examina-
tton In Dentistry, 75 AtL 175, 174, 79 N. J.
Law, 427.
Iiimitatioiis
Comp. Laws 1897, i 2921« provides that
if, at any time after the Incurring of an
indebtedness or liability or the accrual of a
cause of action against him or the entry of
Judgment against him, the debtor shall have
been or shall be absent from or out of the
territory, the time during which he "may"
have been or may be out of the territory
shall not be included In computing limita-
tions. Held, that the use of "may** in con-
nection with "have been" precludes the ap-
plication of the terms to anything future
'They are the equivalent of has been; the
only dllterence being that in one case the
expression is in the certain or indicative
form, and in the other in the contingent or
potential form. They botii refer to a con-
dition completed In present time," and the
MAT
841
HAT
statute is retrospectlTe In operatton. Onnan
T. van Arsdell, 78 Pa«. 48, 49, 12 N. M. 844^
67 L. R. A. 438.
Geou St 1902, i llBl, providing that,
in case of the death of plaintiff, bis executor
and administrator "may enter" within six
months and prosecute a suit, is not an abso-
lute Limitation on the discretionary power
of the court to permit an entry to be made
after that time upon good cause shown.
Hatch T. Busby, 59 Aa 422, 4^ 77 Ck)nn.
347.
Under WUson's Ber. ft Ann. St 1903, |
709, proTiding tliat luggage may consist of
any ardeles Intended for the use of a pas-
senger while traveling or fbr his personal
equipment, the term '*may" is used in the
aense of '^tiat" or '*shaU.'* GhocUw, O.
k G. B. Co. V. Zwirts, 78 Paa 941, 942, 13
OkL 411.
Act June 10, 1898 (P. L. 480) f 22, pro-
vides that the elector "shall" prepare his bal-
lot by marking a cross above the name of a
party if he desires to vote fbr every can-
didate of that party, otherwise by a mark
opposite the party named: As amended by
Act April 29, 1903 (P. L. 840), the section
now reads: "If he desires to vote for every
candidate of a political party, he may make
a cross," etc. Held, that the employment of
the word "may^ in the amending clause gives
no larger privilege as to the way of mark-
ing the ballot than the word ''shall" in the
original clause. Appeal of Dailey, 81 AtL
655, 850, 232 Pa. 640.
In Comp. St. 1907, c. 62, | 8, providing
that every judge and Justice of peace, and
every preacher, authorized by the usages of
the church to which he belongs to solem-
nize marriages, may perform marriage cere-
monies, the word "may" Is mandatory as to
Justices of the peaee who are given a fee
therefore by section 11, c. 28, but Is per-
missive as to clergymen and Judges of the
blgher courts. The ordinary meaning of the
word "may" is perml««ive, and it should re-
ceive that interpretation, unless the rights
of the public or third persons depend upon
the power conferred, or it is necessary, to
Rive effect to the clear Intention of the Leg-
islature, that it should be construed as man-
datory. Douglas County v. Vlnsonhaler, 118
N. W. 1058, 1002, 1063. 82 Neb. 810.
XMtlBCS of
The word ••may," in Gen. St. 1901, |
8122, providing for calling special meetfhgs
by a district board or on petition of 10 resi-
dent taxpayers, is permissive. State v. School
Dist. No. 1, Edwards County, 108 P. 136, 80
Kan. 667.
The word "may** Is used in a permissive
not a mandatory, sense in Mills' Ann. St. i
3162, providing that the relocator of an aban-
doned lode claim may sink the original shaft
deeper than it was at the time of abandon*
m^t Carlin v. Freeman, 76 Paa 26, 27, 19
Colo. App. 884.
Under the statute (Code Oiv. Proc | 2386),
providing that the afildavit of lervlee on the
mortgagor of notice of foredosnre sale by
advertisement "may" be made by the person
making the service^ such person alone can
make the affidavit Deutsch v. Haab, 119 N.
T. Supp. 911, 912, 136 App. Div. 766.
M«aiel9al eKpeadituee
It is a familiar doctrine that, where a
statute confers a power to be exercised tor
the benefit of the public or of a private per-
son, the word '*may" is often treated as Im-
posing a duty, rather than conferring a dis-
cretion. The word, as used in E2itra Sees.
Acts La. 1877, p. 47, providing that aU the
revenues of a city of each year shall be de-'
voted to the expenditures of that year, pro-
vided that any surplus of said revenues
"may" be applied to the indebtedness of
former years, is merely permissive as to the
surplus, and does not contractually dedicate
the surplus of any year to payment of claims
of years prior to that year but subsequent to
1877. The word, in such act, is used in
special contradistinction to the word "shall."
United States v. Thoman, 16 Sup. Ct 378,
380, 156 U. S. 363, 39 L. Bd. 460.
Ketiee of MAmmt of moto
li. O. L. f 6929, provides that the notice
of dishonor of a note may be In writing or
oral, and section 6936 requires such notice,
where the person giving and the person to
receive reside in the same place, to be sent
the day following dishonor, while section
6946 provides that delay in giving notice is
excused when caused by circumstances be-
yond the control of the holder. Held, that
the word "may" in the first section should
be construed as "must," and that the person
giving the notice must give it in writing or
orally, and hence the impossibility of giving
oral notice does not under the last section
excuse delay; notice by mail being prac-
tlcableu Prioe v. Warner, 118 Pac: 178, 174,
60 Or. 7.
Powers of trttsteo
Laws 1896, p. 673, a 647, | 86, provides
that a trustee of property during the life
of the beneficiary "may" execute a lease of
real property for a term not exceeding five
years, without application to the court It
Is also declared that, if any sudi trustee
has leased property before June 4, 1896, for
a longer period than five years, the Supreme
Court on the trustee's application "may"
confirm the lease by an order binding on all
¥Ay
843
MAY
persons interested in the trust esta4^- H^d,
tliiit the legislatlye intent in the ffrst provi-
sion was to extend rather than restrict the
powers of the trustee, so that a flve-year
lease executed in 1900 by a trustee, of the
lif0 beneficiary containing an option for re:
n^wal was enforceable against the trustee
and could not be construed a» though it
read: ''A trustee shall not execute and de-
liver a lease of such real property tw*B. term
exceeding five years without application to
the court." Weir y. Barker, 88 N. Y. Supp.
782, 734, 104 App. Dir. 112.
PxlTate way
Pub. St. 1882, c. 189. | 20, providea that
a party desiring to have a private way laid
out shall file a petition with the county com-
missioners. Section 25 provides that, wben
the premises are situated .entirely ii^ one
town, the petition. may be made to the select-
men, or mayor and aldermen, thereof. The
word "may," in the last section, does not
mean "must" Eldredge v. Hortoik Ck)unty
Com'rs, 7a N. E. 36, 37, 185 Masa 180.
FroKate pvoeeedliics
Code, S 141, providing that any person in-
terested under any will filed In the office of
the register of wills prior to June 8, 1898,
"may offer the same for probate as a will
of real estate," is permissive, and not mand-
atory. Young V. Norris Peters Co., 27 App.
D. C. 140, 145.
The power of modification or revocation
conferred by Gen. St 1902, | 203, providing
that any court of probate "may" modify or
revoke any order or decree made by it e;x
parte, before any appeal therefrom, and, if
made before the final settlement thereof,
upon the written application of any person
interested therein, etc., is one that, on an ap-
plication in a prescribed manner, "may," not
must, be exercised. Appeal of Murdoch, 72
Ati. 290, 291, 294, 81 Conn. 681, 12» Am.
St Rep. 231.
The word "may," as used in West Vir-
ginia Code 1906, i 8259, providing that if,
after administration is granted to a creditor
or other person than a distributee, any dis-
tributee, who shall not have before refused,
shall apply for administration, there may bef
a grant of probate or administration in like
manner as if the former grant had not been
made, means "must" Butcher v. Kunst, 64
S. B. 967, 971, 66 W. Va. 884 (qdoting Hutche-
son V. Priddy, 12 Grat [53 Va.] 85).
Comp. Laws 1897, I 9310, provides that,
when a will shall have been duly proved and
allowed, the probate court shall issue letters
testamentary to the person named executor
therein, if he is legally competent, and shall
accept the trust and give bond. Section 9317
provides that if an executor shall reside out
of the state, or shall neglect to, render his
account or perform any decree of the courl;,
or abscond, etc, the probate court "may" re*
move such executor. Section 50, subd. 1,
reqidres words and phrases used in statutes
to be construed and understood according to
the common and approved use of language.
Held, that a nonresident alien is not abso-
lutely disqualified from serving aa executor,
but his nonresidence is ground for the exer-
cise of a discretion in the probate Judge in
the matters of appointing him or revoking
his letters, and the word "may" should not
be held to mean "shall." Breen v. Kehoe,
105 N. W. 28, 29, 142 Mich. 58, 1 L. R, A.
(N. S.) 349, 113 Am. St Rep. 558.
Proeeediass agatast lasolTomt debtor
The word "may" is used ordinarily
as a word of p«rml8aion» rathrer than of
command, bankruptcy Act (Act U. S. 1898,
a 541» i 11), providing that a suit founded on
a claim from which' a dischaj^e would be a
n^ease, pending against a person when a
petition is filed against him, shall be stayed
until after an adjudieation or dismissal of
the petition, and, if he is adjudged a bank-
rupt, such action may be further stayed until
12 months after the adjudicatloii or until tbe
question .of disci^rge is determined, effects
a peremptory stay only until the adjudica-
tion is made, and leaves the further 8ta7
within the discretion of the court in which
the action is pending. If Congress had in-
tended that a further stay in case of an
adjudication should be peremptory, tbe use
of tjtie word "shall" instead of "may" would
have made its n^e^ing clear. Rosenthal t.
Nove, 56 N. S. 884, 885, 175 Biass. 559, 78
Am, St R^. 512.
The clUuse ia 2 Gen. St 1895, p. 1728, 1
11, proviMng that the court •'may" direct
the diischarge of an insolvent debtor on mat-
ing and filing an assignment of his property
as therein provided, is regarded as man-
datory. Compton V. Calvert, 72 Atl. 29, 30,
77 K. J. Law, 358 (citing Weeks v. Buderus,
39 N. J. Law, 448).
Prooeedlncs relating to sobool dlstrictft
Acts 81st Leg. a 12, § 50, requires county
commissioners, in organized c6unties not sab-
divided,, to divide their counties into conven-
ient school districts, so that no district shall
be thereafter created havinur an area of les»
than 16 square miles or more than one school
for white children and one for colored cbil-
dren for each 16 square miles of territory or
major fraction thereof, except that the com-
missioners "may" reduce the area of any
common school district and create such ad-
ditional districts as may be necessary, pro-
vided that no district shall be reduced to
contain less than 0 square miles of territory,
and that no new district shall thereafter be
created having a less area than 9 square
miles, and that the area of school districts
having an .outstanding bonded indebtednesa
shall not be reduced until after such indebt-
edness has been fully discharged. Held, that
the word "may," as so used, did not confer
a mere discretion, but imported aa lmpe^
MAT
343
UATT'
adve obUcatiOB, and bence a diflirion of a
county in ni€li a manner as to itface In the
district: containing tlie oovnty aeat 200 aec-
Uons of land, making that dlstriet 20 mUes
long, and including the best of the lands in
the county, when the territory did not ex-
ceed 00 scholastics in numberi and giving to
no other district more than 85 sections of
land, constituted an illegal exercise of power
which was subject to review by the courts.
McLaughlin y. Smith, 148 a W. 288, 288, 105
Tex. 330.
Piimarily and as ordinarily used in a stat-
ute, the w<nrd "may" is permissive rather
than per^nptory, but it is sometimes regard-
ed as synonymous with "must," as, for in-
stance, where public officers are authorized
to perform an act for the benefit of the pub-
lic or for an individual who has a right to
its performance. In the statute relating to
school district meetingib which provides spe-
cial meeting may be oilled by the district
board or upon a petition signed by ten resi-
dent taxpayers of the district, the word
"may** is used in its permissive sense. The
word should always be given its ordinary
meaning, unless the other terms and provi-
sions of the statute compel the other view.
State V. School Dist No* 1, Edwards County,
103 Pac. 136, 80 Kan. 667 (quoting Phelphs
V. Lodge, 55 Pac. 840, 60 Kan. 122).
Provlac ownenlilp of estray
In Rev. Codes 1809, § 1575, providing
that the person taking up an eatray and the
claimant of th^ property may go before a
Justice of the peace to have determined the
rights of the parties, the use of the word
"may" is not decisive of the meaning of the
statute, and the word "may" will be con-
strued to mean "shallt'' when the context or
purpose of the statute requires it It wbb
the object of the section to provide a conven-
ient and qpeedy method of proving ownership
and at the same time protect the person
holding the estray from liability for errone-
ous decision as to ownership. Mills v. For-
tune, 105 N. W. 235, 236, 14 N. D. 460.
PabUe laftproreaMats
The word '^may," as used in 1 Starr, ft
C. Am. St (2d Ed.) p. 858, c. 24, par. 430,
providing that a sidewalk ordinance may re-
quire all owners of abutting lots to construct
a sidewalk in front of their respective lots,
etc., should be read "shalL" Pierson v. Peo-
ple, eS N. B. 383, 886, 204 IlL 456.
"Words which, in their ordinary accep-
tation, and when interpreted exclusive of
tbe context and the subject-matter, imply a
discretion or powers such as 'may,' It shall
be lawful,* and the like, become, in the con-
stniction of statutes, mandatory, where such
is the legislative intent" Under a gtatute
providing that, on making changes of a
street, it shall be lawful for the mnnidpal
authorities in any such city to make or cause
to be made, a proper award for damages,
etc., the duty of' the city to ihak» the award
in such case la mandatoryv ClArk v. City of
BUaabeth,; 40 AU. 616, 622, 61 N. J. Law, 565
(citing and adopting Maxwell, Interp. of St
218, 218, Board of Sup*rs of Bock island
County V. United States ex reL State Bank,
4 WalL 435, 446, 18 U £d. 410).
dr. Code 1902, I 1881, provides that the
county sapervlaor "may'* advertise for ^'blds
for working hi^ways by contract" Held to
give sndx officer discretion, and the dty
council of a city under a general charter giv-
ing it the same powers over streets as coun-
ty officers have over highways is not requir-
ed to advertise for bids in county news*
papers for the paving of streets. Dilling-
ham V. City of Spartanburg, 56 & B. 881,
382, 75 & C. 549, 8 L. R. A. (N. &) 412, 117
Ana. St Rep. 917, 9 Ann. CSas. 829 (citing
Minor V. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet [26 U. S.]
46, 7 U Ed. 47).
^e Vrooman Act (St 1885, p. 147, c.
153), as amended by St 1905, p. 63, c 67,
provides that whenever a contemplated im*
provement -in the opinion of the dty council
is of more than local or ordinary publie<
benefit or whenever the total estimated costs
exceed one-half the total assessed value of
the lots fronting on such proposed work, the
city council ^may" make the expense diarge*
able on a district As originally drawn, the
act required the trustees of the city to order
payment of a portion of the expense from the
ci^ treasury if the estimated cost of the im-
provement exceeded one-half the assessed
value of the property. St 1889, pp. 159,
160, 170, c 151, amended the act ao as to
confer discretionary power on city councils.
The amendments^ of 1891 (St 1891, p. 196
et seq., c 147) sire similar in this respect
Held, that the Legislature intended to con-
fer a wide discretionary power, and that the
word ''may" would not be construed to mean
''shall," so as to require the expense of a
street improvement to be made chargeable
on a district where the estimated cost ex-
ceeds one-half the assessed value of the lots
fronting on the proposed work. Ostrander
V. City of Richmond, 101 Paa 452, 453, 155
CaL,468.
St 1896, a 40a, subc. 42, | 925~-223» pro-
vides that when a city council shall order
paving or repaving of a street in which gas,
water mains, or sewers have been previously
laid, the council "may" require service pipes
to be first laid to the curb Une, and that no
street shall be paved or repaved by order of
the council .unless the water, gas mains, serv-
ice pipes, neceasary sewers, and connections
shall, as required by the council, be first laid
in that portion of the streeC ao to be paved
or repaved. Held, that the word *hnay^*
should. be treated as permissive amd not man-
datory, and that a dty council therefore had
power to order ttxt paving of a street with*,
out requiring water, gas, service pipes; and
sewer connections to be laid before the pave-
MAT
344
UAT
meat. Barber Asphalt Ck>. r. Oltj of Osh*
toah, 121 N. W. 603, 140 W1& 68.
"Whether the word 'may/ In a statute,
is permissive or obligatory depends In a
great measure on the true Intent and object
of the L^rlslature in making the enactment
It means 'must' whenever third persons or
the pnbUc have an interest In having the act
done or have a dalm de jure that the power
shall be exercised." The provisions of Acts
24th Leg. Sees. (Laws 1885, p. 213, c. 132),
constituting a eipecial road law for certain
coanties, that the oommlsstoners' court "may"
condemn land in the same manner that a
railroad company can condemn land for a
right of vray is mandatory, and does not
merely confer on the commissioners' court a
discretiLonary power to proceed under the
railroad law. Plowman v. DaUas County
(Tex.) 88 S. W. 262, 256 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in Rains v. Herring, 68 Tex.
468, 6 S. W. 869).
The word "may" Is not to be oonstmed
as "must" or "shall*" but merely as permis*
sive and discretionary with the dty, in an
ordinance providing that the grade of alleys,
not otherwise fixed, at the points of Inter-
section with streets whose grades are estab-
lished by the ordinance, shall be the same as
said streets, and continuous from one street
to tiie next, but between any two adjacent
streets along the line of the alley vertical
curves of grade "may" be used, when neces-
sary to facilitate drainage or afford better
access to property along the line of said al-
ley, eta, for in interpreting statutes and or-
dinances the word "may" should not be con-
strued to mean "must" or "shall," for the
purpose of creating or determining the char-
acter of private rights. Kelley v. City of
Cedar FaUs, 99 N. W. 056, 557, 128 Iowa, 660.
Under Acts 1891, p. 323, c. 118 (Burns*
Ann. St 1901, i 4291), providing that after re-
ceiving bids for the improvement of a street,
in case all bids are rejected as unsatisfac-
tory, then the common council "may" order
work to be done by the street commissioner,
the total cost of the work not to be in excess
of the lowest bid or that the common council
"may** readvertise for bids for the work, the
council must either order the work done by
the commissioner, or readvertise for bids for
the work, and they are not at liberty, after
accepting one of the number of bids submit-
ted, for street wofk, on subsequent recon-
sideration and rejection of the bid, to accept
the proposal of another bidder submitted at
the same time as the bid rejected, but with
a change of material, all of whidi was done
without readvertiaement for bids. Where
power is given to public oflaoers, and the
public Interest or Individual rights called for
ItR exercise, the language used, though per-
missive in form, is in fact peremptory, and
the intent of the Legislature in such cases
IS not to declare a mere direction, but to im-
pose a positive and absolute duty« Zom
▼. Wanvn-Scharf Asphalt Paving Co« G&d.)
81 N. B. 672, 675 (citing Bode Island Comity
V. United States ez r^ State Bank, 4 Wall.
485^ 18 L. Ed. 419).
A waterworks system In a village of the
fourth class was extended to supply aU the
Inhabitants except four. Relator was the
only one of the four to Insist that it be ex-
tended to supply him, and he sued for man-
damus. The cost of the extension would be
less than $500. Village Law (Laws 1897, p.
434, c 414) art 9, | 224, as amended by
Jaws 1903, p. 807, c. 131, 1 1, provided that a
system of waterworks established under the
article shall be under the control of the
board of water commissioners, and that tbe
board shall keep it in repair, and "may" ex-
tend the mains within the village, if the ex-
pense in any one year, In a village of the
fourth class, shall not exceed $600, and that
a board "may," in lieu of extending tbe
mains, etc., use the amount q>eclfled in im-
proving the existing system. Ttie original
cost of the system, which was met by an Is-
sue of bonds, relator being taxed for interest
thereon, was $20,000, and there were 160
residency or places of business. The board
had no money on hand to make the exten-
sion. Held, that the word "may," as used in
the phrase "may extend'* in any one year,
etc., though permissire, would be construed
"must,** especially in view of the permissive
character of "may** used in the last sentence
of the statute, giving an alternative use of
the money. People ex rel. Hllllker v. Pierce^
119 N. Y. Supp. 21. 23, 64 Misc. Rep. 627.
The term *'may," as used in Laws 1900,
p. 1.302, c. 571, providing that the city of
Buffalo "may" enlarge and embank the Buf-
falo river, implies a discretion in the dty
find places no absolute duty on it of improv-
ing such river. White v. C^ty of BulTalo, 115
N. Y. Supp. 1021, 1028, 131 App. DIv. 581.
The word ''may** must be construed as
*'8hall," when an act of the Legislature can
be thereby upheld, If a contrary construction
would render it obnoxious to a constitutional
inhibition. The conTerse cf this must be
likewise true, and Denver City Charter, art
7, I 31, providing that the dty council shall
pass an assessing ordinance after recommen-
dations of the council for improvements have
beai reviewed by the board of public works,
is to be construed as meaning that tbe coun-
cil may pass such an ordinance, (3ty of.
Denver V. Londoner, 80 Pac. 117, 121, 33 CJolo,
104 (citing Board of County Ck>m*rs of Pueblo
County V. Smith, 45 Pac. 357. 22 Colo. 534).
The words "may** and "shall," when
used in a statute, will sometimes be read in-
terchangeably, as will best express the legis-
lative Intent Tbe word ''may" will be con-
strued to mean "shaU," wlien Uie pnblle ar
third person have a dalm that the power
ought to be exercised; but, when ttie word
"shall'* is used where no right or benefit to
IIAT
846
MAT
any one depends on Its imperatli^ use, that
word may be htid diieetory maraly, and by
legislative intention to be used synonymoae-
ly with the wozd "may." Act Kay 20, 1889,
entitled "An act to cieate sanitary districts
and to remove obstructions in the Des Plaines
and Illinois riyers" (section 28), provides that
the sanitary district constructing a channel
to carry water ftom Lake Michigan may cor-
rect, modify, and remove obstructions in
the Des Plaines and Illinois rivers, where-
ever it shall be necessary so to do to prevoit
overflow or damage along such rivers, and
"shall'* remove the dams at Henry and Cop-
peras creek, in the Illinois river, before any
water shall be turned into the said canal;
also that if the canal commissioners "find at
any time that an additional supply of water
has been added to either of said livers* by
any drainage district or districts, to main-
tain a depth of not less than six feet from
and dam ofwned I7 the state^ to and into the
first lock of the mtntAB and Michigan Canal
at Lasalle, without the aid of any such dam,
at low water, then it shall be the duty of
said canal commissioners to cause sodi dam
or dams to be rttnoved." The dams were
oonstnlcted by the canal commissloneffs at a
great expense, and their destruction would
greatly injure navigation. It was held that
the word "shall" should be construed as
"may," so that the removal of the dams at
Henry and Copperas creek by the sanitary
district is not mandatory, but depends on the
qnestion of necessity, and that it is the duty
of the canal commissioners to preserve and
protect the dams until the conditions stated
result Canal Com'rs v. Sanitary Dlst of
Chicago, 66 N. B. 963, 966, 184 IlL 697.
PwasliaieBt of erlnriiiftls
Beformatory Act (Hurd's Rev. St 1909,
c 118) 1 10, divides persons who may be sen-
tenced thereunder into two classes, viz.,
males between 10 and 16 years of age* and
males between 16 and 21. Section U pro-
vides that a boy between 10 and 16 years
of age "shall be committed" to the reforma-
tory; while section 9 provides that both
classes "may be sentenced" to the reforma-
toiy. Section 10 declares that in all oriminal
cases tried by a Jury, where it is found that
the defendant is betwe^ 10 and 21 years of
age, the Jury shall not fix the punishment,
unless it shall also appear that defendant
has been previously sentenced to the peniten-
tiary, or that the offense is a capital one,
and Parole Law, f 1 (Hurd's Rev. St 1909,
c 38, i 498), excepts from its appUcation
treason, murder, rape^ and kidnai^^King. Held,
that the parole law was not intended to de-
stroy by imiHication the application of the
reformatory act to males between the ages
of 10 and 21, convicted of rape; but that the
word "may,** in section 9 of the reformatory
act, diould be construed to mean "must";
and hence a boy of 19, on being convicted of
rape^ could not be properly sentenced to tiie
penitentiafy. PMple ▼• Smith, 97 V. B. 649,
660, 268 IlL 288.
Code 1899, e 160, | 2, providing that in
any other criminal cases than in cases of
sentence to death or to the penitentiary the
court "may postpone" the execution of the
Judgment, where a writ of error lies, the
word "may" means "shall," and a person
convicted of misdemeanor is entitled as mat-
ter of right to suspension of the execution
of the Judgment pending application for a
writ of error. Bx parte Doyle, 67 S. B.
824, 62 W. Va. 280.
The word "may," in Bev. Codes 1899, |
8246, providing that, where the punishment
imposed by the Jury in the verdict is under
the limit prescribed by law for the offense
of which defendant is found guilty, the court
"may" receive the verdict and render Judg-
ment for the lowest limit prescribed by law,
is mandatory, and it is the duty of trial
Judges to receive su<di a verdict and enter
Judgment thereon. State v. Barry, 103 N.
W. 687, 689, 640, 14 N. D. 816.
The word "may," as used in Acts 1897,
p. 78, & 68, i 8, providing that the board of
managers of the Indiana reformatory may
terminate the imprisonment of certain in-
mates when the rules and requirements of
such reformatory have been obeyed and per-
formed according to the provisions of the
act, must be understood in its usual acc^Ha-
tion and as granting to such board permis-
sion, Uberty, or discretion to terminate such
imprisonment, and not as imposing on the
board a duty to be performed in all case»,
whether such board believes the person im-
prisoned entitled to his discharge or other-
wise. Should the clause of the act be con-
strued as mandatory, all discipline in the
institution would inevitably be overthrown,
and the board be exposed to iimumerable and
constantly recurring legal controversies with
the inmates over the question of the right to
a discharge. Terry v. Byera, 68 N. B. 696,
698, 161 Ind. 860.
BeoeiTegship
In Bev. Codee, i 4881, providing that the
court may require an undertaking from an
applicant for a receivership, "may" does not
mean "must" Lee v. Stevens, 127 Paa 680,
681, 22 Idaho, 670.
Beferemeo
The word "may," as used in Bev. St
1898, 1 2864, providing tHat aU or any of the
issues in an action may be referred, is not
used with reference to public rights or inter-
ests, or where the publie or a third penoo
have a dahn de Jure that the power shaU be
exercised. So it is not an instance where by
the rules of statutory construction a permis-
sive word shall be given the mandatory sig-
nificance of "must" or "shalL" When a per-
missive word is not so used In the statute,
it must be taken in its liteml sense. The
privilege of the statute in question is design-
liAT
S46
>ULT
^*f6i the-^uveBl^et of both Oie court and
parties. Hence the statute duthdrlzes a Tef-
erence in the discretlan of the court, and
does not entitle a party to a reference as a
(natter of right Hart v, Glodkln« 100 N. W.
1067, 1068, 122 Wis. 646.
Rea:nlatioai of freigl^t rates '
Under a railroad charter providing that,
when the aggregate amount of di\:ldends de-
clared shall amount to the full sum Invested
and 10 per centum per annum thereon, the
Legislature "may" so regulate the tolls and
freights that not more than 16 per centum
per annum shall be divided on the capital em-
ployed, and the surplus profits, if any, etc.,
the word "may*' is permissive. Terre Haute
& i. R. Co. V. Indiana ex rel. Ketcham, 24
Sup. Ct 767, 760, 194 U. S. 679, 48 L. Ed.
1124.
Under Loa Laws 1847, p. 77, creating a
corporation with power to construct a rail-
road between certain points, and with the
right to fix its transportation rates untU the
stockholders had received in dividends an
ajnount equal to the sum invested and 10
per cent, per annum thereon, when the Leg-
islature may regulate the rates, the word
"may" cannot be construed to mean "shall."
Terre Haute A I. R. Co. v. State ex rel.
Ketcham, 66 N. B. 401, 406, 159 Ind. 438. .
Sj^eoifio perfom&Aiioe
Under Civ. Code, art. 1926, the obligee In
a contract for the sale of land is entitled to
damages, or specific performance, at his op-
tion, and by article 1927 he Is entitled only to
damages in ordinary cases, but "may" be
awarded specific performance In cases where
damages would be inadequate relief.. Con-
struing these two articles together and read-
ing the word "may" in conjunction with the
word "entitled," to which it stands in core-
lation, the word "may" piust be given the
meaning of "shall." Glrault v. Feucht, 41
South. 672, 573, 117 La. 276.
Tazatioii
^ In Pol. Code, i 8804, requiring that any
taxes paid more than once, or erroneously or
illegally collected, may by order of the boiard
of shpervisors be refunded by the county
treasurer, the word "may" means "shall."
Stewart Law ft Collection Co. v. Alameda
County, 76 Pac. 481, 482, 142 Gal. 660.
1*01. Code, i 11804, proTldea that any
taxes, penalties, and costs paid more than,
once, or erroneously or illegally collected,
may, by order of the supervisors, be refund-
ed. Held, that the duty to refund was
mandatory ; the word 'teay" being ccmstrued
to mean "must," under the rule that, where
persons or the public have an interest in hav-
ing an act done by a public body, the word
*"may*' la to be so • construed: Brenner v.
City of Los Angles,: 116 Pad; 397, 400, 160
CaL 72..
' JsL O.L. I 987, gives thlg county court the
ahOuHrity and powers of county commissloD-
ers to transact county business. It Is au-
thorized by subsections 8 and 4 to establish,
vacate, or alter highways, and provide for the
erection of bridges. By subsection 7, to de-
termine the amount of revenue to be raised
for county purposes, and to levy the rate
necessary therefor ; and by subsection 9 it U
given the general management of county
property, funds, and business, where the law
does not othenvise provide. Acts 1903, p.
262, wbidi remodeled the entire road system
of the state, repealing all previous legislation
on the subject, did not in terms repeal section
937; but tt was amended by Acts 1909, p. 296.
so as to provide, in section 34 (L. O^ L. |§
6820, 6321), that the county court "may" levy
a tax, not to exceed 10 mills on the dollar,
which shall be set apart as a general road
fund. Held that, while the word "'may,"
when referring to a ministerial public duty, te
often construed as "shair or **must," the or-
dinary import of the word is directory, and
as the later legislation does Hot in terms a^
tempt to Infringe on the authority of the coun-
ty court Its provisions must be regarded as
merely cumulative, and it rests within the
discretion of the county court to make tbe
levy provided for in section 34. Kime t.
Thompson, 118 Pac, 174, 176, 60 Or. 188.
The word /*may/' as used in a statute
providing that a tax collector "may" noti^
a nonresident taxpayer of the time and place
at which he will receive pa^^ment of tlie
tax, and that the time shall not be less tban
20 or more than 40 days from the time when
the notice is mailed, in view of the summary
method of proceeding against property for
taxes, la used in the mandatory sense of
"must." Brash v. Watson, 69 AtL 141, 142,
81 Vt 43.
It is well settled that the word "may"
or the words "it shall be lawful" are peremp-
tory when used in a statute conferring au-
thority to do certain acts, where the public
or an individual has a right de Jure that tbe
powers conferred by the act should be ex-
ercised. Where a Judgment was obtahied
against a city on a debt which arose prior
to the Constitution of 1876, pursuant to a
statute authorizing the city to levy taxes to
pay the debt, the dty must levy a tax to pay
a Judgment within the limitation as to tbe
amount of levy provided by Const 1901, }
216, and on its refusal the Judgment creditor
is entitled to compel thie levy by mandamus.
Graham t. City of Tuscnmbia, 42 South. 400,
402, 146 Ala. 449 (quotiug and adopting defini-
tion in Tarver v. Oommissionerflr Ck)urt of
Tallapoosa County, 17 Ala. 627).
' « i *
In a statute whi^h provided that a board
of supervisors "may, if deemed advisable,"
levy a special tax to pay a cartain indebted-
ness, tbe language was Qeremptory. Where
power, is given to public offlcor^ In such Ian-
HAT
8U
MAT
goage»'if tli^ paWt lateretft/or'laAlvidiial
rights eall tor its exerdse, the tsn^poag^
thonflth pemiaiaTe In fbrm, is In ttict peramfH
torj, and what they are eiapowsend to do for
a third perton the Uiw requires shall he don^
The power Is given, not for their benefit* but
for his. It Is placed with the depositary to
meet the demands of rlt^t and to prevent a
failure of Justice. It is given as a remedy
to those entitled to invoke its aid who would
be otherwise remediless in aU such ea3es«
The intent of the Legislature which is the
test is not to devolve a mere discretion but
to impose a positive and absolute duty. tJuit^.
ed States v. Cornell Steamboat Co., 137 Fed,
455, 458, 69 C C. A. 603 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition given in Bock Island Counjty v,
United States ex rel. S^te Bank, 4 WalL [71
n. 8.] 4^ Ig L. Ifi^d. 419).
The word '•may/' in a statute, will be
construed to mean ''shall,** where the Imbject-
matier ik^toe in which the public bav^ an
interest to be protected or promoted by thd
ezerdse of a power or the performance of
a prescribed duty by a public officer, unleds
the context shows that the word was used fn
its primary signification. However, as use^
in Galveston city charter, section 56, provid-
ing that laAt taHty be brouglkt to C6nb<«t taxes,
is not mandatory. Bmmmer v. City o^ ^1-
veston, 76 8. W. 4S28, 429, 97 Tex. 99 (dtlng
ismisson V. JStkte, 9 8. W. lU, 71 T^x. 2^)/' >
THal
The word 'Wy^" in R^v. 6t 1899, |
748, providing that upon ttie conclusion of the
evidence either party "miiy*' move the court
to instruct and the court "may** of its own
motion give instructions, is not used in a
mandatory sense, and the court Is not requir-
ed to give Instructions in a dVfl action,
where no instructions are requested. Hall vi
St Louis k 8. By. Oo., 101 8. W. 1137, 1140,
124 Mo. App. 661.
The word "may,** as used in.Eev. St.
1899, I 748, providlDg that the court **may»*
of its own motion give instructions on any
point of law arising ip the cause, ia permis-
stye and not mandatory. Wilson v. Kansaa
aty Southern By. Co., 99 8.' W. 465, 466,
122 UTo. App. 667;
Where the statute ^provided tbat the
court of chancery "may," in Mil. contest
BQits, direct an issue of fact as in other cases;
the word "may" Is equivalent to "mu.9t" and
the court, Is required to direct an issue of de-
ylsavlt vil' non\Vh6nevef demanded; the
word "may,** in a statute, when it cdricerns
the public interest or th'^ tights 6t indlVldu-'
ate, being: mandatory a^d equivalent, , tb'
•^musf* or -shalL- Hill v. Barge. 12 AI4. «8T,
693. ■ * •'•
"liay * ils used is a statute providing
tirnt a trial court ^*may order a view," ete.j
huplies a discretion. ' Commonwealth y.
Chance, 64 :N. fi. 661, -552, 174 Mass. 246, Ttf
Am. 8t.'R<^p. 396 (dtlBg 'and- adopting Gom->
m6nwealtti t. Webster, 6' CoidL t69 Mass.)
296,296»299,62Am.Dec.711)w ;
' TrjiuM title to ottee
Where an individual seekb reli^ of a pri-
vate nature nndef Hurd's R6v. St 1905, c.
112, f 1; providing that, when a person un-
lawfully holds an otfioe in a corporation
created by the state, '*tbe Attorney General
or state's attorney, either of his own accord
tfr at the instance of 'an Individual, "may*
present «• petition te'kny coait of record of
competent jurisdiction" for leave to file- «n
toformatiQD'in the aatara of aumq warrimto,
it waa he)d lii^t tlM on)y fUaoetlon vested in
tfie pvoseei|tibi|g^aiQcer.is to detennUie wheth-
er; Ui(9 documentia 9«e9ento4 to )iiip aj^.in
proper legal form, and ^wbetb#r ev^wice- Is
preseatcyl sn^l^t. W 9stabUBh the fieraop^s
pj^ma fac^, right to. the raUef^ It was urged
that, any anch ponstructien. -WPQ14 result Jkn
hpidlng t^at.the.wo^id *'Jaa%f»y. ^ t]kie.lwg\iago
quoted, means "may'' in cases wh^re.op^vtlia
public interest is at stal^e, and. means "shall"
where private interests afe Involved, and that
It would be an anomaly to hold that th^ same
word in the same sentence of a statute may
mean oiie thing when applied to one class of
oases knd- another thing when applied^' to
anothet: class, butt the court was of the qpln-
ion that thiir^ presented no serious diflfctiltV^
stating that, '^hen the iJetjjtslature extended
the right 'to pi^vate Inditiduats to assert pri-
vate rights by .tills preceding, it is ap]>arent
that it was Intended that tl(ey sh6i^1d,haye,an
opportunity to seek.r^ress for. their wron^
by making a^Ucatloh to a cout^t, or Judge
thereof, /or' l^ave. to file an infbrm^tiou;
th^t'the duty re^tihg on the state's attoirney
to sign and present a petition for teave to
file an information .in- ^ .mUure of a.^io
warranto, where evidence of faets is properly
presented to him by a proposed relator, whlc^
shows prima fade that the rector l^ legal-
ly entitled to the relief, In reference to a
private right, which would be afforded > Mm
by a Judgment in his favor in a quo warranto
proceeding, is an absolute. one. and it foilpw-.
ed, therefore, that, where he declines to act
fiortany reason other than U^at.the fac^, evi-
dence of the existence of which is presented,
to him» do not warrant th^ relief which the
proposed relator seeks, or that the petition
and affidavit or affidavits presented to him
are not in proper leiial fbrm,' his declaration
Is an' abuse bf his discretldn, conceding that
Ms cofistructicftt of the statute be correct, and
such an abuse of discretion as amounts to a
reJHisal on his p'Art to exercise his dlscreftoii*
at all and to a refusafl to t»rfonn the dutir
enjoined upon him by the law. People v.
If ealy. 82, N. 0. 699, 602, 239 UL 280, 16 L. R.
▼eiaiae
The word "nHKy*" as lised in Gen. 8t
1^94, I 6I861 which ptovldes that, Wherd de-
fendant Is a nonresidettt and l>latntlff pro-
deeds by atlachl&g his- ptfopisrty, the action'
BCAT
S48
MATBB
may be bronfirlit in any county wbere de-
fendant has property liable to attachment, is
not mandatory, and cannot be construed as
meaning "must" Clements v. Utley, 08 N.
W. 188, 188, 91 Minn. 852.
The words "may be bronght," as used in
Kirby's Dig. i 6067, providing that an action
against a corporation "may be brought" in
certain counties, have the meaning ot "shall
be brought," and are mandatory. Spratley
V. Louisiana ft A. By. Ck>^ 96 a W. 776^ 777;
77 Ark. 412.
The words "may be brought," as used in
Kirby's Dig. f 6068, protidlng that an action
against a railroad company or an owner of a
line of mall coaches or other coaches, for in-
Jury to person or property, may be brought
in any county through or Into which the road
or line passes, have the meaning of "shall be
brought," and are mandatory. Chicago, B. I.
ft P. B. Co. ▼. Jaber, 107 8. W. U70, 1171,
86 Ark. 232.
The word "may," as used In Code, I 8214,
subd. 7, providing that where a circuit court
Judge is interested in a case which, but for
such interest, would be within the Jurisdic-
tion of his court, the action may be brought
In any county in an adjoining circuit, was not
used in the fienae of "may only," or "must,"
but thereunder a circuit court Judge may
bring an action in the circuit court of any
county in his circuit in which the defendants
reside. Harrison v. Wissler, 36 S. E. 982, 983,
98 Va. 597 (quoting and adopting Thompson v.
Roe ex dem. Carroll, 22 How. [68 U. S.] 422,
434, 16 li. Ed. 391, and citing and adopting
Minor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet (26 U. 8.]
46, 64, 7 li. Ed. 65).
Ae— Cnuuige of
Gen. St 1909, | 5660, provides that where
it shall be made to appear that the Judge is
Interested in the subject-matter or is other-
wise disqualified, the court may, upon ap>
plication of either party, change the place of
trial. Held, that "may," as used, means
"must" and, where the necessary fiicts have
been made to appear, a change of venue Is
not a matter of discretion of the court but
a right In tbe party applying therefor. Jones
V. American Cent Ins. Co., 109 Paa 1077,
1080, 83 Kan. 44.
The word "may" In Bev. Codes 1899,
I 6652, providing that a Justice of the peace
may before trial, on motion, change the place
of trial in certain cases, should be construed
to mean "must" Walker v. Maronda, 106
N. W. 296, 297, 16 N. D. 68.
Under Laws 1891, c. 60, amending sec-
tion 7312, Comp.^ Laws, providing that a crim-
inal action prosecuted by indictment may,
at any time before trial is begun, on the ap-
plication of defoidant be removed from the
court in which It is pending, whenever it
3hall appear to the satisfaction of the court
by affidavit that a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had, (be word ^inay** will be eo
strued as imperative, whece an affidavit
presented by accused sufficiently allegti
prejudice of the presiding Judge. State
Hennlng, 64 N. W. 686, 688, 8 8. IX 492.
The Legislature, by using the term "sha
grant a change of Judge," in Sess. Lav
1907-08, c 68, art 1, f 10, p. 592, Instead (
the term "may, on application of eith<
party, change the place of trial to some cou
ty where such objection does not exist" 1
view of the construction of the word "ma]
in the case of Kansas Pacific By. v. Reynold
8 Kan. 680, did not render the statute in tfai
respect any more mandatory, and there ca
be no spedal significance in the use of tl
word "shall" instead of the word "may
State ex reL Smith v. Brown, 103 Pac. 76
766, 24 Okl. 433.
Wil&drawal of plea
Code, I 5337, providing that at any tin
before Judgment the court "may" permit
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and other pic
or pleas substituted, is mandatory. State
Hortman, 97 N. W. 981, 982» 122 Iowa, 10
MATBB
The teem ''may be," in a will piovidii]
that the trust "may be" ended whoi the te
tator's eldest child comes to 21 years of agi
or, being a daughter. Is married. Implies nei
essarlly that the trust may or not be the
terminated. Hence, until it has been tei
mlnated by the act of the parties or of
court of competent Jurisdiction, the trust wl
endure so as to conserve the title and intei
est devised, to the ends intended by the set
tlor. Davis ▼. Dovey (Ky.) 85 S. W. 725. 72(
The rule appears to be settled that wbei
the term "may be" is used in statutes, unlefi
the contrary appears from the context it i
to be construed as meaning in the futun
Bohart v. Anderson, 108 Pac. 742, 743, 744, 2
OkL 82, 20 Ann. Cas. 142 (citing Board o
Commissioners of Pitkin County v. Aspe
Mining & Smelting Co., 32 Pac 718, 3 Cole
App. 223 ; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37 Ind. 128
6 Words and Phrases, p. 4447).
Civ. Code, f 3193, provides that an ac
ceptance of a bill of exchange must be ii
writing, and "may be made" by the accepto
writing his name across the f^ce of the bill
with or without other words. Held, that th(
phrase "may be made" Indicates that the sec
tion is permissive, only, and that any otlie
written acceptance clearly disclosing tb<
drawee's Intention to accept will coi^stltut
an acceptance. Hughes Bros. v. Bawhid<
Qold Mining Co.* 116 Pac 969, 971« 16 Gal
App. 298.
Where testator bequeathed a sum to Ui
daughter, but provided that the amount sb<
"may be" owing on his books should be de
ducted therefrom, and about $20,000 was
charged against her at the time, but no ad
MATBB
M»
ICAT HAYB
fuioeiiMnta were made tbenaftet tbe words
quoted referred to adyancemente already
made. In re Breder'e Estate. 119 N. W. 1104,
1107, 166 MJtelL 607.
""May be reTlTed,** in equity role 60, pre-
acribing the procednre to refine a snit on the
death of a iMtrty, the expreeaion ''may be ve>
TiTod** afaoold be read «*nrast b^ or ''ahaU
be/* and one entitled to reriTe a suit in eq-
nity, which has abated by the death of a
party, la not authorised to proceed therefor
by motion, bnt must follow the proeedure pre-
scribed by rule 60 by filing a bill of roTiTor,
or a bill in the nature of a bill of leTivor.
Dillard's Adm'r t. Central Virginia Iron Co.,
125 Fed. 167, 160.
MAT BEOOXB
*The phrase 'may become* prima facie
refers to the future." Haspel v. 0*Brien, 07
AtL 128, 218 Pa. 140, U Ann. Oas. 470.
MAT OOMB
Code, S 841, describing embeszlem^t by
a receiver as the fraudulent conversion to bis
own use of property which "may come** into
his possession by Tirtae of his employmeit,
eompr^ends property In the hands of the re*
ceiver before the passage ef the act, bnt
embesKled thereafter. Fields r. United
States, 27 App. D. C. 438, 488.
MAT oomnnix nr SBsnov
The expression '*may continue In ses-
sion," etc, in Baltimore City Charter (Laws
1898, p. 800, e. 128) I 210, declaring that the
dty council shall meet on the Thursday next
after the third Monday in May, 1800, and
upon the same ^ay in each year thereafter,
and may continue in session for 120 days,
and no longer, in each year, provided that
they nmy so arrange their sittings that the
same may be held coattniioiisly or otherwise,
does not mean that at the end of the 120
days, or at the end of the year during which
the council meet that number of days, all
unfinished business must come to an end, and
be again gone over from the beginning to
give it effect Bond v. City of Baltimore, 74
AtL 14, 10, 111 Md. 304.
MATDZDUCT
Though the words "may deduct*** as used
in Gbde Civ. Proc i 1903, as amended by
Laws 1904, p. 1286, c 61J5. providing that, in
an action for wrongful death, plaintiff "may
deduct** from the amount recovered the ex-
penses of the action, the reasonable funeral
expenses of the decedent, and his conunis-
dons upon the residue, confer a mere power,
the power is given without limitation as to
the persons in whose favor it may be exer-
cised, and the observance of the statute Is
therefore not merely discretionary but is
rendered necessary by the scope of the stat-
ate and its dear intent and purpose. In re
McDermotf ■ KsUte, 90 N. T. Supp. 829, 49
Misc. Rep. 402 (citing PeUeCler r. 8auBdei%
07 N. C. 201; In re Thornton's Bstate, 6 Ohio
Dec. 151).
The provision in the state Constitution
that cities of a spedfled class ''may frame
a charter for its own government^ means that
a dty of such dass may frame a diarter for
the government of itself as a dty, which
indudes all that is necessary or inddent to
the government of ttie munidpallty, but not
all the power that the state has for the pro-
tection of the rights and regulation of the
duties of the inhabitants in the dty, as be-
tween themselves. Nor does the Constitu-
tion confer unlimited power on the dty to
regulate, by its charter, all nmtters that ace
strictly local, for there are many matters
that are local to a dty, requiring govern-
mental protection which are fordgn to the
scope of munidpal government State ex
rel. Gamer ▼. Missouri ft K. Telephone Co.,
88 S. W. 41, 48, 180 Mo. 83.
Where a witness replied to a question
(Concerning his flormer testimony, "1 don't
know; I may have,** the words '"may have"
w^e not necessary or even probably intended
as a statement that his best reoollection was
that he had so testified, but rather that he
had no recollection whatever about it The
answer seems to be a statement that he did
not know and Imd no recollection. Higgins
T. Shepard, 70 N. B. 1014, 1016, 180 Mass. 67.
Plaintiff gave defendant railroad compa-
ny a receipt reciting that it was in full sat-
isfaction of all claims and demands whatso-
ever whidi plaintiff "has or noay have**
against defendant by reason of damages to
plalntUTs land from the overflow of water,
etc., for all expenses caused by the overflow,
for the conveyance of a parcel of land over
which the overflow was, and for a general
release^ and providing that a deed and re-
leaae ahoold be executed. Held, that the re-
ceipt only provided for the release of tiie ex-
isting dalm for damages eaoeed by the over'
flow, and not for future claims for such dam*
ages. McCabe v. New Tork Cent ft H. B. EL
Co., 124 y. T, Supp. 062, 0S4, ISO App. DIv.
008.
^ 'May have suff ersd* Is a form of the
verb to suffer,' descriptive of completed ac-
tion, and, so far as tense is concerned, is the
equivalent of the past tense. Indicative mood,
*has suffered.' This latter form of tiie verb
may be substituted for that used without
change of meaning.** An instruction author-
izing the Jury to allow damages for any per-
manent injuries plaintiff *'*may have suf-
fered' by reason of the injury in question, if
any,** was not objectionable as p^mitting the
allowance of such damages based on mere
probability or conjecture. Ballard v. Kansas
City, 80 S. W. 479, 480^ 110 Mo. App. 391.
MAT HOLD CX>tRT
S56
«kir<>ik'
The Words "may bold court,** aa nsM in
Const art 7, S lit empowering the Legisla-
ture to authorize judges of dreait courts to
^old court fox each other, do not limit the
power of circuit Judges to the exchange only
to hold a regular term of the circuit court,
but permit .the Legislature to autt^orlze a
Judge of one circuit to make orders at cham-r
bers in anothe^r circuit, and conduct generally
the business in such circuit which a Judge
is authorised by law to transact In re
Southern Wisconsin Power Ck>^ 122 N. W.
801, 808, 140 Wis. 24$.
MAT UaOT
The words **may limit,** as used in the
New York Motor Vehicle Law, which prohib-
its the operation of motor vehicles in closely
built up districts at a greater speed than
a mile in six minutes, and provides that the
municipal authorities may limit, by ordi-
nance, the speedT of motor yehicles on public
highways, are equivalent to the words "may
still further restrict" A dty'OV Tillage Is
thus authiorised to enact an ordinance pre-
scribing a lower rate of speed within Its ter-
ritorial Jurisdiction than that permitted by
the general law itself, «nd the driver qt a
motor vehicle at a speed in excess of the
lower rate, but not in excess of a mile In- six
minutes, is subject to prosecution, for viola-
tlon of the ordinanee only ; but a perfikon epr
erating an automobile at a greater speed
than a mile in siX' minutes, though within the
limits of the municipality, is stUl liable to
punishment under the general law. people
ex rel. Hainer v. Keeper of Prison of Seventh
District MagistratesV Ck)urt of City of New
York, 83 N. JB. .44, 4^, 190 N. Y, S15.
MAT HEBD
See As She May Need.
MAT PEBMIT
' - The term ♦♦mliy permit,* Jin effulty rdle
67, as tt Btood'prfor to the amendment of May
15, 1893, as given In 14/^ U. 8. 793, 18 Sup.
Ot III, cannot properly beheld to mean '*may
require" or '*may compel,*' and thse-nile, as
amended, providing that on due notice given,
as prc8D^ib(Bd by pifevlouB order, the ^ court
may, In its discretion, permit the whole' or
any part of \tbe ehridenoe to be addatied oral-
ly* in open court on final hearlngr does not
require the court to reqalre an Unwilling
party to so adduce evidence and forego his
right to Use the methods prescribed by the
rule prloir to the amendment Hyams v.
Federal Coal ft Coke. Co., KS2 BM. 070; 073,
82 CO; A. 824.
MAT THEK BE
See As It May Then Be*
MAT irSB
An agreement by one par^ to fhmlsh
and by the other party to purchase all the
coal of a stated lOhir tAe (Mdia' party '^a
use** in the operation of a mine and reda
tlon works during a limited time is vaU<
and binds the purchaser to take from tk
seller' all the ooal that may be needed or n
quired in the conduct of such business dui
Ing the time specified. Golden Cycle Mlnln
Co. V; Bapson Coal Mining Co., 188 Fed. 171
188, 112 a a A. OS.
MAT WX8H
See As She ¥ay Wlsh^
MAY 1ST, 2'FER CENT,, OR JUL1
■ NET' * ■ ' • ^ "■/ .
Terms of sale, '*May Isti 2 per cent, o
July net," mean that the purchaser may pa;
on or before the earlier date and save th
discount, that if he doe? not care to do b(
by losing the <nseount he has additional tlm
wlttdn which to pay, and that the bill Is no
due except at option of purchaser until Jul;
1st Howes Sc Howes ▼. Union Mfg. Co. (Ky.
113 SL W. 612, 503.
MAYHEJM
Slee. also, .Malnt
Under Code 1890, | 6095» providing tba
one who '^unlawfully, maliciously and Inten
tlonally cuts, lyltSB-^ar vtrtkes off an ear o
another person is guilty of "mayhem," tb(
Injury to the ear must be such as disfigures U
ordinary observation, as distlxiguiahed fioa
a wounding which sUnply mar» the membei
Green v. State, 44 South. 194, 151 Ala. 14
125 Am. St Bep. 17, Ifi Ann. Cas. 81.
MAYOR
As Judicial ollleer^ see Judicial Ofllcer.
•^e wo^ 'mayoi^ first occurs In Engllsl
history In 1189, when Blch^rd I'substltutet
a mayor for the two haillffb of London. Th<
Romans styled such officer *prefectu8 urbl,
and originally .the. Engil^ title for such of
fi6er was either *balllir. or *portreeve,* Just ai
the sheriff was 'shlrereeve*; i. e., sheriff/
"It Is said that the word 'mayor* oomes froa
the old JSpglish word, *maler,' which meaoi
•poweirj' 'authority,' and not from the Latli
'major,* meaning greater. He represents thi
power. and authority ,of the town, and th(
duty of presiding at meetings of the towi
commisslbners is only one. of the duties lu
exercises. While the power and duties ol
'mayor* may vary according to the chartei
of the town or the' laws of the state, it la
probably without any exception his duty tc
execute the laws and local regulations of h]i
dty and to supervise the discharge of tbeii
duties by^ the subordinate oflU'cers of the dtj
government" State v. Thomas, 53 S. B. 52^
623, 141 N. C.,7dl (quoting 5 Words anjd
Phrases, p. 4450). "^ * ' '' '
MAYOR
881
.UBATSD^tJVffi
Tb« gaieral mnnlciiMa act of If arch 18„
1&S3 (St 1$S3, p. 03, c. 49), divides cities into
six classes, piovides for a major Ui the first
four, makes blm ia tib^e fourth class a member
of the oouodl, with the right to vote only
In case of a tie, and in the last two classes
requires the council to elect one of its mem-
bers president, imposing on him the duty of
signing all ordinances preliminary to publica-
tion, but giving him no veto power, and not
requiring him to perform the duties of a
mayor. Act March 27, 18d7 (St 1897, p. 190,
c 129), entitled, *'An act to require ordinance
and resolution passed by the city council or
other legislatire body of any municipality to
be presented to the mayor, or other chief ex-
ecutive officer of such municipality, for his
approval," provides (section 1) that every ordi-
nance Imposing a penalty passed by the coun-
cil shall before it takes effect be presented
to the mayor for his approval, and that, if It
fails to rec^ve his approval, it shall be lost,
imless on its return it receives the votes of
three-fourths of all the members, ''provided
that • • • this section shall not apply
to cities In which the mayor is a member of
the dty council, or other governing body,'*
and provides (section 4, p. 191) that in mu-
nicipalities In which there la no maybr the
duties imposed on said officer 1^ tlie provi-
sions of the act shall be performed by the
president of tb% board of trustees^ ot other
chief executive officer of tiie municipality.
Held, that to prevent 'in Justlee and absurdity,
the proviso in section 1 Idiould be made to
read ''mayor or other chief executive,'* or the
word "mayor" should be held to include all
executive officers similarly situate and thus
prevent a eonstmction giving the veto power
to the president of the board of tmstees of
cities of the fifth and sixth classes, when it
is denied to the mayor of cities of the fourth
daas. GIty of San Buenaventura v. McGuire,
97 Pac. 628, G2T, 8 OaL App. 497.
MAYORDOMO
A '^nuiyordomo" is an officer in charge of
an irrigation ^fater system under the laws
of New Mexica Gandekrla v. Yallejbs, 81
Pac 689, 696, 18 N. M. 14&
MEADOW
The term ^'meadow" included salt marsh-
es and beaches. Sandlf ord v. Town of Hamp-
ateaa, 90^Nw^ Z. Smw^ 7^ 81^ 83, 97 Apm Div.
163.
MEAL
See GoarM Healt
If a. single aandwidi satisfies the desires
of a person, it constitutes a "meal,** and the
deeper of a hotel has the right to serve liq-
uors to him with. such meal, ^nier Laws
1897. p.. 234, c. 315, | 81, cl. •%** providing
that the keeper of a hotet being the holder.
of a Uauor tax certificate, joay sell liquor
on Sunday to his guests with their meals.
In re (Dulllnan, 87 N. Y. Supp. 660, 662, 9^
App. Div. 427.
In the manufacture of com meal for
culinary purposes, the com is first kiln-dried,
then cracked or ground between rollers, and
afterwards bolted. A product made by the
same rollers but set farther apart so as not
to crush the grain so finely, and with the.
com not kiln-dried, and the product not bolt-
ed, but merely . passed between the rollers
and then loaded in the cars, and. variously
known as "cracked com,*' *'chop,^ "coarse
meal," was not in the ordinary acceptation
of the term "meal,** and was properly dis-
tinguished frohi meal in apportioning cars
among shippers. State ex rel. Crandall v.
Chicago. B. A Q. B. Co., 101 N. W. 23, 24,
72 Neb. 642.
MEAN TIME
^UetLU solar time^' Is arrived at by the
motion of a fictitious sun called the "mean
sun,** which is imagined to move with per-
fect uniformity, being sometimes b^ind the
tme sun and sometimes in advance of It
This time changes with the longtttnde,and, in
a country of the magnitude of the United
Btates, the difference of time between places
caused much difficulty in the regulation of
the movements of railway trains. About the
year 1883 the principai railroads of the Unit-
ed States adopted an arbitrary standard for
the purpose of securing uniformity in the
operation and connection of their trains. Un-
der this system the country was divided into
four sections, eastern, central, mountain, and
Padflc, approximately 16 degrees in width
from east to west, and the time of the cen-
tral meridian of each section was adopted
as the uniform railroad time for the entire
section. Globe A Rutgers Fire Ins. Go. v.
David Moffat Go^ 164 Fed. 18, 20, 83 0. C.
A. 9L
MEANDER
**Meander comers*' hold, as dedLaied by
the rules of the United States Land Office,
the peculiar position of denoting a point on
line between ifauidowners without nstmlly be-
ing the legal terminus or comer of the land
owned. . Where meander comers of a govem-
ment survey are lost or obliterated, they must
be re^ored in accordance. with the citeulars
of the United States Laud Office. Kleveo v.
Qunderson, 104 N. W. 4» 6» 96 Minn. 246.
MEAHDEB Lmfi.
• Generally "meander lines'* are Hues
which course the banks of navigable streams
or other navigable waters. Chapman A Dew-
ey Land Co, V. Bigelow, 92 S. W. 63^ 637,
77 Ark. 338. . .
MEANDBR UKB
862
BCBAiro
The point to which the water of a navi-
gable stream iiBually rises, in an ordinary
season of high water, is the "meander line^'
which forms the boundary of the title of the
government. State v. Portland General Elec-
tric Ck>^ 88 Fac lOa 102, 62 Or. 602.
**▲ 'meander line* is not a line of bound-
ary, but one designed to point ont the sinuosi-
ty of the bank or shore and a means of ascer-
taining the quantity of land in the fraction
which is to be paid for by the purchaser."
Sherwin v. Biteer, 106 N. W. 1046, 1047. 97
Minn. 262 (quoting and adopting definition in
Whitaker v. McBride, 26 Sup. Gt 681, 197
U. 8. 610, 49 L. Ed. 867).
A '^meander line" is not a boundary line,
but is designed to point out the sinuosities
of the bank or shore of a river to ascertain
the quantity of land in a fractional subdivi-
sion, except where such line is run and mon-
uments erected, so tliat in the absence of
such monuments the fact that a stream has
been meandered does not limit the title of a
grantee of the riparian land to the meander-
ed line instead of to the thread of the stream.
People V. Economy Light & Power Ck>., 89 N.
B. 760, 767, 241 IlL 200.
''Meander lines" are run in surveying
fractional portions of the pablic lands border-
ing upon navigable rivers, not as boundaries
of the tract, but for the purpose of defining
the sinuosities of the banks of the stream.
Seabrook v. Ooos Bay Ice Co., 89 Pac. 417,
418, 49 Or. 287.
"The 'meander lines* run along or near
the margin of waters are run by the govern-
ment surveyors for the purpose of ascertain-
ing the exact quantity of the upland to be
charged for, and not for the purpose of limit-
ing the title of the grantee to such meander
lines." McDade v. Bossier Levee Board, 83
South. 628, 630, 109 La. 626 (quoting and
adopting definition in Hardin v. Jordan, 11
Sup. C%. 811, 838, 140 U. S. 880, 86 L. Ed. 428).
A "meander line" is not established as a
boundary, but is a line drawn along the shore
of water disregarding its minor sinuosities,
and is not used to mark the limits of land,
but to determine tte number of acres for
which the government will demand payment;
and, when payment for such acreage is made,
the purchaser's title exists to the water's
edge, though there be small unmeasured
tracts lying outside the meander line. Bar-
ringer V. Davis, 120 K. W. 66, 68, 141 Iowa,
419.
"A 'meander line,' in an official surv^,
is not a line of boundary, but, as said in
Home v. Smith, 16 Sup. Gt 988, 169 U. S. 40,
40 L. Ed. 68, is used 'as a means of ascer-
taining the quantity of land in the fraction
which is to be paid for by the purchaser.' **
Tolleston Glub of Ghicago v. Lindgren, 77
N. B. 818, 820, 89 Ind. App. 44a
A "meander line" is not a boundary line,
where it substantially represents a water
Une^ and the surveyed tracts actnally at
on a body of water proper to be meandei
under the rules governing public survey, a
in such case the title of the abutting owi
extends to the actual watar line, at least
it existed at the time the survey was ma<
Owners of land bounded on a nonnavigal
lake or ona body of vrater, the banks of whi
were meandered in the original govemme
survey, have no title to the submerged b
of such lake or body of water. Wright
Gity of OouncU Bluffs, 104 N. W. 492, 41
180 Iowa, 274, 114 Am. St B^. 412.
The court judicially knows that "mea
der lines" are unsatisfactory as the basis t
determination of boundaries. The "mea
der lines" running along or near the marg
of waters are run for the purpose of asce
taining the quantity of the upland to be char
ed for and not for the purpose of limitii
the title of the grantee to such meander line
Kleven v. Uunderson, 104 N. W. 4, 6, 1
Minn. 246 (citing Hardin v. Jordan, 11 Sa
Gt 806, 140 U. S. 871, 86 L. Ed. 428; St Pai
& P. By. Go. V. Schurmeier, 7 WalL [74 U. 8
272, 19 U Ed. 74; 6 Words and Phrases, ;
4462).
A government survey or plat of a towi
ship selected by the state ondnr the swan
lands act (Act Ooi^ Sept 28, 1860, c. 84.
Stat 619) showed that a certain part of ti
survey was not laid ont into sections an
subdivisions, and Umt tlis surveyed part wi
separated from the imsnrv^red part by
meandered line, the unsurveyed part beio
designated as "sank lands" and in the sui
veyor's field notes described as low, w(
lands. The township was patented to tli
state according to the official plats of tb
survey. Held, that a "meandered ttne," b<
ing an ordinary line bounding a body of lan^
there was nothing to show tliat the soni
lands was a body of water, though temporarl
ly covered with water, and under the paten
the entire /township passed to the state a
swamp lands. Ghapman A Dewey Lumbe
Go. V. Board of Directors, St Frauds Lere
Dist, 139 S. W. 626, 628, 100 Ark. 94
MEANING
See Plain Meaning.
MEANS
See Bzteraal, Ylolent and Acddenta
Means; Mechanical Means; Beason
able Means; Safe Means.
Any means, see Any.
Any other means, see Any Other.
Other means, see Other.
In an interference involving the ioTea
tion of a machine for mechanically tran»
ferring a dgar "bunch" from the mould tc
a wrapping mechanism by whidi the wrap
per is applied to the dgar "bunch," and is
which the machines of the parties showed
MXiMt
85S
MSASURX
durerent vecto of transferiUig dtfrte^ the
tenn **iiieaiiB»'* in the issues calling for the
combination with the wrapping mechanism
Hi "means for transferring the bonches from
the mould to the wrapping mechanism," was
a generic t&cm, and applicable alike to the
transf^nlng devioe of each party. Leeroix
T. Tybeig, 83 App. D. O. 580, 691.
"Means^ signiiles a plan or method of
procednre. Texas it P. Ry. Co. ▼. Beeid^,
101 S. W. 1051, 1052, 46 Tex. €»▼. App. 108.
In a patentee's claim reading, '^n a sew-
ing machine a back goide, around which the
goods are adapted to be held, a needle co-
operating with said bade guide, means for
reciprocating said needle longitudinally and
•means for causing said needle to recede lat-
erally from said back guide after its point has
entered the material," the word "means,"
describing the word needle as an element of
the combination, refers to some mechanism
other than the needle^ the latter being sep-
arately ^pecUied as one element, so that the
daim is not Infringed by a machine em-
bodying all the elements of the comblnatiMi,
but in which def aidant's needle is slightly in-
clined, and the path in which its point recip-
rocates passing the back guide is nearer
thereto than is the like path of its shaft, and
the reciprocation of which is longitudinaL
Lewis Blind Stitch Mach. Go. y. Premium
Hfg. Co., 103 Fed. 960, 955, 90 0. 0. A. 310.
The word "means," as used in Rev.
Codes 1899, i 8042, providing tiiat, when an
offense may be committed by the use of
different "means>" the "means may be al-
leged in the altematiye in the same count,"
is to be defined as synonymous with the
word "agency** or "instrumentality." The
fraudulent appropriation of property or the
secreting of it with a fraudulent intent to
Appropriate it as described in Rev. Codes
X899, I 7462, defining "embezzlement,'* are
different acts or facts that may constitute
the crime of "embezzlement," and are not
tbe "means" of committing the offense.
State y. Lonne, 107 N. W. 624, 626, 16 N.
D. 275.
A wall in course of construction is not
"works," "ways," nor "means," within the
New York Employers* Liability Act (Laws
1902, p. 1748, c 000), maldng an employer
liable for injuries caused by defecttye works,
ways, or means. Bipp y. Fuchs, US N. T.
8npp. 881, 364, 129 App. Diy. 821.
In Rey. St. f 5444, proyiding that eyery
officer of the reyenue, who, by any means
whatever, knowingly admits or aids in ad-
mitting any goods on payment of less than
the amount of daty legally due thereon, shall
be punished, if the "means'* adopted by him
was to accept a duty that did not belong to
bim, and to take advantage of his knowl-
edge that his performance of that duty
vottid be reoognlMd by his superior oiOoer,
that would be quite as arach of a "aManSt"
8 Wns.& P.2n Skb.— 23
wftiiiB tho meaning off the sta^te^ as If he
had departed from a duty regularly laid on
^im. United States ▼. RosMithal 126 Fed.
766, 774.
The expression "means at his cominand,"
used in a charge in a prosecution for murder
asserting the proposition that, in order to
Justify a killing under a claim of self-de-
fense, the slayer must haye resorted to all
reasonable "means at his command," con-
sistent with his own safety, to ayoid the
necessity of taking human life, is equiyalent
to the expression "means in his power."
King y. State, 44 South. 941, 942, 54 Fla. 47.
A system of perforated pipes In a build-
ing, connected with yalyes outside the boild-
tng for the use of firemen, constitute a '*means
of preventing and extinguishing fires,** with-
in the provisions of Greater New York Char-
ter, Laws 1897, p. 263, c 378, | 762, providing
that the owners of manufactories, office build-
ings, etc., shall provide such fire hose, fire ex-
tinguishers, and other means of preventing
and extinguishing fires as the fire commis-
sioners may direct Lantry v. Hoffman, 105
N. Y. Supp. 353, 854, 55 Misc. Rep. 261.
MEAHS OF KHOWZEDOfB
See Equal Means of Knowledge.
'"Means of knowledge^ plainly within
reach of stodtholders by the exercise of the
slightest dlHgenoe is in legal effect equiyalent
to knowledge.** Cole ▼. Birmingham Union
Ry. Co., 89 South. 403, 405, 148 Ala. 427 (quot^
ing and adopting definition in Jesup v. Illi-
nois G. R. Co., 48 Fed. 488).
The existence of public records of deeds»
access to whicdi is easy, and which would
disclose that a trustee's representaaoh that he
had sold trust property worth (2,200, so as to
net less than $600, was fraudulent, since the
"means of knowledge*' are equivalent to
knowledge. A clue to the fact, which, if fol-
lowed up diligently, would lead to a discov-
ery, is, in law, equivalelit to discovery, equiv-
alent to knowledge Irwin y. Holbrooke 78
Pac 860, 363, 82 Wash. 349.
MEASURE
See Board Measore.
Under a statute giving mayors of cer-
tain cities power to veto any measure passed
by the board of aldermen, a mayor has no
power to veto the election of a police justice
by the board of aldermen, since such an elec-
tion is not a measure. Rich v. McLaurin,
86 South. 337, 83 Miss. 95.
The word •'measure^** in Const art 4,
1 1, proyiding that an initiative petiUon shaU
'Hndude the fnU text of the •measure,' ** and
as it is used in Laws 1907, p. 400, | 2. pro-
viding that the initiative petition "shall
be attached to a full and correct copy of the
title and text of the 'measure^^'* etc., means
an act as It comes from the hands of the Leg-
ilEASUBS
SSA
MJBQHAIVO
80 far as it is 0ODGer9je4i and does not neces-
sarily iQclpde the title of the act Palmer y.
Benson, 91 Pac 679, 581, 50 Or. 277. , ;
Const art 5^ | 6,. providing that any
measure rejected by the people through the
powers of the initlatiye and referendum can-
not be proposed by the initiative within three
years thereafter by less than 25 per cent at
the legal voters, relfites to constitutional
amendments proposed by the Legislature or
initiated by petitiim of the people and bills
or acts initiated by the Legislature or by the
people by an initiative petition ; and a quesr
tion submitted to the electors for acceptance
or rejection by means of a joint resolution
of both houses of the Legislaturoj being nei-
ther a constitutional amendment nor initiated
bill, is not a measure rejected by the people
through the ixiwer of the initiative and ref-
erendum, as contemplated by the Constitu-
tion, so as to prevent the initiation of sub-
stantially the same measure within three
years by less than 25 per cent of the legal
voters. In re Initiative Petition No. 2, "The
New Jerusalem" Proposition, 100 Pac 823,
824, 26 Okl. 548.
MEASURE OF DirTT
See Legal Measure of Duty.
MEASURED ZH THE WAIX
In an action for brides sold for the con*
struction of a building, plaintiff claimed that
they were sold to be ''measured in the wall/'
defendant, that they were to be counted in
the wall; the number of rows being multi-
plied by the number of bricks in a row.
Held, that it was competent to show by the
testimony of persons in the trade, what the
expression "measured in the wall'* meant,
and that the measurement allowed 21^
bricks to a cubic foot of wall; this not b&i
ing an attempt to establish a custom. Welsh
V. Huckestein, 25 AtL 138, 152 Pa. 27*
MEASUREMENT
' Bee Proportional Measurement
MEAT
See Cured Meat; Fredi Meat
In Tariff Act July 24, 18©7, c. 11, | 1,
Schedule O, par. 275^ 30 Stet 172, the pro-
vision for ''meats of all kinds prepared or
preserved,'* includes cooked poultry and game,
in tins, and also goose livers, prepared as
pftt^ de foie graa James P. Smith & Co. v.
United States, 168 Fed. 462.
Duck meat in tins, some salted and
dried, and some packed in oil, is not ''poultry
? ^ ^ dressed," within the meaning of Tar-
iff Act July 24, 1807, c. 11, | 1, Schedule G,
par. 278, 30 St^t 172, but is rather classifi-
able as '*meats of all kinds, prepared or pro-
served," und^r par. 275, 30 SUt 172. Kwong
Xuen Shing v. United States, 1.77 Fed. 605,
606. .. .
I«ECHAIIIIC
, Laborers or mechanics, see Laborers.
"Mechanic;" onee synonymous with "ar>
tlsan," is now comnwnly restricted to a
workman who is skilled In constructing, re-
pairing, or using machinery. State v. City
of Ottawa,. 118 Pac S»h 393, 84 Kas. 100.
In its broadest sense, a "ttiechauic^* is
any one who Is a skilled worker with toola
Jackson v. State, 117 S. W. 818, 810, 55 Tex.
Cr. B. 557.
Arohiteet or dz»f tsnaii.
Under Revlsal 1906» | 2016, giving me-
chanics and laborers lien for work done upon
buildings, an architect Who famished plana
and specifications for a building is not en-'
titled to a lien, having neither performed la-
bor upon It, nor being a '^mechanic"; the
term as used in the lien laws meaning a
person skilled in the practical use of tools.
Stephens v. Hicks, 72 S. fi. 313, 314, 166 N.
O. 289, 36. L. R. A. <N. S.) 354, Ann. Caa.
1918A, 272 (citing 5 Words and Phrases, p^
4457).
Barber
A barber is a "mechanic," within the
meaning of the exemption laws. Ex parte
Caldwell, 118 N. W. 133, 136, 82 Neb. 544;
Terry v. M.cDaniel. 53 S*. W. 732, 733, 103
Tenn. 415, 46 U R. A. 559.
OlTil eaclneer
A dvil engineer is not entitled to a lien
for wages earned by him in the construction
of a railroad, und» Rev. St art 3312, be-
ing neither a "mechanic,'* "laborer,** nor
"operative.** Gulf & B. V. R. Ca v. Berry,
72 8. W. 1049, 1050, 31 Tex. av. App. 408.
Contractor or niaster bnilder
Under Const 1898, art 229, providing
that "all persons, associations of persona)
and corporations pursuing any trade, profes-
sion, business or calling, may be rendered lia-
ble to such tax (a license tax) except derka,
laborers clergymen and school-teachers, those
engaged in mechanical, agricultural and min-
ing pursuits,** the phrase "those engaged In
mechanical, agricultural and mining pur-
suits" includes a corporation engaged in such
pursuits, since the article of the Constitution
applies to both persons and corporations.
According to Worcester's Dictionary, a 'Me-
chanic*' is one employed in mechanical or
manual labor, and "mechanical** is defined to
be ''employment in manual labor." Taking
the phrase "engaged in mechanical pursuita*'
according to these definitions, it is dear that
the Constitution is to be construed as intend-
ing tO/ relieve from Ueense thoae persona
who are engaged from day to day in tbm
performance of manual labor, in mechanical
or agricultural pursuits, and that' the master
builders and* contractors who employ men ta
do the work which tbay. merely superintend*
ed.ahould^. like: other protessional men, pay
MECHAKIC
866 MRCHANIGAI> OOKTBlVAlflCS
tlie license tax. State t« O. a Hartwell Go.,
41 Soutb. 444, 447, U7 La. 144 (citing Tbeo-
balds T. Conner, 7 South. 090, 42 la. Ann.
789; State y. McNally, 12 SouUl 117, 45 La.
Ann. 45; City of New Orleans ▼. O'Nell, 10
^ntlL 246, 43 La. Ami. 1182; BoT y. Scbuff,
24 South. 788, 51 La. Anh. 86; City of New
Orlea2is ▼. Bayley, 85 La. Ann. 545; City of
New Orleans y. Lagman ft Son, 10 South.
244, 43 La. Ann. 1180; Stote y. Dlelehschnel-
der, U South.. 82% 44 La. Ann. 1U6; Stete
y. Comptolr National D'Elscompte de Paris,
26 South. 91, 51 La. Ann. 1272).
The mechanic's Uen act of 1883 (Acts
1883, p. 140, e 115) and amendments thereto
(Burns' Ann. St 1908» M 8295-8307), giying a
lien to **meehanics, laborers, and material-
men," does not giye a lien to contractors or
subcontractors. Fleming y. Greener (Ind.)
MN. B.78,.75.
Painter
The term "medianlcs" includes painters.
A lire insurance policy is not made void by
the use of. a gasoline torch by a painter for
the purpose of burning off paint from the
building insured, where the work has contin-
ued for less than the 15 days allowed by the
policy for repairs. Garrebrant y. Continent-
al Ins. Co.» 67 AtL 90, 92, 75 N. J. law, 577,
.12 Lw B. A. (N. a) 443.
Defendant was a contractor engaged in
constructing for the United States Jetties
near Cape May harbor, extending from the
shore into the open sea. The jetties were
built up with stone, thrown overboard from
barges, which were towed across Delaware
Bay, anchored, and as needed towed to the
Jetties and warped along while being dis-
charged. As crews of such barges defendant
employed engineers, boatmen, and bookmen,
selected for their seafaring experience, who
operated the barges and also discharged their
cargoes. The work done and the time requir-
ed to do it depended on tide, wind, and
weather, wl4ch ordinarily required variable
hours of service on the part of the men.
Held, that such men were seamen, with the
rights of sach, including the right to a lien
on the yessel: for their wages, and could not
be classed as labcHrers or mechanics, within
the meaning of Act Aug. 1, 1892, c 852» S 1,
which makes it unlawful for any contractor
for government w<»k to reqaire or permit
any laborer or mechanic employed by him
thereon to work more than eight hours in
any calendar day, except in case of extraor-
dinary emergency. Breakwater Co. v. United
States, 183 Fed. 112, 114, 105 a C A. 404.
The mechanic's lien act of 1883 (Acts
1883, p. 140, c. 115) aiid amendments thereto
(Barns' Ann. St 1908, » 8295-8307; Bums'
Ann. St 1901, ff 7265-7267), giving a Uen
to ''mechanics^ laboren, and • malerlahuen,"
does not give a lien to contractors or subcon-
tractors. Fleming y. Greener (Ihd.) 90 N. B.
73, 75.
MEOHAKIO ABm
ESmployed in mechanic arts, see Employ^.
MEOHAiaOAI. BUSIHSSS
See lianufacturing and Mechanical Busi-
MEOKANIOAX. COITTBIVANOE
See Vehicles and Other Mechanical (3on-
tzivances.
Tlie words ''scaffolding" and "mechani-
cal contrivance" include any contrivance
made of parts erected or used for support in
or about the particular kinds of work men-
tioned in the statute. Koepp v. National
Enameling & Stamping Co., 139 K. W. 179,
184, 151 Wis. 302.
Box
A box or floor in which concrete is
spread in laying concrete floors is a "me-
chanical contrivance," within Iaws 1897, p.
467, c« 415, I 18, providing that persons em-
ploying or directing another to perform labor
in the erection, repairing, or altering of a
building shall not furnish, for the perform-
ance of such labor, any mechanical contri-
vance which is unsafe. Michael v. Standard
Concrete Steel Co., 105 N, X. Supp. 131, 132,
55 Blisc Rep. 255.
A "buiggy," consisting of a tongue about
14 feet long, with two large wheels at its
rear end, connected by an axle, used to move
iron beams in the construction of a building,
is not a ''mechanical contrivance," within the
meaning of the Employers' Liability Act
(liaws 1897, Pb 467, c. 415, 1 18), requiring per-
sons employing others to perform labor in the
erection of a building to furnish safe and
suitable mechanical contrivances. Pluckham
V. American Bridge Ck>., 79 N. E. 1114, .186
N. Y. 561; Id., 93 N. Y. Supp. 748, 750, 104
App. Dlv. 404.
Jaek
Labor Law (ConsoL Laws 1909, c. 31) |
18, provides that a person employing or di-
recting another to perform labor in the re-
pairing of a house, building, or "structure"
siiall not furnish, erect, or cause to bb fur-
nished or erected, for such labor, scaffolding,
'^hoists," stays, or other mechanical contriv-
ances wliich are unsafe, and wliich are not
such as to give proper protection to a per-
son BO employed or engaged. Held that,
where a car repairer was injured by the
breaking of the handle of a ratchet Jack with
which the body of a freight car had been
hoisted to permit repairs on the trucks, as
the body was bcdng lowered, the Jack, while
not a '*hoist" within the statute, is neverthe-
less a "medianical contrivance" furnished by
the railroad company for plaintiff's use, and
the car was a **8tnicture" as to which the
i 'i
MSX^HAHZCAZ. GORPOAATIOK 856
MECHANIQAIi PUBSUIT
Jack was being used; and hence tbe detecttve
jack was within the statute. Oorbett y. New
Tork Gent & H. R. R. Co., 185 N. Y. Snpp.
137, 139, 151 App. DiT. 150.
MEOKANIOAI. COBPORATIOH
The Pioneer Paatenrisiag Oompany, au-
thorized by its articles of inoocporatlon to
engage in the bnsinees of buying^ siannfiic-
turing, and dealing in milk, cream, butter,
cheese, and other dairy products, and pas-
teurising and treating said milk, and pack-
ing, storing, handling, and selling said prod-
ucts.so pasteurised and treated, is not ez-
dusively a manufacturing or mechanical cor-
poration, within Const art 10, i 38, and its
stockholders are therefore liable for its debts.
Meen ▼* Pioneer Pasteurising Co., 87 N. W.
140, Ul, 90 Minn. 501.
mechahioax. equxvaiant
A ''mechanical equlyalent'* is a thing
which performs the same function, and per-
f4)rms that function in substantially the
siune manner, as the thing to which it is al-
leged to be an equiyalent Maunula y. Bunell,
155 Fed. 535, 539 (quoting and adopting the
definition in Walk. Pat [4th Ed.] I 354, and
dting National Hollow Brake Beam Co. y.
Interchangeable Brake Beam Co., 106 Fed.
693, 45 C. C. A. 554; New Departure Bell Co.
V. Bevin Bros. Mfg. Co., 64 Fed. 859; Na-
tional Typographic Co. y. New York Typo-
graph Co., 46 Fed. 114; Columbus Watch Co.
y. Bobbins, 64 Fed; S84» 12 C. O. A. 174; Ide
y. Trorlicht, Duncker & Renard Carpet Oo^
115 Fed. 137, 149, 68 O. €. A. 841; Shelby
Steel Tube Co. y. Delaware Seamless Tube
Co., 151 Fed. 64).
The term "mechanical equiyalent," as
used in the patent law, means that each of
Ihe ingredients comprising the inyention coy-
ers eyery other ingredient which in the same
arrangement of the parts will perform the
same functions, if that was well known as
a proper substitute for the one described in
the specification at the time of the patent.
Denning Wire & Fence Co. y. American Steel
A Wire Co. of New Jersey, 169 Fed. 793, 803,
96 C. C. A. 259; American Steel & Wire Co.
y. Denning Wire 4b Fence Co., 160 Fed. 108,
120.
"The term 'mechanical equiyalent' when
applied to the Interpretation of a pioneer pat-
ent has a broad and generous signification.
When a]H>lied to a slight and almost imma-
terial improyement It has a yeiy narrow
and limited meaning. When applied to that
great majority of Inyentlons which falls be-
tween these two extremes* its significance is
proportioned to the character of the ad-
vance or inyention under conMderation, and
it Is so interpreted by the courts, as to pro-
tect the Inyentor against piracy and the pub-
lic against unauthorized monopoly." Uni-
yersal Brush Co. y. Sonn, 146 Fed. 517, 529
(quoting National HoUow Brake Beam Co. y.
Interchangeable Brake Beam Co., 106 F<
698, 45 C. a A. 544); Simmons Mtg. Co.
Southern Spring Bed Co., 140 Fed. 606, e(
72 C. C. A. 174 (quoting and adopting t
delinltlon of Judge Sanborn in National H<
low Brake Beam Co. y. -Intercdiangeal
Brake Beam Co., 106 Fed. 710, 45 C. a
561): Sanders t. Hancodt 128 Fed. 424, 42
68 a a A. 166; IfaUon y. William C. 6i«i
ft Co., 187 Fed. 68, 79, 60 0. a A. 48.
The rule applicable to the determlnati<
of equiyalency under the patent laws depen
upon the importance and the breadth of tl
original inyention, and does not depend np<
the question whetiier it was the flist in ti
field relating to that subject, tout upon the d
gree of adyancement which the inyenti(
has made in newness of dlscoyery and nt
Ity, for there may be as much merit in brin
Ing on a large illumination teom a feeb
start as in the conception of the first bedou
ed idea which may haye originated in ti
course of study and dlscoyery along that lis
American Can Co. y. Hlckmott Asparagi
Canning CJo., 142 Fed. 141, 145, 73 C. C. -
359 (quoting and adopting Penfield y. (}hai
bers Bros. & Co., 92 Fed. 630, 638, 84 C <
A, 579).
MBOHAHIOAXr ESTABUSHMEHT
As manufacturing establishment a
Manufacturing Establishment
KECHANIOAX. MBAKS
The phrase "by mechanical or otb(
means,** as used in the statute making it
misdemeanor for any person not licensed i
record or register, by mechanical or oth(
means, bets or wagers on trials of spee
etc, embraces something outside the m
chanical class, and covers the registration <
such bets by means of the initialB or prLyal
marks of the parties written on cards. Stal
y. Villlnes, 81 S. W. 212, 213, 107 Mo. Ap;
593.
MBCBAHIOAX. PIAHO FIiATEB
As musical instrument, see Musical Ii
strument
MBOKANIOaii FimSUXT
Work on a turpentine farm is not a "um
chanical pursuit" within the meaning of Pei
Code 1895, I 1039, proyldlng that conyicl
shall not be employed in such mecbanici
pursuits as will bring the products of th^
labor into competition with tiie product c
free labor. McDonald y. State, 64 S. E. 11(M
1118, 6 GkL App. 339 (citing 5 Words id
Phrases, p. 4462).
The trade of a barber is a "mechanici
pursuit" within the meaning of Const art i
§ 1, exempting perscms engaged in mechanics
pursuits from an occupation tax ; and bene
Acts 80th Leg. 1907, p. 273, c. 141, imposin
a Hcaase tax on barbm, Is Inyalld. Jaduoi
y. StatSp 117 & W. 8i8ft 814, 56 Tex. (3r. J]
567.
MBOHANIOAL WnSUlT
wt
ME0IA ANNATA
Accoraiiig to Worcester's Dictionary, a
'^echanic^ Is one employed in mecbanical or
manual labor, and '*meclianlcar' is defined to
be "employment in manual labor,** and it has
been held that master builders and contrac-
tors who employ m«i to do the work which
they merely superintended are not engaged in
*^echanieal pursuits." ETtate v. G. C. Hart-
well Ck>., 41 South. 444, 447, 117 l4L 144 (cit-
ing Theobalds v. Oonxier, 7 Soutti. 690, 42 La.
AmL 788).
MECHAiao's Luar
See Incumbrance; Public Beoord.
Filing, see File.
A mechanicf s lien is in the nature of, and
hss been likened to, a notice of lis pendens
and to an attachment Sawyer t. Shidc, 120
Pac. 581, 582, 30 Okl. 353.
Mechanics' liens are purely a creation of
statute in this country, and were unknown to
tbe common law, and the principle on which
the statutes were originally enacted was to
subject land to a lien for material and labor
expended in the construction of buildings
which haye by being placed on the land be-
come a part thereof. Joplin Supply Co. ▼.
West, 130 S. W. 156, 150, 149 Mo. App. 73.
A ''mecfaanicfs lien" is a purs creation of
itatute, and cmnplianee with statutory re*
qxiirements is necessary to its validity.
Tenth Nat Bank of Philadelphia y. Smith
Const Co., 67 Ala. 872, 873, 218 Pa. 681 (cit-
ing Wharton y. Real Estate Iny. Go., 36 AtL
725, 180 Pa. 725, 57 Am. St Bep. 629; Knelly
T. Horwath, 57 Aa 957, 208 Pa. 487).
A mechanic's lien is purely a statutory
creation, and can only be maintained by a
substantial observance or compliance with
the provisions of the statute. Whatever is
made necessary to the existence of the lien
mnst be performed, or the attempt to create
It wlU be futile. A substantial adherence to
the terms of the statute in the notice of lien
\i indispensable. Russell v. Hayner, 130 Fed.
90, 92, 64 G. C. A. 424 (citing PhUUps» Mech.
Uens [3d Ed.] I 9).
A mechanic's lien is at most only a ten-
tative charge against the property it purports
to bind, and is liatde to be defeated for lack
of technical sufficiency, as well as by show-
ing that the f^ndebtedness or some consid-
erable part thereof is not owing. Beebe v.
Redward, 77 Pac. 1062, 1055. 35 Wash. 615.
"A 'mechanics^ lien' is a statutory lien
upon buildings and other Improvements on
realty, favoring certain classes of workmen;
to secure them priority or preference of pay-
ment of compensation for work or materi-
als.'* Tommasi v. Archibald, 100 N. T. Supp.
367, 372, 114 App. Dlv. 838.
A ''mechanic's lien" Is a modem statu-
tory right created to encourage the erectlosn
of improvements, and to protect those whose
labor and material enter into the&r oonstruo-
tlon. Hammond v. Darlingtozi, 34 8. W. 44%,
449, 109 Mo. Al9. 333.
The ''mechanics' lien" is a creature of
the statute. It exists on certain conditions,
independent of any special contract. It is
unknown to the common law, and is a cumu-
lative remedy which may be concurrently
pursued in connection with the ordinary ac-
tions for the collection of debts. Filing the
claim does not create, but simply establishes,
the lien. It changes an inchoate and defeasi-
ble right to a lien into a fixed and definite
incumbrance. A mechanic who files a claim
for Hen does not thereby release his debtor
from personal liability. So, too, a subcon-
tractor, to whom the contractor has given
an order on the owner, may still enforce his
rights under such order after he has filed his
claim. It is a cumulative remedy which may
be concurrently pursued in connection with
the ordinary actions for the collection of
debts. Albert! v. Moore, 93 Pac. 543, 547, 20
OkL 78, 14 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1036 (citing Bh-
iers v. Elder, 51 Miss. 495 ; Boisot, Mechan-
ics' Uens, 496; PhilUps, Mechanics' Uens, I
9; 27 Oya p. 432).
''A 'mechanic's lien' is a statutory quasi
mortgage founded upon consent." Cununings
V. Consolidated Mineral Water Ck>., 61 Ati.
368, 855, 27 B. I. 195 (citing Brlggs v. Titus,
13 a I. 138 ; Blackmar v. Sharp, 50 AtL 852,
23 B. L 412).
"A 'mechanics' lien' is additional securi-
ty given by statute on certain conditions, but
does not in any way abrogate the contract
between the workman and his employer.
^ ^ ^ The lien proceedings are in rem
against the land, and the common-law action
is in personam against the employer ;" and a
subcontractor may prosecute a petition for a
mechanic's lien simultaneously with an ac-
tion at law against the contractor. Hunt v.
DarUng, 59 Aa 898, 309, 26 B. I. 4fi0, 60 L.
B. A. 497, 3 Ann. CSaa 1098.
A "mechanlcfs Hen" is a secorfty for "ex^
tras" supplied. under the terms of the con«
tract, though the original contract price, in-
dependent of such extras, has been paid.
Zoliars V. Snyder A Uroey, 94 8. W. 1096,
1097, 48 Tex. Oiv. App. 120.
"A mechanic's lien on diattels, as on
real estate, is simply a security for the pay-
ment of a debt Without indebtedness to
the mechanic there can be no lien. • < •
The lien is commensurate with the amount
due." Tenney v. Anderson Water, Ught &
Power Co,, 48 S. B. 457, 458, 69 S. 0. 430
(quoting Phillips, Mech. Uens, | 493).
MEOHAHO-llEUBAIi THEBAPT
Practice of science as practice of medi-
cine^ see Practice of Medicine.
MEDIA ANNATA
The "media annata" (Spanish) were not
sents payable half-yearly and incident only. t»
f
i
.MEUCAHi.
966 MSMCISAJj nUEFABATIOK
t
grants by oomposltion, but were the half of
the estimated ftDcome or rent for the first year;
and they were chargeable not only on compo-
sition, but on all grants, titles, and offices
whatever. Trevino t. Fernandez, 13 Tez.
630,659.
MEDICAL
MEDIOAIi ATTENDANCE
As family ext^nae, see Family Expenses.
As necessaries, see Necessaries.
As support, see Support
Expenses of medical attendance, see Ex-
penses.
To constitate a medical attendance it is
not requisite that a physician shall attend the
patient at his home, as an attendance at Ids
ofiSce is sufficient Gilligan v. Suiweme Ooun-
dl of Boyal Arcanum, 28 Ohio Gir« CLR, 42,
48.
MEDIOAI. OOIJJBOE
As public institution, see Public Institu-
tion.
MEDIOAI. DEGREE
The words •'without having legally re-
ceived the medical degree," in section 153 of
the public health laws (Laws 1893, p. 1547, a
661, as amended by Laws 18d5, p. 257, c. 398,
and Laws 1905, p. 994, c 455), providing that
one shall be guilty of misdemeanor who shall
append the letters '*M. D.'* to bis name or as-
sume or advertise the title of doctor, so as to
convey the impression that he is a legal prac-
titioner "without having legally received the
medical degree," or without having received a
necessary license, mean without having re-
ceived a medical degree such as legally enti-
tled the holder to practice. People v. Somme,
104 N. Y. Supp. 946, 947, 120 App. Div. 20.
MEDIOAIi EXAMINATION
A "medical examination'* of an applicant
for life insurance within a receipt of the first
annual premium, which recites that an appli^
cation has been made, that the first annual
premium has been collected, provided the ap-
plication is approved, and in that event the
insurance will be in force from the date of
the medical examination, is a final examina-
tion, and not an examination to be retained
by the examiner, under an agreement with
the applicant, contemplating a subsequent ex-
amination, but the applicant may decline to
submit to another examination, and there-
by make the examination final. Northwest-
ern Mut Life Ins. Co. v. Neafus, 140 S. W.
1026, 1028, 145 Ky. 563, 86 L. a A. (N. S.)
1211.
MEDIOAI* EXAMINER
As State officer, see State Officer.
MEDIOAIi INSANITT
"Moral insanity** or ''medical insanify" is
a perversion of the SNentii^ont. and a|Ieption&
Taylor v. McCUntock, 112 8. W. 40Q, 41%
Ark. 343.
MEDIOAI. PBAOTITIONER
See Practice of Medicine^
MEDIOAI. TREATMENT
As accident, see Accident— AcddentaL
MEDICINAL PREPARATION
The expression "medicinal preparatioo
as used in Tariff Act March 8, 1863, c: 1
Schedule A, 22 Stat 494, means such artic
as are of use, or believed by the prescriber
user fairly and honestly to be of use, in c
ing <Hr alleviating, or palliating or preve
ing; some disease or affection of the hum
frame. Dodge k Oloott ▼. United States, J
Fed. 624, 625.
Ad«ps Imnm ankydvovs
The term ''medicinal preparations,*'
Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, 1 1, Schedule
par. 68, includes adeps lauA anhydrous a
adeps lanffi cum aqua, which are highly f
ished products of wool grease, are used pri
dpaUy in therapeutics, are sold generally
the drug trade, and are used to some eztc
in salves and medicinal soaps. Zinkeisen
Go. T. United States, 167 Fed. S12, 313,
O. a A. 624.
Oreolin-Pearsott
Creolin-Pearson is not a medicinal pre;
ration within the meaning of Tariff Act Ju
24, 1897, c. U, I 1, Schedule A, par. (
Merck 4c Co. ▼. United States, 147 Fed. 896.
OluTM^robla.
"Chxysarobtn" is dutiable as a drug a
vanced in value, under Tariff Act July 2
1897, c U, I 1, Schedule A^ par. 20, and n
as a ''medicinal preparation,*' under par
graph 6& Levi y. United States, 140 Fed. 12
Fruit Jtdoe
iYuit juice which has been concentrati
and medicated but is not used by itself as
medicine, but as an ingredient in the prepar
tion of a medicine, is not dutiable as a medk
nal preparation under paragraph 75, Tari
Act Oct 1, 1890, c. 1244, | 1, Schedule ^
26 Stat 570. O. B. Richard 4 Oow ▼. UnlU
States, 147 Fed. 891, 892.
Gaduol
The commercial meaning of the ter
"medicinal preparation" is the same as i
ordinary meaning, viz., a substance used sol
ly in medicine and prepared for the use <
the apothecary or physician, to be admiol
tered ad a remedy in disease. Gaduol, an e:
tract of cod liver oil, which, in the form 1
which imported, is not prepared for the m
of the apothecary or physician, and which
not dispensed in that form, is not a "medi
inal preparation," onder the Tariff Act, b<
is dutiable as>a ' 'chemical compound." Unite
States Y. Merck. A Co.» 136 Jl!ed. 817, 68 a C
MEDICINUti . PBIS ARATIOK
MGDIODiB
A. 472; Mer^ r. UnitBd States^ 126 F^ 438,
439.
GeUtim Ml
Gelatin capsules eontaining balsam ars
dutiable as "medlcbial preparations," nnder
Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c 11, | 1, Schednle
A, par. 68. United States y. Lehn ft Fink,
172 Fed. 171, 178.
"Guarana," a medicinal drug consisting
of a dried paste in the form of sausage-shaped
rolls, this being the crudest state in which it
Is ever imported, and which before being used
as a medicine must be further prepared, is
not dutiable as a 'Medicinal preparation,"
under paragraph 68, Schedule A, | 1, c. 11,
Tariff Act July 24, 1887, but is free nnder the
provisions of paragraph 648, Free List, i 2,
c 11, of said act, for articles *'whioh are
drugs and not edible and are in a crude
state." Cowl ▼. United States, 124 Fed. 476^
476L
Glyeevopltosplwte of liate
Glycerophosphate of lime, though occa-
sionally dispensed medicinally, is almost al-
ways used with other drugs in preparing elix-
irs. Held, not a "medicinal preparation/^ but
a ''chemical compound," within Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c. 11, | 1, Schedule A, para 8,
67. A. KUpstein & Co. ▼. United States, 167
Fed. $35, 536, 93 a a A. 67.
HezaaaetliyleAtetranltt
Hexamethylentetramin is a 'Medicinal
preparation" in the preparation of which
alcohol is not used, within the meaning of
paragraph 68, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11,
I 1, Schedule A. Lehn ft Fink y. United
States, 147 Fed. 640.
ParaldebTde
Paraldehyde, though produced from alde-
byde, which is a by-product in the distillation
of alcohol, but contains no alcohol, is a "me-
dicinal preparation" in the preparation of
which alcohol is not used, within the mean-
ing of Tariff Act Jnly 24, 1897, c. 11, | 1,
Schedule A, par. 68. Merck ft Co. ▼. United
States, 147 Fed. 895.
Bom water
Orange flower water and rose water are
not dutiable as medicinal preparations under
paragraph 68, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c 11,
i 1, Schedule A, but as unenumerated manu-
factured articles under section 6 of s^d act
£nler ft Eobeson y. United States, 147 Fed.
765, 766.
Scammony resin, pr^Dared from gum*
icammony, or scammony root, and used prin-
cipally in compounding medicines, is dutiable
as a "drug advanced in yalue or condition,*'
nnder Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c U, | 1,
Sd^ule A, par. 20^. rather than as a '*medie*
inal preparation,'* under paragraph 67. Unit*
ed States y.^lCgrtin. 155 Fed. 264. 265.
MEDICINE
As soieaee
See Practice of Medicine; Practice of
Medicine and Surgery; Practice of
Medicine, Surgery, and Osteopathy.
Practice of medicine as business, see
Business.
^'Medicine' is an experimental, not an
exact, science. All the law can do is to reg-
ulate and safeguard the use of powerful and
dangerous remedies.'* Bennett y. Ware, 61
S. B. 546, 548, 4 Qa. App. 298 (quoting with
approyal from State y. Biggs, 46 S. E. 401,
133 N. 0. 729, 64 U B. A. 139, 96 Am. St
BepL 741).
As reaaedlal substaaee
See Domestic Medicines; Family Medi-
cines ; Patent Medicine.
As necessaries, see Necessaries.
Medicinal preparations as intoxicating
liquor, see Intoxicating liquor.
Proprietary medicine, see Proprietary.
"^ 'Medicine^ in the popular sense is a
remedial substance." State y. Heffeman, 66
AtL 284» 287, 28 B. I. 20 (quoting and adopt-
ing the definition in State y. Mylod, 40 AtL
763, 755, 20 a I. 632, 637, 41 L. B. A. 428).
Sane— AraisA, iodlmey aiid sMRplior
Tincture of iodine, tincture of arnica, and
spirits of camphor, when sold in sealed bot-
tles, though commonly used as domestic rem-
edies, are, neyertheless, ''medicines," within
Pharmacy Law (Laws 1900, a 667) | 200 (now
Public Health Law [Consol. Laws, a 45J), pro-
hibiting, under penalties, the sale of medi-
cines or poisons except in the presence and
nnder the superylslon of a licensed pharma-
cist State Board of Pharmacy y. Matthews,
90 K. a 966, 967, 197 N. Y. 853, 26 Lu R. A.
(N. 8.) 1013.
Same— Cigairs and toliaooo
"Tobacco'* "in its manufactured form of
cigars, cigarettes, smoking tobacco, chewing
tobacco, snuff, and the like, cannot be said
to be in any sense a drug or medicine," so
as to be a proper subject of sale on Sunday.
Penniston y. City of Mewnan, 45 S. B. 65, 66,
117 Ga. 702.
The fact that the substance employed as
a remedial agent may haye yalue as a food,
and a tendency to build up and restore wast-
ed or diseased tissue, will not depriye it of
its character as a 'Medicine,'* If it is ad-
ministered and employed for that purpose
Stete y. Bresee, 114 N. W. 45, 47, 137 Iowa,
673, 24 L. R. A. (S. S,) 103.
A "condiment" is a 'food" and not a
•'medicine.*' . The ''InCemational stock food**
is a *food or oendiment** within the meaning
of the Kentucky pure food law (Laws 1906,
p. 282, c. 48)» and its sale is subject to regn*
lation thereunder* Sayage t. Scoyell, 171
JM.566.
uedichkx
860
MSMBETR
8mb«— XntmleatlBs liqvom
A registered pharmacist may Bell drags
and medicine containing intoxicating liquor
or alcohol without a license authorizing him
to sell liquor, provided the drugs and medi-
cines are so compounded that they cannot be
used as a beverage. Tonic bitters containing
30 per cent alcohol, and capable of being
used as a beverage, held a beverage, and not
a medicine, and hence could not lawfully be
sold by a pharmacist without a license to sell
intoxicating liquors. McNlel v. Horan, 133
N. W. 1070, 1071, lfi3 Iowa, 630.
MEDIUM
Many scholars and successful business
men sincerely believe In spiritualism, and of
being able, not by all, but through the in-
strumentality of a particular few naturally
qualified persons called "mediums/* to con-
verse with and be advised by the spirits of
departed friends, and believe they recognize
the voices and handwriting of the dead. It
has been held that the mere ftict that one
entertains such belief is not evidence of want
of testamentary capacity. Walt ▼« Westfall,
68 N. E. 271, 276, 161 Ind. 64a
MEET— MEETING
See Adjourned Meeting; Annual Meet-
ing; Galled Meeting; Gamp Meeting;
District Meeting; Legal Meeting;
Regular Meeting; Same Meeting;
Stated Meeting.
Any subsequent meeting, see Any.
Meeting as assemblage, see Assemblage.
Under article 588, Pen. Gode, 1879, pro-
viding that, in order to reduce a homicide to
manslaughter by reason of insulting words
or conduct of the person killed towards a
female relative of the party guilty of ithe
homicide, it must appear that the killing took
place immediately upon the happening of the
insulting conduct, or as soon thereafter as
the party killing may meet with the person
killed after having been informed of the in-
sult, the word **meet" signifies that the par-
ties were brought Into such proximity as
would enable the defendant, to act in the
premises, whether he was armed or unarmed.
Gillespie V. State, 109 S. W. 158, 159, 63 Tex.
Cr. H. 167.
aOSETING FOR PmSLIC WORSHIP
See Public Worship.
MEETm O OF CREDITORS
See First Meeting of Greditorsi
aOSETIKO OF MINDS
An assent is evidenced by a proposition
emanating fr<»m one side and acceptance of It
on the other, such proposition and acceptance
together constituting what is called a meet-
ing of the minds, and, where a meeting of the
minds* does not appear, there is no contract
Wm. J. Lemp Bvewing Go. ▼. Seeor, 96 Pa
686, 639, 21 OkL 537.
A '^meeting of minda^ imonntlnl to co
stitute a contract is the agreement reach<
by the parties and expressed, and the "mee
ing of minds" is not determined by the s
cret intention of the parties, but by their e
pressed intention, which may be wholly i
variance with the former, and the unde
standing of one of the parties to the agre
ment is ImmateriaL Hudson v. Golumbla
Transfer Go., 100 N. W. 402, 408, 137 Mic
255, 109 Am. St Rep. 679 (citing Breviingtc
V. Meeker, 51 Mo. App. 348; 9 Gya pp. 24
578).
KEETZNO POINT
A contract under whidi defendant ca:
rled United States mail required it, at ''mee
ing pc^ts," to transfer to connecting trail
the mail wliich was to be forwarded by sue
trains. Held, that a "Meeting point*' m
one where the defendant's mail route m
another, as established by the govemmen
and not a station upon the defendant's rout
sei)arated by a half mUe from another ma
route, although trains from the latter ra
over said half mile to the station and thei
connected with, and received mail from, tb
trains of the defendant Johnson v. Bosto
ft M. R. Go., 88 AU. 267, 69 Vt 521, 522.
MEETIN O WrmSSSES FAOE TO FAO
See Face to Face.
MELANCHOLIA
See Simple Melancholia.
MEMBER
See Active Member.
Of dtr eoamoil
A provision in the charter of a city tha
the legislative authority of the dty shall b
vested in a council, consisting of a mayoi
two aldermen elected from each ward, an<
the city recorder, made the various officer
named "members" of the city council witbi
the meaning of other statutory provisioiu
Blain V. Ghippewa Gircuit Judge^ 108 N. \V
440, 444, 145 Mich. 69 (dissenting opinion).
Of Oongress
''When we speak of a member of Con
gress, we refer to one who is a componen
part of the Senate or House of Rrepresenta
tlves; one who is in office — not out of office
one who is sharing the responsibilities ani
privileges of membership.** The word
"member of Gongrees," as used in the firs
provision of Rev. St i 1781, making it (
criminal offense for a member of Gongresi
or any officer or agent of the government, t
agree to receive or receive a bribe for procoi
ing or aiding to procure for another any coo
tract, office, or place from the government, d<
not include a person elected to the office a
nlJSW II MtWk
861
WKirauR
Senator of tlie United Statas until be Iw
been aco^^rtMl 48 member by the Senate of
the United States and baa aaevned the duties
of tlie office. United Statee ▼. Dietrich, 126
Fed. 676, 678, 68X.
Of eozporatlom
A resolution of the board of directed of
a corporation which empowers the corpora-
tion to sell its lands to ''members** of the
corporation authorizes a sale to the share-
holders who are not directors and is valid.
Davis V. Nueces Valley Irr. Co,, 128 S. W.
4, 6, 103 Tex. 243.
GonsoL Laws, p. 1381, c. 23, f d, subd. 8,'
proYides that the term **member of a corpo-
ration*' shall include evei^ person haring a
right to vote for the election of directors,
other than a person having the right to Tote
only on a proxy. Section 28 provides that,
"unless otherwise provided fa the certificate
of incorporaflon,** every stockholder shall be
entitled at every meeting to one vote fbr
every share standing in his name on the
books. Section 24 provides that the certifi-
cate of incorporation may provide that, at
all elections of directors, each stockholder
shall be entitled to as many votes as will
equal the number of his shares multiplied by
the number of directors to be elected, and
that he may cast all of such votes for a single
director, or may distribute them among the
number to be voted for, or any two or more
of them, as he may see fit, which right, when
exercised, shall be deemed cumulative voting.
Held, that the phrase "unless otherwise pro-
Tided in the certificate of incorporation," at
the beginning of section 23, does not relate
only to cumulative voting permitted by sec-
tion 24, but permits the certificate of incor-
poration to provide what voting right classes
of stockholders shall possess; and as it is
lawful for different classes to agree that one
class shall have no right to vote on ques-
tions relating to the management, and such
agreement does not contravene public policy,
the Legislature did not intend to compel
every class to hold the right to vote, or pro-
hibit formation of a corporation depriving
preferred stockholders of voting power. Peo-
ple ex rel. Browne v. Keonlg, 118 N. Y. Supp.
136, 137, 133 App. DIv. 756.
Of ftttdlFc
Person of the family synonymous, see
Person.
The "members'* of a man*s family are
bis ^Ife and children. The phrase certain-
ly does not, as usually understood. Include
the servants who may be casually employed
in his kitchen. Grand Lodge, A. O. U. W.,
of New Jersey, ▼. Gandy, 68 AtL 142, 147, 63
N. J. Bq. 6d2.
A member of a fraternal beneficiary so-
ciety lived with friends/ neaeof whom wekre
dependent en him; and, while he paid no
board, ttiey expected eoapensatlon at bis
deatH. Hsia, tbat the wlie of the pecson in
whose home the member lived was not a
member of his faaiily, wMhin Laws iSiS, p.
440, c 86^ • 1, telittng So payment of death
benefits. Supreme Oommandery, U. O. G. O.,
V. Benaghey, 72 AtL 419, 70 N. H. 197.
A party to be a member of a family
within the meaning of the homestead article
of the Constitution must be a member in
good faith. A man and his wife purchased
two lots, not exceeding half an acre. In a
city, in 1886, and resided there nntU their
death, in 1896. They had two daidren, one
a s6n, married in 1876^ and the other a
danghter, married in 1887, and who resided
with her parents nntU her death, in 1889,
leaving two children. Her husband with one
child removed to a home of hie own, but his
daughter r«nained with her grandparrats
under the understanding that they were to
educate and 8Uiqk>rt her as long as she lived,
which they did until the death of the grand-
mother in February, 1898, and the grandfa-
ther in Sept^nber of the same year. There
was no legal adoption of such granddaughter
by either of her grandparents. Held, that
such granddaughter was a member of the
family of her grandfather at the time of his
death. Adams v. Clark, 37 South. 734, 736,
48 Fla. 205.
The oonetitatian of a fraternal order pro-
vided that, on the death of a member, the
person designated as beneficiary should be
entitled to the benefit fund, provided the ben-
efidaiy should "be one or more members of
his family or • • • reUted to or * • *
dependent" on him. A certificate issued to
a member designated his wife as beneficiary.
Snbsequently the parties were divorced. The
member died without exercising his right to
change the beneficiary. Held, that the wife
was entitled to the benefit fuad.—Schmidt v.
Hauer, Ul N. W. 966, 967, 139 Iowa, 631.
The word "person" as ns^ in Rev. St
Mo. 1899, t 870, providing for service of a
summons by leaving a copy of the petition
and writ at defendant's usual place of abode
with some person of his family, is synony-
mous with the word "member^ as used in a
return showing that a copy of the writ and
petition was left with a member of defend-
ant's family. The words may be used inter-
changeably. One could not be a person of a
family without being a member, nor could
he be a member without being a person.
Colter V. Luke, 108 8. W. 608, 609. 129 Mo.
App. 702,
Of Mrm ^epaetietat
Undtf Civil Service Law (Iaws 1899, p.
809, c. 870) i 21, as amended by Laws 1904,
p. 1094, c. 697, providing that no person hold-
ing a position who shall have been a member
of a volunteer fire department shall he re^
moved tKom such position exo^t fbr caase
shown. after hearing, a coroner's clerk, who
became a membw of the flee department fer
MZMOBAKDUM
8M
ICfiMORT
prospective purchaser for earnest nmnegr la
not a note or memorandum In writing, as re*
quired by the statute of frauds. Koenlg t.
Dobm, 70 N. B. 1061, 1004, 200 IlL 468.
Defendant gave plaintiff an order for
goods amottnting to 1329.60, NoTember 25,
1910, having previously given two other or-
ders, and also one of later date. There was
no sufficient memoranduin to satisfy the
statute of frauds, because not signed by de-
fendant On January 11, 1911, defendant
by letter requested plaintiff not to ship any
goods before March 10, 1911, or some time
later, and on receiving a bill, dated March
27, 1011, again wrote requesting plaintiff not
to ship any goods for the present stating
that tlie amount called for by the bill was
more than he had ordered or would want
and requested shipment of one-half of the
amount with the September dating; other-
wise, he could not accept the goods. Held,
that such letters, not being physically at-
tached to the memorandum, could not be
used in connection therewith to make out a
sufficient ''memorandum*' of the sale within
the statute of frauds. Roaring Spring Blank
Book Co. V. Lesser, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1032,
1083, 76 Misc. Rep. 617.
A letter from a vendee to a vendor
stating but a part of the terms of a parol
contract for the sale of land is not a "mem-
orandum of the oral contract," which will
take the contract out of the statute of frauds.
Bogigian v. Booklovera' Library, 70 N. E.
769, 770, 193 Mass. 444.
Where letters from the vendors* agent
to a person who represented the purchaser
in some capacity, either as agent, broker, or
go-between, and from the vendors' agent to
a bank which was to hold the deed in es-
crow, contained the names of the parties to
the sale, the description of the property, the
consideration, and all the terms and condi-
tions of the sale, the letters constituted a
sufficient "memorandum^ to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds. Bronx Inv. Ck). v. National
Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 92 Pac 880,
381, 47 Wash. 566.
Where letters passing between buyer and
seller of certain goods did not disclose the
kind or quantity of goods or purchase price,
and contained no reference either to mem-
orandum made by salesman at the time he
received an order or to an invoice made by
the seller when the goods were shipped, and
it was impossible from the letters to ascer-
talh the terms of the saie^ they cwere insuffi-
cient to constitute a ."ifteviorandara«" : wftth-
in the statute of frauds. JDvans v. Pelta, 181
N. X. Supp. 4U, 412, 146 App. mv. 740.
Letters addressed to a third person, stat-
ing and affirming a contract, may be used
against the writer as a *'memor%ibdum" of
the contract, and are sufficient evidence of
tite contract to wavraaft the conrt in giving
eCleettoit. NldMlaMLV* Doiver,,58 S. E.444,
446, 146 N. O. 18, 18 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 167 (d
lag Brown, Statute of Frauds, 1 854a ; Mize
V. Burnett, 40 N. a 254, 69 Aul Dec 744).
A letter admitting an oral agreement t
buy land is insufficient under Rev. St. a 11'
S 1, par. 4, requiring such contracts to b
evidenced in writing, where it falls to se
up the terms previously agreed upon, ani
particularly omits any reference to the pui
chase price. Under Rev. St c. 113, 1 1, pai
4, requiring a contract for a sale of lands t
be evidenced in writing, signed by the part
to be charged, or his duly authorized ageni
all essential terms of the contract must ap
pear. Including the amount of the purchasi
price where the contract contains a stipula
tlon as to price, so that no part of the agree
ment need be proved by parol evidence
Thurlow V. Perry, 77 AtL 641, 642. 107 Me
127.
The entry In the seller's account book h
not a memorandum signed by the party to N
charged within Gen. St 1906, | 2518, mak
Ing contracts for sale of goods void, in tlu
absence of certain circumstances, including i
memorandum in writing of the contract sign
ed by the party to be charged. United Hard
ware-Furniture Co. v. Blue, 52 South. 364
366, 59 Fla. 419, 85 L. R. A. (N. S.) 103a
The note or memorandum required bj
Rev. St c. 113, I 4, to make a sale valid as
against the statute of frauds, need not be ii
a single writing, but it is sufficient if letten
signed by the party to be charged or his
agent contain by direct statement or by ret
erence to letters written by the other partj
all the essential parts of the bargain. Wey-
mouth T. Goodwin, 75 AtL 61, 62, 105 Me
510.
Meohanio's Ilea
The word ''memorandum," as used in a
statute requiring a mechanics' lien clahnanl
to file a written memorandum signed by him
asserting his claln:|, lias no peculiar mean
ing. The statute means no more than "a
writing signed by him asserting his claim.'
Nor does the use of the word "claim" signi
fy that the particulars of the contract oi
items of the account are to be set forth
This word obviously refers to the claim ol
a lien. Tlie date when the job was com
pleted or the pay became due need not ap-
pear in the absence of statutory require-
ment. The object of the memorandum re
quired to be filed in the clerk's office is to
give notice to the owner and persons deal-
ing with the property that it stands charg-
ed with the payment of the bUls for labor
and material which went Into It under sncb
a contract as entitles the claimant to his
Uen. Baldwin v. Spear Bros., 64 Aa 235,
236, 237, 79 Vt 43.
MJEMORY
flee Disposing Mind and Memoiy; Seand
liind and Memory*
MBMOBT
MB BCBNTAXi AOONT OR AKOUJSH
"Memory** to the power of retaining
knowledge In the mind. State ▼. Ooyne, 114
S. W. 8, 12, 214 Mo. 344, 21 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
903.
The regularly kept and original books
of a corporation identified as snch hy the
proper cnstodians, and constituting the rec-
ords of the bnsinesa transactions of the cor-
poration, required by OIt. Gode, | 877, to be
kept by all corporations tor profit, are admis-
sible in an action between other parties
without farther preliminary proof, as consti-
tuting the ''memory*' of the transaction of the
corporation. Hnrwita y. Gross, 91 Paa 100»
111, 5 OaL App. ei4.
MEN
See BuDoo Men; Business Men; Masses
of Men.
Rer. Codes, | 8536, requires Iron-bonnet-
ed safety eages with doors in mine shafts
over 300 feejt deep to be used in lowering
and hoisting the employ^ thereof, and that
the doors must be closed "when lowering or
hoisting the men.'* Held, that the words
"the men" imported the singular as well,
and that the statute required the closing of
the doors during the hoisting or lowering of
one or more of the men in the coarse of his
employment, and was not complied with by
a closing of the doors only' when the shifts
of moi employed in the mine were being
lowered or hoisted at the usual time of
dianging the workmen. Osterholm ▼. Bos-
ton ft Montana Oonsol. Gopper it Silver MIn-
tag Co., 107 Pac. 409, 802, 40 Mont OOa
MENACE
As threat, see Threat
"Menace" Is defined as the show of an
intent to Inflict eyil; a threat; indication
of probable evil or catastrophe to come ; that
which menaeea ; an Impen^ng evIL Worl^
T. State, 71 8. B. 158, 156, 186 Ga. 231.
A ^'menace" Is defined to be the show of
tn intention to Inflict evil. It is to act in a
threatening manner, and any overt act of a
threatening character, short of an actual as-
sault, is a ^'menace." Rossi y. State, 68 8.
E. 56, 58, 7 Ga. A». 732; Price y. State^ 72
8. £. 908, 910, 187 Ga. 71 (quoting and adopt-
ing the definition In Gumming ▼. State, 27 B.
B. 177, 99 Ga. 662).
To call a man a Uar and raise a stidc to
strike him, If in anger, is a menace of vio-
lenoe, and constitutes a breach of a bond to
keep the peace, under Pen. Code 1895, H
1238, 1239. Rumsey y. Bullard, 68 a B. 921,
5 6a. App. 802.
"Metmxx^* Is generally regarded as syn-
<mymous with nhreat*" It may have otiier
meanings. On a prosecution for murder, an
instmction that mere words or menaces,*^ Ir-
^pectlve of how aggravating, do not of
themselves constitute provocation for the
commission of murder In any degree, was
not objectionable on the theory that the
word "menaesa" waa equivalent to an overt
act, espedaUy In yiew of an instruction In
which the proper diatinetlon between words
and threats and overt acts waa dearly
drawn. I^mch v. People, 79 Paa 1015, 88
Colo. 12&
av. Code, I 1569, defines '"duress" as (1)
the unlawful confinement of a person; (2)
unlawful detention of the property of any
audi person; (8) confinement of such per-
son, lawful In form, but fraudulently ob-
tained. Section 1570 defines "menace^* as ctm-
slsting of the duress specified In subdivisions
1 and 2, and unlawful and yiolent injury to
the person and property of such person, or
injury to his character. Defendant denuind-
ed the right to purchase boxes from plain-
tiff at an alleged contract price, which con-
tract. In f^ct, did not exist, but plaintilf re-
fused to sell at less than practically the
market price, which was higher than the al-
leged contract price. It was practically im-
possible to then buy the boxes elsewhere,
and they were essential to the continuance
of defendant's business, and defendant claim-
ed It was coerced into paying the price charg-
ed therefor. Held, that some element of
compulsion or threatened exerdse of power
over the person or property to compel pay-
ment must be present to constitute duress,
and defendant was not compelled hy duress
to purchase and pay the price charged for
the boxes. Standard Box Co. v. Mutual Bis-
cuit Co., 108 Pac. 938, 943, 10 CaL App. 746.
MENINGITIS
See EJucephalo MeningltlSL
MENS REA
"Mens rea'*— guilty mind— while a neces-
sary element of most criminal offenses, is, in
some offenses, presumed from the facts prov-
ed. Brown v. State (Del.) 74 AtL 836, 837, 7
PennewlU, 158, 25 U B. A. (N. S.) 66L
MENTAL
MENTAX. AOOHY OR AKGinSK
Anguish as Including, see Anguish.
*^ental anguish" la a high degree of
mental suffering, and not mere disappoint-
ment or regret. Geroch v. Western Union
T>elegraph Co., 60 S. R 637, 646, 147 N. C. 1 ;
Hancock v. Western Union TeL Ca, 49 S. S.
952, 953, 137 N. C. 497, 69 L. R. A. 403.
The term **mental angrrtsh,'* recognized
by statute as a groiuitf of action against a
telegraph company, apptlea only to sodal and
persona] matters, and not to business af-
fairs. The statute doea not authorise recov-
ery fitNr vexation caused the aendev of a tel-
egram because of dishonor ^ a ctoolc iMr lall*'
Umi^£!L kCKIKT OB iLM^msH 368:
MENTAIr CAPACITY
ure to deliver thef tetegram In tima Gapers.
V. Western Union Tel. Co;, SO S. EL S37, 63Sk
71 S. C. 29. Nor' for worry orer the possible
loss of a position. Western Ubion Telegraph
Co. ▼. Sbenep, 104 S. W. 164, 155, 8a Ark.
470, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886, 110 Am. St Rep.
14S.
Mental anguish or suffering, as used in
the statute authorizing a recovery of dam-
ages for mental anguish or: suffering, means
distress or serlou« pain as distinguished from
annoyance, regret, or yezation. Mental an-
guish is Intense mental suffering. . Johnson v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 62 S. E. 244,
245, 81 S. O. 235, 17 L. B. A (N. S.) 1002, 128
Am. St Rep. 905.
In order to recover damages imder the
"niental anguish" doctrine, it is necessary
that the mental anguish suffered be real and
with cause, and not merely the result of a
too sensitive mind or a morbid imagination.
Western Union Telegraph Co. ▼. Archie, 121
S. W. 1045, 1046, 92 Ark. 59.
Mental worry, distress, grief, and mortifi-
cation are proper elements of mental suffer-
ing for which an ii^Jured person can recover ;
recovery not being limited to the form of
mental suffering described as physical pain.
Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co., Ill
Pac. 534, 540, 158 Cal. 499, 81 L. R. A. (N. S.)
559, 139 Am. St Rep. 134.
Allegations in a petition, In an action
against a sheriff and his deputy, that they
wrongfully and unlawfully entered into a
house and premises occupied by plaintiff un-
der a lease i^nd dispossessed him, and put his
household goods and personal property in the
public highway, and so put plaintiff to great
trouble and distress, properly authorize a re-
covery for humiliation and mortification, or
any phase of "mental anguish," since the
word ''distress," being a genetic term, in-
cludes anguish or suffering, both of mind and
body, and since "humiliation" and mortifica-
tion are simply phases of mental anguish.
Perkins y. OgUvle, 146 S. W. 785^ 788, 148
Ky. 309.
Allegations that plaintiff was humiliated,
mortified, and shamed by being put off a train
at a place where she was compelled to expose
her person in alighting showed "mental dis-
tress," though that was not alleged in terms.
International & G. N. R. Co. v. Hood, 118 S.
W. 1119, 1122, 55 Tex. av. App. 834.
"Mental suffering" will be implied from
illness accompanied by physical pain. Inter-
national ft G. N. R. Co. v. Johnson, 95 S. W.
595, 596, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 147 (citing Texas
ft P. Ry. Co. V. Curry, 64 Tex. 85 ; Houston,
B. ft W. T. R. Oo. T. Simpson [Tex.] 81 S. W.
858; Brown v. ^nlUvan, 10 S. W. 288, 71 T».
470; Galveston, H. ft 8. A. R. Co. v. Rubio
[Tex.] 65 S. W. 1127). See, also, Ousley v.
Hamper 105 N. W; 122» 128, 128 Iowa, 675.
Thera is a clear distinction between
'^mental aQflertng" and ^Imi^airment of the
mental faci^es^^'- Gagnlerv. Fargp, 96 N.
W{ 1841,848, 12 N.D.219L
MENTAZi OftPAOXTT
"Mental capacity" to execute a deed does
not. mean that the grantor Qon^rehends the ,
legal effect of the words employed; but, if
the nature and effect of the instrument as a .
conveyance of property is understood, he pos-.
sessea sufficient mental capacity, and mere
weakness of intellect from slcicness or old age
is no ground for avoiding a deed in the ab-
seaos; of fraud or undue Influence. Moor-
head V. Scovel, ^ Aa 18, 15, 210 Pa. 446.
The test of "capacity" to diake a deed !»'
whether the grantor at the time fully under-
stood, realized, and appreciated the probable
result^ and consequences of, the transaction.
Corporation of Members of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Watson, 83
Pac. 781, 788, 80 Utah, 126.
The test of "mental capacity" necessary
to make a valid deed is that the grantor is
capable of understanding in a reasonable
manner the nature and effect of the act in
which he is engaged. The requisite mental
capacity is present where the grantor is ca-
pable of understanding in a reasonable man-
ner the nature and effect of the deed, and of
comprehending and protecting his own inter-
ests in ordinary business affairs. Fitzgerald
V. Allen, 88 N. B. 240, 243, 240 111. 80 (citing
Ring V. Lawless, 60 N. B. 881, 190 111. 520).
No particular degree of mental capacity
is essential to enable one to execute a deed,
the test being whether the grantor had at
the time suffld^at mental capacity to under-
stand the nature of the transaction, find asr
sent thereto. Wampler v. Harrell, 72 S. ]^'
135, 138, 112 Va. 635.
To render A deed void on the ground of
the grantor's mental incapacity, it must ap^
pear that his mental Infirmity rendered him
incapable of understanding the nature of
his act, and mere infirmity of mind or body^
not ^.mounting to such incapacity to under-
stand, is insufficient Du Bose v. KeD, 71
S. S. 371, 376, 90 S. G. 196.
That a grantor was advanced in years
and somewhat enfeebled in mind by sickness
is not sufficient to make him mentally Ib-^
competent to execute a deed, where he had
sufficient mental capacity to comprehend
naturally the transactions fn which he was
engaged at the time the deed was executed.
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 89 N. E. ^^
647, 241 IlL 866.
One who is capable of exercising thought^
reflection, and judgment, who knows what he
is doing, and has sufficient memory and un«
derstandlng to comprehend the nature and
cbaracter of the trausacCiitti, has suffideiit
"mental capacity" to make a valid notei
Rogers v. Rogers (Del) 66 AtL 374, 875^'^
PemiewiU, 267.
UESTAlr CAPACITY
MT
MBHTAL JKCAPAGnnr
Hie assignment by a flLther of^lili In-
turestrln'bls life policy to bis son. a law days
before death is. akin to a testamentacy act;
and tbe mles ir^gaidlng mental capacity a^d
undue Influence appUcable to a teatator
ooght to be apidled. M^ital capacity of. in*
sored tp make an assignment ot life insar*
ance means intelligence sufficient to onder-
stand the act he is about to perform, the
property he possesses, what disposition he is
making of it, and the persons and objects of
his bounty. Borchers y. Baxckers, 122 S. W.
357, 360, 143 Mo. App. 72.
OoMtvifetttovy
'^The word ^experience* means to have
practical acquaintance with, which is equira-
lent to knowledge, and the word 'capacity,*
in the sense in which it was used (In an in-
structioa requiring of a boy the exercise of
care and prudence equal to hli9 capacity, etc.)*
means capability or skill as applied to the
business In which he was engaged." And
an instruction' requiring a finding that plain-
tifT did not use such caie^and preoautlon as
a person of his age and experience would
haye ordinarily used under the circumstances
as a prerequisite to the finding of contribu-
tory negligence^ was prpper, and not pbjec-
tionable for failure to use the. words '*capacl-
ty,** "age,** "knowledge,** and "experience.**
Stanley y. Chicago, M. & St P. Ry. Co., 87
8. W. 112, 118, 112 Mo. App. 601.
An instruction on contributory negli-
gence of a child having experience as to the
dangers of playing upon a bumtable, which
requires the Jury to consider ''her age, in-
telligence, and capacity," is bad as omitting
the element of "experience"; this element not
being included in the term "capacity." Lake
Erie ft W. R. Co. t. Klinkrath, 81 N. B. 877,
378, 227 lU. 439.
The word "capacity** does not include
experience; and, when used with ^reference
to mentality in an instruction on the law of
ordinary care gOTemlng children, it means
ability to learn by experience. Fowler t.
Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 85 N. BL 298, 299,
234 IlL 619.
RespoBsililUty for eriata
The test of mental capacity to commit
crime is the power to distinguish moral or
legal right from moral or legal wrong, and
to recognize the particular act charged as
pooral or legal wrong. State ▼. Jackson, 69
8. B. 883, 886, 87 S. C. 407.
Tastaittemtary eapaelAy
The words ''mental capacity," while more
goieral and perhaps less definite, necessarily
include the idea expressed in the phrase
**sufllcient strength of mind and memory."
Barricklow ▼. Stewart, 72 N. B. 128, 180,
163 Ind. 43&
The test of whether testator had suffi-
cient mental capacity to' execute a valid
win is whether at the time he understood
tlie nature of the transaction, and Intelligent*
ly assented to the profusions of tii« will,
Wampler t. Hanel],.72 & B. 185^:188,. 112
Va, 68a.
^e. test of "mental capacity*^' su'st&lnlngr
a will lig sufficient understanding to com-
prehend the nature of the transaction, the
nature and extent of one's property, and to
whom he desires to Sfive it Glbony y.> Fos-
ter, 180 S. W. 314, 322, 230 Mo. 106.
WaSKTAL COMPETEKOY
See^ also, Mental Qwadlty,
^Mental competency** in a testator does
not require the sagacity^ analytical powers,
astuteness, and soundness of judgment requi-
site to the making of Just such a contract,
in eyeiy instance, as an experienced, skillful,
and shrewd man would make. It suffices
that a person in making a will or executing
an instrument. to operate as one knows what
property he has,, and what he wants to do
with it Mere Infirmity of mind and body
is insufficient to overcome the legal presump-
tion of mental capacity in one who has ex-
ecuted a will, deed, contract or other in-
strument Bade V. Feay, 61 S. B. 848, 850,.
63 W. Va. 166.
Where in a will contest it was claimed
that proponent who was the residuary lega-
tee, had exercised undue influence over tes-
tatrix in procuring the will, and it appeared
that he superintended the making of tbe will
ieind obtained therefrom a large portion of
testatrix's estate, though he was not of kin
to her, to the exclusion of many of her
relatives, the term "mental competency"
under such circumstances Included the abili-
ty of testatrix to understand the meaning
and effect of the residuary clause of the
will Cooper v. Harlow, 128 N. W. 269, 261,
163 Mich. 210.
MEMTAI. l>ISQirAIiIFI0AnOir
Witness
A witness who has a ^'mental disquali-
fication" is one who has not the capacity to
receive, to record, and to recall impressions
and to testify intelligently concerning them;
Batterton v. State, 107 S. W. 826, 827, 52
Tax. Cr. R. 881 (quoting and adopting the
definition in 2 EUiott Bv. | 750).
MElfTAIi BISTBESS AND IKJUBY
Bee Mental Agony or Anguish.
As cruelty* see Cruelty.
MENTAX. FACULTIES
. See Impairment of Mental Faculties.
MEITTAX. IKOAPAOITT
See, also. Mental Capacity.
No definite rule can be laid down de-
fining *'m«atal incapacity** which will apply
in all cases and on which the court can rely
as a f6undati<m for granting or refusing the
prayer of a bill to set aside a conveyance.
The mentU inciy^acityy' however, as « sole
ifBNTAIj SUFJrSBINa:
8«8
UJE^TlOJi
groxmd tor setting aside a oonTeyaace, must
be sudi as learea tba penon aitected with-
out understanding to know the consefluenoes
of his own. act Allen's Adm'r v. Allen's
Adm'rs. 64 AtL UIO, 1U5, 79 Vt 173.
MENTAii smPFEitnro
See Mental Agony or Anguish.
As personal injury, see Personal Injury.
KENTAIi UKSOUiroifESB
"Mental unsoundness" which exempts
from responsibility for what otherwise would
be an oifense denotes a mind so far devoid of
understanding that it is unable to distinguish
between right and wrong, and is therefore
without freedom of moral action. Common-
wealth T. HalloweU, 72 AtL 845, 846, 223 Pa.
494.
BCENTAIXT nfCOMPETEKT
The phrases •'incompetent," "mentally in-
competent," and "incapable,'^ as used In arti-
cle 15, c. 86, {§ 5485, 5486, Comp. Laws 1909,
mean any person who, though not insane, is,
by reason of old age, disease, weakness of
mind, or from any other cause, unable, unas-
sisted, to properly manage and take care ot
himself or his property, and by reason thereof
would be likely to be deceived or imposed
upon by artful or designing persons. Shelby
V. Farve, 126 Pac. 764, 765, 33 Okl. 651.
The term "mentally incompetent to have
the charge and management of his property,"
within the statute relating to the appoint-
ment of guardiansi means mental incapabil-
ity to do so. In re Streiff, 97 N. W. 189, 191,
119 Wis. 566, 100 Am. St Rep. 903 (citing
In re Leonard's EsUte^ 95 Mich. 295, 54 N.
W. 1082).
MENTION
Any way mentioned, see Any.
Of dutUMe artiolos
At the time of the arrival of claimant at
the port of New York as a passenger frotn a
foreign country, a treasury regulation provid-
ed that merchandise intended for sale and of
the value of $500 or over could not be ex-
amined on the pier, but must be regularly en-
tered at the custom house and appraised.
Claimant in her declaration made on landing
listed certain articles and "one trui^ for pub-
lic stores"; that being the place where im-
ported merchandise goes' for examination and
appraisal. Later she filed regiUar written
entry at the custom house, and with it dupli-
cate consular invoice of the contents of the
trunk, which consisted of dutiable merchan-
dise of over 1500 in value. Held, that the
description in daimant's declaration was suf-
ficient, and :that her filing of the invoice at
the custom house later was a compliance with
Rev. St I 280% which reQuires aU dutiable
articles to be "mentioned to the collector" "at
the time of making entry." United States v.
Que Trunk, 184 Fed. 317, 318, 106 a 0. A. 469.
2 Reiv. Sts. <l8t Bd.) pt 2, e 6, ttt. 1, a
3, I 48, as amended by Laiws 1809, p. 40,
22, provides that a ehUd bom after the nu
ing of his parent's will, not "provided for d
in any way mentioned in sudi will," shi
take as if the parent died intestate. He!
that the words "in any way mentioned" tm
cate that the expression was to be used in t
broadest possible sense, so as to cover ai
form of reference that showed that a testat
had in mind the possibility of after-boi
children, and where a testator gave his esta
to his wife to her own use^ and that of h
heirs forever, and provided that in case
her death during the lifetime of the testate
leaving issue, the issue would take the estat
and, if the wife should 4iie leaving no lawf
issue, the estate should be divided in accor
ance with the intestate laws, and testator \
the time of the execution of the will waa
married man, but had no ciiildrea, a chil
bom after testator's death was mentioned i
the wiUf and he vfas bound by it, and conl
not take as if the testator had died intestat
Stachelberg v. Stachelbe^, 101 N. Y. Supi
178, 180, 52 Misc. Rep. 22.
A testator, when without children, ex<
cuted a will, which, after making certai
specific legacies, left the residue of his estal
to his wife, and after the birth' of a son, be
before the birth of two daughters, he added
codicil directing what disposition should t
made of his property "in the event of th
death of myself, wife, and child or childre
at one and the same time." Held, that thei
was no such **mention" of an after-bom chil
as was contemplated by Rev. St (1st Ed.) p
2, a 6, tit 1, art 3, 1 49, as amended by La^
1869, p. 40, c. 22, providing that whenever
testator shall have a child bom after tb
making of his last will, and shall die leavlo
it unprovided for, such child shall succeed t
the same portion that he would be entitled t
if his parent had died intestate, and bene
the surviving daughters . were entitled t
share in his estate as the statute providei
Tavshanjian v. Abbott, 115 N. Y. Supp. 93i
940, 130 App. Div. 863.
Where a will made prior to the blrtl
of any children devised testator's propert;
to his wif^, and provided that in case sh
should have any children at testator's deatl
the will should remained unchanged, a chil<
bom prior to testator's death was "men
tioned" in the will within the meaning of Kj
St 1903, I 4847, providing that a will, mad
prior to the birth of a child, wherein an:
child testator might have is not provided foi
or mentioned, shall be construed as if the de
vises therein had. been limited on the dead
of the child under the age of 21 years, no
married and without issue, eai;»ecially in viev
of sections 4842 and 4848, providing that cer
tain classes of dilldren and gcandiildren wb(
are neither provided for n9r expressly exdud
umimim
UMBCAiimim
ed by tte wU, hat only iwetemfttM, abiOl
Inherit as in case ot intestacy. Logaa y«
Bean's Adni'r, 87 8. W. UIO, 120 K>. 712.
Under Eefr. St 1806, art. 6845, profiaiiig
that a will made when testator had no child
living, wherela any child he might liaTe is
not proTlded for or mentioned, shall be Toid
on tlie bitth of a child, etc., whether the un-
born ddld is m^itioned in the will is to he
determined by construing its language with
reference to the circumstances and knowledge
of the testator, the word ^'mentioned** mean-
ing ''referred to,** rather than designated by
aaniBk and tlie f ailwe to make provisLon must
be accidental to avoid the will; and henoe
the win of a wife, executed when in an ad*
vanoed state of pregnaney, whidi deyised the
bulk of her realty to hn husband, and de-
vised her undivided interest in her fath^ 's
homestead to persons named, which devise
was to be void in case of living issue bom of
her body* meotioned the unborn ehild» for
she must have known the practical certainty
that a child would be bom to her, and the
provision that the device is to be void in case
of issue born obviously refers to the expected
child. Pearce v. Pearce, 184 8. W. 210, 214,
104 Tex. 78.
MERCANTILE
The word "mercantile," in its ordinary
acceptation, means pertaining to the business
of merchants, and is concerned with trade or
the buying and selling of commodities. Peo-
ple V. Federal Security Co. 99 N. B. 668, 660,
255 ni. 061; H. H. Kohlsaat ft Go. v. (yCon-
nell, 90 N. E. 689, 690, 255 111. 271.
"Mercantile" is defined thus: **0t or per-
taining to merchants, or the traffic carried on
by merchants, having to do with trade or
commerce; trading; commerciaL" Carr v.
Riley, 84 N. B. 426, 42S, 198 Mass. 70.
The term "mercantile pursuits'' in Bankr.
Act July 1, 1808, c. 541, I 4b, making corpora-
tions principally engaged in sudi pursuits
subject to the act, is to be given its common
and generally understood meaning, and in-
cludes only corporations engaged in the buy-
ing and selling of commodities. Zugalla v.
International Mercantile Agency, 142 Fed.
»27, 980, 74 C. O. A. 97.
Bakery
The word "mercantile" means having to
do with, or engaged in, trade, or the buying
of commodities ; and a corporation organized
to make bakers' goods and restaurant sup-
plies, and sell them, was organized for "mer-
cantile purposes," within the tax law. H. H.
Kohlsaat ft CJo. v. CConneU, 99 N. E. 689,
690, 256 m. 271 (dting 6 Words and Phrases,
p. 4477).
BaildiBS and taisi assooiatiam
The phrase "engaged principally in. man-
ufacturing, trading, printing, publishing,
8 Wbs.ft P.2D Skb.— 24
mining or mercantile pursuits," as used in
Bankr. Act 1898, limiting corporationa which
I may be forced into bankraptcy to such as
' are engaged principally in manufacturing,
trading, printing, publishing, mining, or mer-
cantile pursuits, is to be taken in its natural
and usual meaning, and any corporation
; which does not come within such meaning
• cannot be put into bankruptcy. A building
' and loan association organised to accumulate
a fund from contributions of its members
I from which loans were to be made to assist
' members in purchase of real estate, the
profits of which business were divided among
its members^ is not a corporation engaged
principally in trading or mercantile pursuits
within the act In re New York Building
lioan Banking Ck>., 127 Fed. 471, 472.
Buylag and selllas stoelui
A corporation engaged in bnylng and
I selling stocks and bcmds is engaged in a
; "mercantile pursuit," within section 108 of
I the Revenue Law (Hurd's Bev. St 1911, c
120), prohibiting the state board of equaliza-
tion from assessing companies organized for
mercantile purposes. People v. Federal Se-
curity C!o., 99 N. B. 668, 660, 256 lU. 061.
Ooalyard
A coalyard, wherein coal mined by its
owner is cleaned, assorted, and stored and
from which it is sold, is a "mercantile in-
stitution or establishment,*' within Child La-
bor Act (Hurd's Rev. St 1911, c 48), pro-
hibiting the employment of a child under the
age of 14 years in any mercantile institutton
' or establishment and is also a manufactur-
I lEig establishment, factory, or workshop, since
I that phrase as used in the statute has the
I meaning given to it by the Ohild Labor Act
of June 9, 1897 (Laws 1887, p. 90), defining
' the words "manufacturing establishment
factory, or workahop" to mean any place
I where goods or products are manufactured
' or repaired, dyed, cdeaned or sorted, stored
i or packed for sale. Purtell v. Philadelphia
ft Reading Goal ft Iron Co., 99 N. B. 899, 902,
206 111. 110, 48 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 183, Ann.
Oas. 1918B, 836.
ProduotSon and supply of eleotrloity
I A corporation engaged in generating elec-
tricity, transmitting it and selling power or
light to consumers, is neither a "manufactur-
ing" nor a "mercantile" corporation within
the meaning of Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c.
541, f 4b, as amended by Act Feb. 6, 1903,
c. 487, f 8, and is not subject to adjudication
as an Involuntary bankrupt In re Hudson
River Klectric Power Co., 178 Fed. 934, 941.
Productioa and traasportatiom of gas
Bouvier thus, defines "merchandise": A
term Including all those things which mer-
chants sell, either wholesale or retail, as
dry goods, hardware, groceries, drugs, etc.
It is usually applied to personal chattels
only, and to those which are not required for
MSBCANttliB
S76
MMMAi^riLs
food 01^ iniinedlate support, but Biidi as re-
nialii after having been used, or which are
QSed only by a slow consumption. The Gen-
tory Dictionary defines it: In general, any
morable object of trade or traffic;; that
which is passed from hand to hand by pur-
chase or sale; specifically, the objects of
commerce; a commercial commodity or com-
mercial commodities in general; the staple
of a mercantile business; commodities,
goods, or wares bought and sold for gain.
A gas company which makes, transports
through pipes, and sells gas to special cus^
tomers within il limited area is not prin-
cipally engaged in mercantile pursuits, with-
in the meaning of Bankr. Act July 1, 1888, a
641, I 4b, as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1003,
c. 487, I 8. In re Hudson Biver EUeetrle
Power Co., 173 Fed. 834, 952.
Oridakt bonfl, and stook Inroker
Where a corporation was organised to
carry on a general stock, bond, grain, and
brokerage business and was authorized to
trade on its own behalf in stocks, bonds,
grains, etc., and lease and dispose of real
and personal property, it was subject to ad-
judication as a bankrupt corporation en-
gaged in "trading or mercantile business."
In re H. B. Leighton & Co., 147 Fed. 311, 314
(citing Coll. Law & Pr. Bankr. [5th Ed.] p.
64; In re Surety Guaranty & Trust Co., 121
Fed. 73, 56 C. C. A. 654 ; In re Padflc Coast
Warehouse Co., 123 Fed. 740; In re Cam-
eron, 06 Fed. 756; In re New York Build-
ing^Loan Banking Co., 127 Fed. 471; In re
Snyder & Johnson Co., 133 Fed. 806; In re
United States Hotel Co., 134 Fed. 225, 67 C.
C. A. 153, 68 L. R. A. 588).
The business of a stockbroker may be
carried on by a limited partnership, within
Code Pub. Gen. Laws, art 78, I 1, authoriz-
ing the formation of limited partnerships for
the transaction of any "mercantile, mechani-
cal, manufacturing or banking business," and
declaring that the provision shall not au-
thorize any such partnership for the purpose
of making insurance; -for sales and purchase
es of bonds, stocks, and other securities are
mercantile transactions. Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. y. Cahn, 62 Aa 810, 825, 102 Md.
530.
Hotel
A corporation engaged principally in
running hotels is not engaged principally in
"mercantile** pursuits, so as to be liable to
be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt Toz-
away Hotel Co. v. J. L. Smathers & Co., 80
Sup. Ct 263, 264, 216 U. S. 430, 54 L. Ed.
558; In re United States Hotel Co., 134
Fed. 225, 227, 67 C. C. A. 153 (citing Hall
V. Cooley, 11 Fed. Cas. 217).
lAwwy and Wardims stable
A "merchant" is a person who is en-
gaged in the business of buying and selling,
one who buys in order to sell. A corporation
organized to conduct a general ll¥4i^': kiiA
boarding stable business, and ettgaifed ia
buying, keeping, and hiring ltd horses and
vehicles for profit and Ipe^pinjg, feeding, and
caring for the horses and vehtole^ of others
for hire, not b^ng engaged in buying and
selling horses ,and vehicles or feed aa a busi-
ness, is not a trading corporation or one en-
gaged chl^y in "mercantile" pursuits with-
in Bankr. Act July 1, 1808, c 541, | 4, cL ' V'
providing that such corporations may be-
come bankrupt Gallagher y. De Lanoey
Stables Co., 158 Fed. 381. 882.
A corporation, the principal busliieaB of
which is the keeping of a boarding stable to
feed and care for horses for hire, is not sub-
ject to adjudication as a corporation engaged
principally in mercantile and trading pur*
suits; such term embracing corporations
whose principal bnsinees Is the baying and
selling of goods in the ordinary course of
trade. In re ^^Uis Cab ft Aotomobtte Oo.,
178 Fed. 118, 1.14.
Lumber dealer
A firm engaged in buying standing tim-
ber in large quantities, and cutting and saw-
ing the same, and selUng the lumber, is en-
gaged in a "trading or mercantile business,"
within Gen. St 1002, | 2842, providing for
the assessment of the property of any trad-
ing or mercantile business; *'to trade" being
to engage in the purchase or sale of mer-
chandise, and the word "mercantile" being
defined as of or pertaining to merchants, or
the trafiSlc carried on by them. Jackson v.
Town of Union, 73 AtL 773, 774, 82 Conn.
266.
Beal estate dealer
The term "mercantile pursuits," as used
in Bankr. Act 1808, I 4b, c. 541, does not in-
clude dealing in real estate. In re Kingston
Realty Co., 160 Fed. 445, 447, 87 0. a A.
406, reversing 157 Fed. 200.
Rentiiis fllma for moria^; piotures
A oorporation engaged principally In the
business of renting films for moving pictures
is not engaged in trading or a mercantile
pursuit which rendera it subject to adjudica-
tion as an involuntary bankrupt under Bankr.
Act July 1, 1808, c 541, I 4b, 30 Stat 547, as
amended by Act Feb. 5, 1003, c. 487, | 4, 82
Stat 707. In re Imperial Film Exchange.
108 Fed. 80, 81, 117 C. 0. A. 188.
Restaurant
A corporation operating a restaurant Is
not subject to adjudication as a bankrupt un-
der Bankr. Act July 1, 1808, c. 541, authoriz-
ing an adjudication against corporations en-
gaged in "mercantile pursuits"; the dishes
furnished not being merchandise» nor the
proprietor a merchant engaged in "mercan-
tile pursuits." In ra Wentworth Lunch Co:^
150 Fed. 418, 415, 86 O. a' A. 803w
A restaurateur is not a "trader,'* nor, so
far as his business of cooking and selling
VmWMU'JilL^ A&mfqY:
371
)CB^P¥[:A;^QIS9i
fbod l8 conc0med« U'.lie engaged In "mercan-
tile puTBuits," within Bankr* Act ^uly 1,
1£98, c. 541, authorizing involnntaigr proceed-
ings against traders and persons so engaged.
In re Excelsior Ga£6 Po., 175 Fed. 2H, 296.
MEBCAimiiE AQJSHCT
Ab publisher, a^ Publisher.
HEROANTHiE tjjfSTTSVnOft OB E8«
TABLXSHltENT
See Manufacturing Establishment; Mer-
cantille.
MEBOAMTLLE XiAW
See Commercial Law.
XEBCAHTZLE MABUVB
Rev. St I 4233, providing that steam ves-
sels, when .towing other Tessels, shall carry
two bright, white masthead lights, vertically,
in addition to their side lights, which shall
be of such a character as to be visible on a
dark night with a dear atmosphere for at
least 5 miles and show a uniform unbroken
light over an arc of the horizon at 20 points
of the compass, applies only to the navy and
mercantile marine of the United States,
"mercantile marine" being used to mean tlie
mmvhant service or business of commerce at
sea, and does not apply to steam vessels en-
gaged in ttfwing on inland rivers* Beck v..
Johnson, 169 Fed. 154, 164.
mSBOAHTIZiE PUBStriTS
Bee Mercantile.
XEBOAHTHiE BPEGIALTT
See Specialty.
MERCHANDISE
See Dutiable Merchandise; Lawful Mer-
chandise; Stock of Goods, Weres, and
Merchandise; Stock of Merchandise.
Any article of imported merchandise,
see Any.
Goods, waxes, and merchandise, see
Gooda
Other merchandise, see Other.
"Merchandise" has a very extended
miming and usually means personalty used
by merchants in the course of trade, but
may include every article of traffic. Mara v.
Brand! (Tex.) 136 S. W. 661, 662; Whitewa-
ter Mercantile Co. v. Devore, 109 S. W. 808,
809, 180 Mo. App. 880.
"Merchandise" is defbied as anything
movable, customarily bought and sold for
profit. H. H. Kohlsaat & Co. v. 0*Connell,
09 N. B. 689, 690, 255 III. 271 (citing 6 Words
and Phrases, p. 4482). ..
Bev. St I 2766^ provides that: '*The
word *merrhandlfle' as need in this title may
iadude goods, wares and chattels of every
toqription capable of b^g Imported." Unlt-
^ States V. Fifty Waltham Watch Move-
awnt»,ia0F€4.;29i,294.
As baggage^ see Baggage.
In Rev. St f 8082, prescribhig a penalty'
for importing or bringing Into the United
States any merchandise coittrary to law, the
term "merchandise" is not restricted to gen-
eral merchandise as di^^gulshed from per-
sonal baggage, especially in view of sec-
tion 2766, declaring that the word "merchan*
dise" may include goods, wares, and chat-
tels of every description capable of being im-
ported, and sections 2799 and i2802, showing
that wearing apparel and other personal bag-
gage are embraced within the term. United
States V. Chesbrough, 176 Fed. 778, 781.
OanriUiKes, wasoBS» etc.
The term "merchandise" in the Bulk
Sales Law does not Include wagons or other
appliances used in a retail coal business.
Bowen v. Quigley 130 N. W. feoo, 165 Mich.
337, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 218.
Frait
Fruit is "merchandise^* within Code Miss..
1906, I 1367, prohibiting the keeping open of
a store on Sunday for the purpose of dispos-
ing of wares or merchandise. This term cov^
ers all kinds of personal property which is
ordinarily bought and sold. City of Qulfport
V. Stratakos, 43 South. 812, 90 Miss. 489, 13
Ann. Oas. 855 (citing Blackwood v. Cutting
Packing Co., 18 Pac. 248, 76 Cal. 212, 9 Am.
St. Rep. 199).
.. Fnmiture and fiztures
A fire policy on a stock of merchandise
for a specified sum, and on store and fur-
niture and fixtures for a specified sum which
stipulates that the entire policy shall be
void if the subject of insurance be incum-
bered by chattel mortgage, is not invalidated,'
as to the insurance on the furniture and fix-
tures, by the execution of a chattel mortgage
on the "stock of merchandise" and improve^
ments, the mortgage not covering the fur-
niture and fixtures; "stock," in mercantile law,
being defined as "the goods which a trades-
man holds for sale or trafiSc^" and "merchan-
dise" being defined to be "the objects of
commerce." Spring Garden Ins. Co. of Phil-
adelphia V. Brown (Ttex.) 148 S. W. 292.
Horse or stallioa
A sale of horses, wagons, harnesses, coal
bags, forks, shovels, baskets, stoves, sleigh
runners, chutes, and books pertaining to a
retail coal business was not a sale of ''mer^
chandise," within Bulk Sales Law (Pub. Laws
1905, No. 223X providing that sales in bulk
of any part or ttie whole of a stock of mer-
chandise, or merchandise and fixtures per<
taining to a business, otherwise than. in the
ordinary course of trade, shall be void, etc.
Bowen v. Quigley. 130 N. W. 690, 165 Mich^
337, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 218. .
Xaswaaee
Insurance is not an article of merchan-
dUie^or manufacture or one ^f the necessaries
HEROHAKBXSB
8T2
MEB0HANDI8S BltOKBB
of life, wltldn the laws against aigrossing^
problbiting combinationa among dealers in
merchandise or manufacture or necessaries
of life. Harris ▼. Commonwealth, 73 S. B.
561, 563, 113 Va. 746, 38 L. B. ▲• (N. S.) 458,
Ann. Ca& 1913S, 587.
Iiabor and serviee*
Code, I 5060, prohibiting any combina-
tion to regulate the price "of any article of
merchandise or commodity or to fix * ^ ^
the amount or quality of any article, com-
modity or merchandise to be manufactured,
mined, produced or sold," does not, when
construed as required by section 48 by giving
to the words and phrases the meaning of
approved usage of the language, cover com-
binations to fix the price of skilled or un-
skilled labor, and does not prevent i^iyslcians
from combining to fix charges for profes-
sional services} the word "merchandise" re-
ferring primarily to those things which mer-
chants sell, and the word "commodity*' qual-
ified by the words "manufactured, mined,
produced, or sold," not including labor either
skilled or unskilled, though the word "com-
modity" primarily means a convenience, prof-
it, benefit, or advantage, and, in reference to
commerce, comprehends everything movable
— that is, sold or bought— except animals.
Rohlf V. Kasemeler, 118 N. W. 276, 277, 140
Iowa, 182, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1284, 132 Am.
St Rep. 261, 17 Ann. Cas. 750.
JmrnheTf loss* and posts
Logs to be got out are "merchandise"
within the statute of frauds. Crosby Hard-
Wood Co. V. Tester, 63 N. W. 1057, 1058, 90
Wi& 412 (citing Hanson v. Roter, 64 Wis.
622, 25 N. W. 530).
Though the word "merchandise," as used
in Acts 1903, p. 92, regulating the sale of
"goods; wares and merchandise" in bulk, is
not to be taken in such a restricted sense
as to exclude the usual and customary ac-
cessories of a mercantile or trading estab-
lishment, when a sale in bulk is made of the
whole, the statute is not applicable to a sale
of substantially all the lumber manufactured
by one who operates a • sawmill at which
trees are manufactured into lumber. Cooney,
Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 66 S. R 257, 133
Ga. 511, 25 li. R. A. (N. S.) 758.
Flaoev sold
The word "merdiandise," defined in Rev.
St I 2766, as including goods, wares, and
chattels of every description capable of being
imported, is sufficiently broad to include pla-
cer gold. Six Parcels of Placer Gold v. Unit-
ed States, 76 Pac. 478, 475, 8 Ariz. 389.
Ship
A steamship owned by a corporation and
plying between domestic ports la taxable as
"merchandise," under St 1903, p. 452, c.
437, S 84. The term "merchandise" also In-
cludes general objects of traffic and com-
merce, together with stddcs or shares In in-
corporated companies. As used in the sta
ute of frauds, the words "goods^ and "me
chandise^ are sufficiently comprehensive i
include promissory notes. The Century Di
tlonary states that "real property, ship
money, stocks and bonds are not merchai
dlse," but the word may be used in dlfferei
senses, and In any case of doubt the contei
throws much light on its meaning, and tt
meaning of "merchandise^" as gathered froi
the context and the purpose of the act 1
which it occurs, is broad enough to inclnd
ships. New England ft Savannah S. S. O
V. Commonwealth, 81 N. B. 286, 288» 289, IS
Mass. 385, 11 Ann. Cas. 678 (citing Tisdal
V. Harris, 20 Pidc. [37 Mass.] 9, 13; Baldwt
V. Williams, 8 Mete. [44 Mass.] 865» 367).
Tools aad Impleueitts
A fire policy "on 'merchandise,* consistlii
principally of clothing made and in proces
of making and materials for same," cover
the stock in trade and all articles necessaril
or conveniently used in the business, and en
braces tools and implements of the bnsines
as conducted by insured. Oklahoma Fir
Ins. Co. V. McKey (Tex.) 152 S. W. 440, 44]
ITndertakev'B oaslMts, ete.
"Merchandise," within the bulk sales lai
(Pub. Acts 1905, No. 223), means such thing
as are usually bought and sold In trade b:
merchants, and includes caskets, steel vaults
robes, and casket hardware used in an no
dertaker's business. People's Savings Ban)
V. Van Allsburg, 131 N. W. 101, 102, 165 liidi
524.
Wool
Wool owned by a manufacturing com
pany, bought abroad and entered for ware
housing in a United States bonded ware
house, is "merchandise," within St 1909, c
490, pt 8, I 41, which provides for levy oi
an excise on domestic corporations, base(
on the value of merchandise, etc., which 1
owned by a natural resident would be liabK
to taxation. Farr Alpaca Co. v. Common
wealth, 98 N. B. 1078, 1079, 212 Mass. 156.
MEBOHAKBME BROKER
A "merchandise broker" is one who ne
gotiates the sale of merchandise wlthoai
having it in his possession or controL "H^
is simply an agent with very limited powers
and with reference to right to receive pay
ment it is universally held: *A broker baa
ordtaarily, no authority to receive paymen
for property sold by him for his piindpal
and a purchaser who pays the broker doei
so at his own risk.* Such payment does no
discharge him from liability to the prindpal
unless the authority of the broker to receiv4
payment be express or may reasonably b<
implied from the drcumstances.' " J. M
Robinson, Norton dc 0>. v. Gorslcana Cot
ton Factory, 99 8. W. 306, 806, 124 Ky. 43S
8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 474, 14 Ann. OftS, SOS
(quoting and adopting defltiitioA in Story, Af.
MERCHANDISE ENTITLED
373
UEBOHANT
f 34; and dtinff MecOiem, Ag. | M9; Graham
▼. DackwaU, 8 Bush [71 Ky.] 12; flelpte ▼.
Irwlo, 80 Pa. lUB; HlggiiM T. Moore, 84 N.
T. 417; Basset t. Lederer [N. T.] 1 Hon,
274; Croeby ▼. Hill, 88 Ohio St 100).
MEBCHAyPISB ENTITLED TO BS-
BEJITUBE
See Entitled to DebeDtura
MERCHANDISE NOT IN EXISTENCE
A crop of olives, nearly matured at time
of contract for sale thereof, is not within
GiT. Code, S 176S, providing that one who
agrees to sell merchandise, "not then in ex-
istence," warrants that it shall be sound and
merchantable at the contemplated place of
production, and as nearly so at the place of
delivery as can be secured by reasonable
care, or section 1771, providing that one who
fells or agrees to sell merchandise 'Inagces-
Bible to the examination of the buyer there-
by warrants that it is sound and merchanta-
ble. Kenney v. Grogan, 120 Pac 483, 436,
17 QiL App. 627.
MERCHANT
See Commission Merdiant; Ck>urt Mer-
chant; Custom of Merchants; For-
warding Merehant; Law Merchant;
Lumber Merchant; Permanent Mer-
chant; Public Merchant; Transient
Merchant.
A "merdianf ' Is one who buys and sells
foods of an or any kind. Commonwealth v.
Payne Medicine Co., 127 & W. 700, 768, 188
Ky. 164.
"Merchant" is defined as any one who
buys and sells any species of movable goods
for gain or profit H. H. Kohlsaat A Go. v.
O'ConneU, 99 N. B. 689, 690, 265 IlL 271 (dt-
iDg 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4482).
The word "merehant" is defined as "one
who Is engaged in the business of buying
commercial commodities and selling them
again for the sake of profit, especially one
who buys and sells in quantities or by whole-
sale," or *'a shopkeeper" or "storekeeper."
Carr v. Riley, 84 N. E. 426, 428. 198 Mass. 70.
A statutory provision empowering cities
to impose license taxes upon '"merchants,"
and to enact ordinances for the regulation
and enforcement of such taxes, authorizes
dty councils to impose penalties upon agents
and employte of such merchants who assist
in carrying on an unlicensed bosiness. City
of Emporia ▼. Becker, 90 Paa 798, 799, 76
Kan. 181, 12 L. B. A. (N. S.) 940.
As dealer
See Dealer.
LaboMT dlstSasalslied
Within Act Cong. May 6, 1892, c. 00, 27
8ttt 25^ providing for the deportation <tf
Chinese laborers and defining "merchant"
ai a person engaged la buying and selling
merchandise at a fixed plees of
which business is conducted in his name^
and who during the time he claims to be
engaged as a merchant does not engage in
the performance of any manual labor, ex-
cept such as is necessary in the conduct of
his business as such merchant, a person who
at the time of his arrest was working as a
servant in a boarding house, and who since
coming to the United States had worked as
a cook and delivery man in a store in which
he had no interest, was a laborer and not a
merchant Mar Sing v. U. 8., 187 Fed. 875,
877, 70 0. C. A, 213,
It has been held that a Chinese person
engaged in keeping a restaurant and lodging
bouse is a "laborer**; that a Chinese per-
son whose occupation was that of a laundry
man Is a laborer within the meaning of the
Chinese Exclusion Laws; that a Chinese
person owning an interest in a mercantile'
firm, but not engaged in conducting it, who
is also a cook in a restaurant of which he
is part owner, is a .laborer and not a mer-
chant under such laws; and that a China-
man who from the date of his landing in
this country, although he has an interest in
a mercantile business, \a a laborer. Act Cong.
Nov. 8, 1898, c 14, amending Act BCay 5,
1892, c 60, "to prohibit the coming of Chi-
nese persons into the United States," does
not restrict the meaning of the word "la-
borers," as used in the prior acts, so as to
enlarge the privileged classes. United States
V. Tee Gee You, 152 Fed. 157, 158, 169, 160,
81 C. C. A. 409.
A farmer selling the products of his
farm produced by his own labor is not a
'•merchant, grocer, or dealer in wares and
merchandise, or a trader in any business,"
within Pen. Code, art 199, prohibiting such
persons from bartering or permitting their
places of business to be open for traflic on
Sunday. Hanks v. State, 99 8. W. 1011,
1012, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 577.
Foreign corporation
A foreign corporation engaged in the
publication of school books, which has ob-
tained a contract from the state text-book
oonunission to furnish all the school books
of the state, as provided by Acts 1899, p.
423, c. 205, and which has contracted witli
the dealers within the state to establish de^
pots for the sale of school books in the state
is a "merchant" doing business within the
state, as defined by Acts 1903, p. 656, e
266» I 27, and is therefore Uable to a tax on
the average value of its capital invested In
its stock of merchandise kept on hand for
sale within tbe stats; the term "merchant"
being defined by the statute as including all
persons, copartnerships, or corporations en-
gaged in trading or dealing in any kind of
goods, wares, or merchandise, whethei: the
same be kc^t on hand for sale or be purchas*
MKROHANT
374
MSRCHAMT
?
\\
ed ahtf ' dcOlrered fbr profit as ordered.
American Book Go. ▼* Shelton, 100 S. W.
725, 731, 117 Tenn. 746. A state la not pre-
clnded by tb« commerce danse of the federal
GonstitatioD from imposing a merchants' tax
upon a nonresident manufacturing corpora-
tion which lias selected a dty of that state
as a distributing point, and has secured a
local transfer company to take charge of its
products when shipped to that point, assort
them, store them in a warehouse, and make
delivery in the original packages to the cus*
tomers of the manufacturer, either as ex-
pressly directed by it, or under general di-
rections in favor of its recognized and
approved customers, whose names were fur-
nished to the transfer company, since, un-
der such circumstances, the goods, when
stored in the warehouse, were no longer dn
transit, but had reached th^lr destination,
and were held In the state for sale. Ameri-
can Steel & Wire Ck>. v. Speed, 24 Sup. Ct
866, 866, 192 U. S. 600, 48 L. Ed. 638.
Fmii deal«v
The keeper of a fruit stand, from which
he sold fruit on Sunday, was a merchant en-
gaged in selling merchandise, etc., on Sun-
day, within Code 1906, § 1367, providing that
a merchant, shopkeeper, or other person
shall not keep open his store on Sunday for
the purpose of disposing of any wares or
merchandise, goods, or chattels. City of
Oulfport V. Stratakos, 43 South. 812, 90 Miss.
489, 13 Ann. Gas. 856.
Itineraat optioian.
"Merchant" is defined by Webster, Diet
as "one who traffics on a large scale, espe-
cially, with fordgn countries; a traflBcker; a
trader; ^ ^ ^ one who keeps a store or
Shop for the -sale of goods; a shopkeeper."
A merchant has also been defined as **oiie
whose business is to buy and sell merchan-
dise ; one who buys to sell again, who does
both, not incidentally or occasionally, but
habitually, as a business." An itinerant op-
tician, who merely prescribes and collects
for spectacles, and has his orders filled and
charged to him by a supply house, is not a
merchant City of Waukon v. Fisk, 100 N.
W. 476, 476, 124 Iowa, 464 (quoting Jewel r.
Trustees of Sumner Tp., 84 N. W. 978, 113
Iowa, 47, 49).
SCaanfaotiiver
The words *^merchants" and "dealers,"
according to common understanding, mean
something different from the word "manu-
facturers." The former are generally em-
ployed to designate persons engaged in the
business of buying and selling merchandise
or other personal property in the usual course
of trade; the latter to designate those en-
gaged in the business of making or produc-
ing articles for use or sale. Union County
Nat. Bank, liberty, Ind., v. Oaan Lumber
Co., 179 Fed« 710, 716, 103 C. G. A. 684.
A "manuflactiirer" is/ one engaged
makUig tDaterlais, raw or partly itnisbed, '
t6 wares suitable for use. . A. ''jDerebant**
distinguiflihed trom a mannfacturw , in tti
he sells to eam a pfoflt, azid.the manufach
er sells to take profit already earned,
manufacturer of agricultural ImplementB
not a "dealer" or "merchant," within A<
1909, c 479, I 8, and Assessment Act 19
(Acts 1907, c. 602) U 8, 26, 27, providing f
taxation of dealers and merchants ; sales I
ing made only to jobbers and commissii
men, and the only profit taken being for ma
ufacturing the articles sold. Ghattanooi
Plow Go. V. Hays, 140 8. W. 1068, 1069, 1
Tenn. 148.
A manufacturer of acetylene gas llgl
ing systems who sells through solidti]
agents is not a "merchant" or f dealer" wit
in Kirby's Dig. | 616, which provides that at
tion 613, which nuikes void notes given
ordinary form for the price of patented m
chines, etc., shall not extend to merchan
and dealers who sell patented things in ti
usual course of business; the words "mc
chant" and "dealer" meaning persons engage
in the business of buying and selling mc
chandise or otiier personal property in the u
ual course of trade. Bnslgn v. Coffelt, 1^
S. W. 281, 234, 102 Arit 668.
MemlMrof flvm
The term "merchant^' is defined by A
Cong. May 6| 1892, c, 60, as am^ded by Ai
Nov. 3, 1893, c. 14, as a person engaged 1
buying .and seUling i^erchandlse at a fixe
place of business, which business is conductc
in his name^ and who, du^lJQg the time I
claims to be engaged as a merchant, dot
not engage in the performance of any maniu
labor, except such as is necessary in the coi
duct of his business as such merchant Tt
names of any of the partners need not appei
in the company name under which a Ghlnef
grocery is actually conducted at a fixed pUu
of business, in order to constitute them me
chants within the meaning of the definitio]
Tom Hong v. United States, 24 Sup. Ct 51
619, 198 U. S. 617, 48 L. Ed. 772.
Oil dealer
A "merchant" is a peracm whose baa
ness it is to buy and sell mendiandise an
who habitually trades in merchandise.
BoQV. LsL^ Diet 166. A merdianf s liceu
contemplates that the merchant is to have
fixed place of business within a county <
city. confiMlng of a store or shop for the sal
of good& Brown's Oas^ 36rS. B. 486, 98 Vi
369. An oil company engaged in the boa
ness of refining and distributing oil and sel
ing it to local dealers from tank wagon
and not from a fix4d pUioe of tnudness, is ik
a "merchant"' as that term is generally unde
stood, and cannot, by voluntarily paying
state license as a merchant, prevent the ai
sessment of a spedAiD tax againat its bui
uMsuMAner
USEOBAMTABUt
Standard Oil Go. t. aty of FredodoU-
barg, 62 S. B. 817, 820, 106 Ya. 82.
A oorpoiatlon aelllng oil drawn from sta-
tionary tanks owne^by it, and from a wag>
on tank drlTen about. town. Is a ''mercbant,"
within an ordinance defining a mercbant to be
a person dealing in the selling of goods,
wares, and mercbandlse at any store, stand,
or place occopied for that purpose. Ctty of
Troy T. Hants, 76 B. W. 662, 663, 066, 102
Mo. App. 51.
«s soUcitMr of orders fs»
seeds
Under the treaty of NoTomber 17, 1880
<22 Stat 82S), and the treaty of March 26,
1894 (28 Stat 1210), pro>Tldlng that Chinese
persons entitled to come into the United
States, when provided with the certificate
prescribed by Act Cong. JxUy 6, 1884, c. 220,
23 Stat 115, are Chinese subjects, being
officials, teachers, students, merchants, or
tiaTelers fbr curiosity or pleasure, and under
Act Not. 8, 1803, c 14, I 2, 28 Stat 8, de-
fining the term '^merchant,*' as used in the
exclusion acts, as a t>erson cagaged In buy-
ing and selling mtf^handlse at a fixsd place
of business, whUdi business is conducted In
his name^ and who does not engage In manu-
al labor, a person described In his certificate
as a "salesman" is not a merchant who is
eatitied to remain in the United States;, a
"salesman," as defined by the Standard Dic-
tionary, being a man who seUs goods In a
shop or store or by canvassing, and being gen-
erally accepted to mean a person who sells
goods for a merchant and not to mean the
m^chant himself. United States y. Qln
Hing, 76 Pac. 630, 640, 8 Aria. 41&
Defendant took orders for groceries
which he sent to a wholesale gn>cery firm,
which shipped the goods to their own order
and sent a bill therefor accompanying the bill
of lading to their agent with directions to de-
Uver only as paid for. Such agent received
the goods and removed them to his war^ouse,
where the bulk was broken and the dUfereat
packages for each customer segregated and
delivered to them through defendant on their
paying the price to defendant, and he deliver-
ed the money to such agent Held, that de-
fendant was a "merchant" as defined by Rev.
St 1880, I 8540, declaring every person who
shall deal in the selling of goods, wares, and
merchandise at any store, stand, or place oc-
cupied for that purpose to be a "merchant"
and w^s therefore within a town ordinance
prohibiting any "merchant'* carrying on busi-
ness without first having obtained a license.
Town of Canton v. McDaniel, 86 S. W. 1092,
,188 Mo. 207.
A "merdiant*' is one engaged In the bus!-
oess of buying commercial commodities and
selling them again for the sake of profit He
is one who traffics or carries on trade, espe^
clally on a large scale; one who buys goods
to sell again, and any one who is engaged
ha the purchase or sale of goods; a traffl<^
er; a trader. Under Code, I 700^ gtring to
cities and towns the power to define by ordl^
nance who ahall be considered transleint mer-
chants, and to regulate, license, and tax theAr
sales, a dty may Impose a license fee on one
engaged in taking orders for goods on his
own account and subsequently having the
orders filled by a wholesale house, and the
goods shipped to him for delivery ; he paying
the wholesale price and collecting &e retail
price from his customers. City of Cedar
Falls V. Oentsler, 00 N. W. OO* 602, 128
Iowa, 670.
MEROKJJffT APPRAISEB
The "merdiant appraiser^' appointed by
the collector of customs is an expert, select-
ed as an emergency arises, upon the request
of the importer for a reappraisal. He Is not
a clerk nor an agent nor a person employed
in the customs department within the mean-
ing of the civil service act nor is he an ofllcer
of the United States. Hand v. Cook, 92 Pac.
3, 10, 29 Nev. 518 (quoting and adopting AufT-
mordt V. Hedden, 11 Sup. Ct 103» 137 U. 8.
310, 34 L. Ed. 674).
MERQHAITTABXiB
ICavketAUe symeajmanis
"Marketable^* and "merc9wntable^ are
practically synonymous. In an action for
breach of contract to purdwse hay, tn whldi
defendants alleged that plaintiflF agreed to sell
them merchantable hay, and that the hay
shipped was not as represented, a request by
plaintiff to an expert witness: "State wheth-
er or not this hay you saw there Is con-
sidered as marketable hay here in Baker City,
compared with other kind that Is sold here" —
was not objectionable ; the persons who "con-
sidered" the hay merchantable being himself
and those who, according to his previous tes-
timony, he had seen purchasing such hay at
Baker City. Eaton v. Blackburn, 88 Pac 303,
304, 49 Or. 22 (dtlng Webster's International
Diet.).
Oom
The term 'Merchantable,*' as used in the
rale that a buyer of com Is entitled to mer-
chantable com, means com of such quality
as to be Reasonably fit for the ordinary pur-
poses to which such com Is put and free
from marketable defects, so as to be salable
in the market at an average or ordinary
price. Atkins Bros. Co. v. Landa, 96 B. W.
949, 900, 119 Ma App. 119.
Hay
See Good Merchantable Hay.
Iiiuaber
The words "merchantable lumber, mill
run," are not in common use and have no
settled. Judicial meaning. They are peculiar
to the lumber tkade or business and have a
special meaning well understood by persons
engaged in such businesa» and in an action on
ICBBOHANTABLB
876
a oantr&ct for tbe purchase of lumber at a
specified ptioe per 1,000 for "merdiantable
lumber,. mill run," eTidenee is admissible to
show the meaning of the words. Barnes ▼•
Leidlgfa, 79 Pac. 51, 02, 46 Or. 43.
Ttmbev
The term "merchantable timber," within
a contract to sell land warranted to contain
100,000,000 feet of "mechantable timber/'
while not limited to timber that could be re-
duced to board measure and numufactured in-
to lumber at a profit, is limited to timber
capable of being measured in board feet when
sawed or cut for the purpose of utilization.
Broad River Lumber €k>. ▼. Middleby, ld4
Fed; 817, 819, 114 0. C. A. 621.
'The term 'merchantable' means fit
for the market, of such a quality as will
bring the ordinary market price." A deed
of ^'merchantable" timber had reference to
such timber as would bring the ordinary
market price at the time the deed was exe-
cuted. Listen V. Chapman & Dewey Lumber
Ck)., 91 S. W. 27, 29, 77 Ark. 116 (quoting and
adopting Webst Diet and Black Law Diet ;
and citing Andrews y. Wade [Pa.] 6 Atl. 43).
A contract for the sale of all merchant-
able pine timber, 10 Inches In diameter and
* OTor, on a described tract of land, was not
Told for uncertainty, ''merchantable" being
used to describe the quality and determinable
by experts with approximate certainty. Lee
Lumber Go. t. Hotard, 48 South. 286, 287, 122
La. 860, 129 Am. St Rep. 86&
A contract to sell the "merchantable pine
timber" upon a certain tract of land to be
sawed into lumber by the vendor according
to the directions of the purchaser, and to be
delivered at Richmond, is a contract that the
lumber shall be merchantable, and that the
timber will make merchantable lumber. Rag-
land V. Butler, 18 Grat (59 Va.) 328, 335.
Title
The term ^^merchantable title" does not
necessarily Import a clear and perfect record
title, and is not of such clear and definite
meaning that one contracting to sell stand-
ing timber and to give such a title may not
assert as a defense for not giving such title
that he was Ignorant of its meaning, and
when the contract was executed stated to
the vendee that if It meant a perfect title
or one good of record, he would not sign, be-
cause he could not furnish such titie, and
that thereupon the vendee told him that a
general warranty deed was all that was
wanted, and that that was what was meant
by the term, and that he signed in reliance
on such assurance. — Hughes v. Adams, 119
S. W. 134, 136, 55 Tex. av. App. 197.
MERCHAirrS' GOODS, WARES, AKH
COMMODITIES
See Mierchandisa
MERE
MEBE UOEHSB
See Licepse; Licensee
MERE POSSmUTT
The rights of living remaindermen, dil
dren of the life tenant, in a deed to one U
life with remainder to the "beirB of U
body," are not "mere possibiUtlee" withJ
Civ. Code, | 700, declaring that a mere posa
blllty, such as the expectancy of an heir a]
parent ia not an interest of anj kind, hi
they are estates in fee to vest in the futui
in such of them as survive their motbe
Los Angeles County v« WinaiiB» IM Pa& 69
662, 18 Gal. App. 257.
MERGER
Corpomtloaa
While there is a distinction recognize
by most authorities between a ''merger" to
a "consolidation" of corporations, tha
terms are not always used witii strict «
curacy. Chicago ds Bu I. R. Go. t. Doyle^ Id
N. B. 278, 281, 256 m. 514.
There is a distinct difference betwee
a consolidation and a merger of two con
panics. In a consolidation, both go oat c
existence as separate corporations, and
new corporation is created, which takes thel
place and property ; while In case of a mei
ger one loses its identity by absorption in th
other, which remains In existence, and sw
ceeds to its property; and Issues its ow
stock to the stockholders of the merged cod
pany. Lee v. Atlantic Coast (Tine B. Co^ IS
Fed. 775, 790. See, also, Kent v. Oommo
Council of City of Blnghamton, 81 N. 1
Supp. 198, 200, 40 Mlsa Rep. 1 (2 Bouv. U^
Diet 175; Webst Int Diet 914). Irvine ^
New York Edison Co., 128 N. T. Suppi 29^
299, 143 App. Dlv. 844; Central Univeisit
of Kentucky V. Walters' Bx'rs, 90 S. \^
1066, 1069, 122 Ky. 65; Wasley v. Chicago
R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 147 Fed. 608, 614.
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Con
pany incorporated in Virginia and having it
principal offices in lUchmond, with powe
given by its charter to "consolidate with ii
selT' other corporations, entered into a
agreement of "consoUdatioii and merger
with a comimny owning connecting lines, U
corporated in other states, which agreemei
provided that the stock of the second con
pany should be retired and canceled, an
stock of the Coast Line Company Issued i
its place; that all the stock, property, an
franchises of both should be merged, unltei
and consolidated, "so as to form a merge<
united and consolidated company"; tlu
"said merger, union, and consolidation shai
be into the Atlantic Coast Line Railroa
Company, which is to continue the name o
the consolidated company"; and that its oi
flee should remain in Richmond. Under sue
KEROSat
877
ICBROBB
agreement Uie stock of tlie second oompany
was canceled, but stock prevlonsly issued Xfj
the Coast Line Oompany remained outstand-
ings, and sQCh company took ^arge of and
operated aH lines previously owned and oper-
ated by eitlier company, without any change
in its management or control. Held, that
such agreement effected a merger, aad not a
consolidation, and that the Ck»st Line Oom-
pany continued to exist as a Virginia corpo-
ration. Lee T. Atlantic Coast line B. Co.,
160 Fsd. 775, 784.
A consolidation takes place when, two
companies are extinguished and a new one
created taking over the holdings of those
passing out of existence. It differs from
'Merger,'* which occurs when a thing of
lesser Importance is absorbed by one of
greater importance. Both merger and con-
solidation, however, are equally productive
of unloUt which means agreement, concord,
liarmony, and may exist without either mer-
ger or consolidation. Ramsey v. Hicks, 87
N. S. 1091, 1099, 44 Ind. App. 490.
Eita^es
A *'merger," at law, is defined to be
where a greater estate and a less coincide
and meet in one and the same person, in one
and the same right, without any Interme-
diate estate. The less estate Is immediately
annihilated, or, in the law phrase, it is said
to be merged — that is, sunk or drowned — in
the greater. The rule in equity is the same
as at law, with this modification: That at
law It is invariable and inflexible ; in equity
it is controlled by the expressed or implied
intention of the party in whom the interests
of estete unite. Bagley v. McCarthy Bros.
Co., 104 N. W. 7, 9, 95 Minn. 286 (quoting 5
Words and Phrases, p. 4492).
"Merger," in law, is accomplished when
two or more estates comprising the whole
legal and equitable interest unite in the same
person; but in equity such union does not
effect a merger, unless such was the inten-
tion of the parties, and when equity requires
it Cltlzena' Permanent Savings dc Loan
Aas'n V. Rampe, 116 N. Y. Supp. 597, 600;
Dudley v. People's Trust Co., 107 N. T. Supp.
930, 933, 57 Misc. Rep. 230 (quoting Asche v.
Aache, 21 N. B. 70, 113 N. Y. 232).
Where a greater and a lesser estate
coincide and meet in the same person and in
the same right, without any intermediate
Tested estate, the lesser is immediately anni-
hilated, and is said to be ''merged." Tolsma
V. Adair, 73 Pac. 347, 348, 32 Wash. 383
(quoting and adopting definition in Ander-
son's Law Diet 671; 2 Bouv. Law Diet
{Bawle's Rev.] 400, 401).
**Merger^ is essentially a matter of inten-
tion, and where the intention to merge does
not exist tile doctrtne is not operative. Four
sisters and four brothers being seised in fee
of a tract of land, the sisters conveyed their
nndlTided interests amounting to one-half of
the fee to their brothers, three of whom, be-
ing of age, executed four several bonds tx>
their sisters and gave them collectively a
mortgage on the premises to secure a p<Mrtion
of the purdiase money. The brother, who
was a minor at the time the mortgage was
given and who did not join therein, came of
age within two years after the giving of the
mortgage, and lived for more than thirty
years thereafter and died, devising his one-
fourth interest to his three brothers who
made the mortgage. The entire fee of the
premises subsequently vested in two of the
brothers by virtue of their individual hold-
ings and under the will of their deceased
brother, and by a conveyance by their sur-
viving brother, and in the years 1891, 189S,
and 1908, made three mortgages upon the
premlse& One of the brothers died intes-
tate, and 'yhis interest in the premises de-
scended to his heirs at law, who are his sur-
viving broths and his nephews and nieces,
diUdren of his deceased brothers and sis-
ten. The surviving brother and the neph*
ews and nieces are the owners of the inter-
est in the mortgage of one of the sisters, as
well as being owners of the fee. As against
the mortgages. of 1891 and 1895, there was
no "merger" of their inteiest in the original
mortgage to the sisters and the title to the
fee in the lands. Shreve v. Harvey, 70 Atl.
671, 676, 74 N. J. Bq. 886.
The rule is absolute at law that a "mer-
ger^ takes place when a greater estate and a
lesser coincide and meet in one and the same
person, in one and the same right, without
the intervention of any other or outstanding
right or title. Under such circumstances,
the lessor estate is annihilated or merged
into the greater. The doctrine of merger
springs from the fact that, when the entire
equitable and legal estates are united in the
same person, there can be no occasion to
keep them distinct, tor ordinarily it would
be of no use to the owner to ke^ up a
Charge upon the estate of which he was sela-
ed in f ee simple; but, if there is an out-
standing, intervening title, the fbundation
for the merger does not exist, and, as a mat-
ter of law, it is so declared. It therefore ap-
pears that, in order to effect a merger so. as
to extinguish the lesser estate, there must be
a union, in the same person, of both the
equitable and legal titles, without an inter-
vening right operating to prevent a merger.
Gurry v. Lafon, 118 S. W. 246, 200, 188 Afo.
App. 163 (citing Stantons v. Thompson, 49
N. H. 272; Jones, Mortg. [6th Ed.] f 848).
"'Merger* occurs 'when a greater estate
and a less coincide and meet in one and the
same person, in ond and the same rights
without any intermediate estate.' Tlie rule
in equity is the same as at law, with this
modification that at law it is inflexible,
whereas in equity it Is clear that a person
may become entitled to an estate subject to
a diarge for his own benefit, and if he diooee
MBRaER'
578
M£BIT9i
cftii liold the estate and keep the* cbaiye
alive. It beoamee a qaestion of intention in
tiie person in whom the two interests are
▼ested." Where a purchaser assumed the
payment of notes executed by the Tender, se-
cured by a mortgage on the premises, and
oonveyed the premises to a third person sub-
ject to the mortgage,' and this person after-
wards acquired the notes, the equitable es^
tate was merged in the legal one, thereby
extinguishing the mortgage and the debt se*
cured. Wonderly t. Giessler, 93 S. W. 1130,
1133, 118 Mo. App. 706 (quoting and adopting
Bassett t. O'Brien, 51 S. W. 108, 140 Mo.
A ''merger of estates*' occurs, as de-
clared in GlT. Code 1805, { 3106, when "two
estates in the same property unite in the
same person in his indiyldual capacity, the
less estate [being] merged in the greater,"
or where, as was held in Lowe ▼. Webb, 11
S. B. 846, 85 6a. 731, two or more persons,
having, as tenants in common, a Ufe estate
in realty, acquire in common the absolute
fee thereto. *The doctrine of 'merger of es-
tates* rests upon actualities, not upon mere
possibilities. Ck>incidence of two independ-
ent estates presently held by one and the
same person or class of persons is a neces*
sary prerequisite to merger. No merger can
take place until such identity of person and
of present interest In point of fact exists."
liuquire v. Lee, 48 a B. 834, 838, 121 Oa.
024 (citing Stringfellow v. Stringfellow, 37
S. E. 767, 112 Oa. 494, 497; Bardwell & Co.
V. Edwards, 46 S. B. 40, 117 Ga. 825; 1
Wash. Real Prop. [6th Ed.] I 368; Knowles
V. Lawton, 18 Oa. 476, 63 Am. Dea 290 ; Ck>le
V. Grlgsby [Tex.] 36 & W. 690; Asch v. Asch
[N. Y.] 18 Abb. N. C. 82; Bomar v. Mullins
IS. C] 4 Rich. E)q. 80; Johnson v. Johnson,
7 Allen [89 Mass.] 196, 83 Am. Dec. 676).
Rights are said to be ^'merged" when the
same person who is bound to pay is also en-
titled to receive. This Is more properly
called a confusion of rights or extinguish-
ment. Muscogee Mfg. Go. v. Eagle & Phenix
Mflls, 64 S. E. 1028, 1031, 126 Ga. 210, 7 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1139 (quoting Bonvier Law Diet
word '"Merger," subtitte "Of Rights*'; and cit-
ing Rawle, Ck>Tenants [5th Bd.] i 223 ; Sibley
▼. Beard, 6 Ga. 650; Fields v. Willingham,
49 Ga. 344; Willis v. McGough, 56 Ga. 198;
Olv. Code 1896, | 8106; Ooodel v. Bennett,
22 Wis. 666; Brown y. Metz, 33 111. 339, 85
Am. Dec. 277; Silverman v. Loomis, 104 111.
137; Waterbury v. Head, 12 N. Y. St R.
361).
Offenses
"'Merger* in the criminal law occurs
where the same act of crime is within the
definition of a misdemeanor and likewise
a felony, or of a felony and likewise of a
treason ; and the rule is that-the lower grade
merges in the higher. That is, an act can-
not be both a felony and a misdemeanor— a
doctrine which applies only where the iden-
tical act consjtltuteB both ofleases. * *
Subject to whatever exception may be fouD<
in the doctrine of mergi^, a criminal persoi
may be holden for any crime, of whateve
nature, which can be legally carved out o
his act He is not to elect, but the prosecnl
ing power is. If the evidiuice shows him t
be guilty of a higher offense than he stand
indicted for, or of a lower, or of one dlGFei
ing in nature, whether under a statute or a
the common law, he cannot be heard to con
plain; the question being whether it show
him to be guilty of the one charged." Stat
V. SmUh, 90 S. W. 440. 444, 190 Mo. 706 (quol
ing and adopting definition- In 1 Bish. ti
Law [7th Ed.] fit 786, 791).
MERINO WOOL
In Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, I 1
Schedule K, par. 349, relating to wools, th
words *'merino blood, immediate or remote,'
convey an unmistakable meaning, and includ
wool in which the presence of merino bloo(
is marked, though of inferior quality. Unit
ed States v. American Express Oo.» 177 Fed
736,789.
MERIT
KEBXTORIOUS BEFENSB
Where a complaint alleged execution b:
defendants of a penal bond, the condition o
which was that defendants would make cei
tain repairs to a building for plaintiffs tha
they had failed to perform, and a defaol
Judgment was entered thereon, an answer ad
mitting the execution of the bond and failur
to perform, but alleging that the buildinj
was leased to defendants for gambling ptu
poses, does not on a motion to set aside thi
default Judgment set up a "meritorious de
fense," within Mills' Ann. Code, | 75, aufhoi
izing relief under such circumstances. He
Connell v. Schultz, 128 Pac. 876, 877, 28 Cole
App. 194.
The word "meritorious," as used in coo
nection with a ''meritorious defense,** mean
that the defense is good and lawful, and
when pleaded properly in time, must be recog
nized as a good lawful defense. While an:
defense given by statute is meritorious, 1
does not follow that for that reason it bai
merit equal to any other defense, thus remov
ing from the courts the right to dlscriminati
between different defenses, so that, where 1
appears that a defense otherwise meritorion
when offered for the first time in an amende^
pleading if allowed would worK an injustie
instead of a Justice, the court should refQ»
it O'Neill V. Jones, 123 N. W. 495, 496, 2
S. D. 79.
MERITS
As a technical legal term, ''merits" ba<
been defined as a matter of s^bfltanoe in la^
as distinguished from matters of form, a»
as the real or substantial grounds of actioi
MERITS
379
MSBJTB
or defense, In contradlsd&cttott to wmH teeb-
nlcal or collateral matter raised In the conrae
of the salt. Wolfe ▼. Georgia By. A Bleotric
Co., « S. E. e^ eS, 4 Ga. ^pp. 410 (dtlBg
5 Words & Phrases, p. 4403).
"The term 'merits' has been defined as
meaning the strict legal rights of the parties
as distinguished from those met« questions
of practice which every court regulates for
Itself and from all matters which d^iiend
upon the discretion or fayor of the court-
matters of substance in law as distinguished
from matters of form/' Smoot v. Judd, 83
a W. 481, 519, 184 Ma 508.
The act of the trial court in an election
contest in changing the case from the Jury
docket to the nonjury docket at a subsequent
term, after an order had been made placing
It upon the Jury docket, but on the faith of
which no steps had been taken, is within the
discretion of the trial court, since the rule
that trial judges cannot, at subsequent terms,
change orders made at former terms does
not apply to mere practice points, but only to
the "merits of the controversy," which term
Is not confined to points in actual litigation.
Taylor v. Gtfr, 141 S. W. 745, 748, 125 Tenn.
235, Ann. Caa. 1913G, 155.
In November, 1903, at the instance and
request at plaintiff's counsel, a stipulation
was entered into embracing the facts rele-
vant to all the Issues except one. Such stip-
ulation was entered into in good faith, with-
ont fraud or any attempt to deceive plaintiff's
comisel, and after most careful considera-
tion. Defendant's counsel in good f&fth relied
upon such stipulation for nearly six years.
In Maicfa^ 1908, the cause was tried and sub-
mitted upon such stipulated facta and certain
testimony ' relevant to the issue not covered
by the stipulation. In Biay, flawing, the
trial court made its findings of fact and con-
clusions of law favorable to plaintiff, and
ordered judgment accordingly, which was en-
tered pursuant thereto on liay 14, 1908. De-
fendant's counsel thereafter tfxik steps to set-
tle a statement, of the case preparatory to
appealing to the Supreme Court, and on July
25, 1908, ohappUcattonof plaintilTs oeunsel,
an order was made requiring defendant to
show cause why an qrder should not be made
vacating and setting aside such findings of
fact, conc^isiotifs of law, and order for Judg-
meot, and judgment, and also why plaintiff
should not be relieved from a portion of such
Btipnlation of factB> or why such stipulation
of facts should not be modified by eliminating
such portion, or wliy the parties should not
be relieved in toto from such stipulation. Up-
on the return of such order to show cause,
and after due hearing, the order complained
of was made vacating the findings, conclu-
sions, oHfer for Judgment, and Judgment. It
was held that such order, in so far as It
vacateS'the finding* of fact, and relieves the
pnrtles from snch stipulation, is appealable
imder subdiviBlon-4,t»7225, Bev. Codes 1906,
upon' this ground that it 'nnvolves fhe merltB*'
of the action or some part thereof. Northern
Pac. By. Co. v. Barlow, 126 N. W. 238, 287, 20
N. D. 197, Ann. Ca& 1912C, 763.
AmwMbneAt of plmMnm
The term "merits," in Code Civ. Proc.
I U, giving the right of appeal from an or-
der involving the "merits," embraces more
than the questions of law and fact constitu-
ting a cause of action or defense, and, when-
ever a substantial right of a party to an ac-
tion material to obtaining a Judgment ia de-
nied, a right of appeal lies. An order requir-
ing plaintiff to amend his complaint by statr
ing what of the acts charged were negligent
and what willful is appealable. Lynch v.
Spartan MUls, 44 S. E. 93, 95. 66 8. C. 12
(citing Blakely ft Copeland v. Frazier, 11 S.
C. 122).
Oluuage •£ "wmrnm^
An order granting a diange of venue tn
a dvil action involves the merits, and is ap-
pealable, nndter Ber. Oode» 1899, | 0626^ pro-
viding that an order is appealable when it
Involves the merits of an action or aome part
thereof. Bobertson Lumber Co. r. Jones* 99
N. W. 1062, 18 N. D. 112 (citing White v.
(}hicago, M. ft St P. By. Cm 41 N. W. 780, 5
Dak. 608).
Where there Is confilcting evidence as to
a question of ftict on which plaintifre right to
recover dcfpends, the court may not dismiss
the case "on the merita" under Municipal
Court Act (Laws 1902, p. 1561, c. 580, f 249),
authorizing such dlamissal whece^ at the dose
of the whole case, the court Is of the opinion
that plaintiff ia not entitled to recover aa
matter of law. Bowen v. Farley* 99 N. Y.
Supp. 205, 113 Appw Div. 767.
Where a defendant is discharged because
there waa not sufficient evidence to hold him
for trials .that is a "dismissal on the merits"
within the meaning of Liquor Tax Law, i
25. People ex reL J. ft M. Hoffen Brewing
Co. V. Clement, 124 N. Y. Supp. 102, 106, 139
App. Div. 502.
The precise meaning to be given to the
words "on the merits" in an oider or Judg-
ment has never been very clearly defined. It
has been said that they are to be regarded
aa referring to the strict legal rights of the
parties as contradistinguished from .mere
questions of practice. It is, however, not of
controlling importance whether or not the
Judgment is declared to be on the merits;
the real question being whether it ia in fact
an adjudication on the merits. A judgment
dismissing a complaint on demurrer was one
on the merits where there was no formal or
technical defect or omission in Uie complaint
and it was obvious that it contatned every
allegation necessary to establish a cause of
action if the contract sued on waiT lawful and
valid. HIractihacliv. Kltelum,. SIN. X. Supp.
MERITS
880
METAL
967, 950 40 Mlac Rep. 806 (citiDf St Johns
▼. West IS. Y.] 4 How. Prac. 829).
The dismissal of a bill to set aside cer-
tain tax bills for alleged illegality after hear-
ing and the awarding of a judgmoit for costs
in favor of the defendant is a judgment on
the merits, and is conclusiTe against a sub-
sequent attack on the validity of the tax
bills in a suit between the same parties.
Pond V. Huling, 101 S. W. 116, U7, 125 Mo.
App. 474.
Jvdsmemt oa €km pleadings
A Judgment on the pleadings is conclu-
sive, if it determines the merits of the con-
troversy, as distinguished from the merits
of the pleadings attacked, as the term
"merits'* is used in Code av. Proc. I 1005,
providing that in every case other than those
specified in section 1004 the judgment must
be rendered on the merits. Glass v. Rasin
& Ray State Min. Co., 00 Pac 753, 764, 85
Mont 567.
Under Code Civ. Proa { 681, prescribing
when an action may be dismissed or a non-
suit entered, and section 582, providing that
in every other case judgment must be render-
ed on the merits, a judgment on the pleadings
is a judgment on the merits, so far as its
conclusiveness is concerned. Railey v. iBtna
Indemnity Co. of Hartford, Conn.,. 91 Pac.
416-419, 6 CaL App. 740.
QvasUas writ •£
A motion to quash an alternative writ of
mandamus on the ground of its insufficiency
does not "involve the merits," within Code
Civ. Proc § 2075, providing that an alterna-
tive writ cannot be quashed on motion for
any matter involving the merits. People ex
reL Ajas v. Department of Health of City of
New York, 123 N. Y. Supp. 294, 297, 138 App.
Div. 559.
Btrikiiic o«t pleadlac
An order, striking out most of defend-
ant's answer embracing new matter relevant
and material, held an order "involving the
merits, and necessarily affecting the judg-
ment," within Rev. Codes 1905, i 7081, includ-
ing in the judgment roll "all orders and pa-
pers in any way involving the merits and
necessarily affecting the judgment," and
hence reviewable on appeal from the judg-
ment State V. Meyers, 124 N. W. 701, 705,
19 N. D. 804.
MERRY-GO-ROUND
One of the distinguishing features of the
"merry-go-round" is the inspiring music
which it furnishes. A "scenic railway" being
a railway on which cars are run for the pur-
poses only of amusement, where the track is
elevated for a considerable distance at the
place of beginning and built on an incline,
the cars being propelled by the force of
gravity, is not "8U(^ place of public amuse-
ment" as a ''merry-go^roiind,*' aad is not pi
hibited from beUig kept open on Sunday, 1
Aev. Codes, | 6825. Bx parte Hull, 110 Fi
266, 18 Idaho, 476, 80 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 466.
MERTON
See Statute of Merton.
MESNE
KESKE PBO0E88
"Mesne process" is defined by Bouviei
Law Dictionary as "process which is isBa<
in a suit between the original and final pi
cess.** Moredock v. Kirby, 118 Fed. 180, 1{
KESKE PBOFIT8
The words "mesne profits,** within ti
rule that ''mesne profits** only and not du
ages Tor trespass are recoverable, und
Code 1896, { 1555, in ejectm^it, mean coi
pensation for use and occupation. Hen;
V. Davis, 43 South. 122, 123, 149 Ala. 359, :
Ann, Cas. 1090 (citing Prestwood v. Watso
20 South. 600, 111 Ala. 604, 610).
The common-law rule that^nly nomb
damages are recoverable in ejecbnent h
been modified by statute authorizing a reco
ery of "mesne profits,*' which, under CI
Code 1896, f 1555, are damages from the coi
mencement of the tortious witliholding
the time of the verdict, except as modifl(
by sections 1535, 1540, defining the liabiU
of a tenant asserting his right to possessic
under a lease and the liability of a perse
holding under color of title in good fait
Scott T. Coulson, 47 South. 60, 61, 156 A]
450.
MESSAGES
See Day Message.
Sending a tel^^ihone
■eeSend.
MESSENGER
1IE88ENGEB OOMPAirT
As common carriers, see Common Oi
rier.
KESSElf OER WIRES
Wires whidi run from pole to pole b
mediately over telephone cables which tb(
support are denominated "messenger wiree
Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co.
Metsger (Ky.) 97 a W. 36, 80^
METAL
See Composition Metal; Expanded M(
al; Unwrought Metal
Articles ot see Articles within TarJ
Act
Manufactures ot- toe Manufactures
Manufactured Articleap
Type metal, see Type^
HXTALUO dBCniT
381
HIBDLEMAK
Wliere an electiie curroit txaTVls ito en-
tire course mwn wives wlthaut oaailng into
contact with tbe earth, it la known aa a "me-
talUc drcBit" Smith ▼. Miaeonri * K. TWe-
phone Go^ 87 & W. 71, 78, 118 Mo. App. 429.
METAIXIFEB01T8
Mineral synonymona, aee Mineral Land.
METALLOPHONES
As mnaical Inatmrnent, see Musical In-
stmment.
METALLURGICAL COKE
''Metannrgical coke" is coke soitaUe tor
the smelting of iron. Hotdikias ▼. Bon Air
Coal ft Iron Oo^ 7S Aa 1106, 1114^ 108
Me. 84.
METHOD
See Ben<3i Metliod; Bvainesi Methods;
Gatalogoe Syatem or Metliod.
METHYL ALCOHOL
"Methyl alcohol" ia obtained by the dla-
tiUation of wood, and is the "wood alcohol"
of commerce. People v. Bowen, 74 N. E. 488,
4d3, 182 N. T. 1 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in Webeter'a International Diet).
METtORITE
Aa property, aee Beal Property.
MEXICAN ONYX
Dntlahle aa onyx, see Onyx
MFG.
The letters "Mfjff.** are an abbreTiation
of the word manufacturing and a corporate
signature onploying such letten instead of
the word ''manufacturing" is sufficient 8el-
berllng ▼. MiUer, 6» N« B. 800, 80% 207 UL
448.
MICANITE
'^Micantte** is a trade-name glyen to a
sabstttnte for mica* which haa established
for Itself a recognized place in the electrical
art It is cheaper, more uniform as to di-
electric strength, has a less possibility of
flaws, can be easily molded or cut so that
It can be had in required sizes larger than
mica. Mica Insulator Co. t. Union Mica Go.,
137 Fed. 838^ 033.
MICROPHONE TRANSMIHER
Every "microphone tranamitter«" aa ocun-
rnonly understood in the telephonic art, is an
bistrument IutIi^; carbon electrodes in loose
or feeble contact Bat a tranamitter may
stiU be a microphone without having carbon
electrodes^ provided the electrodes are of sold
material, and so capable ef embodying mi-
crophonic action. American Bell TeL Co. v.
National TeL Mfg. Co., 110 Fed. 803, 808» 06
a a A. 423.
MIDDLE
The western boundary line of Tennessee,
dedared and fixed by treatiea and legislatiTe
enactments to be "the middle of the Missis-
sippi river," means a line along tlie river bed
equidistant from the visible, defined, and
substantially established banks confining the
waters on either side, and does not mean the
center of that part of the river wliich is deep-
est and constitutes the channel of commerce.
This construction has become a rule of prop-
erty and should not be distuiiied. State v.
Munice Pulp Co., 104 & W. 487, 441, 110
Tenn. 47.
In international law and by usage of Eu-
ropean nations, the term "middle of the
stream*' as applied to a navigable river ia
tbe same as the middle of the channel of su<^
stream. State of Louisiana v. State of B£ia-
sifisippi, 26 Sup. Ct 408, 421, 202 U. S. 1,
50 L. Ed. 013 (quoting Iowa v. Illinois, 13
Sup. Ct 280, 147 U. & 1, 87 L. Ed. 55).
The middle of the main channel of the
river is what ia meant by the words "the
middle channel of said river" in the act of
February 14, I860, admitting Oregon into
the Union, with the Columbia river as its
northern boundary. State of Washington v.
Oregon, 20 Sup. Ct 681, 682, 214 U. & 206,
63 L. Ed. 069.
The middle line of a nonnavigable river
at low-water mark is not the center of the
channel* wliich meana the continuous course
of deepest water, but is a line equally dia>
tant from all points on the oi^oaite banks at
right angles with the thread at low-water
mark. MlcelU v. Andrus, 120 Pac. 787, 740,
61 Or. 7a
MIDDIAMAir
A middleman Is a broker whose dutiea
are limited by hia contract to fiuding and pro-
curing a purchaser able, willing, and ready
to accept his clioitfs terms or to effect a
transaction with hia client on any terms sat-
isfactory to botli, the t^m "middleman** be*
ing merely descriptive of the nature of the
contract of employment, he being in no fidu-
ciary rdatlon to hia principal nor under any
obligation not to receive compensation from
the opposite party to the transactioD, while
a broker, in addition to the duties of a mid-
dleman, ia employed to use discretionary au-
thority for the benefit of his employer and to
act for his best interests, and therefore may
not accept a secret double employment or
commissions from both parties, Langford
V. Issenhuth, 134 N. W. 880, 803, 28 S. D.
461.
MIDDLmOS
882
i'i 'i-.i^fllifc -''•■••''
MIDDLINGS
See Wheat Middlings.
"AflddUngs" are the parts of a kernel of
grain next to the skin of the berry, which,
by the later milling processes, are reground
so as to form a very fine floor, with larger
and more uniform granules than that from
the first grinding; also, the. coarser particles
resulting from milling, Intermingled with
foreign matter used for stock food. State y.
Weller, 86 N. B. 761, 762, 171 Ind. 68^
MIDSHIPMAN
See Oadet Midshipman.
MIDWIFE
Both medical and popular lezicograph:
era define ''midwife" as a female obstetrician.
Commonwealth y. Pom, 82 N. B. 81, 196
Mass. 826» 17 L. B. ▲• (N. S.) 94, IS Ann. Cas.
569.
MIDWXFEBT
Both medical and popular lexicographers
define "midwifery" as the practice of obstet-
rics. Commonwealth v. Pom, 82 N. B. 31,
196 Mass. 326, 17 L. B, A. (N. S.) 94, 18 Ann.
Cas. 569.
MIGHT
"The word 'might,* as defined by Web-
ster, denotes not alone possibility, but also
ability and capability. *GouId' denotes abil^
Ity and capability.** Hence instractions
which used "might** and "could" interchange-
ably held not erroneous^ as allowing the jury
to enter the realm of conjecture. Nelson y.
Boston ft Montana OonsoL Copper & Silyer
Min. Co., 88 Pac 785, 786, 35 Mont 228.
A warning given by an officer to one
in his custody, which was in the usual form,
with the exception of the use of the word
"might" instead of "would or could,'* the
officer telling the one in custody that any
statement he might make "noighf* be used
a!gatnst him, was sufficient Garrett y. State,
91 S. W. 677, 49 Tex. Cr. B. 235.
In an action for assault on a passenger
by fellow passengers, in an instruction stat-
ing the duty of the conductor to protect the
party assaulted if he "anticipated that such
assault might be made," it was not error to
use the word "might** instead of "would,**
since the law requires that a carrier use the
highest degree of diligence to protect passen-
gers from assault which may be reasonably
anticipated, and the word "might" is used in
plaoe of "may^ when referring to past time
or a past eyent Louisyille By. Co. y. Well-
ington, 126 S. W. 970, 371, 137 Ky. 719.
An instruction delhiing the term "feloni-
otisly** as an intent- to commit a felony, or
an intent to commit a wrongiul act whldi
"might** result in thecomfflfssJbn'of a fefloDj^,
was errdneouB, as. the jury Wa8.itt effect told
that a p^non is presumed by law to Intend
all the possible, raither than tbe reasim-
aUy probable, consequences of Ills yoluntary
wrongful act State y. Denny, 117 N. Wi
869, 870, 17 N. D. 519.
Acts 1905, p. 579» c 167, I 123, proyides
that any person ag^ieved by any decision of
the county commissioners in any proceeding
relating to highways may appeal therefroofr,
etc., and that such appeal shall be tried de
noyo, and may be had as to any issue tried,
"or that might haye been tried,*' before the
county board. .Hekl, that the last clauae
only authorizes the trial of such Issues on
appeal as might haye been tried. under is-
sues made before the board* and does not
authorifle tJ^ trial of iasu^ not presented to
the board. iBtna life Ins. y. Jone8» 89. N.
B. 871, 872, 874, 173 Ind. 149.
MIOHTT FAST
While the expression "^i^ty fast" is a
term of relatlye meaning, when applied to
the speed of a street car it is sufficiently
definite to enable the jury to s^y yfh^her or
not the car was traveling in excess of seyen
miles an hour. In an action against a street
railroad for injuries to a passenger, eyidence
that the car was going 'Eighty fast" was
sufficient to render it error to exclude an
qpdinance limiting the rate of speed of a
street car to seyen miles an hour. Moore y.
Northern Texas Traction Co., 95 & W*. 662,
653, 41 T^ Oiy. App. 583. ,
MIKE
"Mike** i^ no^ nniyersaUy recognised ab-
breyiation of "Michaiel/' but is, strictly speak-
ing, a mere diminutiye or nickname. -Ohl*
mann y. Clarkson Sawmill Co., 120 S. W.
1155» 115S» 222 Mo. 62, 28 L. B. A. (Iff. 8.)
482, 138 Am. St Bep. 606.
MILCH COW
Under Sayles* Ann. Ciy. St 1897, art
2395, which exempts to every family from
forced sale "five milch cows and tlseti: oalyeii,^
heifers which had neyer been milked but
which were with calf wh^ the leyy was
made, and which the debtor, who was the
head of the family, was keeping ias his mildt
cows, are exempt Patterson y. Bhglish (Tex.)
142 S. W. la
WILE
See Bnglish Geographical Miles; Knot;
Marine Miles.
"The statute, or English, 'mile* wai
adopted as the standard of land measurement
in the thirty-fifth year of the reign of Que^
BUzabeth, 1593. * • • The statute "mil^
measures 5,280 feet on the land.** In the Mus'
vtmw
MILIT^BT RESEBVATION
ooBgiurGraiil; by tbe ooiiiidl ot Plymouth in
Deyon, England, made l>6twe6n 1620 and
1935,afler tlie Inaugoratioa. ot tbe geograph-
ical OS marine mile, granting oectaln land,
etc, within three mile^ of the mainland, the
three-mJle limit is to. be measured by the
geographical or marine mile or Imot, and not
by the statute "mUe." Lazell t. Boardman,
99 AtL 97, 99, 103 Mo* 292, 13 Ann. €as. 673
(citing Rockland* M. D. & S. Steamboat Ok
T. Fessenden, 8 AtL 550, 79 Me. 140) .
In a prosecution under Code 1907, 1 7737,
for.taUure .to work on a public road after
legal notice giren to one living ''withtn
three miles" thereof, the distance, in view of
Gode 1907, I 6804, means on an air line,
wbere thm!e are no barriers between impass-
able by ordinary means, and not a computa-
tion of the distance according to the practic*
able and usual way of travel. Howell y.
State, 54 South. 642, 643» 171 Ala. 62.
MILEAGE
As Fees, see Fees.
As salary, see Salary.
Mileage is compensation allowed to pub-
lic officers for their expenses while tra,veling
on public business. Board of Ck>m'rs of West-
on County V. Blakely (Wyo.) 123 Pac. 72, 77.
Under Bums' Ann. St. 1908, | 7335,
whl<±i proyideci^ th^t a sheriff shall tax and
charge the fees provided by law on account
of services performed by him, the fees and
amounts so charged to be designated ''sher-
iff 8 costs," which shall be the property of the
county, and section 240 which provides that
words and phrases used in a statute shall be
taken in their plain, ordinary, or usual sense,
but that technical words and phrases shall
be understood according to their technical
import unless such a construction would be
repugnant to the legislative intent or to the
context of the statutev the amounts diarged
and collected by a sheriff as statutory mile-
age In the' service of writs, summonctes, notLc^
es, etc, are to be considered as fees provided
by law on account of service in the Olscharge
of official duties, and not ais a reimbursemmt
to him for expenses inoidentally. incurred in
the service of such Writs, so that when col-
lected they belong to the county,. and not to
the sheriff persoilally. Roberts. v. Board of
Com'rs of Brown Oounty (Ind.)/ 99 N. B.
MILEAGE BOOK
*<A *mUeage book' is a contract of car-
riage having attached thereto coupons, one
for every mUe; ea^ coupon being. in two
parts, one part for the i passenger's fare, the
other for his baggage^ When the baggage is
tbecked, the baggage portion of every cou-
pon according to the distance is torn off, and
no more baggasB can be checked upon the
mileage book, nnteas. the remajt^der ^ thes^
coupons^ representing the carriage of th^ paii*
senger, has be^i detached." One who leaves
trunks in a baggageroom by permission of the
baggage clerk upon a statement thjat he will
depart on a train the next day, and will then
^eck them, cannot hold the railway com-
pany responsible as a carrier of baggage for
the destruction of the trunks by fire, though
he holds a mileage book good for transpor-
tation on the railway company's trains.
Southern R. Co. v. Rosenheim & Sons, 58 S.
E« 81, 82, 1 Qa* ApPu 766.
MHiEAGE RATE
See Ck)ntinuou8 Mileage Rate.
MILITARY
mhiItart EXPEDinoic or enter-
FRISE
The term "military expedition," as used
in Rev. St { 5286, denouncing the organiza-
tion of a military enterprise in the United
States to be carried on against any foreign
prince or state, does not contemplate an ex-
pedition or enterprise in matters of pleasure,
commerce, or business, of a civil nature, un-
attended by the design of an attack, inva-
sion, or conquest, but rather a hostile inten-
tion connected with the act of beginning or
setting on f got the expedition or enterprise.
United States v. Ybahez, 53 Fed. 536, 537.
M iutart purpose
Armories are primarily intended for
''military purposes/' but the term '^military
purposes" must be understood to comprehend
all sudi uses as may be said to be incidental
to the general purpose to conserve the mili-
tary needs of the regimentail organization.
Military balls and other entertainments which
are frequently given at armories cannot be
said to be for "military purposes,*' except in
the sense that they contribute to the interest
and good feeling of the members of the mili-
tary organization. In that sense they are
clearly consistent with the general pu'iposes
for which the armory buildings were intend-
ed. Oh the other hand, an armory cannot
properly be devoted to a purely commercial
use in disregard of military needs. Hamill
V. Dungan, 68 Ati, 1096, 1097, 74 N. J. Eg. 251.
ICZUTART RESERVATION
In creating the Lake Superior land dis-
trict in 1847, CSongress reserved from the
lands open for sale certain lands for school
purposes, and also such reservations as the
President should deem necessary for public
purposes. Pursuant to the authority so giv-
en, the President, in ordw to have time to
ascertain what lands were necessary for pub-
lic purposes, reserved a number of tracts
temporarily, one of which, consisting of half
a township, included Ft. Brady on St Mary's
liver,, together with the reservation on which
itt stopd, ^and als<;i a small tract previously
MILITABY fiOAB
384
UIXJL
I
reserved to the Indians by treaty for a camp,
together with other lands. By a subsequent
execntive order In 1852, the reservations
were more narrowly defined, and all the re-
maining lands so temporarily reserved, "ex-
cept the military reservation at Pt Brady,**
were released from reservation. The Indian
right was extinguished by treaty in 1855.
Held, that the exception in the order of re-
lease of the "military reservation at Ft
Brady" Included only the original reserva-
tion as defined prior to 1847, and not the at-
tire temporary reservation of that year
which was the contemporaneous construc-
tion of the order by the department, so that
In any event the Indian reservation became
public lands, subject to disposition by the
government after the treaty of 1855, and a
patent subsequently issued therefor is valid.
United States v. Ghandler-Dunbar Water
Power Ck)., 152 Fed. 25, 34, 81 O. C. A. 221.
MXUTABT -ROAD
"The only, 'military roads' belonging to
the United States within the states are in
the military reservations.** Pensacola TeL
Co. V. Western U. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1« 17, 24
L. Ed. 708.
mUTABT 8ERVXOE
See Actual Military Servioa
See, also, Service.
MILITIA
See Organization of Militia.
The "militia" of the state is an arm of
the state government, and is in no sense
such a county institution or establishment as
that any particular county can, exclusively,
be required to Impose taxes for its, or any
part of Its, maintenance. State ex rel. Mil-
ton V. Dickenson, 33 South. 514, 517, 44 Fla.
628, 60 L. B. A. 539, 1 Ann. Cas. 122.
MILK
See Condensed Skimmed Milk; Impure
Milk.
Dealer in milk, see Dealer.
A product of a patented chemical process
for treatment of milk, called "concentrated
milk," diluted by water, does not constltutft
"milk," within Bev. Laws, a 56, f 55, prohib-
iting the keepini^ for sale of milk to whidi
water has been added. Commonwealth v.
Boston White Cross Milk Co., 95 N. B. 86,
87, 209 Mass. 80, Ann. Caa 1912B, 386.
A provision of a sanitary code adopted
by a city board of health that no owner, les-
see, or occupant of any restaurant, etc,
which shall purchase milk or cream from
any person or corporation not having obtain-
ed a license as therein provided, shall use,
sell, or dispose of any milk, cream, or ice
cream without obtaining a license, only re-
quires a person setting loe'cream to obtain
license where It 1a made from mUk or area
purchased from afi naUietenma person or oo
poration, and sot where the ioe cream ItM
Js so purchased, slnee, wiiile '^ce cream'*
mostly cream or ml&. It is a manufiactarc
article with other ingredients, and is not co
ei*ed by the term "milk or oream." Syracni
Ice Cream Ca v. City of Cortland, 138 N. ^
Supp. 388, 888, 153 App. Dlv. 466.
MILL
See Cotton Seed Oil MIU; Public Mill
Boiler Mill; Saw Mill; Spinning Mil
Water Mill.
The word "mUl" has two deOnitioiis,
primary and secondary: (1) A complicate
engine or madilne for grinding and redudu
to fine particles grain, fruit, or other sal
stance, or for perfonning other operatloi
by means of wheels and a circular motion a
a gristmill for grain, a coffee mill, dder mil
and bark mill. The original puri>oae of mill
was to comminute grain for food, but tfa
word "mill" is now extended to engines c
machines moved by water or steam for cai
rying on many other purposes, as <dl miUi
sawmills, slitting mills, bark mills, fullin
mills, etc (2) The house or building tha
contains the machinery for grinding. Inhal
itants of Norway v. Willis, 72 AtL 733, 73^
105 Me. 54 (citing State t. livermore, 44 f
H. 886, 387).
The word "miir does not ordinarily li
dlcate a place or building in which goods ai
stored for hire. McBeynolds v. People, 82 f
B. 945, 917, 230 111. 623.
Where a pHdntifl purdbased of defeat
ant a sawmill and all machinery connecte
therewith located on certain land, reservln
everything on the land, except timber, saa
mill, and machinery, the term "sawmill" wa
limited to a machine constructed for the pai
pose of sawing logs, and therefore did no
include the shed covering the mill. A saw
mill is a machine for sawing logs, whetbe
or not it is accompanied by a shed, and i
shed covering such a mill is not a part o
the sawmiU, but is a part of the real estat
to which it la attached. A saw is "a too
for cutting," and a "mill" is "a oiacfaine fo:
grinding." According to the standard led
cographers, the first meaning of "mill" is i
machine or device for grinding, cutting, etc
The particular purpose for which it is dc
signed is usually designated by a prefix, mS
as sawmill, gristmill, etc. The term "mill'
necessarily carries with it the idea of a ma
chine, device^ or tool, but it does not neces
sarily convey with it the idea of a sbed oi
house. l%e term '^ill" Is frequency use^
to designate not only the machine used fei
grinding, cotthig, etc., but also In a generaJ
and comprehensive sense to designate tiM
house or shed wh^e BU<di machinery may Im
HItili-
MiiiL saxu
Id operation, and many lezlcograpli^rs glT»
this as the secondary meaning of the word.
Alexander t. Be^man Lumber Oo^ 96 S. W.
449. 451, 78 Ark. 169 (dtlnff ISiesauras Diet
Eng. Language; Woi^cest Diet; Oent Diet;
Webst Int Diet).
A plant tor mixing the materials nsed In
making asphalt payemeat conalating of ma-
diinery mounted on an open or flat car, mov-
ed from place to place as required, is not a
'factory, mill, or workshop" within the mean-
ing of Laws Wash. 1906, e. 84, as amended
Iqr Laws 1907, c. 205, providing for the pro-
tection and health of eraployte in factories,
mills, and worksibopB, and requiring the box-
ing or guarding of machinery and shafting
therein, etc Casey ▼. Barber Asphalt Pav-
ing Co., 192 red. 482, 487.
A gasoline engine, used, in connection
with machinery consisting of belts, pulleys,
and cogwheels, to pump water through pipes
to supply the inhabitants of a dty, is not a
"manufacturing establishment" or a "miU,**
within the meaning of these terms in section
4682, Gen. St 1909. Wind Blver Lumber Go.
T. Frankfbrt Marine Accident dc Plate Glass
Ins. Go., 196 Fed. 840, 845, 116 O. C. A. 160;
Ward T. City of Norton, 122 Pac. 881, 882,
86 Kan. 906.
Under section 5 of the act entitled "An
act concerning private corporations," as
amended in 1873, which provides tat the crea-
tion of private corporations far the conver-
sion and disposal of agricultural products
by means of "mills," etc. (Laws 1873, pp. 137,
139, subd. 86), a corporation may be created
"to build and maintain a flouring mill.**
Glnrlck v. Patrons' Mill Co., 21 Kan. 61, 63.
The title of the act of 1878 (dien. St
1873, c. 44; Comp. SL 1911, e. 57), "An act
relating to mUls and mllldams," is sufllcient-
ly broad to admit of legislation in regard to
mills of all kinds that are of pubUc utility
and having "machinery to be propelled by
water.** Lucas v. Ashland Light, Mill & Pow-
er Co^ 188 N. W. 761, 768, 92 Neb. 660l
As pnUio plaoe
See Public Place.
Am pvlilio ue
See Public Use (In Bmlnent Domain).
miiL AXB ITS OOITTBIITS
Where a contract between a railroad
company and plaintiff authorised the latter
to erect a stave mill on the right of way
and exempted the railroad company from
liability for the destruction of the "mUl and
its contents" by fire, the railroad company is
not liable for damages to staves pUed on the
right of way near the mill, where It appsar-
ed that the use of a part of the right of iray
was necessary for the plUng of the staves;
the staves on the right of way appurtenant
to the mill fhlllng under the designation of
8 Wn&& FJ2u Seb.— 26
"mm and its eontents.** dndnnatl. If. O. 4
T. P. By. Co. V. Saulsbury, 90 S. W. 684, 627,
116 Tenn. 402, 5 Ann. Oaa. 744.
ifzu. Buxu>ixa
See Planing Mill BuUding.
imx PBXvn.£GS
"BOll privilege,*' as contained In an as-
sessment of property for taxes described as
"the mlU privilege at Salmon Falls,** meant
the land and the dam situated as they were,
with the eapadty to hold the water of the
stream and create power, but not the power
or the water. Saoo Water Power Co. v. Bux-
ton, 56 AtL 914, 96 Me. 295.
MILX. BAOB
As used in a deed conveying a certain
piece of land for a "mill race,*' and also a
"privilege of a road to cross the said race
near said gristmill to the land thus describ-
ed,** may be construed to mean either the
head or the tall race ; parol evidence being
admissible to show what was meant. Plaee
V. Proctor (Pa.) 2 Penny. 264, 269.
MILX. SEAT
The word "mill seat" la synonymous with
''mill site*' and means where the mill sits*
''A 'mill site' comprehends not only the site
of the mill building but also the water pow-
er connected therewith for milling purposes.**
The granting of a mill site conveys by im-
plication the water power and the right to
maintain a dam for the beneficial appropria-
tion of the water. State v. Sutton, 51 S. B.
1012, 139 N. C. 574 (quoting in part definition
in Miller v. Alliance Ins. Co., 7 Fed. 651;
Curtiss V. Smith, 85 Conn. 15S).
As used In Laws 1906^ p. 1022, c. 824, pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful for any per-
son to hedge or fish with traps in the waters
of a certain creek between the mouth of the
creek and the "J. mill seat in L. county,"
the word "mill seat" was synonymous with
"mill site," and included the millhouse, dam,
and appurtenances used for operating the
mill by water power and the ground on which
they stood. State v. Sutton, 51 a B. 1012,
189 N. C. 574.
Under Laws 1905^ p. 1022, c. 824, a per-
son, though entitled to maintain wire fences
or hedges on the sheeting of the mill under the
roof of the millhouse to catch fish coming
out of the pond, was not entitled to maintain
such hedges or fences in ditches below the
millhouse &nd on both sides of the mlllrace,
by which fish coming up from the mouth of
the creek would be stopped before reaching
the dam and mill seat; and this, though
the owner of the millhouse also owned the
land for 75 yards below the mill. State v»
Sutton, 51 S. IB. 1002, 1013, 189 N. Q 574.
muxshep
An Insuranee policy
"piled In mlU buildings on
lumber
under mill
iSlLX. SITE
HINS
flIiedB and in sheds adjoining to said mill
building:" The ''mill sheds" where lumber
was piled were situated some distance from
the milL The roof of the mill itself extended
out 10 or ,12 feet over the tracks on either
side of the mill to protect the lumber and
men loading or unloading cars. It was un-
disputed that these projections or sheds were
erected sihjply to cover the tracks, were open
at the ends and sides, and were not intended
to be used as lumber sheds. Held, that the
words '*mill sheds" in the policy should be
construed as indicating the sheds located
some distance from the mill, and not those
projecting from the building, and the quoted
clause of the policy should be construed as
though it read, *'On lumber in mill build-
ing; on lumber on cars; on lumber under
mill sheds and on lumber in sheds adjoining
to said mill building." Wolverine Lumber
Co. V. Palatine Ins. 00., 102 N. W. 901, 002,
130 Mich. 432.
XHiI. SITE
Biill seat synonymous, see Mill Seat
While chapter 184, Laws 1862, limiting
the time for bringing actions for damages for
flowing lands by the maintenance of mill-
dams, applies only to mllldams in the proper
and strict sense of that word, and although
a dam which Is part of and necessary to a
general scheme for the improvement of the
navigation of a river, so as to make it a
public highway, is not a ''mllldam," although
the power created thereby is used to operate
mills, a dam erected to create power to oper-
ate mills, which power is used exclusively for
that purpose, is a ''mllldai^," although the
ownership of the dam and of the mills may
be in different persons. Green Bay dc Missis-
sippi Canal Oo. v. Telulah Paper Co., 122 N.
W. 1062, 1065, 140 Wis. 417 (citing Arimond
V. Qreen Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 85 Wis.
41).
Mnxnro
The term •'milling" is SEynonymous with
*'manuAicturing." Lucas v. Ashland Light,
Mill ft Power Co., 138 N. W. 761, 763, 02 Neb.
660 (quoting Lambom v. Bell, 32 Pa& 080, 18
Colo. 840, 20 L. R A. 240.
MILIJNO IN TRAKSIT
"Milling in transit" refers to cases where
freight is shipped a long distance, and the
carrier will at his own oost defray the ex-
pense of its change in form en route, be-
cause of the easier handling in the more com-
pact shape. Under Laws 1800, p. 301, c. 164^
i 13, providing that any carrier charg^j^; one
person more than another for the same serv-
ice is guilty of discrimination, a railroad
company carrying raw material to factories
cannot charge a factory which agrees to ship
the manufactured product by the same road
less for the same service than It charges a
factory whl<di will make no sudti agreement;
the carrier not being in a position to justi^
under "milling in transit" Hilton Lumber
Ca V. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 48 S. B.
813, 816, 136 N. C. 470, 1 Ann. C^as. 62.
MILLINERY
muxinert abtioles
Dutiable as articles in part of metal,
see Articles Within Tariff Act
imxnfEBT ORNAMEHTS
Not dutiable as articles commonly known
as jewelry, see Articles Within Tariff
Act
MIMEOGRAPH COMPLAINT
A "mimeograph complaint" may be de-
scribed as a form of complaint applicable in
a general way to a particular class of cases.
It is therefore nothing more than a blank
which, before it can be of service in a special
instance^ must be properly filled out Berus
V. New York City Ry. Co., 101 N. Y. Bupp.
748, 740, 62 Misc. Rep. 181.
MIND
See Disposing Mind and Memory; Meet-
ing of Minds; Sound Mind and Mem-
ory; Testamentary Mind; Unsound
Mind.
Distress of mind, see Distress.
MIND OF A KON GOBCPOS
The "mind of a non compos'' is to be tak-
en prima fade as insane and nondisposlng.
A person who is adjudged a non compos and
placed under guardianship is thereby ren-
dered prima fade incapable of making a will
while the adjudication remains in force.
In re Cowdry's Mill, 00 Atl. 141, 142, 77 Vt
860, 8 Ann. Gas. 70.
MINE
See Coal Mine; Fully Developed Mine;
Known Mines.
Appropriation of claim, see Appropria-
tion.
Waste water from mine^ see Waste Wa-
ter.
A "mine" is an excavation in the earth
to obtain minerals, an excavation, pvoperlj
under ground, to take out some useful prod-
uct, and a mining right is a right to excavate
in the earth to obtain minerals or other use-
ful products. People v. BeU, 86 N. B. 603,
604, 237 IlL 332, 10 L. R. A. (N^ S.) 746, 16
Ann. Cas. 611.
The term '*mlne8'* is not limited to mere
subterranean excavation oit workings, nor la
"minerals" limited to the metals or metal-
liferous deposits, whethtf contained in veins
that have well-defined walls, or in beds or
deposits that are irregular and are found
icngB
:»87
:inKB
at or near the surface, or vdMrwtiie. Neplif
Plaster & Mfg. Co. ▼. Juab Ck)unty, 98 Pac.
53, 56, 33 Utah, U4, 14 L. B. A. (N. 6.) 1<H3.
In ordinary parlance, a ''mine*' \b a cer-
tain part of the soil or of the earth's sarfaoe
In which there are mln«nil d^;>oslt8 and In
which a person obtains not only a fall right
of ownership of the soil bnt a right to re-
moye the minerals therefrom and to disiiose
of them as he sees fit Crichfield t. Julia,
147 Fed. 65, 66, 77 a 01 A. 297.
The word "mine*' Includes the whole
mass or vein of coal contained within the
laxid. Ammons y. Toothman, 53 S. B. 18, 16,
59 W. Ya. 165, 115 Am. St Rep. 908.
In an action under the mining act
(Hurd's Rev. St 1908, c 93), for the death of
an employ^ by defendant's Tiolation of sec-
tion 4 in failing to hare flanges on the drum
of a hoisting engine used in sinking an air
shaft, special findings that death was caused
during the construction work preparatory to
opening a coal mine, and that the shaft was
not in use in connection with the mining of
coal or for ventilating in coal mine or for an
escai>ement shaft, do not bring defendant's
property within section 34, defining "mine"
and "coal mine" as all parts of the property
of a mining plant which contribute directly
or indirectly to the mining of coal, and de-
fining "shaft" as any opening which is or may
be used for yentilation or escapement, or for
hoisting men in connection with mining, and
are therefore so inconsistent with a general
verdict for plaintUf that Judgment for de»
fendant is proper. Moore y. Dering Goal Ck>.,
89 N. E. 674, 675, 242 UL 84.
Whether a coal mine is within the pro-
ylslons of Ky. St if 2731, 2733, requiring the
ventilation of coal mines to secure the safety
of persons employed therein, is not dependent
on the fact that the mine has progressed to
such an extent that coal is being marketed
therefrom or shipped from its opening.
When, at the time of the accident, the main
entry and airway of a coal mine had been
driven about 890 feet, and the first and sec-
ond right entries about 220 feet and the dis-
tance from the main airway to the first
break-through, from the first right entry to
the airway in which plaintiff was working,
was about 115 feet, and from the first break-
through to the second it was about 65 feet,
while from the second break-through to the
point where plalntlfl was injured was about
eo feet the opening is a mine within Ky. St
H 2731, 2733 (Russell's St (9 24Q9, 2470), re-
lating to the ventilation of mines. Interstate
Coal Ck>. y. Bazavenie, 137 8. W. 859, 861,
144 Ky. 172.
Defendant mining oCMnpany maintained a
hoisting engine at the top of an incline whidi
was used for the dumping of rock, dirt ete,
which had beeiL s^)arated from the coal,
and iater constmcted a second incline, oyer
which coal Intended for retail trade was
hoisted by, the other side of tfaeisame em-
gibe; rock and coal cars being often operr
ated in different directions at the same time^
Thereafter another engine was substituted
to haul the rock cars, and the old engine was
continued to haul the coal cars which were
permitted to descend by grayity. Held, that
such hoist, though outside tiie mine, was a
part of defendant's mine, as defined by
Hurd's Rey. St 1906, p. 1394, c 93, § 34, to
include all parts of a mining plant on the
surface or under ground which contribute
•und^r one management to the mining and
handltag of coal, and was. therefore within
section 16, subd. "d," making it the duty of
the mine manager to see that all dangerous
places aboye and below were properly mark-
ed and danger signals displayed whereyer
required. Spring Yall^ Coal Ck> y. Greig.
80 N. B. 1042, 1044, 226 lU. 511.
The terms ''mine^' or deposit yielding
metals or minerals of any kind,*' as used in
B. & 0. Comp. f 5668, giying laborers and
materialmen a lien for the working or de-
yelopment of any mine, lode, mining claim,
or deposit yielding metals or minerals of any
kind, include a coal mine, although the term
"mining claim" as used therein may not do
so. Bscott y. OrescCTt Coal & Nayigation
Go., 106 Pac. 452, 458, 56 Or. 19a
As land, see l4Uid.
As oU weU
Const 1898, art 230, proyldes that prop-
erty employed in mining operations shall be
exempt from parochial and municipal taxes
for a period of 10 years from January 1,
1900. Held, that a "mining operation" has
to do with the working of a mine, and a
"mine," defined as an excayation In the earth
for the purpose of getting metal ores or coal,
does not include an oil well, and property
used in connection with petroleum wells Is
not exempted under the article. J. M. Ouf-
fey Petroleum Co. y. Murre]» 53 South. 705,
711, 127 La. 466.
Quarry distingiiUlieil
The yerb 'inine" in Its ordinary accep-
tation means to dig in the earth to get ore,
metals, coal, or precious stones. JThe noun
"mine" means a pit or hole in the earth
from which metallic ores, precious stones, or
other mineral substances are taken by dig-
ging, distinguished from the pita from which
stones for architectural purposes are taken,
whi<di are called "quarries." J. M. Guffey
Petroleum Go. y. Murrel, 53 South. 705, 713,
127 La. 466 (quoting Webster's International
Diet).
"A 'mine,' properly speaking, is the pit
or excayation in the earth from which the
ore is taken. The term is certainly used to
include the bed or yein of ore into which the
pit enters, so f^r as may benecessa^ry to the
MIKX
888
MINERAL
Working of the mine; and the whole series
of shafts and subterranean passages and tilie
<^iambers connected with It But neither In
ordinary parlance nor In strict technical lan-
guage Is a 'mine* understood to Indicate the
entire ore bed with whldi the shaft may be
connected. And by a 'quarry' we under-
stand, not an Indefinite extent of stone or
rock whldi may be worked, but the spot
where the rock Is quarried. The 'ore* may
extend Indefinitely, but the 'mlne^ Is the pit
from whence It Is extracted.*' Hoysradt v.
Delaware, L. & W. B. Go., 101 Fed. 821, 881
(quoting Shaw t. Wallace, 25 N. J. Law,
462).
Bums' Ann. St 1008, | 10,259, auUiorlz-
ing the valuation of real property on which
there Is a mine or quarry, owned by the
same persons, at the price for which the
property, including the mine or quarry,
^ould sell at private, voluntary sale for
cash, and, in case the mine or quarry Is
dwned or leased by a person, other than the
jwner of the land, authorizing the valuation
>f the land and mine or quarry separat^ely,
does not authorize the assessment of hidden,
andeveloped coal or other minerals underly-
ing land; a "quarry" being an excavation
for obtaining stone, slate, or limestone; and
a "mine** being defined by section 8560 to In-
clude the workings In every shaft, slope, or
drift which Is used, or has been used, in the
mining and removing of coal from and b^ow
the surface of the ground, and being also
defined as a pit or excavation from which
metallic ores or other similar substances are
taken by digging. Board of Com'rs of Greene
County V. Lattas Creek Coal Co. (Ind.) 06
N. B. 633, 637.
See Road«
BUNS MAivAaiat
A "mine manager,** within the meaning
of Mining Act, | 83, providing that contribu-
tory negligence shall not bar a miner's re-
covery where the mine manager was will-
fully negligent, is a mine boss, foreman, or
pit boss. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co. v.
Stroff, 66 N. B. 20, 31, 200 UL 483.
MINE SHAFT
See Shaft
MIME WEIGHTS
The language "mine weights to govern
settlement," la a contract to furnish coal,
means that the purchaser Is to pay for the
coal on the basis of the weights at the mines
where It Is deUvered on cars for transporta-
tion. Detroit Southern B. Co. v. Malcolm-
son, 107 N. W. 015, 016^ 144 Mich. 172, 116
Am. St Bep. 800.
MIKEB
As employ^, see Employ^
'*In speaking of ttie measurementi
water In use In California, Mr. WiUla
Kent, In his recent reference book, for a
by engineers and mechanics, states the slto
tlon, thus: The term "miner's Inch" Is mo
or less Indefinite^ for the reason that Ga
fornla water companies do not all use tl
same head above the center of the apertni
and the Inch varies from 1.36 to 1.73 cut
feet per minute each ; but the most conmu
measurement is through an aperture t^
Inches high and whatever length Is require
and through a plank 1^ Inches thid^ Tl
lower edge of the aperture should be tv
Inches above the bottom of the measurii
box, and the plank five Inches above tl
aperture, thus making a six-Inch head abo^
the center of the stream. Eadi square iD<
of this opening represents a miner's iiH
(under six-inch pressure) which is equal to
flow of 1% cubic feet per minute.' " Gar
ner v. Wright, 01 Pac. 286, 207, 40 Or. 609.
A contract to furnish a specified numtx
of miners' inches of water for Irrigation pn
poses is sufficiently certain to Justify specli
performance, where witnesses explain tl
meaning of the ambiguous term "minei
inch" and show that at the time of the ma
ing of the contract it was commonly node
stood that the term meant a quantity of w
ter which would flow through an orifice i
inch square under a four-inch pressure, ai
that a four-inch pressure meant a head <
water which stood four inches above the U.
of the orifice, and such testimony Is not di
puted. Ulrlch v. Pateros Water Ditch O
121 Pac. 818, 820, 67 Wash. 82&
MINERAL
See Crude Mineral ; Land Valuable t
Minerals ; Valuable Minerals.
Other mineral, see Other.
Other valuable minerals, see Other.
The word "minerals," in the popoli
sense, means those inorganic constituents (
the earth's crust which are commonly o
tained by mining or other process for brin
ing them to the surface for profit Kansi
Nat Gas Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Neosl
County, 80 Pac 750, 75 Kan. 385.
^'Mineral," as defined in Webster's Di
tionary, is ''any inorganic spedes having
definite chemical composition." O. G. Hem]
stead A Son v. Thomas, 122 Fed. 588, 5S
50 C. C. A 842.
The term "mines" is not limited to me]
subterranean excavations or workings, nor
"minerals" limited to the metals or meta
Uferous deposits, wfae^er contained in veii
that have well-defined wtUls, or in beds (
deposits that are irregular and are found t
or near the surface, or otherwise. Nepl
Plaster & Mfg. Ca v. Juab County, 03 Pa
53, 58, 83 Utoh. 114, 14 L. B. A. (N. S.) IM
MIKSRAIi
IflNERAL
Ifinerals embracing boOi sinface and
gnbsurftice minerals include every constltii-
ent of the eartb's crust Gladys Olty Oil,
Gas & ICfg. Co. y. Rlgfat of Way OU Co.
(Tex.) 1S7 S. W. 171, 177 (dtlng 6 Words and
Phrases).
The word ••minerals," In conveyances of
"minerals," means all substances in the
earth's crust, sought for and removed for
the substance Itself, and is not limited to
metallic substances, but includes salt, coal,
clay, stone, etc. McGombs v. Stephenson, 44
South. 867, 889, 164 Ala. 109.
The term "mineral" found in a deed,
lease, or other contract, unqualified and un-
restricted by any other clause in the instru-
ment, or by circumstances within the knowl-
edge of the parties which may reasonably
be deemed to have determined their inten-
tion, will be given a sufficiently broad mean-
ing and effect to include prima fiicle every
substance that can be gotten from under-
neath the sur&ce of the earth for the pur-
pose of profit, and will include not merely
such articles as coal, ironstone, and free-
stone, but fire clay, and china clay or porce-
lain clay, and also every kind of stone, flint,
marble, slate, brick earth, chalk, gravel, and
sand; provided only that these articles are
imder the surfiice, and do not lie loosely
upon it Suit V. A. Hochstetter Oil Co., 81
8. B. 307, 310, 83 W. Va. 317.
Diunoad
A diamond is a ''mineraL" Kentucky
Diamond Mining & Developing Co. v. Ken-
tucky Transvaal Diamond Co., 182 8. W.
397, 398, 141 Ky. 97, Ann. Caa. 1912C, 417.
Chw
on and gas are classed as ndnerals;
that term not being confined to metallic sub-
stances. Poe V. Ulrey, 84 N. B. 48, 48, 288
111.56.
Natural gas is a "mineral/' and is a
part of the land until severed. Osbom v.
Arkansas Territorial Oil & Gas Co., 146 S.
W. 122, 124, 103 Ark. 175.
The Legislature has now classed oil and
gas among minerals of this state; and per-
sons engaged in producing these minerals are
following a mining pursuit Act No. 144 of
1908; Act No. 154 of 1910; Act No. 172 of
1910; Act No. 196 Of 1910; Act No. 254 of
1910. Etchison Drilling Co. v. Flournoy,
69 South. 867, 872, 131 La. 442.
Oil and gas are "minerals" within Act
April 25, 1850 (P. L. 673) S 24, recognizing a
right of action by a tenant in common against
a cotenant in sole possession for a share of
tile profits where minerals are held In com-
mon. Mcintosh V. Bopp, 82 Atl. 949, 956, 233
Pa. 497.
A reservation of '*all 'ndnerals' " Includes
gas. Weaver v. Richards, 120 N. W. 818,
819, 166 MldL 820.
r Under the broad divisUm of all matter
into three classes of animal, vegetable, and
mineral, petroleum and gas are "minerals";
but the term may be used in a more restricted
sense. "Mineral" is not per se a term of art
or trade, but of general language, and in
addition to its broader scientiflc meaning is
also used in a commercial sense, where it
may include any inorganic substance found
in nature having snflicient value, separated
from its condition as a part of the earth, to
be ndned, quarried, or dug for its spedftc
uses; but it does not necessarily have so
broad a meaning or include all such sub-
stances. A deed of land exciting the min-
eral underlying it did not include natural gas
within the exception. Silver v. Bush, 62 Atl.
832, 833, 218 Pa. 195.
OraBlt«9 stone, sUiea, Mid elaj
A deed to land largely covered with lime-
stone and granite, rising above the natural
surface, which reserved to the grantor all
"mines and minerals" which may be found
on the land, with the right of entry to dig
and carry the same away, does not give a
right to open quarrying and blasting, but
such right passes to the grantee. Brady v.
Smith, 78 N. B. 963, 964, 181 N. Y. 178, 106
Am. 8t Rep. 631, 2 Ann. Cas. 686.
Const art 2, f 33, provides that the own-
ership of land by aliens other than those
who in good faith have declared their inten-
tion to become citizens is prohibited, except
where acquired by inheritance, under mort-
gage, or in good faith In the oidinaxy course
of justice, provided that the statute shall
not apply to lands oontalning valuable de-
posits of "minerals," metals, iron, coal, or
fire cUiy. Held, that an alien may acquire
by purchase lands containing valuable depos-
its of limestone, silica, and clay; the word
"minerals" not being restricted to the valua-
ble mineral ore contained in gold and silver,
etc. State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 89 Pac.
565, 666, 46 Wash. 219, 10 L. B. A. (N. S.)
1163.
oypi
Gypsum is a mineral, and lands con-
taining it are mineral lands, within the fed-
eral statutes. Madison v. Octave Oil Co., 99
Pac. 176. 178, 164 Cal. 768.
Gypsum is a "mineral," and constitutes
a mineral deposit under the mineral laws.
Nephi Plaster ft Mfg. Co. v. Juab County,
93 Pac. 53, 64, 33 Utah, 114, 14 L. R. A, (N.
S.) 1043.
A deed was executed in 1814, conveying
farm land, but "excepting mines and minerals
which are not hereby intended to be con-
veyed." Small deposits of gypsum had been
discovered on the land in 1812, and gypsum
rights had been leased in 1814, though it was
first removed therefrom In 1842, at whldi
time it was taken out by open quarrying,
but could be mined As found, it underlaid
the limestone formation at a depth of from
JIINERAXi
390
tflNBRAL
25 to 40 feet, but in places rose to within a
foot or 18 inches of the surface. Held, that
an exception of "minerals" includes all inor-
ganic substances which can be taken from
the land in the absence of other words re-
stricting the meaning of the term, so that the
exception in the deed reserved to the grantor
all minerals, including gypsum, but not the
surface limestone. White v. Miller, 02 N.
E. 1065, 1067, 200 N. Y. 28, 140 Am. St Rep.
618.
See Land.
OU
Oil is a ''mineral," and as such is a
part of the realty. Isom v. Bex Crude Oil
Co., 82 Paa 317, 318, 147 Gal. 659.
Oil and gas are classed as "minerals,**
that term not being confined to metallic sub-
stancea Poe y. XJlrey, 84 N. E. 46, 48, 233
lU. 56.
Oil and gas are "minerals" within Act
April 25, 1850 (P. L. 573) { 24, recognizing
a right of action by a tenant In oommon
against a cotenant in sole possession for a
share of the profits where minerals are held
in common. Mcintosh y. Bopp, 82 AtL 949,
955, 233 Pa. 497.
A reservation of "all 'minerals* " includes
oiL Weaver v. Richards, 120 N. W. 818, 819,
156 Mich. 320.
The opening of a new mine on land by a
life tenant amounts to waste, and this rule
Applies to oil wells, as oil is a mineral and
' part of the realty. Ohio Oil Co. ▼. Daugh-
etee, 88 N. B. 818, 820, 240 IlL 861, 36 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1108.
The Legislature has now classed oil and
gas among "minerals'* of the state; and per-
sons engaged in producing these minerals
are following a mining pursuit Etchison
Drilling Co. v. Floumoy, 59 South. 867, 872,
131 La. 442 (citing Act No. 144 of 1908; Act
No. 154 of 1910; Act No. 172 of 1910; Act
No. 196 of 1910; Act No. 254 of 1910).
Oil before its extraction is a "mineral**
Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 86 S. W. 740,
742, 98 Tex. 597, 69 L. R. A. 986, 8 Ann. Cas.
1117; Isom v. Rex Crude Oil Co., 82 Pac.
817, 818, 147 Cal. 659.
Petroleum
Under the broad division of all matter
into three classes of animal, vegetable, and
mineral, petroleum and gas are "minerals.**
Silver V. Bush, 62 Atl. 832, 833, 213 Pa. 195.
A reservation of "all 'minerals' ** Includ-
ed petroleum. Weaver v. Richards, 120 N.
W. 818, 819, 156 Mich. 320.
Hurd's Rev. St 1905. p. 1399, c. 94, §§
6, 7, declare that any mining right or the
right to dig for or obtain iron, lead, copper,
coaU or other mineral from land tn^s be con-
veyed by deed or lease^ which may be ac-
knowledged and recorded in the same mai
ner as deeds and leases of real estate, ai
that when the owner of land shall conve;
by deed or lease, any mining right there!
the conveyance shall be considered as so sei
arating such right from the land as to I
separately taxable. Held that, since petr<
leum is a mineral, the right of the lessee 1
mine for oil and gas on certain spedfle
premises is a mining right, and separate!
taxable under such sections. People v. Bel
86 N. E. 593, 237 lU. 332, 19 L. B. A. (N. S
746, 15 Ann. Cas.. 511.
.Petroleum oil is a "mineral,** and whij
it is in the earth It forms a part of the rea
ty, and when it reaches a well and is pr<
duoed on the surface it becomes persom
property and belongs to the owner of tt
welL If it moves from place to place by pei
eolation, or otherwise, it forms a part of tli
tract of land in which it tarries for the tin
being; and, if it moves to the next adjolnin
tract, it becomes a part and parcel of tba
tract; and if it forms a part of the sam
tract, until it reaches a well and is raised t
the surface and then for the first time, it b<
comes the subject of distinct ownership sei
arate from the realty. It becomes the proi
erty of and belongs to the person who read
es it by means of a well and severs it froi
the realty. Nonamaker v. Amoa, 76 N. 1
949, 951, 73 Ohio St 163, 4 L. R. A. (N. 8
980, 112 Am. St Rep. 708, 4 Ann. Cas. 17
(citing Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N. B. 39f
57 Ohla St 317, 39 L. B. A. 765. 63 Am. S1
Rep. 721; Northwestern Ohio Natural Ga
Co. V. Ullery, 67 N. B. 494, 68 Ohio St 259]
As property
See Property; Real Property.
Sand, aooord^g to the circumstance!
may, or may not be a mineral, in the commei
dal sense intended by Act May 8, 1876 (I
L. 142), providing that, if any person or coi
poration shall dig minerals in the land o
another without the consent of the ownez
he shall be liable for double the value there
of. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 58 At!
488, 489, 209 Pa. 263.
Under Rev. St | 2329, by which claim
usually called placers, including all forms o
deposits excepting veins of quartz or othe
rock in place, shall be subject to entry
building sand is a "mineral**; and hence lan(
more valuable for the building sand it cod
tains than for agriculture is mineral land
subject to placer locations. Loney v. Scott
112 Pac 172, 175, 57 Or. 878.
SHale
Shale is a "mineraL" Bibby y. Bond
(Ala.) 58 South. 916, 917.
Water
Subtetraneati w&ters are considered i
"mineral** In respect to their use and enjoy
ment, irrespective of the cliaracter and quaii
HIN»tA£h D8M6R
^sn
unmm
aty of salts and* gases which may be In soln?
tioiL Hathorn ▼. Natural Carbonic Gas Go.,
87 N. E. 604, 608, 194 N. Y. 326, 23 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 436, 128 Am« St Bflp. 666, 16 Ann.
Caa. 089.
MHIEBAXi DEPOSIT
Valuablo mineral deposits*
liineials.
Yalnable
MIHEBAX. ILAHB
The words "said lands being mineral,**
88 used in Act June 8, 1878, c 160, S 1, is not
confined to any species of mineral, but is
synonymous with the word ''metalliferous."
Morgan v. United States, 169 Fed. 242, 248,
94 O. O. A. 618 (dting Northern Pac. Ry. CJo.
T. Soderberg, 23 Sup. Ct. 366, 188 U. S. 626,
47 L. Ed. 575).
Gypsum is a mineral, and lands con-
taining it are "mineral" lands, within the
federal statutes. Madison y. Octave Oil Go^
99 Paa 176, 178, 154 CaL 768.
Goal lands are ^'mineral lands^' within
the meaning of that term as generally em-
ployed in the laws regulating the disposal of
the public domain. United States y. North-
em Pac. Ry. Go., 170 Fed. 498, 600; Wash-
ington Securities Go. y. United States, 194
Fed. 69. 66, 114 0. 0. A. 79.
The term "mineral lands," as used in
Rev. St U. S. I 2302, is one of broader sig-
nificance than "known mines." It refers to
a dass of lands, rather than specific tracts
easily ascertainable, not only by the Land
Department, but by the applicants them-
BeWes. Old Dominion Gopper Mining dc
Smelting Co. y. Haverly, 90 Pac. 333, 338,
11 Ariz. 241.
MDIEBAI. X.ODB
See, also, Lode.
A "mineral lod^ Is a totally different
thing from a placer mine and not a mere
state or condition of such mine. McGarter
▼. Sooy Oyster Go., 76 AtL 211, 215, 78 N.
J. Law, 394.
mHERAI. SITBSTAKCnB
Other mineral substances, see Other.
MINIATURE FRAMES
Not dutiable as articles commonly known
as jewelry, sea Articles Within Tar-
iff Act
MINIMUM
"Minimumy" as applied to damages,
means the least possible amount that may be
awarded by a jury. The court should not
Instruct in a libel suit that, if an honest
mistake is made in an honest attempt to en-
lighten the public, it must reduce the dam-
ages to a minimum, as the jury may under
such circumstances award much more than
the minimum as actual damages. Dauphiny
y. Buhne, 96 Pac. «80, 881, 886, 108 GhiL 71P7,
126 Am. St. Bep. 186.
The tf ect, if any, of the ttse of th*
word '^minimum," in a contract relating to
water rates, is that the rates shall not be
less. Olty of Bit Vernon y. New York In*
terurban Water Go., 161 N. Y. 8uM>. 232, 233,
115 App. Diy. 66a
The term "minimum charge,*' as used in
water supply contracts, where the meter sys-
tem obtains, usually signifies rate of com-
pensation for expense and labor of being
ready to supply water at will of consumer,
though the supply be not used at all. Gox
y. Abbeville Furniture Factory, 64 8. S. 830,
832, 76 S. O. 4a
Where the application for charter and
the charter of tiie corporation name only one
sum as the proposed capital of the corpora-
tion, that sum is the ^n:dnimum capital
stock," which Olyil Gode 1910, f 2220, re-
guires to be subscribed fdr in order to re-
lieye the organizers of the corporation from
Indiyidual liability to creditors Jos. Bosen-
heim Shoe Go. y. Horne^ T8 8. IL 963, 965,
10 Ga. App. 682.
MINING
See Skillful and Giarefnl Mining.
As public use, see Public Use (In Em-
inent Domain).
System of minihg, see System.
The word "mining," in Bankr. Act July
1, 1898, I 4b, as amended in 1903 (Act Feb.
5, 1903, c. 487), is used in a broad sense and
includes quarrying as of slate from an open
quarry. Burdick v. Dillon, 144 Fed. 737, 740,
75 G. G. A. 608 ; In re Mathews GonsoL Slate
Go., 144 Fed. 724, 785.
The form of coal obtained from the
strata of the earth is a carbonaceous miur
eral substance, commonly known as mineral
coal, and the procurement thereof by digging
in the earth is termed "mining." Escott y.
Grescent Goal dc Nayigation Go., 106 Pac. 462
453, 66 Or. 190.
If the business of a corporation formed
to drill and mine for natural gas, petroleum,
and other minerals and to purchase, lease,
and otherwise acquire gas and petroleum
wells and the products thereof and to fumlah
the same to its patrons for use was not with-
in the classification of "mining," as employed
in Burns* Ann. St Ind. 1901, S 3851, author-
izing the formation of corporations to carry
on any kind of manufacturing, mining, etc.,
business, it was clearly brought within that
classification by Burns' Ann. St. Ind. 1894,
§ 5099, defining the term "mining" as used
in the former statute as covering and, includ-
ing sinking, drilling, boring, and operating
wells for petroleum and natural gas. Con-
sumers* Gas Trust Go. y. Quinby, 137 Fed.
862, 896, 70 G. a A. 220.
MINING AND MANUFACTURINQ 382
MINING LOCATION
lUnUfO Ain> XAKUFAGTfmKa
A corporation engaged in operating a
granite quarry, which it owned, and selling
the stone either for building or paving pur-
pc^ses or after it had been manufactured and
finished for monumental or other purposes,
is chiefly engaged "mining and manufactur-
ing" and ifl subject to bankruptcy proceedings
under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 4b,
as amended by Act F^b. 6, 1903, c. 487, S 3.
In re Quincy Granite Quarries Co., 147 Fed.
279.
MINING BOSS
The term, ''mining boss,** used in Acts
1881, p. 238, c. 170, S 8, requiring a coal mine
operator to employ a competent mining boss
who is required to ke^ a careful watch
over the ventilating apparatus, airways^
traveling ways, pumps, sumps, timbering, etc.,
indicated the person on whom is imposed
nondelegable duties of the master, so that in
the performance thereof the boss will be re-
garded as a vice principal. Smith ▼. Day-
ton Coal & Iron Co., 92 S. W. 62, 68, 115
Tenn. 543, 4 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 1180.
MINING CLAIM
See Necessary to Hold Mining Claim.
As permanent monument, see Permanent
Monument
As property, see Property; Real Prop-
erty.
Development of, see Development
Improvement on mining claim, see Im-
provement
Inspection of as taking property, see
Taking (In Eminent Domain).
The term "mining claim" means in the
mining country a portion of the public min-
eral lands of the United States to which a
qualified person may first obtain the right of
occupancy and possession by means of loca-
tion, and, secondly, title by pursuing prescrib-
ed methods therefor. Gray v. New Mexico
Pumice Stone Co., 110 Pac. 603, 606, 15 N. M.
478.
A '^mining claim*' is a parcel of land
containing precious metal in its soil or rock.
Creede & Cripple Creek Mining ft Milling Co.
V. Uinta Tunnel Mining & Transportation Co.,
25 Sup. Ct 266, 270, 196 U. S. 337, 49 L. Ed.
501 (quoting and adopting the definition in
St Louis Smelting ft Refining Co. v. Kemp,
104 U. S. 636, 649, 26 L. Ed. 875, 879).
A "mining claim" in the ordinary sense
of the word is a "portion of the public min-
eral lands which the miner, for mining pur-
poses, takes up and holds in accordance with
mining law." Berentz v. Kern King Oil ft
Development Co. (Cal.) 84 Pac. 45, 46 (quot-
ing and adopting Morse v. De Ardo, 40 Pac.
1018, 107 Cal. 622).
"The location and sale of oil land is
governed by the mineral laws of the United
States applicable to the location and sale of
placer mining claims, and. If land is locatei
and held under this law, it ia a ininlQi
claim* before patent in every sense of tbi
word, and for the purpose of the lien law i
does not cease to be a 'mining claim* when
by a patent from the government, the fee l
transferred to the locator or his assigns.'
And an 80-acre tract of land in pro<*ess oi
development as an oil mine is a "mininj
claim" within Code CJiv. Proc. || 1183, U87
providing that a miner working on a mininj
claim has a lien on the entire claim for hii
wages or the value of his material. Berenti
▼. Belmont Oil Co., 8 Paa 47, 48, 148 Cal
577, 118 Am. St Rep. 308.
In construing a statute the court must
look to the purpose for which it was enacted
and statutes providing for liens are to be con
strued in favor of the purpose of the law
Hence where the purpose of a statute was U
protect laborers and materialmen of a par
ticular class, and the Legislature used tb(
words "mining claim** in the title, the words
are not to be strictly construed to determiiu
the right to a lien, but they are to control
in measuring the extent of the lien. Escoti
v. Crescent Coal & Navigation Co., 106 Pac
452, 454, 56 Or. 100.
One of the essential requirements of i
valid location of a mining claim, as provided
by Oomp. St 1910, i 3474, is that there shall
be a discovery of mineral, on the ground
Dean v. Omaha-Wyoming Oil Co. (Wyo.) 12fi
Pac, 881, 882.
Mlimf G DISTRICT
Locality synonymous, see Locality.
MINUIG IiEASE
Instruments by which estates or inter
ests in minerals are created are frequently
and without distinction called ''mining leas-
es." Appeal of Sanford, 54 AtL 739, 741, 7S
Conn. 590.
MINING LICENSE
Mining license as distinguished from
lease, see Lease.
A contract simply giving a right to take
ore from a mine, no estate being granted,
confers a mere "license,'* and licensee ac-
quires no right to tbe ore until s^;Hirated
from the freehold; but an instrument de-
mising lands for mining purposes, for a des-
ignated term of years, at a fixed rent, and
giving the right to erect all necessary build-
ings, is a lease, not merely a mining license.
Bamsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 Atl. 207,
208, 225 Pa. 338, 26 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 614.
MINING LOCATION
As property, see Property.
Extension of, see EztensioiL
Lode mining location, see Lode LocatioD.
The words "claim" and "location" in min-
ing law are used interchangeably, Del Montt
MIKINO LOCATION
3»3
lilKIKQ OPBRATION '
Ifln. ft Mill. Co. ▼. Last Obance Mln. ft Mini
Co., 18 Sup. Gt. 885, 902, 171 U. 8. 00, 48 L.
Ed. 72.
A location Is not made by taking posses-
sion alone, but by working on the ground,
recording, and doliig whatever else is requir-
ed for that purpose by the acts of Ck>ngress
and the local laws and regulations. Wright
r. Lyons, 77 Pac 81, 82, 45 Or. 167 (citing
Belk Y. Meagh^, 104 U. S. 279, 284, 26 L. Ed.
735); Kniitson v. Fredlund, 106 Pac. 200, 202,
56 Wash. 634 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion h) Purdum v. Laddin, 69 Pac. 153, 154,
23 Mont 387, 389) ; Hickey v. Anaconda Cop-
per Mln. Ck>., 81 Pac 806, 811, 33 Mont 46
(quoting and adopting the definition in Belk
T. Meagher, 104 U. 8. 279, 26 L. Ed. 735).
A "mining claim" Is a pared of land con-
taining predous metal in its soil or sock, and
a "location" Is the act of appropriating such
parcel according to eertaln established rules.
It usually consists in placing on the ground
In a conspicuous position a notice setting
forth the name of the locator, the fact that
it is thus taken or located, with the requisite
description of the extent and boundaries of
the parcel according to the local custom or,
since the statute of 1872, according to the pro-
Tisions of that act Rot. St. S 2324. The
location, which is the act of taking a parcel
of mining land, became among the miners
synonymous with the mining claim originally
appropriated; so now, if a miner has only
the ground covered by one location, his min-
ing claim and location are identical, and the
two designations may be indiscriminately
used to denote the same thing; but if, by
purchase, he acquires the adjoining location
of his neighbor and uses the ground which his
neighbor has taken up and adds it to his
own, then his mining daim coTcrs the ground
embraced by both locations, and henceforth
be will speak of it as his claim. Indeed, his
claim may i&dude as many adjoining loca-
tions as be can purchase, and the ground ooy-
ered by all will constitute what he claims
for mining purposes, or, in other words, will
constitute his mining claim and will so be
designated. Such is the general understand-
ing of miners and the meaning that attached
to the term. Lockhatd v. Asher Lumber Oo.,
123 Fed. 480, 498 (quoting St Louis Smelting
& Ref. Ck). ▼. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 648, 26
L. Ed. 875).
" 'Location' \s the act or series of acts by
which the right of ezclusiye possession of
mineral lands is vested in the locator. For
this the only reqnirement made by Congress
is the marking on the surface of the bounda-
ries of the claim. By section 2324, howeyer.
Congress reoogalzed the yalidity of any reg-
Qlatlons made Itj the miners of any mining
district not in conflict with the laws of the
United States or the laws of the state or
territory within which the district is situ-
ated." Creede k^ Cripple Creek Mining *'
Mining Co. T. Uinta Tunnel Mining k Trans-
portation Co., 25 Sup. Ct 266» 270, 196 U. S.
387, 49 L. Bd. SOX
The word 'location," in its application
to mining claims, has two distinct meanings :
First, all the acts, including discovery, req-
uisite to perfect the right of possession;
and, second, the placing of the claims, the
posting of the notice, and the marking of the
boundaries* excluding discovery. An agreed
statement of facts, which stipulated that the
lode claims of the plaintifr were 'located
in compliance with law" at dates anterior to
the location of the defendant's tunnel stte^
and that as to the issue made in the plead*
ings upon the question whether mineral in
rock in place was discovered in the plaintifrs
daims before the location of the tunnel site
the defendant offered testimony tending to
negative such diacovMy, which is on plain-
tifrs objection ruled 6at by the court, and
such ruUng is excepted to by the defendant,
used the word "location" In its more restrict-
ed sense, excluding discovery, and did not
estop the defendant ftom litigating the issue
relative to the discovery of mineral in rock
In place in the plaintiffs claims prior to the
location of the defendant's tunnel site. Uin-
ta Tunnel, Mln. & Transp. Co. v. AJaz Gold
Mln. Co., 141 Fed. 563, 664, 567, 73 C. a A.
35.
Bev. St I 2324, providing that "location"
of mining claims shall be distinctly marked
on the ground so that the boundaries can be
readily traced, and the location notlcie *flled
shall contain a description of the property
by which it can be identified, is mandatory
and must be compiled with in order to secure
a valid location. A "location" is not made by
taking possession alone, but by marking on
the ground, recording, and doing whatever
else is required for that purpose by the acts
of Congress and the local terms and regula-
tions. Consequentiy, if there is no location,
there can be no possession under it Location
does not necessarily follow from possession,
but possession from location. Ware v. White,
108 S. W. 831, 834, 81 Ark. 220 (quoting Belk
v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 26 L Kd. 735).
MINIHQ OPEBATZON
Const 1898, art 230, proTides that prop-
erty employed in mining operations shall be
exempt from parochial and municipal taxes
for a period of 10 years from January 1, 1900.
Held, that a "mining operation** has to do
with the working of a mine, and a "mine,"
defined as an excavation in the earth for the
purpose of getting metal ores or coal, does
not indude an oil well, and property used in
connection with petroleum wells is not ot-
empted under the article. J. M. Ouffey Pe-
troleum Co. V. Murrel, 08 South. 700, 711, 127
La. 466:
MINING PARTNERSHIP
394
MINING PARTNmaHIP
MJJIIJIO PABTWBBMfflP
Trading partnership dlirdngnlRheil, see
Trading Partnership.
A mining partnership exists when two
or more persons, who own or acquire a min-
ing claim for the purpose of working it and
extracting the mineral therefrom, actually en-
gage in working the same. Marks v. Gates, 2
Alaska, 519, 523.
In order to constitute a "mining partp
nership" under the Idaho Revised Statutes
of 1887, it is essential that the co-owners ac-
tnaUy engage in working the mine or in the
business of operating the mine. The co-
tenancy of two or more persons in a min-
ing claim is not of itself sufficient to con-
stitute such tenants mining partners. It is
not essential that all the tenants join in the
working or business of mining in order to
establish such partnership, but that relation
may be established among such co-owners as
have actually engaged in the working or
''mining operation.*' Those not so engaging
will be left to their right and chargeable by
their duties as cotenants only. Madar t.
Norman, 92 Pac. 672, 13 Idaho, 586.
"A 'mining partnership* exists between
the tenants in common of a mine who work
it together and divide the profits in propor-
tion to their several interests. Ownership
of shares or interests in the mine is an es-
sential element of a mining partnership. The
relation does not exist between tiie owners
of a mine and one who, under a contract
with«them, works a mine for a share in the
profits or proceeds. Mere profit sharing will
not create a mining partnereOiip. • • •
A mining partnership differs from an ordi-
nary partnership in the fact that no con-
tract between the partners is necessary to
create it, that there is no delectus person-
arum, so that the death of a member of the
transfer of his interest does not operate as a
dissolution, and that there are no rights of
survivorship. Because of the absence of
these features, mining partnerships have been
said not to be true partnerships, but rather a
cross between tenancies in common and part^
nershlps proper.*' Blackmarr v. Williamson,
50 S. B. 254, 256, 57 W. Va. 249, 4 Ann. Gas.
'265.
A "mining partnership** may exist,
though all of the partners may not have a
personal interest in the property, if they liave
an interest in tiie working of the property,
and it is not essential that there be an ex-
press agreement to become partners, or an ex-
press agreement to share profits and losses,
as that is an incident to the prosecution of
the general business. Bentley v. Brossard, 94
Pac. 736, 743, 33 Utah, 396.
A "mining partnership** exists where the
several owners of a mine co-operate in work-
ing it . Where two parties leased mining
property and ol>tained a bond for its con-
veyance upon payment of a sum by a certain
date, which was extended for a oonsideratioii
each paying half,iind where, under the bom
and lease, the parties agreed to work tii<
property Jointly, each to bear one-half th
expense, the defendant putting in his owi
work and the plaintiff furnishing a man t
do his share of the work, they were eqna
partners in respect to the joint enterpria
in which they were engaged for the purposi
of carrying out the provisions of the bou
and lease. Walker ▼. Bruce, 97 Pac. 250, 4^
Colo. 109.
A "mining partnership" exists when tw<
or more persons who own or acquire a mln
ing claim for the purpose of working it anc
extracting the mineral therefrom actually
engage in working the same. An express
agreement to become partners or to share th(
profits and losses of mining is not necessan
to the formation and existence of the part
nership. The relation arises ftom the own
ership of shares or interests in tiie mine an^
the working of the same. Eisenberg v. Gold
smith, 118 Pac 1127, 1131, 42 Mont 56S
(quoting and adopting the definition in Be?
Codes, ii 5535, 5536).
"'Mining partnerships' are somewhat
peculiar in their nature, and the ordlnan
rules regarding such relations do not, U
seems, apply. Of course, there may be a
strict partnership in a mining venture — foi
Instance, where it is formed for the purpose
of working a mine by extracting minerals
therefrom — and in such a case there musi
be an accounting in equity. But parties maj
be tenants in conunon of a mining property
without being partners. It is alleged in the
petition that the contract in this case wai
for prospecting, locating, and developing min-
ing claims on the public domain in the Crii^
pie Creek district for the joint and equal
benefit of the parties, and each was to for-
nish labor, supplies, and money for this pur-
pose. If by this it was meant to <diarge that
the mine, when discovered and developed,
should be worked on Joint account, doubtless
a partnership would have been created, at
least as to the working of the mine. But
the petition does not allege such an agree-
ment, nor did plaintiff's evidence show it"
"Such agreements should be construed ac-
cording to the intent of the parties, and,
while they may speak of eadik other as part-
ners, this tom, as is well known, does not
in all cases mean that the parties are en-
gaged in a joint enterprise, each agreeing to
share the profits and to bear a part of the
losses of the particular business. In order
to create a 'mining partnership,* it seems to
be necessary that there be an agreement to
work the mine for the joint profit of the par-
ties. Otherwise the owners of the property,
acquired in sudi manner as is here charged,
are tenants in conunon.'* Doyle v. Bums, 99
N. W. 195, 197, 128 Iowa, 488 (citing and ap-
proving Boucher v. Mulverhill, 1 Mont 310:
Duryea v. Burt, 28 Oal. 569; Hartney v. Gos
MINIKa PARTNERSHIP
396
. MIHIfiXXRlAL
liBg, 68 Pac. 1121, 10 Wy6« 115, 06 Am. St
Rep. 972; Patrick v. Wteton, 43 Pac. 446, 21
Colo. 73; Anaoonda Copper Mining Ca t.
Batte & Boston Min. Co^ 48 Paa 492, 17
Mont 519).
Where complainant and defendant, who
were Jointly Interested in mining property,
in the derelopment of which complainant had
made adyances, entered into a contract giv-
ing complainant the right to manage the
property and apply the profits, and also, in
case of a sale, the proceeds of the property
to the repayment of such adrances, the ar-
rangement and agreement constituted a "min-
ing partnership." Connolly t. Bouck» 174
Fed. 312, 315, 96 a O. A. 184.
MUUIO PSOPEBTT
See Entire Mining Property.
Mnrnf o wbmujt
The Legislature has now classed oil and
gas among minerals of this stato; and per-
sons engaged in producing these minerals are
following a mining pursuit Act No. 144 of
1908; Act No. 164 of 1910; Act No, 172 of
1910; Act No. 196 of 1910; Act No. 254 of
1910. Etchison Drilling Ca t. Floumoy, 69
Soath. 867, 872, 131 La. 442.
Mnrni G BEOOBDS
The term "mining records," as used in
B. dc C. Comp. I 6668, authorizing Uens on
mines In favor of laborers and materialmen,
but proTidlng that It shall not apply to the
owner when the mine is worked by a lessee,
if a copy of the lease is recorded in the min-
ing records of the county before the work
is begun, in the absence of a statute defining
sneb term, or prescribing that such Instru-
ments shall be recorded in any particular
book, is sufficiently compiled with by the
record of a mining lease In a book kept by the
county derk for the recording of leases and
Instruments affecting the title to ndning
claims, designated "mining conveyances."
Slover V. Bailey, 90 Paa 665, 606, 49 Or. 426.
Hnmro right
As property, see Property.
''A 'mining right' is a fight to enter upon
and occupy ground for the purpose of work-
ing it, either by underground excavation or
open working; to obtain from it the minerals
or ores which may be deposited thereunder.
By implication, the grant of such a right car-
ries with it whatever Is incident to it and
necessary to ite beneficial enjoyment The
term may also include licenses and the rights
of the owner of the minerals." McGraw v.
UuUn, 68 S. B. 27, 28, 67 W. Va. 385.
A "mine" Is an excavation in the earth
to obtain minerals, an excavation, properly
nnder ground, to take out some useful prod-
uct, and a mining right is a right to excavate
In the earth to obtein minerals or other use-
fol products. People v. BeU, 86 N. S. 593,
594, 287 m. 882» 19 L. B. A. (N. S.) 746, 15
Ann. Caa. 511.
durd's Rev. St 1905, p. 1399, c. 94, H 6,
7, declare that any mining right or the right
to dig for or obtain iron, lead, copper, coal, or
other mineral from land may be conveyed by
deed or lease, which may be acknowledged
and recorded in the same manner as deeds
and leases of real estete, and that when the
owner of land shall convey, by deed or lease,
any mining right therein, the conveyance
shaU be otmsldeied as so s^iMirating such
right from the land as to be separately taxa-
ble. Held that, since petroleum is a mineral,
the right of the lessee to mine for oil and
gas on certain specified luremises is a min-
ing right, and separately taxable under such
sections. People v. Bell, 86 K. B. 593, 694,
237 IlL 832, 19 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 746, 15 Ann.
Cas. 51X
Mnmro work
Ab improvement, see Improvement
MINISTER
As profession, see Profession.
A pubUc school opened with prayer and
the reading without comment of passages
from King James' translation of the Bible,
during which pupils are not required to at-
tend, is not a ''place of worship,'* nor are ite
teachers "ministers of religion," within the
meaning of Const | 5, providing that no per-
son shall be compeUed to attend any place
of worship or contribute to the support of a
minister of religion. Hackett v. Brooksville
Graded School Dist, 87 & W. 792, 798, 120
Ky. 606, 69 L. B. A. 692.
The term ''ministerlar is generic rathM
than specific, and includes acte which are
ministerial only and involve no judgment or
discretion, and those which are quasi Judi-
cial ; a purely ministerial act being one which
a person performs on a given stete of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard
to his own Judgment on the propriety of the
act Stete V. Stutsman (N. D.) 139 N. W. 83,
8a
The word "mlnisterlar means 1;iertaln-
ing to executive offices as distinguished from
Judicial; administrative." An act in the per-
formance of a ministerial duty is imperative
It is done in obedience to some legal mandate,
and it involves the exercise of no official dis-
cretion and of no Judgment as to the propriety
of the act thereby differing entirely from an
act in the performance of Judicial duties.
Hamma v. People, 94 Pac 326, 327, 42 Colo.
401, 15 L. B. A« (N. S.) 621, 16 Ann. Oa& 655.
The words '^ministerial and ''adminis-
trattve^' may be, and fnequMiflyare, used
interchangeably. An "administrative offloet^
is frequently classed as a "ministerial of-
MINISTERIAL ACT
396
MINISTERIAL ACT
fleer/' and vice venuu Bouvler speaks of
"administrative*' as synonymous with "execu-
tive/' a "ministerial dul^"; one in which
nothing is left to discretion. People v. Sals-
bury, 96 N. W. 936, 940, 134 Mich. 537 (citing
State V. Loechqer, 91 N. W. 874, 65 Neb. 814,
59 L. R. A. 915).
MINISTEBIAL ACT
A "ministerial act" is one which a person
performs in a given state of facts in a pre-
scribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of legal authority, without regard to, or the
exercise of, his own judgment upon the pro-
priety of the act being done. Galey y. Board
of Oom*rs of Montgomery Ck)unty, 91 N. B.
593, 594, 174 Ind. 181, Ann. Ga& 19120^
1099; Freund v. Freund, 76 N. B. 925, 930,
218 lU. 189, 109 Am. St Rep. 283; Floumoy
V. aty of JeffersonviUe, 17 Ind. 169, 174, 79
Am. Dec. 468; Pennington v. Streight, 54
Ind. 376, 377; Galey v. Board of Com'rs of
Montgomery County, 91 N. E. 593, 594, 174
Ind. 181, Ann. Oas. 1912G, 1099; Bair ▼.
Struck, 74 Pac. 69, 71, 29 Mont 45, 63 L. R.
A 481 (citing Throop, Pub. Off. | 537).
A "ministerial act" Is an "act, office, or
power that is to be performed or exercised
uniformly on a given state of facts, in a pre-
scribed manner, in obedience to law or the
mandate of legal authority, without depend-
ence on the exercise of Judgment as to pro-
priety of so doing/* Metz v. Maddox, 105
N. Y. Supp. 702, 712, 121 App. Div. 147 (quot-
ing Ont Diet.).
"A 'ministerial act,' as applied to a pub-
lic officer, i9 defined to be an act or thing
which he is required to perform by direction
of legal authority upon a given state of facts,
independent of what he may think of the
propriety or impropriety of doing the act in
the particular case." The duty of the Secre-
tary of State in granting a certificate to a
private banking corporation being purely
ministerial, mandamus lies to compel him to
isslie the certificate. State ex rel. Jones v.
Gook, 73 S. W. 489, 493, 174 Mo. 100.
A "ministerial act" is one which a public
officer is required to perform upon a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
and without regard to his .own judgment or
opinion concerning the propriety or impro-
priety of the act to be performed. Garff v.
Smith, 86 Pac. 772, 773, 31 Utah, 102, 120
Am. St R^. 924 (citing State ex rel. North
ft South Ry. Co. v. Meier, 45 S. W. 306, 143
Mo. 439).
"Official action, the result of perform-
ing a certain and specific duty, arising from
fixed and designated facts, is a 'ministerial
act'" Rainey v. Ridgway, 43 South. 843,
844, 151 Ala. 532 (citing Floumoy v. aty of
JeffersonviUe, 17 Ind. 169, 79 Am. Dee. 466;
Tennessee & C. R. Ck>. v. Moore, 36 Ala. 371;
Morton v. Oomptroller General, 4 S. (X 430;
Gommiasloiier of the General Land Office v.
Smith, 6 Tex. 471; life & Fire Ins. Co. v
Wilson, 8 Pet 291, 8 L. Ed. 949).
AllowABoe of elidm
Prohibition does not lie to restrain tin
commissioners' court from proceeding witii
the construction of a bridge for the building
of which a contract has been let by it; the
allowance of a daim therefor being a "mini»
terial act" Goodwin v. State ex ret Wake
field, 40 South. 122, 123, 145 Ala. 536.
AssesMuemt of oMittod yroportx fm
tazAtioa
Where a city council by ordinance pro
vided for the listing of omitted taxes upon
notice and hearing, the act of "assessing
omitted property partakes somewhat of min-
isterial and somewhat of Judicial or quasi
judicial functions. That is to say, the act ir
listing of the property for taxation is (dearlj
a 'ministerial act'; and, as an incident i<
finds the fact whether the property was in
fact omitted, whether it belonged to the al-
leged recusant taxpayer, and what its fail
value then was. To hear evidence, and
therefrom to find whether a certain fact was
or was not, partakes of 'Judicial functions.*
Still it is not necessarily Judicial, in the sense
that it is an act of a court Many ministe
rial acts include in part the determination ol
pre-existing facts, and the exercising of the
quality of Judgment sometimes called *di»
cretion* with respect thereto. • • • The
action of the council in assessing omitted
property is purely ministerial, although it
has mixed certain discretion as to finding
values and the like, which is not reviewable,
and which quality is sometimes called 'Judi-
cial,' though it is not Judicial in the sense
that it is the act of a court" And hence the
ordinance was not in violation of the consti-
tutional limits upon the part of the Legisla-
ture to create any "Judicial tribunals" other
than the courts expressly named in that in-
strument Muir's Adm'r v. City of Bards-
town, 87 S. W. 1096, 1098, 120 Ky. 739.
Entry of Jndsment
Under L. O. L. 1 185, which provides that
in an action arising upon contract for the re-
covery of money or damages only, if no an-
swer is filed within the time Umited, the clerk
on the plaintiff*s written application shall
enter the default and thereupon give Judg-
ment for the sum demanded against one or
more of the defendants amenable by appear-
ance on service of process, the clerk in ente^
ing such Judgment exercises no Judicial func-
tions, but performs a "ministerial act," which
in general consists in the discharge of some
duty enjoined by law upon one or more per-
sons, who, in obeying the rule prescribed, ex-
ercise no Judgment or discretion regarding
the matter. Hodgdon v. Goodspeed, 118 Pac
167, 168, 60 Or. 1 (dting 5 Words and Phrases,
p. 452^. .
IflNISTBRIAIi ACT
397
MINISTERIAIi DUTY
The renditioii of a Jadgment by tbe court
Is a jndiidal act; but the entry thereof by the
derk is not, but Is a ''ministerial act'* Jaqna
v. Harklns, 82 N. B. 020. 922, 40 Ind. App. 089.
Imwabiw of eertifioate to iMuak
*'A 'ministerial act' is one which a public
officer or agent is required to perform upon a
given state of facts in a prescribed manner
in obedience to the mandate of legal authority
and without regard to his own Judgment or
opinion concerning the propriety or impropri-
ety of the act to be performed." The duty of
the bank commissioner to issue to a bank a
certiflcate when all the things required to be
done have been done is not discretionary, and
mandamus will lie to compel him to perform
such duty which is merely a ministerial one.
Smock ▼. Farmers' Union State Bank, 98 Pac
»i5, 94a 22 OkL 825 (quoting and adopting
definition in Merrill, Mandamus, pw 90).
JvdidAl aei distliigwislied
See Judicial Act
Keepias ottee aad reeotfds at seat of
A "ministerial act" is an act whicb a per-
son performs on a given state of facts in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the man-
date of legal authority, without regard to, or
the exercise of, his own Judgment, upon the
propriety of the act done. The constitutional
provision requiring each executive officer to
keep his office and public records and papers
at the seat of government requires a mere
ministerial act, bo that mandatory injunction
will lie to enjoin the execmtive officers of the
state other than the Governor from removing
their offices, public records, etc., from the seat
of government, and expending the state funds
for that purpose. State ex rel. Attorney Gen-
eral V. Huston, 113 Pac 190, 198, 27 OkL 006,
34 L. B. A. (N. S.) 380 (quoting and adopting
the definition in 27 Gya p. 793).
As proeeodiag
See Proceeding.
Bejeetioii aad retnra of oloetloa ballot
A moderator of a voting district, who
honestly r^ects the ballot of an elector and
returns it as prescribed by statute, is not lia-
ble in tort to the elector, though the act fol*
lowing the quasi Judicial determination of the
invalidity of the ballot is a "ministerial act,"
which is performed in a given state of facts
in obedience to the law, without regard to or
the exercise of his own Judgment on the pro-
priety of the act being done. Blake v. Mason,
73 Atl. 782, 783, 82 Conn. 324.
SoUovias BilUtIa oflloe»
"Official action, the result of performing
a certain and specific duty, arisbig from fixed
and designated fticts, is a ^ministerial act'*"
The act of a Governor in relieving relator
from his conunand as colonel of a regiment in
the state national guard for the good of the
service, without a trial or bearing on charges
preferred, was not a mialsterial aet, but ooo-
stituted an exercise of tbe Governor's discre-
tion, wbldi could not b« controlled by manda-
mua State ez reL HIgdon ▼. Jelks, 85 South.
60, 62, 188 Ala. 115 (quottng and adopting
definition in Ozlder t. Talley, 77 Ala. 424, 54
Am. Rep. 65; Bz parts Thompson, 62 Ala. 98^.
mXISTSBUJi DITTT
A purely ^'ministerial duty" la one ae to
whidk nothing la left to discretion. City of
Biddleford t. Yates, 72 AtL 386, 887, 104 Me.
606, 16 Ann. Cas. 1001.
A ''ministerial duty^ Is one regarding
which nothing is left to discretion — a simple
and definite duty, imposed by law, and arising
under conditions admitted or prored to exist
If it is one that requires exercise of Judgment
in its performance, it is not ministerial but
discretionary. State y. Howard, 74 AtL 892,
395, 83 Vt 6.
A "ministerial duty,*' the performance of
which may in proper cases be required, is
one in which nothing is left to discretion. It
is a simple definite duty arising under condi-
tions admitted or proved to exist and imposed
by law. State ex reL Attorney General t.
Huston, 118 Pac. 190, 198, 27 OkL 606, 84 L.
B. A. (N. &) 880 (quoting and adopting the
definition in Marbury t. Madison, 1 Granch,
137, 2 L. Ed. 60).
Official duty is "ministexlal," when it is
absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely execution of a specific duty arising
from fixed and designated facta. People v.
May, 96 N. E. 999, 1000, 251 IlL 64, Ann. Gas.
19120, 5ia
"An official duty Is 'mlnisteriaF when it
is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
merely the execution of a set task, and when
the law which imposes it prescribes and de-
fines the time, mode, and occasion of its per-
formance with such certainty that nothing
remains for Judgment or discretion. Official
action is ministerial when it is the result of
performing a certain and specific duty arising
from fixed and designated facts.** Garff v.
Smith, 86 Pac. 772, 773, 31 Utah. 102, 120 Am.
St Rep. 924 (quoting People for Use of Mun-
son V. Bartels, 27 N. B. 1091, 138 IlL 322).
Where an officer's duty necessarily re-
quires examination of evidence in the decision
of questions of law and fact, the duty is not
ministerial, but Judicial or discretionary. An
act, however, is none the less ministerial be^
cause tbe person performing it may have to
satisfy himself that a state of flacto exists un*
der which it is his rigfht and duty to-perform
tile act, though in doing so he must to some
extent construe the statute by which the duty
is imposed. Stephens v. Jones, 123 N. W. 705,
708, 24 S- D. 97. .
. QrtaMMK eleetloa eevttfte^te
A '"Bilnlst^rial" duty it ^'ene whl^ has
been positively Imposed by law and its per>
MINISTERIAL OFFICE— OFFICER 398
MINOB
formance required at a time and in a manner
or upon conditions wMcb are spedflcally des-
ignated; the duty to perform under tbe condi-
tions spedfled not being dependent on the of-
ficer's diflcertlon'* (quoting Mediam on Pub-
Uc Officers, | 658). A "ministerial" diuty, the
performance of which may, in proper cases,
be required of the head of a department, by
judicial process, is one in respect to which
nothing is left to discretion. It Is simply defi-
nite duty arising under conditions admitted
or proTed to exist or imposed by law (quoting
Sullivan v. Shanklin. 63 Cal. 247, 251).
"Where the law prescribes and defines the
duty to be performed with such precision and
certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise
of Judgment, the act is 'ministerial' " (quot-
ing Commls&doner of the General Land Office
V. Smith, 5 Tex. 471). €k)nsequently, the duty
Imposed by Rev. St Wyo. 1899, | 351, upon
the Oovemor to grant a certificate of election
to state ofilcers after the canvassing board
has filed Its certificate showing him to have
been elected, is a "mlnisterlar' duty. State
ex reL Irvine v. Brooks, 84 Pac 488, 490, 14
Wyo. 393, 6 U R. A. (N. 8.) 750, 7 Ann Cas.
110&
MIinSTEItlAL OFFIOE^-OmCEB
Assessors of taxes and county clerks are
''ministerial officers," and, while in some re-
spects their acts may be construed as Judi-
cial, they are not "Judicial officers" as that
term is used in the Constitution. They have
no power to inflict penalties for violation of
laws or to determine whether a law has been
violated and adjudge persons guilty. Cleve-
land, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. People, 72 N. B.
725, 726^ 212 IlL 638.
Attorney
Acts 1880, p. 18, No. 11, making it unlaw-
ful for any Judicial or "ministerial officer"
of any of the courts of the state to go ball for
any prisoner, etc., refers exclusively to such
officers as Judges, clerks, sheriffs, and their
deputies, etc., as directly constitute the ma-
chinery of the court, and does not prohibit an
attorney from becoming a surety on his cli-
ent's ball bond, though an attorney is an
jofficer of the courts generally. State v. Rab-
in, 50 South. 825, 826, 124 La. 1005, 18 Ann.
Cas. 837.
City olerk
The dty derk of Los Angeles is a purely
"ministerial officer" who must sign any ordi-
nance duly passed, regardless of any views
which he may entertain as to its legality.
City of Los Angeles v. Lelande, 106 Pac. 218,
219, 157 CaL 30 (citing City of Loe Angeles
V. Hance, 70 Pac. 475, 187 Cal. 490).
Olerk of ooitrt
The clerk of a court is essentially a min-
isterial officer. He has nothing to do with
the cliaracter cr purpose of papers which are
tendered to him to be fijed. When suit- is
ordered or process directed to be issued, it
his duty to comply, if the party is prii
facie entitled to it, and for failure to do
be is liable for any loss; the measure of I
liabiUty being the damages which have i
suited theref)*om. In an action on the offid
bond of a derk of the circuit court for i
fusal to issue a smnmons, the plalntlflT mn
state, in his declaration, enough to show tb
he had a good cause of action against tj
parties whom he desired to sue. He cann
simply claim as damages the amount f
which he wanted to bring suit Any ded
ration or complaint which does nothing mo
is demurrable. United States v. Bell, 1
Fed. 1002, 1003 (citing 7 Cyc p. 19^.
Poliooauui
Under Code 1904, p. 1018, cL 1, | 1017
iwovlding that officers and privates in tl
police force of cities and towns of the coi
mon wealth shall possess such power and a
thorlty as now belongs to the office of coi
stable at common law in enforcing the crii
Inal laws of the commonweal^ and the o
dlnances of the city or town for which th<
are appointed or elected, and it shall be tl
duty of policemen to prevent the commlssic
within the dty or town of offenses again
the laws pf the commonwealth and againi
the ordinances of th,e dty or town, to obsen
and enforce all such laws and ordinance
to detect and arrest offenders against tl
same, to preserve the good order of the d1
or town, and to secure the inhabitants theri
of from violence and the property therei
from Injury, a policeman is not a pure)
"ministerial officer," since a number of tl
powers enumerated in the statute are of a
executive character, and therefore a perso
bribing a policeman is subject to punlshmei
under Code, | 3744, providing that if as
person give or offer any gift or gratuity t
any "executive officer" with intent to ii
fiuence his act, decision, or Judgment o
any matter or question which is or may fc
then pending, or may be brought before hii
in his offidal capadty, shall be punished, et(
Haynes v. Commonwealth, 52 S. B. 358, 35(
104 Va. 854.
MINOR
Man as including, see Man.
See^ also» Child— Children (In Crlndiia
Law). ,
The common-law rule that a minor Is o
age on the beginning of the day preceding bl
twenty-first anniversary does not pi^evaJ
here, under Rev. Civ. Code, art 37, providin
that minors are persons who have not yet at
talned the age of 21 years complete, and i
minor whose twenty-first anniversary doe
not occur until the next day after an electioi
cannot lawfully register to vote thereai
State ex rel. Fleming v. Joyce, 48 South. 22J
222, 123 La. 037, 17 Anii. Qa^. 905.
lONOB
89»
MuroR
Tlie term ''minor cbildren,'* as used In
Const, art 18, | 62| declaring tluit the home-
stead shall not be apportioned among the
heira of the decedent, so long as the goardian
of minor children may be permitted to oc-
cupy the same^ and in Hev. St 1896, art
2046, requiring the setting apart for the ben-
efit of the widow and minor children of prop-
erty exempt from execution, etc, does not in-
clude minor gmndchildvoi living as members
of the grandmother's family, and on her*
death, her property may be sold to pay debts.
Ross T. Martin, 140 8. W. 482, 483, 104 Tex.
558.
Tbe fact that GIt. Code, H 25, 27, defines
minors as males under 21 and females under
18 years of age, did not deprive the Legisla-
ture of the right to pass Juvenile Court Law
(St 1911, pw 658), declaring that various acts
shall constitute dependency and delinquency,
and shall apply to all persons under 21,
whether male or female. Moore v. Williams,
127 Pac. 509, 510, 19 Gal. App. 600.
The words ''minor children," as used in
Rev. St 1885, arts. 2046, 2049, providing for
the setting apart of the homestead and €S-
empt property to the widow, minor children,
and nmnarried daughters of the deceased,
were used in the sense of immediate descend-
ants of the deceased, and therefore did not
include a grandchild who lived with the intes-
tate as a member of his family. Wilkins v.
Biiggs, 107 & W. 185, 140, 48 Tez. Civ. Appw
506.
Laws 1809, p. 298^ e. 141, f 17, providing
for the redemption of real property of any
''minor heir" from a sale for taxes, applies
only to minors inheriting the property. Bur-
dick V. Kimball, 101 Flac 845, 846, 53 Wash.
198.
Complainant's mother conveyed certain
Teal estate to defendant in trust for com-
plainant, to be conveyed in fee to him on his
becoming of age, with remainder over on his
death before that time. Whoi complainant
became 18 years of age, he obtained an order
removing his civil disabilities, and authoriz-
ing him to manage his property and to sue
and be sued, whereupon he brought a bill to
compel the trustee to convey the estate to
Mm. It was held that the emancipation did
not terminate complainant's minority, so as
to entitle him to a conveyance of the trust
estate, as Bev. Oode 1892, f 1506, defines a
"minor'* to be any person under the age of
21. Ray V. Kelly, 35 South. 166, 166, 82 Misa
597.
Rev. St 1899, { 3009, provides that every
dramshop keeper who sells intoxicants to a
minor without his parent's written consent
Shan forfeit a certain sum, etc., and makes
every dramshop keeper violating such provi-
sion guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 8477
provides that males of 21 years shall be con-
flldered of foil age, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law and, until they reach such age,
flball be considered "minors." Held, that the
fact that a minor to wliom Hquor was sold
without his parent's conaant was marKlsd and
the head of a family would not prevent a con-
viction of the offender under section 3000.
State ▼. Seiberling, 127 S. W. 106, 107, 148
Mo. App. 81&
Section 721, Bev. St, declaring that the
laws of the several states, except when the
ConstituUon^ treaties, or statutes of the
United States otherwise provide, shall be
the rules of decisions in trials at conuuon
law where they apply, does not require the
recognition of state statutes in an examina-
tion before an immigration officer to deter-
mine the right' of an alien to enter or to re-
main in the United States under our immigra-
tion statutes. Section 3636 of the Revised
Laws of Minnesota of 1900, providing that
the word "minor" shall mean a male under 21
or a female under 18 years of age, is not
binding in determining whether an alien fe-
male attains her majority when she reaches
the age of 18 years; but such officer should
follow the common-law rule, whidi fixes the
age of majority at 21 for both sexes. Bx
parte Petteraon, 166 Fed. 536, 646.
Under Glv. Coda, | 25, defining ''minors'*
to Include males under 21 years of age and fe-
males under 18 years of age ; and section 26
providing that the age of a minor must be
calculated from the first minute of the day
on which he or ahe was bom to the same
minute of the ooiresponding day completing
the period of minority, a female bom on
March 17, 1889, completed her minority and
became an adult at the commencement of
the day on March 16, 1907, prior to her com-
mitment on that day to a reform school ms a
minor delinqu^it Bx parte Wood, 90 Pac
961, 962, 5 Cal. App. 471.
A "minor" within Act May 27, 1908, a.
199, H 1, 2, 6, 35 Stat 312, 313, authorizing
the sale of the allotments of minor freedmen,
includes males under the age of 21 years and
females under the age of 18 years, and the
marriage of such minor does not confer on
him or her the authority to sell his or her
allotted lands independent of the supervision
of the probate courta Jefferson v. Winkler,
110 Pac 755, 768, 26 OkL 653.
Within Oomp. Laws OkL 1909, | 6523,
providing that the marriage of a minor ward
terminates the guardianship, and that the
guardian may be discharged by the county
court whenever it appears that the guardian-
ship is no longer necessary, and Act Cong.
May 27, 1908, c 199, 35 Stat 312, providing
that all lands of minor allottees, including
mixed-blood Indians having less than half
Indian blood, shall be free from restrictions
on alienation, and section 2, providing that
"the terms minor or minors as used in this
act shall include all males under the age of
twenty-one years," the marriage of a minor
male ward, a member of the Cherokee tribe of
Indians, of less than one-half Indian blood.
MINCm X^B^GUB
«0Q
mnvTM
does BQ&.of ItQcSf temrinate his gntrdiansbip,
«8 to his allotment^ oor abate the juriadiction
of the ooimty court, and the guardian under
such Jurisdiction has authority to sell the
minor's allotted lands. Kirkpatriok t. Bur-
gess, 116 Pac. 764, 765, 29 OkL 121.
MXNOB XiEAGUE
Tluree organizations, th^ National
League, the American League, and the Na-
tional Association, include in their member-
ship practically erery professional baseball
dub in the United States. The first two
are known as the "major leagues," and the
last as the ''minor league." Kelly t. Herr-
man, 165 iPed. 887, 888.
mKOB OFFEH8X
See, also, Misdemeanor.
An offense punishable by Imprisonment
in the parish prison er by hard labor in the
penitentiary is a '*minor offense," and not a
f^ony. State t. Wa^l, 62 South. 656, 559, 126
l4|. 400.
The words ••minor offenses," as used In
the state Ck>hstitution authorizing the Legis-
lature to grade all. ''misdemeanors and minor
offenses against the state", and to fix the
minimum and maximum penalty therefor,
must be construed as meaning minor crimes,
sudi as petty larceny and the like, which
may be punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary. The words were used to desig-
nate minor crimes which in the discretion of
the court may be punishable by imprisonment
in the parish Jail or in the penitentiary, or, in
other words, as misdemeanors or as felonies.
Hence the act grading misdemeanors and. mi*
nor offenses is constitntipnal in so far as it
grades the offense of. petty larceny and makes
'the same punishable by imprisonment in the
parish Jail. The contention was that petty
larceny is a "felony," and not, therefore,
within the purview of article 155 of the Con-
stitution, or of the title of Act No. 107, p.
161, of 1902. The court says that the word
"felony"*in American law has no very definite
or precise meaning, except in cases where it
is defined by statute. "Apart froni this, the
word seems merely to imply a crime of a
graver or More atrodoub nature than a mis-
demeanor." Black's Law Dictionary. The
term "felon** does not appear in the Ck>nstitu-
tion of 1898. In that instrument the words
"offense" and "crime" are uised as synony-
mous and "misdemeanor** as the lowest grade
of offenses. Articles 9 and 12. Hence, in
construing article 155, the words "minor of-
fenses against the state** must be construed as
meaning minor crimes, such as petty larceny
and the like, which may be punishable by im-
prisonment in the penitentiary. Th^, article
reads, "All misdemeanors and minor offenses
against the state.'* State ▼. Eubanks, 38
South. 407, 408, 114 La. 428.
MXHOmiTT
Real Propeity Law (Laws 1896, p. 565,
547) I 82, provides that for the purposes
the section a ^'minority" Is deemed a pari
a Ufe, and not an absolute term equal to tl
possible duration of such "minority.** Tob
y. Orounse, 107 N. Y. Supp. 990, 994, 57 Mis
Rep. 252.
MnrOBITT PAXtTT
Acts 1907, c. 435, I 1, providing that tl
members of the State Board of Electioi
shall be appointed by the Governor, wj
amended by Acts 1909, c. 103, | 1, requirii
such board to be elected by the Joint vote
both houses of the General Assembly. Sc
tion 3 of the amending act, amending sectic
4 of the original act, which fixed the ter
of office of the first members of the boai
and made the term of their successors t^
years, provides that all successors to tl
first board appointed shall be bona fide mei
hers of the same party to which the prece
ing members belongs Section 4, amendii
section 8 of the original act, which prohibj
ed more than two of the members from b
ing of the same political party, provides thi
not more than two of such members shall b
long to the same political party, reqair
the representatilves of the majority ai
minority parties to be bona fide members <
su<di parties, and defines the '*minority parti
as that which polled the second highest nui
b»^r of votes at the preceding president!
election. Held, that the persons appoint
by the Governor as members of the Sta
Board of Elections under the original a
could not, in . proceedings to establish the
right to office as against persons holdii
under the amending act, claim that sectioi
3 and 4 of the amending act contravened tl
Constitution, as imposing a political test t
a qualification for oflice, unless the invalidli
of such sections rendered the whole act 1
valid; such sections not imposing any bu
dens, 80 as to give them an interest in the
validity as taxpayers, and not affecting the
in a way not common to all citizens. Bid
ardson v. Young, 125 S. W. 664, 667, li
Tenn. 471.
MINUTE
Loosely, a '•minute" is a short space <
time. We all know well that it is commc
parlance to describe the briefest space (
tiLie — ^a second or few seconds — as a "ml
nte*' or a "few minutes.** The expression *
couple of minutes,** used by plaintiff in fl
action against a railway in testifying tbi
after getting on the car she waited a coup
of minutes before attempting to reach a sea
is not necessarily a statement that she ac
ually desisted for 120 seconds In the act (
seeking a seat. McGlynn v. Nassau Electr
R. Co., 113 N. Y. Supp. 119, 120^ 128 App. Di
866.
lONUTBS
iOl
MI^B^AYIOII
MINUTES
The **inliMiteB" are the proper record of
the conrty and are under the eye of the Judge,
uid are at least prima facie correct Dilzell
Engineering & Construction Go. t. Lehmann,
(5 South. 138, 139, 120 La. 273.
WhUe the 'Umnutee*' kept by the Judge
are not the memorial of the Judgment, and
sre not records required by law to be kept,
tbey constitute legal eyidence of what was
Adjudged, and as such may serve as the foun-
dation fbr the correction of errors of the
clerk in the performance of his duty. The
minutes are only evidenoe of what was done.
State ex rel. Sheridan Pub. Ck>. y. Goodrich,
140 8. W. 020^ 690, 168 Mo. App. 422 (dt^
ing Krelsel ▼. Snavely, 116 8. W. lOeO, 136
Ho. App. 166).
MISADMINISTRATION
See Homicide by Misadyeiitiiiia
MISAPPLICATION
See Willful MisappUcatiOD— Willfully
Misapply.
To constitute a "misapplication'* of the
funds of a national bank, it must appear
that the officer has been guilty of conversion,
though it is unnecessary to show that the
recipient of the proceeds of misapplication
was also guilty of a conyerslon. United
States y. Helnze, 31 Sup. Ct. 98, 218 U. S.
532, 541, 54 L. Ed. 1139, 21 Ann. Cas. 884.
It is not a "misapplication of the funds"
of a bank, as that term is used in Rev. St
{ 5200, denounciug the willful misapplication
of the funds of a national bank, where an
officer merely gave credit to an insolvent per-
son or corporation, or honored the check of a
depositor when there were no funds to the
credit of the depositor, without any intention
of defrauding the bank. Flicklnger v. Unit-
ed States, 150 Fed. 1, 12, 79 C. a A. 515.
Embesslement disiiaguislied
See Embezzlement
mSAPPLT
See Willful Misapplication— Willfully
Misapply.
The word "misapply*" as used in Rev.
St, I 5209, providing that every president,
director, cashier, teller, etc., of any national
bank association who embezzles, abstracts, or
willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds,
etc^ shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
etc., does not necessarily mean that the of-
ficer in charge should have physical posses-
sion of the funds misapplied. It is sufficient
if he have such "control, directioi), and pow-
er of management as to direct an application"
of the same. Lear v. U. S.« 147 Fed. 349, 357,
77 C. C. A. 627.
8 WDS.& P.2D Sbb.— 26
MISAPPROPRIATION
See Willful Bflsappropriation.
While considered alone, the word ^^nOth
appfopriatkm" dpes not necessarily la all
cases mean dishonesty, yet it is susceptible
of a meaning of dishonesty, embracing em-
bezzlement Johnson v. Turner, 47 South.
570, 571, 159 Ala. 356 (citing 6 Words and
Phrases, p. 4529).
"Misappropriation" means ''wrong ap*
propriation; to turn or put to a wrong pur-
pose!" As used in a provision of the bank-
ruptcy act exempting from a discbarge debts
created by "misappropriation" while acting
in a fiduciary capacity, the tenn contemplatee
a conscious "misappropriation." Haggerty y.
Badkin, 66 Ati. 420, 424, 72 N. J. £q. 473
(quoting and adopting Webster's Internation-
al Dictionary and Ency. Dictionary).
Words spoken of plaintiff, that he had
destioyed a docket or public reoord belonging
to the mayor's office to cover up evidence of
his misappropriation of public funds and fines
belonging to the town, were defamatory per
se as imputing moral turpitude, since, ascrib-
ing to the word "misappropriation" the most
Innocent of its commonly accepted meanings,
the gravamen of the charge was that plaintiff
had destroyed evidence of his wrongful con-
version of or dealing with the public funds
and fines, to cover up, with the purpose to
hinder, if not to render impossible, the detec-
tion of his misconduct, innocent of peculation
though it were, and imputed a species of dis-
honesty of a higtily depraved character.
Johnson v. Turner, 47 South. 670, 571, 159
Ala. 356.
Where a trustee for creditors, who was
appointed receiver for the debtor, loailed the
funds in his possession to a firm of which
he was a member and concealed the facts
from the court as long as possible, he was
guilty of a "misappropriation" of the funds
within Bankr. Act 1898, | 17, providing that
a disdiarge shall release a bankrupt from his
provable debts, except such as were created
by fraud, embeszlement, misappropriation, or
defalcation while acting as an officer or in a
fiduciary capacity, though he may have ex-
pected that the loan would be repaid. Field
y. Howry, 94 N. W. 218, 214, 182 Mich. 687.
MISBEHAVIOR
The conduct of an Indian is not to be
held "misbehavior," Justifying his arrest, in
the absence of a law, rule, or regulation so
defining it. Ex parte Bi-A-Lil-Le, 100 Pac.
450, 451, 12 Ariz. 150.
The giving of false, vague, and evasive
testimony by an alleged bankrupt on his ex-
amination before a special commissioner,
with the intention of misleading the court
and concealing assets of his estate, is a "mis-
behavior," and constitutes a contempt, which
the district court has power to punish under
MISBI}HAVIOR IN OFFIOB
402
MISBRANB-MISBRANDINa
Rev. St i 726, on a sammary hearing without
a jury. Ex parte Bick, 155 FecL 908, 909.
MI8BEHAVIOB IN OiPFIOB
Bee, also, Mlscondact in Office; Misde-
meanor in Office.
A statute specitying acts **in respect to
a court of Justice or proceedings therein,"
constituting contempts, niLmlng ''misbehavior
in office'* or other willful neglect or viola-
tion of duty by a sheriff or other person
appointed or elected to perform a Judicial
or ministerial service, only includes misbe-
havior done "in respect to" such court or
some proceeding therein, and does not include
an unauthorised arrest not shown to be a
willful disobedience of any Judgment, order,
or process of the court Hutton v. Superior
Oourt of City and County of San Francisco.
81 Pac. 409, 411, 147 Cal. 150.
MISBRAND— MISBRANDING
An article long known and sold under Its
trade-name of "Coca-Cola," cannot be deemed
misbranded within the meaning of the Food
and Drugs Act (Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915, « 8,
[U. S. Comp. St Supp. 1909, p. 1191]), because
it does not contain any material element de-
rived from the leaves of the coca plant.
United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty
Kegs of Coca-Cola, 191 Fed. 431. 436.
A food product, labeled "Compound;
Pure Comb and Strained Honey and Com
Syrup," is not "misbranded," within the
meaning of Food and Drugs Act June 30,
1906, c. 3915, { 8, so that its shipment in
interstate commerce constituted a misdemean-
or thereunder, merely because the percentage
of corn syrup in the compound largely ex-
ceeds that of honey. United States v. Boeck-
mann, 176 Fed. 382.
An article composed of the compound of
vanllline, cumerin, spirits, sugar, coloring,
and water, and nlainly labeled on one side
with the words "Peerless Extract of Vanilla,"
and on the reverse side, in small letters, with
the words "Formula Vanllline Cumerin Spir-
its Sugar Coloring Water," is "misbranded,"
within Agricultural Law, {$ 164, 165, as
amended, declaring that an article shall be
deemed misbranded where it is an imitation
of, or offered for sale under the distinctive
name of, another article, and is not a mix-
ture or compound known under its own dis-
tinctive name, and not included under the
definition of misbranded articles of food
within the exception in section 165. People
V. James Butler, 118 N. Y. Supp. 849, 850,
134 App. Div. 151.
The Pure Food Law (Act June 30, 1906,
c. 8915) prohibits misbranding of articles of
food, and section 8 declares that the term
"misbranded" shall apply to all articles of
food, or articles which enter into the com-
position of food, the package or label of
which shall bear any statement, design, or
device, regarding su<di article, or the Ingred!
ents or substances contained therein, whid
shall be false or misleading in any partica
lar. Subdivision 4, par. 2, declares that ai
article of fbod which does not contain an]
poisonous or deleterious ingredients shall no
be deemed misbranded if labeled so as ti
plainly indicate that they .are compounds
imitations, or blends, etc, provided that tin
term "bloid" shall be construed to mean i
mixture of like substances. Held^ that tlM
proviso was not limited to cases where th<
blend was claimed without disclosing the In
gredients, but applied as well to cases when
the component parts of the blend were dis
closed, and hence a label attached to vinegar
which was in fact distilled vinegar to whid
a small quantity of pure boiled apple ddei
had been added for coloring, describing tin
substance as "Saratoga Brand vinegar, s
blend of pure boiled apple dder and distilled
vinegar," was misbranded as misleading th(
public to believe that It was composed ol
pure boiled apple dder vinegar and distiUed
vinegar. United States v. Ten Barrels ol
Vinegar, 186 Fed. 899, 401.
The federal pure food act of 1906 (Ad
June 30, 1906, c. 3915, { 2, prohibits the in
troduction into any state from another state
of food or drugs adulterated or branded with
in the meaning of the act By section €
the term "drug" is made to include all medi
dnes and preparations recognized in tbc
United States Pharmacopoeia or Nationa]
Formulary, and whisky is so recognized ii
both. By section 7 a "drug" Is to be deemed
adulterated if, when it is sold under a name
recognized In the United States Pharma
copceia or National Formulary, it differs from
a standard of strength, quallly, or purity u
determined by the test laid down in those
publications, unless the actual standard
thereof be plainly stated on the package.
Held that, where bottles containing intox-
icants are labeled as containing "mono-
gram whisky*' and marked "Blend," and the
alcoholic content is less, and the residaun
from 100 cubic centimeters is more, than the
standard test prescribed by such act, tbc
liquors are misbranded and adulterated with-
in the meaning thereof. State v. Intoxicating
Uquors, 76 AtL 268, 269, 106 Me. 135.
Defendant manufactured aymp from
cane sugar, flavored to represent maple syr-
up by the Introduction of an extract from
maple wood after it had been diopped down
The syrup was put up in bottles labeled
"Western Reserve Ohio Blended Maple Syr-
up," the words "Ohio" and "Maple Syrup" be-
ing in red, and between them the word Blend-
ed," and then below that in smaller type, the
statement **This syrup is made from the
sugar maple tree and cane sugar." Seld that
the label was misleading, in that purdiasera
would ordinarily understand that the artide
contained in part maple syrup made from
the boiled-down sap drawn from live maple
BdSBRAKD-^MISBRANDINa
403
M^fiCARRIAGB
trees, and that defendant was therefore
soilty of misbrandias. United States t.
Scanlon, 180 Fed. 486, 488.
Claimants operated a canning factory in
Benton Harbor, Mich^ where fruits grown
Ln Michigan, as well as in other states, were
canned and prepared for sale. Claimants
canned certain 'tepee*' apples and black-
berries, grown in Arkansas, sold nnder a
label on whicli was printed: "Tepee Apples
[or Blackberries, as the case might be].
Packed by C. H. Godfrey & Son, Benton Har-
bor and Waterrliet, Mldiigan." There was
&Tidence that Michigan apples and blackber-
ries were better tlian those grown in Arkan-
sas. Held, that the labels indicated that the
fruit was grown in Michigan, and that claim-
ants were therefore guilty of misbranding
in violation of Food and Drug Act CSong.
June dO, 1908, c SQIB. United States t. 100
Cases of Tepee Apples, 179 Fed. 985, 987.
"^Salad oU** prima fbde means olire oil,
and, in the absence of eyidenoe that the term
has recently acquired a more general mean-
ing to include other oils, its use without fur-
ther explanation on packages of cotton seed
oil shipped in Interstate commerce consti-
tutes a misbranding in yiolation of Food
and Drogs Act June 80, 1906, c. 8915, { 2.
Brina v. United States, 179 Fed. 873, 105 a
C. A. 658.
Ordinary Groton water drawn, from the
pipes in New York Gity filtered and bottled
after the addition of small quantities of min-
eral salts and carbonic acid gas, is not
''spring water,*' as the term is generally un-
derstood, and the labeling of the bottles as
spring water constitutes a misbranding with-
in the meaning of the food and drugs act
(Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915, | 8). United
States T. Morgan, 181 Fed. 587, 58a
The H. Oompany, at B^ansas Gity, Mo.,
on April 8, 1909, contracted to sell to the W.
Company at Ft Worth, Tex., 5;000 bushels of
No. 2 red wheat, according to the Missouri,
official state grades. On April 29, 1909, the
U. Company ordered the operator of a public
elevator where it stored its grain to ship to
the W. Company in fnllillment of this con-
tract No. 2 red wheat The operator loaded
and sent to the W. Company a car of wheat
After this wheat was loaded, the official in-
spector of the state of Missouri at Kansas
City inspected, adjudged, and certified this
wheat to be No. 2 red wheat. An iUToice
of it was forwarded to the W. Company dat-
ed Biay 8, 1909, Showing that it was sliipped
under the contract of April 3, 1909, and sub-
ject to Kansas City weights and grades.
The wheat arrived in Texas without change.
The Texas inspector, Hbe federal inspector,
and other witnesses th^ found it to be, and
It was, wheat of another and less valuable
grade. None of the officers or employ^ of
the H. Company had any knowledge of this
fact, or anything ]to do with the grading or,
shipping, except to order the operator of the
public elevator to ship No. 2 red wheat
Held, that H. Company was not guilty of
misbranding or of adulterating within the
meaning of sections 7 and 8 of the Pure
Food Act (Act June 30, 1906, c. 3915). HaU-
Baker Grain Go. v. United States, 198 Fed.
614, 617, 117 a G. A. 318; United States v.
Seventy-Five Boxes of Alleged Pepper, 198
Fed. 934, 987.
False and misleading statements in the
labels on a proprietary medicine as to its
curative or remedial effects, but which do
not import any statement concerning Iden-
tity, are not "ndsbranding," within the mean-
ing of the food and drugs act of June 30,
1906, c. 3915, I 8, which defines that term as
applicable to all drugs or articles of food,
the package or label of which shall bear any
statement design, or device regarding such
article or the Infi^^ients or substances con-
tained therein which shall be false or mis-
leading in any particular. United States v.
Johnson, 81 Sup. Gt 627, 221 U. 8. 488, 55 L.
Bd. 823.
MISCARRIAGE
See Debt, Default, or Miscarriage of An-
other.
la atedieal JarlsyradeaMBe — Abortioa
The word "Abortion,*' when used in Judi-
cial proceedings, necessarily Implies that the
crime was committed on a woman with child,
and is synonymous with "miscarriage** in its
primary meaning. Marmaduke v. People, 101
Pac. 337, 338, 45 Colo. 357.
In strictness, abortion is not of itself a
crime, since the word ''miscarriage** in its
legal acceptation does not necessarily include
the destruction of the child before birth ; nor
is a design to cause its miscarriage the same
thing as a design to destroy the child. State
ex reL Gaston v. Shields, 130 S. W. 298, 301,
230 Mo. 91.
Decedent having applied for insurance
in a mutual benefit society, answered that she
had never had any local disease, personal in-
jury, or illness of any kind, but In answer to
the medical questions stated that her last
confinement was In 1908, and that she had
had two miscarriages from overexertion. In
an action on the certificate, it was shown
that in 1903, about seven years prior to de-
cedent's death, she suffered Sn abortion when
she was about three months advanced in
pregnancy, and that about three years later
another occurred at about the same stage.
Held, that since the words "abortion** and
"miscarriage" are synonymous, both meaning
premature parturition, there was no breach
of warranty or misrepresentation. Royal
Neighbors of America v. Bratcher (7ex.) 151
S.W.885, 886.
MISOELLANT
404
MISOONDUOr
MISCELLANY
If Storage aooonnts against whisky in
bond are not assessable as "accounts," they
are assessable under the title "miscellany" of
Ky. -St i 4058, making subject to taxation
the "value of all of the property not men-
tioned above"; that item being placed in the
statute to effectuate section 4050, requiring
that, if there be no appropriate column for
the statement and valuation Qf property, it
shall be valued in the column headed "Mis-
cellany." Commonwealth v. Kentucky Dis-
tilleries & Warehouse Co., 136 S. W. 1032,
1039, 143 Ey. 314.
MISCHIEF
See Malicious Mischlet
MISCONDUCT
See Official Misconduct; Willful Miscon-
duct
His own official misconduct, see His.
See, also, Malconduct
"Misconduct" is defined as ''wrong con-
duct; bad behavior; mismanagement" The
synonyms are "misbehavior; misdemeanor;
mismanagement; misdeed; delinquency; of-
fense." The verb "misconduct" is defined:
"To conduct a&iss; to mismanage." Bailey
V. Examining & Trial Board of Police De-
partment of aty of Helena, 122 Pac. 67% 674,
46 Mont 197.
"Misconduct" is defined as improper con-
duct, wrong behavior. The sense in which
the word is used in a threat by an attorney
to expose "misconduct" of his client is a
question of fact for the court Bar Ass'n of
Oity of Boston ▼. Hale, 88 N. B. 885, 887, 107
Mass. 428.
"'Misconduct* of the prevailing party"
as a statutory ground for a new trial is not
confined to something occurring at the trial,
but includes acts amounting to misconduct,
which, though they occurred before, operate
at the trial. Pharea v. Krfaut, 91 Pac 62,
63, 76 Kan. 23&
Attorney
The attorney for an administrator had,
prior to the administrator's appointment, ar-
ranged to borrow money of him, and after
the appointment the administrator withdrew
from the bank funds belonging to the estate,
which funds were deposited by the attorney
in his own bank to his own credit: a part
being used to cover an overdraft The attor-
ney then gave the administrator a check for
a part of the funds, a note for the balance,
and paid him $50 in cash for making the
loan. Held, that the attorney was guilty of
"misconduct" within Code Civ: Proc. { 67, au-
thorizing suspension from practice of attor-
neys therefor. In re Freedman, 99 N, Y.
Supp. 135, 186, 113 App. Div. 327.
''Misconduct" of attorney, as used in PoL
Code Alaska, | 748, authorising suspension or
disbarment therefor, is not confined to mis-
conduct in the attorney's relation to his
client, but includes as well misconduct to-
ward the court or a Judge in or out of court
Cobb V. United States, 172 Fed. 641, 643, 96
0. 0. A. 477.
For an attorney to publish and advertise
a pamphlet, the purpose of which is to at-
tract nonresidents to the state to apply to
its courts for divorce, through his agency as
an attorney, that he may profit financially
thereby, is "misconduct," within Comp. Laws,
I 2625, providing for removal or suspension
of attorneys for misconduct In re Schnitzer,
112 Pae 848, 851, 88 Nov. 681, 88 L. B. ▲.
(N. S.) 941.
Corporate offloer
The use of the word "misconduct" of offi-
cers of a corporation in an application for a
removal of a receiver does aot denote person-
al wrong, but merely that the business was
not conducted properly; and while there may
be some blame, or censure connected with it,
it is not actionable ag libeL Lebovltch ▼. Jos-
eph Levy & Bros. Oa, 64 South. 978^ 981« 128
La. 618.
The issuance of stock by officers of a cor-
poration without authority from the direc-
tors, and without consideration fiowing to the
oorporations, is misconduct, within Code Civ.
Proc. I 1781, authorising the removal of of-
ficers, etc^ for misconduct towards the cor-
poration. People V. Lyon, 104 N. Y. Supp.
319« 119 App. DiT. 861; Id., 82 N. B. 1130,
189 N. Y. 644.
Ezeontor
It is "misconduct" rendering the execu-
tor ''unfit" for the execution of his office, for
which his letters may be revoked (Code Civ.
Proc. i 2685, subd. ^, where he claims the
benefits of a contract between himself and
testator, as to which there was strong evi-
dence that testator was of unsound mind at
the time of its execution, and by which the
executor secured great pecuniary advantage,
to the detriment of the estate. In re Glea-
son's Estate, 41 N. Y. Supp. 418^ 428, 17 Misc.
Rep. 510.
Jnror or Jitry
After the jury is sworn, misconduct on
the part of an individual Juror is misconduct
of the Jury. State v. Mott, 74 Pac. 728. 730,
29 Mont 292.
"Misconduct" of a Juror whidi is
statutory ground for a new trial is mis-
conduct while he is such Juror, and has no
reference to what he has done before he la
sworn to try the case ; and therefore a state-
ment by a Juror, before being sworn as a Ju-
ror, that accused was guilty and ought to be
punished, is not such "misconduct" as would
be ground for a new trial. People v. Em-
mons, 95 Pac. 1082, 1089, 7 Cal. App. 686.
MISOONDUOT
406
MISCONDUCT IN OFFICB
The fact that the Jury made incorrect
or untrue answers to special interrogatories
returned with their general verdict is not
"misconduct of the jury," within the meaning
of a statute providing that a new trial may
be granted for misconduct of the Jury. BL
O'Connor Co. ▼• Gillaspy, 83 N. B. 738, 741,
170 Ind. 428.
Mi800]n>voT nr offiob
See, also. Misbehavior in Office; Mis-
demeanor in Office.
^'Misconduct in office" includes such acts
as amount to a breach of the good faith and
of the right action that are tacitly required
of all officers. Etzler v. Brown, 60 South.
4ie, 417, 418, 58 Fla. 221, 138 Am. St Rep.
113.
''Misconduct in office" in its penal sense
is any act or omission in breach of a duty
of public concern by one who has accepted
public ofiice, providing his act is willful and
corrupt and is not Judicial. United States
V. Haas, 1B7 Fed. 211, 214 (adopting defini-
tion in Bish. New Cr. Law, (( 459, 400).
The phrase "misconduct in office" is
broad enough to Include any willful mal-
feasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance in of-
fice (citing State ex reL lilley v. Slover,
113 Mo. 208, 20 S. W. 788). It does not neo-
essarily imply corruption or criminal inten-
tion. The official doing of a wrongful act, or
official neglect to do an act which ought to
have been done, will constitute the offense^
although there was no corrupt or malicious
motive (citing Mechem, Public Officers, { 457) .
After defining "misconduct," Webster declares
it to be synonymous with "misbehavior,"
"misdemeanor," "delinquency," and "offense."
Pen. Code, { 758, provides that an accusation
against any municipal officer fbr "willful or
corrupt misconduct in office" may be pre-
sented by the grand Jury. Section 772 pro-
vides for the summary removal of public
officers on an accusation verified by the oath
of any person alleging that the officer has
"neglected or refused to perform the offi-
cial duties pertaining to his office." Section
335 declares every public officer who refuses
or neglects to inform against and prosecute
persons whom he has reasonable cause to
believe offenders against the chapter on gam-
bling, guilty of a misdemeanor. Under the
definitions and statutory provisions recited
above^ a public officer who fails to proseeute
gamblers of whom he has knowledge is guilty
of "willful misconduct" within the meaning
of section 758, and may be accused by the
ffrand Jury thereunder. Coffey v. Superior
Court of Sacramento County, 82 Pac. 75, 70,
77, 147 Cal. 525.
"Misconduct in office" means any unlaw-
ful misbehavior in regard to the duties of an
office, willful in its character. A county com-
missioner, who, without willfulness or a cor-
rupt motive, but through ignorance disre-
gards the provisions of a statute regulating
the exercise of his official duties, is not
thereby guilty of "misconduct in office," with-
in the meaning of section 0915» Rev. St, which
prescribes a fine and the forfeiture of office
for such misconduct State ▼. Bair, 73 N. E.
514, 516, 71 Ohio St 410.
A charge against a chief of police of
"misconduct in office" includes any act in-
volving moral turpitude, or any act which is
contrary to Justice, honesty, principle, or
good morals, if performed by virtue or au-
thority of office. State ex rel. Wynne v. Ex-
amining and Trial Board of Police Depart-
ment of City of Butte, 117 Pac. 77, 78, 43
Mont 389, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 143.
Where a policeman, a married man,
while not on duty called upon a married wo-
man at her home in the absence of her hus-
band, and, the husband returning unexpected-
ly, the policeman secreted himself in a bed-
room, where he was found by« the husband
and driven from the house, the conduct of
the policeman was "misconduct," within a
statute providing that officers will not be re-
movable at will for political reasons or for
any other cause than "incapacity, misconduct,
nonresidence, or disobedience of Just rules
and regulations." Winters v. Board of Police
(Dom'rs of Jersey aty, 71 Aa 50, 51, 77 N. J.
Law, 153.
The complaint against a police captain,
alleging that a merchant complained to the
officer of an obstruction, consisting of a stone
step on the sidewalk in front of a certain
house, and that the officer told him nothing
could be done for him unless he would swear
out a warrant is sufficient to charge the of-
fenses of misconduct in office and incompe-
tency, triable under Rev. Codes, | 3309, by
the police trial board, in view of a police reg-
ulation requiring an officer, to whom com-
plaint is made, to remedy the matter, or, if
he cannot do so at once, to make a memo-
randum at police headquarters of the com-
plaint so that it may receive proper atten-
tion. Bailey v. Examining and Trial Board
of Police Department of City of Helena, 122
Pac. 672, 573, 45 Mont 197.
Where a deputy county auditor in Min-
nesota authorized by law to act in the name
of his principal and for whose official acts
the auditor and his bondsmen were responsi-
ble to the county, and to any person injured
by his "misconduct in office" (Gen. St Minn.
1894, §1 710, 5951), issued spurious refund
orders on the county treasurer in favor of
fictitious payees, purporting to be for the
refunding of taxes received through redemp-
tion from tax sales, and procured the orders
to be authenticated by the cbairmah of the
board of county commissioners and forged
the names of the fictitious payees to assign-
ments thereof and sold them to a bank, any
loss sustained by the bank through its pur^
MJSCJONDUCT IN OPriOJB
406
MISDEMBANOB
chase could not be attrlbatable to tbe ofDcial
"misconduct In office** of tbe deputy in Issuing
tbe same, but the proximate cause was his
Individual act in forging the assignments and
selling the orders as genuine, and, as tiie or-
ders were nonnegotlable, the bank was put on
inquiry, and acquired no greater rights than
tiie supposed payees, and had no claim to re-
cover any loss either from the county or from
the sureties on the auditor's bond. National
Surety CJo. v. State Savings Bank, 156 Fed.
21, 25, 84 C. O. A. 187, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.)
155, 13 Ann. Cas. 421.
A deputy county auditor in Minnesota,
authorized by law to act in the name of his
principal and for whose official acts the au-
ditor and his bondsmen were responsible, not
only to the county, but to any person injured
by his '^misconduct in office" (Gen. St Minn.
1894, §S 710, 5951), Issued spurious refund
orders on the county treasurer in favor of
fictitious payees, purporting to be for the re-
funding of invalid tax sale certificates. He
procured the orders to be authenticated by the
chairman of the county board, and they were
presented to the county treasurer, who in-
dorsed thereon that there were no funds avail-
able, but that they would be paid v^th 7 per
cent, interest when there was money in the
treasury for the purpose. Such deputy forged
the names of the fictitious payees to assign-
ments and sold the orders to a state savings
bank, to which they were paid by the treas-
urer with Interest a year later. The deputy
auditor bore a good reputation, and his integ-
rity had never previously been questioned.
The bank was expressly authorized by stat-
ute to invest funds in such orders, and had
done so before in the usual course of busi-
ness. On discovering the forgeries, the coun-
ty brought suit on the auditor's bond and re-
covered a judgment which was paid by the
surety, which then brought suit against the
bank. Held that, although the orders were
not negotiable, the bank was not chargeable
with any negligence in their purchase, but
that the loss was one caused by the "mis-
conduct in office" of the deputy auditor for
which the surety was liable, and that it could
not recover over against the bank. National
Surety Co. v. Arosln, 198 Fed. 605, 606, 117
O. 0. A, 813.
MISDELIVERY
"Misdelivery" of goods is the same as a
total failure to deliver them at all, and is
deemed a conversion of the property by the
carried. Leaving goods at the wrong place
may constitute a misdelivery and conversion
of them, as well as delivering them to the
wrong person. Cleveland, C, C. & St L. By.
Co. V. C. & A. Potts & Co., 71 N. B. ©85, 689,
33 Ind. App. 564 (citing Elliott, Railroads, |
1526; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. O'Donnell, 32
N. B. 476, 49 Ohio St 489, 21 L. B. A. 117, 34
Am. St Bep. 579 ; Houston ^ T. C. By. Co.
V. Adams, 49 Tex. 748, 80 Am. Bep. 11(
Jetfersonville B. Ca v. White, 69 Ky. I
Bush] 251 ; Claflln ▼. Boston & I4. B. Co., {
Mass. [7 Allen] 341).
MISDEMEANOR
See Cases of Misdemeanor; High Crim(
and Misdemeanors.
"A 'misdemeanor' is an act commltte
or omitted in violation of the public law, e
ther forbidding or commanding it" Cod
monwealth v. B. L Sherman Bifg. Co^ 75 I
E. 71, 72, 189 Mass. 76, 4 Ann. Caa. 2(
(quoting and adopting definition in 4 Blad
Com. 5).
''Misdemeanor" la generally nnderstoo
to mean the lower criminal offense, as di
tlnguished from a f^ony. United States ^
Stevenson, 30 Sup. Ot 35, 87, 215 U. S. 19(
54 L. Bd. 153.
A "misdemeanor^ la misconduct or 01
fense inferior to a felony. People ▼. Butt
105 N. T. Supp. 677, 678, 121 App. DIt. 22(
A "misdemeanor^ la a ndnor crime whk
does not amount to a felcmy. State ▼. D<
ran, 50 AtL 440, 441, 99 Me. 829, 105 Am. 8
B^. 27&
A "misdemeanor" la defined to be an ii
dlctable offense which does not amount to
felony. State t. MeUes, 42 South. 199, 20(
117 La. 656; United States v. Zarafonitii
150 Fed. 97, 101, 80 C. C. A. 51, 10 Ann. Cai
290 (quoting 4 Chitty, Blackstone, 6, an
note).
A "misdemeanor" is an offense punlshi
ble by fine or imprisonment in the count
JaU only. SUte v. Wilson, 126 & W. 99(
140 Mo. Ai^. 726.
A "misdemeanor" la defined l^ Bev. 8
1899, I 2395, to mean every offense punist
able only by a fine or imprisonment in
county Jail, or both. State ex reL Bntltf ^
Foster, 86 S. W. 245, 248, 187 Mo. 59a
"Bflsdemeanors," in the state of Indiani
are such wrongs of a public nature as ar
punished by criminal proceedings in tli
name of the state. The charges must be pn
ferred upon oath in the form of an afSdavii
information, or indictment The process i
a vrarrant, and it is served by arresting tli
person of the defendant The poniahment 1
all except capital cases is by fine or Imprii
onment or disfranchisement, or by two 0
more of these, and, whenever it la by fln
only, the defendant stands committed untJ
the fine la paid or bail la entered. Adam
Express Co. t. State, 67 N. B. 1033, 1039, 16
Ind. 328.
The word "misdemeanor,** aa used 1
Charter of City of Kingston, | 61, providin
that certain persons shall be punished a<
cording to the provlsiona of the Code c
Criminal Procedure as for misdemeanor, ii
eludes the whole class of Crimea bearing tba
MISDEMEANOB
407
MISDEMSANOB
name. People ▼. Schermerhorn, 112 N. Y.
Supp. 222, 223, 69 Misc. Rep. 146.
BfaUdomly tbreatenlng to accnie anoUi-
er of crime is a '"mlBdemeanor." Schvltx ▼.
State, 116 N. W. 259, 264, 185 Wis. 614 (dis-
a»itins opinion of Judge Timlin, citing Bout.
Uiw Diet; Stat 1898, | 4880).
To solicit the commission of an otfense
whidi is a fel(Hi7 is a ''misdemeanor" at
common law, and it is immaterial wliether
the offense wMch is solicited is made a fel-
ony by act of Pariiament or by the common
law. One who solicits that he be bribed so-
licits the commission of a felony and is
therefore guilty of a conmion-law "misde-
meanor.'* State T. Snilivan, 84 S. W. 105,
109, no Mo. App. 76 (distlngalshing State ▼.
Priestley, 74 Mo. 24, State y. Harney, 14 S.
W. 657, 101 Mo. 470).
B. A O. Gomp. I 1067, snbd. 1, authorises
disbarment on an attorney's conrictlon of
felony or misdemeanor involying moral tur-
pitude, and makes the conviction record con-
dusire evidence. Held, that the words "fel-
ony" and "misdemeanor" were used in their
statutory sense, and, there being no offense
known to the state law as "conspiracy to
suborn perjury," an attorney's conviction of
such offense in a federal court was not con-
clusive evidence, in a disbannent proceedlD'?,
of his conmaission of an act warranting dis-
barment State ▼. Biggs» 97 Pae. TLB, 714, 62
Or. 438.
Felony distinsaisl&ed
See Felony.
Assavlt
Under Bevisal 1905, i 3621, making it a
felony for one to maliciously assault another
with a deadly weapon by waylaying, etc.,
and section 3291, defining a misdemeanor as
an offense not punishable by death or im-
prisonment in the state's prison, and Acts
1870-71, p. 94, c 43, punishing by fine or im-
prisonment a person convicted of an assault,
with or without intent to kiU, a prosecution
for an assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill is a prosecution for a misde-
meanor, and not for malicious mischief, de-
fined by section 2676 as willfully injuring
personal property with malice to the owner,
and is bcurred in two years by section 3147,
providing that all misdemeanors, except for
''malicious mischief, and other malicious
misdemeanors," shall be presented within
two years after the commission of the same,
the words "other malicious misdemeanors"
being intended to describe an offense of
which maUce is a necessary ingredient, as in
the case of malicious mischief. State v.
Frisbee^ 65 S. B. 722, 724, 142 N. C. 671.
Contempt
A contempt proceeding. is classified as a
misdemeanor, and not as a felony. Bullock
Blectric & Mfg. Co. v. Westlnghouse Elec-
tric & Mf^ CkK, 129 Fed. 106, 107, 68 a a
A. 607.
Ky. St I 1127, divides aU crimes into
fdonies and misdemeanors, defining ''fislo-
nies" as offenses punishable with death or
confinement in the penitentiary, and *'misde-
meanors" as all other offenses, whether at
common law or by statute. Chapter 36, art
4, subd. 6 (chapter 15, art 12), classifies a
contempt as a misdemeanor. Section 1188
(section 241) provides that prosecutions by
the commonwealth to recover a penalty for
violation of any penal statute shall be com-
menced within one year after the right to
such penalty accrued, with immaterial ex-
ceptions. Held that, criminal contempt be-
ing a misdemeanor, and the punishment
therefor regulated by statute, a prosecution
therefor is a prosecution by the common-
wealth to recover a penalty, within section
1138, barred by limitations after one year
from the time that the penalty accrued.
(Gordon v. Commonwealth, 133 & W. 206^
208, 141 Ky. 461.
CHmlaalUba
Criminal libel is a 'Misdemeanor,*' with-
in Code, i 7, defining a misdemeanor to be
any public off^ise, the punishment for which
is not death or confinement in the peniten-
tiary, and hence, under the express provi-
sions of section 184, the trial may be had in
the absence of defendant Walston v. Com-
monwealth (Ey.) 102 S. W. 276.
Beievriac wltaess f veat apyearias o«
BtvlaK evideaee
Rev. St 1899, f 2041, provides that every
person who shall by bclbery or other means
deter a witness from appearing or giving evi-
dence in any cause shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor, and that, if the cause be a
prosecution for a felony, the person so offend-
ing shall be punished by Imprisonment in the
penitentiary for two years, or in the county
Jail, or by fine. Section 2393 provides that
the term *'felony" shall be construed to mean
any offense punishable with imprisonment in
the penitentiary or with death, and by section
2395 the term "misdemeanor" is to be con-
strued as Including every offense punishable
only by fine or imprisonment In the county
Jail, or both. Held, that an offense within
the proviso of section 2041 is a misdemeanor,
though punishable by imprisonment in the
penitentiary. State ex rel. Butler v. Foster,
86 S. W. 245, 248, 187 Mo. 590.
Obstmotiag street
Under Rev. Laws, e 215, | 1, defining a
'"felony" as a crime punishable by death or
state imprisonment, and making other offens-
es misdemeanors, violation by a railroad com-
pany of St 1906» c 463, pt 2, { 166, by ob-
structing a street, being punishable by a fine
only, is a ''misdemeanor." C!ommonwealth
V. New York Cent & H. R. R.O0., 92 N. S.
76C, 768, 206 Masa 417, 19 Ann. Qas. 62a
i
MISDEMEAKOR
408
MIBDEMEANOB
PoMesslon mmd sale ' of oovAterf elt
trade-marlui and labels
The offense of haTlng in possession and
selling counterfeit trade-marks and labels,
in violation of Pen. Code, { 364, subd. 4, is a
"misdemeanor,'' and hence defendants, act^
ing in concert in the commission of snch of-
fense, may be properly tried together. Peo-
ple T. Strauss, 88 N. Y. Supp. 40, 43, 94 Appi
DiT. 453.
VasTiuaoy
"Vagrancy,** as defined in Pen. Oode, |
647, snbd. 6, declaring guilty of vagrancy
every idle, lewd, or dissolute person, or asso-
ciate of known thieves, or every person who
wanders about the streets, at late or unusual
hours of the night, without any visible or
lawful business, though it cannot be commit-
ted by a single act observable at one time, is
a "misdemeanor" that can be committed "in
the presence" of an officer, so as to Justify
him, under sections 836-^0, in arresting him
without a warrant. Defendant, for the pur-
pose of rebutting the evidence of his vagran-
cy, which was claimed to have existed to the
knowledge of the officer arresting him, so as
to Justify the arrest without a warrant, hav-
ing testified that he had a lease, covering
several months prior and up to the time of
the arrest, of a certain tenement, which he
had sublet to prostitutes, and that he had in
the meantime purchased a mining location,
on which he intended to go as soon as the
lease expired, may, for the purpose of show-
ing that he had no lawful business, which
fact, in connection with his wandering about
the streets at late and unusual hours of the
night, would constitute him a vagrant under
Pen. Oode, i 647, subd. 6, be required on
cross-examination to testify that during the
running of his lease he had no other business
except gambling. People v. Oraig, 91 Pac.
997, 1001, 152 Cal. 42.
ViolatioB. of anti-tnui law
St 1907, p. 984, c. 530, i 1, defining
"trusts," and for a violation thereof provid-
ing a fine of not less than $50 nor more than
$5,000, or imprisonment not less than six
months nor more than a year, or both, pre-
scribes a "misdemeanor," since under Pen.
Code, §§ 16, 17, a "felony" is a crime punish-
able by death or by imprisonment in the state
prison, and every other crime is a "misde-
meanor." Union Ice Co. v. Rose, 104 Pac.
1006, 1007, 11 Oal. App. 357.
Violation of immigration law
Immigration Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134,
{ 4, provides that "it shall be a misdemeanor"
for any person to prepay the transportation
or in any way to assist or encourage the im-
portation of any contract laborer into the
United States. Section 5 provides that for
every violation of section 4 the persons know-
ingly violating the same "shall forfeit and
pay for every 'such offense the sum of $1,000,
which may be sued for and recovered by the
United States or by any person who sha
first bring his action therefor," etc HeU
that section 4 defines m criminal offense, an
that, although the act provides no crimini
punishment therefor, an indictment will U
under Bev. St { 6440, for a conspiracy t
commit such offense. United States v. Tsol
as, 163 Fed. 129, 130, 131.
Violation of lioonso law
A violation of a license law is a "misdi
meaner." Perry v. BCan, 1 R. I. 268, 265.
Violation of liqnor law
The offense of manufacturing, selliiij
bartering, giving away, or otherwise furnist
ing any intoxicating liquor of any kind, ii
eluding beer, ale, and wine, contrary to tli
provisions of the prohibition article of tti
Constitution, is a "misdemeanor." Ex part
Cain, 93 Pac 974, 976, 20 OkL 125.
Since the punishment for retailing splri
uous liquors is that fixed for a misdemeano;
under Revisal 1905, | 3291, providing that
"felony" is a crime punishable by either deat
or imprisonment in the state's prison, an
that any other crime is a "misdemeanor," Ui
word "feloniously," in a warrant chargin
that accused unlawfully, willfully, and fel<
niously retailed spirituous liquors, is supei
fluous. State v. Shine, 62 S. E. 1080, 10&
149 N. C. 480.
An ordinance entitled "An ordinance coi
corning misdemeanors" is sufficiently broad t
cover a provision prohibiting any one froi
engaging in any calling on Sunday, or froi
keeping open any place of business, or froi
permitting persons to resort thereto for tt
purpo'se of drinking intoxicating liquors o
Sunday. Town of Lovilia v. Cbbb, 102 N. V
496, 497, 126 Iowa, 557.
Violation of atnnioipal ordinaneo a
Fosolntion
The violation of a municipal ordinaD(
is not a "misdemeanor," within the meanio
of Pen. Code 1895, {| 2, 31, defining felony an
misdemeanor, since those sections of tb
Code relate only to offenses against the pul
lie laws of the state and not to infractions (
local laws of municipalitieB. Pearson '
WimMsh, 52 S. E. 751, 755, 124 Ga. 701,
Ann. Cas. 501.
The word "misdemeanor," in statute
conferring power on municipal corporatioii
is not synonymous with the same term t
used at common law, or in general statut<
defining offenses against the state, but hi
a more restricted meaning, and is limited 1
offenses against the smaller local goven
ment; and, while an offense against a dt
may also be an offense against the stat
there are many offenses against municipal
ties which are not offenses against the stat
and which the legislative bodies of the muoi<
ipalities are authorized to define and declai
by ordinance, subject to the condition tbi
the ordinance is not in conflict with the Ooi
HIBDSMEAKOR
409
MISFXAfiAKCB
Btltatioii or general laws, or the charter, and
la not nnreasonahle. O'Havw v. Montyeni-
ery. 111 8. W. 440, 4fi0, 120 TttUL 448, 137
Am. 8t Bep. 1014.
Every offense punishable by fine or Im-
prisonment, or both, is at least a "misde-
meanor*' which concerns the state at large
and not specially any municipality. A viola-
tion of the resolution of the board of health
of a town in Milwaukee county outside the
city of Milwaukee, which prohibits the bring-
ing therein of garbage, and which provides
that any violation thereof shall be punishable
under St 1898, § 4608, making any person
violating any regulation of any board of
health punisliable by imprisonment in the
county Jail or by a fine, is a "misdemeanor,**
within Laws 1809, a 218, | 6, taking away
from the Justice of the peace of Milwaukee
county Jurisdiction of criminal actions, in-
cluding misdemeanors, arising in the county,
triable before a Justice of the peace. Stolt-
man v. Lake^ 102 N. W. 920, 921, 124 Wis.
462 (citing City of Oshkosh v. Schwartz, 18
N. W. 552, 65 WU 483).
A resolution of the board of health of a
town in Milwaukee county outside the city of
Milwaukee prohibits the bringing therein of
garbage, etc., and provides that any violation
thereof shall he punishable under Bev. St
1886, I 4606, whidi makes any person who
shall violate any order or regulation of any
board of health punishable by imprisonment
in the county Jail not more than three months
or by a fine not exceeding $100. Rev. St
1898, c. 142, 1 8294, provides that in all cases
not otherwise specially provided for by law,
where a forfeiture shall be incurred, and the
act or <Hnis8ion for which the same is impos-
ed shall not also be a misdemeanor, such f or^
feiture may be sued for and recovered in a
dvll action; that when such act or omission
is punishable by fine and imprisonment, or
by fine or imprisonment, or is specially de-
clared by law to be a misdemeanor, it shall
be deemed a misdemeanor within the chapter,
and that the word "forfeiture," as used in the
chapter, shall include any p^ialty in money or
goods other than a fine. H^d, that a violation
of the resolution is a misdemeanor, within
Uw8 1899, p. 350, c. 218, $ 5; taking away from
Justices of the peace of Milwaukee county
Jurisdiction of criminal actions, including mis-
demeanors arising in the county otherwise tri-
able before a Justice of the peace, so as to
deprive a justice of the peace of Jurisdiction
thereof notwithstanding the amendment of
Laws 1899, p. 859, c. 218, { 5, by Laws 1901.
p. 80, c. 70, 1 1, and Laws 1908, p. 613, c. 388,
adding thereto that nothing therein contained
•ball be construed to deprive any Justice of
tbe peace of any town in Milwaukee county,
except <Mily the dty of Blllwaukee, of juris-
diction of complaints for the violation of any
ordhiance of any such town. Stoltman v.
^wn of Lake^ 102 N. W. 920, 921, 124 Wis.
462.
■MBAJfOm ZH omcB
Within a statute providing that if any
clerk shall knowingly and willingly do any
act contrary to the duties of his ofllce, or
diall knowingly and willfully fail to per-
form any act or duty required of him by law,
he shall be deemed guilty of a "misdemeanor
in ofllce,*' and authorising his removal on in-
formation that he has been guilty of a "mis-
demeanor in oflnce," the circuit Judge is with-
out Jurisdicticm to remove a clerk of the
circuit court from ofllce because he had been
infonned against for murder wholly discon-
nected with his office. State ex rel. Henson
v. Shei^>ard« 91 & W. 477, 480, 482» 192 Mo.
497.
MISFEASANCE
** ^Misfeasance' is the improper doing of
an act which a person might lawfully do."
It is a failure to use, in the performance of
a duty owing to an individual, that degree
of care, skill, and diligence which the dr-
cumstances of the case reasonably demanded.
State, to Use of Cardin, v. McOlellan, 85 S.
W. 267, 268, 113 Tenn. 616, 8 Ann. Cas. 992.
A "misfeasance" la the failure to do
something imposed upon the persoQ by law
as a reasonable member of society, or the
failure to use reasonable care and dilissnce in
the performance of a duty imposed by con-
tract whidi results in an injury to a third
person. Irvin v. Callaway, 55 8. B. 1089,
1040, 127 Oa. 246 (citing Southern By. Ck>. v.
Grizsle, 58 S. BL 244, 124 Oa. 787, UO Am.
St Bep. 191).
" 'Misfeasance* is the performance of an
act in an improper manner, whereby some
one receives an injury." The directors of
a county fair association failing to securely
protect patrons of the grand stand from in-
juries by a wild ball pitched or batted In
the game, one of the amusements of the
county fair, are not liable to such patrons as
for misfeasance. Williams v. Dean, 111 N.
W. 931, 983, 134 Iowa, 210, U Ll R A. (N. S.)
410.
IVoaf easaaee distlsciilslied
"Nonfeasance" is doing nothing, while
"misfeasance" is doing improperly. Stiewel
V. Borman, 87 8. W. 404, 406. 63 Ark. 30, 36.
"Misfeasance" is the performance of an
act, which might lawfully be done, in an im-
proper manner, resulting in injury to another,
while "nonfeasance" is the nonperformance of
an act which should be performed. Haynes'
Adm*rs v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. C6.
140 S. W. 176, 179, 145 Ky. 209, Ann. Gas.
1913B, 719.
"Bilsfeasance" is the improper doing of
an act, as distingutahed from "nonfeasance,**
which is the total omission to do an act If
a party makes a gratuitous engagement, ac-
tually enters upon the execution of the busi-
ness, and does It amiss throni^ want of due
lOSFEASANCE
410
MISFBASANGB
care, by which danger ensues to the other
party,, an action will lie for misfeasance. It
has been held that misfeasance may involve to
some extent the idea of not doing, as where
an agent, while engaged in the performance
of his undertaking, does not do something
which it is his duty to do under the cir-
cumstanceS; as, for instance, when he does
not exercise that care which a due regard
for the right of the other party requires.
Such negligence as would be actionable in
any relation of life is "misfeasance** by not
doing. Southern Ry. Ck). v. Rowe, 59 S. E.
462, 466, 2 Ga. App. 557.
"A distinction ordinarily is taken be-
tween acts of 'misfeasance,* or positive
wrongs, and 'nonfeasance,' or mere omissions
of duty. The master is always liable to third
persons for the misfeasances of his servants
in all cases within the scope of his employ-
ment The principal is also liable to third
persons for like misfeasances of his agent
The agent is also liable to third persons for
his own misfeasances and positive wrongs,
but he is not liable to third persons for his
own nonfeasances or omissions of duty in
the course of his employment His liability,
in such cases, is to his principal. The dis-
tinction between misfeasance and nonfeas-
ance, between acts of direct positive wrongs
and mere neglects of agents as to their per-
sonal liabilty, seems to be founded on this
ground. No authority whatever from a su-
perior to an inferior can furnish the latter a
Just defense for his own positive wrongs or
trespasses, for no man can authorize another
to do a positive wrong. But in respect to
nonfeasances, or mere neglects in the per-
formance of duty, the responsibility therefor
must arise from some express or implied ob-
ligation between particular parties standing
in privity of law or contract with each other,
and no man is bound to answer for any such
violations of duty or obligation except to
those to whom he has become directly bound
or amenable for his conduct*' Bryce v.
Southern R. Co., 125 Ped. 958, 962 (quoting
and adopting definitions in Story, Ag. [9th Ed.]
tS 308, 309).
"Misfeasance" and "nonfeasance," as
used in connection with the acts of agents,
is often difficult of determination. ''Mis-
feasance** means a positive wrong. It may
involve also, to some extent, the idea of not
doing, as where the agent, while engaged in
the performance of his undertaking, does not
do something which it was his duty to do
under the circumstances. The distinction to
be observed between mere nonfeasance and
misfeasance was considered in Osborne v.
Morgan, 130 Mass. 103 (39 Am. Rep. 437),
where the court said: "It is often said in
the books that an agent is responsible to
third persons for misfeasance only, and not
for nonfeasance. And it is doubtless true
that if an agent never does anything towards
carrying out his contract with his principal,
but wholly omits and neglects to do so, tl
principal is the only person who can mail
tain any action against him for the nonfe
sance. But, if the agent once actually uj
dertakes and enters upon the execution (
a particular work, it is his duty to use rei
sonable care in the manner of executing i
so as not to cause any injury to third persoi
which may be the natural consequence of hi
acts ; and he cannot, by abandoning its en
cution midway and leaving things in a dai
gerous condition, exempt himself from lii
bility to any person who suffers injury t
reason of his having so left them withoi
proper safeguards. This is not nonfeasane
or doing nothing, but it is misfeasance, doiii
improperly.'* Where an agent has complel
control of a tenement house, and construd
a new walk in the court, leaving a large hoi
in the walk, and plaintiff, a new tenant, wlU
out previous knowledge of the existence (
the hole, stepped into it after dark an
was severely injured, it is misfeasance of tli
agent rendering him liable, and not a mei
nonfeasance. Carson v. Quinn, 105 S. ¥
1068, 1091, 127 Mo. App. 525.
"There is a distinction betweoi 'nonfei
ance' and *misf easance' or 'malfeasance' ; an
this distinction is often of great Importanc
in determining an agent's liability to tbii
persons. In this connection 'nonfeasano
means the total omission or failure of a
agent to enter upon the performance of son
distinct duty or undertaking, which he hi
agreed with his principal to do; 'misfei
sance' means the improper doing of an a<
which the agent might lawfully do, or, i
other words, it is the performing of his dut
to his principal in such a manner as to iJ
fringe upon the rights and privileges (
third persons; and 'malfeasance' is the d<
ing of an act which he ought not to do at al
It is not every omission or failure to perfon
a duty that will constitute a nonfeasance, bt
only an omission to perform such distin<
duties as he owes to his principal, as dii
tinguished from those which he owes to thir
persons, or the public in general as a membc
of society. Nonfeasance does not extend t
the omission or failure to do some act, when
by a third person is injured after he ha
once entered upon the performance of hJ
contractual obligations. For example, if a
agent undertakes to perform certain act
for another, and he refuses or fails to eate
upon sudi performance, it is nonfeasance
but if he once begins the performance of snc
acts, and, in doing so, fails or omits to d
certaiOQ acts which he should have don<
whereby a third person is injured, it is d(
a nonfeasance, but a misfeasance. Biisfei
sance may involve the omission to do 8om(
thing which ought to be done, as where a
agent, engaged in the performance of his oi
dertaking, omits to do something which i
is his duty to do under the ctrcnmstance
as when he does not exerdse that degree c
MISF£ASANCB
ill MISMAKAOI>— MISMANAGBMXNT
re which due regard for the rights of otfa-
I Tequire&" Orcatt t. Ceatury Bldg. Oo^
& W. 1082^ 1068, 201 Ma 424, 8 L. B. A.
. S.) 929 (quoting and adopting deflnidon
Clark & Skyles, Law of Agency, { 596).
"'Nonfeasance' la the total omission or
Llnre of the agent to enter upon the per-
rmance of a distinct dnty or ondertaktog
dch he has agreed with his principal to do.
Isfeasance* means the improper doing of
act which the agent mi^^t lawfully do.'*
uthem By. Ck>. ▼. Miller, 57 S. B. 1090,
92, 1 Ga. App. 616 (quoting and adopting
e definitions in Southern Ry. Co. v. Grizzle,
S. E. 244, 124 Ga. 735, 110 Am. 8t Bepw
1).
The distinction between "nonfeasance^
id ''ndsf easance'* has been expressed by the
urts of the state as follows: *'If the duty
litted by the agent or servant deyolved up-
i him from his agency or employmoit, his
Qission Is only of a duty he owes his prin-
pal or jnaster, and the master alone is
ible. While if the duty rests upon him in
s indiTidnal character, and was one that
e law imposed upon him independently of
8 agency or employment, then he is liable,
onham ▼. City Trust Co. of New York, 101
. Y. Supp. 87, 89, 90, U6 App. Div. 584.
The negligence of a mining company's su-
rintendent in charge of its mine in main-
inlng a shaft in a dangerous condition, and
permitting its use by third persons una-
ftre of its dangerous character, is not a
ionfeasance" for which he is responsible to
e company only, but is 'Misfeasance^ for
tiich he is liable when such negligence la
e proximate cause of injuries. Hagerty ▼.
oDtana Ore Purchasing Co., 98 Pac 648,
«, 88 Mont 69, 25 K R. A. (N. 8.) 9S^
The failure of a gas company operating
I an agent of a city under contract for the
umination of the city streets to perform its
ity to keep seryice pipes from its mains to
e dty lamps in repair involves an affirma-
re element of negligence amounting to mis-
osance, and it is liable to any one injured
consequence thereof, for an agent who
idertakes and enters on the execution of a
irticular work, must use reasonable care
i the manner of executing it, and he cannot
r abandoning its execution, exempt himself
om liability to any person suffering Injury
7 reason of his act, because that act is not
ionfeasance," but is "misfeasance." Con-
^lidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v. Con-
)r, 78 AtL 726. 729, 114 Md. 140, 32 L. B.
. (N. S.) 809.
IISFORTUNE
Unavoidable casualty or misfortune, see
UnaToidable Casualty.
IISHAP
An injury to a servant from a cause
hieh could not have been reasonably an-
ticipated, or anticipated iind» the drcnm-
stances surrounding the accident, may be
characterized as a "mishap,'* for the result
of which a master is not liable. Han v. Mis-
souri & Kansas TeL Co., 124 8. W. 567, 068,
141 Mo. App. 183.
MISINSTRUCT
Where the defendant sugar company
agreed that its agents should give instruc-
tions regarding the growing and delivery of
beets to be raised on plaintifTs land, and
plaintiff sues for damages because of mis-
instructions, the word "mlsinstruct," as un-
derstood and used in charging that if de-
fendant misinstructed plaintiff in the growing
of beets, etc, the verdict must be for plain-
tiff, means to instruct amiss or give wrong
or improper instructionsL Smith t. Billings
Sugar Co., 94 Pac. 839, 841, 87 Mont 128, Ifi
L. B. A. (N. S.) 887.
MISJOINDER
See, also. Multifariousness.
While not entirely synonymous, the com-
mon-law term "misjoinder" and the equity
term "multifarious" have much in common.
They each token improper joinder, and both
have reference to the confusing result
wrought thereby. Neither goes to the sub-
stance of complainant's claim, but merely as-
serts improper Joinder of causes of action.
Since these terms go only to form, and not
to substance, objections for either or both
are not defenses, within the accepted mean-
ing of that term. Skalns v. Barnes, 53 South.
268, 270, 168 Ala. 426.
There is no "misjoinder" of causes of
action where a complaint states a good cause
of action against one defendant but none
against the other. Reld v. Hennessy Co.,
124 Pac 273, 274, 46 Mont 462.
MISLEADING
See Grossly Misleading.
MISMANAGE— MISMANAGEMENT
"Mismanagement," as used in Civ. Code
1902, I 2028, providing that any person who
shall receive bodily injury or damage through
a defect in any street, causeway, bridge, or
public way, or by reason of defect or ••mis-
management'* of anything under control of
the corporation within the limits of any town
or city, may recover in an action against
the same, means ••mismanagement'* in mak-
ing repairs on the streets, so that the cor-
poration should be held liable, not only for
neglect in making repairs on the streets, but
also for "mismanagement** of anything un-
der the control of the corporation in mak-
ing such repairs.' Bryant v. City Council of
Orangeburg, 49 S. B. 229, 231, 70 S. a 137
<eitlng Dunn t. Town of BamweU, 21 & B.
I H
MISMANAGB— MISMANAGEMENT 412
MISREPRESENTATIOK
r? i
m
M
%
H!
1
I'll!
815, 43 S. G. 401, 49 Am. St Bep. 843; Acker
▼. Anderson, 20 S. C. 495; Brown ▼. Laur^u^
Gonnty, 17 S. B. 21, 88 8. G. 282; Mawm t.
Spartanbnrg Gonnty, 19 & E. 15, 40 S. G
393, 42 Am. St Rep. 887; Parks t. Glty
Goundl of GreenviUe, 21 S. B. 540, 44 S. a
172).
An allegation in an application for re-
moval of a recelrer of a company that the
officers of the company mismanaged Its af-
fairs is not libelous or slanderous of the of-
ficers; the word "mismanaged" not denoting
any wrong or turpitude on the part of the
persons managing. Lebovitch y. Joseph Levy
& Bros. Go., 54 South. 978, 981, 128 La. 518.
Gen. St Kan. 1901, { 5858, proYldlng that
railroad companies shall be liable for dam-
ages to any employ^ of said companies in
consequence of any negligence of their agents
or of any mismanagement of their engineers
or other employes to any person sustaining
such damage, does not make a distinction be-
tween agents on the one hand and engineers
and other employte on the other, nor between
negligence and "mismanagement," but by
the act a company is made rec^nsible for
any mismanagement of its engineers or other
employes to any person sustaining damage
thereby. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Go. of Texas
▼. Kellerman, 87 & W. 401* 404» 89 Tex. Glv.
App. 274.
MISNOMER
Publication of an original notice desig-
nating the defendant as "Ghase Marker," in-
stead of "Ghan Marker/' constituted a fbtal
"misnomer." Schaller & Son ▼. Marker, 114
N. W. 43, 44, 136 Iowa, 575.
If two names are commonly used as the
same name, although they differ in sound, if
either Is used for the other, it is not a "mis-
nomer.** Where one name is an abbrevia-
tion of the other, but both are taken by com-
mon use to be the same, both differing in
sound, the use of one for the other is not a
misnomer. Where the two names are derived
from the same source, the use of one for the
other is not a misnomer; but this must be
held to mean the same source, as defined and
understood in the English language, and not
as including names derived from the same
source in some other language. The names
Helen and Ellen will not be regarded as the
same name. Thomas v. Desney, 10 N. W.
315, 316, 57 Iowa, 58 (citing Trimble v. SUte
[Ind.] 4 BUckf. 437; 4 Bac Abr. ''Mis-
nomer").
MISPRISION
See Glerical Misprision.
Misprision of felony at common law Is a
criminal neglect ^ther to prevent a felony
from being committed or to bring the offen-
der to Justice after its commission, but with
out such previous concert with or subsequent
asBistanoe of him as will make tbd eonceaJ
an accessory before or after the fltct Sti
T. Wilson, 67 AU. 633^ 80 Vt 248.
At common law it was one's duty to pi
vent the commission of a felony, with foi
if necessary, and the failure to da so cons
tuted a misdemeanor, called misprision
felony. Snell v. Derricott, 49 South. 885, 9(
161 Ala. 268, 28 U B. A. (N. S.) 986, 18 Ai
Gas. 686.
Giv. Gode Prac. { 517, defines ''mlsprlsio
of a derk to consist in the rendition of Jnc
ment before the action stands for trial, or
render Judgment against an infant, exceptl
married women or persons of unsound mii
until a defense or report is filed pursuant
section 36, snbsec. 3. H^d not to Include f
rendition of a Judgment not in complian
with a prior order of the Gourt of Appeals
an equity suit after a retrial erroneouE
granted by the court ; such error being Ju(
dal, and not ministerial. Gayheart t. Gbii
ers, 126 S. W. 1085, 1087, 137 Ky. 472.
MISREPRESENTATION
See Fraudulent Misrepresentatio
Knowingly Misr^reseot; Materl
Misrepresentation.
Element of fraud, see Fraud.
Estoppel by misrepresentation, see 1
toppel in Pais.
See, also. False Bepresentation; Fran
Fraudulent Bepresentation.
A ''misrepresentati<m" must be an afilri
ative statement or affirmation of some fb(
in contradistinction to a concealment or fa
ure to disclose, and to a mere expression
opinion. Lee v. Halle, 114 S. W. 403, 405,
Tex. Giv. App. 632 (citing 8 Pom. Eq. Jur. a
877).
*'To profess an intention to do or n
to do when a party intends the contrary
as clear a case of 'misrepresentation and
fraud' as could be made." Schrafft v. Fid
ity Trust Go., 62 Att. 033, 935, 73 N. J. La
57 (quoting and adopting the language
Bigelow, Fraud, 484).
A ''misrepresentation" as the basis of i
scission must be material ; but it can be mai
rial only when it is of such a character Uu
if it had not been made, llie contract won
not have been entered hito. The misrepi
sentatlon need not be the sole cause of t
contract, but it must be of such natui
weight, and force that the court can say wll
out it the contract would not have been ma(
Greenawalt v. Bogers, 01 Pac. 526» 528, 1
Gal. 630 (citing Ck>lton v. Stanford, 23 Pi
16, 28, 82 Gal. 351, 399, 16 Am. St. B^. 13
A "misrepresentation," the fialsity
which will afford ground f6r a UU f or resc
slon of a contract, must be as to an existl
fact and an afilrmative statement of facts
contradistinction to the mere expression
an opinion which is ordinarily not presum
HISBEPRE8ENTATI0N
413
MISRSPRJB8ENTATI0K
) deoeiTe or misTtpfesent Dotson ▼. Kiik,
M) Fed. 14, 23, 108 0. G. A. 86a
To entitle one to sue for fraud and de-
dt, it Is necessary that the fftlse representa-
on be made directly to him, or that it be
ade by defendant personally ; it being sof-
:rient that defendant authorized it Keeler
Seaman, 96 N. Y. Supp. 020, 022, 47 Misc.
ep. 292.
A representation that a worthless medi-
ne is a sure cure for hog cholera is a "mis-
4;>resentation of fact^ and is actionable,
id the representation cannot be said to be a
lere expression of opinion, and hence not
ctionable. McDonald ▼. Smith, 102 N. W.
», 670, 189 Mich. 211.
While ordinarily a "misrepresentation'*
lUst consist of an assertion or statement
ich as misleads another to his injury, as
Istinguished from an assertion or statement
hich is obviously the expression of an opin-
»n, yet it is well settled that a misrepre-
mtation, by reason of which injury results,
lay consist of concealment of truth, as well
9 of positiTe falsification. United States t.
terllng Salt Ca, 200 Fed. 593, 597.
Moral delinquency is a necessary element
1 "misrepresentation." This immoral ele-
lent consists in the necessary guilty knowl-
[Ige and consequent intent to dec^re, some-
imes designated by the technical term "sd-
nter." The rery essence of the legal con-
eptlon is the fraudulent intention flowing
rom the guilty knowledge. No **misrepre-
entation** is fraudulent at law unless it is
lade with actual knowledge of its falsity, or
nder such circumstances that the law must
ecessarily impute such knowledge to the
arty at the time he makes It Mason ▼.
foore, 76 N. B. 932, 986, 73 Ohio 81 276, 4
x R. A. (N. 8.) 597, 4 Ann. Gas. 240 (citing
Pom. Eq. Jur. | 884).
**A 'misrepresentation to be material*
hould be in respect of an ascertainable fact,
B distinguished from a mere matter of opin-
m. A representation, which merely amounts
0 a statement of opinion, goes for nothing,
bough it may be true, for a man is not justi-
led in placing reliance upon it" Where de-
oidant, a machinist, with ample facilities to
scertain the exact condition of itn ice plant,
ras offered erery opportunity to determine
ts condition before purchasing it from the
ncceflSors of a corporation which had been
mable to operate it sueoessfuUy, of which
lefendant was fully informed, the doctrine
>t caveat emptor applied, and defendant, in
m action for the price, was not entitled to a
let-off and damages because of alleged false
^presentations that the plant, with some re-
)9iin, would turn out 4,400 pounds of ice a
lay. Williamson y. Holt, 61 S. BL 884, 386,
147 N. C. 515, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240.
The word "misrepresentation," in Bey.
St 1899, I 8528, •as amended, authorizing the
board of dental examiners to revoke the
lloeaae of any dentist for "fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation" in the practice of dentist-
ry, means untrue, improper, or unfaithful
representation, such as a fUse statement of
account or as a misrepresentation of one's
motives, and the words, when so construed,
prevent the statute from being invalid for
uncertainty. State ex reL Williams v. Purl,
128 S. W. 196, 201, 228 Mo. 1.
The "misrepresentation" whlcb<*will viti-
ate a contract of sale, and prevent a court
of equity from aiding its enforcement, must
relate to a material matter constituting an
inducement to the contract, and respecting
whidi the complaining party did not possess
at hand the means of knowledge, and it must
be a representation on which he relied, and
by which he was actually misled ; and where
the means of knowledge are at hand and
equally available to both parties, and the
subject of purchase is alike open to their in-
spection, if the buyer does not avail himself
of such means, he will not be heard to say
that he was deceived by the representations.
Long V. Kendall, 87 Pac 670, 673, 17 OkL 70.
la iBOTurauMe
The terms '"misrepresentation" and "sup-
pression of f^ct by the employer" contained
in a policy of guaranty insurance, which pro-
vides "that any material ndsstatements or
suppression of fact by employer in any state-
ment or declaration to the company, or in
any daim made under this bond, shall render
the bond void from the beginning," mean the
same thing. BIferepresentations is here used
in a somewhat more restricted sense than
ordinarily. It has reference to misstate-
ments, known to be untrue, or which are
positively stated as true without actual
knowledge by the insured, and made under
drcumstancee which call for such knowledge
as might be based upon reasonable care pre-
viously exercised. It is akin to the expres-
sion "suppression of fact by the employer,"
which is a species of misrepresentation as it
leads the inquirer to believe what is appar-
ently true by concealing the fact which shows
it to be not true. One is the active, and
the other is the passive, phase of the same
thing. One is the false statement and the
other is the suppression of the truth ; each
intended to mislead as to the matter pertain-
ing to the risk. Fidelity & Guaranty Go. of
New York t. Western Bank (Ky.) 94 S. W.
1. 4.
Under Rev. St 1899, I 7890 (Ann. St
1906, p. 3746), providing that no misrepre-
sentation made in obtaining a policy of life
insurance shall be deemed material or ren-
der the policy void unless the matter mis-
represented shall have actually contributed
to the contingency or event on which the pol-
icy has become due^ the word "misrepre-
sentation" embraces statements in the nature
of a warranty, which are introduced into
the policy as part of it Salts v. Prudential
ins. Co., 120 S. W. 714, 716, 140 Mo. App.
ui6a
414
MI8STATEMHNT
142 (Citing Jacobs t. Omaha Life AsiTn, 48
S. W. 462, 146 Mo. 623; Jenkins t. Coyenant
Mnt Life Ins. Co., 71 S. W. 688, 171 Mo.
875; Keller ▼. Home Life Ins. Co., 96 S. W.
903, 198 Mo. 440).
MISS
MISSED SHOT
The^rm ''missed shots,** as used In the
vocabulary of miners, means charges of
powder that had failed to explode at the
proper time. Bird v. Utica Gold Mining Co.,
84 Pac. 256-259, 2 Cal. App. 674.
mssiHO
Bums' Ann. St. 1894, | 7618, requires the
Secretary of State, as soon as the acts are
printed to certify that he has compared the
printed with the enrolled acts and Joint reso-
lutions and found them correctly printed.
It also authorizes him to use the engrossed
bills; he to return them to the state library
when the printing is complete. Held, that a
certificate showing that a certain chapter of
the acts of a given year was compared with
the engrossed act, **the enrolled bill being
missing," was prima facie evidence that there
was such an enrolled bill, and that the same
was an existing law, the word ''missing"
meaning that there was to the knowledge of
the Secretary such enrolled bill, but that it
was lost or gone at the time he compared the
printed act with the engrossed act State
V. Wheeler, 89 N. B. 1. 8, 172 Ind. 678,
19 Ann. Cas. 834.
MISSION
MISSIONARY
The terms "missionary^ and ''missionary
society" are of common use and have a well-
known meaning which is the same whether
the use is intended to be precise and techni-
cal or merely that of everyday speech. By
universal acceptance the word "missionary,"
whether as a noun or as an adjective, em-
braces not only the conception of religious,
charitable, or educational work or worker,
but also work done through philanthropic
motives for the welfare of others too poor,
too unappredatlve, or too indifferent to do it
themselves, and by persons supported or
means furnished in part at least by some
agency of which those for whom the work
is done do not form a sustaining part The
derivative of the word implies a sending, and
so it is that in both technical and common
speech the idea of sending forth to the serv-
ice of others, the doing of a work for oth-
ers, is associated with its meaning. Some-
times it is used to characterize the agency
sent, sometimes the agency sending, but al-
ways there is associated with tbe notion of
a benevolent service for others that of such
service sent, whether far or near, by those
who maintained it to those who need it.
There is no use of th* term as descriptii
of self-supporting religious tf ort in the mal
tenance by, within, or for an ecdesiastio
society or parish of churches, church servic
Sunday schools, and the ordinary agencies <
worship or religious activity according 1
the usual practice, and especially the pra
tice of congregational societies in the coiu
try towns of New England. Bulkeley
Worthington Ecclesiastical Soc., 63 Atl. 35
354, 78 Conn. 626, 12 U B. A. (N. &) 526.
MI8SIONABT nOCflETIBB OB OOBPG
RATION
See, also. Missionary.
A bequest to a society incorporated 1
advance the cause of religion throughout a
unlimited field by circulating the Bible, prin
ing, establishing Sunday schools, and 8en<!
ing out persons to distribute religious book
and tracts, being a bequest to a "missionar
corporation," was exempt from a transfe
tax, under Tax Law (Laws 1896, c. 908) | 22:
as amended in 1905 (Laws 1905, c 368), &
empting legacies to such corporationa In i
Mccormick's Bstote, 99 N« H 177, 178, 206 I
T. 100.
Testator bequeathed certain property t
R. for life, and directed that on his deceu
it should be equally divided among th
"schools Und missionary societies mentione
in the wiU.** The will had previously be
queathed a legacy in favor of the Worthinj
ton Ecclesiastical Society, and in succeedini
paragraphs gave various sums to seven dei
ignated missionary corporations, boards, o
societies. The ecclesiastical society was i
corporation organized for the ^read of re
ligion by the maintenance and support o
the church known as the "Congregationa
Church at Berlin, Connecticut," of wbid
testatrix and her ancestors had been mem
bers and supporters. Held, that such sodet:
was not "a missionary society," entitled t
share in the residue so bequeathed. Bnlke
ley V. Worthington Ecclesiastical Soc, 61
Atl. 351, 354, 78 Conn. 526, 12 L. B. A. (M
S.) 526.
MISSISSIPPI RIVER
As boundary between states, see Bonn
dary.
The term "Mississippi rtver,** deed ii
the enabling act (Act Cong. Aug. 6, 1846, c
89, 9 Stat 56) descriptive of the boondan
between Wisconsin and Sfinnesota, applio
to the broad expanse of water flowing in i
generally southerly direction, known at th<
date of such act as such river, not any ba
you upon either side thereof! Franzlni ▼
Layland, 97 N. W. 499, 501, 120 Wla. 72.
MISSTATEMENT
See Willful Misstatement
MISTAKX
415
MISTAKE
MISTAKE
liistakft; Qrom Mistake;
See Clerical
Mateilal Miataka
The **mUitake" from wUdi equity will
■elteve may be eommon to both parties to the
ontxact and consist in either the expres-
don of their a^reeinent or of some matter
»f iiidiicement thereto or to which it is to
>• applied. Brlggs t. Watkins, 70 8. B. 661,
»64, X12 Ya. 14 (dting 6 Words and Phrases,
K 4&40).
"Mr. Pomeroy says that "mistake,' with-
in tlie meaning of equity and as the ooca-
doii of juxisdictioii, is an erxoneous mental
(audition, conception, or conviction induo-
Bd by ignorance, misanirehenslon, or misun-
derstanding of the truth, but without negli-
gence, and resulting in some act or omission
done or suffered erroneously by one or both
tbe parties to a transactiom bat without its
erroneous <diaracter being intended or known
at ttte time." Pearson t. Dancer, 89 South.
474, 476, 144 Ala. 427 (quoting and adopting
definition in 2 Pom. Bq. Jur. pp. 299, 800, U
839, 864).
''Mistake," within the rule making it a
head of equity jurisdiction, has been defined
as *'8ome unintentional act, omission, or er-
ror, arising from unconsciousness, ignorance,
forgetfnlness, imposition, or misplaced con-
fidence." Where an instrument Is drawn
and executed, professing or intending to car-
ry into execution an agreement previously
entered into, but which, by mistake of the
draftsman, either as to fact or as to law,
does not accomplish that purpose or rlolates
it, equity will reUeve from su<^ mistake.
Mere neglect or omission to read or know
the contents of a written instrument before
execution is not necessarily a bar to reforma-
tion thereof, but relief is proper in such
case, if the instrument, through mistake,
tails to accomplish the purpose intended.
Taylor t. Godfrey, 69 S. S. 631, 688, 62 W.
Va. 677.
Under the rule that equity will relieve
against a Judgment for "mistake," the er-
roneous advice of counsel is not such a '*mis-
• take" as will entitle a party to reliet Don-
ovan V. MUler, 88 Pac. 82, 83, 12 Idaho, 600,
9 U R. A. (N. S.) 624, 10 Ann. Cas. 444.
It can be found from the fact that one
fails to act because of a ''mistake" of his
counsel that he was prevented from acting
bj '^mlstake^" Dame v. Wood, 66 AtL 484,
74 N. H. 212.
Where a written contract of insurance
was not the contract made by insured and
the general agent of insurer, and Insured,
though knowing that the policy as written
did not accord with the agreement as made,
had the right to rely on the representations
made by the general agent, and was led to
believe that the misstatement in the policy
vaa merely formal, and oould not be taken
adv«nts«s of by insurer, equity can reform
tlie policy, sinee insured either acted under
an erroneous convletion in accepting the pol-
icy containing the tenns not agreed on, or
he was imposed on, and became a victim of
misplaced oonfldenos; the word ''mistake"
being defined to be either the doing of an
act under an erroneous conviction, which
act, but for such conviction, would not have
been done, or some intentional act or omis-
sion or error, arising from ignorance, sur-
prise, imposition, or misplaced confidence.
Sloss-Sheffield Steel ft Iron Co. v. iBtna Life
Ins. Go., 70 Atl. 880, 886, 74 N. J. £q. 686.
Where a creditor, who attached the in-
terest in land descending to tlie debtor on
the ancestor dying intsstate, knew ot pro-
ceedings to probate the ancestor's will, which
disinherited the debtor, who took no steps
to become a party* thereto, and the wlU wan*
admitted to probate, the creditor's failure to
contest the probate was not the result of
''accident, mistake, or unforeseen cause,"
within the statute authorizing the granting
of a new trial, where, by reason of accident,
mistake, or unforeseen cause, judgment was
rendered against the applicant for a new
triaL Seward v. Johnson, 62 AtL 660, 670,
27 R. I. 396.
An instruction that if defendant, on his
express malice aforethought, with intent to
kill M., shot at him with a gun, and by mis-
take killed deceased, he would be guilty of
murder in the second degree^ was objection-
able in the use of the word "mistake" for
"unintentionally"; they not being synony-
mous. Deneaner v. State, 127 S. W. 201,
204, 68 Tex. Or. R. 624.
The code provision that the court may
at any time permit a pleading or mistake
in any other respect to be amended author-
ises the substitution of a sufllcient appeal
bond in an election contest, where the bond
given has failed to comply with the stat-
utory requirements. Galloway v. Bradbum,
82 S. W. 1013, 1016, 119 Ky. 49.
That land is sold at administrator's sale
which is not embraced in the petition to
sell, nor in the decree of confirmation, is not
a "mistake in description," within Code 1906,
i 2072 (Ann. Code 1892, | 1897), providing
that, any mistake in describing land of dece-
dent sold, etc., in any part of the proceed-
ings, may be corrected on petition of the
purchaser. Pearson v. Caldwell, 47 South.
436, 437, 93 Miss. 637.
The word "mistake" in Oen. Laws 1896,
c 266, 1 21, giving reUef to a garnishee fail-
ing through mistake to disclose to the court
that he has no property of defendant in bis
hands, should receive a broad construction,
and an affidavit by a garnishee that through
accident and mistake he neglected to file bi^
personal affidavit of no funds is within tl&e
provision. Marshall v. McCormiclL, 62 Atl-
212, 27 B. I. 867.
MISTAKE
416
MI8TAEX
The mistake of persons in execoting a
lease of a lot, the beUef of both parties that
the lot was not within the district where
construction of wooden buildings was pro-
hibited by ordinance, whereas two days be-
fore the lease was ezecoted an ordinance
was passed putting it within such district,
was not, as regards the lessee's right to re*
sdnd, a mistake caused by any neglect of
his legal duty, within Civ. CJode, I 1577, pro-
viding, as part of the definition of a *'mls-
take," that it "was not caused by the neg-
lect of a legal duty on the part of the per-
son making the mistake." Hannah v. Stein-
man, 112 Pac. 1094, 1098, 159 Gal. 142.
Ballinger^s Ann. Ck)des ft St. | 6153, re-
lating to the modification of Judgments and
orders and providing in subsection 3 that
the same may be modified for mistakes, etc.,
of the clerk, etc., does not apply solely to
mistakes of the clerk, but to any mistake
warranting a modification of the Judgment
in furtherance of Justice, and in view of
section 4953 (section 426) providing that the
court may, in furtherance of justice, eta,
amend any pleading, etc., or by correcting a
mistake in any other respect, the court had
Jurisdiction to modify an order of confirma-
tion of a receiver's sale so as to confbrm
the same to the order of sale. National Bank
of Commerce v. Ia Kllsheimer ft Oo., 110 Pac.
16, 17, 59 Wash. 460.
A mortgagor's surviving husband, to pro-
tect his Interest and that of his children,
employed F. to bid for the property on fore-
closure. One of the tracts was worth $1,-
600 and was struck down to B. for $610. F.
immediately claimed the bid was his, but
the officer making the sale declined to rec-
ognize it, and returned B. as the purchaser.
The husband thereupon applied to set the
sale aside as to such tract, agreeing on a
resale to bid $1,600. Held, to Justify vaca-
tion of the sale for ''mistake*' and inade-
quacy of price, on condition that the hus-
band give bond to bid $1,600, pay the costs
of the first sale, and interest on the purchas-
er's deposit Montclalr Building ft Loan
Ass'n V. Farmer (N. J.) 67 Atl. 852, 853.
Impresston equivale&t
See Impression.
Bfistake of law
The word *'mlstake,** when used alone,
without any limiting expression, Includes a
mistake of law as well as of fact. If its
meaning, as used in a statute, is narrowed
to mistakes on questions of fact, it would
have been proper and more natural for the
Legislature to say so. Where a railroad
company made a mistake in the construction
of its statutory rights, such as an ordinari-
ly prudent person, honestly desiring to act
within his rights, might make. It is exempt
from the penalty under Laws 1890, p. 1095,
c. .565, § 37, as amended by Laws 1892, p.
1392, c 676, providing for a penalty for
the exacting by a carrier of unlawfol ral
of fare, unless the overcharge was ma
through tnadrerteaee or mistake, not amom
ing to groM negligence. Goodspeed v. Itt
ca St By. Oa, 77 N. B. 8d2, 398, 184 N.
361.
Mistakes of law are mistakes with
Code Civ. Proc. f 473, authorising the con
in the furtherance of Justice, to allow i
amendment correcting mistakes in procec
Ings had during the progress of a trial
the furtherance of Justice. Dent v. Superi
Court of Los Angeles County, 96 Pac. 6i
673, 7 Cal. App. 683.
Civ. Code, I 1578, subd. 2, provides th
a mistake of law constitutes a mistake wil
In the meaning of the articde only when
arises from (1) a misapprehension of the li
by all parties, all supposing that tiiey kn<
and understood it, and all making sut>8ta
tially the same mistake as to the law;
(2) a misapprehension of the law by one pi
ty, of which the othns are aware at t
time of contracting, or whi<^ they do n
rectify. Several sales of defendant's prop<
ty were made at the same time by the sIm
iff under executions issued on various Jud
ments. Defendant redeemed from a Juni
lien, paying the amount thereof to the sh<
iff for plaintiff, who had purchased at i
the sales, defendant believing that by t
acceptance of such amount plaintiff was <
topped to deny that the redemption was coi
plete, and the property thereby freed frc
all prior liens. Plaintiff, knowing the li
and defendant's supposition, accepted t
money from the sheriff. After the explrati<
of the period of redemption plaintiff broug
an action against defendant to quiet tit
to the property. Held that as each par
seemed to have aimed to obtain an adva
tage against the other to which he was d
entitled plaintiff was entitled to the reli
prayed only on the condition of repaying
defendant the amount paid by the latter f
redemption, with interest from the date
its payment Woods v. Kellerman, 89 Pa
358, 360, 3 Cal. App. 422.
Hegllgenee of self or eovmsel
The afladavlt of counsel that owing to
business engagement, which took him to a
other state after a stipulation for the e
tension of time to move for a new trial,
being engaged in court the day the stipul
tion expired, the serious illness of his wU
and the impression that the stipulation 1
eluded another day, he neglected to ask f(
an extension of time for such motions sbo^
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or exeus
ble neglect'* within Comp. Laws, I 3163, ai
entitled him to relief against his default ai
a further extension of time. Sherman
Southern Pac Co., 102 Pac. 257, 31 Nev. 28
A court is Justified in setting aside
Judgment against a defendant in ejectmeo
taken during the absence of himself and h
SaSTAXB
417
MI9TAKK OF WMXft
eontt^ on the ground of '^mistake, Inad*
Tertence, or surprise,*' wliero bis eonnsel
left the court, during the term at which tbe
judgment was rendered^ with the nnder^
standing and belief that tiie case was not
to be tried at that term, and where a prima
fade valid defense is shown. Virginia, T.
& C. Steel ft Iron Go. t. Harris, 161 Fed. 428,
429, 80 O. O. A. 658.
Onissiom.
Laws 1906, p. 204, e. 184, iworides that
whenever, after delivery of the tax roll to
the treasnrer, it shall be discovered that any
town derk, in makiog out the tax roll, has
made a "Mistake" therein in computing or
carrying out the amount of the tax, the clerk,
with the consent of the treasurer, at any
time before the treasurer is required to
make his return of delinquent taxes, may
correct the errors, etc Held, that the in-
tent of the Legislature was not to cover a
case where a tax apportionment was delib-
erately and intentionally omitted by the
town derk in making op the tax roll deliv-
ered to the treasurer, since such an omission
is not a mistake within the contemplation of
the statute. State ex rel. Bowe v. Knim-
enauer, U6 N. W. 798, 80O, 186 Wis. 186.
mSTAKE OF FACT
A ''mistake of fact** may be defined as
an unconscious ignorance or fbrgetfulness of
the existence or nonexistence of a fact past
or present material to the contract. Kan-
sas City Packing Box Co. v. Spies (Tex.) 109
8. W. 432, 434.
A "mistake of fact" takes place either
when some fact which really exists is un-
known, or some fact is supposed to exist
which really does not exist Scott v. Ford,
78 Pac. 742, 746, 46 Or. 681, 68 L. R. A. 469.
A "mistake of fact" extends to and in-
cludes the case of a party who, through
mere ignorance of the existence or nonex-
istence of a material fact, is induced to do
an act injurious to himself, where, if he
had been informed of the existence or non-
existence of such fact, he would not have
performed such an act Scott v. Ford, 80
Pac 899, 900, 46 Or. 631, 68 L. R. A. 469
(quoting and adopting Hurd v. Hall, 12 Wis.
126, 180).
A "mistake of fact*' is a mistake not
caused by the neglect of any legal duty on
the part of the person making the mistake,
but "which consists in his ignorance of some
fact, past or present, material to the trans-
action, or in his belief In the existence of
some fact material to the transaction which
does not exist Such a mistake may afford
ground for relief In a court of equity."
Steinfeld v. Zeckendorf, 86 Pac. 7, 11, 10
Ariz. 221.
"Mistake of fiict,'* for which a contract
may be avoided, is defined in Civ. Code, I
1577, to be "an unconscions ignorance or for-
8 Wns.& P.2D SBB.-27
Cttfulness of a fiict, past or present, material
to the cpntract" White v. Stevoiaon, 77
Pac 828< 880, 144 OaL 104.
''A mistake as to title is a 'mistake of
fact,' even though arising from an erroneous
view of the legal eifect of a deed." Boslere
V. ReiUy, 76 N. £. 968, 960, 189 Mass. 618.
Under Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St 1903, I
748, a "mistake of fact" is a mistake not
caused by neglect of a legal duty on the part
of the person making the mistake, and, where
plaintiff made a mistake of fact in paying its
taxes when it was not liable, the mistake
was made by its own neglect of duty, and,
the payment being voluntary, the law will
furnish no relief. Louisiana Realtj Co. v.
City of McAlester, 108 Pac. 39^ 392, 26 Okl.
726.
Civ. Code, I 1666, defines a "mistake of
fact" as one not caused by the neglect of
legal duty on the part of the person making
the mistake, and consisting in: (1) An uncon-
scious ignorance or forgetfulness of a fact
past or present material to the contract, or
(2) belief in the present existence of a thing
which does not exist, or in the past existence
of such a thing which has not existed. Plain-
tiff reinsured part of its risk with defendant,
and then, on the defendant's request, placed
such reinsurance with another oommenclng on
a certain day, on which day it returned to
defendant its written obligation. On the day
previous unknown to them, the insured prop-
erty was burned. Held, that the release, not
being made in contemplation of a prior loss,
was made under a mistake of fact, against
which relief would be granted. Trader's
Ins. Co. of Chicago, lit, v. Aachen ft Munich
Fire Ins. Co., 89 Pac. 109, 110, 160 Oal. 870,
8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 844.
Under Civ. Code, | 1689, providing that
a party to a contract may rescind it if his
consent was given by mistake, while the mis-
take may be one of fact, as defined by section
1577, or of law, as defined by section 1678,
in which latter case the mistake must be by
both parties, not only must the mistake be
one but for which the party would not have
consented to the contract, section 1568 de-
claring that consent is deemed to have been
obtained through mistake "only when it
would not have been given had such cause
not existed," but in case of "mistake of fact,"
the mistake must be "material to the con-
tract," this being an element of a mistake of
fact as defined by section 1577. Hannah v.
Steinman. 112 Pac. 1094, 1096, 159 Cal. 142.
Where plaintiff paid the consideration
for a deed on the belief that defendant had
title to the premises, and thereafter it ap-
peared that she had no title because the
conveyance to her was a forgery, plaintiff
was entitled to recover the consideration as
money paid under a "mistake of fact" under
Civ. Code, I 1677, subd. 2, providing that
mistake of fact is a mistake not caused by
MISTAKE OP LAW
418
MITIOATE-^&nTiaATION
neglect of a legal duty, and consisting In the
belief of the present existence of a thing ma-
terial to the contract which does not exist
or In the past existence of a thing which has
not existed. Home y. Hughes, 124 Pac. 730,
19 Gal. App. 6.
MISTAKE OF UkW
As mistake, see Mistake.
"A 'mistake of law' happens when a
party, having fall knowledge of the facts,
comes to an erroneous conclusion as to their
legal effect" Scott v. Ford, 78 Pac. 742, 746,
45 Or. 531, 68 L. R. A. 460 (quoting Hurd ▼.
Hall, 12 Wis. 125).
A "mistake of law" is an erroneous con-
clusion as to I the legal effect of known facts,
and Is no ground for the Intervention of a
court of equity. Stelnfeld v. Zeckendorf, 86
Pac. 7, 11, 10 Arls. 221 (citing And. Law
Diet).
A '•mistake of law," from which a court
of equity will relieve, is defined and gov-
erned by section 2123 of the Civil Code,
which reads: " 'Mistake of law' constitutes a
ndstake, within the meaning of this article,
only when it arises from: (1) A misappre-
hension of the law by all parties, all suppos-
ing that they knew and understood it, and
all making substantially the same mistake
as to the law; or (2) a misapprehension of
the law by one party, of which the others are
aware at the time of contracting, but which
they do not rectify." Bottego v. Carroll, 77
Pac 430, 31 Mont 122.
Under Code Civ. Proc. f | 2186, 3132, pro-
viding that a written contract supersedes all
oral negotiations, and no evidence of the
terms of an agreement other than the con-
tents of the writing shall be received, except
where a mistake or Imperfection lis in issue,
and the validity of the instrument is in dis-
pute, and to establish fraud, and sections
2117, 2123, declaring that actual fraud con-
sists in a promise made without any inten-
tion of performing it, or any act fitted to
deceive, and that "mistake of law" consti-
tutes a misapprehension of the law by a
party, of which the others are aware at the
time of contracting, but which they do not
rectify, where plaintiff alleged mistake and
fraud, and the evidence disclosed that the
inducement held out to plaintiff to sign an
agreement was based on fraudulent repre-
sentations of defendants that a lease need
not be mentioned in a contract of sale of a
business and the lease, evidence was admissi-
ble showing the purchase of the lease and de-
fendants* fraudulent conduct, over objection
that it varied the contract Sathre t. Rolfe,
77 Paa 431, 432, 31 Mont 85.
MISTRESS
Where a single woman consents to un-
lawfully cohabit with a man generally, as
though the marital ration existed betwe
them, without any limit as to the domtion
such cohabitation, and actually commences
cohabit with him under that understandii
she becomes his "concubine," or, as express
in modem times, his '*kept mistress." Coy
Humphreys, 125 S. W. 877, 880, 142 Ma A]
MISTRIAL
A "mistrlar is a nugatory trial, as d
tlnguished from a new trial, which recogniz
a completed trial which for some suflacie
reason has been set aside so that the issu
may be litigated de novo. It Is a matter
law. A case does not result in a mistrial t
cause the trial judge becomes disqualified
act on a motion to set aside the verdict ai
for new trial. Stern v. Wabash R. Co., 1
N. Y. Supp. 181, 182, 52 Misc. Rep. 12.
It is a "mistrlar* where there la no gc
eral verdict, and the Jury's answer to sped
questions do not cover all of the facts
issue. Ward v. Qradin, 109 N. W. 57, 61,
N. D. 649 (citing Manning t. Monagbao, :
N. Y. 539).
MITER BOX
A "miter box^ la a rough three-sided bo
without top or ends, into the two uprigi
sides of which slits are sawed at the prop
angle. Metzler v. McKenzle, 76 Paa U
115, 34 Wash. 470.
MITIGATE— MITIGATION
Extenuate synonymous, see Extenuate
The term "mitigation of damages*'
properly applied only to actions where tl
damages are not capable of exact pecuniai
measurement and is used in contradi8tincti(
to the term "aggravation of damages" ; an
where matter In aggravation of damages
proper, matter In mitigation may be show
Swank v. Elwert, 106 Pac. 901, 907, 55 0
487.
There is a technical difference betwe<
the "commutation of a sentence*' and tl
"mitigation" thereof. The first is a cfaani
of a punishment to which a person has bet
condenmed into-one less severe, while to mil
gate a sentence is to reduce or lessen tl
amount of penalty or punishment Redudi
sentence of a court-martial, dismissing a ni
val officer from service, to suspension for fii
years on half sea pay, with a reduction ]
rank to the foot of the list of his grade,
a "mitigation of sentence," within the prov
sion of Rev. St U. S. f 1624, art 54, thj
every officer authorized to convene a geuen
court-martial shall have power, on' rerisic
of its proceedings, to "remit or mitigate
but not to "oommnte," the sentence of ai
such court which he Is authorized to appro^
and confirm. Mullan ▼• Uxdted Stat^ 2
MITIOATS— MITIGATION
419
MIXED BLOOD
Ct 390, 382, 212 U. S. 516. 521. 53 L. Ed.
(citing Thomaon-Houfiton EUectrlc Oo. t.
> Brass 0>., 130 Fed. 549; Perkins Elec.
tch Mfg. Oo. T. Bachanan* 129 Fed. 134).
** 'Mitigating circiinistanoeiBr are such as
Lot constitute a justiflcatian or excuse of
offense in question, but whicb, in fairness
mercy, may be considered as extenuating
educing tbe degree of moral culpability."
th T. People, 75 Pac. 914, 910, 32 Colo.
(quoting and adopting the definition in
5l, Law Diet).
**MI tigs ting circumstances'* are audi as
\ to an appreciable extent to proTe the
h of the charge, though not completely
ring it, 80 as to permit an inference that
^nda]\t was not actuated by malice, and
t be connected with or bear upon the
lous charge. An alleged libel consisted of
oagazine article entitled ''Bucket Shop
rks/' and stated that the business of
^et shop keeping was followed by persons
Lng themselves "bankers and brokers"
> fleeced their customers by pretended
s and purchases of stock; that H. was
of the members of plaintiff firm of ''bank-
and brokers'* ; that his picture was in the
les' gallery; and that these were but
dmens of the thieves who plied their
ie as keepers of bucket shops while posing
"bankers and brokers." The complaint
led that H. was ever a member of their
1, or that they were brokers, or had ever
e business as "bankers or brokers" or as
^ers, or advertised themselves as such.
i answer alleged that H. became "assodat-
^th the plaintiffs in their business" with-
stating in what capacity, and that plain-
} held themselves out as "bankers" ; their
idpal business being the promotion of cer-
ate enterprises and marketing the capital
± of mining enterprises, which stocks
jitiffs and H. knew were practically worth-
L Held, that the fftcts alleged in the an-
iT were not a defense by way of mitigation
I reduction of damages, they not even
ding to prove the lib^ous matter in part
■gstrom V. Ridgway Ck>., 128 N. Y. Supp.
33, 138 App. Div. 178.
To an action of libel for publishing a
eral charge of ignorance against plaintiff,
attorney, not limited to ignorance in the
duct of the particular case as to which
publication was made, defendant pleaded
a partial defense the statutory law relat-
to the former case and its bearing on that
e and that plaintiff as attorney therein
led to raise any question thereunder be-
ise he did not understand and was ignor-
: of the law on that particular question,
1 in mitigation of damages, that this was
>wn to defendant before publication, and
it the article was publifdied in reliance
reon in good faith and without malice.
Id, that "ndtlgatlng drcnmstances" are
>8e which, while not proving the truth of
) charge, tend in some appreciable degree
toward such proof, and thds permit of an in-
ference that defendant was not actuated by
malice In his charge, and that the matter
pleaded bore upon and tended to establish a
charge of ignorance, and that the plea was
good on demurrer. Josephson v. Musical
Courier Go., 180 M« X. 8u]M>. 484, 430, 146
App. DiT. 2a
MITTIMUS
An ordinary '^mittimus" directs the of-
ficer to commit the convict then in custody to
JaU or prison, according to the sentence. It
contains no order to arrest and does not au-
thorize an arrest of one at large and not an
escaped prisoner. Where, after conviction
and sentence, a court of general or limited
Jurisdiction permits the convict to go at large
without day, it cannot thereafter issue a
mittimus for his commitment, for in such
cases the court, having completed its judicial
functions, has surrendered all further con-
trol over the case and person. Tuttle v.
Lang, 00 AtL 892, 894, 100 Me. 123.
MIX
The art of enameling metalis old. Many
difl^ient fbrmulas and substances are used
to form the enamel, but the usual process 4a
substantially as follows: Certain ingredients,
usually a mixture of silica or sand, and of
other substances having a fluxing property
to produce glass when mixed with sand, sub-
jected to heat, are mixed together mechani-
cally. This mixture Ib called by enamelers
the "mix." The mix is then subjected to a
high degree of heat and fused, resulting in a
vitrified or glassy mass. This is called the
"frit" The frit is then put in a miU and
ground fine, with a mixture of clay and
water, resulting in a liquid paste. TMs is
called the "dip." The metal article to be en-
ameled is then dipped in the paste, dried,
and subjected to a very high temperature in
an oven or muffle. In some cases more than
one dipping and bumlDg takes place. The
result is, if the operation is successful, a
metal article with its surface covered with
an adherent coat of metal. National Enam-
eling & Stamping Co. v. New England Enam-
eling Co., 151 Fed. 19, 20, 80 C. a A. 485.
MIXED
MIXED ASSOCIATION
An insurance association, possessing
some features incident to both a "stock com-
pany^ and a "mutual company," but being
neither, more nearly falls under the dassifl-
cation of a "mixed association." State v. Al-
ley, 51 South. 467, 477, 96 Miss. 720.
MIXED BI.OOD
Indian of mixed blood, see Indian.
See, also. Half Blood.
Tbe rule of the common law that diil-
dren of f reebom parents take the legal status
MIXED CQMFAmr
420
MIXTURE
of the father, imd therefore children of a
white father and Indian mother must be
held to be whites, and as such to be disquali-
fied from sharing In the tribal property be-
longing to the Indians, does not apply to
treaties made with the Indians. "In the ser-
eral treaties entered Into between the United
States and the Omahas, frequent reference
Is made to 'half blood* and 'mixed blood,* but
In none Is there a distinction made between
those deriving their Indian blood from the
mother and those deriving It from the father.
It is not to be supposed that the Indians,
when called upon to agree to an allotment of
the lands under the provisions of the treaty
of 1865 and the act of 1882 had knowledge of
the artificial rule of the common law, which.
If It was applied in these cases, would require
the ruling that a half blood residing with the
tribe, the child of a white father and an
Indian mother, could not be deemed to be of
mixed Indian blood, whereas a child of an
Indian father and a white mother would be
held to be of Indian blood and therefore en-
titled to share In the tribal property. As
ordinarily understood by white people, a per-
son of white and Indian parentage Is deem-
ed to be of *mlxed blood," without regard to
the source of the Indian blood." Sloan t.
United States, 118 Fed. 283, 28&
BIIXED COMPANY
An Insurance association, possessing
some features Incident to both a "stock com-
pany" and a "mutual company,** but being
neither, more nearly falls under the dasslflca-
tlon of a "mixed company." State v. Alley,
61 South. 467, 477, 96 Bliss. 720.
"Mixed Insurance companies** are those
which embody the characteristics of both
stock and mutual companies. State t. Wll-
lett, 171 Ind. 296, 86 N. B. 68, 70, 23 L. B. A.
(N. 8.) 197.
MIXED NUISANCE
"There Is a class of acts which may prop-
erly be denominated 'mixed nuisances,' be-
ing both public and private In their effects,
public In that they produce Injury to many
persons or all the public, and private because
at the same time they produce a special and
particular Injury to private rights, which sub-
jects the wrongdoer to an Indictment by the
public, and to damages at the suit of persons
Injured. Ot this class are * * * estab-
lishments which, by reason of the nature o1
the business carried on, produce such nox-
ious smells and vapors as to annoy the whole
community, and are at the same time a
special Injury to those residing or doing busi-
ness In their immediate vicinity, by rendering
their houses untenantable, or their enjoy-
ment so uncomfortable that they sustain a
special and particular damage, apart from
and beyond the rest of the public'* Acme
Fertilizer Co. v. State, 72 N. B. 1037, 1038,
34 Ind. App. 346, 107 Am. St Rep. 190 (quot-
ing and adopting definition In Wood, Nui-
sances [3d Bd.] m. 84, 85, || 14-16, and (
Ing Kenney v. Koopman, 22 South. 593, ]
Ala. 310, 87 L. B. A. 497, 67 Am. St R
119).
In "mixed nuisances,*' an actlona
wrong arises in favor of all persons ^
come within Its effects and Influence a
whose 'rights of person or property are
jurlously affected, and It Is not required,
sustain such an action, that the person
jured should establish damage different
kind and degree from others In like drcn
stances, however numerous they may
The right of action In such case Is sustali
by showing the existence of appreciable da
age to the plaintiff, whether such damage
special or otherwise. McManus t. SouUm
Ry. Ck)., 64 8. E. 766» 768, 150 K. G. 655.
HIXED TRAIN
*'Mlxed trains'* are trains composed
freight cars and passenger cars. State
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 117 S. W. 1173, 11
219 Mo. 156.
A '*mlxed train'* Is parUy used for 1
transportation of freight but also has a p
senger car or ears attached, and Is held (
to the world as a regular means for tm
porting passengers. Southern Ry. Ox,
Cunningham, 50 S. B. 979, 981, 123 Qa. 90
A freight train with a passenger cos
attached Is a *'mlxed train." Leach v.
Louis & S. r. R. Co., 118 S. W. 510, 511, 1
Mo. App. 300.
A train consisting of four freight a
and a passenger coach Is a "mixed trail
Holland v. St Louis & S. F. R. Co., 79 S.
508, 509, 105 Mo. App. 117.
A '*mlxed train" Is a train equipped
carry passengers as well as freight In
arrangements, the safety of passengers is
much looked to as the carriage of f rei^t
usually has two or more coaches for passi
gers, and separate compartmoits or coact
for the races, and a baggage compartment
car,, etc., and runs on a regular sdiedule, a
subordinates Its freight business to the p
senger business so far as necessary to ma
connections with other pass^iger trains
Its own line and those on connecting roa
and It stops opposite stations for the con?*
lent Ingress and egress of passengers. Wh
V. Illinois Cent B. Co^ 55 South. 593, 595,
Miss. 651.
MIXERS
See Batch Mixers; Continuous Mixe
mXTUBE
See Intoxicating Liquors and Mlxtnn
liquid Mixture.
*'If we are to say that every article \i
'mixture' or compound which has, chemica
considered, more than one ingredient tli
we would make every fruit, of the earth
compound. Certainly we should make t
MIXTURE
421
MODEL OF INVENnOH
?oa bean a 'mixture* or oompooBd. But
arly a fair Interpretation of the meaning
the words *mixtaze* and 'compound' in
i statute, is something resolting fr<»n the
ttlng together of parts or Ingredients other
Ein as nature has put them together in the
lits of the earth." The proTisions of War
venue Act June 18, 1898, c 448, | 20, that
B stamp taxes provided for in Schedule B
tiall apply to all medicinal articles com-
anded by any formula, published or un^
blished," but that they shall not apply to
y uncompounded medicinal drug or chemi-
l, contemplate a compound made after some
rmula, and a natural product, such as pa-
in, which is prepared from the Juice of
i pawpaw and cannot be made artificially,
iiough it may be a chemical compound, is
t '^compounded,*' within the meaning of
i statute, and is not taxable, whether used
the basis of a plaster, or prepared in the
rm of tablets or pills by being mixed with
exdpient which has no medicinal effect
tinson & Johnson ▼. Herold, 161 Fed. 603,
I (quoting and adopting Rose t. State, 11
do dr. Gt R. 87).
The term intoxicating liquors or "mix-
res thereor' embraces bitters. Intoxicat-
; Liquor Cases, 26 Kan. 761, 761, 87 Am.
ip. 284, 283.
OB
As public enemy, see Public Enemy.
An assemblage of a number of people
ting in a tumultuous and riotous manner,
Iculated to put good citizens in fear, and
endanger their person or property, con-
itutes a "mob," but it is not necessary that
I these elements must be present to have
at effect Stevens v. Sheriff, 80 Pac. 036,
7, 71 Kan. 434.
In an action under Gen. St. 1901, | 2601,
iklng cities liable for injury done by mobs,
1 instmction that "a mob is an unorganized
semblage of many persons Intent on unlaw-
1 violence, either to persons or property,"
not erroneous because making no reference
a determination on the part of those com-
sing it to resist opposition. City of Cher-
vale T. Hawman, 101 Pac. 994, 80 Kan. 170,
L. B. A. (N. S.) 646, 133 Am. St Rep. 196,
I Ann, Cas. 149.
The persons engaged in a "riot," consti-
te a "mob"; the two terms being almost
nonymous. Luckett-Wake T. Co. v. Globe
Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 171 Fed. 147, 148.
Blot synoiiTmoiis
The word "mob," in legal use, is prac-
cally synonymous with "riot," but the lat-
T is the more correct term. Adamson v.
Ity of New York, 96 N. T. Supp. 907, 909,
LO App. Div; 68 (citing Bouv. Law Diet).
MODAL LEGACY
"A 'modal legacy' is a beauest accom-
panied with directions as to the mode in
which it should be applied for the legatee's
benefit; for example, a legacy to Titius to
put him an apprentice." A legacy to be ap-
plied to the education of testator's minor
sons is a "modal legacy." Heady v. State ez
rel. Heady, 60 Ind. 316, 323 (quoting and
adopting the definition in 2 Bout. 21),
MODE
See Potential Mode.
The exandnation of a party before trial,
authorized by Code Civ. Proa N. Y. | 870,
cannot be required by a federal CMreuit Court
sitting in that state, by virtue of the decla*
ration of Act March 9, 1892, c. 14, that, in adr
dition to the mode of taking the depositions
of witnesses in causes pending in the federal
District and Circuit Courts, it shall be Uwful
to take the depositions or testimony of wit-
nesses in the mode prescribed by the laws of
the state in which the courts are held.
" 'Mode' usually means the manner in which
a thing is done, and this act relates to the
manner of taking 'depositions and testimony,'
which the title treats as equivalent terms,
and which may be so regarded so far as the
question before us is concerned. But it is
contended that the word 'mode,' as used in
the act, has a broader significance, and em-
braces the production of evidence, thereby
qualifying section 861, Rev. St, which pre-
scribes the mode of proof. We cannot concur
in this view." Hanks Dental Ass'n v. Inter-
national Tooth Crown Co., 24 Sup. Ct 700,
702, 194 U. S. 808, 48 L. Ed. 989.
MODEL
While a model filed in the Patent Ofllce
will not, in itself, amount to an anticipation
which will invalidate a subsequent patent to
another, the word "model" as so used must be
understood in its ordinary sense as meaning
merely a pattern or reprebentation, and not
as meaning the actual machine or device of
the invention. American Writing Mach. Ck).
V. Wagner Typewriter Co., 151 Fed. 576, 588,
81 C. C. A. 120.
MODZX OF imnSNTION AND HC-
PROTEICEKT
Exact models of steamships of improv-
ed design, showing the details of the vessels,
valued at about $1,000 each, and intended
for exhibition in steamship offices, are mod-
els of improvements in the art of shipbuild-
ing, and are free of duty under Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c. 11, I 2, Free list, par. 616,
covering "models of inventions and of other
improvements in the arts." Boas t. United
States, 128 Fed. 470.
l-i— L
MODEL OP INVENTION
422
MODERN APPLIANCE
The proYlQion In Tariff Act July 24, 1897,
c. 11, I 2, Free List, par. 616, for ''models
of Inventions and of other Improvements in
the arts, including patterns for machinery,'*
is not limited to the class of patterns known
as "model patterns," intended to show the
working of the thing illustrated, but in-
cludes also molders* patterns, which are used
as models about which to form sand molds
in which castings may be made, and
which are fitted for successive use in that
way. R. Hoe ft Co. t. United States, 141
Fed. 488, 480.
MODERATE
MODERATE SPEED
"Moderate speed" is not a fixed rate of
miles per hour, but something materially less
than the vessel's full speed, depending upon
surrounding circumstances. The James A.
Carney, 192 Fed. 216, 217.
"Moderate speed," required of a steam
vessel in a fog, is purely a relative term;
and what constitutes such speed in a given
case is to be determined with reference to
the time, place, and circumstances, rather
than from the actual speed. Quinette v.
Bisso, 136 Fed. 825, 830, 60 C. C. A, 503,
5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 303 (citing The Colorado,
91 U. 8. 702, 23 L. Ed. 379; Newton v.
Stebbins, 10 How. [51 U. 8.] 606, 13 L. Bd.
651; The Martello, 14 Sup. Ct 725, 153 U.
8. 70, 38 L. Ed. 637 ; The Umbrta, 17 Sup.
Ct 615, 166 U. 8. 417, 41 L. Bd. 1053).
What constitutes a '^moderate speed" on
the part of a vessel in a fog cannot be de-
termined by any hard and fast rule, but de-
pends on the dangers which are known or
should be anticipated in the particular case.
City of Chicago v. Goodrich Transit Co., 199
Fed. 112, 114, U7 C. C. A. 362.
The phrase "moderate speed," in the act
of Congress providing that every vessel shall,
in a fog, go at a "moderate speed," having
careful regard to the existing circumstances,
means that a vessel should, when in a fog,
so reduce her speed that other vessels, free
from blame, may not be injured. Smith v.
Norfolk & S. R. Co., 58 8. E. 799, 801, 145
N. C. 98, 122 Am. St Rep. 423.
The "moderate speed" required of a
vessel in a fog, by article 16 of the Inland
Navigation Rules (Act June 7, 1897, c. 4),
is such speed as under existing conditions
will enable her to stop before coming into
collision with another vessel after the latter
can be seen, assuming that the other vessel
also observes the rule. The Cascades, 178
Fed. 726, 731.
Rule 15 of the navigation rules for the
Great Lakes (Act Feb. 8, 1895, c. 64), which
provides that every vessel shall in thick
weather go at a moderate speed and on hear-
ing a fog signal ahead slow down to bare
steerageway, does not require a vessel 1
stop in a fog nor to slow down to bai
steerageway while progress appears saf
but requires running at moderate speed, con
mensurate with dangers whidi are elthc
known or must be anticipated; she hario
the right to proceed in expectation of con
pliance on the part of others with the law 1
respect of fog signals. Erie & Westei
Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 Fed. 4!
48, 101 C. a A. 170.
A steam vessel passing from Portlan
do^n the Willamette river in a dense fo
at a speed of 15 miles an hour, in view of tfa
extensive commerce on such river, was nc
going at the "moderate speed" required b
article 16 of the Inland Navigation Rule
(Act June 7, 1897, c. 4), which provides tiu
in a fog a vessel shall go at a moderat
speed, "having careful regard to the existiii
circumstances and conditions." The Balle
Gatzert, 179 F. 44, 47, 102 C. C. A, 612.
A steamer at sea, proceeding at night i
a dense fog, in frequented waters, at
speed of 10 or U knots an hour, is not goio
"at a moderate speed, having careful regar
to the existing circumstances and condltioDfi
as required by article 16 of the Intemationi
navigation rules. Ji sdiooner which, as
preponderance of the evidence tended t
show, was proceeding at night in a fog i
a speed not exceeding 8^ knots an hou
held to have been going at a moderate spee
in compliance with the rules. Palmer y
Merchants* & Miners' Transp. Co., 154 Fee
683, 689, 709 (citing The Chattahoochee, 1
Sup. Ct 491, 494, 173 U. a 540, 548, 43 1
Ed. 801; The Btruria, 147 Fed. 216, 218, 1
C. C. A. 442, 444; The Nacoochee, 11 So]
Ct 122, 137 U. 8. 330. 34 L. Ed. 687; Tb
Cambridge, 2 Lowell, 21, 28, 4 Fed. CtL
1118; The Louisburg, 75 Fed. 424, 21 a (
A. 424; The Eleanora, 17 Blatchf. 88, 8 Fe(
Cas. 420; The Martello, 34 Fed. 71, 74; Tb
Parthian, 55 Fed. 426, 432, 5 C. O. A. 17
176; McCabe v. Old Dominion Steamship O]
31 Fed. 234, 237 ; Marsden, ColUslons [5t
Ed.] 373; The Mount Hope, 84 Fed. 91<
29 0. 0. A. 365).
MODERATOR
As quasi Judicial officer, see Quasi Ji
dicUl.
A "moderator" is one of the officers pn
vided by statutes in New Hampshire to coi
duct the affairs of a school district meetlni
State ▼. Waterhouse^ 63 AtL 804^ 71 N. £
488.
MODERN
MODEBK APPUANOB
A charge in an action for fire set by i
locomotive, stating that it was defendant*
duty to have its engines properly eiiuippe
MODJERN ASPHAI/r ROADWAY 4St
ICOIDBRnSl PATmOf
ith SQch appliances for arresting i^rks as
'e in general and approved use, not, bow-
er, such as will prevent any spark from
caping; bnt mitt as are in general and
mmon nse^ and that if the fire was caused
r its fkilnre to properly equip its engine
Lth a spark arrester that was modem and
. common use, or by failure to properly
)erate it, it was negligent, does not, by use
* the word "modem,'" necessarily require
le latest and best appliances. Jeffress v.
orf olk-Sonthem B. Co^ T8 8. B. 1013, lOie,
» N. a 21fi.
[0]>mH A8PHLAI.T ROABWAT
Where, at the time a contract for the
lie of dty lots, providing for the constrac-
on by the vendor of a ^'modern asphalt
>adway,'' was executed, the only asphalt
xeets in that city were hot or sheet asphalt
Teets, and no such thing as a "cold Ken-
icky rock asphalt street'* was known, the
>nstruction of such a street was not a
»mpllance with the contract. Tennant Land
o. y. Nordenum, 146 8. W. 756^ 707, 148 Ky.
51-
lODIFY
See As Modified.
The word "modify,** as used in a cor^
orate charter, providing that, upon the re-
ort of commissioners to appraise property
rhich the corporation seeks to acquire as a
Ight of way, the judge of the district court
tiall confirm the report, modify it, or refer
: back to the present or new commission-
rs, does not give the court authority to in-
reaae the amount found by the commission-
rs. Louisiana Western B. Co. v. Cross-
lan's Heirs, 35 South. 784, 785, 111 La. 611.
Under Civ. Code, I 139, providing that,
rhere a divorce is granted for an offense of
tie husband, the court may compel him to
lake a suitable allowance to the wife for
er support during her life, or for a shorter
eriod, and may from time to time modify
ts orders in such respect, where a divorce
ecree awarded plaintiff alimony at the rate
f $75 per month, the court had statutory
uthority to "modify" the decree so as to
elieve defendant from further payment of
ucb alimony, though the decree contained
10 reservation for such modification. Under
tils section it may '^modify" its former order,
ither by increasing or reducing the amount
if money to be paid at any one time, or en-
arging or diminishing the frequency with
rhich the payments are to be made. Neither
B the authority to modify the decree lim-
ted by the section to a mere change in the
imount of the allowance to be paid, but it
Qcludes a modification of the order in any
espect which, under the circumstances of
he particular case, may seem Just to the
xmrt. Under such discretionary authority,
t U within the power of the court, not only
to change the amount of the allowance, but
also to suspend any enforcement of the order
until its further direction. Boole v. Soole,
87 Pac 205, 206, 4 CaL App. 07.
A motion to correct a judgment rendered
by a municipal court Justice is a motion to
amend or "modify" the same, within Munic-
ipal Court Act (Laws 1902, p. 1563, c. 580, |
254). Ryan v. Brown, 00 N. Y. Supp. 868,
860, 51 Misc. Rep. 67.
The word "modified," as used in Acts
1001, p. 608, c. 262, 1 1, providing that, on the
original hearing of an application for the oon-
stractlon of a district sewer, the "resolution
shall be confirmed or 'modified,'" is to be
given the meaning intended by the definition
of the verb "modify" in the Bncy<4opedic
Dictionary: "To change or alter the external
qualities or incidoits of anything; to vary;
to alter; to give a new fdrm, character,
force, or appearance to" — and therefore the
board of public works, after hecuring a resolu-
tion to construct a district sewer, had power,
without a further hearing, to modify the ree-
olntton so as to provide for the construction
of such projected order. Edwards ▼. Cooper,
70 N. B. 1047, 1060, 168 Ind. 54.
As used in a declaration alleging that de-
fendant insurance company, in violation of
its agreement, modified a policy so that it
covered a part only of the goods insured, and
thereby canceled the policy as to the other
goods, the words "modified" and "canceled"
plainly referred to the physical changes made
and to the effect which those changes would
have had if authorized. Goodhue v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co, 55 N. B. 1060, 1040^ 175
Masa 187, 180.
MOLASSES
See Btocik of Sugar and Molassea
MOLD
See Button and Button Molds.
MOLDED
Pressed syAoaymoiis
In Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c 11, f 1,
Schedule B, par. 00, the term "molded," as
applied to glassware, is synonymous with
"pressed." United States v. Hell Chemical
Co.. 178 red. 537, 530, 102 C. a A. 47.
HOLDER'S PATTERN
"Molders* patterns" are intended to be
placed in sand in order to form the matrix
in which the molten metal is cast The pro-
vision in Tariff Act July 24, 1807, c. 11, I 2,
Free List, par. 616, for "models of inventions
and of other improvements in the arts. In-
cluding patterns for machinery," is not limit-
ed to the dass of patterns known as "model
patterns," intended to show the working of
the thing illustrated, but includes also mold-
ers' patterns, which are used as models about
MOMENTABIIiT UKCONTROLLED A24
MONEY
Which to form sand molds in, in whidi cast-
ings may be made, and which' are fitted for
snccessire use in that way. R. Hoe & Go. t*
United States, 141 Fed. 488, 489.
MOMENTARILY UNCONTROLLED
Generally it may be said that the event
sought to be described by the phrase ''mo-
mentarily uncontrolled" is wholly inconsist-
ent with a condition where a horse is moving
along the road in the coarse of a struggle
for mastery. It is substantially limited to
those spasmodic movements whi<^ often oo*
cur while the horse is generally within the
control of his driver, but where the partio*
ular movement is so quick and unexpected
that it and its resulto can take place before
efforts to control can be exerted. A horse
shied to one side, and then at a gallop ran
forward 60 to 90 feet, the driver all the time
pulling back on the lines, so that the horse
was drawing the vehicle by the bit and
resisting the efforts to stop him, till a defect
in the highway was reached and an accident
occurred. The horse could not be held to
have been only "momentarily uncontrolled,"
within the law as to liability of a municipal-
ity for defects in highways. Bhleiter v. CSty
of Milwaukee, 98 N. W. 934, 935, 121 Wis.
85, 66 U B. A. 916, 105 Am. St Bep. 1027,
2 Ann. Oas. 17&
MONDAY
A defendant is presumed to' know the
law, and therefore to know that venires are
drawn for the different we^s of the term,
and not for the different days, and that a list
served on him headed "Petit Jury for Monday,
October 15, 1906," means for the week begin-
ning on that day. State v. Jones, 42 South.
967, 968, 118 La. 869.
MONEY
See Bond for the Payment of Money; Ck>l-
lection of Money; Condemnation Mon-
ey; Contract for Payment of Money;
Current Money; Lawful Money; Pub-
lic Money; Purchase Money ; Bight to
Becover Money; Smart Money; Suit
Money ; Sum of Money.
Earnest money, see Earnest
My moneys, bonds, etc., see My.
Proceeds as money, see Proceeds.
Baise money, see Baiae.
See, also^ Lawful Currency.
In legal acceptation, the word "money**
means current metallic coins. Block v. State,
44 Tex. 620, 622.
The word "money," in its most strict and
technical sense, means coined metal, usually
gold or silver, upon whi<^ the government
stamp has been impressed to indicate its
value, but in its more popular use it imports
any currency, tokens, bank notes, or other
circulating medium In general use a$ the
representative of value. Kennedy v. Briere^
45 Tex. 805, 309.
"Money,** in its strict tedmical sense. Is
coined metal, gold or silver, on which the
government stamp has been impressed to in-
dicate its value; but in its more popular
sense any currency token, bank notes, or oth-
er circulating medium in general use as the
representative of value Is money, and the
word designates the whole volume of the me-
dium of exchange, regardless of its charac-
ter or denomination. Johnson v. State, 52
South. 652, 167 Ala. 82, 140 Am. St Bep. la
"'Money,' in the constitutional sense,
means coins of gold and silver fabricated and
stamped by authority of law as a measure of
value, pursuant to the power vested in Con-
gress by the Constitution. Coins of copper
may also be minted for small f ractioiial cir-
culation, as authorized by law and the us-
age of the government for eighty years."
Legal Tender Cases, 12 WalL (79 U. S.) 457,
587, 20 L. Ed. 287.
"While gold coin Is In one sense 'money,'
it Is in another an article of merchandise."
Gregory v. Morris, 96 U. S. 619, 625, 24 U
Ed. 740.
The word "money," in reasonable and
colloquial use, signified whatever customarily
passed current as a medium of exchange and
oonunerce, and was not necessarily confined
to coined metals. Clawson v. State, 109 N.
W. 578, 579, 129 Wis. 650, 116 Am. St Bep.
972, 9 Ann. Cas. 966 (citing State v. Kube, 20
Wis. 217, 91 Am. Dec 390).
"Money" includes "whatever is lawfully
and actually current in buying and selling,
of the value and as the equivalent of coin."
State V. Quackenbush, 106 N. W. 953, 955, 98
Minn. 515.
"Money" Is a generic term, and, as com-
monly understood, is anything that circulates
as the ordinary medium of exchange in buy-
ing and selling property. State v. Finnegan,
103 N. W. 155, 157, 127 Iowa, 286, 4 Ann.
Cas. 628.
"Money" is the medium of exchange es-
tablished by law, as well as by custom amonir
men and nations, and to perform its functions
it must circulate freely, unembarrassed by
suspicion or inquiry as to its ownership by
him who tenders it in payment of a debt
or in any transaction where its use is requir-
ed or permitted; and, unless the one by
whom it is received in any such transaction
actually knows at the time that it is not the
money of him from whom it is received, it
becomes his absolutely, and he is not liable
to him who was its real owner before he re-
ceived it even though it were stolen, either
for the specific money received or its value.
Young V. Pecos County, 101 S. W. 1055, 1058,
46 Tex. Civ. App. 319.
The term "money" or "moneys," as used
in Acts 1895, p. 3, c 4322^ i 5^ providing for
MONEY
426
MOKBT
the taxation 6f property, means gold and
direr coin, United States tteiPniiy and bank
notes, legal tender, and all other forms of
currency, and erery deposit wbich any per-
son owning the same or holding in trust and
residing in the state is entitled to withdraw
in money on demand. Hunt v. Turner, 45
South. 509, 518, 54 Fla. 654.
Laws 1908, c. 73, 8 1, fixing a system of
public revenue, defines tbe term ''money" as
Including all kinds of coin and all kinds of
paper issued by or under the authority of the
United States circulating as money, whether
deposited in a bank or elsewhere. State ex
rel. Palmer ▼. iBleming, 97 N. W. 1063, 1066,
70 Neb. 529.
As used in Laws 1901, p. 166, | 2, pro-
hibiting the conduct of games of chance for
*'money," checks, credits, or any representa-
tive of value, or for any property or thing
whatever, the word "money" Includes all
money. State v. Woodman, 67 Pac. 1118,
1120, 26 Mont 348.
In Rev. St i 5209, which makes it a
criminal offense for any officer or agent of a
national bank to embezzle, abstract, or wUl-
fnlly misapply "any of the moneys, funds,
or credits of the association," the word "mon-
eys" refers to the currency or circulating
medium of the country. United States v.
Smith, 152 Fed. 542, 548 (citing United States
V. Greve, 65 Fed. 489).
As ImnTASO
See Baggage.
"Money or money's worth** means cash or
its eaoivalent Olllett t. Chicago Title ft
Trust Co., 82 N. E. 891, 904, 230 IlL 873.
The word "money" in a will, whereby a
wife gave to her husband certain personalty,
"money, securities for money, evidences of
debt, and of title and accounts," etc, does not.
Include the amount received by the wife un-
der a will executed about nine years after
the will of the wife, who died before the
amount of her share in testatrix's estate was
ascertained, so that the right of the executor
of the wife at the time of her death was
merely a cBose in action ; the word "money"
covering only cash or money on deposit un-
less the context gives it a more extended
meaning. In re Hendrickson, 125 N. Y. Supp.
309, 813, 140 App. Diy. 388.
The word "money" in its popular sense
signifies cash or its equivalent used as a cir-
culating medium, as in its generic sense it is
not confined to coin, but includes everything
which by common consent is made to repre-
sent property and passes currently, such as
gold and silver coins and the various kinds of
paper money issued by the federal govern-
ment People V. Clark, 99 N. £. 866, 868, 256
lU. 14, Ann. Gas. 1913B, 214.
Ab eluittel
See ChatteL
JL* eipedits
See Credits.
As debt
See Debt
As coeds
See Goods.
As Issal teadev
The word "money," as used In statutes de-
fining embezzlement or larceny, means only
what is legal tender. State v. Mispagel, 106
S. W. 513, 516, 207 Mo. 657 (quoting and
adopting Bish. St Crimes, § 346).
As all personal estate
"The term 'money' can be used in a re-
stricted, and also in an enlarged, sense. In.
one it is a standard of value or medium of
exchange stamped by government authority;
and in the other, in addition to this, it in-
cludes stocks, bonds, and other personal se-
curities of an investment nature." Testatrix,
after certain bequests, gave certain person-
alty to one H. and all "money" remaining
after payment of debts. Testatrix left per-
sonalty amounting to about $5,000 and real
estate worth $1,500. When she made the
will she had $400 in money, and $327 at the
time of her death. After paying expenses,
debts, and legacies, the personal estate, con-
sisting of furniture^ mortgages, and railtoad
stocks, amounted to $3,839. The real estate-
which was not devised was inherited by her
brother. Held, that what remained of her
perscmal estate passed by the will to H. In
re Blackstone's Estate, 96 N. Y. Supp. 977,
980, 47 Misc. Rep. 53&
As property
Money as property, see Property; Per-
sonal Property.
Testatrix, after making bequests, gave
the remainder of her estate to her sister B.,
and then provided that if B. predecease her,
half of all ;*moneys" belonging to her estate
should be paid to a society, and the other
half should be .divided among certain persons,
who included all who would have taken un-
der the intestacy laws. Held, that the word
"moneys*' was used in the sense of property,
of whatever nature, without which meaning
there would be a partial intestacy. Mt
Holly Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Deacon, 81
Att. 356, 357, 79 N. J. Eq. 120.
Bank MUs or liotes
. "Doubtless the word 'money' is often used
as applicable to other media of exchange
than coin. Bank notes lawfully issued and
actually current at par in lieu of coin are
treated as money, because flowing as such
through the channels of trade and commerce
without question." Woodruff v. Mississippi,
16 Sup. Ct 820, 162 U. S. 291, 300, 40 L. Bd.
973.
Under Pen. Code 1896, art 945, of the
chapter on "Swindling,'* which provides that
*'.wlthln Ibe meaning of money as used in this.
MONBT
426
MONET
chapter are induded also bank bills or oUier
drcolating medium current as money/* an
indictment for swindling, alleging current
money, includes bank bills, as well as United
States treasury notes. Baxter t. State, 105
S. W. 1»5, 51 Tex. Or. R. 57ft.
Bonds, lioteSf and a&ortgages
The word "money" in its usual meaning
signifies gold, silver, or paper money used as
a circulating medium of exchange, and does
not include notes, bonds, evidence of debt, or
other property, and such usual meaning
should be given it when used in a will, unless
it appears from construing the entire will
that testator intended it to include bonds and
other securities. Pohlman v. Pohlman, 150
S. W. 829, 830, 150 Ky. 679.
Railroad bonds d^osited in a Circuit
Court as collateral security by its order, and
kept in a bank vault to which the clerk kept
the key, are not "money," and the clerk is
not entitled to a oommission thereon, under
Rev. St i 828, when by order of the court he
takes them from the bank and surrenders
them to the depositor; nor is there any au-
thority outside of the statute for the allow-
ance of such a commission, liichigan Cent
R. Co. V. Harsha, 134 Fed. 217, 221, 67 C. C
A. 145.
A conditional sale contract required pay-
ment in 10 days either in cash or notes, de-
claring that all notes and open accounts shall
be drawn payable at Oklahoma City, with 10
per cent attorney's fees, and that on default
in any installment the seller might consider
the entire indebtedness due ; the title to the
goods to remain in the seller until the price
had been paid in money. Held, that the word
"money" was used in contradistinction to
"notes," and did not include notes, so that
the acceptance of notes did not constitute a
payment vesting title in the buyer. In re
Gray, 170 Fed. 638, 643.
The provision of a contract of sale that
the title shall remain in the vendor until the
price is paid "in money" is not complied with
by the giving of a note for the price, and,
while the giving of the note may be presump-
tively a payment of the price, it is not a pay-
ment "in money." Anderson Carriage Co. v.
Hartley, 67 Ati. 567. 569, 102 Me. 492.
Clieclu, drafts, and other bills of ex-
ol&anse
"A check is a mere order for so much
money to the credit of the drawer in the
bank or drawee, which it is bound to honor
when made In form and properly presented."
Where an indictment charged the larceny
of money, proof of the taking of a check on
which the money was obtained was not a
variance; and where defendant married a
woman in pursuance of a scheme to procure
certain money which she had on deposit in
bank, and later procured a check for the
money on representations that he would use
the money in making an investment for her,
he was guilty of larceny. Hunt ▼. Stat
79 a W. 769, 772, 72 Ark. 241, 65 I-. R. i
71, 105 AnL 8t Rep. 84, 2 Ann. Qaa. 33.
Where a draft is obtained by fftlse pn
tenses in Wisconsin, but is paid in Iowa, th
crime of obtaining "money" by false pretem
eB in violation of Rev. St 1898, | 4423, is con
mitted in Iowa, and a prosecution therefo
can only be maintained th^e. Rates \
State, 103 N. W. 261, 254, 124 Wis. 612,
Ann. Cas. 865.
A bill of exchange is not "money" do
legal tender. United States Health ft Acd
dent Ins. Co. v. Clark, 88 N. B. 700, 762, 4
Ind. App. 845.
DeMs and erodits
The term "money," in a gift to testa
trix*s husband for life, and thereafter ore
to another, of "all the money that may b
in the hands of my said husband as trustee
for me at my decease," includes a debt t
him as trustee for money of the trust turn
which he has loaned out Dillard v. Dillanj
84 S. B. 60, 61, 62, 97 Ta. 434.
Issuance of bonds by a corporation fo
antecedent debts is not issuance for "monej
labor, or property," etc, within St Wis, 189f
i 1753, which prohibits issuance for othe
purposes. Nichols v. Waukesha Canning Co
195 Fed. 807, 812.
Deposits la liaak
Under Rev. Civ. St art 5064, deflninj
"money," as used in the provisions relatim
to taxes, to include deposits which the owne
is entitled to ¥dthdraw in money on demand
an indictment for perjury in fUsely listinj
the amount of money deposited in a bank i
insufficient, which does not allege that th
money was payable on demand. Parker i
State (Tex.) 69 S. W. 75, 76.
The word "money,** in embezslemen
statutes relating to public funds, is used ii
a generic, and not in a specific sense, viz.
it includes all actual moneys, credits, an(
funds of every kind belonging to tiie public
so that, where accused was charged wlti
an embezzlement of money, proof of the tak
ing of public funds deposited in /i bank oi
general deposit, by means of drawing check
on the deposit, did not constitute a variance
Territory v. Hale, 81 Paa 683, 585, 13 N. M
181, 13 Ann. Cas. 551.
The word "money," defined in Revenu-
Laws 1903, p. 389, c. 73, § 4, as Including *'al
kinds of coin, all kinds of paper issued by o:
under the authority of the United States am
circulating as money whether in possessioi
or deposit in bank or elsewhere," include
"money" on general deposit in a bank upoi
certificates of deposit payable on demand
and not a credit against which the depositor'
indebtedness can be offset White v. City o
Lincoln, 112 N. W. 369, 370, 79 Neb. 153 (cit
ing Critchfield v. Nance County, 110 N. V
538, 77 Neb. 807).
MONET
427
MONET AT JNTERE8T
Berenue Act 1908, | 4, proyldiiig that the
»rd "money,** as used in the act for the pur-
>8e of listing for taxation shall iadnde
oney deposited in bank or elsewhere, is in-
nded to include money on general deposit
a bank. Critchfleld t. Nance Ck>unt7, 110
W. 638, 77 Neb. 807.
Real estate
The term "money,** when used to deslg-
Lte the property embraced in a residuary
ause, is sufficient to include real estate,
risen Association of Virginia v. Russeirs
dm'r, 49 S. E. 966, 968, 103 Va. 563 (citing
^houler. Wills [3d Ed.] | 622).
Testator^s children signed an instrument
^nowledging having receiyed from their fa-
ler '^divers sums of money and other proper-
,** which he desired acknowledged in order
ia( no misunderstanding or confusion might
isult in the settlement of his estate. Subse-
lently two of the children signed an instru-
ent admowledging that since executing the
>oye instrument they had received certain
Al estate as an advancement, and consent-
ig that the value of the same, as fixed at a
^rtain sum set opposite their names therein,
nay be deducted firom any share we may
>come entitled to" in his estate. The will
Irected "tibat the sums of money which I
Bve advanced and which I may hereafter
ivance to my children shall be considered as
Ivances and charged against each; • • ^
idk advances and payment of money shall
5 taken out of their respective shares."
[eld, that the conveyances of land to the two
>n8 were to be deemed *'8ums of money," or
Ldvances and payment of money," within
le intention of the will. Vreeland v. Vree-
ind, 66 Ati. 1069, 1092, 65 N. J. Eq. 668; Id.,
) AtL 1118, 66 N. J. Eq. 454.
State hmmJk motes, ete.
Bank paper is not "money,** and hence an
?tion by petition which is allowed to be
rought on a bond or note for the direct pay-
lent of money only, would not lie upon a
ote payable "in the money of this state,"
' it is intended thereby to make the note
eiyable in the bank paper issued by author-
y of the state. Ohambers v. George, 15 Ky.
; Litt) 335, 336.
'*Bank notes payable to the bearer (or
hen payable to order, indorsed in blank)
Eu» in the ordinary intercourse and busi-
ess of life as' 'money,* and circulate and are
"eated as money. They are not, indeed, in
legal and exact sense, money; but, for
»nimon purposes, they possess the attributes
[id perform the functions of money." Bris-
)e V. Commonwealth Bank, 11 Pet (36 U. S.)
S7, 330, 9 U Ed. 709.
Stock
Certificates of stock in a bank on which
Eily 60 per cent has been paid, and which
ere held by the. bank as security for the bal-
Qce, are not moneys, funds, or credits of the
bank within Free Banking Act, | 30 (Rev. SL
I 3821 — 85), making it an offense for an of-
ficer of a bank to embesale moneys, funds,
or credits of the bank. State v. Davis, 96
N. EL 1022, 1025, 85 Ohio St 48.
MOHET AFPLIOABUB
A complaint in an action by a subcon-
tractor to foreclose a mechanic's lien and for
a personal judgment, which alleges that plaln-
tiflf contracted with a third person to furnish
materials for a building on premises of de-
fendant, that he furnished materials and re-
ceived a part of the price, that the third
person, for the balance, executed an order on
defendant to deduct from the final payment
a specified sum and pay the same to the sub-
contractor for goods delivered and to be de-
livered by him, that the owner accepted the
order, that at the time of the acceptance of
the order a contractual relation existed be-
tween the third person and defendant who
had in his possession money belonging to the
third person, that said money is in the hands
of defendant applicable to the payment of
the order, charges facts disclosing the exist-
ence of a fund against which the order was
directed and states a cause of action as
against a motion to dismiss treated as a de-
murrer, and any defect in the complaint
must be reacdied by motion to make it more
definite and certain; the term "money ap-
plicable" meaning money which one is en-
titled to have applied in payment Wood
Mfg. ft Realty Co. of Long Island v. John-
stone, 133 N. Y. Supp. 422, 424, 148 App. Div.
747.
MOHET AT IHTEREST
The phrase "money at interest" includes
all forms of interest-bearing securities,
whether represented by bonds, notes, or
otherwise, unless the contrary appears from
the assessment itself. Sweetsir v. (Chandler,
56 AU. 584, 586, 98 Me. 146.
The phrase "money at interest" as used
in Rev. St a 9, I 5, imposing taxes on all
obligations for money or other property,
''money at interest," and debts due the person
to be taxed more than they are owing, is
embraced in the word "debts," and therefore
the amount which the person to be taxed is
indebted is to be deducted from money which
he has at interest Taylor v. Inhabitants of
Town of Caribou, 67 Atl. 2, 3, 4, 102 Me. 401,
10 Ann. Cas. 1080.
Petitioners purchased land by contract
providing for delivery of deed in escrow, to
be delivered with possession of the property
on complete payment of the purchase prices to
be paid in installments, the last at the op-
tion of the vendor, at one of two certain
times. It was also provided that on install-
ments paid the purchaser should be allowed
4^ per cent interest in the final settlement
Held that when the purchasers paid install-
ments, ownership of the money passed to the
liCONET AT INTERESir
428 MONET IN THE HANDS OF BANE
vendors, and that the arrangement for pay-
ment of 4^ per cent on it was not strictly
as interest on money belonging to them, so
that they were not taicable thereon as
"money at interest." Williams ▼. City of
Boston, 94 N. E. 808, 809, 208 Mass. 497.
Where plaintiff advanced money to the
purchasers of real estate under a bond from
the owner, under an arrangement whereby
the land was deeded to plaintiff on an un-
derstanding that he would convey to the
purchasers under the bond on the payment
to him of the amount advanced and interest,
and plaintiff gave a bond binding himself to
convey, and to those to whom the bond was
given, gave no note, ^ but promised to pay
plaintiff the amount advanced, plaintiff was
properly taxed on the amount under a stat-
ute subjecting ''money at interest'* to tax-
ation. Glidden v. Town of Newport, 66 Atl.
117, 118, 74 N. H. 207.
MOITET DECREE
An ordinary real estate mortgage fore-
closure proceeding is in part at least other
than a "money decree" within Gen. St 1906,
{§ 1701, 1909, regulating supersedeas bonds.
State ex rel. Purvis v. Palmer, 48 South.
638, 57 Fla..541.'
MOH ET DELIVERED
An advance of money by discounting a
church order for $150 for decedent was a de-
livery of money, within section 4187, St 1898,
providing that book account entries of items
of "money delivered," at one time exceeding
$5, are inadmissible to prove the account
Dohmen v. Blum's Estate, 119 N. W. 349, 350,
137 Wis. 560.
MONET DEMAND ON OONTRAOT
As defined by Itev. St. 1852, the phrase
"money demands on contracts," when used in
reference to an action, means any action aris-
ing out of contract, where the relief demand-
ed is the recovery of money. State v. Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 93 N. E. 213,
218, 175 Ind. 59, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 256.
MONET DEPOSITED IN BANK
The expression "money deposited in
bank," as used in section 4 of the revenue
act of 1903 (Comp. St 1903, p. 1283), is in-
tended to include money on general deposit
in bank. Critchfield v. Nance County, 110
N. W. 538, 77 Neb. 807.
MONET DISBURSED
Where pledgees of collateral by the bank-
rupt were entitled to sell the same at public
or private sale without notice to the pledgors,
and apply the proceeds to the payment of
their liabiHaes, and in one case the pledgee
was authorized to buy the securities pledged
free from any right or equity of redemption
ih' the pledgors, but after bankruptcy the
trui^tee was permitted to sell the securities
freie from lien on payment of .the debts by the
pledgees when the securities were delivere
to the purchaser, on which sale the truste
received a balance of $3,802.87, representini
the bankrupt's equity in the securities, sue!
sum, and not the price secured from the pui
chaser, was the "moneys disbursed," withii
Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, i 48, a
amended by Act June 25, 1910, c 412, | 9, oi
which commissions were to be allowed. Ij
re Meadows, 199 Fed. 304, 306.
MONET HAD AND RECEITED
See Assumpsit for Money Had and Re
ceived.
Action for, as equitable action, see Eqol
table Action.
The action for "money had and recei^
ed" rests on an implied promise, and may bi
maintained against the person who has re
ceived money from plaintiff, or from a thiit
person, under such circumstances that, In eq
uity and good conscience, he should not re
tain it. Jackson v. Creek, 94 N. E. 416, 41£
47 Ind. App. 541.
The action for *'money had and recei?
ed" is governed by equitable principles, am
generally lies whenever one person has re
ceived money belonging to another which u
justice and good conscience should be return
ed. Stout V. Carruthersville Hardware Ca
110 S. W. 619, 621, 131 Mo. App. 520.
'The action for 'money had and receiv
ed' lies to recover money to which plaintiff i
entitled, and which in justice and equity thi
defendant ought to refund to the plaintiJl
and which defendant cannot with a goo<
conscience retain." Whittle v. Whittle, 9:
Pac. 170, 172, 5 Cal. App. 696 (citing Bou?
Law Diet).
"The count for 'money had and recelT
ed' is a very important one, and in some re
spects differs from all other common-law ac
tions. It is a sort of connecting link betweei
law and equity, and by the use of the ver]
convenient fiction of an implied promise thij
count will lie to recover any money wbicl
defendant has received, or in any manner ob
tained possession of, which in equity anc
good faith and conscience he ought to paj
over to plaintiff." Montgomery v. Wise, 12(
S. W. 100, 103, 138 Mo. App. 176 (quoting anc
adopting Green & Myer, Missouri Prac & PI
§ 266).
MONEY IN ANT BANK
All money in any bank, see AIL
MONET IN THE HANDS OB POSSES-
SION OF BAN^
Money deposited in a savings bank ii
"money or other property in the hands oi
possession" of the bank, within the meaning
of Qen. St. 1902, § 1019, providing for ae
tions in the nature of bills of interpleader
Brown v. Clark, 68 Ati. 1001, 1006, 80 Oonn
419.
MONEY JUDGMBKT
429
MONET C^ THE OITT
KEY JUDGMEHT
"Money judgment," as used in Code Civ.
^ § 6S5, providing tliat, in all cases oth-
han for the recovery of a money Judg-
t, the judgment may be enforced or car-
into execution after the lapse of five
rs from the date of its entry, etc, Ic-
es a decree allowing a certain sum to a
missioner in partition for services and
mses, and hence it cannot be enforced
execution after five years. Cortes v. Su-
or Court, 24 Pac 1011, 86 CaL 274, 21
St Rep. 37.
A Judgment foreclosing a laborer's Hen
directing a sale is not a ''money judg-
t * within Rer. St 1887, i 4810, proTiding
on appeal from a judgment directing the
Dent of money, appellant, to stay ihto-
iings, must give a bond In doable the
unt of the judgment Naylor & Norlin t.
Iston ft S. B. Eflectric Ry. Co., 95 Pac.
828, 14 Idaho, 722.
A judgment ordering a party to pay a
ific sum into court, and authorizing the
erse party to withdraw it as soon as
i, is a judgment for the payment of mon-
within Civ. Code Prac. t 764, providing
:, on the affirmance of a judgment "for
payment of money," the collection of
nh has been superseded, 10 per cent dam-
\ on the amount superseded shall be
rded against appellant Motion for as-
ment of damages on supersedeas, 99 S.
305, sustained. Robinson-Norton ft Co. v.
dcana Cotton Factory, 102 S. W. 869,
126 Ky. 75, U L. R. A. (N. 8.) 723, 15
. Oas. 770.
A judgment for alimony Is a ''judgment
a sum of money only,'* within Code Civ.
2. I 1913, providing that an action on a
^ment for a sum of money only cannot
maintained between the original parties
!S8 10 years have elapsed since the dock-
g of the judgment Shepherd v. Shep-
1, 100 N. Y. Supp. 401, 402, 51 Blisc. Rep.
An application for foreclosure of a ven-
s lien on realty in which personal judg-
it is rendered against defendant, with a
'ee directing the sale and application of
proceeds, is not a judgment directing the
ment of money within Rev. Codes 1906, t
), providing that, to stay execution pend-
appeal from such a judgment, appellant
t furnish a bond conditioned to pay the
»unt of the judgment; but the bond re-
red is defined by Rev. Codes 1905, | 721^,
litioned that appellant will not eonunit or
er waste and if the judgment is affirmed
pay the value of the property pending
appeaL Schafer v. Oleon* (H D.) 132 N.
646,647.
Civ. Code Prai!. § 764, provides than on
affirmance or dismissal of an appeal from
idgment for the payment of money, the
ection of which' has heen superseded, 10
per oent. damages on the amount superseded
shall be awarded. Held, that a judgment re-
quiring appellant to execute a deed to cer-
tain real estate on payment of the piloe pur-
suant to a contract of sale, and if appellant
failed to do so that the court cemmissioner
execute the deed, and that a writ of posses-
sion be issued on behalf of appellee, was not
a judgment lor the payment of money; and
hence, on the dismissal of an appeal on which
the judgment had been superseded, appellee
was not entitled to damages. Bdaret t. San-
ders, 182 S. W. 552, 141 Ky. 806.
MOHET UBXT
Money deposited in a bank in New totk
at Interest and subject to check constitutes
"money lent" to the banker, within Civ. Code
La. art 3638 (3503), requiring actions for
the payment of money lent to be brought
within three years. Schinotti t. Whitney,
130 Fed. 780, 781 (quoting Morse^ Banks, f
298).
KOHET XiOAMBD AHS INVESTED
A note and mortgage taken in exchange
for property is not "money loaned and in-
vested,*' within Cbbbey's Ann. St 1903, i 10,-
427, but is a credit from which the holder
may deduct the just debts by him owing at
the time of making his tax return. Oleson v.
Cuming CJounty, 115 N. W. 783, 784, 81 Neb.
209.
**Money loaned or invested,** within ttie
ordinary meaning of the term, Is money or
capital laid out with a view of obtaining a
profit or income therefrom. The fact that a
fund in question has assumed the form of
bonds, mortgages, or other securities does not
of itself fix its nature or determine its use;
it is the use to which it is put that deter-
mines its character. Royal Highlanders v.
State, 108 N. W. 183, 186, 77 Neb. 18, 7 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 380.
MONEY HEOEMAHY FOB THE JOUR-
NET
The phrase "money necessary for the
journey," within the law as to the liability of
carriers for the loss of effects of the passen-
ger, includes a pro];)er, reasonable, and nec-
essary amount for the plaintiff to carry with
him for his journey, taking into considera-
tion his position and circumstances, the
length and character of his journey, and the
contingencies and accidents that might nat-
urally arise, and the fact that he was in a
foreign country. Knieriem v. New York
Cent A H. R. R. CJo., 96 N. Y. Supp. 602, 603.
109 App. Div. 709 (citing Fairfax v. N. Y. C.
& H. R. R. R. Co., 73 N. Y. 167, 29 Am. Rep.
119).
KOMET OF THE OITT
The power of a dty to grade sireels or
lay sewers or water pipes at the cost of
abutting property^ is not strictly a govern-
mental fuBction, and la the exercise at the
MONET OF THE UNITED STATES 480
UONWSC VALUE
power it acts in its proprietary character, and
the money collected from the abutting prop-
erty' owners is not "money of the city" with-
in its charter, for it la only money raised by
the operation of a general law that becomes
"money of the city," or public funds, and sub-
ject to the charter provision as to the deposit
thereof. City of Seattle ▼. Stirrat, 104 Pac.
834, 886, 65 Wash. 560, 24 L. B. A. (N. S.)
1275.
mok:^t of the united states
Current money of the United States, see
Current Money.
It is held that the term "money of the
United States" includes gold, silver, and
treasury notes of the government which are
by law made legal tender for the payment of
debts but not national bank notes. Johnson
V. State, 83 S. W. 651, 652, 73 Ark. 101 (cit-
ing Marshall t. State, 75 S. W. 584, 71 Ark.
416; Murphy y. Smith, 8 S. W. 891, 49 Ark.
37; Burton t. Brooks, 25 Ark. 215).
The phrase "money or property of the
United States," In the federal statutes, relat-
ing to embezzlement, does not Include fees
and emoluments received by the clerk of a
federal district court, and the duty of a
clerk of a federal district court to pay over
to the United States the surplus fees and
emoluments of his office which is half-yearly
returned, or the audit thereof shown to ex-
ist over and above the compensation and al-
lowances authorized by law to be retained
by him, is not governed by the statutes re-
lating to the embezzlement of money or prop-
erty of the United States. United States v.
Mason, 31 Sup. Ct 28, 34, 218 U. S. 517, 54
L. Ed. 1133.
MONET ORDER
The terms "pay check" and "money or-
der" mean practically the same thing. Barnes
V. State, 35 South. 227, 228, 46 Fla. 96.
MONEY ORDER FUNDS
Rev. St. I 4045, defines "money order
funds" to consist of all money received for
the sale of "money orders," Including all fees
thereon, all money transferred from the post-
al revenues to the money order funds to
the service of the Post Office Department.
The term "sale of money orders" related to
the executed transactions, when the money
order clerk at the post office building had sold
the money order to an applicant and received
the price, which then became part of the
money order funds. United States y. Mann,
160 Fed. 552, 554.
MONEY OWING
Code Civ. Proc. t 710, providing that a
transcript of a judgment may be filed with
the controller of the state or auditor of any
municipal corporation from "which money Is
owing to" the judgment debtor, whereon the
controller or auditor shall draw his warrant
In favor of the creditor, or pay so much
money into court as will cancel the Judgm
and which belongs to or is owing to the jt
ment debtor," applies to legislative offic
making their salaries subject to the payn
of their debts ; salaries and wages of pu
officers and employ^ being included in
phrases "money owing," "money which
longs to," etc. Ruperich v. Baehr, 75 1
782, 784, 142 Cal. 190.
MONEY PAID
Under Const, art 12, | 6, providing t
no corporation shall issue stock, except
"money paid" or "property actually receive
a contract for the sale of stock, to be f
for in part In cash and in part by the i
chaser's notes, payable on a future date
ultra vires, though the notes are to be
dorsed by a solvent Indorser and secured
a pledge of the stock, since a note is
the equivalent of "money paid," and sli
as between the parties, a note is mere (
dence of Indebtedness, and is not ''propc
actually rec^ved." McCarthy v. Texas li
ft Guaranty Co. (Tex.) 142 S. W. 96, 97.
MONEY PAID IN FRAUD OF ORE]
TOB8
Rev. Laws 1902, c. 118, | 73, provid
every life policy for benefit of a married
man, or after its issue transferred to I
shall inure to her separate benefit, provii
that, subject to the statute of limitation,
amount of premiums paid in firaud of ci
itors, shall inure to their benefit from
proceeds, etc., gives to her Insurance oi
husband's life, originally for her benefit
subsequently transferred to her, whether
not he was Insolvent at time of transfer, f
gives creditors the benefit of premiums p
by him when insolvent, subject to such si
ute, and money paid by an insolyent as i
mlums on a policy inuring to a third %
son's benefit as a gift is "money paid
fraud of creditors"; and this is true wheti
or not such person Is his wife. Bailey
Wood, 89 N. E. 149, 158, 202 Mass. 562.
MONEY PAID INTO COURT
See Paid into Court
MONEY RAISED
A note or bond would be as stric
"money raised" as would a subscription, wi
in the meaning of a condition in a subsa
tion to a church that the church raise a t
ther sum within a certain time. St Pai
Episcopal Church t. Fields, 72 Atl. 145, 1
81 Conn. 670.
MONEY RECEIVED
See Money Had and Received.
MONEY VAI-UE
"The so-called 'money value' of real
personal property ia but a conveniently sb
method of expressing the present potent
'usefulness,' and 'investment' becomes me
Ingless if construed to mean what the thJ
MONXTSD BUSINESS
481
ICOKSYBD OORPORATIOII
Bsted In cost genenUons ago- Proptrt7«
ither real or personal, la only valuable
m naefuL Ita nsefalneaa commonly de-
ds on the business purposes to wbicb it
>T may be complied with. Such business
I living thing and may flourish or wither,
reciate or depreciate, but whatever hap-
B its present usefulness, expressed in nat-
1 terms, must be its value.** Ck>nsolidated
I CkK V. aty of New York, 157 Fed. 849,
IHETED BUSXHESS
The expressions "moneyed businesan or
>neyed man" are often used, and in their
imon acceptation and generally under-
Ml meaning are not applied solely to the
iness of handling and loaning money, or
1 man whose property merely consists of
ley. A person is commonly referred to as
Qoneyed man because of his large pos-
dons, yet those possessions may consist
lusively of real estate. State v. Fidelity
deposit Co. of Maryland, 80 S. W. 644,
, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 214.
^HETED OAPITAI.
Rev. St U. S. i 5219, providing that
res of stock in national banks shall not
taxed at a greater rate than is assessed
"other moneyed capital'* in the hands of
Ividual citizens of the state, permits the
ation of national bank shares, provided no
Timination is made against them in favor
stock of other banks in competition with
lonal banks; the terms '*other moneyed
ital*' being defined as capital in corpora-
is carrying on the business of banking as
ned by law and custom, and which is em-
red in competition with the business of
lonal banks. Des Moines Nat Bank v.
r of Des Moines, 188 N. W. 767, 788, 153
ra, 836. The phrase "other moneyed cap-
** applies to such capital as in its use
les into competition with the business of
k& Lippincott V. Llppincott, 66 AtL 113,
» 74 N. J. Law, 439.
Before a state statute denying all right
taxation to deduct debts from the stock
national banks assessed with taxes, but
wing deduction from other investments,
be held a violation of Rev. St U. S.
!19, prohibiting a state from taxing such
^k at a greater rate than is assessed on
ler moneyed capital," it must appear that
b other moneyed capital exists in such an
mnt as to operate as a discrimination
inst such banks, and that it is of such
racter as to come in competition with
lonal Banks. West Virginia Nat Bank
)unkle, 64 S. B. 531. 65 W. Va. 210.
"The term 'moneyed capital,' as used in
\ St U. S. I 5219, respecting state tax-
in of shares of national banks, embraces
Ital employed in national banks, capital
doyed by individuals when the object of
ir business is the making of profit by the
use of their moneyed capital, as in banking."
First Nat Bank of Albu<|uerQue v. Albright
86 Paa 548, 560, 13 N. M. 514 (quoting Tal-
bott V. SUver Bow County, U Sup. Gt 594,
139 U. 8. 488, 36 L. Bd. 210).
The w<«d8 ^other moneyed capital^" as
used in Rev. St U. S. i 5219, providing that
the shaiw in national banlLs shall not be
assessed at a greater rate than other mon-
eyed capital in the hands of individual clti-
sens, does not mean all capital, the value
of which is measured in terms of money, nor
all forms of investment in which the inter-
est of the owner is expressed in money, nor
shares of stock represented by certificates
showing that the owner is entitled to an in-
terest expressed in money value in the entire
property of the corporation, nor real or per-
sonal property, such as ordinary chattels or
commodities, nor investments in manufac-
turing and industrial enterprises ; but does in-
clude shares of stock or other interest owned
by individuals in enterprises in which the
capital employed in carrying on the busi-
ness is money, and the object of the business
is the making of a profit by the use of mon-
ey. First Nat Bank of Nephi v. Christensen.
118 Pac. 778, 780, 39 Utah, 568.
In a statute providing for the taxation
of bank stock and directing that the assess-
ment and taxation of such stock shall not
be at • greater rate than is made or assessed
upon "other moneyed capital" in the hands
of individuals within the states the expres-
sion "other moneyed capital" means such
capital as in its use comes into competition
with the business of banks. Lippincott v.
Lippincott, 66 Aa. 113, 115. 74 N« J. Law,
439.
XOHETED COBPORATIOir
The term "moneyed corporation" is de-
fined in 1 Rev. St N. Y. p. 598, t 51, to mean
every corporation having banking powers, or
having the power to make loans upon pledges
or deposits, or authorized by law to make
insurances, and ia defined by the New York
act of 1890 (LawB 1890, c. 563) to be one
formed under or subject to the banking or
the insurance law. A Kansas trust com-
pany, empowered to receive deposits and to
loan money on real estate and personal se-
curity, is a "moneyed corporation," within
this definition and within the meaning of
Code Civ. Proc N. Y. f 394, prescribing a
three-year limitation for actions to enforce
stockholders' liabilities. Piatt v. Wilmot 24
Sup. Ct 542, 545, 198 U. 8. 602, 48 L. Ed.
809.
The expression "moneyed cor];>oration,"
in Sayles'. Ann. St 1897, art 5063, providing
for the taxation of all personal estate of
moneyed corporations, means all classes of
corporations organised and created for busi-
ness purposes, as distinguishable from public
or charitable or other corporations which
are exempted by law from taxation. The
MOKETED CORFORATIOK
432
MONOMANIAC
Legislature evidently did not Intend to use
it in the restrictlTe sense, as applied only
to corporations that dealt exclusively in mon-
ey. State V. Fidelity ft Deposit CJo. of Md.,
80 S. W. 644, 553, 85 Tex. Oiv. App. 214.
A company incorporated for pecuniary
profit, though having no power to engage in
banking or loaning money or to write insur-
ance, is a "moneyed corporation," within the
meaning of that phrase as used in the crimes
act (Gen. St 1900, | 2621), declaring one
guilty of forgery who fraudulently makes
false entries in the books of an association of
that character. State v. Chance, 108 Pac
701, 82 Kan. 392, 20 Ann. Gas. 184.
A corporation engaged in leasing its own
property and collecting rents therefor, with
power to sue and be sued, to contract debts,
and to dispose of its property, is a "moneyed,
business, or commercial corporation,** against
which involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy
may be had under Bankruptcy Act July 1,
1898, c. 541, § 4b, 30 Stat 547, as amended
by Act June 25, 1910, d. 412, | 4, 36 Stat
839. In re B. L. Radke Ck)., 193 Fed. 735,
736.
MONEYED MAN
See Moneyed Business.
MONEYS AND CREDITS
Corporate bonds are not taxable as
•inoneys and credita" Murrow v. Heath, 125
N. W. 259, 261, 146 Iowa, 347.
MONEYS RECOVERED ON A RECOO^
NIZANCE
"Moneys" deposited in lieu of ball are to
be treated as If they had been recovered on
a recognizance. The fact that a deposit of
currency In lieu of ball, made under Code
Cr. Proc. § 586, was made with money be-
longing to the estate of which the depositor
was executor, and did not belong to him, did
not entitle the estate to recover the money
back after the failure of the executor to ap-
pear before the magistrate in accordance
with the terms of the deposit, In the absence
of an IdeDtiflcation of the particular money
misappropriated by the executor, or of proof
that the sheriff or treasurer with whom the
money was deposited knew or had notice
that the executor was depositing moneys
which did not actually belong to him. Suth-
erland V. St. Lawrence County, 91 N. Y. Supp.
962, 966, 101 App. Dlv. 299.
MONEYS REMAnmro
Where a testator, after providing for
the payment of his debts and funeral expens-
es, and devising his homestead to his wife,
and bequeathing her the sum of $50 per
month, dlrected'his executors to sell both real
and personal estate and to invest the moneys
remaining in their hands, the expression
"moneys remaining'* means that portion of
the proceeds remaining after payment of the
debt! and funeral erpenacwi and payment
the wife. BoU t. Bo11« 69 Ati. 296, 298,
N. J. Bq. 227.
The wUl of one whose personal propei
at the time of his death was insufficient
pay his debts and funeral expenses, a
whose real estate, other than his homester
had a rental value of only $300 a year,
rected that his debts and funeral expens
be paid, gave to his wife in lieu of debt
the homestead and $50 a month to be pf
each month during her life, authorized 1
executors to sell any part of his property, a
directed that the "moneys remaining** in 1
hands should be Invested. Held, tl
"moneys remaining" meant remaining fn
the proceeds of sale after deducting, wfai
can only be of payments previously direct
which were three, to wit, the debts, funei
expenses, and payment to the wife, and woe
not mean remaining if only debts and funei
expenses were made. Roll v. Roll, 59 A
296, 297, 68 N. J. Eq. 227.
MONEY'S WORTH
"Money or money's worth" means ca
or its equivalent Gillett v. Chicago Ti
ft Trust Co., 82 N. BL 891, 904, 230 IlL 373.
MONGOLIAN
As Indian, see Indian.
MONOMANIA
The term *'monomanla" implies ''part
insanity, and excludes the idea of any «
of ratiocination as to the particular 8UbJ<
to which the partial insanity relates. Mc
omanla cannot be implied because a pers
takes a narrow, or prejudiced, or utterly
logical view of a particular subject. It
not the result of any conclusion. The p<
son does not arrive at his conviction becav
of any attempt either at reasoning or i
vestlgation. The partial insanity is the o
spring of a disordered Intellect" The cc
elusion that a testator was a monomani
is not warranted by the bare circumstan
that, actuated by a spirit of resentme
against his wife, he disinherited her in 1
will, for the sole reason that she had 1
terfered with him Ip carrying out his del
cirate choice to lead an Immoral and diss
lute life. Bohler t. Hicks, 48 S. EL 306, 3(
120 Ga. 800.
MONOMANIAC
''Monomaniac" is a person who Is derai
ed in a single faculty of his mind or with i
gard to a particular subject only, and perso
of that kind may, and often do, on all so
jects foreign to the subject of mania, a
rationally and with ordinary prudence ai
judgment, even to the making of a valid wi
where the monomania does not in any degr
Influence or affect the provisions of the wi
Swygart v. Wlllard, 76 N. E. 756, 767, H
Ind. 25. .
MONOPOLY
433
IfONOPOLr
9N0P0LY
Se? Contract in Aid of Monopoly; Un-
lawful Monopoly.
Ab pobllc nuiaance, see Public or Ck)ni-
mon Nuisance.
See, alao. Combination in Restraint of
Trade; Engrossing; Trust (Combina-
tion).
A ^'monopoly" is the exchisiTe power,
lilt, or prl¥ll€«e of selling a eommodity, or
dealing in the same article or trading in
s same market; sole command in traffic
anything, however obtained. State v. Cen-
a Lumber Co.« 123 N. W. SOi, 509, 24 S.
Ida, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 804.
Under the (Ad Bnglish law, a tedmical
lonopoly" was a lleense or priviTege, grant-
by the sovereign to an individual for the
le buying and ailing, making, working, or
[ng of anything, whereby ttie people in
oeral were excluded from the liberty of
inufacturing and trading, which they had
fbre enjoyed. It differed from "engross^
f* only in that, in the case of a monopoly,,
patent was had from the king, while en-
osslng was a transaction between Indivldu-
I. State V. Duloth Board of Trade, 121
W. 395, 408, 107 Minn. 506, 28 L. B. A.
. S.) 1280.
A ''monopoly,'* as defined by Coke, was
i institution or allowance by the Eling by
s grant, commission, or otherwise, to any
rson or persons, bodies politic or corpo-
te, of or for the sole buying, selling, mak-
g, working, or using of anything whereby
ly person or persons, bodies politic or cor-
rate, are sought to be restrained from any
eedom or liberty that they had before, or
Ddered in their lawful trade. The word
IS defined by Hawkins as an allowance
the King to a particular peraon or persons
the sole buying, selling, etc., of anything
hereby any person is sought to be restrained
om any freedom which he had before,
andard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
ates, 31 Sup. Ct 502, 512, 221 U. S. 1, 55
Ed. 619, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 834, Ann. Cas.
H2D. 734.
"*A monopoly' is an institution or ai-
wance to any person or persons, bodies poll-
z or incorporate, of or for the sole buying,
Ulng, making, working, or using anything,
hereby any person or persons, bodies politic
' corporate, are sought to be <x>nstrained of
ly freedom or liberty that ihfey had before
' hindered in their lawful trade." In re
barge to Grand Jury, 151 Fed. 834, 835
uoting and adopting definition by Sir Ed-
ard Coke); Ware-Kramer Tobacco Co. v.
merican Tobacco Co., 180 Fed. 160, 170
uoting and adopting the definliion by Lord
oke).
It is a '^monopoly*' when one person alone
lys up the whole ai one kind of commodity,
3 Wns.ft P.2n Sbb.— 28
fixing a price at his own pleasure^ Sti^te v.
Eastern Coal Co., 70 AU. 1, 4, 29 a I. 254,
132 Am. St Rep. 817, 17 Ann. Cas. 96.
A ''monopoly" exists when the mahufac-
ture and sale of any commodity is restrained
to one or a certain number. City of Seattle
V. Dencker, 108 Pac. 1086, 1090, 58 Wash.
501, 28 L. a A. (N. S.) 446.
The purpose of the Wisconsin Public
Utility Law was to give the holder of an
indeterminate permit, as regards the condi«
tions existing at the time of its origin, a
qualified monopoly within the scope of the
privilege, subject to the conditions and llmita.
tions of the public utility law; the term
"monopoly" not being used in its common-
law sense, except as to exclusiveness, but be-.
Ing characterized by purpose to promote pub-
lic welfare, by a return consideration and
by not being of common right, instead of
being otherwise but for the grant and being
for private gain. Calumet Service Co. v.
City of Chilton, 135 N. W. 131, 140, 148 Wis.
334.
"The terms 'monopolies' and 'trusts* are,
pe^aps, too often employed at the bar to all
business enterprises requiring and employing
great aggregations of wealth, and in the
vague sense in which, at the bustlings, they
are used to arouse envy and jealousy, forget-
ting the manifest necessity of such aggrega-
tions of wealth to produce the commodities,
and their transportation, which our civiliza-
tion and comfort require. Every railroad
corporation is In one sense a monopoly. It
has franchises giving rights and powers not
common to all citizens. It alone can operate
its own railroad, though subject to reason-
able regulation by the state. All monopolies,
in a strict sense, rest upon some grant by the
sovereign power of an exclusive franchise
or prlvilega" State of Minnesota v. North-
ern Securities Co., 123 Fed. 692, 705.
A "monopoly," as generally defined or
understood, is the exclusive control of sup-
ply asd price due either to a single owner-
ship of a large part of the sources of supply,
or unity of action among & large proportion
of the owners of such sources. With mo-
nopoly in this sense neither the pre-emption
act nor the land act has anything to do, since
there is nothing in ^ther to prevent any
person, having sufficient means, acquiring
acres by the million under the policy of free
disposition so greatly favored by the United
States courts. Pereles v. Weil, 157 Fed. 419,
427 (dtlng and adopting Myers v. Croft, 18
WaU. [80 U. S.l 291, 20 L. Ed. 562).
A "monopoly" not only includes an ex-
clusive right granted by the state to a few,
of something which was before of common
right, but embraces any combination or con-
tract, the tendency of which is to pcevent
competition in its broad and general sense
and control prices to the detriment of the
public, regardless- of th^ form assumed.
liONOPOLT
434
MONOPOLY
Where owners of land adjacent to a city
platted the same and executed deeds to the
dty for the streets, alleys, and public
grounds, reservations therein to the grantors
of the ezclnsiYe right to use the streets
for the operation of street railways and for
the maintenance of lighting appliances, sew-
ers, gas, waterworks, and telephone lines,
free from the control of the dty, were void
as tending to create a "monopoly." Jones v.
Carter. 101 S. W. 514, 516, 45 Tex. Civ. App.
450.
Same— Xdoenslns of pilots
Pnb. Laws 1907, p. 903, c. 625, providing
for the liceDsing of pilots for a river, and
limiting the number to be commissioned to
20, does not create a •'monopoly" in violation
of Const, art. 1, {§ 7, 31, declaring that no
man or set of men is entitled to exclusive or
separate emoluments or privileges, etc, and
that '•monopolies" are contrary to the genius
of a free state. 8t George v. Hardie, 60 8.
B. 920, 923, 147 N. O. 88.
Same— Patent
"Monopoly" restrains trade or commerce
in articles, which were before the subjects of
trade or commerce. Patented articles can-
not be the subject of monopoly, since a patent
is that which brings out from the realm of
mind something which never existed before
and gives it to the country. Rubber Tire
Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Works Co., 142 Fed.
531, 537.
A patent is a '^monopoly" created by law,
and gives the right to exclude all others
from making, using, and selling the inven-
tion or article made in accordance therewith.
National Hollow Brake Beam Co. v. Bake-
well, 123 S. W. 561, 566, 224 Ma 203.
The "monopoly" authorized by a patent
is a substantial property right conferred by
law as an inducement or stimulus to useful
invention and discovery, and it rests with the
owner what part of this property he will
transfer to others, and upon what terms he
will make the transfer. National Phono-
graph Co. V. Schlegel, 128 Fed. 733, 735, 64
0. a A. 594.
-Water f raaoMse
A contract between a city and a water
company's assignor, by which the city agreed
not to grant to any other person the right to
furnish water for fire hydrants during the
life of the Contract, etc., was Invalid as a
"monopoly," in violation of Const, art. 1, { 3,
prohibiting the granting of a perpetuity or
monopoly. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. City of
Houston, 116 S. W. 36, 38, 102 Tex. 317.
In an action against a water company to
recover damages for cutting oft plaintiff's
supply of water, an allegation in the petition
that defendant was possessed of "a monopoly
of such business in said dty" would not be
construed as used in an oflenMve sense o
with the purpose of insinuating that the com
pony was not conducting a legitimate bus!
ness, but with a view to setting forth th(
pertinent fact thlit the company had tiie ei
elusive privilege of supplying the city and it
Inhabitants with water, and for this reasoi
the plaintiff was wholly dependent upon de
f endant for his supply of water. Freonan i
Macon Gas light & Water Co., 56 S. E. 61
63, 126 Ga. 848, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 917.
Defendant city entered into a contrac
with a water company, by which the dt:
agreed not to grant to any other person th(
right to furnish water for fire hydrants dur
ing the life of the contract, which was for 2!
years, and the city to have the privilege o:
buying the waterworks, but if the dty did no
exercise the option to purchase, the contrac
to continue until the city finally pnrchasec
the works. Held, that the exclusive privi
lege granted by the contract was a "perpetu
ity" and "monopoly," in contravention oi
Const art 1, i 26, prohibiting the granting ol
a perpetuity or monopoly, which rendered Um
contract entirely void ; and hence the dt]
could not recover for damages arising out oi
the water company's failure to furnish snffi
dent water pressure, whereby the dty mar
ket house was burned. Hartford Fire Ins
Co. V. City of Houston (Tex.) 110 8. W. »73
d77.
As a eomblaLatlom
A '*monopoly" is the concentration ol
business in the hands of a few. Nations
Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders* Ass'n
169 Fed. 259, 264, 94 C. C. A. 535, 26 Li R
A. (N. S.) 148.
A "monopoly," within the meaning ol
the Aati-trust Law, is more than the men
complete occupation of a certain field whlcl
does not unfairly exclude other competitors
FonoUpia Limited v. Bradley, 171 Fed. 951
959.
The gravamen of the offense of '*monop
oly" consists in combining to acquire power
the exercise of which depends entirely upon
the will of those who hold the power, and
efforts to acquire the power of monopoly
should be prevented. A monopoly embraces
any combination the tendency of which is tc
prevent competition in its broad and general
sense, and to control prices to the detriment
of the public. SUte v. Eastern Coal Co., 7C
AtL 1, 5, 29 R. L 254, 132 Am, St Rep. 817,
17 Ann. Cas. 96.
A "monopoly" exists where all, or so
nearly all, of an article of trade or commerce
within a district, is brought within the hands
of one man, or set of men, as to practically
bring the handling or production of the com-
modity or thing within such control to the
exclusion of the competition of free traffic
therein. Orogan v: Chaffee, 105 Pac. 745,
746, 156 Cal. 611, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 395.
MONOFOLT
435
MONOPOLY
A 'Monopoly/* In its orlgUial sense, was
i exclvslTe ri^t granted by tbe state to one
a few persons to do something which was
fore of common right As now used and
derstood, it embraces any combination, the
idency of which is to prevent competition
its broad and general sense and to control
lees to the detriment of the public. Poca-
ntas CJoke Co. t. Powhatan Coal & Coke
L, 66 S. B. 264, 269, 60 W. Va. 508, 10 L.
A. (N. S.) 268, 116 Am. St Rep. 901, 9
in. Cas. 667.
"At one time a 'monopoly' meant a
ant from King or state of an exclusive
^t to manufacture or sell certain things,
it now it means *any combination, the tend-
icy of which is to prevent competition, in
{ broad and general sense, and to control
ices to the detriment of the public.*"
larleston Gas Co. v. Kanawha Gas Co., 00
E. 876, 878, 58 W. Va. 22, 112 Am. St Bep.
6, 6 Ann. Cas. 164 (citing 4 Black. Com.
'TThe idea of 'monopoly' is not now oon-
led to a grant of privil^es. It is under-
ood to Include a 'condition produced by the
;ts of mere individuals.' Its dominant
lought now is, to quote another, 'the notion
' exclusiveness or unity' ; in other words,
le suppression of competition by the uniflca-
on of interest or management, or it may
i through agreement and concert of action.
D<i the purpose is so definitely the control
! prices that monopoly has been defined to
i "unified tactics with regard to prices.' It
the power to control prices which makes
le inducement of combinations and their
refit It is such power that makes it the
mcem of the law to prohibit or limit them."
ational Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 25 Sup.
t 379, 383, 197 U. 8. 115, 49 L. Ed. 689.
"A ^monopoly,* as now understood, em-
races any combination, the tendency of
hich is to prevent competition in its broad
Qd general sense and to control prices to
le detriment of the public (quoting and
dopting definition in 20 Ency. of Law, 846).
'trust' has been defined as a contract, com-
Ination, confederation, or understanding, ex-
ress or implied, between two or more per-
>ii8, to control the price of a commodity or
^rvice for the benefit of the parties thereto
Qd to the injury of the public, and which
mds to create a monopoly. More accurate-
r, perhaps, it is the entity resulting from
tie contract, etc, just described." A contract
rhereby plaintifF agrees to sell exclusively
> defendant and defendant to buy exclu-
Ively of the plaintiff, certain farm machin-
ry to be sold in a certain territory is not
[ijurious to the public as tending to create
monopoly, or a violation of Civ. Code 1902,
2845, as lessening full and free competition
D an unreasonable extent Walter A. Wood
lowing & Reaping Co. v. Greenwood Hard-
ware Co., 65 S. E. 978, 974, 76 8. C. 878, 9
L. R. A. (N. 8.) 501, 9 Ann. Cas. 902.
The size of a business alone does not con-
stitute a "monopoly'* in restraint of inter
state commerce, in violation of section 2 of
tbe anti-trust act (Act July 2, 1800, c. 647) ;
but to render a combination Illegal there-
under it must intentionally and necessarily
prevent other persons from engaging in such
business, thereby stifling competition. United
States V. American Naval Stores Co., 172
Fed. 455, 458.
Personal service and occupation cannot
be the subject of a "monopoly," but, unless
there is propwty to be affected with a public
interest there is no basis for the fact or the
charge of a monopoly. Labor organisations
oompoaed of carpenters, joiners, and other
persons doing carpenter work and other labor
In constructing buildings, organised to short-
en the hours of labor and to increase the com-
pensation therefor, is not a monopoly or un-
lawful combination In restraint of trader
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 114 8. W.
997, 1002, 215 Mo. 421, 22 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
007, 128 Am. 8t Rep. 492.
Combination of several corporations, each
selling or leasing machinery intended for dif-
ferent operations, not competing, but supple-
menting each other, does not ordinarily con- ,
stitute a "monopoly" in restraint of trade.
United States v. Winslow, 195 Fed. 578, 592.
The Texas anti-trust acts of May 25,
1899, and March 31, 1903, prohibiting any cor-
poration becoming a party to any under-
standing with any other corporation to regu-
late the price in the state of any article of
merchandise, etc., defining a trust as a com-
bination to restrict commerce, fix the price
of commodities, lessen competition, etc., and
defining a "monopoly" as a combination of
two or more corporations, with a view of
stifiing competition, etc., are not indefinite
and uncertain, and are valid. Waters-Pierce
Oil Co. V. State, 106 S. W. 918, 926, 48 Ter.
Civ. App. 162. .
Section 2 of the statute (Laws 1903, p.
119, c. 94) defines a monopoly as "a combina-
tion or consolidation of two or more corpo-
rations, when effected in either of the two
following methods: (1) When the direction
of the affairs of two or more corporatious is
in any manner brought under the same con-
trol for tfie purpose of producing • ♦ ♦ a
trust as defined in the first section of this
act (2) Where any corporation acquires the
franchises or other rights or the physical
properties • ♦ ♦ of any other corpora-
tion ♦ • ♦ for the purpose of prevent-
ing or lessening • ♦ ♦ competition,'' etc.
Held, that the contract did not constitute a
monopoly within the terms of said section
2, as the agreement by the railroad to haul
the cars of the sleeping car company did not
transfer to the latter any of the former's
MONOPOLT
436
MONOPOLT
franchise anthorizing It to operate ' trains
over its road. Ft Worth ft D. 0. Ry. Co. v.
State, 87 & W. 836, 840, 99 Tex. 84, 70 L. B.
A. 950.
An agreement by a seller of whisky not
to sell any other whisky of the same brand
in the places where the buyer was engaged
in business until the buyer had disposed of
the quantity purchased was not in violation
of Acts 1899, p. 246, c. 146, prohibiting agree-
ments to regulate or fix the price of any ar-
ticle, to maintain said price when so fixed, or
to fix or limit the amount or quantity of any
article, and defining "monopoly" as a "un-
ion or combination whereby any of the pur-
poses mentioned in the act is accomplished or
sought to be accomplished," and making it
unlawful for persons engaged In buying or
selling any articles to ^Qter into any pool or
agreement to control or limit the trade in
su<di article, or to limit competition by re-
fusing to buy from or sell to any other per-
son for the reason that such other person or
corporation is not a member of or a party to
such pool or agreement Norton y. W. H.
Thomas ft Sons Co., 91 8. W. 780, 781« 99
Tex. 57&
A grocery company and a photographic
company agreed that the latter should far-
nish the former with trading tickets, each
entitling its holder to a photo art calendar
at the photographic company's studio when
countersigned by the grocery company, and
the grocery company agreed to pay a certain
amount for each ticket three months from
date, or as soon as the tickets should be dis-
posed of, if before that time, and to dispose of
the tickets as soon as possible, and it was fur-
ther agreed that from the date of the contract
the photographic company should not with-
out the consent of the grocery company, or
until the disposal of the tickets furnished,
sell any other local grocery company any of
such tickets. Such a contract was not a
^'monopoly" within the meaning of the act
of 1903 (Gen. Laws 1903, p. 119, c. 94), pro-
hibiting trusts, monopolies, and conspiracies
in restraint of trade. Forrest Photographic
Co. V. Hutchinson Grocery Co. (Tex.) 108 8.
W. 768, 769.
A contract between a railroad company
and an express company, whereby the latter
was given exclusive privileges, and the for-
mer bound itself not to contract with others
to do an express business on the road, and
agreed that in case privileges should be
accorded others by legislation or judicial pro-
ceedings, the express company in question
should have credit for the sums paid by oth-
er companies, was violative of Acts 1903, p.
119, c. 94, defining an unlawful trust as a
combination of capital, skill, or acts, by two
or more persons, to create or carry out re-
strictions in the free pursuit of any business
authorized by the laws of the state or to
prevent or lessen competition in the trans-
portation of merchandise. State y. KIssour
K. ft T. Ry. Co. of Texas, 91 8. W. 214, 211
90 Tex. 516, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783, 13 Am
Caa. 1072.
Where two corporations supplying tt
same community with natural gas made a
agreement whereby they parceled out betwee
them the territory, giving to each the ei
elusive right to sell gas in a given boundar]
fixing the prices, and prohibiting change €
prices except by their mutual consent bindin
one company to use for public consumpdo
only gas produced by the other, and prohibli
ing one from producing from the section o
the country in which the other produced gaa
the agreement tends to "monopoly** and i
void as against public policy. Charlesto
Gas Co. V. Kanawha Gas Co., 60 S. E. 87(
879, 68 W. Va. 22, 112 Am. St Rep. 936^
Ann. Ca& 164.
A "monopoly** in trade and commerce 1
created within the anti-trust law (Gen. Law
1899, p. 487, c. 359; Rev. Laws 1905, t 5168]
when, as a result of efforts to that end, prevj
ously competing businesses are so oonceutral
ed in the hands of a single person or corpora
tion, or a few persons or corporations actinj
together, that they have power to practicall:
control the prices of a commodity, and t
thus suppress competition. State v. Duloti
Board of Trade, 121 N. W. 395, 398, K^
Minn. 506, 23 L. R. A. (N. a) 126a
A "monopoly," within the anti-trust la^
(Rev. St 1899, c. 143), is created when, as i
result of any contract or combination, previ
ously competing businesses are so concentrat
ed into the hands of a single corporation, oi
of a few individuals or corporations acting li
concert, that they have the power to prac
tically control the prices of commodities an<
suppress competition. The chief question ij
detennlning whether a monopoly exists la
not that prices are raised, and competitio]
destroyed, but whether the power exists iJ
the combine to raise prices and destroy com
petition at pleasure. State ex inf. Hadley v
Standard Oil Co., 116 S. W. 902, 1045, 21J
Mo. 1.
Where neither party to a contract givlDi
an exclusive selling agency in specified terri
tory was a corporation, and there being d<
evidence of a combination or consolidatloi]
the agreement was not in violation of Rev
Civ. St 1911, art 7797, defining a "monopo
ly" as a consolidation or combination of tw<
or more corporations. Nickels v. Prewit
Auto Co. (Tex.) 149 S. W. 1094, 1096.
It is the policy of the common law anc
the purpose of the anti-monopoly act (Consol
Laws, c. 20, §§ 340-346), prohibiting comblna
tions whereby a "monopoly" may be created
or competition restrained, to keep free tLut
unfettered the prosecution by individuals ol
any lawful business, and to protect competl
tion in trade and comnieToe for the protectioi
MONOPOLT
487
MONOPOLT
he public. Hie word *^rningemenf* in
anti-monopoly act (ConsoL Laws, c. 20,
40-346). making every "contract; agree-
t, arrangement or combination*' whereby
onopoly may be created, or whereby com-
tion may be restrained, nnlawfol, has a
ider meaning than either the word "Gon-
t," "agreement," or "combination,** and it
include each and all of these things,
more, and means the disposition of meas-
I for the accomplishment of a purpose, and
tructure or combination of things in a
Icular way for any purpose, and one buy-
the business of his competitors under an
cement binding them not to engage there-
or a specified time within specified ter-
ry, for the purpose of creating a monopoly,
6?hereby competition may be restrained,
:es an "arrangement" prohibited by the
A^ purchase of a going business accom-
ied by an agreement by the seller not to
age in the same business for a limited
B, and within a prescribed territory, made
ti no ulterior purpose of establishing a
lopoly or preventing competition, is not
?al under the anti-monopoly act (Consol.
^s, c. 20, H 340-^6), prohibiting comblna-
IS whereby a monopoly may be created, or
ipetltion restrained, but such a purchase
the purpose of creating a monopoly so as
be able to control prices is illegal. A
tract whereby the seller of an ice busi-
3 binds himself not to engage in such husi-
B for a specified term within a spedfled
ritory restricts the free pursuit in the
te of a lawful business, and, if taken by
buyer for the purpose of creating a mo-
>oly within the state, to illegal under the
i-monopoly act (Consol. Laws, c 20, U
^-346), prohibiting combinations whereby
Qonopoly may be created, or competition
trained. The Jury in determining whether
orporatlon engaging in the ice business in
city of New York, which procured con-
cts from competitors whereby the latter
1 their business and bound themselves not
engage therein within a specified time
hin described territory, procured the con-
cts for the purpose of creating a monopoly
violation of the anti-monopoly act (Consol.
ws, c 20, H 340-346), must consider all the
!ompanying facts, including the facts that
! restrictive agreements included greater
ritory than that in which the selling com-
Itor had previously done business, and
Lt the corporation procured a great num-
' of such contracts. A corporation beoom-
; the owner of all or substantlaUy all of the
<:k of existing corporations is not crlminal-
Uable for their acts in procuring before
own organization contracts for the pur-
se of creating a monopoly, but where, after
acquisition of such stock, it makes use of
2h contracts to maintain an arrangement to
Ate a monopoly and prevent competition, it
Liable under the anti-monopoly act (Cohsol.
iW8» c, 20, f I 340-^46), prohibltiiig such
comblnatl<Ma& A corporation owning and con-
trolling subordinate corporations, which, un-
der its direction and for its use, bought the
business of competitors and procured from
them agreements not to engage In similar
business for a spedfled time within d^escrlbed
territory, fbr the purpose of creating a mo-
nopoly, is guilty €i violating the anti-monopo-
ly act (ConsoL Laws, c. 20, If 340-846). A
contract whereby the •ello' of an lee businees
binds himself not to engage thef^^ for a
specified time within described territory is
permissible only when innocently made with-
out any purpose of creating or maintaining
a monopoly, and a contract made with such
an illegal purpose is illegal because it may
prevent and restrain competition in violation
of the anti-monopoly act (Consol. Laws, c 20,
11840^^46). Anti-monopoly act (ConsoL Laws,
c. 20, H 84<V-846), prohibiting every agreement
or combination whereby a monopoly may be
created, or whereby competition in the supply
or price of any article in common use may be
restrained, treats a monopoly and restraint
of competition as two distinct things, as a
monopoly usually restrains competition and
usually is the result of a restraint of compe-
tition, but a restraint in competition may not
extend to the degree of creating a monopoly,
and, to vitiate contracts procured by one
from his competitors on purchasing their
business. It need not be shown that the ar-
rangement results or may result in a total
suppression of all competition, or in an abso-
lute monopoly, and all that is essential is
that they restrain competition and tend to
deprive the public of the advantages of free
competition. A corporation engaging in the
ice business in the dty of New York« whidi
bought the business of competitorB and pro-
cured from them agreements not to engage in
such business for a spedfled period within
described territory, for the purpose of creat-
ing or maintaining a monopoly, violated the
anti-monopoly act (ConsoL Laws, c 20, §§
340^346), prohibiting combinations whereby a
monopoly may be created or competition re-
strained, though it did not subsequently raise
prices. A monopoly condemned by the anti-
monopoly act (ConsoL Laws, c. 20, || 340-
346), prohibiting combinations whereby a
monopoly may be created, or competition re-
strained, need not be an absolute one, exdud-
ing all competition, but a monopoly is creat-
ed where, as the result of effort to that end,
previously competing businesses are so con-
centrated in the hands of a single person or
corporation, or in a few persons or corpora-
tions, that they have power to practically con-
trol prices of a commodity, and thus sup-
press competition. A corporation engaging
in the Ice business in the dty of New York,
which establishes a monopoly covering a
part of the borough of Manhattan, or of one
district in the borough, so that the oonsum-
ers in tiiat portion of the dty are deprived
of the benefit ef free competition* is guilty
MONOPOLY
438
MONOPOLY
of creatlBg a monopoly in ylolation of the
anti-monopoly act (Consol. Laws, c. 20, |i
340-346). The anti-monopoly act (Consol.
Laws, c. 20, SS 340-^46), punishing every per-
son ipaking or attempting to make any con-
tract or combination whereby a monopoly
may be created, or competition restrained,
makes an attempt to create a monopoly un-
lawful, and one who attempts to create a
monopoly by buying the business of his com-
petitors and procuring from them agreements
not to engage in such business for a specified
period within described territory, and by
doing any act for the consummation thereof,
as by keeping such contracts in force and
attempting to derive benefit therefrom, is
guilty of violating the anti-monopoly act,
though it failed of its purpose, and the crea-
tion of a monopoly became practically im-
possible. People V. American Ice Co., 120
N. Y. Supp. 443, 447.
Stock Corporations Law N. Y. i 7, as
amended, declares that no domestic stock cor-
poration shall combine with any oth^ cor-
poration or person to create a "monopoly" or
the unlawful restraint of trade, or to prevent
competition in any necessary of Ufa Held,
that the word "monopoly" was not used in its
strict sense as requiring a control of all ex-
isting means of carrying on a business, or
doing a particular thing, and the right to pos-
sess, own, or control all means of doing that
thing in the future, but was satisfied by an
exclusive privilege to carry on a traffic or the
possession or assumption of anything to the
exclusion of other possessors, and embraces
any combination or contract the tendency of
which is to prevent competition in its broad
and general sense. Continental Securities Co.
V. Interborough Rapid Transit Oa, 165 Fed.
945, 95a
Stock Corporation Law (Laws 1890, p.
1073, c 564, I 40), as amended, permits a
stock corporation to purchase stock of anoth-
er corporation, if authorized in its certificate
of incorporation, or if the corporation whose
stock is purchased is engaged in a business
similar to that of the purchasing corporation.
Stock Corporation Law (Laws 1890, p. 1069,
c. 564, i 7), as amended, provides that no
corporation shall combine with any corpora-
tion or person for the creation of a monopoly
or the unlawful restraint of trade, or for the
prevention of competition in any necessary
of life, and Laws 1897, c. 810, c 383, and
Laws 1899, p. 1515, c. 600, were enacted to
destroy monopolies and prevent combinations
in restraint of competition or the free pur-
suit of any lawful business. Held, that the
consolidation under Laws 1884, p. 448» c. 367.
of six companies engaged in the manufacture
and sale of gas and electricity into a corpora-
tion to continue such business, and the sub-
sequent purchase by such consolidated com-
pany of all, or a controlling interest in, the
shares of other similar corporations, purchas-
ed to prevent competition, did not create a
"monopoly" in contravention of said acts, i
it left the field open to any company th
might be organized with the approval of t]
commission, provided for by Public Servl
Commission Law (Laws 1907, pu 889, c 421
Attorney Cteneral v. Consolidated Oas Ca
New York, 108 N. Y. Supp. 823, 824, 124 An
Div. 401.
In statutes prohibiting contracts or coi
blnations creating monopolies, the wo
"monopoly" is not used in a strict, leg
sense as including the power to legally e
elude all others from the field monopolize
since such a "monopoly" cannot be created 1
a contract or combination, but only by so
ereign power; but it la used in a differei
but equally well-understood, sense as mea
ing the obtaining of a substantially comple
control of a particular business or artic
of trade. The acquisition by a oori>orati(
of controlling Interest in the stock of the cc
porations owning or controlling and operati]
all of the street railway lines in the boroug!
of Manhattan and the Bronx in New Yo
City, including the underground, elevate
and surface lines, la unlawful, as creating
practical "monopoly" of the means for trai
portation of passengers in the city, in viol
tion of Stock Corporations Law, | 7 (Lai
1897, p. 313, c. 884). Burrows v. Interborouj
MetropoUtan Co., 156*S'ed. 389, 392.
A 'Monopoly," in the sense forbidden I
Const art 1, I ^ consists in the ownersb
of control of so large a part of the mark
supply of a given oommodlty as to stifle ooi
petition, restrict the freedom of oommen
and give the monopolies control over prio
and hence Act Jan. 26, 1905 (Acts 29th U
c 7), which granted to a private corporati<
property owned by the state diarged with i
repair and maintenance for historical a:
patriotic purposes, subject to future legisl
tion, did not violate the constitutional pi
vision, since it was but the assumption of
burden which deprived no citizen of a]
privilege or right and brought no flnand
gain to the corporation. Conley v. Daughtc
of the Republic of Texas (Tex.) 151 S. W. 8i
883.
To constitute a violation of Anti-Tn
Act July 2, 1890, c 647, H 1, 2, there mi
be a contract, combination, or conspira
which in purpose or effect tends to restrs
trade or commerce among the states or
monopolize some portion thereof. The
must be a meeting of the minds of two
more to accomplish some common purpose (
rectly violative of the act, or a purpose whi
will, whether intentionally or not. In eff<
constitute a restraint of trade and commei
among the several states. The mere extent
acquisition of business or property achiev
by .fair and lawful means cannot be t
criterion of monopoly within the meaning
Antt-Trust Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, i 2; t
in addition to acquisition and acquireoM
MONOPOLT
489
MONOPOLY
re most be an intent by uDlawfsl metns to
lode others from the same traffic or boel-
s» or from aoqulring by the same means
perty and material things. One of the
poses of AntiL-Tmst Act July 2, 1890, c.
, f 1, in making illegal every contract,
ibination» or conspiracy in restraint of
ie or commerce among the aereral states,
to maintain Interstate commerce on the
is of free competition, and any contract,
ibination, or conspiracy, the purpose or di-
t effect of which is to restrict snch free
ipetition by way of transportation or oth-
rise, is in restraint of interstate commerce
{ unlawfuL The fact that the several acts
which the purpose of a combination in
traint of trade and commerce among the
eral states is effected are, taken in isola-
1, lawfid or intrastate in diaracter, and
within the purview of Anti-Trust Act
y 2, 1890, a 647, does not relieve the com-
ation from illegality; but such acts must
viewed as elements of a whole and in the
It of their purpose and effect in combina-
1. United States t. Reading Co., 183 Fed.
, 456.
The generic character of the prohibitions
Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, U 1, 2, against
abinations in restraint of interstate or f or-
D trade or commerce, and monopolization
attempts to monopolise any part thereof,
ers every conceivable act which can pos-
ly come within the si^rit or purpose of the
tdenmatlon of the law, without regard to
I garb in which such acts are clothed. The
rds **iestraint of trade" in Anti-Trust Act
iy 2, 1890, c. 647, condemning combinations
restraint of interstate or foreign trade or
amerce, or the monopolization or attempts
monopolize any part thereof, should be glv-
a meaning which will not destroy the in-
idual right to contract, and render dif-
ilt, if not impossible, any movement of
de in the chiinnels of commerce, the free
vement of wl^ich it was the purpose of the
tute to protect The standard of reason
ich had theretofore been applied at the
omon law and in the United States in deal-
; with subjects of the character embraced
the prohibitions of Act July 2, 1690, c. 647,
1, 2, against combinations in restraint of
erstate or foreign trade or commerce, or
>nopolization or attempts to monopolize any
rt thereof, was intended to be the measure
Ml for the purpose of determining whether,
a given case, a particular act had or bad
t brought about the wrong against which
> statute provided. United States v. Amer-
n Tobacco Co., 31 Sup. Ct 632. 648, 221
S. 106, 179-184, 55 L. Ed. 663.
The control by one mining corporation
poized under the laws of Michigan of
other similar corporation engaged in a
upeting business in interstate and foreign
mmerce by acquiring a majority of iti
Kik, or in part by soliciting and obtaining
oxles from other stockholders with the
purpose and intention of ellmlnwting competi-
tion and obtaining a monopoly of trade in
their products, either complete or partial, is
in violation of the fMeral Anti-Trust Law
(Act July 2, 1800, c. 647), which makes un-
lawful every ''combination in restraint of in-
terstate or foreign trade and commerce,**
and also of Pub. Acts MidL 1899, p. 409, No.
255, as supplemented by Pub. Acts Mich. 1905,
p. 507, No. 829, prohibiting all combinations
entered into for the purpose and with the
intent of establishing and maintaining a ''mo-
nopoly"; nor is such transaction relieved
from its invalidity under the latter statute
by Pub. Acts Mich. 1905, pp. 153, 154, No. 105,
which authorizes mining corporations of the
state to purchase and own stock in other
similar corporations. Bigelow v. Calumet ft
Hecla Mining Co., 155 Fed. 869, 874.
A secret arrangemoit between two cor-
porations, which together produced about
85 per cent of all the licorice paste consumed
in the United States and sold to consumers
throughout the country, by which they ceased
competition, fixed from time to time the pric-
es at whiidi each should sell« and apportioned
the customers between them, and also by
concerted action secured contracts with their
chief, if not only competitors, which enabled
them to control either the output of such
competitors or the prices at which and the
persons to whom they should sell, constitutes
a virtual ''monopoly** in the interstate dis-
tribution of the substance manufactured.
United States t. MacAndrews k Forbes Co.,
149 Fed. 823, 834.
The combination of the stocks of the va-
rious corporations trading in petroleum and
its products in the hands of a holding com-
pany, with the intent to exclude others from
the trade, and thus centralize in the com-
bination the perpetual control of the move-
ment of these commodities in the channels of
interstate and foreign commerce, constitutes
a violation of the prohibitions of Act July 2,
1690, c. 647, fi 1, 2, against combinations in
restraint of interstate or foreign commerce,
or the monopolization or attempt to monop-
olize any part of such trade or commerce.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States. 31 Sup. Ct 502, 516, 221 U. 8. 1, 61,
55 L. Bd. 619, 84 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 884, Ann.
Cas. 1912D, 734.
An indictment against operators of a cot-
ton comer for alleged violation of the Sher-
man anti-trust law charged that defendants
had conspired to monopolize a part of the
trade and commerce among the several states
by becoming members of and engaging in an
unlawful combination in the form of an agree-
ment by which they were severally to pur-
chase cotton to such an extent that, together,
they would have enough to enable them to
control the price of such cotton, and several-
ly to demand arbitrary, excessive, and mo-
nopolistic prices for tiie same on the sale
MONOPOLY
440
MONTH
[
hereof by them respectively to spinners and
manufactiirers other than such consplratont
Held that, since no monopoly exists when in-
dlyiduals, each acting for himself, own large
quantities of a commodity, the Indictment
was fatally defective as alleging only a
scheme to demand monopolistic prices as the
result of indlTidual as distinguished from
coUectiye power. United States v. Patten,
187 Fed. 664, 672.
A business device by which a considera-
ble number of competing corporations are
welded into a single corporate entity con-
trolling from 90 to 95 per cent, of the com-
merce of the country in a particular branch
required for the economical production of a
necessity of mankind, as shoe machinery, is
a monopoly, within the federal anti-trust act
United Shoe Machinery Co. v. La Chapelle,
99 N. E. 289, 290, 212 Mass. 467, Ann. Gas.
1913D, 715.
An undue and unreasonable restraint of
inteiBtate commerce, forbidden by the act
of July 2, 1890, results from the concerted
scheme of railway carriers possessing a sub-
stantial monopoly of the transportation facil-
ities between the anthracite deposits in Penn-
sylvania and tide-water distributing points,
and also controlling, with the aid of their
subsidiary coal-mining and selling companies,
nearly three-fourths of the annual supply of
anthracite, whereby a large number of the
independent coal operators were induced to
enter singly into uniform perpetual agree-
ments for the sale to some one of such car-
riers, or its subsidiary coal company, of the
entire output of their several mines and any
others they might thereafter acquire, at a
fixed percentage of the general average price
prevailing at tide-water points at or near
New York, whl<di would net the operator
slightly more than if he shipped and sold on
his own account, the necessary result being to
secure to the carriers the control at tide-wa-
ter markets of the sale of a large part of the
independent output. United States v. Read-
ing Co., 33 Sup. Ct 90, 94, 226 U. S. 324, 57
L. Ed. 243.
MONTE
As banking game see Banking Game.
"Monte" is a game kept by a dealer;
that .is, the dealer against all the bettors.
Chancellor v. State, 107 S. W. 823, 824, 52
Tex. Cr. R. 464.
MONTH
See Calendar Month ;
Month to Month.
Tenant from
A month is a definite period of time,
commencing on the 1st day thereof, and end-
ing on the 28th, 29th, 30th, or 31st day. Der-
by v. Dancey, 86 South. 795, 796, 112 La.
891*
The term "montiis,'' when' used In a sta
ute^ means calendar months, not liuu
months, unless there is something in U
statute whidi indicates that a contrai
meaning was Intended. Simmons t. Hann
39 South. 77, 79, 60 Fla. 267, 7 Ann. Ca
322 (citing Guaranty Trust ft Safe Depoa
Co. T. Buddington, 9 South. 246, 27 Fla. 21
12 L. R. A. 770; Bacon v. State, 22 Fla. 4€
Bertwell y. Haines, 68 Pac 702, 10 OkL 46
The word '*month," whenever it occu
in the statute of this state, means a "calei
dar month," unless the contrary be partlci
larly expressed. Ellmball y. Lamson, 2 \
138, 141.
Under Rev. St 1878, | 2183, providii
that a tenancy by sufferance may be termina
ed by the landlord giving "one month's n
tlce" in writing to the tenant, requiring hi
to. remove from the demised premises,
notice is sufficient where giving the prop(
number of days before the action is brougl
as contained in the calendar month in whic
it is given. Mlnard v. Burtls, 53 N. W. 50
511, 83 Wis. 267.
The term "month" in a policy of life ii
surance construed to. mean a calendar montJ
Bohles V. Prudential In& Co. of Amerlc
83 Aa 904, 905, 83 N. J. Law, 246.
The word "month" in a contract to se
4,000 tons of asphalt to be delivered on o
ders not exceeding 400 tcms "in any on
month*' payments to be made on the lOt
o( each month for asphalt delivered durin
the preceding month meant calendar moot!
Fairchild-Gllmore-Wllton Co. v. Southern B(
fining Co., 110 Pae 951, 963, 158 CaL 264.
When an act is required by statute to I
performed within a certain number of montt
after a certain date, the word "months" wi
be construed to mean calendar month
whether of 28, .29, 30, or 31 days, and pr
ceedlngs in error commenced on the com
spending day of the fourth ^onth after it
rendition of the judgment comply with tl
statute in this regard. Oehler y. Walsh, 2
Ohio Clr. Ct. R. 446, 447.
The term "months,** in a constitntioni
provision providing that a vacancy in a
office of any judge holding office by electlo
shall be filled by appointment, the appoint!
to hold his office until the next general ele
tion for any state officer, held at least si
months after the vacancy oecors, means ca
endar nlonth& Foster v. State ex reL Stai
ford, 43 South. 179, 180, 1^ Ala. 632.
Under Laws 1892, p. 1490, c. 677, | 3
relating to the computation of **months,
and negativing any right to Include in sue
computation a day beyond the day in tt
last month so counted, having the san
numerical order in the days of the mont
as the day from which the computation J
made, and section 27 providing that a Soi
day or public holiday must be excluded froi
MOyTHLT PAYMENTS
441
MONUMBKT8
reckoning^ If it la the last day Of any
h period, when a life inenranoe poUcy
Tides that no action can be maintained
reon after six months from the death of
Insured, and such period ezpirea on Son-
, an action commenced on the following
Dday la barred by the express terms of
policy. Ryer ▼. Prudential Ins. Go. of
lerica, 77 N. B. 727, 185 N. T. 6.
mTHIiY PATMEHTS
See In Monthly Payments as Due.
>lfTHIiY 8ETTIi£M£MT
By a contract for services of plaintiff
five years in selling defendant's beer to
tain customers, defendant agreed, on con-
Ion that such sales should not be less
n 30,000 barrels per annum, to pay plain-
12 V^ cents per barrel so sold yearly dur-
the term of the agreement, monthly set-
nents to be mada Held, that the words
onthly settlements" could not be construed
mean "monthly payments," thereby quail-,
Dg the provisions by which the promise to
7 was conditioned on sales of a specified
ount per annum, and payments were to be
de yearly, and that nothing would become
i until the expiration of a year, or at
St until 30,000 barrels should have been
1 ' Gmlnder v. Zeltner Brewing Co., HI
Y. Supp. 215, 217, 126 App. Div. 770.
3NUMENT
See Suitable Monument
Dutiable as dressed granite, see Dressed
Granite.
A testator, who sets apart a spedfled
n from his estate for funeral expenses and
>per Interment of his remains and a sult-
le monument to his memory, and requests
It his remains be burled on a designated
ich, does not authorize the executors to
i a part of the fund for the erection of
free library as a memorial; the word
iODument'* being used in Its natural sense
meaning a shaft or any structure placed
it a tomb or at a grave, and not in its
plied sense as meaning a reminder taking
y form. In its applied sense, a monument,
Ing a reminder, may take any form. Na-
leou's battles are monuments to his mem-
f. Horace by his poetry "built himself a
mament more enduring than brass"; and
p Christopher Wren in his oft-quoted
Itaph, "Si Monumentum Bequiris Circum-
ice," declares St. Paul's cathedral his mon-
lenL Fancher v. Fancher, 103 Pac, 206,
7, 156 Cal. 13, 23 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 044. 19
in. Cas. 1157.
Act April 3, 1003 (P. lU 136), amending
t May 22, U895, authorising the erection of
idlers' monuments^ and reciting the title
such amended act in its own title. Is a
fficlent notice of a provision in the amend-
act allowing county commissioners in
counties having a population of over 000,060
and less than 1,000,000 to erect a building in
memory of the soldiers and sailors In the
War of the Rebellion from sndi counties; a
memorial hall being in the nature of a "mon-
ument" Yoho V. Allegheny County, 67 AtL
648, 640, 218 Pa. 401.
MO]IUM£llT8 <Im Bomadari— )
See Natural Monument; Permanent
Monument
''Monuments" are permanent landmarks
established for the purpose of indicating
boundaries. Tbompson v. HU1« 73 S. E.
640, 648, 187 Oa. 80a
Permanent objects, such as streams, or
rivers, and the shore of a lake, or highways,
or other lands, or buildings, or stakes, when
referred to in the description of property
conveyed, are known as "monuments." Tem-
ple V. Benson, 100 N. E. 68, 218 Mass. 12a
A deed describing land as running along
an unnavigable stream, or referring to it as
the boundary, makes it a "monument"
Drake v. Russian River Land Co., 103 Pac.
167, 170, 10 Oal. App. 654.
In the description in a deed of land,
commencing 26 feet west of the southeast
comer of a certain lot, "being the southwest
comer of the portion of said lot, formerly
owned by B., where she now resides," and
running thence north 26 feet, thence west
26 feet, or to and intersecting "the northeast
comer of a lot formerly owned by M.," and
mnning thence south to Seventh street and
thence to place of beginning, said southwest
comer of land owned by B., and said north-
east corner of land owned by M., are not
real "monuments," which are fixed and vis-
ible objects, within the rule that real monu-
ments called for in the description of a deed
are ordinarily given precedence over dis-
tances called for ; It not appearing that such
comers are any more established than are
the disputed lines of description in the deed.
Koch V. Gk>rdon, 138 S. W. 600, 610, 231 Mo.
645.
The engineer making an original survey
of a tract into lots, blocks, and streets set
stakes on the ground to Indicate boundaries
of lots. He made a resurvey from his orig-
inal notes, and discovered a discrepancy be-
tween the stakes and the field notes. In
placing the stakes originally, he intended
to place them in accordance with the notes
and plat One of the earliest purchasers
found the stakes, and relied thereon. Oth*
ers accepted the stakes as marking the boun-
daries. An abutting street was Improved
with paving, gutters, curb, and parking in
accordance with the boundaries of the lots
established by the stakes. Held, that the
stakes constituted monuments on the ground
controlling the field notes, and established
the boundaries between property owners and
were controlling on the dty. TomUnaon v.
Golden (Iowa) 138 N. W. 448, 46a
"H
^
ll
MOOB 442
MOOR
MOORAGB
Wharfage lynonyiDoiiB, aee Wharftige.
MOBAIi OERTAINTT
MOOT CASE
A "moot dise" la one which seeks to get
a jadgment on a pretended controversy, when
In reality there is none, or a decision in ad-
vance about a right before it lias been ac-
tually asserted and contested, or a Judgment
upon some matter which, when rendered, for
any reason, cannot have any, practical legal
effect upon a then existing controversy. £z
parte Steele, 162 Fed. 694, 702.
The fact that a suit may be a friendly
one would not of necessity render it a '*moot
case," which is defined as one which seeks to
determine an abstract question . which does
not rest upon existing facts or right& State
T. First Catholic Church of Lincoln, 128 N.
W. 657, 658, 88 Neb. 2.
'*A 'moot case' is one which seeks to de-
termine an abstract question which does not
rest upon existing facts or rights." '*It is
universally understood by the bench and bar
* ^ * that a moot case is one which seeks
to get a judgment on a pretended contro-
versy when in reality there is none, or a de-
cision in advance about a right before it has
been actually asserted and contested, or a
judgment upon some matter which, when ren-
dered, for any reason cannot have any prac-
tical legal effect upon a then existing con-
troversy." Where a request is made of u
public officer to perform an act under a
statute, and he, although believing that the
law requires its performance, refuses because
of a doubt on the subject and because he
wishes the question to be quickly and finally
settled by the decision of a court, a proceed-
ing brought by the state to compel such ac-
tion on his part is not fictitious. State v.
Dolley, 108 Pac. 846, 847, 82 Kan. 533 (quot-
ing Adams V. Union Railroad Co., 42 Atl.
517, 21 R. I. 140, 44 L. R. A. 273; Ex parte
Steele, 162 Fed. 694, 701).
MORAL
See Contrary to Good Morals.
MORAI. CERTAIHTT
See To a Moral Certainty.
"Moral certainty" is that degree of proof
which the law requires of moral evidence.
Moral certainty is described as a state of
impression produced by facts in which a
reasonable mind feels a sort of coercion or
necessity to act in accordance with it. It is
also declared to be a certainty that con-
vinces and directs the understanding, and
satisfies the reason and judment of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
People V. Lew Fook, 75 Pac* 188, 141 Cal.
54a
"Moral certainty" is a probability sui
dently certain to justify action upon
"Reasonable and moral certainty" may
said to be that degree of probability whi
exists with such strength as to justify h
man action upon it Austin v. State, 64 S.
670, 6 Qa. App. 211.
Where a fact established by evidence
the only one that can reasouably exist und
the circumstances, the truth is established
a "moral certainty," which is the highest d
gree of certainty obtainable in human i
fairs. ESvidenciary circumstances relied i
and essential to establish any necessary e]
ment in a criminal prosecution must, in c
der to be efficient, be shown to exist to ti
satisfaction of the jury with the same degr
of certainty as the ultimate object of inqul
is required to be to warrant a finding in ti
affirmative. Schwantes t. State, 106 N. )
237, 244, 127 Wis. 160.
A "mathematical demonstration" is wh<
ly different from a "moral certainty." £
Idence of demonstration relates to necessa
truths, truths as to which the supposition
the contrary involves, not merely what is n
and cannot be true, but what is also absui
whereas moral evidence Is the basis of co
tingent truth. It follows obviously tfai^t ti
convictions which these distinct and dissij
liar classes of evidence are capable of pi
dudng are necessarily of veiy different ii
tures. In the one absolute certitude is ti
result, to which moral certainty, the highc
degree of assurance of which truths of ti
latter class admit, la necessarily inferic
Wills, Cir. Bv. 5. Moral certainty is th
full and complete assurance whi<di admits
no degrees, and induces a sound mind to a
without doubt upon the conclusions to whi(
it naturally and reasonably leads. 2 Ste^
art's Elements, c. 2, i 4. It is apparent, th€
that the precision attainable in the one ca
is of a nature of which the other does n
admit Bowman v. Little, 61 AtL 1084, Itt
101 Md. 273.
The term '*moral certainty," as applii
to the evidence in a criminal case, has tJ
same meaning as "reasonable doubt" Sta
V. Martin, 74 Pac. 725, 728, 29 Mont 27
State V. Wappenstein, 121 Pac. 989, 998, <
Wash. 502; Stewart v. State, 115 8. W. 31
375, 88 Ark. 602 (citing Commonwealth
Costley, 118 Mass. 1; Jones v. State,
South. 772, 100 Ala. 88; Woodruff v. Stat
12 South. 653, 31 Fla. 320; Carlton v. Pc
pie, 37 N. B. 244, 150 111. 181, 41 Am. J
Rep. 346); Norman v. State, 74 S. ET. ^28,
Oa. App. 802. See, also. People r. Buettn<
84 N. B. 218, 220, 233 IlL 272, 18 Ann. Ci
235.
"Reasonable douhtf* and '*nioral certai
ty" may be used interchangeably. The wr
ers of legal dictionaries define '^oral a
tainty" to mean that degree of certain
which will justify a jury in grounding up
MORAL CERTAINTY
44S
MORAL OBLiaATIOH
beir Terdlct Bouvler defines the term to
in: '^Certainty tliat conyinces and directs
understanding, and satisfies the reason
I Judgment of those who are bound to act
scientlously upon it A certainty beyond
easonable doubt*' Black's Law Dlctlona-
ieflnes the term as follows: "In the law of
nlnal evidence that degree of assurance
Ich induces a man of sound mind to act
bout doubt upon the conclusion to which
eads. Hendriz ▼. United States, 101 Pac.
, 129, 2 OkL Cr. 240.
To say Chat proof of the fact must be
de reasonably certain is, by literal Import
liie words, tantamount to saying that the
of must be made beyond a reasonable
ibt This has been e3q>ressly held as to
phrase "moral certainty," which Is equlv-
Qt to the words "reasonable certainty."
[diarge that if a passenger's sickness was
; the result of her being put off the train,
1 that It was "reasonably certain" to have
alted from other causes, the carrier is not
3le is erroneous as requiring proof beyond
sonable doubt St Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co.
Bums, 9 S. W. 467, 468, 71 Tex. 479, 481.
Refusal to give an instruction in a mur-
> trial that the presumption of innocence
ust be overcome by competent evidence
Ich convinces you of his guilt to a moral
tainty" is not error where an instruction
given that "moral certainty, only, is re-
ired, or that degree of proof which produc-
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.**
ite V. Megorden, 88 Pac. 306, 810, 49 Or.
). 14 Ann. Cas. 130.
An instruction to the Jury that they
ist be satisfied to a "moral and reasonable
talnty" is the same in effect as saying
It they must be satisfied "beyond a rea-
lable doubt" Warr^ v. Gay, 51 S. B.
I, 303, 123 Ga. 243 (quoting and adopting
3nltion in Dwight v. Jones^ 42 a B. 48»
5 Ga. 744).
[>RAIi CHARACTER .
See Good Moral Character.
[>RAI. BUTT
The term "performance of a moral duty,^
applied to a meritorious consideration for
contract, Is confined to three duties, of
irity, of payment of creditors, and of
iDtainlng a wife and children, and un-
r the last head are Included provisions
ide for persons, not being children of the
rty promising, but in relation to whom he
s manifested an intention to stand in loco
rentis in reference to the parental duty
making provision for a child. Where the
Ly consideration for a deed by a father to
} daughter was love and affection, the
ughter could not enforce a provision in
i deed that the grantor would K>ay an ior
mbrance on the property at maturity.
Hcher V. Union Trust Co., 101 N. W. 852,
3, 138 Mich. 612, 68 L. R. A. dti7, 110 Am*
St Rep. 329 (quoting and adopting definition
in Adams, Bq. [8th Ed.] 96).
MORAL HAZARD
'''Moral hazard,' in insurance, is but
another name for a i>ecuniary interest in the
insured to permit the property to bum.**
Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Michael, 74 N. E. 964,
972, 167 Ind. 659, 8 Li R. A (N. S.) 708 (quot-
ing definition in Columbian Ins. Co. of Alex-
andria V. Lawrence, 2 Pet [27 U. S.] 25, 49,
7 L. Ed. 335); Ck>nnectlcut Fire Ins. O). v.
Manning, 160 Ffed. 382, 385, 87 C. C. A 334,
15 Ann. Caa 338; Johnson v. Sun Fire Ins.
Oa, 60 S. E. 118, 119, 3 Ga. App. 430 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in 2 Cooley,
Brtefs on Ins. p. 1831 et seq.).
Tlie term "moral hasaid," as used in the
law of fire insurance, means the possibility
of loss by fires of Incendiary origin. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dorroh fTex.) 188 & W.
466, 468.
MORA!. nrSAHITT
"Moral insanity" or "medical insanity^ is
a pervenflon of the sentiment and affections.
Taylor v. McClintpck, 112 a W. 405» 412.
87 Ark. 248.
MORAI. MARRIAOB
"Moral marriage" was a term applied to
a relation between slaves who, although they
had no power to make the marriage contract,
yet came together and agreed to live as man
and wife. The essence of such an agreement
was that it be bona fide, and that the parties
act in accordance with it Watson v. Ellerbe,
67 a B. 866, 866, 77 S. C. 232.
MORAL OBUOATIOH
'"Moral obligations' are those arising
from the admonitions of conscience, and ac-
countability to the Supreme Being. No hu-
man law-giver can impair them. They are
entirely foreign from the purposes of the
Constltutloa." Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat
213, 318, 6 L. Ed. 606 (Trimble, J., dissentp
ing).
*'Moral obligation" is defined to be an ob-
ligation '"which cannot be enforced by action
but whUAi is binding on the party who incur-
red it in conscience and according to natural
justice." It is again defined as ''a duty
which would be enforceable by law were it
not for some positive rule which, with a view
to general benefit, exempts the party in that
particular instance from legal liability. It
is held that such 'moral obligation' will sus-
tain an express promise to pay." Rathfon v.
Locher, 64 AtL 790, 701, 215 Pa. 571 (quoting
and adopting definitions from Bailey v. C!ity
of Philadelphia, 31 AtL 025, 167 Pa. 569, 46
Am. St Rep. 691).
A debt which a person 'inorally owes"
is one which he owes in equity and good con-
science, lawfully owes, but iniilch he cannot
be personally adjudged to pay. MacDdnald
MORAL OBLiaATION
444
MORB
?. TefftWeUer Co., 128 Fed. 881, 885, 68 0.
0. A. 123, es L. R. A. loa
A "moral obligation" on the part of the
state must have something more substantial
than legislation obnoxious to the fundamental
law to rest upon; something more for a foun-
dation or starting point than a statute which
Is itself immoral. A moral obligation can nev-
er be deemed to rest upon the people of the
state to discbarge a contract made by the
Legislature in direct violation of the Consti-
tution. Minnesota Sugar Co. v. Iverson, 91
Mhin. 30, 97 N. W. 454, 457 (citing Adsit v.
Osmun, 48 N. W. 31, 84 Mich. 420, U L. B. A
534).
PoUtioal ol^satloms distiiiKiilslhed
"*Moral obligations' are universal and
immutable, but Apolitical obligations' must
frequently vary according to political circum-
stances." Shanks v. Dupont, 8 Pet 242, 268,
7 L. Ed. 666 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
MORAIi TUBPITUDE
"Everything done contrary to Justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals is said to be
done with 'turpitude.*" Thus where an at-
torney, acting as a notary public, falsely cer-
tified, to affidavits to be used in the prosecu-
tion of pension claims, that the affiants per-
sonally appeared before him and were sworn
and acknowledged the execution thereof, and
he was convicted in a federal court, under
Rev. St U. S. I 4746, imposing a fine for such
an offense not exceeding (500 or imprison-
ment for a term not exceeding five years, he
was convicted of an offense involving "moral
turpitude," Justifying his disbarment, under
BalUnger's Ann. Codes & St | 4775. In re
Hopkins, 103 Pac. 805, 806, 54 Wash. 669
(quoting and adopting definition in Bouv.
Law Diet).
'•Turpitude," in its ordinary sense in-
volves the idea of inherent baseness or vile-
ness, shameful wickedness; depravity. In
its legal sense, it includes everything done
contrary to Justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals. The word "moral," which so often
precedes the word "turpitude," does not seem
to add anything to the meaning of the term,
other than that emphasis which often results
from tautological expression, within the di-
vorce statute. Holloway v. Holloway, 55 S.
E. 191, 126 Ga. 459, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 272,
115 Am. St Rep. 102, 7 Ann. Cas. 1164 (citing
5 Words and Phrases, p. 4580; Webst Diet;
Black, Law Diet; Bouv. Law Diet).
Proof of a prior conviction of assault and
battery was inadmissible to affect a witness'
credibility, under the rule permitting evi-
dence of prior convictions of offenses involv-
ing "moral turpitude," as such term signifies
an inherent quality of baseness, vileness, and
depravity not inherent in assault and battery.
Gillman v. State, 51 South. 722, 723, 165 Ala.
135.
Oanytng m concealed weapon 1b not
offense inv<^vlng "moral turpitude," and
offender's conviction is not ground for his
portation. Bx parte Saraceno, 182 Fed. {
957.
The keeper of a disorderly house wit
Pen. Code 1911, art 496, defining a disordc
house as any assignation house, or tbeatei
house where liquors are kept for sale i
women of bad reputation are permitted,
guilty of an offense involving "moral to:
tude," and a witness for accused is propc
cross-examined as to whether he Is under
indictment for keeping a disordwly hoi
Bird V. State (Tex.) 148 S. W. 738, 739 (dt
5 Words and Phrases, p. 4580).
The illegal sale of intoxicating liquon
not a crime involving moral turpitude wit
Kirby's Dig. | 5247, authorizing the revc
tion of a physician's license on his convict
of crime involving moral turpitude, the wo
"moral turpitude" implying something
moral, regardless of the fact that it is p
ishable by law, and offenses against the
uor laws, such as illegal sales of liquor,
statutory crimes, and merely mala prohib
Fort V. aty of Brinkley, 112^. W. 1084, 1(
87 Ark. 400.
Proof of a conviction of an illegal sale
intoxicating liquors is not admissible to
peach a witness* credibility; the crime
showing "moral turpitude," which signifies
inherent quality of baseness, vileness, or
pravity. Swope v. State, 58 South. 809, 81
Ala. App. 83.
"Moral turpitude" is an act of basen^
vileness, or depravity in the private and 8o<
duties which a man owes to his fellow l
or to society in general, contrary to the
cepted and customary rule of right and d
between man and mAn. Though the point
which an act begins to take on the color
turpitude is not very definitely marked,
the commission of the crime of larce
whether grand or petit undoubtedly invol
"moral turpitude," as that term is conmio
used. In re Henry, 99 Pac. 1054, 1055,
Idaho, 755, 21 L. R. A (N. S.) 207.
Fighting not being an offense involv
"moral turpitude," the state may not
cross-examination of defendant show t
he had paid several fines for fighting bef
the charge of assault for which he was be
tried. PoUok v. State (Tex.) 101 & W. 2
232.
MORE
pmlblio nam
Under a Code provision allowing proi
ty already taken for public use to be tal
for a "more necessary public use" than t
to which it has been already approprial
the land of a private person, subject to
easement for a public highway, may be tal
by a water company for a dam and reservi
MORE
446
MORE OR LE88
MariB County Water 'Co. ▼. Marin Oonntj, 79
Pac. 282, 283, 14S Cal. 586.
More partiovlarly
"Particularly" Is defined as *in a particu-
lar manner; expressly with a specific refer-
ence or Interest; in particular; distinctly.'*
The term "more particularly described," as
used in a contract to convey a farm "consist-
ing of two hundred (200) acres, more or less,
• • * more particularly described," in a
deed specified, means exactly described.
Sweet T. Marsh, 117 N. T. 8iiK>« 980, 084, 138
App. Dir. 315.
More tostimoBj
An inatmction was correct whlcb, con-
strued as a whole, told tlie Jury that, after
rejecting the testimony of witnesses discredit-
ed by them, their verdict should be for daim-
tnt, if there was "more testimony" (that is, a
preponderance of testimony) tending to es-
tablish the validity of her claim, and if there
was not, their verdict should be for the es-
tate. Taylor v. Taylor's Estate^ 101 N. W.
832, 835, 188 Mich. 658.
More tluuft one
An allegation, in a pleading contesting
the validity of an election in a school dis-
trict authorizing the Issuance of bonds, that
**more than one" person voted in favor of the
bonds who was not a taxpayer of the district
is tantamount to an allegation that two votes
were cajst by persons who were not taxpayers
of the district Hicks v. Krigbaum, 106 Pac.
482, 486» 13 Ariz. 237.
More tluuft tea years
Where defendant pleaded that he had
been in peaceable possession of all the prop-
erty described in plaintiff's petition, using
aod exercising ownership over same for "more
than ten years next preceding the filing of
said suit," the phrase quoted indicates that
It was not the intention of the pleader to limit
the time of possession to the ten years im-
mediately preceding the filing of the suit
Campbell Real Estate Co. v. Wiley (Tex.) 83
S. W. 251, 252 (dtlng Hennessy v. Savings
& Loan Co., 55 S. W. 124, 22 Tex. Civ. App.
691).
MORE OB ZJB88
The phrase "more or lessH following a
numeral conveys the meaning of an estimate
of probable distance or amount The idea
of nearness is suggested but that of fixedness
is excluded, and, where the question at is-
sue in the controversy is one of distance, it
Is a question of fact tor the jury to determine
as to what is a reasonable limit in connec-
fion with the subject-matter and surrounding
tacts and circumstances of the particular
case. Geiger v. Kaestner, 148 111. App. 529,
632; Santa Paula Commercial Co. v. Park-
hurst-Davis Mercantile Co., 120 Pac. 347, 348,
S6 Kan. 328. j
MOBS OB XJM8 (PerMkuaty)
In a contract for sale of goods, the qual-
ifying words **more or less" merely provide
against slight and accidental variati<ms in
number, measure or weight Hills v. Ed-
mund Peycke Oo^ 110 Paa 1088, 1060, 14
CaL App. 32.
The i^rase "more or lees," as used in a
contract tor the manufacture and sale of
glass, where the quantity is stated at 200,000
square feet '*more or less," means only such
Immaterial variations in quantity as would
occur naturally in connection with such a
contract Hadley-Dean Plate Glass Co. v.
Highland Glass Co., 143 Fed. 242, 243, 74 C.
C. A. 462.
The words '•more or less," in a contract
for the sale of a designated number of staves
"more or lees," all b^ng branded, etc., are
merely precautionary so as to cover slight
and unimportant Inaccuracies and do not en-
large the descriptive words or quantity. Lit-
tle Rock Cooperage Co. v. Gunnels, 101 S. W.
729, 730, 82 Ark. 286, 12 Ana Cas. 293.
The terms "about" and *'more or less,"
as used in a contract of sale of "about" 250
tons of grapes "more or less," do not create
such an ambiguity in the contract as to let in
extrinsic evidence of previous or contempo-
raneous conversations to show intent Pe-
terson V. Chalx, 90 Pac. 948, 951, 5 CaL App.
525.
Qujuitity iileatMUd hf ladepeademt elr.
ewnstaaees, ov detendmed liy o»-
tleii of Imyer
Where a contract Is made to sell or fur-
nish certain goods identified by reference to
independent circumstances, such as an entire
lot deposited in a certain warehouse, or all
that may be manufactured by the vendor in
a certain establishment, or that may be ship-
ped by his agent or correq;>ondent in certain
vessels, and the quantity is named with the
qualification of "about," or "more or less,"
or words of like import, the contract applied
to the specific lot; and the naming of the
quantity is not regarded as In the nature of
a warranty, but only as an estimate of the
probable amount, in referraoe to which good
faith is all that is required of the party mak-
ing it In such cases the governing rule is
somewhat analogous to that which is ap- '
piled in the description of land, where natu-
ral boundaries and monuments control cours-
es and distances* and estimates of quantity.
A contract for the sale of cotton linters stip-
ulated that the seller confirmed the sale to
the buyer of the "season's output of lin-
ters ♦ ♦ ♦ estimated at 200 to 250" bales.
Held, that the contract was for the sale of
the output, regardless of the number of bales,
especially in view of the eyidence that the
buyer was buying linters generally, and want-
ed all he could get, and the buyer was re-
quired to take the output consisting of 6(>
bales in excess of the maTini^TTi f>^;»vin^,
MORE OR LESS
U6
MORE OR LESS
Loeb V. Wlnnsboro C3otton Oil Oo. (Tex.) ©3
S. W. 515, 516 (quoting and adopting Braw-
ley, to Use of Myiick, y. United States, 96 U.
S. 171, 24 L. Bd. 622).
MORE OR 1X88 (BMltj)
The words *'more or less" ordinarily
mean "abont," when used in a deed. Oarling
T. Wilson (Ala«) 58 South. 417, 418.
Where land sold was described by metes
and bounds, the words "containing by esti-
mate" a certain number of acres were equiva-
lent to the words *'more or less.** Mayer &
Schmidt ▼. Wooten, 102 S. W. 423, 427, 46
Tex. Civ. App. 327.
"In common-law conveyances the words
'more or less,' while sometimes having prac-
tically no effect, are frequently added to pre-
vent the precise quantity named from being
conclusive on the parties, and may operate
to make a sale of land one in gross instead of
by the acre." Alnsa v. United States, 161 U.
S. 206, 228. 16 Sup. Gt 544, 40 L. Ed. 673.
When the description of the quantity of
land conveyed by the deed concludes with
the words "more or less,*' the purchaser is
not entitled to any reduction on account of
a deficiency unless it is very gross. Keenan
V. Bird, 14 N. Y. Supp. 467, 60 Hun, 175, 177;
Cunningham v. Millner, 82 Va. 526, 527.
Where an agreement for the conveyance
of land describes it as 32 acres more or less,
and which does not describe the land by
metes and bounds, or by any fixed ascertain-
able monuments, the words "more or less" do
not weaken or destroy the statement of the
quantity. Brooks v. Halane, 116 IlL App.
383, 388.
The qualification '*more or less," specified
in a conveyance of land, will cover any de-
ficiency not so gross as to Justify a suspicion
of willful deception or mistake amounting to
fraud. In the latter event the purchaser may
have either a rescission of the sale or an
apportionment of the price according to the
relative value. The use of the words con-
fers no additional right upon the seller.
Kendall v. Wells, 55 S. B. 41, 42, 126 Ga.
343 (quoting and adopting definition in Civ.
Code 1895, | 3542, and citing 4 Kent, Comm.
[14th Ed.] 467; 1 Jones, Real Prop. || 398,
399, 400; Rawle, Cov. [5th Ed.] | 297; 3
Washb. Real Prop. [6th Ed.] | 2322; 1 Warv.
Vendors, | 381; Collinsville Granite Oo. v.
Phillips, 51 S. E. 666, 123*Ga. 842; Jack-
son ex dem. Suffem v. McConnell [N. Y.] 19
Wend. 175, 32 Am. Dec. 439; Powell v. Clark,
5 Mass. 355, 4 Am. Dec. 67; Wright v.
Wright, 34 Ala. 194; Seegar v. Smith, 3 S.
E. 613, 614, 78 Ga. 616, 618; BeaU v. Berk-
halter, 26 Ga. 567; Estes v. Odom, 18 S. E.
355, 91 Ga. 600; Perkins Mfg. Oo. v. Wil-
liams, 25 S. E. 556, 98 Ga. 388; Seymore
V. Rice, 21 S. E. 293, 94 Ga. 184 ; Harrison
V. Talbot, 2 Dana [32 Ky.] 258; Noble v.
Googins, 99 Mass. 231 ; Gauldin v. Shehee, 20
Ga. SSl [4] ; Soidth v. Dudley, 69 Oa. 768 [3
2 Warv. Vendors, | 832; Finney v. Morrj
42 S. E. 1020, 116 Ga. 758; WyUy v. Gaza
69 Ga. 506, 516; Walton v. Ramsey, 50 G
618 ; Adams, Eq. [8th Ed.] 177, 178 ; Spen
V. Duren, 3 Ala. 251; Leyden v. Hickma
75 Ga. 684 ; Seymore v. Rice, 21 S. E. 28
94 Ga. 183; Yost v. MalUcote's Adm'r, '
Va. 610).
The words "more or lees," as used in
deed stating that the land conveyed oontai
ed a speciiied number of acres more or les
are not construed to mean "as estimated
"as supposed," but are construed to mei
about the specified number of acres, and a
designed to cover only such small errors <
surveying as usually occur in surveya Wii
ton V. McGraw, 54 S. E. 506, 508, 60 W. V
96.
The term "more or less," when appendc
to the expressed area of land stated in
deed, constitutes a recognition of the ft<
that measurements of land ar^ apt to diffe
and that m^i of intelligence and experienc
who are familiar with the premises, may m
agree in their estimates ; and one who pu
chases land in bulk or as containing an e
timated number of acres can ordinarily o
tain no relief on account of any shortai
which subsequent accurate measurement mt
disclose, but the introduction of the won
"more or less" does not afford a able]
against liability for false representations, ai
the mere fact that the deficiency is vei
large in proportion to the suiqposed quantil
is often treated as in itself evidence of frav
or of mutual mistake, and in such case tl
purchaser is entitled to relief by rescissioi
or by an abatement of the price, or, whei
he has paid the price, an action at law f(
damages. Boddy v. Henry, 101 N. W. 44
452, 126 Iowa, 31 (citing Paine v. Upton, I
N. Y. 327, 41 Am. Rep. 371 ; Lewis v. Hoel(
tke [Tex.] 76 S. W. 309; Couse v. Boyles,
N. J. Eq. 212, 88 Am. Dec 514; HarreU
Hill, 19 Ark. 102, 68 Am. Dec 202; Triple
V. Alden, 26 Grat [67 Va.] 721, 21 Am. Re
320; Hoback v. Kilgores, 26 Grat [67 Va
442, 21 Am. Rep. 317; Camp v. Norfieet
Adm'x, 5 S. E. 374, 83 Va. 380; Fiske
Fleming's Syndic, 15 La. 202 ; Estes v. Odoi
18 S. E. 355, 91 Ga. 600; Anthony v. Oldacr
4 Call [8 Va.] 489 ; Cravens v. Kiser, 4 Im
512; Blessing's Adm'rs v. Beatty, 1 pob. [4
Va,] 287; Grislip v. Gain, 19 W. Va. 43J
Wilson V. Randall, 67 N. Y. 338; McCandlei
V. Young, 96 Pa. 289; Baltimore Permanei
Building & Land Soc v. Smith, 54 Md. 18
39 Am. Rep. 374; Hosleton v. Dickinson,
N. W. 550. 51 Iowa, 244).
Tlie language "more or less,** used 1
contracts for the sale of land, must be ui
derstood to apply only to small excesses (
deficiencies attributable to variance of instn
ments of surveyors, etc, and tixese terms ai
used to rather replace the idea of a contra<
of hazard, and implies that there la no ccn
MOBE OR US8S
447
HOUE OR LESS
fliderable diffeseiKKi in the quantity. Berry^s
Ex'x Y. Flshbnme, 61 S. B. 827, 104 Va. 459.
The retam of a]K>raiBer8 setting aside a
year's sapport to a widow described the proiH
erty set aside as "460 acres of land, more or
less, including homestead." Held, that the
words ''more or less'* indicate that no pre-
cise number of acres was intended, but that
the statement of the quantity was given as
desdiptlTe of the land assigned. Hancock
▼. Kin& W 8. E. 949, 960, 183 Qa. 734.
The words "more or less," used in de-
scribing land, are ordinarily intended and
nnderstood not to admit of infinite variation,
but to restrain the representation to a rea-
sonable or usual allowance for small er-
rors in surveys; and a description of land,
in a bUl to quiet title thereto, as beginning
at a point on the south line of S. avenue, 60
feet, more or less, eastwardly from the
southeast comer of S. avenue and B. avenue,
said point being at the intersection of said
sonth line of S. avenue, and the north and
south fence separating the lot described from
the lot at the southeast comer of said two
avenues supposed to belong to B., 00 feet
more or less, to the southeast comer of said
B. lot, thence northwardly along the fence
separating the lot described from the B. lot
and parallel, or nearly so, with B. avenue,
202 feet, more or lest, to the place of be-
ginning, being suffldently definite that, if the
action had been ejectment, a surveyor would
have been able, in case of recovery, to locate
the exact limits, and the sheriff to execute a
writ of possession, was sufficient Touart
V. Jett Bros. Ckmtractlng Oo., 68 South. 761,
753, 109 Ala. 63a
A grantor, whose land was bounded on
the east by lands of 8., conveyed a part to
C, and then conveyed land lying between
that conveyed to <X and that owned by S.,
describing it as "beginning at a point
* * * adjoining the land of G.,^ence run-
ning easterly * • * 68 feet to the land
of S., * * * all distances above men-
tioned to be more or less." Held, that the
conveyance covered all of the land owned
by the grantor lying between the lands of S.
and C, whether "more or less" than 68 feet
wide. Holden v. CroUy, 138 N. Y. Supp. 23,
25, 163 App. Div. 264.
Mistake «v framd
Where through innocent mistake a gran-
tor represented that a tract, described by
metes and bounds, containing but 60.71 acres
contained 82 acres more or less, the grantee,
purchasing by the acre and paying the price
In ignorance of the deficiency, could sue in
equity for the deficiency in the acreage ; the
words "more' or leas'* not including a con-
siderable variance, and the mistake being
rafiOcient to induce the court to believe that
If the truth had been known the purchase
would not have been made. Straus v. Nor-
rt^ 79 Aa 611, 012. 78 N. J. Bq. 488.
ReasoAAble ezoesa or defleiettey oorered
The words "more or less" in a deed re-
lieve only from the necessity for exactness,
and not from gross deficiency. Boggs v.
Bush, 122 & W. 220, 222, 137 Ey. 96.
The words ''more or less*' in a convey-
ance ordinarily mean that the grantor does
not warrant the precise quantity of land
named therein, but import that the actual
quantity ia a near approximate to that men-
ti<med, so that, if there is no more than a
reasonable deficit in the quantity, such as a
shortage arising from a part thereof taken
for street, there is no breach of the covenant
in the conveyance. Eitzman v. Carl, 110 N.
W. 687, 133 Iowa, 340, 12 Ann. Cas. 290.
Risk M to «Mmtlty Imdleated
The general rule ia that, where it ap-
pears in a deed conveying land by the quali-
fying words '*more or less" that the state-
ment of the number of acres in the deed is
a mere matter of description and not of the
essence of the contract, the purchaser, in the
absence of fraud, takes the risk as to the
quantity of acres conveyed to him. Adams
V. Beta, 78 N. B. 649, 661, 107 Ind. 101;
Newman v. Eay, 49 S. B. 926, 932, 67 W.
Va. 98, 68 L. B. A. 908, 4 Ann. Gas. 39 (cit-
ing 4 Eent, Conun. 467 ; Noble v. Ooogins, 99
Mass. 231; Flagg v. Mason, 6 N. E. 702, 141
Mass. 64; libby v. Didcey, 27 AU. 263, 86
Me. 362; Frenche v. Chancellor of State of
New Jersey, 27 ML 140, 61 N. J. Bq. 624, 40
Am. St. Rep. 648; Borkenhagen v. Vian-
den, 62 N. W. 260, 82 Wis. 206; Betes v.
Odom, 18 S. B. 355, 91 Qa. 000); Eendall v.
WeUs, 66 S. B. 41, 44, 126 Ga. 343 (citing
Jones, Beal Prop. || 398, 399, 400; Rawle,
Cov. [6th Ed.l I 297; 3 Washb. Real Prop.
[6th Ed.] I 2322; CoUinsville Granite Co.
V. PhilUps, 61 S. B. 666^ 123 Ga. 842; Jack-
son V. McConnell [N. Y.] 19 Wend. 176, 32
Am. Dea 439; Powell v. Clarke, 6 Mass. 866,
4 Am. Dec. 67; Wright v. Wright, 34 Ala.
194) ; Cohen v. Numsen, 66 AtL 432, 438, 104
Md. 676; Yates v. Buttrell OCex.) 132 S. W.
831, 832.
Sale la gross or hf acre Indicated
The description of land conveyed as con-
taining so many acres, "more or less," con-
stitutes a sale by the acre, unless it plainly
appears from the whole deed that a sale in
gross was intended. Pack v. Whitaker, 66
S. B. 496, 498, 110 Va. 122.
A description in a deed of land as 16
acres, "more or less," off the southwest cor-
ner of a quarter section, signified a sale in
gross of 15 acres, and was not uncertain
because of the words quoted. W. C. Barly
& Co. V. Long, 42 South. 348, 89 Miss. 285.
Where defendant rented a tract of land
of plaintiff, and executed a rent note, prom-
ising to pay plaintiff |160 for rent of 40
acres of land at 94 per acre, more or less,
etc., it waa held that the words "more or
> ' ^).
!'■'(
t'i
|,i|H|
1 '^H .,
H
IB
/ .
I
MORE OR LESd
448
lEORTOlGB
less" iref erred to the quantity of landj and
that the Instrument should be construed to
evidence a contract for renting by the acre,
and not for a gross sum for the entire tract
Ayers ▼. Heustess, 127 S. W. 957, 94 Ark.
493.
Immaterial deiiatioB— 2 In 200 aerea
On an exchange of land, a deficiency of
about two acres in a farm of "200 acres,
more or less/' is insafflcient to raise a pre-
sumption that it would have prevented the
exchange, if known. Webber v. Barter, 134
N. W. 947, 960, 154 Iowa, 317.
Bfaterial deTiation— 8 in 200 acres
Where a contract for the exchange of a
stock of goods for a farm described it as
containing 200 acres "more or less according
to the government survey," such quoted
words contemplated only such differences as
were due to errors incident to measurements
by different surveyors and the variance in
the instruments used, and did not cover a
discrepancy of 8.58; such discrepancy being
sufficient to Justify an allowance of damages.
Fisher v. Trumbauer & Smith (Iowa) 138 N.
W. 528, 530.
Same— 30 in 80 aeres
The term ''more or less," in a deed de-
scribing the land as 80 acres more or less,
does not cover a shortage of 30 acres, and
the grantee going into possession and im-
proving the land before discovering the fraud
of the grantor, who knew that the land de-
scribed was 50 acres, may elect to retain the
land the grantor conveyed and demand an
abatement of the price for so much as the
Quantity falls short of the amount repre-
sented. McGhee v. Bell, 70 S. W. 493, 496,
170 Mo. 121, 59 L. R. A. 761.
MORGUE
As used in Rev. St 1906, | 3586a, mak-
ing it unlawful to establish a morgue on any
street on which there are dwelling houses,
unless the owners or occupants of such
dwelling houses within 200 yards thereof
give their written consent, the word "morgue"
must be given its usual meaning, which is a
place or deadhouse where the bodies of per-
sons fonnd dead are exposed for identifica-
tion, or that they may be claimed by their
friends. Koebler v. Pennewell, 79 N. R 471,
473, 75 Ohio St 278 (citing Black, Law
Diet; Rap. & L. Law Diet; Cent Diet;
Stand. Diet; WebstDict; Thesaurus, Diet ;
Bnc. Diet).
MORTAL INJURY
The words "mortal injuries,** as used
in an indictment for murder alleging that
defendant inflicted certain mortal injuries,
must be taken as the equivalent of "serious
bodily injuries," as used in Or. Ck>de, | 215,
providing that an aggravated assault is com-
mitted when a serious bodily injury is in-
ISicted upon the person assaulted* and m
indictment Justifles a eonvMion for an
gravated assault ICapoU t. Territory,
Pac 889, 891, 9 Arts. 199.
MORTAR
"Mortar" is a mixture of lime in ps
with sand. It may be divided into t
principal cdasses: Hydraulic mortar, wh
is made of hydraulic lime, and common m
tar, made of common lime. Donaldson
Roksament Stone Co^ 170 Fed. 192, 193.
MORTGAGE
See Chattel Mortgage; Construct
Mortgage; Dry Mortgage; E)quita
Mortgage; Indicia of a Mtortga;
Kansas Cut-Throat Mortgage; F
sonal Mortgage; Purchase-Money M<
gage; Railroad Mortgage; Tight M(
gage.
Deed, mortgage, or otherwise, see Otti
wise.
Party to mortgage, see Party.
Subject to mortgage, see Subject to.
"A 'mortgage' is literally a dead pledi
Stumpe ▼. Kopp, 99 S. W. 1073, 1076^ !
Mo. 412.
At common law a mortgage was a o
ditional conveyance to secure the payment
money or the performance of some act,
be void upon such payment or performan
By more modem law and under the statu
of many states a mortgage is a mere I
upon land. Its dominant attribute is seci
ty, but nevertheless it must be regarded
"both a lien in equity and a conveyance
law.*' United States t. Commonwealth
tie Ins. & Trust Co., 24 Sup. Ct 546, 5
193 U. S. 651, 48 Li Ed. 830 (citing Pom. ]
Jur. I 1191).
A mortgage is a conveyance of an est
or property by way of pledge for the secur
of a debt, to become void on payment there
and is not a mere Ilea Poarch v. Duno
91 S. W. 1110, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 275.
A ''mortgage" is a pledge of land <
scribed in the agreement by a grantor
the grajltee and to revert to the grantor
the discharge of the obligation for the p
formance of which it is pledged. Safe I
posit Title Guaranty Co. v. Linton, 62 A
566, 213 Pa. 105 (citing Lance's Appeal,
Ati. 375, 112 Pa. 456; Moran v. Munhall
Ati. 1094, 204 Pa. 242).
A "mortgaged' is a conveyance or tra:
fer of property, either real or personal,
security to pay a debt or in discharge of soi
other obligation. Williams v. Davis,
South. 908, 909, 154 Ala. 422.
An instrument will be deemed a mo
gage, whatever its form, if, taken alone or
connection with the surrounding drcu
stances, it appears to have been giv^ to i
MORTGAGE
U»
BCOB^XGAGB
cure payment of money; and the meie ab-
eence of terms of defeasance does not con-
trol its natore as a mortgage. Connor ▼.
Connor, 52 South. 727. 729, 60 Fla. 467; Wyl-
ly-Gabbett Co. v. WllUams, 42 South. 910,
929, 53 Fla. 872 (quoting Cooper t. Brock,
2 N. W. 660, 41 Mich. 488).
Act Feb. 25, 1909 (26 St at Large, p.
161), provides that In every action to recover
personal property which lias been pledged in
any way to secure credit or debt the defend-
ant may plead a counterclaim arising out of
the same transaction, and the jury may find
the amount due the plalntifl, if any, in which
case the defoidant may pay said amount and
costs, and have the property released from
the incombranoe. Held that, by the use of
the words 'pledged in any way," the statute
evidences an intention not to limit its appli-
cation to cases of mere technical pledges,
and, as a 'Mortgager' is a "pledge," the mort-
gagor of diattels to secure the purchase
price was properly permitted to Interpose a
counterclaim that the property in question
was not suitable for the purpose for which
it was purdiased as represented by the sell^
in an action to foreclose the mortgage.
Woodruff Afachinery & Mfg. Ck>. v. Timms,
76 S. B. 114, 115, 98 S. C. 90.
Any instrument creating a lien, specify-
ing the debt and personal property on which
it is to take effect, is a mortgage, though
there may be some language indicating an in-
tention to convey legal title. Powers & Co.
V. Georgia-Florida Grocery Co., 67 S. B. 685,
686, 7 Ga. App. 502.
No particular formality is essential to th^
creation of a mortgage. A writing indicating
an intention to create a lien, and specifying
a debt to be secured and the property on
which the lien is to take effect, is a mortgage.
Howard v. Rumble, 61 S. EL 297, 4 Ga. App.
327.
A 'inortgage" is a conveyance by a debtor
to his creditor, or to some one in trust for
him, as a security for the debt Whatever is
substantially this is held to be a mortgage in
a court of equity. Wilson v. Fisher, 62 S.
B. 622, 624, 148 N. C. 585.
A "mortgage^* is a contract pledging prop-
erty embraced in it for the payment of the
debt it is given to secure. McClung v. Culli-
aon, 82 Pac. 499, 500, 15 Gkl. 402.
A common-law "mortgage" is defined to
be an absolute sale of the property by the
mortgagor to the mortgagee, subject to be
redeemed according to the terms of the con-
tract Mower v. McCarthy, 64 Aa 578, 579,
79 y t 142, 7 Ia B. A. (N. S.) 418, 118 Am.
St Bep. 942.
A conveyance of property in writing as
security is a "mortgage," regardless of the
letter of the instrument The purpose, not
the form, determines its character. No matp
ter what the nature of a conveyance may be
8 Wds A P.2n Sn.— 29
wtaldi fB given as secaxlty, when the evldeacft,
either written or parol, establishes the ftict
that the relation of mortgagor and mort-
gagee exists between the. parties, the right
of the party is limited to a mere mortgage
interest Smith v. Pfiuger, 106 N. W. 476.
477, 126 Wis. 253, 2 Lu B. A. (N. S.) 783, 110
Am. St Bep. 911 (citing Starks v. Bedfield,
9 N. W. 168, 52 Wis. 349 ; Hoile v. BaUey, 17
N. W. 322, 58 Wis. 434; Schriber v. Le
Clair, 29 N. W. 570, 889, 66 Wis. 579; Mc-
Cormick v. Hemdon, 56 N. W. 1097, 86 Wis.
449; Schierl v. Newburg. 78 N. W. 761, 102
Wis. 552; Chumps v. Kiyo, 80 N. W. 937, 104
Wis. 656).
"A transfer of property as eeeurity, re-
gardless of the form therec^, is a 'mortgage,'
and, as regards rights or remedies, must be
dealt T^th as such. If, from all the circum-
stances of the case, it appears dearly that
the parties intended to create the relation of
debtor and creditor between themselves or
to recognize that rdation as existing as a
basis for a mortgage, their purpose in that
regard will be deemed to have been accom-
plished so f^r as necessary to carry into ef-
fect the incidental purpose to create the re-
lation of mortgagor and mortgagee to secure
payment of the indebtedness, though It does
not appear that there was the express prom-
ise to pay which generally characterizes the
creation of such principal relation." Beebe
V. Wisconsin Mortgage Loan Co., 98 N. W.
1103, 1105. 117 Wis. 828 (citing Starks v.
Bedfield, 9 N. W. 168, 52 Wis. 849; Bray-
ton V. Jones, 5 Wia 117; Cumps v. Kiyo,
80 N. W. 937. 104 Wis. 666; Schriber v. Le
Clair, 29 N. W. 570, 889, 66 Wis. 579; Get-
telman v. Ck>mmercial U. Assur. Co., 72 N.
W. 627, 97 Wis. 237, 241; Plato v. Boe, 14
Wis. 403; Sweet v. Mitchell, 15 Wis. 641;
Jordan v. Warner's Ditate^ 88 N. W. 946, 107
Wis. 539, 560).
An instrument in the form of a common-
law deed of mortgage, reciting a loan of mon-
ey and a sale of real estate to secure the re-
payment of the sum loaned, with interest, ex-
ecuted in the state of Louisiana and duly
recorded in the mortgage office of the parish
wherein the property is situated, has the
legal effect of a ''mortgage^* or hypothecation
against third persons. In re Immanuel Pres-
byterian Caiurch, 36 South. 408, 413, 112 La.
348.
Where one executed an assignment and
transfer of all the rents from a farm to
secure payment of his note, the instrument
amounted to a "mortgage." Thatcher v. Jef-
fries (Tex.) 91 S. W. 1091, 1092.
A building and loan contract providing
that, on default by the borrower, the lending
company may re-enter and r^^oesess the
premises, that all sums advanced by it shall
become due and payable, and that it shall
have power to sell the premises according
to law, and be entitled to the rights and
MORTGAGE
450
MORTGAGE
remedies ot the "mortgagee," and any over-
plus after satisfying the Indebtedness shall
be paid to the borrower, 1b In the nature of
a "mortgage^' and subject to foreclosure as
such. Preston v. JD'Ambroslo, 95 N. Y. Supp.
70, 71, 46 Misc. Rep. 523.
Where a fire policy provided that the
loss. If any, was payable to R., trustee, as
his Interest might appear, and the Interest
of R. was that of a trustee under a deed
securing bonds Issued by Insured, such In-
terest would be treated as a mortgage, and
the insurer estopped to deny liability on the
ground that It did not know the nature and
character of the trust Peerless Mineral
Springs Ck>. v. German American Ins. Go. of
New York, 138 N. W. 1023, 1024, 151 Wis. 352.
Assignment distinffnlslied
An "assignment for benefit of creditors"
Is more than a security for the payment of
debts; It Is an absolute appropriation of prop-
erty to their payment It does not create a
lien In favor of creditors upon property which
In equity Is still regarded as the property of
the assignor, but it passes both the legal and
equitable title beyond the control of the as-
signor, and there remains in him no equity
of redemption, and the trust which results
to the assignor in the unemployed balance
does not indicate such an equity. The assign-
ment is voluntary on the part of the debtor,
and no authority can exact it, and it there-
fore partakes of the nature of a private con-
tract Miller V. Swhier, 79 N. B. 1092, 1093,
40 Ind. App. 465 (citing Burrill, Asslgnm.
I 6, and distinguishing O'Neil v. Beck, 69 Ind.
239; Robinson v. Hughes, 20 N. E. 220, 117
Ind. 293, 3 L. R A. 383, 10 Am. St Rep. 45;
Graves v. Hinkle, 21 N. B. 328, 120 Ind. 157).
"If the intention of the debtor U mere-
ly to secure his debt to one or more of his
creditors, and the conveyance Is not Intended
as an absolute disposition of his property,
but he reserves to himself a right therein,
the conveyance will be treated as a 'mort-
gage,' even though the debtor is Insolvent at
the time, and it covers all his property, and
but a portion of his debts are secured by it"
Civ. Code, §§ 3449-n3473, provide that an as-
signment for the benefit of creditors is void
against any creditor of the assignor not as-
senting thereto, in case it gives a preference
of one debt or class of debts over another,
and that the assignment must be made to the
sheriff of the county where the property is
situated. A debtor executed a deed of a
portion of her property to a trustee, who
Was to pay certain creditors from the profits,
but it was provided that the surplus of profits
should Inure to the use of the grantor during
her life, and that, after payment of the debts
and the grantor's death, the property should
be transferred to her children. Any surplus
from the proceeds of any sale or mortgage by
the trustee was to be invested by him, and
he was empowered to exchange the property
for other property to be held subject to
trust Held, that the deed was not Inten
as an absolute dl^>ositlon of the property
as an assignment for the benefit of credit
within the meaning of the statute, and he
was not invalid for failure to comply th<
with. Heath v. Wilson, 78 Paa 182, 185,
CaL 362 (quoting and adopting definltioi
Cadwell's Bank v. Crittenden, 23 N. W. (
66 Iowa, 240).
"A 'mortgage^ or deed of trust In the
ture of a mortgage 1b Intended as secuj
for the payment of money, or for the ]
formance of some oollateivil act, and becoi
void upon such payment or performan^
"A 'mortgage' does not Invest the mortga
with an abs(dute and indefeasible title. ^
equitable title, called the 'equity of redei
tlon,' remains in the mortgagor. The m
gage is a security for the debt, and create
Hen upon the property in fftvor of the en
tor. There is no difference in legal effect
tween a mortgage with a power of sale i
a deed of trust executed to secure a di
where the power of sale U placed li
third person. Both are securities for a d<
Both create specific liens on the proper
and In both the equitable title or ri^^t
redemption remains in the debtor, and Is
estate or Interest in the property that
debtor may sell, or that may be seized i
sold under Judicial, process by his ot]
creditors, subject to the lien created by
mortgage or deed of trust ♦ • ♦ An
signment for the benefit of creditors is v
defined to be 'a transfer by a debtor of so
or all of his property to an assignee
trust, apply the same, or the proceeds the
of, to the payment of some or all of
debts, and to return the surplus, if a
to the debtor.'" The owner of a sawr
property, including the mill, machinery, «
logs and lumber, the personalty being s
Ject to a chattel mortgage, entered intc
contract with the chattel mortgagee by wh
he purported to convey and transfer to a
mortgagee all of the property, both perso
and real, with authority to take possess
and to operate the mill and to sell any i
all of the property, the owner agreeing to
ecute conveyances of the same as required
him. In consideration of such contract i
grantee agreed to pay certain Indebtedness
the owner, including his own, and to apply
that puri)ose all sums received from i
operation of the mill or sales of the proE
ty, after deducting expenses ; the surplus
any, to be paid over to the grantor. He
that such contract was not a mortgage, bu
trust agreement or deed, which vested the
solute title to the property in the grant
and that it avoided a policy of Insurai
previously issued to the grantor on the pr
erty containing a provision that it should
void if his Interest in the property should
or become other than unconditional and 8
ownership. Brecht t. Law, Union A Cro
IIOBTGAGB
451
IIOBOTOAOB
Ins. Co., 153 Fed. 452, 4B6 (qaoting and adofyt-
Ing definitions In Ladd v. Johnson, 49 Paa
756, 32 Or. 105, 200; BartleU r. Teah, 1 Fed.
768; Bnrrlll, Assignm. | 2; and citing
Appolos et al. T. Brady et aL, 49 Fed. 401,
1 G. a A. 299; Richmond t. Mississippi
Hills, 11 S. W. 960, 52 Aik. 80, 4 L. B. A.
413; Bohson r. Tomlinson, 15 8. W. 456^
54 Ark. 229; Stote, to use of Holliday, ▼.
Benoist, 87 Mo. 501 ; GadweU'a Bank v. Gri^
tenden, 23 N. W. 646, 648, 66 Iowa, 240^ 241;
Sabichi t. Chase, 41 Pac. 29, 108 GaL 81;
Monteith y. Hogg, 20 Pac. 827, 17 Or. 270).
Am referrins t« mortsMTe om realty
Aloae
The word "mortgage,** as used in Const
art 18^ I 4, providing that a mortgage by
which a debt is secured shall, tor the pur-
poses of assessment and taxation, be deemed
and treated as an interest in property af-
fected thereby, has reference to mortgages on
realty flone^ an employment of the word
countenanced even in legal usage, where
"mortgage" is generally employed and meant
to apply to the creation of liens upon real
estate, while like liens upon personalty are
designated as ''chattel mortgages." Bank of
Woodland r. Pierce, 77 Pac 1012, 1018, 144
GaL 434.
CoDBt art 18, 1 1, permits provision, ex-
eept in case of credits secured, for a deduc-
tion from credits of debts due to bona fide
residaits. Pol. Code, I 8617, subd. 8, pro-
Tides that a mortgage, or other obligation by
which a debt is secured, when land is pledged,
shall, for the purposes of taxation, be deemed
an Interest in the land so pledged, and by
Bubdiyision 6 the term "credits" means those
solvent debts not secured owing to the per-
son assessed, and the term "debt" means
those unsecured liabilities owing by the per-
son assessed to bona fide residents, and sec-
tion 3628, provides that, in assessing solvent
credits not secured, a reduction shall be made
of debts due bona fide residents, and section
3650, subd. 15, provides that in entering as-
sessments containing solvent credits, subject
to deduction, the assessor must enter in the
proper column the value of debts and deduct
tbem therefrom. Const art. 13, | 4, provides
that a mortgage, or other obligation by which
a debt is secured, shall, for the purpose of
taxation, be deemed an interest In the prop-
erty affected. Pol. Code, | 8627, contains the
same provision. Held, that a collateral secu-
rity of credits by a loan on personalty was
not a mortgage, etc., or "other obligation by
wblcb a debt is secured," within Const art
13, § 4, that section applying only to liens on
land; nor was it a "mortgage or trust deed,"
within section 1, so that the person assessed
on such credits was entitled to have his debts
deducted therefrom; and Pol. Code, I 3629,
subd. 6, directing the assessor to require each
person assessed to show separately all sol-
vent credits unsecured, is not applicable, not
referring to the assessor's duty Itt making the
assessment but only prescribing the form of
the taxpayer's zetum for the assessor's infor-
mation. Bank of Willowa v. Glenn County,
101 Pac 18, 15, 16^ 155 CaL 852.
As elhattel
SeeChatteL
See Claim.
Oondltioaal sale dlstiiignlslie4
See Conditional Sale.
Coatvaet for yaymeat •£ moaey dlstta^
svislied
Defendant, having settled on unsnrvey-
ed public land, executed a written contract
for the purchase of fruit trees, which recited
that defendant was the owner of 160 acres,
and that for the payment of the price of the
trees he bound himself, his heirs, assigns* and
grantees of and to the aforesaid land. De-
fendant thereafter acquired title to a quar-
ter section of land in the section described in
the contract though not of the same tech-
nical deseripttcm as the one therein describ-
ed. Held, that the contract was a simple
contract for the paymoit of money, and not
a "mortgage^' on the land. Stark Bros. t.
Boyce^ 87 Pac 840* 843» 44 Wash. 287.
See Conveyance.
Convey as including, see Convey.
Gontrmet for sale of real estate
The words "foreclosure of a mortgage"
do not in common parlance refer to the fore-
closure of a land contract and the words, as
used in Comp. Laws, | 435, providing that the
circuit courts in chancery shall dismiss suits
concerning property where the matter in dis-
pute shall not exceed $100, excepting suits
for the foreclosure of morti^ges, etc., do not
include a foreclosure of a land contract and
a suit to foreclose a land contract on which
there remains less than $100 unpaid must
be dismissed. Sands & Maxwell Lumber Co.
T. Gay, 101 N. W. 53, 138 Mich. 82.
OomTeyamee absolmte Im f •*»
An instrument though in form an abso-
lute deed, having been jbatended merely as se-
curity for payment of a debt is a "mort^
gage." Todd v. Todd, 128 Pac 413, 414, 164
Gal. 255; White v. Walsh, 114 N. Y. Supp.
1015, 1017, 62 Misc. Rep. 428 (citing Mooney
V. Byrne, 57 N. BL 163, 163 N. Y. 86) ; Mar-
quam t. Boss, 83 Pac 852, 860, 47 Or. 874.
An absolute conveyance given to secure
a note which the grantor intends to repay
will in equity be held a "mortgage," where
the form of the conveyance is dictated by
the lender. Plato v. Roe, 14 Wis. 458, 457.
In determining whether an instrument in
the form of a deed is or is not a ''mortgage,"
the principal test to be applied is whether the
relation of the parties towards each other,
M(»TGAGB
462
MOBTQAaB
of debtor o? creditor, continued after the ex-
ecution of the deed. The test is the eidst^ice
or nonexlBtence of a debt, and equity looks
behind the form to the fact. If the transac-
tion was Intended as a loan. If there remains
a debt for which the conveyance is only a
security, and the collection of which may be
enforced independent of the security, equity
will hold it a mortgage, no matter whether
the transaction is evidenced by one or two in-
struments. Plummer ▼. Ilse, 82 Pac. 1009,
1010, 41 Wash. 5, 2 L. a A. (N. S.) 627, 111
Am. St Rep. 907.
The conyeyance must be judged accord-
ing to the real intent of the parties. If there
is a debt subsisting between the parties, and
it is the intention to continue the debt, it is
a "mortgage" ; but if the conveyance extin-
guishes the debt, and the parties intend that
result, a contract for a resale at the same
price- does not destroy the character of the
"deed'* as an absolute conveyance. While J.
was indebted to M., he made a fraudulent
conveyance to K. Thereafter, for the pur-
pose, not of extinguishing the debt, but of
securing it, he conveyed land to M. by deed,
reciting a consideration, the amount of the
debt, and at the same time M. quitclaimed
the land to J. for the same recited considera-
tion, reserving a vendor's U&i, Held, that
M. still remained a creditor, whose debt ex-
isted at the date of the fraudulent convey-
ance. James v. Mallory, 80 S. W. 472, 473,
76 Ark. 509 (citing Hays v. Bmerson, 87 8.
W. 1027, 75 Ark. 551).
A deed absolute, with parol agreement
that it shall be a mortgage is a "mortgage"
from its inception. Where a cotenant*s in-
terest in land was to be sold on execution,
and it was agreed that the other tenant
should purchase the laud at such sale, and
take title under the sheriff's deed, as secu-
rity for payment to him, by the judgment
debtor, of the amount of the debt, the trans-
action created a "mortgage," although the
agreement was unknown except to the ten-
ants. Stafford v. Stafford, 71 S. W. 984, 986,
29 Tex. Civ. App. 73 (citing and adopting
Jones, Mortg. | 285).
Where a deed is intended to secure a
debt, and the relation of debtor and creditor
exists between the parties, the legal inference
is that a "mortgage" was intended. Thus a
deed was a mortgage, and not a conditional
sale, where it was given to secure payment
for a horse, recited a consideration of "$110
cash or its equivalent," a horse, describing it,
contained the ordinary recitals of a war-
ranty deed, and recited that the grantee
should hold the land for 1^ years and I'econ-
vey on payment of $118.60 "being purchase
price hereof and necessary recording fee."
Tucker v. Wltherbee, 113 S. W. 123, 125, 130
Ky. 269.
"Where the proof is clear that the trans-
action was a borrowing of money, and that
the deed was made to secure the monej
rowed, the deed will always be treated s
'mortgage,' and redemption will be allo^
notwithstanding the form in which the ]
ties may have put the contract" Garr
Adm'x V. Vincent (Ky.) 87 8. W. 804,
Where a contract and chattel mortg
executed contemporaneously with a deed
solute in form show that It was inten
merely as security for a debt and to ind
nify the mortgagee on a contract of goan
for the benefit of the mortgagor, such d
will be given effect as a "mortgage.** Fei
son V. Boyd and.) 79 N. B. 549, 556 (dl
Davis V. Stonestreet 4 ihd. 101, 106 ; W11
V. Carpenter, 62 Ind. 495, 600; Orassei
Swoveland, 22 Ind. 427, 429; Yoss ▼. El
10 N. B. 74, 109 Ind. 260, 262, 263; Heat!
WlUlams, 80 Ind. 495, 513; Watkins v. Oi
ory [Ind.] 6 Blackf. 113. 114; Lents v. 1^
tin, 75 Ind. 228, 235; Miller r. Curry. 24
E. 219, 374, 124 Ind. 48, 49, 61; Housei
Lament, 55 Pa. 316, 93 Am. Dec 756;
peal of Harper, 64 Pa. 819 ; Taylor v. W
5 Mass. 109; Keithley v. Wood, 38 N.
149, 151 lU. 566, 42 Am. St. Rep. 266, 2
Smith V. Brand, 64 Ind. 427, 429, 430; L
V. McAllster, 41 N. B. 1061, 44 N. B. 378,
Ind. App. 643, 645 ; Proctor v. Cole, 66 1
576, 578; Peugh v. Davis, 96 U. & 832, :
24 L. Ed. 776; Cox v. Ratcliffe, 6 N. E
106 Ind. 374; ComeU v. Hall, 22 Midi. 3
Russell V. Southard, 12 How. [58 U. SJ )
13 L. Ed. 927; Jones, Mortg. [6th Bd.] |j
8, 242, 245, 247a, 258, 265, 340).
"Under (Georgia law the word "mortgt
is used in a double sense. Sometimes it
fers to a mortgage which creates a lien, i
at othei' times as passing title as a secui
for the debt An instrument containlni
defeasance clause describing the debt, i
showing on its face that it is intended
security, is a mortgage, and passes no tl
A writing in the form of an absolute bill
sale, but in fact intended only as secui
for a debt, conveys title, but is treated as
equitable mortgage." Denton v. Shields,
S. B. 423, 120 Ga. 1076.
Under Rev. Codes, | 3391, every tra
f er of an interest in real property other tl
in trust, made only as security for the p
formance of another act, is a "mortga«
though the conveyance is a deed absolute
form. Hannah v. Vensel, 116 Pac 115, 1
19 Idaho, 796.
Notwithstanding the provision of C
Code, I 2922, that a '^mortgage" can be c
ated only by writing executed with the t
malitles required in case of a grant of n
property, a deed absolute on its face may
equity be shown by K>arol evidence to bi
been intended as a mere mortgage, and 1
indebtedness intended to be secured therel
whether present or future, although not sp
Ified in the deed or in any contemporanec
writing, may also be shown by parol e
IIORTOAOB
453
MOBTGAOV
doice. The fttct that the manager of plain-
tiff corporation, Instead of plaintiff Itself,
was named as grantee In certain deeds ex-
ecuted to secure an indebtedness dne plain-
tiff in no wise impairs the validity of snch
deeds as mortgages in plaintiff's favor. Ab-
solute deeds, given solely by way of seen-
rity, and constitutinff in fact only mortgages,
carry with them no estate in the land, but
create only a lien thereon as incident to the
aecnred d^t Anslo^Salifomlan Bank y.
Oerf , 81 Pac. 1077, 1079, 147 OaL 884.
Where a conveyance of land is made as
security for a loan, although there is no per-
sonal obligation to repay, the mortgagee look-
ing solely to the instrument, it will be deem-
ed a **mortgage,'* if intended as security.
Ck)nover v. Pahner, 108 N. Y. Supp. 480, 4^
123 App. Div. 817.
Plaintiff advaneed money to the purchas-
ers of land under a bond from the owner,
under an arrangement whereby the land was
deeded to plaintiff, on an understanding that
he would convey to the purchasers under the
bond, on payment to him of the amount ad-
vanced and Interest Plaintiff gave a bond
binding himself to convey, and those to whom
the bond was given gave no note, but prom«
ised to pay him the amount advanced. Held,
that the transaction constituted a "mort-
gage,** within a statute subjecting to taxation
money at interest, including money loaned on
any mortgage, etc. Glidden v. Town of New-
port, 06 AtL U7, 118, 74 N. H. 207.
An owner of property executed a deed to
a corporation in pursuance of an agreement
by which payment therefor was to be made in
the capital stock of the corporation at par;
the value of the property to be determined
by appraisers. Subsequently agreements were
made between the corporation and a syndi-
cate composed of the larger sto^holden of
the grantor and between the grantor and
grantee for the ikirpose of aiding the grantor
in adjusting its liabilities, by whidi the syn-
dicate and grantee were to pay the indebted-
ness of the grantor and receive reimburse-
ment thtf efor from the stock c<mstitutlng the
purchase price (tf the property, the stock to
be deposited with a third party until sudi
Indebtedness was liquidated. Thereafter the
grantor caused such property to be Insured,
the application containing a warranty that
it was the sole owner, and the policy a pro-
vision that it should be void if the property
was sold without the assent of the company,
and subsequently the deed theretofore exe-
cated was delivered. The policy was not as-
signed, and no consent to the sale was given.
The property was destroyed by fire. Held,
that the Insuranoe company was not liable,
because insured had no insurable Interest
in the property at the time of its destruction,
tbe transfer being an absolute one and not
a "mortgage** within Rev. St c 92, | 1, de-
fining mortgages as those made in the usual
fMm, In whldi the condition Is set fbrth In
the deed, and those made by a conveyance
appearing on its face to be absolute, with an
instrument of defeasance executed at the
same time or as part of the same transaction,
since there was no agreement purporting to
be a defeasance and also because the property
was "sold** without the consent of the Insurer
within the meaning of that term as used In
the policy, and hence the policy was invali-
dated previous to the fire. Buffalo Fertiliser
Oo. V. Aroostook Mut Fire Ins. Co., 84 AtL
1078^ 1080, 100 lie. 488.
gawe Defeasaaee elaase
Notes reciting that they are given to se-
cure payment for certain described lands,
and deeds reciting that the land is secured
by the notes of the grantee (describing them),
and that if the notes are not paid at maturity
the deeds are to be null and void, constitute
mortgages, and not conditional sales. Land
V. Uay, 84 S. W. 488, 490, 78 Ark. 415 (citing
Gibson V. liartin, 88 Ark. 207; Stryker v.
Hereby, 88 Ark. 204; mtchell v. Wade, 89
Ark. 877; Hershey v. Luce, 19 & W. 963, 20
8. W. 0, 06 Ark. 820).
iMstna&emi of def ea-
A conveyance of land, absolute in form,
accompanied by a contemporaneous instru-
ment executed by the grantee and reciting
that on the payment of a specified sum with-
in a specified time the premises shall be re-
conveyed to the grantor, is a mortgage to se-
cure the payment of a debt Raskl v. Wise,
107 Pac. 984, 988, 66 Or. T2. The test in de-
termining whether such conveyance, con-
stitutes a '^mortgage** is whether the relation
of debtor and creditor continues to exist
Fabrlque v. Cherokee & P. Coal & Mining 0>.,
77 Pac. 684, 586, 69 Kan. 788.
Whether a conveyance absolute in form,
when taken with a contemporaneous separate
agreement to reconvey, constituted a mort-
gage, depends upon the existence of a debt;
a deed made to secure a debt being a mort-
gage in legal effect, and the fact that the
mortgagor subsequently leased the property
from the mortgagee would not change the na-
ture of the transaction. Farmers* & Mer-
chants* Bank of Scandia v. Kackley, 127 Paa
589, 540, 88 Kan. 70.
The contemporaneous agreement for a
resale and purchase does not of itself make
the deed a "mortgage." The conveyance
must be Judged according to the real intent
of the parties. If there is a debt subsisting
between the parties, and it is the intention
to continue the debt, it is a ''mortgage*' ; but
if the conveyance extinguishes the debt, and
the parties intend that result, a contract for
a resale at the same price does not destroy
the character of the deed as an ''absolute
conveyance.** Hays v. Eknerson, 87 8. W.
1027, 1028, 75 Ark. 561.
MORTGAGE
454
MOBTGAGB
A deed csecated as security for a loan,
the lender executing, In turn, a written de-
feasance agreeing to reconvey to the borrow-
er upon payment of the debt, constituted a
"mortgage." Wells v. Scanlan, 102 N. W.
571, 572, 124 Wis. 229.
Where the relation of debtor and credi-
tor exists between parties executing a deed
absolute on its face, and a collateral agree-
ment permitting redemption, the. court is
always inclined to treat such arrangement
as constituting a mortgage. Where plaintiffs
executed to defendant a deed absolute on its
face, but on the same day a writing was
executed reciting the sale and providing that
plaintiff^ were to occupy the house they lived
in for five years at a certain rent, and at
the end of such period they were to pay back
the purchase money and redeem, defendant
to have the rent of a log house and all the
land as Interest, plaintiffs to pay the taxes
and keep the house insured, such deed and
other writing constituted a mortgage^ even
though the collateral writing was made an
hour after the deed, and nothing had been
said about it before that time. Sebree v.
Thompson (Ky.) 104 S. W. 781.
Where, at the time a deed of conveyance
was executed, the grantees therein executed
a deed to the grantors reciting the first deed,
and stating that it was made in considera-
tion of an agreement by the grantees to pay
the grantors a sum of money, and purported
to reconvey the land to secure the same, both
deeds were to be construed as one, the form-
er as a conveyance of title to the grantees,
and the latter as a "mortgage," under Prac-
tice Act 1851, p. 93, I 260, providing that a
"mortgage" shall not be deemed a convey-
ance, whatever its terms, so as to enable
the mortgagee to recover possession without
foreclosure. Adams v. Hopkins, 77 Pac. 712,
713, 717, 144 Cal. 19.
Although, under Real Property Law (Con-
sol. Laws 1909, c. 5O0 S 320, one who records
a deed without recording a defeasance agree-
ment making the deed a mortgage, receives
no benefit from the recording, the failure to
record the defeasance agreement, and pay
the mortgage recording tax, does not bring
the grantee within the provision of Tax Law
(Oonsol. Laws 1909, c. 00) | 258, forbidding
the enforcement of any mortgage on which
the tax has not been paid as Tax Law, f
250, defining a mortgage on real property as
being every mortgage by which a lien is im-
posed on or which affects the title to real
property, executory contracts for sale of real
property and contracts Increasing indebted-
ness secured by mortgage, does not include
this kind of a mortgage, and, the law being a
tax law, it must be strictly construed. Ger-
ken V. Sonnabend, 130 N. Y. Supp. 605, 606.
Where plaintiff's land, worth $790, was
sold at Judicial sale for |455, and a subse-
quent agreement between him and defendant
recited that defendant had paid the puzebM-
er at judicial sale |455 and received a con-
veyance, and that defendant agreed to con-
vey to plaintiff in case he should repay de-
fendant before a specified date, but that
otherwise defendant's duty to convey should
terminate,, the transaction amounted to a
"mortgage." Sheffield v. Day (B^.) 90 S. W.
545,546.
Where plaintiff deeded land to defend-
ant, her husband's creditor, under a separate
agreement for a reconveyance on the payment
of the amount of the debt, interest, etc., that
plaintiff was not bound to pay the amount
for which the reconveyance was to be had,
does not show conclusively that the transact
tion was a conditional sale. If an instru-
ment does not show clearly whether a "mort-
gage" or conditional sale was intended, equity
will oonstrue it as a ''mortgage," rather than
a conditional sale. White v. Redenbaus^, 82
N. E. 110, 111, 41 Ind. App. 580.
Gonveymnoe oonditioned for support
A conveyance conditioned for the support
of the grantor will be treated as a "mort-
gage." Abt)ott V. Sanders, 66 AtiL. 1032, 1033,
80 Vt. 179, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 725, 130 Abl
St Rep. 974, 12 Ann. Gas. 898.
Debt or obligation neoossary
One sure test and essential requisite of a
mortgage is the existence of a debt from the
grantor to the grantee in the deed. If there
is no debt, the instrument cannot be a "mort-
gage," whatever else it may be. Jones v.
Hubbard, 90 S. W. 1137, 1141, 193 Mo. 147;
Goodbar & Oo. v. Bloom, 96 S. W. 657, 602,
43 Tex. Civ. App. 434. But it is not neoes-
sary that the debt be created by an expreas
promise. Beebe ▼. Wisconsin Mortgage Loan
Co., 93 N. W. U03, 1105, 117 Wis. 328.
One of the essentials of a mortgage is
the existence of an indebtedness, payment of
which the mortgage is designed to secure.
An instrument, in form a conditional bill of
sale. Lb not made a mortgage by reason of
the fact that it contains a provision that
the instrum^it shall be void if the grantora
pay a certain sum of money by a certain
day. Smith t. Hope, 80 South. 865, 866, 47
Bla. 295.
A "mortgage" is to be regarded as a mere
incident or security of the debt A mortgage
given as part of a business transaction can
be foreclosed only when it secures a debt
Perkins v. Trinity Realty Co., 61 Ati. 167,
168, 69 N. J. Eq. 723.
A debt either pre-existing, or created at
the time, or contracted to be created, is an
essential requisite of a "mortgage." Hence
a deed absolute on its face is not a mortgage,
where it is delivered to extinguish a debt, and
the parties so intended, though the grantee
gave a contemporaneous promise to reconvey
on being r^mbursed within an agreed period
an amount equal to the debt and interest
IIOBTQAOB
466
MOBTGACHD
thereon. Rotan Groeery 0>. t. Turner, 102
a W. 082, 033, 46 Tex. Oiy. App. 684.
A "mortgage" has been defined as a con-
reyance of lands npon a condition, in the
deed or a defeasance out of it, that on the
grantor's paying a sum of money, or doing
some other aet, the conveyance shall be void,
and performance of the condition, without
any other act, puts an end to all title and
interest in the grantee. A deed absolute on
its face will not be h^d a mortgage unless
the relation of debtor and creditor exists
between the grantors and grantee, and it was
the intention of the parties to secure the pay-
ment of such debt Where the grantee, in an
absolute conveyance, by an agreement execut-
ed at the same time^ reciting that the convey-
ance was made to pay a certain sum of mon-
ey, stipulates that he will not convey the
premises within a specified time without the
consent of the grantor, and that, if the gran-
tor within that time shall find a purchaser,
the grantee will convey on receiving the
amount, with interest, for which the land had
been conveyed to liim, the transaction is not
a ''mortgage," but is a conditional sale, giv-
ing the grantee the right to recover the land
after the expiration of the specified time.
Duell V. Ticelie, 106 S. W. 489, 405, 207 Mo.
668.
The conveyance must be Judged accord-
ing to the real intent of the parties. If there
is a debt subsisting between the parties, and
it is the intention to continue the debt,
it is a "mortgage^*; but if the conveyance
extinguishes the debt, and the parties in-
tend that result, a contract for a resale at
the same price does not destroy the character
of the deed as an "absolute conveyance."
Hays V. Emerson, 87 S. W. 1027, 1028, 75 Ark.
551; James v. Mallory, 89 S. W. 472, 473, 76
Ark. 509 (citing Hays v. Emerson, 87 S. W.
1027, 75 Ark. 551).
Where plal^ntiiT, having an option on
land which was about to expire, wished to
borrow money to enable him to take it up,
but defendant refused to make a loan, taking
a mortgage on the land as security, but ad-
vanced thS money, took title to the land in
his own name, and executed to plaintiff a
bond for title, the transaction did not con-
stitute a "mortgage" entitling plaintiff to
the rights of redemption. Conner v. Clapp,
79 Pac. 929, 931, 87 Wash. 299.
Under Civ. Code, | 2924, providing that
every transfer of land, made only as security
for another act, is a "mortgage," a transfer
to enable the grantee to recover a judgment
quieting title in him is not a mortgage. Ren-
ton V. Gibson, 84 Pac. 186, 187, 148 CaL 650.
As deed or sMUit
See DeAd ; Grant
Beed of tvnst
Certain trust deeds In real estate are
recQi^ilsed by our decisions, by whidh trust
deeds the legal title passes to the trustee,
witii power of sale^ In all respects these
deeds and transfers of title are "security,"
but they are not "mortgages." Renton r.
Gibson, 84 Pac. 186-188, 148 Cat. 66a
As oTldenoo of ladebtedness
See Evidence of Indebtedness.
As laoiisiliranoe
See Incumbrance.
As iaterest Im Irnrnd
See Interest (In Property).
As passliiK lesal title
A "mortgage** Is a mere lien or security
for the payment of money, and does not con-
vey any title to the mortgagee. Jump v.
North British A Mercantile Ins. Co., 87 Pac.
928, 929, 44 Wash. 696, 12 Ann. Ca& 267 (cit-
ing Dane t. Daniel, 68 Pac. 268, 28 Wash.
879).
Under the Idaho statute and the deci-
sions of the court construing the same, a
"mortgage," or any contract or Instrument
made only as security for the payment of a
debt, merely creates a lien on the real prop-
erty therein described, and leaves the legal
title in the mortgagor or grantor, which ti-
tle can only be divested by Judicial sale in a
suit or action under and In conformity with
the statute. Hannah t. Tensel, 116 Pac. 115,
117, 19 Idaho, 796.
Under the statute of South Dakota a
"mortgage** on real estate Is not a convey-
ance of title, but only a lien on the land
as security for a debt Farr v. Semmler, 123
N. W. 885, 887, 24 S. D. 290.
Under Civ. Code, | 2920, defining a mort-
gage as a contract hypothecating spedflc
property for the performance of an act with-
out the necessity of a change of possession,
and section 2927, providing that a mortgage
does not entitle the mortgagee to possession
unless authorized by the express terms of
the mortgage, a mortgage gives the mort-
gagee neither the title, possession, nor right
to possession of the mortgaged property un-
less authorized by the express terms of the
instrument Ely v. Williams, 92 Pac. 898,
394, 6 Cal. App. 455.
A "mortgage** on real estate creates only
a lien in favor of the mortgagee, and neither
the legal nor equitable title passes to the
mortgagee until after a valid foreclosure and
sale thereunder. The rights of the mortgagee
in possession are therefore not adverse to
the rights of the mortgagor or his grantees,
so long as the relation of mortgagor and
mortgagee exista Gillett v. Romig, 87 Pac.
825, 329, 17 Okl. 824 (citing Baldufl v. Grif-
wold, 60 Paa 223, 9 Okl. 489; 3 Pom. £q.
Jur. [3d Ed.] | 1188).
At common law a "mortgagei" vests the
legal title In the mortgagee, and; on condl-
MORTGAGE
454
MOBTGAGB
A deed csecated as security for a loan,
the lender executing, in turn, a written de-
feasance agreeing to reconvey to the borrow-
er upon payment of the debt, constituted a
"mortgage." Wells v. Scanlan, 102 N. W.
571, 572, 124 Wis. 229.
Where the relation of debtor and credi-
tor exists between parties executing a deed
absolute on its face, and a collateral agree-
ment permitting redemption, the court is
always inclined to treat sudi arrangement
as constituting a mortgage. Where plaintiffs
executed to defendant a deed absolute on its
face, but on the same day a writing was
executed reciting the sale and providing that
plaintiffs were to occupy the house they lived
in for five years at a certain rent, and at
the end of such period they were to pay back
the purchase money and redeem, defendant
to have the rent of a log house and all the
land as interest, plaintiffs to pay the taxes
and keep the house insured, such deed and
other writing constituted a mortgage, even
though the collateral writing was made an
hour after the deed, and nothing had been
said about it before that time. Sebree v.
Thompson (Ky.) 104 S. W. 781.
Where, at the time a deed of conveyance
was executed, the grantees therein executed
a deed to the grantors reciting the first deed,
and stating that it was made in considera-
tion of an agreement by the grantees to pay
the grantors a sum of money, and purported
to reconvey the land to secure the same, both
deeds were to be construed as one, the form-
er as a conveyance of title to the grantees,
and the latter as a "mortgage," under Prac-
tice Act 1851, p. 93, I 260, providing that a
"mortgage" shall not be deemed a convey-
ance, whatever its terms, so as to enable
the mortgagee to recover possession without
foreclosure. Adams v. Hopkins, 77 Pac. 712,
713, 717, 144 Cal. 19.
Although, under Real Property Law (Con-
sol. Laws 1909, c. 50) S 320, one who records
a deed without recording a defeasance agree-
ment making the deed a mortgage, receives
no benefit from the recording, the failure to
record the defeasance agreement, and pay
the mortgage recording tax, does not bring
the grantee within the provision of Tax Law
(Oonsol. Laws 1909, c. 00) | 258, forbidding
the enforcement of any mortgage on which
the tax has not been paid as Tax Law, §
250, defining a mortgage on real property as
being every mortgage by which a lien is im-
posed on or which affects the title to real
property, executory contracts for sale of real
property and contracts increasing indebted-
ness secured by mortgage, does not include
this kind of a mortgage, and, the law being a
tax law, it must be strictly construed. Ger-
ken V. Sonnabend, 130 N. Y. Supp. 605, 606.
Where plaintiff's land, worth $790, was
sold at Judicial sale for $455, and a subse-
quent agreement between him and defendant
recited that defendant had paid the purelh
er at Judicial sale $455 and received a en
veyance, and that defendant agreed to c<
vey to plaintiff in case he should repay <
fendant before a specified date, but tl
otherwise defendant's duty to convey shoi
terminate,, the transaction amounted to
"mortgaged" Sheffield v. Day (Ky.) 90 S.
545, 546.
Where plaintiff deeded land to defei
ant, her husband's creditor, under a sepan
agreement for a reconveyance on the paymc
of the amount of the debt, interest, etc., tli
plaintiff was not bound to pay the amoi]
for which the reconveyance was to be hi
does not show conclusively that the transi
tion was a conditional sale. If an insti
ment does not show clearly whether a ''mo
gage" or conditional sale was intended, equl
will oonstrue it as a ''mortgage,** rather th
a conditional sale. White v. Redenbau^,
N. E. 110, 111, 41 Ind. App. 580.
Oonveyanoe oomditloned for support
A conveyance conditioned for the suppc
of the grantor will be treated as a "moi
gage." Abt)ott v. Sanders, 66 AtiL. 1082, m
80 Vt. 179, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, 130 A
St Hep. 974, 12 Ann. Gas. 898.
Debt or obligation neoesMUPsr
One sure test and essential requisite of
mortgage is the existence of a debt from t
grantor to the grantee in the deed. If the
is no debt, the instrument cannot be a "moi
gage," whatever else it may be. Jones
Hubbard, 90 S. W. 1187, 1141, 193 Mo. 14
Goodbar & Co. v. Bloom, 96 S. W. 657, 6(
48 Tex. Civ. App. 434. But it la not nea
sary that the debt be created by an expre
promise. Beebe ▼. Wisconsin Mortgage Loi
Co., 93 N. W. U03, 1105, U7 Wis. 82a
One of the essentials of a mortgage
the existence of an indebtedness, paymoit
which the mortgage is designed to seem
An instrument, in form a c6ndltional bill
sale, is not made a mortgage by reason
the fact that it contains a provision tb
the instrument shall be void if the granto
pay a certain sum of money by a certa
day. Smith t. Hope, 80 South. 865, 866, ^
Bla. 295.
A "mortgage" Is to be regarded as a me
incident or security of the debt A mortgai
given as part of a business transaction a
be foreclosed only when it secures a del
Perkins v. Trinity Realty Co., 61 Ati. 16
168, 69 N. J. Eq. 723.
A debt either pre-existing, or created i
the time, or contracted to be created. Is t
essential requisite of a "mortgage." HeD(
a deed absolute on its face is not a mortgas
where it is delivered to extinguish a debt, ai
the parties so intended* though the grants
gave a contemporaneous promise to reconvi
on being r^mbursed within an agreed peric
an amount equal to the debt and intere
IfOBIOAOB
466
HOBTGACHD
thereon. Rotan Oroeery Oow t. Turner, 102
a W. 982, 833, 46 Tez. Cttv. App. 684.
A "mortgage" has been defined as a con-
yeyance of lands upon a condition, In the
deed or a defeasance ont of it, that on the
grantor's paying a sum of money, or doing
some other aet, the conv^ance shall be void,
and performance of the condition, without
any other act, puts an end to all title and
interest in the grantee. A deed absolute on
Its face will not be held a mortgage unless
the relation of debtor and creditor exists
between the grantors and grantee, and it was
the intention of the parties to secure the pay-
ment of such debt Where the grantee, in an
absolute conyeyance» by an agreement execut-
ed at the same time^ reciting that the convey-
ance was made to pay a certain sum of mon-
ey, stipulates that he will not convey the
premises within a spedfled time without the
consent of the grantor, and that, if the gran-
tor within that time shall find a purchaser,
the grantee will convey on receiving the
amount, with interest, for which the land had
been conveyed to him, the transaction is not
a "mortgage," but is a conditional sale, giv-
ing the grantee the right to recover the land
after the expiration of the specified time.
Dnell V. TiCSlie, 106 S. W. 489, 495, 207 Mo.
658.
The conveyance must be Judged accord-
ing to the real intent of the parties. If there
is a debt subsisting between the parties, and
it is the intention to continue the debt,
it is a "mortgage^'; but if the conveyance
extlngui&ihes the debt, and the parties in-
tend that result, a contract for a resale at
the same price does not destroy the character
of the deed as an "absolute conveyance."
Hays V. Emerson, 87 S. W. 1027, 1028, 75 Ark.
551; James v. Mallory, 89 S. W. 472, 473, 76
Ark. 509 (citing Hays v. Emerson, 87 S. W.
1027, 75 Ark. 651).
Where plal!ntiiT, having an option on
land which was about to expire, wished to
borrow money to enable him to take it up,
bat defendant refused to make a loan, taking
a mortgage on the land as security, but ad-
vanced thS money, took title to the land in
his own name, and executed to plaintiff a
bond for title, the transaction did not con-
stitute a "mortgage" entitling plaintiff to
the rights of redemption. Conner v. Clapp,
79 Pac 929, 931, 37 Wash. 299.
Under Civ. Code, | 2924, providing that
every transfer of land, made only as security
tor another act, is a "mortgage," a transfer
to enable the grantee to recover a judgment
quieting title in him is not a mortgage. Ren-
ton T. Gibson, 84 Pac. 186, 187, 148 CaL 65a
As deed or sraai
See DeAd ; Grant
Deed of traet
Certain tmst deeds in real estate are
recognised by our decisions, by whicb trust
deeds the legal title passes to the trustee,
witii power of salow In all respects these
deeds and transfers of title are ''security,"
but they are not ''mortgagee.'* Ronton t.
Gibson, 84 Pac. 186-188, 148 CaL 66a
Jkm OTldenoe of ladebtedaess
See Evidence of Indebtedness.
Jkm laevabraace
See Incumbrance.
As Interest Im Umd
See Interest (In Property).
As passliiK lesal title
A "mortgage" is a mere Hen or security
for the payment of money, and does not con-
vey any title to the mortgagee. Jump v.
North British k Mercantile Ins. Co., 87 Pac.
928, 929, 44 Wash. 696» 12 Ann. Ca& 267 (cit-
ing Dane t. Daniel, 68 Pac. 268, 23 Wash.
879).
Under the Idaho statute and the deci-
sions of the court construing the same, a
"mortgage," or any contract or instrument
made only as security for the pajrment of a
debt, merely creates a lien on the real prop-
erty therein described, and leaves the legal
title in the mortgagor or grantor, which ti-
tle can only be divested by Judicial sale in a
suit or action under and in conformity with
the statato. Hannah t. Tensel, 116 Pae 116,
117, 19 Idaho, 796.
Under the statute of South Dakota a
"mortgage" on real estate is not a convey-
ance of title, but only a lien on the land
as security for a debt Farr v. Semmler, 123
N. W. 835, 837, 24 S. D. 290.
Under Civ. Code, | 2920, defining a mort-
gage as a contract hypothecating spedflc
property for the performance of an act with-
out the necessity of a change of possession,
and section 2927, providing that a mortgage
does not entitle the mortgagee to possession
unless authorized by the express terms of
the mortgage, a mortgage gives the mort-
gagee neither the title, possession, nor right
to possession of the mortgaged property un-
less authorized by the express terms of the
instrument. Ely ▼. Williams, 92 Pac. 393,
394, 6 CaL App. 460.
A "mortgage" on real estate creates only
a lien in favor of the mortgagee, and neither
the legal nor equitable title passes to the
mortgagee until after a valid foreclosure and
sale thereunder. The righto of the mortgagee
in possession are therefore not adverse to
the righto of the mortgagor or his grantees,
so long as the relation of mortgagor and
mortgagee ezista Gillett v. RonOg, 87 Pac.
326, 329, 17 Okl. 324 (citing Baldufl v. Grif-
wold, 60 Pac. 223, 9 Okl* 439; 8 Pomu £q.
Jur. [3d Ed.] | 1188).
At common law a ''mortgage^' vests the
legal title in the mortgagee, and* on condl-
HOBTGAGE
456
MOBTGAGB
\vi\
Uon broken, the mortgagee may re-enter or
bring ejectment The Ck>lorado statute, how-
ever, has taken from the instrument the com-
mon-law character and deprived the mort-
gagee of all possession or right of possession
either after or before condition broken, and
before this right exists the mortgagee must
foreclose his mortgage and seU the mortgaged
property. Moncrleff v. Hare, 87 Pac 1082,
1083, 38 CJolo. 221, 7 K R. A. (N. S.) 1001
(citing Pueblo & A. V. B. B. Co. v. Beshoar,
5 Pac. 639, 8 Colo. 82; Fogarty ▼. Sawyer,
17 Cal. 589).
In eqi^ty, a mortgage is not a convey-
ance of the legal title, but only a security for
debt, Barron v. San Angelo Nat Bank
(Tex.) 138 S. W. 142, 144.
Und» the statute, a "mortgage" does not
convey title to the property mortgaged, but
only creates a lien thereon. The mortgagor
has the right to pHy the indebtedness, and
thus extinguish the lien, at any time before
the property is sold by the mortgagee. The
contract of the mortgagor does not terminate
with his death, but by operation of law it is
suspended until an administrator is appoint-
ed. Litz V. Exchange Bank of Alva, 83 Paa
790, 792, 15 Okl. 564.
Iden indioated
As lien, see lien.
The owner of property, exempt from tax-
ation under its charter (Pub. & Loa Laws
1869, c. 149), executed a mortgage to secure
a loan, and executed its bonds to secure the
mortgage, and agreed that it would pay all
taxes and assessments imposed on the mort-
gaged property, all taxes assessed or imposed
on the mortgage, and all taxes assessed
against the lien or interest created by the
mortgage. St 1898, f 1042d, added by Laws
1903, c. 378, I 2, provided that, whenever tax-
able real estate is subject to mortgage, the
mortgage, for the purposes of taxation,
should be an interest in the real estate tax-
able as such where the real estate was lo-
cated, or might be separately assessed and
taxed. Held, in the mortgagee's action to
foreclose because of the mortgagor's refusal
to pay taxes against the bonds in the hands
of purchasers from the mortgagee, that the
first obligation referred only to general tax-
es or special assessments levied on the prop-
erty; that the third obligation referred to
an assessment against some interest In the
mortgaged real estate, not including an as-
sessment on the bonds; that the words
"mortgage" and "lien or interest created
thereby" were synonymous; that the obliga-
tion to pay taxes on the "mortgage" did not
comprehend such taxes assessed on the
' bonds, and that the mortgagor was not lia-
ble therefor. Citizens' Savings & Trust Co.
V. School Sisters of Notre Dame» 189 N. W.
439, 441, 151 Wla. 619.
Aa m mere laeldMit of tlM deM
"A 'mortgage' ia a mere incident of t
debt which it la intended to secure." Vo<
hees V. Nixon, 66 AtL 192, 195, 72 N. J. E
791 (quoting Magie t. Beynolds, 26 AtL li
51 N. J. Eq. 118, 117).
"The debt la the principal thing, and t
'mortgage' only an incident, a mere aecuri
for the payment of the debt, and the relea
of the debt secured by the mortgage ne
not be under seal, but the transfer of t
debt will in equity carry the mortgage wi
it" Bradley ▼. lightcap, 66 N. Bl 540, 5^
201 111. 611 (citing Vansant ▼. Allmon, 23 1
30).
"A 'mortga^ la but a security for
debt. Independent of the debt, the lien o
have no existence in equity. The debt is t
principal, the lien is the accessory, whi
can no more exist without the debt than t
shadow without the substance." Walsh
Bobinson, 99 N. W. 282, 135 Mich. 16.
A "mortgage" la only an incident to t
debt it was given to secure, and cannot
separated therefrom, and a transfer of t
mortgage without the debt is a nuliii
Bichards Trust Co. v. Bhomberg, 104 N. ^
268, 270, 19 S. D. 595 (quoting and adopU
definiUon in Merritt t. BarthoUck, 36 N.
44).
Aa a mero seenHty for tlio doM
A mortgage itself does not create
alienate an estate in real property, but is
mere security for the payment of a debt
the discharge of an obligation. Mueller
Benkes, 77 Pac. 512, 518, 31 Mont 100. Si
also, Alexander t. Cleland, 86 Pac. 425, 41
18 N. M. 624.
A mortgage is a security for payment
a debt, or performance of some condition; t
mortgagee only acquiring a chattel intere
Malsberger y. Parsons (Del.) 75 Atl. 698, 7i
"A 'mortgage* is a contract by whl
specific property is hypothecated for the p<
formance of an act, without the necessity
a change of possession." Civ. Code, { 3S]
"The lien of a mortgage is special, unk
otherwise agreed, and is independent of [x
session." Qv. Code, i 3812. A mortga
does not create an estate in real properl
"It is a mere security for the payment of
debt or the fulfillment of an obligation, ai
is only a chattel interest While it affe<
lands by imposing a lien of charge upon the
it in no wise conveys title thereto." Swa
y. McMillan, 76 Pac. 943, 946, 80 Mont 42
A "mortgage" is but a security tor t
payment of money with the right of lien up
the mortgage premises to enforce paymei
It is not stamped with the character of re
estate, but is a bare incumbrance or chan
In re Lukens, 188 Fed. 188, 191 (citing Bic
ert v. Madeira [Pa.] 1 Bawle, 828; Oorpoi
tion for Belief of Poor Miniafeers y. Walla
[Pa.] 8 Bawle^ 100; Graft v. Webster [Pi
MORTGAGE
46T
MORTGAGSB
4 Rawle, 242; Asay v. Hoover, 5 Pa. 21, 45
Am. Dec 713 ; Wilson t. Shoenberger's IDx'n,
31 Pa. 296; In re Lenning's Bistate, 62 Pa«
135; Mclatyre ▼. Velte» 25 AtL 739, 153 Fa.
350).
In egoity a "mortgage" is a mere securi-
ty for the debt and only a chattel interest,
and until a decree of foreclosure the mort-
gagor continues the real owner of the fee.
Where the owner of land conyeyed the timber
thereon on condition that the deed should be
Toid unless the grantee paid a note for the
purchase price at maturity, and removed the
timber within a spedfled time, the deed creat-
ed a relation in l^al effect the same as in the
case of a conveyance of absolute title with
mortgage back to secure the purchase price.
Ordway v. Farrow, 64 AtL 1116, U19, 79 Vt
192, 118 Am. St Rep. 961.
A "mortgage" is too narrowly defined
when it is said to be a security f6r a debt
It may be a security for the payment of a
debt or for the performance of some duty,
or for both. Stitt v. Rat Portage Lumber Oo.,
104 N. W. 661, 664, 96 Minn. 27 (citing Madi-
gan V. Mead, 16 N. W. 539, 81 Minn. 94).
A "mortgage," prior to its foreclosure
and the final confirmation of the sale had
thereunder, is but a security for the debt,
and does not operate as a lien on the rents
and profits of the mortgaged premises, un-
less an application is made for a receiver in
the manner provided by law. Westerfleld v.
South Omaha Loan it Bldg. Ass'n, 105 N. W.
1087, 1088. 75 Neb. 63.
"A 'mortgage' is a mere security for
a debt and there is no such relation of trust
or confidence between the maker and holder
of a mortgage as prevents the latter from
acquiring title to its subjectrmatter, either
under his own or any other valid lien."
Jones V. Black, 90 Pac 422, 424, 18 Okl. 844,
11 Ann. Cas. 763 (quoting from opinion in
Williams v. Townsend, 81 N. Y. 416)«
A mortgagee ^holds his "mortgage" as
security for the debt only, and, where there
is no obligation in the contract on the part
of the mortgagee to pay taxes on the prop-
erty, he may acquire title through tax sale.
The mortgagee has a mere lien on the proper-
ty, but no title. His lien gives him no right
of possession, and his only remedy is by fore^
closure. Jones v. Black, 88 Pac. 1052, 1063,
18 Okl. 344, 11 Ann. Oas. 758.
Note or oihmr seeiixitjr immeoeMAry
Under Bev. Civ. Code, i 2044, providing
that every transfer of an interest in property,
other than a trust made as security for the
performance of another act, shall be deemed
a mortgage, a transfer of real property by
deed made to secure a loan is a "mortgage,"
and may be shown to be such by proof of
circumstances attending its execution and
the actual intention of the parties. Where
a deed was executed as security for a loan^ ^
the tsLCt that there was no collateral under-
taking evidencing the indebtedness, and no
covenant or personal obligation by the gran-
tor to pay, wap not fatal to the grantor's
right to have the deed declared a mortgage.
Krug V. Kauta, 118 N. W. 623, 024, 21 S. D.
461.
to mortSACe «Utiii«ois]Md
An instrument reciting that, to secure in-
tervener as surety on a certain note of even
date with the instrument, "I doth hereby
agree, and doth agree to give unto" said inter-
vener a mortgage on certain real estate de-
scribed, "to have and to hold the said prop-
erty to secure said" intervener as surety on
said note, to be void on condition that the
maker cause the note to be paid and signed
by defendant and his wife, constituted a
"mortgage" and not a mere promise to mort-
gage. Bray v. Ellison (Ky.) 83 S. W. 96.
As property
See Personal Property ; Property.
As pmtehmam •
See Purchase.
As sale or transfer
See Sale; Sell and Convey; Transfer.
KORTOAOS ACTION
Under Rev. St 1895. I 1490, providing
that all claims against a corporation at the
time of receivership shall be paid out of the
earnings thereof to the exclusion of mortgage
action, the term "mortgage action" does not
merely mean a mortgage, but relates to the
action whereby a mortgagee secures the ap-
pointment of a receiver; and hence a mort-
gagee, not having secured the appointment
of a receiver, is entitled to share in the earn-
ings of a receivership. First Nat Bank of
Houston V. J. I. CampbeU Ck)., 140 S. W« 430,
481, 104 Tex. 467.
MORTGAGE OI.AIM
See Open Mortgage Clause.
KORTOAC^B DBBT
See Transfer of Mortgage D^t
KORTOAGB SAUB
Expenses of mortgage sale, see Bkpenses.
Though a chattel mortgagor and mort-
gagee brought about an auction sale of the
property by agreement, in order to create the
Impression that the sale was not a forced
one, in order thereby to sell the property for
a better price than on a forced sale, it being
understood that the proceeds should be turn-
ed over to the mortgagee to satisfy his debt
the sale was nevertheless in legal effect a
"mortgage sale." Seiberling ft Co. v. Porter,
74 N. B. 516, 517, 165 Ind. 7.
MORTOAOZfi
As assigns, see Assigns.
As creditor, see Creditor.
As owner, see Owner.
MORTOAOEE
468
MOSS
As purdiaaer, see Purchaser.
As purchaser tor valuable consideration,
see Purchaser for Valuable Considera-
tion.
As purchaser for yalue,' see Purchaser
for Value.
KOaXOAOEE m GOOD FAITH
8ee Bona Fide Mortgagee; Good Faith.
MOBTOAOEE IH POSSESSION
The expression "mortgagee in possession"
has been adopted by the courts and law writ-
ers as a conyenient phrase to describe the
condition of a mortgagee, who is in posses-
sion of mortgaged premises under such cir-
cumstances as to make the satisfaction of his
lien a prerequisite to his being dispossessed,
even in Jurisdictions where the mortgage it-
self can confer no possessory right, either be-
fore or after default Stouffer v. Harlan, 74
Pac. 610, 611, 68 Kan. 135, 64 L. B. A 820, 104
Am. St Rep. 396.
A "mortgagee in possession" is not only
one who holds actual possession with the
consent of the mortgagor, but one who has
in good faith taken possession as the result
of a y(4d foreclosure. The possession must,
however, be actual and not merely construc-
tiye. Fuhrman v. Power, 86 Pac 940, 942,
43 Wash. 533.
A mortgagee who, while the mortgage is
subsisting, obtains in a lawful manner the
possession Is a "mortgagee in possession," and
his interest enables him to retain such pos-
session and to defend against it against the
mortgagor or those succeeding to his title. A
mortgagee who has foreclosed his mortgage
without bringing in a purchaser from the
mortgagor, and who has entered into posses-
sion under such proceedings, though without
the consent of the purchaser, may retain pos-
session until his lien is released by payment
though the debt is barred by limitations.
Burns y. Hiatt 87 Pac. 196, 198, 149 CaL
617, 117 Am. St Rep. 157.
A "mortgagee in possession" is one who
enters either by the consent of the mortgagor,
honest mistake, or pursuant to lawful pro-
cess, and he is not allowed for permanent
improyements, but only for necessary repara-
tions made by him during the time. Faulk-
ner y. Cody, 91 N. Y. Supp. 633, 638, 45 Misc.
Rep. 64 (citing Moore v. Cable [N. Y.] 1 Johns.
Ch. 385; Madison Ave. Baptist Church v.
Baptist Church in Oliver St, 73 N. Y. 82 ; 3
Pom. Eq. Jur. i 1217).
It is not necessary to the status of a
mortgagee in possession that possession of the
land shall have been taken under the mort-
gage or by the consent of the mortgagor. To
constitute a mortgagee in possession, it is
enough if the possession be peaceably and
legally taken; and one who takes possession
under an invalid tax deed, and purchases
a subsisting mortgage, is not precluded from
claiming the rights of a mortgagee in posses-
sion. Jaggar y. Pluukett 106 Pac 280, 2
81 Kan. 565, 25 L. B. A (N. S.) 935.
KOBTOAOOB
See Creditors of the Mortgagor.
As owner, see Owner.
Rev. Codes 1899, i 5846, antfaorlzln«
suit by a "mortgagor" to restrain foreclosi
by advertisement includes any person daJ
ing title to the mortgaged premises unc
and in privity with the original mortgag
Scott y. District Court of Fifth Judicial Di
of Barnes County, 107 N. W. 61, 62, 16 N.
259.
As used in Rey. Codes 1906, | 7464, p:
viding that when the mortgagee or his i
signee has commenced foreclosure proce<
ings by advertisement, and it shall be made
appear by the affidavit of the mortgagor tb
the mortgagor lias a legal counterclaim
any other valid defense, foreclosure may
enjoined, the word "mortgagoif' includes p<
sons in privity to and claiming under t
mortgagor; and a subsequent mortgagee m;
take the necessary affidavit and enjoin t
sale. State v. Buttz, 131 N. W. 241, 21 N.
540.
As used in Rev. St 1899, { 4342, reguj
ing the inclusion of the mortgagor and acta
tenant or occupier of the land among the d
fendants in all actions to foreclose moi
gages, the term "mortgagor," so far as
relates to the foreclosure of the equity of i
demptlon, refers to the actual owner of tJ
equity, who is an indispensable party to ai
kind of a foreclosure proceeding, but the a
sence of the grantor in a deed of trust Const
tutes no defect of parties, where, prior i
such action, he has conveyed his equity of r
demption. McCauley v. Brady. 100 S. ^
541, 543, 123 Mo. App. 558 (citing 2 Pin
Mortg. I 1707).
MORTIFICATION
As mental amsulsk
Allegations in a petition, In an actio
against a sheriff and his deputy, that the
wrongfully and unlawfully entered into
house and premises occupied by plaintl
under a lease and dispossessed him, and pi
his household goods and personal propert
in the public highway, and so put plaint!
to great trouble and distress, properly ai
tborize a recovery for humiliation and mort
fication, or any phase of "mental anguish,
since the word "distress,** being a generl
term, includes anguish or suffering, both o
mind and body, and since "humiliation** an
"mortification** are simply phases of ments
anguish. ' Perkins T. Ogilvie, 146 S. W. 73!
737. 148 Ky. 309.
MOSS
See Sea Moss.
liily of the valley roots are not covere
by Tariff Act Aug. 28, 1894, c. 349, { 2, Pre
ICOfiS
459
HOTIOK
fst, par. 568, rutins to "moMi, seaweeds,
Qd Tegetable substances,*' not bcdng Tegeta-
le sabstances in the class of moss and sea-
eeds. McAllister t. United States, 147 Fed.
73.
Tariff Act July 24. 1897, c. 11, i 2, Free
1st, pars. 566, 617, relating to "fibrous vege-
ible substances** and to '^moss, seaweeds,
Qd vegetable substances," does not include
Irch bark. Reed & Keller ▼. United States,
72 Fed. 453.
iOST
A blU for diroroe a vinculo, iUed June
S, 1906, in tbe county court of Cleburne
}unty, alleged that complainant, a resident
f Cleburne county, was married May 3, 1906,
Dd tliat he and his wife lived together until
nne 4, 1906, most of the time residing in
lebome county, and that complainant 'lias
Ben a bona fide resident of Cleburne county
>r more than three years,'* and that re-
[wndenfs particular place of residence was
nknown. Held, that the verb *'has been,*'
eseriptive oit past action, referred the resi-
enoe to a period before the bill was filed,
at did not make a part of the period so
rerred the year next before the bill was
led, and that "most** signified, not all, but
early all, of the time between the marriage
nd the date of the bill, and that the aver-
lent of more than three years' bona fide
»idence was InsnfDcient as a Jurisdictional
verment of residence for "one year next
receding the filing of the bill," and hence
lat a decree entered on the bill was void
a collateral attack. Martin t. Martin, 65
ooth. 682, 634, 173 Ala. 106.
[08T OOmnBHIEXT
As used in a charter party providing
lat the anchorage directed by the charterers
last be the "most convenient," the words
most convenimit** mean convenient as well
»r the ship as for the consignees of the car-
). Reld V. Jones, 23 Sup. Ot 89, 187 U. S.
S3, 47 L. Ed. 116.
lOTES
Waste, to which a small quantity of cot-
m still attaches after it has been run
trough the machine at a cotton mill, is call-
l "motes." Washington Mills v. Cox, 157
ed. 634, 686, 86 C. C. A. 164.
lOTHER
See From and Through the Mother;
Through the Mother.
Father synonymous, see Father.
A statute referring to a father or mother
)es not. In the absence of special statement,
idude a natural father or mother. Landry
American Creosote Works, 43 Sonth. 1016,
)18, 119 La. 231, 11 L. B. A. (N. S.) 387.
The right granted by Bar. av. Oode^
art 2315, to the surviving father or mother to
recover damages for the death of their son,
is a right granted to the actual father or
mother, and not to an adopting parent.
Mount V. Tremont Lumber Co., 46 South. 103,
121 La. 64, 126 Am. St Rep. 312, 15 Ann.
Cas. 14a
The exemption allowed by Ky. St 1903,
1 1403, subsec. 6, to be set apart to "the wid-
ow or infant child" from the estate of an in-
testate, to the Infant child. If no "mother"
survives, and to the "widow** if there be no
infant children, or If none reside in the fami-
ly with the "widow,*' does not apply to the
husband and children of the intestate wife.
Thaxton's Guardian v. Walters* Adm*r, 113
S. W. 118, U9, 130 Ky. 235.
Where the constitution of a firemen's re*
lief association organised pursuant to Laws
1885, c. 176 (St 1898, || 1987, 1988), and acts
amendatory thereof, providing for the organ-
ization of such associations, and designating
that they may be organized for the purpose
of giving relief to persons dependent upon
the deceased members, but no others, stated
the object of such association to be to give
relief to families of deceased members, and
provided that an Insured could designate his
mother or certain others as his beneficiary,
a designation by an insured of his stepmoth-
er as beneficiary was valid, where he was a
single man living with her as a member of
the same family at the time of his death;
tbe term '^mother'* in this connection not be-
ing limited in meaning merely to a mother
by blood, though used with such meaning in
a subsequent provision of the association's
constitution which specified the beirs to
whom relief money should be paid in case
no beneficiary be designated by the insured.
Jones V. Mangan, 138 N. W. 618, 620, 151
Wis. 215.
MOTHER or FEABL
Manufacture of, see Manoflactares —
Mannfactnred Articles.
MOTION
See Greyhound Motion; Inleriocutoxy
Motion; Special Motion.
In practice
See Civil Action— Case— Suit— Bta
As answer, see Answer.
As commencement of action, see Com-
mencement of Action.
As pleading, see Pleading.
As special proceeding, see Special Pro-
ceeding.
A "motion" is a request to the court to
grant the mover some right which he claima
It is a notification that he considers himself
entitled to what he asks. Arnold v. Regan,
69 Atl. 292, 29 B. I. 71. See, also, Howard
V. Carter, 80 Pac. 61, 02, 71 Kan. 85 (citing
h i
MOTION
460
BfOTIOK
dark T. Board of CJom'rs of Mitchell €k>imty,
77 Pac. 284, 09 Kan. 542, 66 L. B. A. 965).
A '^motion*' is an application for an or-
der and la nsnally made orally. Williama t.
Hawley, 77 Pac. 762, 763. 144 Cal. 97.
A **niotion*' is an application for an or-
der, and was sufficiently made within a re-
quired time by formal appearance in court
and application for relief, stating the grounds
and filing affidavits, though the opposing
parties were not required to appear until a
subsequent day. Brownell v. Superior CJourt
of Yolo County, 109 Pac. 91, 94, 167 Cal. 703.
A *'motion" la simply an application
made in a pending or proposed action or spe-
cial proceeding, and must depend for its
granting upon its relevancy to the main liti-
gation. It is not an independent right In
re Diets, 122 N. Y. Supp. 1063, 1065, 188
App. DiY. 283.
A "motion" seeks some order of court
falling short of the dignity of a Judgment
Ewing V. Vernon County, 116 S. W. 518, 519,
216 Mo. 681 (citing Bliss, Code PI. [3d Ed.]
SI 418, 420, et seq.).
"Motions" are not original and independ-
ent proceedings, but are only incidental steps
taken in all classes of cases pending; and
the rulings of the court thereon are not
"judgments." State ex rel. Shackelford y.
McElhinney, 145 S. W. 1139, 1142, 241 Mo.
592.
A motion is not required to be signed,
but it is a proper practice of the counsel for
a party to sign it. Nobach y. Scott, 119
Pac. 295, 296, 20 Idaho, 558.
Applications for orders directing issu-
ance of executions against the wages of
defendant debtors are not "motions" within
Code Civ. Proc. | 3236, authorizing the award
of costs on motion. Brodie v. O'Donnell, 130
N. Y. Supp. 805, 806, 71 Misa Rep. 580.
The district court at chambers has ju-
risdiction to open a judgment under Code
Civ. Proc. I 83 ; the application being a mo-
tion within section 556 which defines "mo-
tion" as an application for an order address-
ed to the court or a judge in vacation. Tay-
lor v. Woodbury, 120 Paa 867, 368, 86 Kan.
236.
An application for suit money in a di-
vorce action should be treated as a motion
within Code, | 3833, authorizing motions to
be supported by affidavit which may be con-
sidered as testimony on the hearing. Mengel
V. Mengel (Iowa) 138 N. W. 495, 500.
Under Rev. St. 1909, | 2092, defining a
motion as an application for an order, and
section 1841, requiring motions to contain a
written specification of the reasons on which
they are founded, a motion possessing these
requisites may be embodied as well in a brief
ill the Supreme Court as on a separate piece
of paper. Smith y. Moseley, IST S. W. 07
978, 284 Mo. 48a
Under Local Improvement Act, I I
(Hurd*s Rev. St 1906, c 24, | 543), provii
ing that copies of the ordinance, the recoi
mendation of the board, and the estimate <
cost, certified under seal, must be attache
to the petition, but that failure to so fi
them shall not affect the jurisdiction of tl
court to act on the petition, but, if it sha
appear that such copies have not been a
tached, then, on motion of any objector f(
that purpose, on or before appearance da;
the entire petition shall be dismissed, mer
ly filing obje«.tions to the confirmation of tt
assessment, one of which objections wi
that the copies were not attached under sea
without calling the attention of the court t
them in some way, is not a "motion" withJ
the statute, since a motion is an appUcatio
made to the court, and the filing of the pi
per in the office of the clerk is not such
motion. City of Marengo y. Bidiler, 91 I
B. 758, 759, 245 111. 47.
The words "motion" and "application
as used in Code Civ. Proc. { 686, dedarii
that, notwithstanding the death of a part
after judgment, execution may issue in eta
of the death of the judgioent creditor o
"application'* of his executor, administrato
or successor in interest, and section 685 di
daring that judgments may be enforced af
er five years from the date of its entry t
leave of court on "motion," have the saii
signification, and on the death of a judgmei
creditor his administratrix is not require
to institute an action at law to enforce tt
judgment but is entitled to an execution c
"motion." Weldon v. Rogers, 90 Pac 106
1063, 151 CaL 432.
A judge may be disqualified for bias an
prejudice to sit on a motion for new tria
when such disqualification is invoked peD<
ing the motion and before the day of hea
ing; such moticm being a "motion," withi
the statute providing for such dlsqualifla
tion on the filing of an affidavit by any pa
ty to an "action, motion or proceeding" t
any time before the day fixed for the hearin
of such "action, motion, or proceeding.
State ex rel. Carleton v. District Court (
Lewis and Clarke County, 82 Pac. 789, 79
33 Mont 138, 8 Ann. C^as. 752.
Same— Notice of motioii
An application to change the place (
trial of an action commenced in the wroi
county is not a motion within (3ode 01
Proc. § 1005, providing for service of wri
ten notice of a motion, though under se
tion 1010 the action of the court on a d<
mand for a change of venue is an order, an
though the application made on the deman
is designated a motion, but the moUon goc
on the calendar to be called for hearing i
the regular ord^ of business. Bohn y
Bohn, 116 Pac. 568, 569, le CaL App. 17ft.
MOTION FOR JUDOMSNT
461
MOTION TO DISMISS
OTIOK FOB JUDGMEirr ON PUBA1»-
IHG
A motion to dismiss tbe action and
ash the attachment and lery therein, has-
on affldavlts and files and records in the
56, is not within Mills' Ann. Code I 887,
Glaring that decisions on "motions hased
the pleadings/* etc., shall he taken as a
It of the record without heing made snch
bill of exceptions, and is not a part of
e record, unless embodied in a bill of ez-
ptlons. Sfverett y. Wilson, 88 Pac. 211,
2, 84 Gola 476.
OTION FOB NEW TBIAX.
A motion for a new trial is, in this
ite, a statutory remedy, and can only be
roked in the manner, within the time, and
>0D the grounds provided in the statute.
le losing party must pursue the require-
snts of the statute, or else he cannot avail
mself of the remedy. State ez rel. City of
alkerville ▼. District Ck>urt of Second Jn-
dal Dist, 74 Pac 414, 415, 29 Mont 176.
A ''motipn for a new trial" is not fjn-
dded as evidence of previous action by the
art It is a proceeding taken by a party
a cause after verdict; its purpose being
secure a new trial on account of alleged
rors which it assumes to designate that
ay have occurred on the trial or in the
oceedings in pais, as distinguished from
x>ceedings evidenced by the record proper,
le errors in which are reached by motions
arrest of judgment Keigans ▼• State,
South. 886, 894, 52 Fla. 57 (citing S^dg-
Lck y. Dawkins» 18 Fla. 886; Murray y.
tate, 9 Fla. 246).
The "motion for a new trial** \a a rem-
ty accorded to a party for the correction
r the trial court of injustice done by the
^rdlct of a jury. It is one of the most im-
>rtant rights which a party to a jury trial
IS. It is a right to invoke the discretion
! the court to decide whether the injustice
' the verdict is such that he ought to have
1 opportunity to take the case bedtore an-
her jury. It is the only method by which
\e weight of the evidence can be reviewed.
assey y. Btate, 89^ South. 790, 791, 60 Fla.
)9.
[OnON FOB NONSUIT
A motion for nonsuit is a general one,
Dd only challenges the general sufficiency
I the evidence ; that is, says, in effect, there
' a total failure of evidence. Upon a mo-
on of this kind the only question raised is
bether there is any evidence tending to
rove the crime charged, not whether the
rldence fails in some particular matters,
tate V. Eubank, 74 Pac. 378, 33 Wash. 293
Itlng State v. Hyde, 61 Pac. 719, 22 Wash;
51). ' .
A motion for nohstrit at title close of
laintiffs case is tantamount to a demiirrto
> the evidence on the ground that it is in^
Sufficient to establish one or mora of the
material issues devolving upon the plaintiff
to proves and that the cause therefore Aonld
not be submitted to the jury, and where de-
fendant offers no evidence after the denial
of the motion, and the plaintiff moves for a
directed verdict, the conrt may direct the
verdict; there being some evidence to sua-
tain plaintiff's case^ as both parties have
waived the right to a jury trial by submit-
ting the case to the court Patty v. Salem
Flooring Mills Oo., 96 Pac. 621, 622, 68 Or.
880.
A motion to dismiss in a justice's court
on the ground that plaintiff has failed to
prove his case is in effect a "motion for a
nonsuit," and the question presented on a
motion for a nonsuit it is a question of law.
Smith V. Superior €k>urt of Napa Oounty,
84 Pac. 64, 66, 2 OaL App. 629 (citing Don-
ahue V. Gallavan, 48 Oal. 670).
MOTION FOB BESEABINO
The words "motion for a rehearing," as
used in the statute relating to appeals, are
to be construed broadly as including any mo-
tion involving a setting aside or modifica-
tion of the judgment actually rendered by
the court, Inclusive both of the motion for a
rehearing, strictly so called, and those mo-
tions for the modification of a judgment,
but not for a reargument of the case, which
have come to be termed "motions in the na-
ture of a motion for a rehearing." Ott v.
Boring; 111 N. W. 883, 884, 181 Wis. 472, U
Ann. Cas. 867.
MOTION TO AMBNB
See Amend.
MOTION TO DIBEOT VEBBIOT
A motion for verdict is considered In
law as in the nature of a demurrer to the
evidence, and on a motion for a verdict the
province of the court is not to weigh the
evidence and ascertain where the preponder-
ance is, but it is limited to a determination
as to the existence of evidence from which,
if true, it may be reasonably inferred that
the fact afllrmed exists, excluding the effect
of all modifying or contrary evidence. Bass
V. Bublee, 67 AtL 906, 966, T6 Vt 896^
A motion by defendant at the close of
plaintiff's testimony, reciting that plaintiff
had failed to allege or prove certain speci-
fied things, "wherefore defendant moves the
court to instruct the jury to return a ver-
dict for the defendant," was not a "demur-
rer to the evidebce*' but a "ihotlon to direct
a verdict," and the interposition of the same
did not preclude defendant from introducing
defensive evidence after it was overruled.
Woldert Grocery . Oo. v. Veltman (Texi) 83
S. W. 224.
MOTION TO DI8MI8S
"A ^notion to dismiss' Is^ the equlvmlent
of a general 4emu«ser, and Baar be mads at
MOTION TO DISMISS
462
MOTOR VEHICLB
the trial term, if the petition is fatally de-
fective; but such a motion cannot reach
mere defects in pleading, such as may be
cured by appropriate amendment." Minne-
sota Lumber Go. v. Hobbs & Livingston, 49
S. B. 783, 784, 122 Ga. 20.
"A 'motion to dismiss' and a demurrer
are not interchangeable. The former can
be used to abate an action only when it is
apparent from the record that the court has
no jurisdiction. The latter admits the ju-
risdiction but attacks the pleadings.'* lit-
tlefleld V. Maine Gent R. Go., 71 AtL 657,
660, 104 Me. 126.
MOTIOH TO QUASH
A motion to quash the writ in habeas
corpus amounts to a demurrer, and, if de-
nied and excepted to, may be urged on ap-
peal, though issues were joined and trial
had, providing the proceeding is one which
is appealable. Bleakley v. Barclay, 89 Pac.
906, 912, 75 Kan. 462, 10 L. B. A (N. S.) 290.
A "motion to quash" an indictment may
be made when there is a defect apparent
upon the face of the record. Ldndsey v.
State, 69 N. E. 126, 128, 69 Ohio St 215.
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDOMEHT
As part of record, see Record.
MOTIOH TO BTBJKB OUT
A motion to strike seeks an order of
court Of less dignity than a judgment, while
a demurrer raises an issue at law and seeks
a trial and judgment on that issue. A mo-
tion to strike a petition might lie against a
frivolous pleading, a second petition depart-
ing from the first, or a sham pleading, or
against trifling, nugatory, redundant, or ir-
relevant matter, or matter of duplicity, but
it cannot fill the office of a demurrer on chal-
lenging demurrable defects in the petition.
Ewing V. Vernon County, 116 S. W. 518, 519,
216 Mo. 681.
A "motion to strike" is applicable where
a pleading, either as a whole or any part
of it, is so framed as to prejudice, or em-
barrass, or delay a fair trial, and is thus
distinguished from a demurrer which goes
to a pleading as a whole for insufficiency.
If the answer to an alternative writ of man-
damus is wholly irrelevant and impedes a
fair trial of the cause, it may be stricken on
motion, while, if it is wholly insufficient as
a pleading, a demurrer will He. State ex
reL Ellis v. Atlantic Goast Line R. Go., 44
South. 230, 236, 53 Fla. 711.
MOTIVE
See Improper Motive.
As consideration, see Gonslderation.
*'In the sense of the criminal law, 'mo-
tive^ has been well enough defined as that
which leads or tempts the mind to indulge
in a criminal act,, and it is something that
may be resorted to as a legitimate help
arriving at the ultimate act in questic
Thompson v. United States, 144 Fed. 14,
75 G. G. A. 172, 7 Ann. Gas. 62.
In murder, "motive" is the impulse
purpose that induces the murderer to kill
victim. Where it is demonstrated that
defendant murdered the deceased, no qc
tion of motive need arise. State v. Hyde, :
S. W. 816, 322, 234 Mo. 200, Ann. Gas. 191!
191.
"Motive" means reason, cause, indc
ment, and incentive to do the acts and thii
charged in the indictment Ball v. Comm
wealth, 101 S. W. 956, 960, 125 Ky. 6
Gambrell v. Gommonwealth, 113 S. W. 4
480, 130 Ky. 513.
" 'Motive* is an inferential fact, and n
be inferred, not merely from the attends
and surrounding circumstances, but, in c
junction with these, all previous occurren
having reference to and connected with i
commission of the offense." State v. Bo
86 Pac. 43, 48, 12 Idaho, 424 (quoUng Wall
V. State, 4 South. 686, 85 Ala. 7, 7 Am.
Rep. 17).
Intent dlstinsnlsl&ed
"Intent," in its legal sense, is quite i
tinct from "motive." It is defined as I
purpose to use a particular means to effec
certain result "Motive" is the reason wh
leads the mind to desire that result Bal
V. State, 97 N. W. 566. 570, 120 Wis. 135.
^'Motive" must be distinguished from **
tent" "Motive" is the moving power wh
impels an action for a definite result It
that which incites or stimulates a person
do an act "Motive" is not an essoitial c
ment of a crime, and a good motive does i
prevent an act from being a crime. Peoi
ex rel. Hegeman v. Gorrigan, 87 N. E. 7
796, 195 N. Y. 1 (quoting People v. Molinei
61 N. B. 286, 296, 168 N. Y. 264, 297, 62
R. A. 193; Glark, Gr. Law, 1 14).
MOTOR
MOTOa OTCLE
As motor vehicle^ i
Motor Vehicle.
MOTOB VEHICLE
As wagon, see Wagon.
Running, registration, and license of
within police power, see Police Pow
The Maryland Statute (Gode Pub. &
Laws 1904, art 56, { 180) provides that wb<
ever the term "motor vehicle" is used in st
ute it shall be construed to include auton
biles, locomobiles, and all other vehicles pi
polled otherwise than by muscular power, i
cept those running on rails. Fletcher v. Di
on, 68 AtL 875, 878, 107 Md. 420.
A motor cycle la a "motor vdiide" wil
in Pub. Acts 1905, p. 287, Act No. 196, pi
viding for the registration and identificati
MOTOB VEHIOLB
46a
MOVED BY HAND
! sach y^bUdea, and regnlatiiig tliel^ ine,
Id defining the same (section 1) to mean ''all
ihlcles propelled by power, other than mna^
liar power, except traction engines and such
otor vehicles as run only upon rails or
acks.** People y. Smith, 120 N. W. 681, 582,
>6 Micb. 173, 21 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 41, 16 Ann.
as. 607.
A statute requiring the licensing ot op-
rators of automobiles and "motor cycles,"
ad defining them as all yehidles propelled
f other than muscular power, except rail-
>ad and railway cars, and motor yehicles
mning only upon rails or tracks, and road
>llers, includes a road locomotLye or trae-
on engine used to draw cars. Emerson
roy Granite Oou t. Pearson, 64 Aa 682, 74
. H.22.
lOUNTED
In machine construction, the expression
mounted on" seems to haye an ordinary
leaning. The thing mounted upon another
lost be borne or supported by it Mere rid-
ig in or oyer another in a slot for the pur-
ose, although operating in connection there-
rlth, is not equiyalent to being mounted
tiereon. In re Duncan, 28 App. D. C. 457,
60.
lOUTH ORGAN
As musical instrument» see Musical In-
strument.
lOVABLE
The word "moyable," as applied to prop-
rty, is defined as "that which may be lifted,
arried, drawn, turned, or conyeyed, or in
Jiy way made to change place or position*"
lonarch Laundry y. Westbrook, 63 8. B.
070, 1072, 100 Va. 882.
"Moyables" are conyerted into immoy-
bles by destination, when placed by the own-
3* of a tract of land upon it "for its seryice
iBd improyement'* Ciy. Ck>de, art 468. Hence
t would seem that when from any cause a
moyable" ceases to be of seryice to a tract
t land, or is detached from a building or
enement of which it formed a part as an ac-
essory, there is no longer ground for a claim
hat such "moyable" appertains to realty.
^o\ae y. Tridie, 37 South. 875, 113 La. 915.
The lease required the lessee of rooms in
in office building to surrender the premises
Q as good condition as reasonable use per-
Qitted, and proyided that all alterations, ad-
litioDs, or improyements made by either
)arty, except moyable office furniture put In
)y the lessee, should be surrendered to the
esBor as a part of the premises. The lessee re-
DOTed some of the permanent partitions with
he lessor's consent, agreeing to restore them
It the termination of the lease, and con-
structed temporary partitions, whidi did not
extend to the ceiling, and were lightly nailed
to the floor and walls, and at the termina-
tion of (he lease the permanent partitions
were restored. Held, that the reasonable in-
tention of the parties was the test of wheth-
er fixtures were annexed to the realty, and
the word "improyements" alone, though of
wider meaning than "fixtures," did not in-
clude the temporary partitions; and, con-
struing the word in connection with the ex-
ceptions in the lease, and in yiew of the in-
tention shown thereby that such partitions
should not be permanently annexed, they
were not "improyements," but were "moy-
able oflice furniture." wthln the meaning of
the lease, and remoyable by the lessee. Unit-
ed Booking Offices y. Pittsburgh Life ft Trust
Go., 110 N. Y. Supp. 216^ 217, 65 Mise.
Bep. 31.
Where, in a press for making screw
insulators, an essential element, to difTeren-
tiate the prior art is a rotary table or its
equiyalent to support the molds and carry
them in a fixed and predetermined path to
and from other parts of the machine, by
which the process inyolyed is carried out the
spedflcation of a "moyable mold adapted to
traVel," although under some circumstances
competent to imply a structural arrangement
by which the mold is moyed back and forth
mechanically, in a predetermined way, be-
tween designated points, the spedflc means
employed for doing so in the patent in suit
being of the essence of the inyention, a claim
in which it is not made an element of the
combination is inyalid, as being too broad;
or if, disregarding this, the omitted element
is read into the claim as being implied, it will
also be bad where, as here, it thereby dupli-
cates another claim. Noyelty Glass Mfg. Co.
y. Brookfleld, 170 Fed. 946, 056, 05 0. O. A
516.
MOVE
The word "moyed,** aa applied to a
change of one's residence, may or may not,
according to circumstances, warrant an 'in-
ference of a permanent change. Dixon y.
Dixon, 66 Aa 597, 598, 72 N. J. Bq. 588.
MOVE SLOW 8IGNAI.
A "moye slow signal" is one calling for a
slow and gradual moyement of the train.
Texas Mexican It Ce. y. Hlggins, 99 S. W.
200, 201, 44 Tex. Ciy. App. 523.
MOVED BY HAND
In Code Pub. Gen. Laws Md. art 83, |
11, exempting from execution all tools or
other mechanical instruments or appliances
moyed or worked by hand or foot necessary
to the practice of any trade or profession and
used in the practice thereof, the expression
"moyed or worked by hand or foot" evidently
applies only to machinery, and the goyeming
idea of the section seems to be that the ar-
ticles exempted are those necessary to the
a
ii
MOVEMJSSCr
404
BCDIiATTO
praetlQe 0f the tnde or professloii, not mored
by steam, electricity, or other motlTe power
than hand or foot Stelner t. Marahall* 140
Fed. 710, 712» 72 a a A. 108.
KOVEMEMT
See Forward Movement
MOVCfO 0AU8E
See Initial and Moving Ganae.
MOVniG PIOTUBB SHOW
As drcas, see Gircns.
As other amusement, see Other.
As public show, see Public Show*
As theater, Ste Theater.
See, also. Panorama.
MOVnrG TBAFFIO
Used in moving Interstate traffic, see
Use— Used.
A freight oar which was being taken to
a repair shop to be repaired was not within
Rev. Laws, c. Ill, H 203, 209, prohibiting a
railroad company, in '•moving traffic,** from
hauling a car not equipped with an automatic
coupler. Taylor v. Boston ft M. B. B., 74 N.
E. 591, 188 Mass. 890.
MRS.
In the absence of « statute, parties to a
litigation must be designated by name, and
not merely by description of the person, and
the designation ''Mrs.** is not a name, but
usually distinguishes the person referred to
as a married woman. Feld v. Loftis, 88 N.
B. 281, 283. 240 111. 105 ; Uihl^n v. Gladleux,
78 N. E. 363, 365, 74 Ohio St 232.
The. prefix "Mrs.,** before the name of a
party in a pleading, indicates that the party
is a female, but leaves it doubtful whether
she is married or single (using the word
"single** in a sense broad enough to include a
divorced person). Wrightsville & T. R. CJo. v.
Vaughan, 71 8. E. 691, 693, 9 Oa. App. 871.
Where the back of a railread mileage
book containeid a line for the signature of the
purchaser, preceded by a printed M., which
was to be followed either by the designation
Mr. or Mrs., such designation was a mere
matter of courtesy", although intended to
show the sex of the purchaser, and a con-
ductor should not refuse to accept mileage
where he knows that through some error, a
book purchased by i^alntiff, a woman, redd
"Mr.** Instead of "Mrs.** Parish v, Ulster ft
D. R. Co., 85 N. E. 153, 154, 192 N. Y. 353.
MUCH
See As much as.
The word "many," In a provision of a
dty charter that notice of the introduction of
an ordinance shall be published at least as
many as ten days before the adoption of such
ordinance* meant the same lis though the
word 'Innclf* had been used, and reqni
merely that the notice be published ten d
before the action was taken, but did not
quire that it be published every day for
days. Smith T. Atlanta* 51 & B. 741« 'i
128 Ga. 877.
MUCK BAR
" 'Muck bar* is more advanced than
iron, for it is the product of pig iron ai
its conversion into wrought iron \n the p
dllng furnace. But t/s> make muck bar
wrought iron is rolled through a set of ro
This rolled iron comes from the rolls in I
form. * * * Knight's Mechanical I
tlonary defines 'muck bar* as 'bar iron wb
has passed once through the rolls.* *' Moc
head Bros, ft Co< ▼• United States, 127 f
779, 780.
MUCKER
A "mucker^ Is one who r^noves
ore, rock, and debris thrown down by mln<
His work must be done in part, at lei
ahead of the timbering, which is to aff<
protection against the falling of ore, ro
and d^rls. Smith v. Hecla Mln. Co.,
Pac. 779, 780, 88 Wash. 454 ; Bird v. Ut
Gold Mln. Ck»., 84 Paa 25^-260, 2 GaL A
674.
MUD
See Water and Mud*
MUFFLER
"Muttier,'* anything used to mufBe
wrap up, is an ordinary English word, whj
fitly describes a neck scarf. The name "m
fiet," used as a trade-mark, is not, under t
trade-mark law, preclusive of the word "m
fier.** Hygienic Fleeced Underwear Co.
Way, 137 Fed. 592, 595, 70 C. C. A. STv*) ((
Ing Cent Diet).
A "muffler** is a device attached to t
exhaust pipe of a gas engine and throo
which the exhaust passes, used to muffle
deaden the sound of the explosion. Wolf
Des Moines Elevator Co., 98 N. W. 801, 9
126 Iowa, 659.
MUGUET
As enfleurage grease, see Enfleura
Grease.
MULATTO
A person too dark to be white and t
bright to be a griff is a "mulatta" State
Treadaway, 52 South. 500, 508, 126 La. dC
139 Anu St Rep. 514, 20 Ann. Cas. 297.
MUXiOT
466
MDZiTZFABJOPSKBBS
MULCT
Tlie words •"mulct," ''pmilaliment,'* and
**fine," as used In the decisions of the Su-
preme Court of Alabama in referring to the
statutory action for death, given by Oode
Ala. 1896, 1 27, are not used In the sense that
Is ordinaTlly attached to such words In the
domain of criminal law, and therefore such
statute is not a penal <»e^ within the rule
that one state wUl not enfoioe the penal
laws of another state. Whitlow v. NashyiUe,
C. & St L. R. Co., 84 S. W. 618, 620, 114 Tenn.
344, 68 L. B. A. 503 (Citing Southern Ry. Co.
T. Bush, 26 South. 168, 174, 122 AUl 470, 488,
489).
lEUI^nr TAXES
The term ''mulct taxes," in Code, | 2433,
etc, imposing *'mulct taxes" on dealers in
Intoxicating liquors, and providing that the
tax shall be a lien on the property where the
Uquor is sold. Is not a license for the privi-
lege of carrying on the business of selUng
intoxicating liquors, but is a tax without
legalizing the business, and Its imposition is
levied pursuant to the taxing power and may
be collected as other taxes. Newton v. Mc-
Kay, 102 N. W. 827, 828, 180 Iowa, 506.
MULE
As horse, see Horse.
As mare^ see Mare.
As work horse, see Work Horse.
MULTIFARIOUSNESS
Duplicity synonymous, see Duplicity.
A bill Is generally understood to be mul-
tifarious when distinct and independent mat^
ters are impr<^;»^ly joined in one bill, and
thereby confounded, as for example, where
several perfectly distinct and unconnected
matters against one defendant are united In
one MIL Baumgartner v. Bradt, 60 N. B.
012, 913, 207 IlL 345; Btate Trust C3o. v. Kan-
sas City, P. & O. B. Ck)., 128 Fed. 129 (dtlng
Story, £q. PI. [10th Bd.] par. 271).
While the rule as to multifariousness may
be said to be one of convenience, and there
may not be any inflexible rule as to what
constitutes fatal multifariousness, yet, broad-
ly speaking, "multifariousness'* may be de-
fined as the improper Joining In one bill dis-
tinct and Independent matters. Murrell v.
Peterson, 49 So. 31, 34, 67 Fla. 480.
A bin is multifarious when it states dis-
tinct, separate, and Independent equities that
can better be adjudicated in more than one
suit Arcadia Mercantile Go. v. Branning,
S2 South. 588, 689, 69 Fla. 428.
"Multifariousness*' Is the Improper joln-
iag In one bill of distinct and Independent
unconnected matters against one defendant
or the demand of several matters of a dis-
tinct and independent nature against sever-
8 Wn&& P.2D Sbb.— 30
ml defendants. Martin v. Brown, 69 9. B.
302, 300, 129 Ga. 662.
Btrlotly speaking, misjoinder of parties
plaintiff is not ''multifariousness.'* Brelmey-
er V. Star BotUlng Cki., 117 & W. 119, 122,
136 Mo. App. 84.
A bill U multifMoos when it Improperly
Joins several defendants in charging matters
of a distinct nature. Baker v. Berry Hill
Mineral Springs Co., 66 S. B. 660, 668, 109
Vr.776.
While not entirely synonymous, the com-
mon-law term "misjoinder** and the equity
term ''multifarious** have much in common.
They each token improper Joinder, and both
have reference to the confusing result
wrought thereby. Neither goes to the sub-
stance of complalnant*s claim, but merely as-
serts improper Joinder of causes of action.
Since these terms go only to form, and not
to substance, objections for either or both are
not defenses within the accepted meaning of
that term. Skalns v. Barnes, 68 South. 268,
270, 168 Ala. 426.
"To render a bill 'multifarious,* it must
contain, not only separate and distinct mat-
ters, but such that each entitles the com-
plainant to separate equitable reliet It is
not so if it be single as to the subject-matter
and object thereof, and the relief sought. If
all the defendants are connected, though dif-
ferently, with the whole subject of dispute."
Braun & Ferguson Co. v. Paulson (Tex.) 95 S.
W. 617, 619 (quoting and adopting definition
in Love v. Keowne, 68 Tex. 191, and citing
Skipwith V. Hurt, 60 S. W. 423, 94 Tex. 322;
SSinger Mfg. Ck). v. Ponder. 18 S. W. 152, 82
Tex. 653).
By '^multlftirionsness'* is meant the im-
properly Joining in one bill distinct and Inde-
pendent matters, and thereby confounding
them, as, for example, the uniting in one
bill of several matters, perfectly distinct and
unconnected, against one defendant, or the
demand of several matters, of a distinct and
Independent nature, against several defend-
ants in the same bill. United States v. Rea-
Read MiU & Blevator Co., 171 Fed. 601, 616
(quoting and adopting definitions In Walker
V. Powers, 104 U. S. 245, 26 L. Ed. 729).
The objection of "multifariousness," as
containing different causes of action, is not
supported unless •'two things occur: First,
the grounds of suit must be different; second,
each ground must be sufficient, as stated, to
sustain a bill.'* Howe & Davidson Oo. v.
Haugan, 140 Fed. 182, 184 (citing Brown v.
Guarantee Trust ft 8. D. Co., 9 Sup. Ot 127,
128 U. S. 403, 411, 412, 82 K Bd. 468).
A bill may contain equity and not be
"multifarious,'* which is generally under-
stood to indicate a case where a party Is
brought in as a defendant on a record, with
a large portion of which, and in the case
B4ULTIFAKI0USNBSS
466
MULTIFARIOUSNESS
made by which, he had no connection what-
eyer. Alabama Great Sonthern R. Co. v.
Prouty, 43 South. 352, 354, 149 Ala. 71 (quot-
ing and adopting the definition in Adamt y.
Jones, 68 Ala. 117, and dtlng Mayfleld'a
Dig. 290. if 2104, 2105).
A joinder of two cauaea of action against
the same party for the same relief, one
against him as an individual and one against
him as an officer, does not make the bill
"multifarious." No biU Is multifarious which
presents a common point of litigation, the de-
cision of which will affect the entire subject-
matter and settle the rights of the parties to
the suit Rogers v. Penobscot Mining Co.,
154 Fed. 606, 614, 83 C. C. A. 380.
The Tice of ^'multifariousness" la the
union of causes of action which, or of parties
whose claims, it is either impracticable or
inconyenlent to hear and adjudicate in a sin-
gle suit. Where it is practical and conyen-
ient for the court and the parties to deal
with the claims or causes of action present-
ed, and the parties joined by a petition, in
one suit as in many, the pleading is not mul-
tifarious and should be sustained. The union
of several causes of action for the same de-
mand or relief in a bill or petition does not
constitute multifariousness. The joinder of
a cause of action to enforce a mechanic's
lien and a cause of action to enforce an
equitable lien upon the same property, to se-
cure the same debt, in a bill or petition to
enforce the preferential payment of the debt,
does not render the pleading multifarious; it
being more convenient and practicable to try
and adjudicate these causes of action in one
suit than in several. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co. v. Kansas City Southern R. Co.,
137 Fed. 26, 31-33, 71 C. C. A. 1 (citing
Stephens v. McCargo, 9 Wheat [22 U. S.] 502,
504, 6 L. Ed. 145; Gerriah y. Towne, 3 Gray
[69 Mass.] 82; Halsey y. Goddard, 86 Fed. 25,
28; Chaffin v. Hull, 39 Fed. 887, 889, 891;
Davis V. Berry, 106 Fed- 761; Barcus y.
Gates, 89 Fed. 783, 791, 32 C. C. A. 337, 345 ;
1 Danlell, Ch. PL & Prac. ♦343. ♦344 [6th
Am. Ed.] ; Story, Eq. PI. Si 531, 532, p. 461
[10th Ed.]; Fletcher, Eq. PI. & Prac. | 108, p.
145).
"A bill in equity is said to be 'multi-
farious' when distinct and independent mat-
ters are joined therein. If the subject-mat-
ter in the main relates to one transaction
around which the others cluster, and each
party has an interest in some matters in the
suit, and they are connected, evien though all
tbe parties do not have an Interest In all the
matters in the suit, the bill is not multifari-
ous." Where complainants were all inter-
ested in a suit to compel specific performance
of a contract to dispose ot real and personal
property by will, there was no misjoinder of
parties complainant, because they were not
all Interested to the same extent. Stewart v.
Smith, 91 Pac. 667, 669, 6 CaL App. 152 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in WhitAead
Sweety 58 Pac. 876, 120 OaL 7Q).
The essence of "multifariousneas'*
pleading is the improperly blending of d
tinct demands or independent matters in o
bilL A bill alleging that defendant H. w
the holder of notes variously indorsed
plaintiffs, representing a single transaction
series of transactions, consisting of loans
discounts at usurious rates and usurious i
newals, that among sncdi notes were two 1
dorsed by defendant N., which were giv&i
H. as collateral without further considei
don, that H., in renewing the loans, had pv
posely so mingled his usurious transactioi
as to make it difllcult, without a full accoui
ing with him, to determine the amount of ti
legal indebtedness to him either of plaintj
or defendant N. on the notes bearing the
names, and prayed f6r such an acoonntiii
was not objectionable for "multifSiriousnesfl
in so far as defendant N. and H. were co
cemed. Homer y. Nitach, 63 AtL 1052, 105
103 Md. 498.
"Multifariousness" is avoided if each <
the parties is concerned in matters materk
provided they are allied to or connected wit
the others. So, where some defendant ma
be a necessary party to some essential po
tion of the relief growing out of the entii
controversy, the objection will not obtain,
bill is not "multifarious" which seeks to ha^
an accounting on contracts with one of it
defendants, where another defendant is job
ed under allegations that the two have wronj
fully taken the funds equitably belonging t
the complainant, and fraudulently sought 1
cover them up by investing them in land
taking the legal title thereto in themselve
and the bill seeks to fasten a trust thereo
for the use of the complainant McMulle
Lumber Co. ▼. Strother, 136 Fed. 296, 306, 6
C. C. A. 433 (citing Barcus v. Gates, 89 Fe<
783, 32 C. C. A. 387; Brown v. Guarante
Trust & Safe-Deposit Co., 9 Sup. OL 127, 12
U. S. 403, 412, 32 Lw Ed. 468; K^ey y
Boettcher, 85 Fed. 64, 29 C. C. A. 14; Curra
V. Campion, 85 Fed. 70, 29 a a A. 26; Wei
V. Bay State Gas Co., 91 Fed. 940).
"By 'multifariousness in a bill/ as defii
ed by Story, Bq. PI. { 271, is meant: Th
impitoperly joining In one bill of distinct aD<
Independent matters, and thereby confound
ing them ; as, for example, the uniting in on
bill of several matters, perfectly distinct an
unconnected, against one defendant, or tb
demand of several matters of distinct and li
dependent nature against several defendant
in the same bill.'" There is no fatal m&
joinder of causes pf action in equity in an:
bill which presents a common point of lltlga
tlon, the decision of which will affect thi
whole subject-matter and will settle thi
rights of all the parties to the suit It is no
Indispensable that all the parties should havi
an interest in all the matters contained in thi
MULTIFARIOUSNESS
m
MULTIFARIOUSNESS
Boit. It will be saffldent if each party baa
ui interest in some material matters in tbe
suit, and that they are connected with the
others. Where an inaurance corporation ia-
sued a large number of poIicLea and contract-
ed to pay a certain sum to each policy holder,
together with an equitable portion of a profit
fund, to be made up from gaioa and profits
from lapses and other sources, and, when
such policies were outstanding, the company
transferred its assets to another company,
disenabling itself from performing its con-
tracts, and went out of business, and its suc-
cessor, after issuing similar policies, trans-
ferred its assets to a third, and the third to
a fourth, company, the holders of policies in
the transferring companies were entitled to
join in a bill in equity for some form of relief
with respect to the assets transferred as a
trust fund, and where the bill contained alle-
gations tending to negative any novation to
Join all the companies as d^endants. Wat-
son V. National Life ft Trust Oo^ 102 Fed. 7,
10, 88 C. C A. 380 (quoting and adopting Kel-
ley v.,Boettcher, 85 Fed. 55, 64, 29 0. O. A.
14; Brown v. Guarantee Trust Co., 9 Sup. Ot
127, 130. 128 U. S. 403, 412, 32 U Ed. 468).
It is difficult to give any distinct defini-
tton of "multifajiousness," and the cases so
nearly approach each other that it is not
easy to distinguish them. A learned author
states that ''multlfSariousiiess means the join-
ing together improperly in one bill of com-
plaint of distinct and independ^it matters
and thereby confounding them"; also that
"a claim against two or more defendants
cannot be properly united in the same bill
with a SQ;Mirate daia against one only.*'
Our own court has said that it "is generally
understood to include those cases 'where a
party is brought as a defendant on the rec-
ord,' with a large portion of which, and in
the case made by which, he has no connection
whatever." A bill for specific performance
of a contract for the assignment of an inter-
est of a partner in the firm property, and for
an accounting from one who had done busi-
ness with the assignor in violation of the
provisions of the assignment, and for an ac*
counting of the firm business by the other
partners, is multifarious. Bentley v. Barnes,
47 South. 159, 161, 151 Ala. 659 (citing 1
Beach, Mod. Eq. Prac li 115, 121; Adams v.
Jcmes, 68 Ala. 117, 119).
"Multifariousness" is Incapable of exact
definition. The objection is frequently a
matter of discretion, and every case must, in
a measure, be governed by what is convenient
and equitable under its own peculiar facts,
subject to the recognized principles of equi-
ty jurisprudence. It is always proper to exer-
cise this discretion in suefa manner as to dis-
courage future litigation about the same sub-
ject-matter, and to prevent a multiplicity of
suits, but never to do plain violence to the
maxim that "courts 0(( equity deUght to do
justice and not by halves." All that can be
done in each particular case, as it arises, is
to consider whether it comes nearer to the
decisions where the objection has been held
fatal or to those where it has not been so
held. Complainant purchased a portion of
a plat of ground, all of which originally be-
longed to his vendor, W., who had previously
sold another portion of the plat to Q., who
had taken possession only of the portion so
purchased; W. retaining the balance. As
the result of inaccuracies and misdescriptions
in each of the deeds, there was a confusion
of boundaries on the face of the paper titles,
and G., claiming that her deed conveyed the
land claimed by complainant, Instituted eject-
ment against him to recover the lot of which
he was in possession, whereupon complainant
filed a bin against G. and W. and wife, seek-
ing to correct the errors and misdescriptions
in both deeds, to enjoin the ejectment suit,
and for general relief. Held, that the bin
was properly maintainable to prevent a mul-
tiplicity of suits, and was therefore not de-
murrable for multifariousness. Sicard v.
Guyllou, 41 South. 474, 147 Ala. 289 (citing
Adams v. Jones, 68 Ala. 117; 1 Danlell, C3i.
PI. ft Prac. 834, note 2; Boyd v. Hunter, 44
Ala. 705).
There is no fixed or infiexible rule by
which to determine whether or not a bill 1b
"multifarious." The test must be applied to
the facts of each particular case, in the ll^t
of the general principles regulating single-
ness in pleading, which forbid the blending
in the same suit entirely distinct and sep-
arate matters relating to different parties.
A bill to reach property fraudulently convey-
ed is not multifarious because it Joins as
defendants with the debtor a number of per-
sons alleged to have severaUy assisted him
in covering up separate and distinct portions
of his property by accepting transfers there-
of. Regester v. Regester, 65 Aa 12, 13, 104
Md. 859.
As to whether a bUl is "multifarious"
depends on the particular fact of each case
and is largely within the sound discretion of
the court It Is not indispensable that an tbe
parties to a suit in equity should have an in-
terest in all the matters contained in the suit,
but it \b sufficient If each party has an inter-
est in some material matters in the suit and
they are cotmected with the others. In a
suit for the appointment of a receiver of a
bankrupt prior to adjudication for the pur-
pose of taking possession of property alleged
to have been fraudulently conveyed to vari-
ous relatives of the bankrupt, the biU was
not 'Multifarious" because many claimants
were joined who were the various aUeged
fraudulent transferees of the property. Hor^
ner-Gaylord Ca v. MlUer ft Bennett, 147 Fed.
295, 298 (citing United States v. American
BeU Telephone Ck>., 9 Sup. Ot 90, 128 U. S.
315, 32 L. Ed. 450; Walker t. Powers. 104
MULTIFARIOUSNESS
468
MUIiTlPIilCITT OF SUITS
U. S. 245, 26 L. Bd. 729; Brown T. Guarantee
Tniflt ft S. D. Co., 9 Sup. Ct 127, 128 U. a
403, 82 L. Bd. 468; South Penn Oil Co. v.
Calf Creek Oil & Gas Co., 140 Fed. 516 ; Sha-
fer T. O'Brien, 8 S. E. 298, 31 W. Va- 601).
" 'Multifariousness,' abstractly, lias been
properly said to be Incapable of a distinct
definition, but Is generally understood to In-
clude those cases 'where a party Is brought
as a defendant on the record, with a large
portion of which, and In the case made by
which, he has no connection whatever.' " A
bill against a cotton compress company and
a carrier for discovery and the value of cot-
ton damaged or lost Is not multifarious be-
cause, on an accounting, It may result that
one of the defendants may be shown to be
liable to complainant on one or more Items
for which the other Is not, and with which It
l8 In no wise connected. Qulf Compress Co.
V. Jones Cotton Co., 47 South. 251, 254, 157
Ala. 32 (dtlng Adams v. Jones, 68 Ala. 117,
119).
A stockholder's bill to compel the cancel-
lation of an alleged Illegal Issue of the corpo-
ration's conmion stock and the rescission of
a transfer thereof and for a receiver to con-
duct the corporation's affairs for a reasonable
time and an Injunction restraining the trans-
feree of the stock from voting the same as
stockholders' meetings was not demurrable
for multifariousness, under the rule that
whether a bill is "multifarious" is a question
of discretion, and that the bill will not be so
held where there are only s^arate claims to
the same individual subject-matter. Howard
V. National Telephone Co., 182 Fed. 215, 220.
A bill filed by the United States to cancel
for fraud a large number of separate convey-
ances made by individual Indians to the sev-
eral defendants, and having no connection
with each other, the suit being on behalf of
the various grantors, is multifarious. Unit-
ed States V. Allen, 171 Fed. 907, 928 (citing 6
Words and Phrases, p. 4616).
A bin by a Judgment creditor against
the debtor and others to set aside various
conveyances by which it is alleged the debtor
fraudulently transferred his property to dif-
ferent corporations organized for the purpose,
and of which he owned the stock, the purpose
being to cover it up and place it beyond the
reach of execution, through which transfers
the other defendants have acquired or claim-
ed some Interest in different portions of the
property, has but a single object, which is to
reach and subject the property, is based on a
series of transactions forming one course of
dealing, and is not demurrable for "multifa-
riousness," although the interests of the oth-
er parties defendant are separate and dis-
tinct Where the object of the suit is single,
and it happens that different persons have
separate interests in distinct questions which
arise out of the single object, it necessarily
foUowB that siich different persons must be
bron^t before the court in order that tl
suit may conclude the whole subject; and :
order to determine whether a suit is multif
rlous, or, in other words, contains distloi
matters, the inquiry is, not wheth^ each d
fendant is connected with every branch <
the cause, but whether the plaintiff's bl
seeks relief in respect of matters which u
in their nature separate and distinct. Fo^
«r V. Palmer, 160 Fed. 1, 16, 17, 18, 19, 87 (
a A. 157.
A bin in equity, which charges: (1) Tbi
certain real estate was bought for the plai
tiff corporation by its president, and wt
paid for in whole or in part with its fund
or with the proceeds of its stodc unlawful
Issued and sold, and not properly accounU
for, and that its president fraudulently can
ed the real estate to be conveyed to his so
one of the defendants, through whom seven
other defendants, but not all the defendant
have legal or equitable titles, which tin
should convey to the plaintiff; (2) that a pa
of the above defendants, and two other d
fendants, have unlawfully received stock 1
the plaintiff corporation, which they shonj
account for to it; and ^) that still anotht
defendant has unlawfully received and sol
the stock of the plaintiff, in part, at leaa
other than that mentioned in the precedii
class, for the proceeds of which he shon]
account to It— Is bad for "multifariousnesB
Camden Land Co. v. Lewis, 63 Aa 628, 52
101 lia 7a
MULTIPHASE SYSTEM
Technically the ''multiphase 87Btem«'* i
used in the transmission of electric powe
consists of the use of two or more altemai
currents of equal period, but differing 1
phase. Harrison y. Detroit, Y., A. A. & .
By., 100 N. W. 451, 452, 187 Mich. 7a
MULTIPLICITY
BfULTIPLIOITY OF PBOOEEDOf 08
The continuation of a pending suit ft
infringement of a patent, and the taking <
testimony therein by complainant after It hi
filed a petition for a reissue on the ground (
the invalidity of the patent in suit, const
tutes a '^multiplication of proceedings,*' so t
to unreasonably and vexatiously increase tl
costs, within the meaning of Rev. St I 98
and on a dismissal of the suit after the gran
Ihg of a reissue defendant is entitled ther
under to a special allowance commensurai
with the expense Occasioned thereby. M
tlon Picture Patents Co. v. Yankee Film C(
192 Fed. 134, 135.
MUXTIPIiICITT OF fHllTS
A "multiplicity of suits" does not met
a multitude of ^its, the term not applylr
merely because each of sev^al parties joint)
and^^everaliy liable toa^ bi» independent!
MtTLTITUDB
489
MUKICIPAr. AlV AIB8
ned, tmt wbere one may be sued sereral
imee reepectliiff tbe same aubject-matter in
ts enttrety, or some element or elements
liereot. Illinois Steel Go. v. Schzoeder, 118
S\ W. 51, 66, 133 Wis. 661, 14 U B. A. (N. &)
S9, 126 Am. St BeiK Wl.
HULTITUDE
The law of trespass or forcible entry
■equires a demonstration of force sufficient to
create a reasonable apprehension that the
)arty In possession must yield to avoid a
)reach of the peace being committed, either
>y a "multitude" or by weapons, and three
)er8ons have been held sufficient to constitute
I multitude. State v. Davis, 13 S. E. 883,
109 N. G. 811, 14 U B. A. 206.
MUNICIPAL
The term 'teimlcliMil,'' as oommnoly
ised, is appropiriately applied to all corpora-
tions exerdfling govemmental functions, ei-
^er genial or special. Merchants' Nat.
Bank of San Diego v. Bscondido Irr. Dlst,
n Paa 937, 938, 144 GaL 329.
The word ''municipal" is defined as
meaning or pertaining to a city or corpora-
tioD having the right to administer local
government Miller v. People, 82 N. B. 621,
523, 230 IlL 65.
The word ''municipal,** as originally used
In its strictness, applied to cities only, but
It now has a much more extended meaning,
&nd, when applied to corporations, the words
"municipal," "poUtical," and '-pubUC' are
ased interchangeably. Smith v. Board of
Trustees of Robersonville Graded School, 63
S. E. 524, 527, 141 N. G. 143, 8 Ann. Gas. 529
(quoting and adopting definition in Gurxler
T. District Tp. of Sioux Gity, 17 N. W. 191,
62 Iowa, lOZi.
The term "munldpar relates not only to
a town or dty as a territorial entity but also
pertains to local self-government in general,
andin a broader sense to the internal govern-
ment of a state. A town or a city is wholly
a creature of the state and wholly sub-
servient to the stat^, and for that reason is
not strictly a corporation, as interpreted by
the common law. It is rather a quasi mu-
nicipal corporation. City of Augusta v.
Augusta Water Dist., 63 Ati. 663, 664, 101
Me. 148 (citing Standard Diet "munldpaV).
The word "municipal" appears to have
been derived from "municipium," meaning
4 town, particularly In Italy, which possess-
ed the right of Roman citizenship, but was
governed by its own laws, a free town; and
it may be thus defined : (1) Of or pertaining
to a dty or corporation having the right of
administering local government, as municipal
rt^ts, municipal officers. (1^ Of or pertain-
ing to a state, kingdom, or nation, as mu-
nicipal law, municipal offense, in contradis-
tinction to international law or international
offense— and stifcUy the word applies only
to what belongs to a dty- Laws 1906, p.
276^ c 163, creating a board, to be known as
the state capltol commission, for the purpose
of procuring the erection of a capltol build-
ing, and authorising the commission to pro-
cure the erection of a building, adopt plans
and spedflcations, etc.. Is not in conflict with
Gonst art 3, f 26k declaring that the Legis-
lature shall not delegate to any special com-
mission power to perform any "munidpar*
function; the erection of a capltol building
not being a •'municipal" function, which in
sudi case is restricted to the affairs of cities
and towns. Davenport v. Elrod, 107 N. W.
883, 834, 20 S. D. 067 (citing Webst Int Diet
and Bouv.).
The word "municipal'* applies strictly
only to a dty or community within a state
possessing rights of self-government Prac-
tice Act (Kurd's Rev. St 1909, c. 110) t 118,
which provides that appeals from and wilts
of error to drcuit courts and the superior
court of Oook county shall be taken direct to
the Supreme Gourt in cases In which the va-
lidity of a "munidpal" ordinance is involv-
ed, upon a certificate of the trial court that
the public interest so requires, applies only
to ordinances of dties and villages and not
to ordinances of the sanitary district of Ghl-
cago. People ex rel. Mortell ▼. Bergman, 97
N. B. 695, 696, 268 IlL 469.
The term "munidpal officer," as used
in Gonst art 16, | 6» limiting the terms of of-
fice thereof to two years, means "dty offi-
cers"; the word "munidpar* having its ori-
gin in the idea of a free town or dty, and in.
its popular use Is applied to dties, though in
Its general meaning It embodies the idea of
local self-government as distinguished ftom
centralized government "Munidpar* may
either refer to* a town or a dty. State ex
rel. Quintin t. Edwards, 90 Pac. 040, 941, 946,
38 Mont 290 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion In 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4619).
mnaciPAX. affairs
The phrase "munidpal affairs'* has a
meaning and a most significant one, and, as
used in the organic law, referred to the in-
ternal business affairs of the munidpality.
Ck>nst art 11, § 6, provides: "Gities and
towns heretofore or hereafter organized, and
all charters thereof framed and adopted by
authority of this Gonstitution, except in mu-
nidpal affairs, shall be subject to and con-
trolled by general laws." The wording of
this provision shows that aU matters of leg^
islation pertaining to and bearing upon mu-
nldpalities do not come within the significa-
tion of the words "munidpal affairs'* as used
in the Ck>nstitution. Fragley v. Phelan, 68
Paa 923, 925, 126 OL 383, 388..
The power to Impose a license tax fbr
revenue purposes, granted by the state to a
munidpality for munidpal purposes, became
a "mruiddpal affair^'* within Const art 11,
I
MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS
470
MUinoiPAIi AFFAIRS
I 6, providing that cities and their charters
shall be subject to and controlled by general
laws, except in municipal affairs, and the
Legislature was without authority to with-
draw or modify such power. Ehc parte
Braun, 74 Pac 780, 783, 141 CaL 204.
A proylsion in a charter authorizing a
municipality to impose and collect a license
tax for purposes of municipal revenue is a
"municipal affair," and within the proper
scope of a municipal charter. Ex parte
Jackson, 77 Pac. 457, 460. 143 Cal. 504.
The election and dismissal of teachers
In the public schools are not "municipal af-
fairs," which may, by a freeholder's charter,
be regulated in a manner in conflict with that
provided by the general law. Barthel v.
Board of Education of City of San Jose, 95
Pac. 892. 893, 153 Cal. 376.
The amendment of Const, art 11, | 6, by
Insertion of the words '^except in munidpal
affairs," so as to protect the cities and coun-
ties and parties thereof except in municipal
affairs, shall be subject to and controlled by
general laws, and was intended to give mu-
nicipalities the sole right to regulate, control,
and govern their internal conduct independ-
ent of general laws, while intended to give
municipalitleB the sole right to regulate, con-
trol, and govern their internal conduct, in-
dependent of general laws, and this internal
regulation and control by municipalities com-
prises the municipal affairs spoken of in the
Constitution. Dinan v. Superior Court of
City and County of San Francisco, 91 Pac.
806, 808, 6 Cal. App. 217 (citing Fragley v.
Phelan, 58 Pac. 923, 126 Cal. 383).
The election of municipal officers is
strictly a municipal affair, within Const art.
11, { 6, providing that general laws shall i»ot
be applicable to municipalities as to matters
which are strictly ''municipal affairs." So-
cialist Party v. Uhl, 103 Pac. 181, 186, 156
Cal. 776.
The licensing of bawdy houses, and the
sale of intoxicating liquors is not "municipal
affairs" within. Const art 11, i 6, declaring
that "all charters, ♦ ♦ ♦ except In mu-
nicipal affairs, shall be subject to and con-
trolled by general laws." Farmer v. Behmer,
100 Pac. 901, 904, 9 Cal. App. 773.
The regulation and fixing of charges to
be made by telephone companies doing busi-
ness within a city is none the less a "mu-
nicipal affair," within the jurisdiction of the
city, because rates so fixed' would not be uni-
form throughout the state; the reasonable-
ness of the charge depending on the value of
the plant, cost of maintenance and operation,
which vary in different localities. The regu-
lation of the charges of a public service cor-
poration within the limits of the city is a
"municipal affair." The streets of the city
are public highways in which the people of
the whole state are interested; and yet the
opening and widening of streets are "i
nicipal affairs," and the regulation of t
phone rates in a city would seem to be m
clearly a matter of local concern than
control of streeta Home Telephone & T<
graph Co. v. Los Angeles, 155 Fed. 554, 5C
The construction and maintenance
telephone wires along the streets of a d
and the terms and conditions under wh
they shall be constructed and maintain
is a municipal affair within Const art U
6, as amended in 1896, making the provisic
of a freeholders* charter, adopted by a ci
paramount to general laws enacted by t
state Legislature in municipal affairs. Sli
the rights of a telephone company to ma
tain and operate a telephone line on t
streets of a city is a municipal affair witl
Const art 11, { 6, making the provisions
a freeholders' charter paramount to genei
statutes in municipal affairs, the rights
a telephone company, using the streets of
,city governed by a freeholders' charter, wc
not extended by Civ. Code, § 536, as re-ena
ed by St 1905, p. 492, authorizing: telegra
or telephone corporations to construct lli
along and on any public road or hlghwi
etc. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph Co.
aty of Pasadena, 118 Pac. 796, 802, 803, 1
Cal. 265.
Where the power to Impose a license t
for revenue for municipal purposes is conf<
red upon a municipality, that power becom
a "municipal affair," within the meaning
those words, as used in Const art 11, §
declaring that cities and towns heretofo
or hereafter organized, and all charts
thereof framed or adopted by authority
this Constitution, except in municipal affaii
shall be subject to and controlled by genei
laws. Ex parte Helm, 77 Pac. 453, 454, 1
Cal. 553.
Under Const art 2, | 6, providing th
the charters of cities heretofore or hereaft
organized shall be subject to the genei
laws, except in "municipal affairs," Si
Francisco has power to incur a bonded \
debtedness for the erection of new scbo<
houses for the acquisition of land for the
purposes, and for additional land for pla
grounds of established schools; they bel
''municipal affairs." Law v. San Francls<
77 Pac. 1014, 1017, 144 CaL 384.
San Diego City Charter, art 6, c 2, { 1
provides that the common council shall deti
mine the necessity for public improvemcD
and that where the ordinary revenues a
insufficient, bonds may be issued, the pi
ceedings for which shall be In accordas
with the general laws relating to manldi]
bonded debts, but the charter Is silent as
how money so raised shaU be spent He
that, in the silence of the charter, the c
pendlture of the money was not a "munidF
affair" within Const art 11, | 6, provldi
that city charters shall be controlled 1
KDKIGIPAXi AFFAIRS
471
MUNICIPAZi CLAIM
sneral laws, ^'ezoeiit In mimlcipal aflftln,**
o that the general law followed as to the
node of teolng the bonds for the Imiaove-
Qent, lisws IDOl, c. 80» | 9, was controUlng,
rhich forbids wending sach funds, ezoept on
ompetitlTe bidding. Olonse ▼. City of Ban
Mego, 114 Pae 673, 574, IfiO CaL 484.
Proceedings for annexation of territory
0 a city are had nnder Act March 19, 1889
St 1889, p. 858, c. 247), a general law pro-
iding a complete scheme for annexation
rhich, nnder the Gonstitntion, controls and is
nperior to city diarter provisions, except in
Inunicipal afflairs," annexation of territory
o a dty being in no s^iae a *'nranicipal af-
^dr" within the Oonstitatlon; and hence an
mnexation was not Told because the ordi*
lance calling the spedal election on that
luestion and (Hrdering notice thereof to be
riren, pnblislied as provided by the act of
L889, was not published for 10 days as pre-
Krrlbed by the city charter for ordinances
aiUing elections. People ex rel. Peck y. City
>f Loe Angeles, 97 Pac. 811, 314, 154 Cal 220.
(General Municipal Incorporation Act
[Gen. Laws 1906, p. 898), i 862, empowering
titles of the sixth class to acquire and main-
tain waterworks and works for light, relates
to a "municipal affair,** and is not special
legislation because confined to cities of the
sixth class. Gary y. Blodgett, 102 Pac. 668,
369, 10 CaL App. 463.
The supplying of water by a city to out-
side territory, when incidental to the main
purpose of supplying water to its own in-
habitants is a "municipal affair^' of the dty,
within Const art 11, i 6, providing that the
charters of cities "except in municipal af-
fairs'* shall be controlled by general laws,
and the charter of the dty preyails oyer the
general legislation embodied in Act March
27, 1897, St 1897, p. 182, c. 121, authorizing
a dty, having in its supply more water than
is necessary for its inhabitants, to sell the
surplus, etc. City of South Pasadena v.
Pasadena Land A Water Co., 93 Pac. 490,
496, 152 CaL 679.
Act March 8, 1909 (St 1909, c. 133), pro-
viding for the care and custody of children
who are likely to develop criminal tendencies,
and giving additional powers to the superior
courts in respect thereof, provides for an ex-
ercise of the police powers of the state
through the judicial department, and its
subject-matter is not embraced within "mu-
nicipal afr airs*' as used in Const art 11, § 6,
providing that charters of cities and towns
except in municipal affairs shall be subject
to and controlled by general laws, though
the functions of the particular extension of
the system may be exercised exclusively with-
in incorporated cities having a freeholders*
charter. NicboU v. Koeter» 108 Pac. 302,
303, 157 Cal. 416.
Act April 10, 1906 (P. L. p. 206), provid-
ing for a special election in any election dis-
trict in whidi the Secretary of State has ,
placed voting machines to determine upon the '
retention or rejection of such madiines^ is
not in violation of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against private, local, or special acts af-
fecting the tntemal affairs of municipalities.
Mara v. City of Bayonne, 71 AU. 1181, 77
K J. Law, 288; Id., 75 AtL UOl, 78 N. J.
Law, 74a
KUHICTPAZ. BOMD
As negotiable instrument, see Negotiable
Instrument
The term ''mnnleipal bond" imports a
nmnieipal debt or obligation. The common
mind understands, from the fact that a mu-
nicipal bond is issued, that a municipal debt
has been created, and that the faith and good
credit of the municipality issuing the bond is
pledged to its payment As used in Const
art 16, I 5, as amended in 1894, permitting
the investment of the school funds in nation-
al, state, county, municipal, or school dis-
trict bonds, the term does not include bonds
of a city indebted to its constitutional limit,
issued under the express provisions of Laws
1901, p. 177, c 85, for the payment of a water-
works plant, payable out of a q;)eclal fund
composed of a fixed per cent of the gross
receipts of the plant, and such further sum
as the dty may from time to time by ordinance
transfer from the receipts of the plant or
from its general revenue, without pledging
the credit of the dty. State ex rel. City of
Port Townsend v. Clausen, 82 Pac. 187, 190,
192, 40 Wash. 95.
"By the term 'municipal bonds' is meant
evidences of indebtedness issued by dties, in-
corporated towns, townships, school districts,
and other corporate public bodies negotiable
in form payable at a designated future time,
bearing interest payable annually or semian-
nually, and usually having coupons attached
evldendng the several installments of inter-
est Municipal bonds issued in the usual
negotiable form and authorised by law have
all the attributes of negotiable commercial
paper of individuals and private corpora-
tions; they are usually made payable to
bearer ; they pass by delivery and, like other
negotiable papers, are not subject to equities
between prior holders in the hands of a bona
fide purchaser for value, before due, without
notice of such equities." But, despite the
similarity in form, county commissioners,
authorized to issue new bonds to take up old
ones, have no power to issue bonds to take
up the promissory notes. Muskingum County
Comers V. State, 85 N. Ek 662, 566, 78 Ohio St
287 (quoting and adopting definition la Har-
ris, Mun. Bonds, 8).
MITNICIPAIi CHARTER
See Charter.
ICUiaOIPAI. CLAIM
Registered taxes are "munidpal daims,"
within a statute providing for service for
MUNICIPAL OONTHAOT
473
MUKICIPAI» ODRPaRATTON
posOng and advertlaement In proceedings on
a "nraniclpal claim." Jones y. Beale, 06 Atl.
254, 217 Pa. 182.
MUNIOIPAI. OONTRAOT
As privilege of citizen, see PrlYlleges
and Immunities.
mnaoiPAi. oobporatiok
Charter of, see Charter.
See, also, Municipality; Public Corpora-
tion.
Municipal corporations are mere govern-
ing bodies having charge of and Jurisdiction
over particular political subdivisions of the
state. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co. v. City
of New York, 184 N. 7. Supp. 60, 51, 149 App.
Div. 40L
A municipal corporation proper is cre-
ated mainly for the interest, advantage, and
convenience of the locality and its people.
People V. Sours, 74 Paa 107, 172, 81 Colo.
369, 102 Am. St Rep. 84 (citing 1 DUL Mun.
Corp. i 23).
The term "municipal corporation" im-
plies the organization of a certain geograph-
ical district under authority of law includ-
ing within its Jurisdiction and control a cer-
tain geographical area. Short v. Gouger
(Tex.) 130 S. W. 267, 269.
A ''municipal corporation" is one created
by a government for political purposes, hav-
ing subordinate and local powers of legisla-
tion; and the word ''municipal" applies strict-
ly only to a city or community within a state
possessing rights of self-government People
ex rel. Mortell v. Bergman, 97 N. E. 695, 696,
253 111. 469.
A "municipal corporation" is a body cor-
porate, established by law to share in the
civil government of the country, but chiefly
to regulate the local or internal affairs of
the dty, town, or district incorporated.
State V. Mayor, etc., of City of Knoxville,
90 S. W. 289, 293, 115 Tenn. 175 (citing East
Tennessee University v. Mayor, etc^ of City
of Knoxville, 6 Baxt [65 Tenn.] 166).
The term "municipal corporations" In-
volves the idea of a voluntary association by
the inhabitants of a particular territory,
sanctioned by the power of the state for the
purposes of local government But the sov-
er^gn power may, without regard to any
prior agreement or action on the part of the
inhabitants of the territory involved, pro-
vide for the exercise of powers, such as the
election of local ofRcers by the inhabitants,
and these organizations, though public in
character and partaking somewhat of the na-
ture of a corporation, are not, strictly speak-
ing cori)oratlons, but "quasi corporations."
Hanson v. City of Cresco, 109 N. W. 1109,
1110, 1111, 132 Iowa, 533.
A municipal corporation in its historical
and proper sense is the incorporation by the
authority of the government of the inhabit-
ants of a parttcolar place or district and
thorizing them in their oorporate capac
to exercise subordinate spedfled powers
legislation and regulation with respect
their local and internal concerns. This p(
er of local government is the distinctive p
pose and the distinguishing feature of a z
nidpal corporation proper. £x parte S
mons, 112 Pac. 951, 956, 4 OkL Cr. 662.
A complaint, in an action tor damages
a change in the grade of a street, which
leges that the defendant is a municipal c
poration, organized and existing under
laws of the state, and that in a specU
year the defendant committed the act ca
ing the injury complained of, suffldently
leges that the city which committed the i
was at that time a municipal corporation a
a "body politic and corporate," within R
CkMles, S 3202. Drew ▼. City of Butte, ]
Paa 279, 280, 44 Mont 124.
Action for lands may not be brought
the name of the state for the use of 1
board of directors of a levee district, sr
board being under Acts 1888, p. 24, a "bo
politic and corporate" with power to sue, a
so having the right to sue for the lands
its own name. State ▼. Southwestern La
& Timber Co., 126 S. W. 73, 76^ 98 Ark. 6
A municipal corporation is a legal ln<
tution formed by charter from sovereign pc
er, erecting a populous community of p
scribed area into a body politic and con
rate, with corporate name and continue
succession, and for the purpose and with t
authority of subordinate self-government a
improvement and local administration of i
fairs of state. Ancrum v. Camden Wat
Light & Ice Co., 64 S. B. 151, 154, 82 S.
284, 21 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1029.
"Municipal corporations" or governmei
are creatures of the law, and the warrant 1
their creation must be found in a valid sfe
ute or they have no legal existence. Hurl
V. Motz, 152 S. W. 248, 250, 151 Ky. 451.
A "municipal corporation" is a creatu
of statute, and the adjustment of its powe
and duties and its rights relative to those
citizens is the province of the Legislatui
Scott T. Village of Saratoga Springs, 115
T. Supp. 796, 797, 131 App. Div. 847 (quotl]
MacMullen y. City of Middletown, 79 N.
863, 187 N. T. 87, 11 L. R. A. [N. S.] 391).
Municipal corporations are bodies polil
vested with many political and legislati
powers for local government and police reg
lations, established to aid the government 1
the state, and a municipal government hi
power to make more definite regulations thf
are usually provided by general 1egislati<
and to enforce them by appropriate penaltic
City of (^Icago v. Union Ice Cream Mtg. O
96 N. B. 872, 873, 252 IlL 311, Ann. Ob
1912D, 675.
"Municipal corporations" are bodies pc
itic and corporations vested with politic
MlTNXOIPAIi COBFORAnON
47S
MUNICIPAL GORFORATIOH
ind leglalattre powers for local ctfll sovem-
Qent and police regulatioiia of tlie inhabit-
ints of partUmlar dlatiieta Indiided in the
lotmdarieB of tbe eorporatlona. They are in
nany xeqpects local goyemmenta established
o aid the goyemment of the state. The ne-
■essity of their organization may be found in
he density of the population of localities and
he conditions incidental thereto. Town of
^'eola V. Reidiart, 109 N. W. 6. 7, 131 Iowa,
[92.
"Manidpal corporations" are bodies pol-
tic» created by laws of the state for the
>urpose of administering the affairs of the
ncorporated territory. They exercise pow-
^ of goyernment, which are delegated to
hem by the Legislature, and they are sub-
jected to certain duties. They are the auz-
liaries, or the conyenient instrumentalities,
)f the general goyernment of the state for
;he purpose of municipal rule. The consid-
eration of the grant of a charter is the
)eDefit to the public, and their relation to
the state Is not contractual, in the constitu-
tional sense, for there is no element of rec-
iprocity, and the corporate duties are in-
compatible with the notion of a compact
rhe whole interests are the exclusiye do-
Dsaln of the goyemment itself, and the pow-
er of the Legislature oyer them is supreme
ind transcendent, except as restricted by the
Constltutton of the state. Their charters be-
ing granted for the better goyemment of
the particular districts, the right to Insert
Buoh proyisions as seem to best subserye the
public Interest would seem, from the very
nature of such institutions, to be inherent
MacMuUen y. City of Middletown, 79 N. D.
863, 864, 187 N. X. 87, 11 I* B. A. (N. B.)
391 (citing People ex rel. Wood y. Draper,
15 N. Y. 532, 544 ; People y. Tweed, 63 N. T.
207; Meriwether y. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472,
511, 26 Ia Bd. 197; Dartmouth College y.
Woodward, 4 Wheat [17 U. S.] 518, 4 U Bd.
629; Cooley. CJonst Um. ♦pp. 191-193; Dill.
Man. Corp. || 9, 30; Ang. & A. Corp. i 31).
"A 'municipal corporation' is, for the
purposes of its creation, a goyemment pos-
sessing, to a limited extent soyereign pow-
ers, which in their nature are either legls-
latlve or judicial, and may be denominated
'goyemmental* or 'public' The extent to
which it may be proper to exercise such pow-
ers, as wen as the mode of their exercise by
the corporation, within the limits prescribed
by the law creating them, are of necessity
intrusted to the judgment discretion, and
will of the properly constituted authorities
to whom they are delegated; and, being pub-
lic and soyereign In their nature, the corpora-
tion is not liable to be sued either for a
failnre to exercise them or for errors com-
mitted in their exerdae." Hall y. Town of
Hoxborob 55 8. B. 861, 862, 142 N. O. 4B8, 12
L. R. A. (N. 8.) 688 (Qiiotlng and adopting
the definition Uk Klstnar t. Indianapolis, 100
lQd.210).
*'A 'municipal corporation' la, for the
purposes of its creation, a goyemment posaess-
Ing, to a limited extent soyer^gn powers.
* * * The extent to which it may be prop-
er to exercise such powers, as well as the
mode of theij exercise by the corporation,
within the limits prescribed by the law cre-
ating it are of necessity Intrusted to the
judgment and discretion and will of the prop-
erly constituted authorities to whom they
are delegated." Indiana By. Co. y. Calyert
80 N. B. 961, 964, 168 Ind. 321, 10 U B. A.
(N. 8.) 780, 11 Ann. Gas. 685 (quoting and
adopting deflnitlon in Brinkmeyer y. City of
Byansyille, 29 Ind. 187).
"The framers of our Constitution intend-
ed, by the term 'municipal corporations,' to
use it in its restricted sense as applicable
only to dtles, towns, or yillages inyested
with the power of local legislation." Day«i-
port y. Blrod, 107 N. W. 833, 834, 20 S. D.
567 (quoting and adopting the definition in
Town of Dell Rapids y. Irylng, 64 N. W. 149,
7 8. D. 810, 29 L. R. A. 861).
The term "municipal corporations,'* as
used in Ck)nst 1898, art 48, prohibiting the
(General Assembly from passing any local or
special law creating corporations or renewing
or amending the charter thereof, proylded
that 'this shall not apply to municipal cor-
porations haying a population of not less
than 2,6(N> Inhabitants, or to the organisa-
tion of leyee districts and parishes," is lim-
ited by the context to dtles, towns, and yil-
lages. Board of 8chool Directors of Madison
Parish y. Ooltharp, 64 8outh. 299, 800, 127
La. 066.
"Counties, dtles, and towns are 'munic-
ipal corporations^ created by the authority
of the Legislature, and they deriye all their
powers from the source of thdr creation, ex-
cept where the Constitution of the state oth-
erwise proyldes. Beyond doubt they are, In
general, made bodies polltie and corporate^
and are usually inyested with certain sub-
ordinate leglslatiye powers, to fadlitate the
due administration of their own internal af-
fairs, and to' promote the general welfare of
the munidpallty. They haye no Inherent
jurisdiction to malce laws, or to adopt goy-
emmental regulations; nor can they exercise
any other powers in that regard than such as
are expressly or impliedly derlyed from their
charters, or other statutes of the state."
State ex rel. Potter y. King County, 88 Pac.
935, 936, 45 Wash. 619 (quoting Laramie
County y. Albany County, 92 U. 8. 307, 28
L. Bd. 652).
As an aseat or Isatruaeatality of tlie
state
A "munidpal corporation" la an agent
of the state for local purpoaea. CSamdea
Interstate B. Co. y. Catlettabnrg, 129 Fed-
421,422.
" 'Municipal eorporatlona' are but poblio
agendes with llndtsd riffhts and powotb.**
• H
|l 1 ki
i
I \
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
474
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
Peterg v. aty of St Louis, 125 8. W. 1134,
1135, 226 Mo. 62, 21 Ann. Gas. 1069.
A "municipal corporation" Is, so far as
Its purely municipal relations are concerned,
simply an agency of the state for conducting
affairs of government, and as such it is sub-
ject to the control of the Legislature. They
owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from, the Legislature. Ry-
an V. City of New York, 69 N. B. 599, 601,
177 N. T. 271 (quoting Williams v. BJggleston,
18 Sup. Ct. 617, 619, 170 U. S. 304, 310, 42
L. Ed. 1047 ; City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids
& M. R. R. Ch., 24 Iowa, 455).
A "municipal corporation" In the machin-
ery of the state Is a mere agency. It pos-
sesses no inherent and independent author-
ity to create rights in others which affect
the public interests. Rhinehart v. Redfleld,
87 N. Y. Supp. 789, 791, 93 App. Div. 410.
''Municipal corporations" are instrumen-
talities of the state for the more convenient
administration of local affairs, and for that
purpose are invested with certain legislative
powers. Wolff v. City of Denver, 77 Pac.
364, 365, 20 Colo. App. 135 (citing Lewis v.
Denver City Waterworks Co., 34 Paa 993,
19 Colo. 236, 41 Am. St Rep. 248).
"Municipal corporations" are mere in-
strumentalities of the state for the more con-
venient administration of local government
Their powers are such as the Legislature may
confer, and these may be enlarged, abridged,
or entirely withdrawn at its pleasure. Attor-
ney General ex rel. Battishell v. Township
Board of Springwells, 107 N. W. 87, 90, 143
Mich. 523 (quoting and adopting definition In
Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472, 511, 26
L.Bd. 197).
"A 'municipal corporation' is but a gov-
ernmental agency or local organization for
governmental purposes. Its officers are none
the less governmental officers because elected
or chosen by the people of a particular local-
ity." Llvesley v. Litchfield, 83 Pac. 142, 143,
47 Or. 248, 114 Am. St Rep. 920.
•"Municipal corporations' are political
subdivisions of the state, created as conven-
ient agencies for exercising such of the gov-
ernmental powers of the state as may be In-
trusted to them." Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 28 Sup. Ct 40, 46, 207 U. S. 161, 52
L. Ed. 151.
"Municipal corporations" are political
subdivisions of the state, created as conven-
ient agencies for exercising such of the gov-
ernmental powers of the state as may be in-
trusted to them. The charter of a municipal
corporation is conferred for political purpos-
es, and the power to alter municipal charters
or to repeal them exists without limitation ;
and Const 1901, 9 229, providing that the
charter of any corporation shall be subject
to amendment or repeal under general laws,
a];H>lie8 only to private business corporations.
City of Eosley ▼. Simpson, 52 South. 61,
166 Ala. 366 (citing Hunter v. Pittsburgh,
Sup. Ct 207, 207 U. S. 161, 52 L. Ed. 15
"'Municipal corporations,' such as coi
ties and Incorporated cities and towns, i
instrumentalities of the state govemme
They serve Its political and civil purpos
more or less generous In their nature a
extent and more particularly where tl
are located. They are public in their natu
and the Legislature has control over the
It may determine and establish their pow<
and enlarge or modify their powers and i
tbority from time to time ; it may create n
ones prescribing their powers and author
as public necessity and convenience requir
Folsom V. Greenwood County, 137 Fed. 4
451, 69 C. 0. A. 473 (quoting definition glT
in Wood V. Town of Oxford, 2 8. B. 665,
N. C. 230).
" 'Municipal corporations,* Including cbi
tered municipalities, are agencies in the wo
of government They are created by the L
islature, which delegates to them certi
clearly defined portions of the sovereign po
er. Except as restrained by constltutioi
provisions, these auxiliary agencies of govei
ment are under the absolute control of t
Legislature. Powers and duties may be i
posed and taken away at the legislative wil
Schigley v. City of Waseca, 118 N. W. 2;
260, 106 Minn. 94, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 61
16 Ann. Cas. 169.
''Municipal corporations" are the Inst
mentalities of the state for the more conv<
lent administration of local affairs, and i
that purpose are invested with certain leg
lative power. In the exercise of the po^
upon the subjects submitted to their Jurisd
tion, they are as much beyond judicial inti
ference as the Legislature Itself. Glide
Superior Court of County of Yolo, 81 Pj
225, 226, 147 Cal. 21.
"'Municipal corporations* are the i
ministrative agencies established for the
cal government of towns, cities, and coi
ties, or other particular districts. The s]
cial powers conferred on them are not vest
rights as against the state, nor are they
the nature of contracts, but, being wholly i
litical, they exist only during the will of t
Legislature. Such powers may at any tii
be changed, modified, repealed, or destroy
by the Legislature, saving only the vest
rights of the individuals." Ex parte O
liss, 114 N. W. 962, 981, 16 N. D. 470 (citi
Black, Const Law, { 132).
"A 'municipal corporation' is simply
political subdivision of the state, and exii
by virtue of the exercise of the power of t
state thiough its legislative department T
Legislature could at any time terminate t
existence of the corporation itself, and pi
vide other and difTewnt means for the g<
emment of the district comprised within t
MT7KICIPAL OOKPORATION
«76
MUNICIPAL OOEPORiiTION
limits of the former dty. The city 1b tbe
creature of the state." City of Worcester ▼.
Worcester ConsoL St. Ry. Oo^ 25 Sap. Ot
327, 329, 196 U. S. 539, 49 U Ed. 591 (quot-
ing East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge CJo., 10
How. 511, 533, 534, 13 L«. Ed. 518, 628).
As p<»ssessiifts donUe eliAraoter
"Municipal corporations,** as ordinarily
constituted, possess a doable character— the
one, governmental, legislative, or public;
the other. In a sense proprietary or private —
and over Its dvil, political, or governmental
powers the authority of the Legislature is, in
the nature of things, supreme and without
limitation, unless the limitation 1b found in
the Constitution of the particular state. But,
in its proprietary or private character, the
theory is that the powers are supposed not
to be conferred primarily or chiefly from con-
siderations connected with the government of
the state at Irf^ge, but for the private advan-
tage of the compact community which is In-
corporated as a distinct personality or corpo-
rate individual ; and as to such powers, and
to property acquired thereunder, the corpo-
ration Is to be regarded quo ad hoc as a pri-
rate corporation. Town of Nahant v. United
States, 136 Fed. 273, 281, 70 0. 0. A. 641,
69 Ia R. A. 723 (dtlng Dill. Man. Corp. [4th
£d.] H 66, 67, and notes).
A "municipal corpbratlon" is the delegate
of sovereign power to legislate as to the pub-
lic needs of the locality, and in a sense- it
possesses a dual character. It acts In a
governmental capacity to the extent that It
exercises its powers in matters of public con-
cern, and it acts in a private capacity in so
far as it exercises Its powers under its by-
laws for private advanftage in matters per-
taining to the municipality, as the propri-
etor of the various works and properties. It
cannot be held liable for the nonexercise of
governmental powers delegated by the state,
which are discretionary powers, and which
are classed as a public or legislative charac-
ter ; neither can it be held responsible for
tbe manner in which it exercises those pow-
ers. 0*DonneU ▼. City of Syracuse, 76 N. B.
738-740, 184 N. Y. 1, 8 U R. A. (N. S.) 1053,
112 Am. St Bep. 558, 6 Ann. Oas. 173 (citing
liloyd V. Mayor, etc, of City of New York, 5
N. Y. 369, 55 Am. Dec 347).
Ai eorporate body or person
See Corporate Body.
Corporation as Inalvdias
See Corporation.
Ai em1»raeisic UJiaUtants
A "municipal corporation" la a flctittous
being created for the sole and exclusive pur-
pose of administering the public interest
Bnch corporation and the inhabitants of its
territory are in law distinct separate persons,
^nd a corporation is not the mandatary of
the inhabitants iadividuaily for ^terlng into
contracts for them individually. It does not
follow, from the fiust that the inhabitants ore
Interested, that the obligations of contractors
toward the "municipal corporation** shall be
faithfully complied with, or, from the fact
that they, as taxpayers, contribute the money
with which the payments have to be made,
that they are principals in the contracts en-
tered into by the corporation. Allen A Cur-
rey Mfg. Co. v. ShrevQ;>ort Waterworks Co.,
37 Sooth. 980, 981, 113 La. 1091, 68 L. R. A.
600, 104 Am. St Rep. 525, 2 Ann. Cas. 471.
As yart of state
As political snbdiviflion, see Political
Subdivision.
A 'Municipal corporation*' Is a subordi-
nate subdivision of the state government It
derives its existence, powers, and privileges
from the state State v. City of Aberdeen,
74 Pac 1022, 1023, 34 Wash. 61.
""Municipal corporations' constitute a
part of the civil government of the state, and
their streets are highways." Southern Bell
Telephone A Telegraph Co. ▼. Mobile, 162
Fed. 523, 529.
A ''municipal corporation" is a subordi-
nate branch of the domestic government of
the state. It is Instituted for public purposes
only, and has none of the peculiar qualities
and characteristics of a trading corporation,
instituted for the purpose of private gain,
except that of acting in a corporate capacity.
Its objects, its responsibilities, and its pow-
ers are different As a local governmental
institution it exists for the benefit of the
people within its corporate limits. The Leg-
islature invests it with such powers as it
deems adequate to the ends to be accomplish-
ed. State V. Butter, 77 S. W. 560, 570, 178
Mo. 272 (quoting Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall.
[86 U. S.1 468, 475, 22 L. Ed. 164).
A ''municipal corporation*' is a part of
the governmental machinery of the state, or-
ganized for the purpose of exercising certain
functions of government, within a specified
locality; and it possesses such powers, and
such only, as are conferred upon it by the
Legislature ; and they are to be exercised in
such form, mode, and manner, and by such
agencies, as the Legislature may from time to
time prescribe, within the limits of the Con-
stitution. Tommasl v. Bolger, 100 N. Y.
Supp. 367, 372, 114 App. Dlv. 838; People ex
rel. Devery v. Color, 65 N. B. 956, 958, 173
N. Y. 103 (quoting People ex rel. City of
Rochester v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553-559).
It is within the power of the Legislature
to abolish the ofilce of chief of police of the
dty of New York, and as chapter 33^ Laws
1901, to that effect, does not purport to
abrogate any right of such chief of police to
any pension, he has the power to assert
any vested rights which he may have to sudti
pension ot in the pension ford by a proper
MUmOIPAL CORPORATION
476
MTfMOIPAL OORPORAHON
proceeding. People ex rel. Devery y. Ooler,
66 N. E. 956, 968, 173 N. Y. 10$.
As political or pvblio corporation
"The American 'municipal corporation* is
simply and purely a strictiy public corpora-
tion. It is a corporation of citizens, for citi-
zens, and by citizens. Its sole object is local
government" Beale v. Pankey, 67 8. B. 661,
663, 107 Va. 215, 12 Ann. Ca& 1134.
For the purpose of general designation,
it is not uncommon to use the term "munici-
pal corporation" as including quasi corpora-
tions to distinguish public or political corpo-
rations from those which are termed "pri-
rate." A county is a "municipal corpora-
tion," within a constitutional provision pro-
viding that no right of way shall be appro-
priated for the use of any corporation other
than municipal until full compensation shall
have been made, Irrespective of benefits.
Lincoln County ▼. Brock, 79 Pac. 477, 478,
37 Wash. 14.
The term "municipal corporations,** as
used by text-writers in discussing the del-
egation of the power of taxation to munici-
pal corporations, is not used in the restricted
sense of cities and towns, but in a more en-
larged and generally received acceptation,
which Includes municipal corporations tech-
nically so termed, and also public corpora-
tions created by the state for the purpose of
exercising defined and limited govenmiental
functions in certain designated portions of
the state's territory. These are termed by
authors of approved excellence and decisions
of authority to be "public quasi corpora-
tions," and are said to include counties, town-
ships, school districts, and the like. Smith
▼. Board of Trustees of Robersonville Graded
School, 63 S. B. 624, 627, 141 N. a 143, 8 Ann.
Gas. 629.
"The term ^municipal,' as used in defining
a corporation, indicates by its historical mean-
ing a corporation proper, as distinguished
from a quasi corporation, and designates only
cities and incorporated towns which have
powers of local self-government, and, in strict-
ness of meaning, would not include counties
and school districts, although they are ex-
pressly declared by statute to be bodies corpo-
rate. But, in common speech, the term 'mu-
nicipal corporation* is used to include all pub-
lic or political corporations having corporate
powers." Hanson v. City of Cresco, 109 N. W.
1109, 1112, 132 Iowa, 638 (citing 6 Words and
Phrases, p. 4620).
Board of drainage coaunissioncrfl
Code 1906, | 3486, providing that money
deposited in banks by an ofl[lcer having the
custody of public funds, "state, county, mu-
nicipal, or levee board," is prima facie public
money, and a trust fund, and may not be
taken by the general creditors of the bank,
is in derogation of the common law and must
be strictly construed, and the word "munic-
liNU" embraces only municipal corporations
represented by cities, towns, and villages,
and does not Indude the board of drainage
commissionerB, and the funds of such board
deposited In a bank are not within the pro-
tection of the statute. United States Fidel-
ity & Guaranty Bank v. First State Bank of
Shaw (Misa) 60 South. 47.
Board of edacatioa
Under Detroit City Charter (Comp. 1904»
I 696), providing the school inspectors shall
be a body corporate, known as '^ard of
education of the city of Detroit," and in that
name may sue and be sued, and hold and
convey real and personal property, such
board is a "municipal corporation,*' and not
liable for the negligence of its employte and
agents. Whitehead v. Board of Education of
City of Detroit, 102 N. W. 1028, 1029, 18»
Mich. 490. .
Oowatj
A county is a "Municipal corporation.''
Wadsworth v. Board of Sup'rs of Livingston
County, 116 N. Y. Supp. 8, 16 (citing County
Law [Laws 1892, p. 1744, e 686] | 2; Gen-
eral Corporation Law [Laws 1890, p. 1061, a
663] I 3, subd. 1).
A county, properly spealdng, is not a
"municipal corporation." Knowles v. Board
of Education of City of Topeka, 7 Pac. 661,
664, 83 Kan. 692 (citing Dill. Mun. Corp. 1 22).
A county is a "municipal corporation,"
within the rule that a municipal corporation
cannot be estopped by the unauthorized or
illegal agreements or acts of their agents.
People ex rel. Sweet v. Board of Sup'rs of St.
Lawrence Ck)unty, 91 N. Y. Supp. 948, 949.
101 App. Div. 327.
While a county is not strictly a munic-
ipal corporation, yet, in the sense that it is
a body corporate with only such powers as
are expressly conferred by statute, it is with-
in the rules applicable to such corporations.
Morse v. Qranlte County, 119 Pac. 286, 289,
44 Mont 7a
A county is a municipal or <]uasi munic-
ipal corporation Invested with lief^^islative
powers to be exercised for local purposes,
subject to the control of the state, but Is not,
in a strict sense, a "municipal corporation.'*
Schubel V. Olcott, 120 Pac. 375, 378, 60 Or.
608.
"Municipal corporations" are subordi-
nate parts of the state, and Invested with
limited powers. In Montana counties are at
most only <iuasi municipal corporations, with
no legislative authority vested in tiie several
boards of county conunlssioners, in the sense
that they may adopt ordinances and pre-
scribe penalties for a violation thereot or
define nuisances and provide for their abate-
ment In re O'Brien, 75 Pac. 196, 199, 29
Mont 680, 1 Ann. Cas. 378 (citing Wilcox ▼.
Deer Lodge County, 2 Mont 674).
MUNIOIPAL CORPORATION
477
MUNIOIPAL CORPORATION
A ''municipal corporation" proper la ere*
ated mainly for the interest, advantage, and
convenience of the locality and iti people, as
distinguished from a county organization
which is created almost exclusiyely with a
Tiew to the policy of the state at large. Peo-
ple ex reL Attorney General y. Johnson, 86
Pac 233, 235, 84 Colo. 143 (citing 1 Dill.
Mun. Corp. | 23).
A "county" ifl a goTemmental agency of
the state, and in a sense a ''municipal corpo-
ration^' Kumpe ▼. Bynum» 48 South. 66, 66,
168 AU. 311.
A special sdiool district is not within
the constitutional provision declaring that
no county, city, town, or municipality shall
issue any interest bearing evidence of indebt-
edness. All corporations intended as agencies
in the administration of dvil government are
public, as distinguished from private, corpora-
tiona Cities are "municipal corporations,"
while school districts and "counties,** properly
^peaking, are not Schmutz v. Special School
Dlst of City of Uttte Rock, 95 S. W. 438,
439, 78 Ark. 118 (citing Memphis Trust Co. v.
Board of Directors of St Francis Levee Dist,
62 S. W. 902, 69 Ark. 284; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp.
122).
The "county" is a political subdivision
of the state, though for many purposes it is
deemed a municipality. Its power of con-
tracting indebtedness is limited to the mat-
ters expressly conferred by the Legislature,
or which are conferred by necessary impli-
cation as an incident of powers expressly
conferred. Not only is it limited as to the
things for which, but it is limited as to the
manner in which, it may become bound by
contract McDonald's Adm*x ▼. Franklin
County, 100 S. W. 861, 862, 125 Ky. 205.
A "county" is a local subdivision of the
state, created by the state of its own will,
and is not a "municipal corporation" proper,
which is called into existence either at the
direct solicitation or by the consent of the
persons composing it for the promotion of
theiT private advantage, and a county cannot
be sued except on an express contract Ma-
rion County V. Rives k McChord, 118 8. W.
809, 311, 138 Ky. 477.
Drainage dlstrioi
"Municipal corporations" cease to exist
only by legislative consent and a failure for
a term of years to exercise the functions of a
municipality doea not eitect a dissolution,
neither does a failure to elect officers.
Drainage districts are classed as municipal
corporations. People ex rel. Oauen v. Nie-
bruegge, 91 N. B. 115, 117, 244 IlL 82.
A drainage district although a quasi
public corporation, is not a '^municipal cor-
poration" within the purview of Const art
6, f 5, providing that property belonging to
the state or municipal corporations shall be
exempt from taxation, and hence under
Ck>nst art 6, | 8, art 7, | 9, respectively,
providing that all moneys, stocks, and per-
sonal property shall be taxed by uniform law,
and that all taxes levied by any county, city,
or town shall be uniform, the Legislature
was without power to exempt from taxation
bonds issued by a drainage district as was
attempted by Pub. Laws 1911, c. 177. Drain-
age Com'rs V. C. A. Webb & 0>., 76 S. E. 552,
16(> N. C. 594.
Znigatioa distriot
Irrigation districts organized under the
laws of the state are quasi municipal corpo-
rations, and are governed by the general elec-
tion laws of the state; and the qualifications
prescribed by the Constitution for voters at
elections apply to an election held in an ir-
rigation district Pioneer Irr. Dist v. Walk-
er, 119 Pac 304, 307, 20 Idaho, 605.
Xi«Te« board or dlstHet
Acts 1909, p. 660, creating levee district
No. 2, in Jackson county, provides by section
2 that the district shall have power to make
such by-laws and regulations as they may
deem proper, not inconsistent with their
charter and state law, to carry into effect the
object of their incorporation, and to do all
other acts not inconsistent with state law
which may be proper to effectuate the pur-
pose of the act uid section 9 authorisEes them
to hear complaints from parties aggrieved by
the assessment and make all necessary cor-
rections therein. Held, that the district is
not a municipal corporation within Const
art 12, i 4, prohibiting a municipal corpora-
tion from levying a tax on realty to a greater
extent in one year than five mills on the
dollar of the assessed valuation. St Louis,
I. M. & S. Ry. Ca v. Board of Directors of
Levee Dist No. 2, Jackson County, 145 S. W.
892, 895, 103 Ark. 127.
Levee boards, under the Constitution, are
bodies politic, entirely separate and distinct
from "municipal corporations," fbr the pur*
pose of taxation. United Railroad & Trad-
ing Co. V. Movers, 86 South. 797, 799, 112 La.
897.
Paiisli preoiaet
A parish precinct la not one of the sub-
divisions mentioned in Const art 282, au-
thorizing special election to be held In any
parish, "municipal corporation,*' ward, or
school district Regard v. Police Jury of
AvoyeUes, 42 South. 438, 117 La. 952.
Portdlstvlot
A port district incoiporated to provide
public terminal facilities for both sea and
land commerce is a "municipal corporation,*'
within a constitutional limitation as to the
amount of indebtedness of "counties, cities,
towns, school districts, and other municipal
corporations," and when properly and legally
organised it will possess the same powers aa
the municipal corporations specifically men-
tioned; and, though U be superimiKMed over
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
478
MI7NI0IPAL CORPORATION
territory occupied by each other mimlcipal-
Itles, existing for an entirely different pnr^
pose, the limit of its power to incur indebt-
edness is independent of and not measured
by the portion of the constitutional limita-
tion not taken up by the indebtedness of the
other divisions. Paine v. Port of Seattle,
127 Pac. 580, 581, 70 Wash. 294.
Reolan&ation distriot
A reclamation district is a public,' as
distinguished from a private, corporation,
acting as a state agency invested with limit-
ed powers, but it is not a "municipal cor-
poration," possessing in any degree general
powers of government, though, within the
limits of the authority granted to it, it ex-
ercises public functions. Metcalfe v. Merritt,
111 Paa 505, 506, 14 CaL App. 244.
Sehool dlstHet
A school district is not a "municipal
corporation." State ex reL Oarrollton School
Dist No. 1, Tp. 53, R. 23, v. Gordon, 133 S.
W. 44, 51, 231 Mo. 547 ; Knowles v. Board of
Education of City of Topeka, 7 Pac 561, 564,
33 Kan. 692 (citing DilL Mun. Corp. | 22).
A sdiool district is not a municipal cor-
poration within Const art 7, | 6, prohibit-
ing the Legislature, from imposing taxes for
the purpose of any municipal corporation.
Fenton t. Board of Com'rs of Ada County,
119 Pac. 41, 44, 20 Idaho, 392.
A school district is a "municipal cor-
poration," within Const art 8, 1 1, excepting
such corporations from the prohibition
against creating corporations by special act
Board of Education of Union Free School
Dist No. 6 of Town of Cortlandt v. Board of
Education of Union Free School Dist No. 7
of Town of Cortlandt 78 N. Y. Supp. 522,
524, 76 App. Dlv. 355.
Graded school districts are public quasi
Corporations within the term "municipal cor-
poration," as used in Const art 7, | 7, pro-
hibiting any city, town, or other municipal
corporation from contracting debts except
for necessary expenses, unless by vote of the
qualified voters ; so that a gr&ded school dis-
trict could not issue bonds to erect a school
building unless their issue was approved by a
majority of the qualified voters; the erection
of a school building not being a "necessary
expense" within section 7. Ellis v. Trustees
of Graded School of Oxford, 72 S. B. 2, 3,
156 N. C. 10.
School districts are public quasi corpora-
tions included in the term **munlcll)al cor-
porations" as tiered in article 7, f 7, of our
Constitution, and so come withfh the ex-
press provisions of section 7, that '*no county,
city, town, or other municipal corporation,
shall contract any debt pledge its faith, or
loan its credit etc., nor shall any tax be
levied unless by a vote of the qualified vot-
ers." And the principle of uniformity is
efltabUahed and required by section 9 of tUa
artide. Smith v. Board of Trustees of Rob-
ersonville Graded School, 58 S. B. 524, 827,
141 N. C. 143, 8 Ann. Ca& 529.
Const art 5, | 1, directing the Gen-
eral Assembly to levy a poll tax equal to the
tax on property valued at $300, but provid-
ing that the state and county poll tax com-
bined shall not exceed ^ a head, does not
apply* as to such limitation, to a special
school district created pursuant to Revisal
1905, I 4115, but such district is a public
quasi corporation included within the term
"municipal corporations," as used in Const
art 7, and subject only to the limitations
contained in that article, forbidding a munici-
pal corporation to contract any debt or to
levy any tax, except for the necessary ex-
penses thereof, unless by a vote of a ma-
jority of the qualified voters, and requiring
all taxes levied to be uniform and ad valor-
em. Perry v. Commissioners of Franklin
County, 62 S. B. 608, 609, 148 N. C. 521.
State
Laws 1905, p. 870, c. 176, in amendment
of Code Civ. Proc. i 1391, authorizing an ex-
ecution against the wages or salary of the
judgment debtor, and making it the duty of
any person or corporation, municipal or oth-
erwise, to whom the execution shall be pre-
sented, and who shall be Indebted to the
judgment debtor, to pay over to the oflicer
the amount of the debt does not authorize
the issuance of an execution against the
salary of a state officer; the state being
neither a person nor a corporation nor a
municipal corporation. Osterhoudt v. Keith,
117 N. T. Supp. 809, 810, 183 App. Dlv. 88.
Toim or towasldp
A township is clearly to be classed
with quasi corporations, and not with "mu-
nicipal corporations.'* Hanson ▼. City of
Oresco, 109 N. W. 1109, 1112, 132 Iowa, 588.
''Townships" are the lowest grade o7
''municipal corporations," being created for
specific purposes, and endowed with limited
powers and liabilities, acting through oflicers
duly authorized by the law for that purpose.
Posey Tp., Franklin County, v. Senour, 86
N. B. 440, 441, 42 Ind. App. 680.
Under General Corporation Laws, ||
2, 8, Town Law, | 2, and General Municipal
Law, I 1, a "town" is a "municipal corpora-
tion." Town of Hempstead v. Lawrence, 122
N. T. Supp. 1037, 1039, 188 Al^. Dlv. 478.
New Tork Town Law defines a "town"
as a "municipal corporation" comprising the
inhabitants within its boundaries, and form-
ed for the purpose of exercising such powers
and discharging sudi duties of local govern-
ment and administration of public affairs bm
may be conferred or imposed upon it by law;
and hence a town is a municipal corporation
which may enter into a lighting contract
Dunn V. Whlteatown* 185 Fed. 586^ 688.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
479
aiUNIOIFAIi CK>Y£RNMENT
Gode Civ. Proc. | 264, provides that no
award Bhall be made on any claim against
the state, except upon such legal evidence
as would establish liability against an in-
dividual or corporation. Canal Law, | 47,
provides that no judgment shall be awarded
by the Court of Claims for damages from
neglect or conduct of any state officer having
charge of canals, or from any accident con-
nected with the canals, unless the facts make
out a case which would create a legal lia-
bility against the state, were they established
in court against an individual or corpora-
tion. Held, that the phrase "individual or
corporation*' includes a town; Town Law, §
2, defining a *'town** as a "municipal corpora-
tion** comprising the inhabitants within its
boundaries. O'Bryan v. State, 126 N. T.
Supp. 490, 491, 68 Misc; Rep. 618.
KUNIOIPAIi COUXOXL
See Council.
MUJWXOAPAIi OOUBTS
As state court, see State Court
There is no substantial or material dif-
ference between the terms "city court" and
"municipal court." Miller v. People, 82 N.
B. 621, 623, 230 IlL 66.
MUmClPAIi DEPARTMENT
A covenant in a lease that the tenant
shall comply with the orders of "municipal
departments" of the city of New York in-
cluded the tenement house department of
such city, although its existence began at a
date subsequent to the execution of the
lease. Palmieri v. Antinozzl, 96 N. T.
Supp. 866, 866, 47 Misc. Rep. 237.
JfUNICIPAI- EliECTION
See Next General Election.
Included In any election, see Any.
Under Rev. Laws 1906, | 886, municipal
Sections, as well as state and county col-
lections, may be contested, and a village
election is a ''municipal election." State ex
rel. Village of Rxcelsior v. District Court of
Henn^ln County, 120 ISL W. 894, 896, 107
Minn. 437.
An election authorized by the general
council of a city of the fourth class to sub-
mit the question of whether the city should
Issue bonds to raise money for the erection
of common school buildings was not held
under any statutes relating to common
schools, but was a "municipal election" held
under Ky. St. | 3490, subsec. 34, authorizing
cities of the fourth class to issue municipal
iMUds for municipal purposes, and providing
that the city council, if they deem it neces-
sary to incur a debt, shall give notice of an
election to determine whether the debt shall
be Incurred, and, if two-thirds of the quali-
fied electors vote therefor, shall provide by
ordinance for creating the debt, so that the
olectioa was properly held by secret ballot, as
provided by the Constitution, even if elections
relating to common ^public schools must be
held viva voce. Frost v. Central City, 120
S. W. 367, 368, 134 Ky. 434.
XUNICIPAIi FtTNCTION
Const art 11, | 13, providing that the
Legislature shall not delegate to any as-
sociation or individual power to perform any
"municipal function," has no application to
St 1899, p. 868, c. 247, permitting territory
to be annexed to towns at the discretion of
the inhabitants, nor does it effect the valid-
ity thereof, for "the fixing of the boundaries
of the territory to be annexed is In no sense
of the words a 'municipal function.' " There
is no constitutional provision that intimates
that this power can be conferred only on
some legislative body, and not upon the elec-
tors pf . the locality to be affected^ and, in the
absence of such a provision, the question as
to whether it shall be given to the one or
the other is purely one of policy, upon which
the determination of the Legislature is con-
clusive. People V. Town of Ontario, 84 Pac.
205-208, 148 Cal. 625.
Laws 1905, p. 276, c 163, creating a
board, to be known as the state capitol com-
mission, for the purpose of procuring the
erection of a capitol building, and author-
izing the commission to procure the erection
of a building, adopt plans and specifica-
tions, etc., is not in conflict with Const art
3, I 26, declaring that the Legislature shall
not delegate to any special commission power
to perform any "municipal function"; the
erection of a capitol building not being a
"municipal function," which in such case is
restricted to the affairs of cities and towns.
Davenport v. Elrod, 107 N. W. 833, 834, 20
S. D. 667.
MUNICIPAIi CK>VEItNMENT
"'Municipal governments* are entities
distinct from the state government, incur-
ring liabilities of their own, In no way bind-
ing upon the state, and acquiring rights and
property in which the state has no property
interest Except where the law makes the
municipal government an agent for the state
in collecting the state's taxes, or in discharg-
ing some other state function, there is no
relation between the one and the other of
principal and agent, as that relation is usual-
ly understood in the law. The state may,
through its legislative branch, confer upon,
and withdraw from, the counties and cities
power of taxation. But when the power
thus conferred is for the benefit of the local
community in which it is to be exercised, its
exercise is not by agent for a principal. It
is by a quasi Independent government for the
benefit of the people within its lindta" Bank
of Kentucky v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 94 S.
W. 620, 621 (quoting and adopting definition
in Northern Bank of Kentudsy v. Stone» 88
Fed. 413).
MUNICIPAL* n^DEBTEDNESS
480
MUNICIPAL OFFICEB
m
H
KUNIOIPAIi XmiEBTllDlfEBS
An indebtedness created by l>ondB for a
street improvement as authorized by stat-
ute, allowing a city to order the original
construction of a dty improvement at the
cost of abutting owners, and to issue 10-
year bonds against the property not paying
in cash, is not a "municipal Indebtedness"
within the Constitution, limiting municipal
indebtedness. Guilfoyle's Ez'r v. City of
Maysville, 112 S. W. 666, 667, 129 Ky. 532.
MUmUIPAI. XJLW
"Municipal law** is a rule of civil con-
duct prescribed by the supreme power of a
state That definition is a part of Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone's, which adds, commanding
what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.
Merchants* Exchange of St Louis ▼. Knott,
111 S. W. 065, 571, 212 Mo. 616 (dtlng 1
Kent, Comm. 447).
MUHIOIPAI. liEOISLATIOK
The only acts of a dty council subject
to the referendum by Const art 4, § la, re-
serving the referendum as to "municipal
legislation,** are such as come within the term
"municipal legislation**; and such legislation
must be considered in the sense of laws of
general application, and does not include
transient orders to a particular person, and
the latter may be adopted without reference
to the referendum. Long v. City of Port-
land, 98 Pac 1111, 1112, 53 Or. 92.
To understand the signification of the
words "municipal legislation,'* as used in
Const, art 11, § 2, prohibiting the Legisla-
ture from amending the charters of cities
and towns, the right of which is reserved to
the voters thereof, and article 4 providing
that the referendum may be demanded by
the people, which power is reserved to the
legal voters of every municipality and dis-
trict, as to all local, special, and munldpal
legislation of every character in and for
their respective munidpalities and districts,
requires an interpretation of the term 'lo-
cal and spedal legislation,** the right to for-
mulate rules in relation to which is implied-
ly denied to dties and towns, on the prin-
dple that the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. The qualifying words
"local** and "special" are synonymous, and,
in the sense in which they are used, mean
any enactment that is plainly intended to
affect a particular person or thing or to be
in effect in some spedfled locality only.
The words "munidpallty** and "district** are
evidently expressions of equivalent import,
for a district legally created from a desig-
nated part of the state and organized to
promote the convenience of the public at
large is a "munldpal corporation.'* The au-
thority of such a corporation has been here-
tofore derived from an act of the legislative
assembly creating it, and, as sudi statute is
applicable to and enforceable in a part of
the state only, it is a local or special 1
The change in the <)rganic law deprlyes
legislative assembly of all authority to
act, amend, or repeal any charter of a to
the legal voters of which reserve to th
selves the exercise of all such power,
cept the right of repeal, and it was evid
ly the intention of the framers of such <
stitutional provision, and also the people \
ratified it, to vest an incorporated dty
town with authority to provide the mai
of exercising the initiative and referent
powers as to amendments of a diarter, wl
change is reasonably within the term of **
nidpal legislation." Acme Dairy Co. v. (
of Astoria, 90 Pac. 153, 154, 49 Or. 62a
MUNIOIPAI. OFFENSB
As crime, see Crime.
MUMIOIPJJL OFFIOB
A ^Milage,*' as defined In the.^tatate
elections (Rev. Laws 1905, | 154), is a mn
ipality, and an office therein is a ''mnnicl
office,** witliin section 386. State ex
Village of Excelsior v. District Court
Hennepin County, 120 N. W. 894, 895,
Minn. 437.
MUHiClPAIi OFFICER
See, also, City Officer.
In the broad sense "municipal office
indnde all local elective or appointive <
cers. Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co. ▼. Cits
New Tork, 134 N. Y. Supp. 60, 52, 149 A
Div. 491.
The mayor and aldermen constitate
'Munldpal officers of a dty," under Rev.
1903, c. 1, I 0, par. 25. Huntington v. C
of Cahiis, 73 Aa 829, 830, 105 Me. 144.
The term "municipal officer,'* as naed
Const art 16, | 6, limiting the terms of
fice to two years, means "dty officers.** St
ex reL Quintin v. Edwards, 99 Pac. 910, $
38 Mont 250 (dting 6 Words and Phrai
p. 4618).
Sersea&t at arms of ooiinoll
"The distinction is plainly taken
tween a person acting as a 'servant* or '(
ploy^' who does not discharge independ
duties but acts by the direction of oth<
and an 'officer* empowered to act in the <
charge of a duty or legal authority in <
dal life.** Where a fireman, wrongfully <
charged from the fire department of the c
of New York, pending reinstatement, acoi
ed a position as sergeant at arms to
council of the mnnidpal assembly, he wai
mere "employ^** of the dty, and not an '
ficer," within New York City CSiarter (U
1897, p. 543, c. 878, I 1549), prohibiting "i
nidpal officers^ from holding two offl<
Padden v. City of New York, 92 N. Y. So
926, 928, 45 Misc. Rep. 017 (quoting a
adopting definition in Olmstead v. City
New York, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct 481, and (
ing People v. Murray, TB N. X« 639.
MUNICIPAL OFFICER
461
MUNICIPAL PURPOSES
Jmdse
Judges of dty courts* organized by Rev.
St 1899, a 87, i 240, are municipal officers,
within Const art 9, | U, providing that
the fees, salary, or compensation of no mu-
nicipal officer elected or appointed for a def-
inite term shall be increased or diminished
luring the term. Wolf ▼. Hope, 70 N. B.
1082, 1087, 210 IlL 60.
PoUeemmm
A policeman is not strictly a state officer,
Qor is he a "municipal officer" or servant of
i dty in which his duties are to be perform-
ed, and is therefore not within Const art
16, § 6, limiting the terms of office of munic-
ipal officers to two years. State ex rel.
QalDtin v. Edwards, 99 Paa 940, 946, 38
Mont 250.
A private policeman or watchman em-
ployed by a private corporation, who is paid
by the corporation and who may be discharg-
ed by it, is not a munidpal officer, so as
to make his wages exempt from garnish-
ment, notwithstanding the fact that he was
empowered to make arrests and subject to
the supervision and control of the dty police
department Tabb v. Mallette, 47 S. E. 687,
S88, 120 Cki. 97, 102 Am. St Rep. 7a
State oAeer dUtlnffnisHed
The distinction between "state officers*'
and '*munidpal officers" Ib that the duties of
the former concern the state at large and
the general public, although exercised with-
in definite territorial limits, while the func-
tions of the latter relate to a particular com-
munity. Ex parte Corliss, 114 N. W. 962,
M8, 16 N. D. 470.
■tmilClPAIi ORDIHAHOB
See Ordinance.
As statute, see Statute.
Violation of ordinance as crime, see
Crime.
KUNICIPAIi PBOPERTT
As private property, see Private Prop-
erty.
A tax legally imposed by a munidpali-
ty Is *'munldpal property" of which the
municipality cannot be deprived without due
process of law. Harris v. Steams, 97 N. W.
361. 363, 17 S. D. 439.
MUKICIPAI. PUBP08E8
See Corporation for Munidpal Purposes.
The erection of a school building was a
'*munidpal purpose'* for which the dty was
authorized to issue bonds. Frost v. Central
City, 120 S. W. 367, 368, 184 Ky. 434.
Acts Ala. 1894r^, p. 593, entltied "An
act to amend an act entitled an act to incor-
porate the dty of Columbia," etc., provides
(section 29) for the construction of a bridge
across the Chattahoochle river, and author-
izes the issue of bonds therefor. Held that,
8 WD8.& P.2D SSB.— 81
since the river constitutes the south and east
boundary of the dty, as declared in its
amended charter, the construction of a
bridge across the river was a "munidpal pur-
pose," and hence the authority for the bond
issue was valid and within the title to the
act City of Columbia v. Chicago Title &
Trust Co., 200 Fed. 569, 571, 119 a C. A. 49.
Under a charter authorizing a dty to in-
cur indebtedness for "munidpal purposes,'*
the furnishing of water for street sprinkling,
for use in public buildings, etc., is a mu-
nidpal purpose. City of Winchester v. Win-
chester Waterworks Co., 148 S. W. 1, 6, 149
K:y. 177.
The acquisition of parks is, without any
express words of authorization. Included
whenever a grant of power is conferred to
acquire property for ^'munidpal purposes."
Cil^ of Oakland v. Thompson, 91 Pac S87,
888, 151 Cal. 572.
An ordinance of A town out of debt,
levying a property tax for "munidpal pur-
poses" and a poll tax "for said purposes,**
suffidently spedfles the purposes for which
the taxes are levied, within Const | 180, re-
quiring an ordinance imposing a tax to sped-
ty distinctly the purpose for which the same
is levied. The expression "for munidpal
purposes," in the ordinance, is the same in
meaning as if it had read "for ordinary mu-
nidpal purposes" or "for carrying on the
town government in the ordinary routine.'*
Town of Mt Pleasant v. Eversole (Ky.) 96 S.
W. 478, 479.
Laws 1905, p. 2096, c. 737, I 11, provid-
ing that no munidpality shall build and op-
erate for other than "munidpal purposes"
any systems for furnishing gas or electridty
fOr lighting purposes, without a certificate of
authority granted by the state gas commhi-
sion, enacted whoa Laws 1897, p. 488, c. 414,
authorising a village to maintain a lighting
system for lighting its streets and the
private buildings of its Inhabitants, was la
force, prohibits a village from erecting a
lighting system for llflfhting the private
buildings of its inhabitants unless authority
therefor \b granted by the commission.
Potsdam Electric Ldght A Power Co. v. Vil-
lage of Potsdam, 97 N. Y. Supp. 190, 192, 49
Misc. Rep. la
Const art 8^ | 8^ gives the Legislature
power to establish and abolish munidpalities,
to provide for thdr government, to prescribe
thdr jurisdiction and powers, and to alter
the same. Article 9, § 5, provides that the
Legislature shall authorize counties or incor-
porated dties and towns to impose taxes for
county and mimldpal purposes, and for no
other. Article 12, § 1, provides that the Leg-
islature shall Institute a uniform system of
public free schools and provide fOr the liber-
al maintenance thereol Section 10 requires
the Legislature to provide for the division of
the counties into convenient school districts.
MUNICIPAL TREASURY
482
MUNICIPALITY
and for the levying and collecting of a dis-
trict school tax for the exclusive use of pub-
lic free schools within the district Section
U provides that any Incorporated town or
city may constitute a school district, and the
fund raised by section 10 may be extended in
the district where levied for building or re-
pairing schoolhouses, purchase of school li-
braries and text-books, etc, so that the dis-
tribution among all the schools of the dis-
trict be equitabla Held, that the power giv-
en the Legislature to prescribe the "powers**
of municipalities and to authorize cities and
towns to assess and impose taxes for *'munlc-
ipal purposes" does not authorize the giving
to municipalities, as such, authority to issue
bonds and levy a municipal tax to pay them,
when the proceeds are to be used to erect
schoolhouses and maintain a system of pub-
lic education in the municipality, as provided
by Laws 1899, c. 4869, 9 37, as amended
by Laws 1907, c. 5817, § 3. Brown v. City
of Lakeland, 64 South. 716, 717, 61 Fla. 60a
KUNIOIPAI. TBEA8URY
Expenses of municipal treasury, see Ex-
penses.
MUHIGIPAIi YEAB
The "mimicipal year" has usually been
taken to be the political year, or year inter-
vening between the taking of office by the re-
spective city officers elected in each year. So
where the time of elections was fixed as the
first Tuesday of April in each year, and as
this day may fall on the first or any day up
to and including the 7th day of the month,
the municipal year may vary several days
in length. It is not a fixed number of days
or weeks or months. The term "municipal
year," as used in Comp. St 1903, a 60, § 25,
providing that a liquor license shall expire
on the last Monday of the "municipal year,"
means the political year. Reusch v. City of
Lincoln, 112 N. W. 377, 878, 78 Neb. 828,
]fUHIOIPAI.ITT
See Freeholder of the Municipality.
As owner, see Owner.
Improvement of municipality, see Im-
provement
Other municipalities, see Other.
Private powers of municipality, see Pri-
vate Powers.
"Municipalities" are statutory creaturea
Burke v. State, 119 N. T. Supp. 1089, 1099,
64 Misc. Rep. 558.
"Municipalities" are but mere depart-
ments or agencies of the state, charged with
the performance of duties for and on its be-
half, and subject always to its controL
Straw V. Harris, 103 Pac 777, 782, 54 Or.
424.
"'Municipalities' are agencies of the
commonwealth created by the sovereignty of
the people." Adams v. Oklahoma City, 95
Pac. 975, 979, 20 OkL 519.
A "municipality" is merely an agency in-
stituted by the sovereign for the puri>ose ol
carrying out in detail the objects of govern-
ment essentially a revocable agency, subject
to legislative control "which may destroy lt«
very existence with the mere breath of arbi-
trary decision." In re City of Pittsburg, 66
Atl. 348, 352, 217 Pa. 227 (quoting and adopt-
ing the definition in City of Philadelphia t.
Fox, 64 Pa.
"A 'municipality' is a mere political sab-
divislon of the state." "It is a public corpo
ration having for its object the administra-
tion of a portion of the powers of the govern-
ment delegated to it for that purpose." Pen-
ick V. Foster, 58 S. B. 773, 775, 129 Ga. 217,
12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346.
A "municipality" is an arm of the state,
an effluence from its sovereignty, and is an
instrumentality by which the state seeks to
give its citizens the best government possi-
ble; hence a municipal waterworks system is
of a governmental and public nature, and is
exempt from taxation. Commonwealth t.
City of Covington, 107 S. W. 231. 232, 128 Ky.
36, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1214.
The word "municipality/' as used before
the independence of Texas, comprehended not
only the town but certain adjacent country,
and the square set apart for municipal build-
ings was granted for the use of the people
of the whole district municipality, or pre-
cinct and was not granted to the central or
capitol town alone. City of Victoria v. Vic-
toria County (Tex.) 94 S. W. 368, 371.
The term "municipality" has sometimes
been limited by definition to include munic-
ipal corporation in the proper and strict
sense. But the term is also used by good
authority in a broader sense to include pub-
lic and political corporations which are not
strictly municipal. Hanson v. City of Cres-
co, 109 N. W. 1109, 1112, 132 Iowa, 633 (cit-
ing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4630).
As used in Const art 4, providing that
the referendum may be demanded by the
people, which power is reserved to the legal
voters of every "municipality" and district,
as to all local, special, and municipal legis-
lation of every character in and for thfir
respective municipalities and districts, the
words "municipality" and "district" are eri-
dently expressions of equivalent import for
a district legally created from a designated
part of the state and organized to promote
the convenience of the public at large is t
municipal corporation. The authority ot
such a corporation has been heretofore de-
rived from an act of the legislative assembly
creating it and, as such statute is applicable
to and enforceable in a part of the state only,
it is a local or special law. Acme Dairy Oa
V. City of Astoria, 90 Pac. 153, 154, 49 Or.
520.
MUKICIPALITT
488
HURDBft
A conntr 18 within Ck>n8t art 4, | la, re-
srving the initiative and referendum powers
} the voters of every municipality and dis-
rict, and the people of the several counties
re authorized, by article 9, | la, to regulate
ization and exemptiona within their several
Dunties, as provided by article 4, | la, In a
lanner subservient to any general law whldi
lay be enacted, though the word "district,*'
s used in article 4» | la, has a broader sig-
ification than ''county,** and may designate
territory comprising more than a county,
r containing less area. Schubel ▼• Olcott,
20 Pac. S75, 379, 60 Or. 608.
The original meaning of a ''municipality"
ras a "free town under the Roman S2mpire,
rith powers of local self-government" Its
redBe use now would confine it to subordi-
late subdivisions of the state having powers
f local self-government Dillon, however,
K)ints out in the same section, after stating
he proper signification of the word: "But
ometimes it is used in a broader sense that
Qcludes also public or quasi corporations, the
frinclpal purpose of whose creation is as
in instrumentality of the state, and not for
he regulation of the local and special aflCairs
)t a compact community." Act March 30,
892 (P. li. p. SeO; Gen. St p. 207^, provid-
ng for liens for persons doing labor or fur-
lishing materials under any contract for a
mblic improvement made with any city,
»wn, township, or other municipality author-
zed by law to make contracts for public
mprovements, applies to contracts with conn-
Jes for public improvements. Union Stone
3o. V. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hud-
wn County, 66 Atl. 466, 469, 71 N. J. B^. 657
citing 1 DHL Bfun. Corp. [4th Ed.] p. 89,
120).
Act Mardi 80, 1892 (P. L. p. 869; 2 Oen.
3t p. 2078), provides that any person who,
[>iur8uant to the terms of a contract for any
?ablic improvement in any city, town, town-
ship, or other "municipality," within the
»tate, authorized by law to contract for such
improvement, shall perform labor or fur-
bish materials for the completion of such
contract, shall have a Hen on the moneys
Sue under the contract Held that, where a
county let a contract for the construction of
I county courthouse, the county was a "mu-
nicipality," within such a^t Herman &
Grace ▼. Board of Chosen Freeholders of
Essex County, 64 AtL 742, 71 N. J. Bq. 641.
Seliool distrioi
A special school district is not within
the constitutional provision declaring that no
county, city, town, or "municipality" shall
Issue any interest bearing evidence of in-
debtedness. All corporations intended as
agencies In the administration of dvil gov-
ernment are public, as distinguished from
private, corporations. Cities and school dis-
tricts are public corporations. Cities are
municipal corporations, while school dlBtriefcil
and counties, properly speaking, are not A
municipality is a corporation having the
right to administer local government as a
dty or incorporated town. A schof»l dis-
trict Is merely an agency of state wiUi lim-
ited corporate powers btionging to a class of
corporate bodies known as quasi corporation^.
Schmuts V. Special School Dist of City of
Uttle Bock, 90 8. W. 438, 489, 78 Ark. 118
(citing Memphis Trust Co. ▼. Board of Di-
rectoxto of St FrancU Levee Dist, 62 S. W.
902, 69 Ark. 284; 1 DHL Mun. Corp. | 22).
TowBsMp
Code Supp. 1902, i 2676, provides that
when a controversy arises between munic-
ipalities or boards of health thereof respect-
ing the location of pesthouses, reference shall
be made to the president of the state board
of health, who shall appoint a committae
whose order in the premises shall be flnaL
Code, I 394, declares each county to be a
body corporate for dvil and political pur-
poses, and gives it power to sue and be sued
and other corporate powers. A township is
not expressly declared to be a body corporate,
and has no right to sue or to be sued and
none of the characteristics of a corporation.
Held« that, in view of the evident legislative
intention, a township is a "munidpallty^
within the statute. Hanson v. City of Cres-
00, 109 N. W. 1109, 1112, 132 Iowa, 638.
Villase
A village, as defined in the statute on
elections (Rev. Laws 1906, 1 164), is a "munic-
ipality." State ex rel. Village of Excelsior v.
District Court of Hennepin County, 120 N,
W. 894, 896, 107 Minn. 437.
MURDER
See Assault with Intent to Commit Mur-
der; Ck>mmon-Law Murder.
Willful murder, see Willful— Willfully.
See, also, Express Malice; Intent to Kill ;
KilL
The word "murder^ defines the crime l^
self, and is not a constituent element there-
of. Hocker ▼. Commonwealth (Ky.) Ill S.
W. 676. 679.
"Murder" is an unlawful killing with
malice. Cole v. State, 69 S. B. 24, 26, 2 Ga.
App. 734.
"Murder" is the unlawful killing of a
human bdng with malice aforethought State
V. Tinkler, 83 Pac. 830, 831, 72 Kan. 262;
State V. Ireland, 83 Pac. 1036, 1038, 72 Kan.
265; State v. Wetter, 83 Pac 341, 346, 11
Idaho, 433; State v. Abbott, 62 S. BL 693, 64
W. Va. 411 ; State v. Johnson (Del.) 78 Atl.
606, 2 Boyce, 49; State v. Brown, 60 S. B.
946, 946, 79 8. C. 390; State v. Moore (Del.)
74 Ati. 1112, 1114, 1 Boyce, 142.
Murder is the unlawful killing of a hu-
man creature in being with maUce afore-
JtfUBDEB
484
inTRDBB
thoni^t, either express or Implied. State ▼.
Pepe (Del.) 76 AtL 867, 809, 1 Boyce, 232;
State T. Jackson (Del.) 82 AU. 824, 825; State
V. Stockley (Del.) 82 AtL 1078, 1079; State
y. Moore (Del.) 74 Atl. 1112, 1114, 1 Boyce,
142.
"Harder" is the killing of a human be-
ing by a person of sonnd memory and dis-
cretion with malice aforethought, either ex-
press or implied. State ▼. Mills (Del.) 69
Atl. 841, 842, 6 Pennewill, 497; State y. Wil-
son (Del.) 62 Att. 227, 280, 6 PennewUl, 77;
State ▼. Di Ouglielmo (Del) 56 Atl. 360, 851,
4 PennewUl, 336; Smith y. State, 56 S. B.
475, 126 Ga. 644 (quoting and adopting the
definition in Pen. Code 1895, § 60.)
*'Murder" is the unlawful killing of a
human creature with malice aforethought,
either express or implied, and is of the first
or second degree, as the malice is express or
implied. State ▼. De Paolo (DeL) 84 Atl. 213,
214.
** 'Murder,' at common law, was commit-
ted when a person of sound mind and dis-
cretion unlawfully killed any reasonable crea-
ture in being, in the peace of the sovereign,
with malice aforethought, either expressed or
implied. According to this rule, if one feloni-
ously and with malice aforethought wounded
another, from which wound death ensued
within a year and a day, it was murder, un-
less excuse or Justification was shown. Un-
der our statute, such act would not consti-
tute an element of murder, unless perpetrat-
ed with a premeditated design, to effect the
death of the person killed or of some other
person, but would be embraced within some
one of the lower degrees of homicide." Mor-
ris V. Territory, 99 Pac. 760, 767, 1 Okl. Or.
617 (quoting with approval from Jewell ▼.
Territory, 4 Okl. 63, 43 Paa 1076).
Under a statute defining "murder" as the
unlawful killing of a human being, an indict-
ment charging that the act was done "felo-
niously,** and which omits the word "unlaw-
fully," is sufficient, as the word "feloniously"
includes that which would be charged by the
use of the word "unlawfully.** People ▼. St
Caair, 91 N. E. 573, 244 IlL 444.
"Murder" is the unlawful, willful, and
felonious killing of another with malice afore-
thought, not in the necessary or apparently
necessary self-defense of the slayer. Com-
monwealth V. Mosser, 118 S. W. 916, 133 Ky.
609.
If the killing by a defendant or his aid-
ing or abetting of the killing by another was
done with malice unlawfully and willfully
in sudden affray, it was murder. Watklns
V. Commonwealth, 97 S. W. 740, 742, 123 Ky.
817.
As expressly defined by Pen. Code, 1 187,
"murder** is the "unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought*' People v.
Frank, 83 Pac 678, 579, 2 CaL App. 283.
By Pen. Gode, | 860, '^uidei^ to the on
lawful killing of a hnman being with maKo
aforethought State v. Hliboka, 78 Pac 965
31 Mont 466^ 8 Ann. Gas. 934.
Bev. St 1887, I 6660, defines "murder*
as the unlawful killing of a human beini
with malice aforethought State t. Fhlnnej
89 Pac 634, 18 Idaho, 307, 12 U B. A. (N. S.]
935, 12 Ann. Gas. 1079.
An information charging that accused
unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, premedltat
edly, deliberately, and of hto malice afore
thought shot and killed decedent, a humai
being, sufiadently charges murder as defined
by Rev. Oodes, | 8290, defining murder as th(
unlawful killing H>t a human being wltli
malice aforethought State ▼. Grean, 114 Pac
603, 606, 43 Mont 47, Ann. Gas. 1912G, 424.
An information alleging that accused oi
a specified date did willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously and with maUoe aforethought
assault S., with intent tiien and there to kill
and murder her, was not fatally defective foi
failure to allege that S. was a human b^g,
the term "murder" being defined as the xm
lawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought under Pen. Gode, | 950, snbd
2, providing that an information shall coi^
tain a statement of the acts constituting thi
offense in ordinary and concise language, and
in such a manner as to enable a person ol
common understanding to know what is in
tended. People v. Vaughn, 111 Pac 620, 622,
14 GaL App. 201.
"Murder" in this state is the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice afore
thought Allegations sufficient for a common
law indictment are sufficient tor an informa
tion under the statute defining murder as
above. State v. McGowan, 93 Pac 662, 655,
36 Mont 422 (citing Territory ▼. Stears, 2
Mont 324; State v. Lu Sing, 86 Pac 621, 34
Mont 31).
Where the act of killing another to doni
willfully, feloniously, and with malice otort
thought, accused to guilty of murder. Comba
V. Commonwealth (Ky.) 112 S. W. 658, G59.
A deliberate killing committed in re
venge for an injury infiicted in the past ei
ther near or remote, to "murder." fix parte
Fraley, 109 Pac 296, 297, 8 Oki Gr. 719, 139
Am. St Bep. 988.
"The word 'murder* is a legal and tech-
nical term and implies something more tbas
mere killing, though it includes all the ele-
ments of the latter word, but there to nothing
technical about the word *kilL* It means to
deprive of life; to put to death; to slay."
An allegation that defendant did "kUl and
murder" the deceased to a sufficient allega-
Uon that the latter died. State ▼. Sly, SO
Pac 1125, 11^, 11 Idaho, 110.
Homicide to "murder" when perpetrated
without authority of law and with a pre-
meditated design to effect the death of tbe
MUBDEB
186
MURDER
person killed. Baystnger ▼. Territory, 82
?ac 728, 730, 15 OkL 888.
"AU voluntary felonious homicide, with-
>ut a proTocation, is undoubtedly 'murder.* "
rhe presumption of murder arises from proof
>t voluntary homicide, and, when the killing
s admitted or proved, the burden of proof
s thenceforth on the defendant to excuse or
ustify his act Rutherford v. Foster, 126
red. 187. 190, 60 C. C. A. 129 (quoting and
idopting definition In Fost Grown Law, p.
as).
"Murder" Is distinguishable from every
»ther spedes of homicide by the absence of
Ircumstances which reduce the ofl!ense to
negligent homicide or manslaughter, or which
ixcuse or justify the homidde. Jones v.
Jtate, 96 S. W. 930, 931, 60 Tex. Or. R. 329.
The crime of *'murder" includes the les-
er crimes of second degree murder and man-
laughter. State V. Pepoon, 114 Pac. 449,
^1, 62 Wash. 635.
Under a statute providing that where
in involuntary killing happens in the com-
Qission of an unlawful attack, whidii. In its
onsequences, nalurally tends to destroy the
Ife of a human being, or Is committed in
he prosecution of a riotous intent, or of a
Time punishable by death or confinement in
he penitentiary, the offense shall be deemed
murder,** one indicted for murder may be
onvicted of involuntary manslaughter, where
he evidence on the part of the state would
luthorize a verdict of murder. Chatman v.
;tate, 66 S. E. 360, 6 Ga. App. 564.
In view of Pen. Code 1901, | 172, defin-
og "murder** as the unlawful killing of a
luman being with malice aforethought, an
Qdlctment sufficiently charges murder by si-
eging facts showing the unlawful killing of
. human being with malice aforethought,
without alleging facts bringing it within one
f the statutory degrees of murder; it bdng
or the jury to determine the degree. Wil-
lams V. Territory, 114 Pac. 666, 13 ArlB. 806.
"Murder,** as defined in Pen. Code, ( 187,
iedaring that "murder is the unlawful kill-
Qg of a human beijig with malice afore-
bought,** includes murder in the first degree
nd murder in the second degree. People v.
Jng Ting Bow, 75 Pac. 899, 142 CaL 341 (cit-
Qg People V. De la Cour Soto, 63 Cal. 166).
One is guilty of murder who by felonious-
f severing another's blood vessel causes him
0 bleed to death, where through want of
ssistance decedent is unable to prevent ex-
essive loss of blood. Rlgsby v. State, 91
1 E. 925, 927, 174 lud. 284.
An information in extradition proceed-
Dgs charging accused with ''assault with in-
ent to kill and murder*' sufficiently brings
he offense within article 10 of the treaty
rith Great Britain, authorizing extradition
f persons charged with "assault with intent
0 commit murder.** An assault with intent
to kill and murder is practically the same as
an assault with intent to commit murder,
though the words "to kill" do not necessarily
imply more than the destruction of life,
whidi may have been caused without guilt,
while to commit murder implies killing with
malice aforethought. But the use of the word
"kiU** in the conjunctive with "murder**
shows that it waer intended to charge the com-
mission of the crime of assault with Intent
to kill with malice aforethought. United
States V. Plaza, 133 Fed. 998, 999.
In view of Pen. Code 1901, | 172, defin-
ing murder as the unlawful killing of a
himaan being with malice aforethought, an
indictment charging that accused unlawfully,
willfully, feloniously, and of his deliberately
premeditated malice aforethought made an
assault with a loaded revolver upon R., "a
human being, with the intent, then and there^
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and of his
deliberately premeditated malice aforethought
to kill and murder him, the said R.,*' suffi-
ciently alleged the crime of assault with in-
tent to murder. Williams v. Territory, 114
Pac. 566, 13 Ariz. 806.
Under Pen. Code, H 187, 189, defining
murder as the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought, and defining
murder in the first and second degrees, and
section 192, defining manslaughter as the un-
lawful killing of a human being without mal-
ice, and dividing manslaughter into volun-
tary and involuntary manslaughter, and sec-
tion 274, making it a felony to perform a
criminal abortion, an unlawful killing with
malice aforethought is "murder,** and is also
"manslaughter,** because it is the unlawful
killing of a human being, though it cannot be
logically classed as voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter, and under a charge of murder
by attempting a criminal abortion, a verdict
of manslaughter may be returned. People v.
Hunangtoo, 97 Pac. 760, 762, 8 Cal. App. 612.
Under Pen. Code, §§ 242, 246, 254, declar-
ing that a homicide is either murder, man-
slaughter, excusable homicide, or justifiable
homicide, that homicide is "murder,** when
perpetrated with a premeditated design to
effect the death of the person killed, and that
homicide is "manslaughter," when perpetrat-
ed without a design to effect death, and in
heat of passion, etc., and Oode Cr. Proc i
400, authorizing a conviction of any offense
necessarily included in the offense charged,
the jury may find accused guilty of man-
slaughter in the first degree under an in-
dictment charging murder. State v. Stum-
baugh, 132 N. W. 666, 668, 28 S. D. 50.
An indictment which shows that the
homicide complained of is the result of a
pemeditated design to effect the death of the
person killed, and is without authority of
law, sufficiently alleges "murder.** Cavett v.
Territory, 98 Pac. 890, 893, 1 Okl. Cr. 493.
BiURDEB
486
MURDEB
Under 2 Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St 1903, i
2167, defining "murder" as "homicide when
perpetrated without authority of law and
with a premeditated design to effect the deatli
of the person killed, or of any other human
being," a killing of a human being, perpetrat-
ed without authority of law and with a pre-
meditated design to effect the death of the
person killed, is •'murder." Walcher v. Ter-
ritory, 90 Pac 887, 888, 18 Okl. 528.
"Murder" must be conmiitted by an act
applied to or affecting the person either di-
rectly, as by inflicting a wound, or indirect-
ly, as by exposing the person to a deadly
agency or influence, from which death ensues,
and the working upon the fancy of another,
or treating him harshly or unkindly, by whi<^
he dies of fear, or grief, would not constitute
this offense. State v. McGowan, 93 Pac. 652,
554, 36 Mont 422 (citing Commonwealth y.
Webster, 5 Cush. [59 Mass.] 295, 52 Am. Dec.
711 ; State v. Turner [Ohio] Wright, 20).
If a man shoots at another with the in-
tention of killing him (and such killing if
consummated would be murder), and kills a
bystander or another, he is guilty of the mur-
der of the person killed, whether the killing
of the latter was due to a mistake as to his
or her identity, or to recklessness in the aim
of the one doing the killing. United States
V. Hart, 162 Fed. 192, 197.
Where one shoots with intent to kill an
intended victim, it is immaterial, on a prose-
cution for killing a different person, whether
he saw the person who was killed by the shot
when be fired. Gater v. State, 37 South. 692,
695, 141 Ala. 10.
In an indictment for the murder of one
person, committed with a premeditated de-
sign to effect the death of a different person.
It is not necessary to allege an actual as-
sault upon the person designed to be killed,
under a statute defining murder as the kill-
ing of one human being by another, without
authority of law, and with a premeditated
design to effect the death of the person killed,
or of any other human being. Fooshee v.
State, 108 Pac 554, 559, 560, 3 Okl. Cr. 666.
Under Rev. St 1908, i 1624, the term
"murder" includes all killing perpetrated from
a deliberate and premeditated design, unlaw-
fully and maliciously, to effect the death of
any human being other than him who is
killed, so that where defendant was damaged
in an altercation with two others, and shorts
ly thereafter, when a half dozen or more per-
sons, including these two, were gathered, de-
fendant came around the corner with a re-
volver in each hand, and fired five or six
shots toward the crowd, resulting in the
death of deceased, who was unknown to liim
and only accidentally there, the provision of
the statute is expressly applicable. Ryan v.
People, 114 Pac. 306, 308, 50 Colo. 99, Ann.
Cas. 1912B, 1232.
One who, as heir, would, under Or. O
i 1386, share in the estate of decedent
not, by reason of his conviction of manslai
ter for killing intestate, within section 1'
declaring that no one convicted of "murd
of deceased shall succeed to any of his
tate; "murder" not only being a techn:
word within section 13, requiring such wo
to be construed according to their pecu
or technical meaning, but being precisely
fined by Pen. Ckxie, i 187, so as to excl
manslaughter, and PoL Code, i 4480, reqi
ing, with relation to each other, the pn
sions of the four Codes to be construed
though they were all parts of the same si
ute. In re Kirby's Estate, 121 Paa 370,
OaL 91, 39 L. R. A. (N. a) 1088. Ann. C
19130, 928.
The word "murder" is often used in
dual character of both a noun and a vc
When it is said that A. concealed hinu
with intent to murder B., it is undersb
that his purpose was to commit "murd
upon B., without the use of the verb, "a
mit" Hence a verdict finding defendi
guilty of an assault with intent to "murd
Is not objectionable for fiblure to use
verb "commit" before "murder." Nickles
State, 87 South. 812, 813, 48 Fla. 46.
The statute dividing murder into two
grees has not added to or taken away any
gredients of murd^ at common law, i
every murder at common law is murder un<
the statutes of Alabama. McMahan t. Sti
53 South. 89, 90, 168 Ala. 70.
Deliberation and premeditation
Where, in a prosecution for homid
there was evidence that defendant killed •
ceased deliberately, intending so to do, 1
length of time that such intention existed v
immaterial to make the offense of murd
State V. PoweU (Del.) 61 Atl. 966, 971, 6 P
newill,24.
Under Rev. Codes, i 8290^ defining "mi
der" as the unlawful killing of a human 1
ing with malice aforethought, an informatl
charging accused with willfully, unlawful
and feloniously, and of his "deliberately p
meditated" malice aforethought, killing ano
er sufficiently charged that the killing ^
with malice aforethought, and that the woi
quoted characterized the malice, and not t
killing, was immaterial. Deliberation a
premeditation need not be alleged. State
Nielson, 100 Pac 229, 230, 38 Mont 451.
Under White's Ann. Pen. Code, art 7(
providing that though a homicide occurs i
der circumstances showing no deliberati(
if the guilty person provoked a contest wl
the apparent intent of killing decedent,
doing him serious bodily harm, the offense
not manslaughter, if accused provoked t
contest with the apparent intention of kill!
decedent, or doing him serious bodily injoi
he is guilty of murder, though he may ha
killed him suddenly without deliberation ej
MURDEB
487
MURDEB
to protect his own life, though, if he proToked
the contest without intent to kill, or inflict
serious bodily injury and suddenly without
iellberation killed decedent, the offense might
\>e a lower grade than murder. Keeton t.
State, 128 S. W. 404, 413, 60 Tex. Gr. R. 316w
To constitute "murder,** the homicide
must be committed with the premeditated
lesign, on the part of the accused, to unlaw-
rully take the life of the person slain or som^
:>ther person. Kent v. State, 126 Pac 1040,
1042, 8 OkL Or. 188.
In its last analysis murder in Oklahoma
[Consists in the unlawful killing of a human
being with a premeditated design to effect his
death, or the death of some other person,
rhis premeditated design to effect death must
be established either by direct evidence as a
matter of fact, or it arises as a condusiye
presumption of law in the class of cases men-
tioned in paragraphs 2 and 8 of section 2268,
Oomp. Laws 1909. These paragraphs do not
Btate a rule of pleading to be followed in an
Indictment, but they establish a rule of evi-
dence for the trial Judge in the admission
of testimony and in his instructions to the
iury. Turner t. State^ 126 Pac 462, 467, 468,
B OkL Or. IL
Am felonious l&omioide
See Felonious Homiddew
IfaUeo
To constitute "murder," it \a sufDdent if
the malice existed at the moment of the kill-
ing. State v. Heidelberg, 45 South. 266, 268,
120 La. 800.
At common law the reckless killing of
another with a deadly weapon was murder;
malice being impUed. Bwing v. Common-
wealth, lU S. W. 862, 366, 129 Ky. 237.
Malice is the essence of "murder." In
murder of the first degree such malice must
be express, and may be indicated by all such
facts and circumstances as show a deliberate-
ly formed design to take life. In murder of
the second degree, malice may be shown by
sach cruel acts and conduct as indicate a
reckless disregard of human life, although
unaccompanied with a deliberate design to
take life. In manslaughter there is no mal-
ice. Stote V. Collins (Del.) 62 Ati. 224, 226,
6 Pennewill, 263.
^Ifurder" is the unlawful killing of a
human creature in being with malice afore-
thought, either express or implied; it being
sufficient that the malice is implied from any
unlawful act which in itself denotes a wicked
heart, fatally bent on mischief, or a reckless
disregard for human Ufe. State t. Lee
(Del.) 74 AtL 4, 6, 1 Boyce^ 1&
** 'Murder* does not consist merely in the
Ulling of a human being. The killing must
be done with malice.'* Where, on a trial for
murder, the accused admitted the killing, but
coupled such admission with declarations,
which, if b^eved, showed Justification, no
presumption that the homicide was m^urder
arose f^om such admission. Perkins y. State,
62 S. B. 17, 124 Oa. 6.
"Murder" is where a person of sound
memory and discretion unlawfully kills any
human being with malice aforethought, ei-
ther express or implied. The chief charac-
teristic of this crime, as distinguished from
other homicides, is malice aforethought
State T. Wilson (DeL) 62 Aa 227, 230, 6
Pennewill, 77.
Hie crime of murder is the unlawful
killing of a human creature in being with
malice aforethought, either express or im-
plied. If Hie killing is proTed, it must be
also proved that it was done with malice,
either express or implied, before the person
charged can be convicted of murder; but
sudi malice may be implied from any unlaw-
ful act, such as in itself denotes a wicked
heart fktally bent on mischief, or a reckless
disregard of human life. The deliberate se-
lection of a deadly weapon has been held
to be evidence of maUce, and where malice
exists, together with the killing, the crime
of murder is complete. Btate t. Scott (Del.)
67 Atl. 684, 636, 4 Pennewill, 638.
Under Revisal 1906, i 3631, providing
that a murder which shall be perpetrated by
means of poison, etc., or by any other kind
of willful, deliberate^ and premeditated kill-
ing, shall be deemed "murder in the first de-
gree,*' and that all other kinds of murder
shall be deemed murder in the second degree,
malice is always an essential ingredient of
murder. State y. Baldwin, 68 S. B. 148, 161,
162 N. C. 822.
To constitute •'murder," the evidence
must show that accused thought of it before-
hand, though as to the time it is immaterial
whether it was thought of an hour before-
hand, or a day beforehand, or a minute be-
forehand. If the thought came to the mind
of the accused, "I will kill," and he did kill
immediately after that, the killing is "mur-
der*'; there being malice aforethought Green
V. United States, 104 S. W. 1159, 1160, 7 Ind.
T. 733.
Both before and since the statute divid-
ing the crime of "murder" into two degrees
(Revisal 1906, i 3631), "murder" is the unlaw-
ful killing of another with malice afore-
thought This malice may arise from per-
sonal ill will or grudge, but it may also be
said to exist whenever there has been a
wrongful and intentional killing of another
without lawful excuse or mitigating circum-
stances. The statute does not undertake to
give any new definition of murder, but dasBi-
fies the different kinds of murder as they ex-
isted at common law, and which were before
the statute all included in one and the same
degree. Thus all murder done by means of
poison, lying in wait, etc., or by any other
kind of willful, deliberate^ or premeditated
IfXTRDBB
488
MURDEB
r
killing, or murder done In the effort to per-
petrate a felony, shall be murder in the first
degree, and punished with death. All other
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in
the second degree, and punished by imprison-
ment in the state's prison. But the constit-
uent definition of murder remains as it
was, and in neither degree is it necessarily
required that the unlawful killing should be
from personal ill will or grudge. State t.
Banks, 67 S. E. 174. 176, 143 N. O. 652 (citing
Clark, Or. Law, p. 187 ; State v. Wilcox, 23
S. E. 928, 118 N. O. 1131; State t. Finley,
24 S. E. 495, 118 N. C. 1161).
▲n instruction that when a homicide oc-
curs, and the circumstances are absent which
would excuse or justify the act or reduce it
to manslaughter, the law implies malice, and
the killing would be murder, was a mere ab-
stract statement applicable to all degrees of
murder, as prescribed by St 1898, 8 4365, and
was not erroneous, the court having also
charged that the law presumes that every
person Intends all the natural and probable
consequences of his acts, and when one as-
saults another with a dangerous weapon,
likely to kill, not in self-defense, nor in sud-
den heat of passion caused by provocation
apparently sufficient to make passion irre-
sistible or involuntary, and the life of the
person assaulted is taken in consequence of
such assault, then the legal presumption Is
that death was intended, and the law liiiplies
malice making the Idlling murder, etc. Hedg-
er V. State, 128 N. W. 80, 90, 144 Wis. 279.
KilHiig in eommlMloa of nalawf «1 aet
If an involuntary killing happens in the
commission of an unlawful act, which, in its
consequences, naturally tends to destroy life
of a human being, the offense is murder, un-
der Pen. Code 1895, 8 67. Gadsden v. State,
68 S. E. 497, 134 Ga. 785.
Killing in perpetration of a felony
Under Code, 8 4727, defining "murder"
as the killing of a human being with malice
aforethought, and under section 4728 provid-
ing that all murder committed in the per-
petration or attempt to perpetrate any rob-
bery is murder in the first degree, one who,
with intent to rob, displaced the rails of a
railroad for the purpose of wrecking a train
is guilty of murder, where the train was
wrecked in consequence of his act, «nd a
person named was fatally injured. State v.
Von Kutzleben, 113 N. W. 484, 487, 136 Iowa,
89.
An indictment for murder while com-
mitting robbery, under Code, | 798 (31 Stat
1321, c. 854), providing that one who kills an-
other in perpetrating any offense punishable
by imprisonment in the penitentiary is guilty
of murder, is not demurrable on the ground
that robbery is not punishable by such im-
prisonment; section 810 punishing robbery
by imprisonment for not lees than 6 months
or more than 15 years, and section 934 pro-
viding for Jail imprisonment where the i
tence is for more than 6 months and not
ceeding a year, and for imprisonment in
penitentiary where it exceeds a year. U
ed States ▼. Evans, 28 App. D. 0. 264, '
XansUnsktOT diatingnislied
Voluntary manslaughtier diatinguist
see Voluntary lianslaaghter.
The unlawful killing of another ^
malice is "murder," as distinguished fi
"manslaughter," which is an unlawful kill
without such malice. State v. Lee, 60 S.
524, 625, 79 S. 0.223.
"Murder" and "manslaughter^* are dis
guished, in that malice is essential to the i
mer offense, and by absence of premeditat
or deliberation in the latter. Reed v. Sti
145 S. W. 206, 208, 102 Ark. 525.
While, in <me sense "murder" and "m
daughter" are separate and distinct crin
yet, in a broader sense, they both involve 1
one offense and are simply different degr
of felonious homicide. On an indictment
murder, defendant may be convicted of m
slaughter. Rhea v. Territory, 105 Pac. 3
816^ 8 OkL Cr. 230.
"'Homicide* is 'murder,* unless it
attended with extenuating circumstanc
which must appear to the satisfaction of 1
Jury. If A. assaults B., giving him a seY(
blow, or otherwise making the provocati
great, and B. strikes him with a deadly wei
on, and death ensues, the law, in deferei
to human passion, says this is 'manslauj
ter.* ♦ ♦ ♦ If the provocation be slig
and it can be collected from the weapon us
or any other circumstances that the prisoi
intended to kill or do great bodily harm, a
death follows, it is 'murder.* " State
White, 51 S. E. 44, 48, 188 N. O. 704 (quoti
and adopting definition in State ▼. Smith,
N. O. 488).
If the slayer provoked the combat or pi
duced the occasion in order to have a pi
tense for killing his adversary or doing bi
great bodily harm, the killing^ will be "mi
der,** no matter to what extremity he m
have been reduced in the combat But if
had no felonious intent, intending, for 1
stance, an ordinary battery merely, the fin
killing in self-defense would be "manslaug
ter** only; the distinction being between t
right of perfect and the right of imperfe
self-defense. State v. Kelleher, 100 S. }
470, 475, 201 Mo. 614 (citing State v. Partlo
4 S. W. 14, 90 Mo. 608, 59 Am. Rep. 81).
"Manslaughter** is distinguished froi
"murder** by the absence of malice as a eo
tingent element. If, under the infiuence <
some violent emotion, a sudden intent wi
formed, which on adequate provocation ove
whelmed the reason of the appellant, tb(
the killing was not murder, but manslaugbti
only. State y. Clark, 77 Pac 287, 288, (
Kan. 576.
IffUBDEB
HUBDBB
The chief dlstinctton between 'border"
d '^manslaughter" is deliberation and mal*
I in murder, and the want thereof in man-
lUgbter, and, where the Issue was whether
:used or a third person inflicted the fatal
lund, the error in an instruction that if ac-
aed killed decedent without authority of
V, and not in necessary self-defense, he was
llty of manslaughter, arising from the
dssion of the words "without malice, and
the heat of passion," was not prejudicial,
lest y. State, 52 South. 211, 212, 06 Miss.
I.
Generally it is not "murder" but "man-
Lughter" to kill an officer, or other person,
prevent an illegal arrest. Consequently*
ootlng at an officer without killing him, if
ne to prevent an illegal arrest, is prima fa-
) not an assault with intent to murder, but
B statutory crime of shooting at another,
scribed in Code 1882, 8 4370. Jenkins v.
ate, 50 S. E. 435, 436, 3 Ga. App. 146 (quot-
l with approval from Thomas v. State, 18
B. 305, 01 Ga. 20$.
Under Pen. Code, {{ 187, 180, defining
irder as the unlawful killing of a human be-
? with malice aforethought, and defining
irder in the first and second degrees, and
:;tion 102 defining manslaughter as the un-
^ful killing of a human being without mal-
U and dividing manslaughter into volunta-
and involuntary manslaughter, and section
4 making it a felony to perform a criminal
ortion, an unlawful killing with malice
orethought is "murder," and is also "man-
mghter," because it is the unlawful killing
a human being, though it cannot be log!-
Ily classed as voluntary or involuntary
iDslaughter, and, under a charge of murder
attempting a criminal abortion, a verdict
manslaughter may be returned. People v.
antington, 07 Pac. 760, 762, 8 Cal. App. 612.
"Manslaughter" is an unlawful killing,
ilch becomes "murder in the second degree"
len it has the added element of malice,
ate V. Fowler, 66 S. E. 567, 151 N. C. 731.
"Manslaughter" consists of the unlaw-
1 killing of a human being without malice,
id so, in a prosecution for assault with in-
Qt to commit murder, the accused cannot
convicted if, had his victim died, his
Lme would have only been manslaughter,
ate V. Stockley (Del.) 82 Atl. 1078, 1070.
"Manslaughter" is an unlawful killing in
iger without malice. Proof of prior provo-
tion may exclude the idea of malice in the
mieide, but does not exclude the idea of
^lawfulness. It merely substitutes the ele-
Bnt of anger without malice for the element
malice, thus distinguishing manslaughter
om "murder." Cole v. State, 50 S. B. 24, 26,
Ga. App. 734.
"Murder" in the second degree consists
the killing of another without a formed
»ign to take life, and without provocation
to reduce the offense to "manslaughter," and
under the influence of a wicked or depraved
heart, or with cruel and wicked indifference
to human life. " 'Manslaughter* is where one
in a sudden afTray, in the heat of blood, or in
a transport of passion, without malice, inflicts
a mortal wound, without time for reflection
or for the passions to cool. It is where one
person unlawfully kills another without mal-
ice. In order to reduce the crime to Man-
slaughter,* the provocation must be very
great, so great as to produce such a trans-
port of passion as to render the person for
the time being deaf to the voice of reason.
While 'murder* proceeds from a wicked and
depraved heart and is characterised by mal-
ice, 'manslaughter' results, not from malice,
but from unpremeditated and unreflecting
passion.'* State v. Cephus (Del.) 67 AU. 150,
151, 6 Pennewill, 160.
When a killing is intentional and is not
lawful, it is generally 'Murder*' ; but under
circumstances of provocation, or of mutual
combat. It may be reduced to "manslaughter."
State V. Goldsby, 114 S. W. 500, 503, 215 Mo.
48 (citing 2 Bish. Cr. Law [6th Bd.] § 605).
Murder is where a person of sound mem-
ory and discretion unlawfully kills any hu-
man being under the peace of the state, with
malice aforethought, either express or im- '
plied. The chief characteristic of this crime,
distingulBhing it from manslaughter and ev-
ery other kind of homicide, and therefore in-
dispensably necessary to be proved, is malice
preconceived or aforethought State v. Brinte
(Del.) 58 Ati. 258, 262, 4 Pennewill, 551.
A charge that, where an officer is shot
and killed by one whom he is seeking legally
to arrest, the ofTense is "murder" and not
manslaughter was not erroneous when taken
in connection with the evidence, which waa
sufficient to show that defendant was violat-
ing the law in the presence of the officer, and
that, upon an effort to arrest him, he drew a
pistol and shot the officer. Johnson v. State,
60 S. B. 160, 161, 130 Ga. 27.
In an instruction correctly deflning mur-
der and manslaughter, the statement that,
"You see by these definitions that in murder
malice must exist, but that manslaughter is
the killing of a human being without malice,"
made only to distinguish the two, is not re-
versible error. Prince v. United States, 100
Pac. 241, 242, 3 OkL Cr. 700.
If two persons deliberately agree to flght
with deadly weapons on a subsequent day at
a deflnite time and place, and, both being
armed, meet by chance near the appointed
place and near the appointed time, and with-
out any fresh cause of a quarrel or other al-
tercation one slays the other without juntifl-
cation, the crime is "murder,** and not volun-
tary manslaughter. Bundrick y. State^ 54
S. B. 683, 685, 120 Ga. 753.
i
;;
iim
I
MI7BDEB IN FIRST DEGBBB
490
HUBDEB IN FIRST DEORBB
XUBDEB or FIB8T DEOBEB
As felonious homicide, aee Felonious
Homicid&
"Murder in the first desrree*' is the wiU-
ful« deliberate, and premeditated killing of a
human being. State t. Briggs, 02 S. B. 218,
219, 68 W. Va. 291.
**Murder in the first degree" U the will-
ful, felonious, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought State ▼. Hottman, 94 S. W. 237,
239, 196 Mo. 110.
Willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, without any motive appearing at all,
is murder in the first degree. State y. Jag-
gers, 68 AtL 1014, 1016, 71 N. J. Law, 281,
108 Am. St Rep. 746.
"Murder of the first degree'* is where
the killing was done with malioe afore-
thought State V. Primrose (Del.) 77 Atl. 717,
2 Boyce,164; State y. Roberts (DeL) 78 Atl.
806, 310, 2 Boyce, 140.
To constitute murder in the first degree,
the offender 8 mind must be cool and sedate;
and there must be express malice afore-
thought Dixon y. State, 103 S. W. 39^-401,
61 Tex. Cr. B. 666.
"Murder in the first degree" is defined
'in Bey. St 1899, i 4960, as a purposeful and
premeditated malicious killing. Hollibaugh
V. Hehn, 79 Pac 1044, 1047, 13 Wyo. 269.
To constitute **murder in the first de-
gree," the killing must be done with malice
aforethought, express or implied, and with
willful premeditation and determination.
State y. McKay, 63 S. E. 1069, 1060, 160 N.
0.813.
A homicide committed with express mal-
ice aforethought is "murder in the first de-
gree." State y. Brooks (Del.) 84 Ati. 226, 227.
An indictment charging that accused pur-
posely, feloniously, and with premeditated
malice killed a person named charges murder
in the first degree. Stout y. State, 92 N. E.
161, 162, 174 Ind. 395, Ann. Gas. 1912D, 37.
"Murder of the first degree'* is a killing
done with express malioe aforethought or in
perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a
crime punishable with death. State y. Wig-
gins (Del.) 76 Atl. 632, 634, 7 Pennewill, 127;
State 7. Brown (Del.) 61 Ati. 1077, 1078, 5
PennewUl, 339; State y. PoweU (Del.) 61
Atl. 966, 971, 5 Pennewill, 24; State y. Busso
(Del.) 77 Ati. 743, 745, 1 Boyce, 538; State
V. Mills (Del.) 69 Ati. 841, 842, 6 Pennewill,
497; State y. Samuels (Del.) 67 Ati. 164, 165,
6 Pennewill, 36; State y. Johns (Del.) 65 Atl.
763, 764, 6 Pennewill, 174; State y. Tilghman
(Del.) 63 Ati. 772, 773; State y. Boberts (Del.)
78 Atl. 306, 310; State y. Blackburn (DeL)
76 Ati. 536, 639, 7 PennewUl, 479; State y.
BeU (Del.) 62 Ati. 147, 148, 6 Pennewill, 192.
"Murder in the first degree" occurs
where the killing was done in perpetrating or
attempting to perpetrate a cdnie ponisha
with death* State y. Beese (DeL) 79 AtL S
221, 2 Boyce^ 434.
Murder In the first degree oonsiste in k
ing a human being with malice aforethong
or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetr
a crime punishable with death, where
murder is committed with sedate deliber
mind, and formed design to take Mte. St
y. Adams (DeL) 66 AtL 610, 611^ 6 Pameif
17a
Murder in the first degree is the tak
of human life with express malice afo
thought or in perpetrating or attempting
perpetrate a crime punishable with dea
when the act is done deliberately and wit]
formed design to take life or do some gr^
bodily harm. State y. Collins (Del.) 62 I
22A, 226, 6 Pennewill, 263; Same y. £
(DeL) 62 Aa 147, 148, 6 Pennewill. 1\
Same y. Brown (DeL) 61 AtL 1077, 1078
Pennewill, 339.
Under Ck>de Iowa, | 4728, killing sho
not only to haye be^ done in malice. 1
with deliberation, premeditation, and w
specific Intent to kill, is "murder in the fl
degree." State y. Baldes, 110 N. W. 440, 4
133 Iowa, 168.
An instruction on murder in the secc
degree which fails to state that there mi
be no circumstances of mitigation, Justifl
tion, or excuse is erroneous. Campbell
Territory (Ariz.) 126 Pac 717, 721.
Under L. O. L. | 1893, defining "mun
in the first degree" as a homicide with <
liberate and premeditated malice, or in 1
commission or attempt to commit any ra
arson, robbery, or burglary, the state, cha
ing a killing while in the commission of sc
other offenses, need not proye deliberate
premeditated malice; but fts malice is i
necessarily excluded by su<di other offeni
in which homicide results, defendante a
not complain if the state electa to predict
the murder upon a killing with deliben
and premeditated malice. State y. Hn
phrey, 128 Pac 824, 827, 63 Or. 640.
Under the statute declaring that whoei
purposely and with premeditated mali
kills another is guilty of "murder in the fi]
degree," the intent to kill, the premeditatii
or deliberation, and malice are as much e
menta of the crime as the act of killing, a
each must exist and be established b«yo
a reasonable doubt State y. Pressler,
Pac 806, 808, 16 Wyo. 214, 16 Ann. Cas. I
The statutes define "murder in the fi:
degree" as follows: "Every person who sb
purposely and in his deliberate and preme
tated malice kill another shall be deem
guilty in the first degree." State v. Lii
grind, 74 Pac 666, 666, 33 Wash. 440.
The crime of 'Murder" is diyided into t
degrees in North Dakota, according to t
facta and circumstances attending the U
ftfUBDBB IN FIBST DBGRBB 491 HUBDBB ^^ FIRST DBOBBS
ig, depending upon the presence 6r absence
r deliberation and premeditation. Tbese de-
rees are not distinct crimes but are simply
egrees of murder dependent upon the facts
ttending the killing. There are no degrees
f murder in the first degree; the elements
r murder in the second degree are necessa-
11 y included in the charge of murder in the
rst degree. State ▼. Noah, 124 N. W. 1121,
124, 20 N. D. 281.
Under Rem. & BaL Oode, i 2892, defining
murder in the first degree" as the killing of
human being with the premeditated design
> effect deaths an information alleging that
ccused did, with a premeditated design to ef -
Bct her death, kill and murder a spedfled
erson, is sufficient, without alleging that the
erson died. State y. Jahns^ 112 Pac 747,
1 Wash. 630.
Where death naturally ensues f^om the
orce, manner, or instrumentality of a chas-
Isement, and the chastisement is made re-
ardless of its probable result in death, the
ury may oonyict of murder in the first de-
ree. Bosemond y. State, 110 S. W. 229, 230,
6 Ark. 100.
Where accused entered into a plot with
nother, by which the latter was to do the
illing, while he was to wait at some little
istance from the house to allow the murder-
r to escape, and then to set fire to the house,
nd the plot was carried out, accused could
e convicted of murder in the first degree.
Commonwealth y. Johnson, 66 AtL 233, 235,
17 Pa. 77.
One who kills another, who is approach-
Qg in a friendly manner, with no weapon in
is hand, and making peaceable overtures, by
booting at him, both at dose range and after
e has fied across the street and into another's
lOuse, is guilty of murder in the first degree.
;tate y. WUliams, 84 S. W. 924, 927, 186 Mo.
28 (citing State y. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13 ; State
. Ellis, 74 Mo. loc. dt 218, 219; State y.
tobinson, 73 Mo. 306; State y. McEenzie,
6 S. W. 1015, 177 Mo. 699).
Where defendant, haying manifested ez-
ress antecedent maUce against deceased, fol-
Dwed him down a creek, in which he and his
rife were fishing, and without any cause shot
Im to death, and threw his body into the
reek, and there were no mitigating drcum-
tances^ he was properly eonyicted of murder
Q the first degree. Young y. State, 84 S. W.
22, 47 Tex. Or. R. 530.
The killing of a human being in the
Perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the
Time of arson is *'murder in the first degree.**
^udwig y. State, 85 N. B. 845, 847, 170 Ind.
^48.
An instruction that all murder commit-
ed with express malice is "murder in the
list degree," and that all murder commit-
«d in the perpetration of robbery is "murder
in the first degree,** is correct Ransom r*.
State CTez.) 70 S. W. 960, 963.
An indictment charging the commission
of murder by accused while engaged in per-
petrating a burglary charges murder In the
first degree. Stout y. State, 92 N. B. 161,
162, 174 Ind. 896, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 87.
A murder which is perpetrated by poison,
lying in wait, or any other kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing is mur-
der in the first degree. State y. Abbott, 62
S. B. 693, 64 W. Ya. 411.
All murder which is perpetrated by
means of poison, or lying in wait, torture, or
by^ny kind of willful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated killing, or which is conmiitted in
the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a
felony, is "murder of the first degree.** State
y. Hllboka, 78 Pac 965, 31 Mont 455, 8 Ann.
Cas. 934.
Rey. St I 6808, provides that whoso-
ever purposely and either of deliberate and
premeditated malice or by means of poison
or in perpetrating or attempting to perpe-
trate any rape, arson, robbery or burglary
kills another is guilty of "murder in the
first degree.*' State v. Schiller, 70 N. B. 505,
506, 70 Ohio St 1.
Pen. Code 1901, i 173, providing that all
"murder^ which Is perpetrated by means of
poison, etc., shall be murder in the first de-
gree, and all other kinds of murder are in the
necond degree, does not prescribe that aU
"killing** perpetrated by means of poison is
murder in the first degree, but that all **mur-
der" 80 perpetrated is so; the word "murder"
being used to denote all that is covered by
section 172, defining murder as the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought, etc Bytinge v. Territory, 100 Pac
443, 445, 12 Ariz. 131.
By Rev. St 1887, i 6562, "murder of the
first degree** includes all murder "which is
performed by means of poison, or lying in
wait, torture, or by any other kind of will-
ful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or
which is conmiitted in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate arson, robbery, bur-
glary, or mayhem.*' State y. Phinney, 89
Pac 634, 13 Idaho, 307, 12 K R. A. (N. 8.)
985, 12 Ann. Cas. 1097.
Pen. Code, i 189, provides that murder
committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate arson, robbery, rape, burglary, or
mayhem Is murder in the first degree. Held,
that it is immaterial on a trial for such a
murder whether the killing was willful, dc^-
liberate, and premeditated, or absolutely ac-
ddentaL People y. MUton, 78 Pac 549, 146
CaL 169.
Where two persons acting together arm-
ed themselves and broke into a dwelling to
rob it, and were, when discovered, engaged,
one in robbing the house and the other in
MUBDBB IN FIRST DBGRBB
492
MURDBB IN FIRST DBQRBB
watching, and one of them killed an coca-
pant of the dwelling in their attempt to es-
cape, both were guilty of "murder in the
first degree,'* under Pen. Code, 1 183, defining
murder in the first degree as murder commit-
ted by a person "engaged in the commis-
sion of, or in an attempt to commit, a felony."
People V. Giro, 90 N. E. 432, 434, 197 N. Y.
162.
"Murder in the first degree," as defiijed
by Comp. Laws 1897, { 1063, is "all murder
which shall be perpetrated by means of poi-
son or lying in wait, torture, or by any
kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, and which is committed in the perpe-
tration or attempt to perpetrate any felony,
or perpetrated from any dellber^e design un-
lawfully and maliciously to effect the death
of any human being, or perpetrated by any
act greatly dangerous to the lives of others,
and Indicating a depraved mind regardless
of human life." Territory v. Hendricks, 84
Pac 523, 524, 13 N. M. 300.
Under Rev. St 1899, { 1815 (Ann. St
1906, p. 1258), providing that every homldde
committed in perpetration or attempt to per-
petrate robbery shall be deemed murder In
the fii^st degree, where poison was adminis-
tered willfully and deliberately in the perpe-
tration of a robbery and death ensued, mal-
ice aforethought and premeditation were not
elements of the offense, and it was unnec-
essary for the court to define such terms in
the instructions. State v. Daly, 109 S. W.
53, 57, 210 Mo. 664.
Crimes and Punishments Act, i 17 (Comp.
Laws, $ 4672), making all murder by poi-
son, lying in wait, or torture, or any other
kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing, or committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, rob-
bery, or burglary, murder in the first degree,
does not create separate statutory homicides,
but the killing of a human being in either
one of the methods described is "murder in
the first degree," and a felony and a homi-
cide committed in perpetrating or attempt-
ing to perpetrate a felony constitute together
the one crime of murder in the first degree.
State V. Mangana, 112 Pac 693, 696, 33 Nev.
511.
Under Pen. Code 1895, art. 711, provid-
ing that murder committed in the perpetra-
tion or in the attempt at the perpetration of
arson, rape, robbery, or burglary is "murder
in the first degree," etc, an indictment for
murder which alleges in different counts that
the murder was committed in the perpetra-
tion of arson and in the perpetration of bur-
glary, and which alleges malice aforethought,
sufHclently advises accused of the character
of the charge against him; and it is not nec-
essary to define with particularity the con-
stituent elements of the offenses of arson or
burglary, or what accused was doing at the
time he committed the murder, further than
that the same was conmiitted in the perp
tratlon of arson and burglary. Jones t. Stat
110 S. W. 741, 742, 68 Tex. Or. R. 131, 11
Am. St Rep. 776.
Where the evidence tends to prove tin
a murder was committed by means of pc
son, lying in wait, imprisonment, or tortui
or In perpetration or attempt to perpetra
any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or oth(
felony, and where there is no evidence i
prove murder in the second degree or mai
slaughter, the trial judge should instruct tl
Jury that it is their duty to render a verdl
of guilty of "murder in the first degree,"
they are satisfied beyond a reasonable dout
or of not guilty. State v. Spivey, 66 S. ]
995, 998, 999, 161 N. C. 676.
P. L. 1898, p. 824, { 107, declares thi
"murder which shall be perpetrated by meai
of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any oth<
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditate
billing, or which shall be committed in pe
petrating, or attempting to perpetrate, ai
arson, burglary, rape, robbery or sodom
shall be 'murder in the first degree'; and a
other kinds of murder shall be murder in tl
second degree." In this istatute the two coi
Crete cases of murder in the first degree, an
the general description of the cognate clai
that immediately follows, are all based upc
the existence of a certain condition of mii
in the perpetrator of the murder, which, t
to the concrete instances, is described by re
erence to the means employed or the met)
od adopted, viz., by poison or by lying 1
wait, and as to the general class that fo
lows, by the use of descriptive words of whlc
the two concrete cases are something moi
than apt illustrations, being, by force of tl
word "other," criteria controlling the seni
in which the more general terms are emplo:
ed. It is clear, therefore, that murder, whet)
er resulting under the special circumstance
first detailed or evincing the state of mil
afterwards described, is "murder in the fir
degree," without regard to any extraneoi
consideration, and that the determining el
ment in either case is the existence of tl
reprobated state of mind in the murdere
and not the measure of success that attende
its accomplishment. The court correctly Ij
structed that, if the death of R. results
from a pistol shot intended by the defendai
for another person, defendant's guilt and tl
degree of guilt was to be determined preci.*
ly the same as if the bullet had killed tl
person for whom It was intended. State
Bectsa, 58 Atl. 933, 985, 71 N. J. Law, 322.
BalUnger's Ann. Codes & St § 68(
(Pierce's Code, { 2091), abolishes all forms (
pleading in criminal acts theretofore exls
ing. Section 6850, subd. 6 (Pierce's Code,
2103), provides that an information shall 1
sufficient if it cah be understood therefroi
that the act or omission charged is clearl
and distinctly set out in ordinary, languag
MUBPBB IN FIRST DEGREE 403 MURDER IN FIRST DEORBB
ithout repetition, and so as to enable a per-
m of common understanding to know what
intended. Section 7035 (Pierce's CJode, |
K/4) defines murder in tlie first degree as
le killing of another purposely and of de-
t>erate and premeditated malice, or in the
jrpetration or attempt to perpetrate rob-
^ry, burglary, etc Held that the words,
Ltte^pt," "robbery," "burglary," as used in
le &:tatute, have a well-defined legal mean-
.g, and in drawing an information charg-
ig murder in the first degree, if the perpe-
aUon or attempt to perpetrate the included
Imes is pleaded in the language of the stat-
:e without setting forth the acts constitut-
ig the crimes, it is a sufiScient compliance
Ith section 6850 (Pierce's Ck>de, 8 21C»).
tate V. Fillpot, 98 Pac. 659, 661, 51 Wash.
13.
An information, on thd oath of the pros-
siting attorney, alleging that on January
t, 1905, in P. county, lio., defendants did
ake an assault on deceased, and did felo-
oosly, willfully, deliberately, premeditated-
, and of their malice aforethought shoot de-
ased with a pistol loaded with bullets and
mpowder, thereby inflicting on deceased a
ortal wound described, of which deceased
lortly thereafter died, was sufficient to
Large first-degree murder. State v. Barnett,
t2 S. W. 506-509, 203 Ma 640.
"Murder in the first degree," as defined
f Pen. Ck)de, { 1044, subd« 1, is the IdlUng of
human being when committed '*from a de-
^rate and premeditated design to effect the
Ath of the person killed, or of another,"
broad enough to embrace murder in the
<»nd degree, as defined in the same statute,
eople T. Schleiman, 90 N. B. 950, 952, 197
. Y. 383.
Under Rev. Codes, U 8290, 8292, 8295,
iflning murder as the unlawful killing of a
mian being with malice aforethought, and
nrder in the first degree as all murder per-
itrated by any kind of willful, deliberate,
id premeditated killing, and manslaughter
I the unlawful killing of a human being
Ithout malice, murder in the first degree
eludes manslaughter, and an information
larging murder Justifies a conyiction of
andaughter within section 9826, authoriz-
g the Jury to convict of a lesser offense in-
aded in the offense charged. State v.
rean, 114 Pac. 603, 605, 43 Mont 47, Ann.
is. 1912C, 424.
Where, on a trial for homicide, the evi-
nce showed that decedent had assaulted
xnised, and the court charged that willful,
^liberate, malicious, and premeditated kill-
ig Is "murder in the first degree," and that
the assault by decedent was sufficient to
rouse in accused passion, and that while un-
*r its influence he killed decedent, he was
Jllty of voluntary manslaughter only, an
istructlon that if sufficient time elapsed for
xiised's passion to subside before the kill-
ing, and if accused deliberately drew a pis-
tol and shot deoedent with malice afore-
thought, and with the intent to take his life,
accused was guilty of ''murder in the flrst
degree" was not erroneous for falling to
state the elements constituting murder in the
flrst degree. Duckworth t. State, 97 S. W.
280, 281, 80 Ark. 860.
An instruction on a trial for homicide
that murder in the flrst degree consists in
the taking of a human life with intent to
kill and with deliberation and premeditation;
that it is not necessary that deliberation and
premeditation should continue for an hour
or for a minute, but that it Is enough that
the design to kill be fully formed and pur-
posely executed; and that the elements con-
stituting the crime are an Intent to kill and
an execution of that Intent with deliberation
and premeditation — ^properly deflnes murder
in the flrst degree. State y. Lang, 66 Atl.
942, 945, 76 N. J. Law, 1.
An indictment for homicide charging that
accused feloniously, willfully, deliberately,
premeditatedly and of his malice afore-
thought assaulted deceased with a pistol,
which he feloniously, willfully, deliberately,
premeditatedly and of his malice afore-
thought discharged against and upon him,
thereby feloniously, willfully, deliberately,
and premeditatedly striking, penetrating, and
mortally wounding deceased, of which mor-
tal wound he instantly died, sufficiently
charges the offense of murder in the first de-
gree. Stete V. Clay, 100 S. W. 439, 441, 201
Mo. 679.
An Instaruction that if the jury believes
from the evidence that the defendant shot
and killed Lw as charged, and that at the
time, or before the shot was fired, the de-
fendant had formed in his mind the willful,
premeditated, and deliberate design or pur-
pose to take the life of the deceased, and
that the shot was fired in furtherance of that
design or purpose, and without any Justifi-
able cause or legal excuse therefor, as ex-
plained in these instructions, then the Jury
should find the defendant guilty of "murder
in the first degree" sufficiently d^ines that
offense. State v. McCarver, 92 S. W. 684,
691, 194 Mo. 717.
(Domp. Laws 1907, { 4159, defines murder
as "the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought" Section 4161
maked a killing committed in an attempt to
perpetrate robbery murder in the first degree.
An information for murder alleged that ac-
cused "unlawfully, willfully, feloniously, ^de-
liberately, premeditatedly, and of his malice
aforethought, and with the specific Intent to
take the life" of a person named, shot and
killed him. The undisputed evidence at the
trial showed that the murder was committed
during an attempt to perpetrate a robbery,
and the evidence of accused was to the ef-
fect that the kiUing was due to an unlnleii-
MUBDBB IN FIRST D1DGBB& iM MUBDBB IN FIB6T DEQ|BUSE
tlonal disdiarge of his pistoL Tbe state ad-
duced eyldenoe tbat the klUing was willfol
and intentioDal, and occorred daring tbe at-
tempt to perpetrate a robbery. Held, that It
was not error for tbe court to instruct tbat
though tbe killing was done in perpetrating
or in an. attempt to perpetrate a robbery, and
though the information contained no allega-
tions of the killing under such circumstances,
nevertheless the accused could, under the al-
legations contained in the information, be
convicted of first degree murder. State v.
Thome, U7 Pac. 58, 60, 89 Utah, 208.
In a prosecution for statntory murder in
the first degree^ the state claimed that accus-
ed killed deceased with premeditated design.
The court charged tbat premeditated design
was simply an intent to kill, that ''design"
meant 'intoit,'* and that both words implied
premeditation, that premeditation did not ex-
clude sudden intent, and tbat whether it be
described by the words "actual intent," "de-
sign," or "premeditated design" was immate-
rial; that the intent was understood to be
premeditated because without mental action
the purpose could not be formed ; that, when
there were no circumstances to prevent the
presumption, the law would presume that the
unlawful act was intentional and malicious;
that, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, he who takes the life of another by
some act naturally calculated to produce
death would be presumed to have intended
that result and to be guilty of murder in the
first degree, it being presumed that such per-
son intended the result that followed, and
must be guilty of murder in the absence of
evidence that the homicide was justifiable or
excusable or such as to raise a reasonable
doubt on the question; thus that where ac-
cused fired a shot, the weapon being aimed
at a vital part of the body, and death ^isued
as a natural result, the presumption of fact
as to the Intention to take life, in the ab-
sence of any explanatory circumstances,
makes a prima fade case for the prosecution,
the state not being required to negative any
probability that there were circumstances re-
ducing the homicide below that of murder
in the first degree, or excusing or justifying
it Held, that such diarge was correct in so
far as it related to statutory murder in the
first degree under the facts proved. Hedger
V. State, 128 N. W. 80, 90, 144 Wis. 279.
Pen. Code 1895, art 710, provides that
every person who shall unlawfully kill any
person with malice aforethought, either ex-
press or implied, shall be guilty of murder,
and that all murder committed in the per-
petration of robbery is murder in the first de-
gree, and that all murder not of the first de-
gree is murder of the second degree. White's
Ann. Code Cr. Proc. art 554, provides that, if
the defendant pleads guilty, he shall be ad-
monished of the consequences of such plea,
and no such plea shall be received unless it
appears that he is sane and 1b oninfiuenced
by fear or hope of pardon. Artide 555 i
vldes that where a defendant in a case
felony persists in pleading guilty, if the p
Ishment of the offense is not absolutely fi:
by law, a jury shall be impaneled to ass
the punishment on evidence submitted
enable them to decide thereon. Pen. Gc
1895, art 712, provides that if a per
pleads guilty to murder, a jury shall be si
moned to find of what degree of murder h<
guilty. Held, that when an accused plea<
guilty of murder, and his plea was accep
by the court after examination, and evlde
was introduced before a jury which c
cluslvely showed that the murder was c<
mitted in the perpetration of robbery,
court was not compelled to submit the is
of second degree murder, under article 1
Neither was the court in error in not defin
for the jury murder in tbe first degree. Mil
V. State, 126 S. W. 864, 58 Tex. Cr. B. 600.
Dellberatlom aad premeditation
Deliberation, as an element of first
gree murder, is established if accased I
time for thought and, thinking, though 1
for a moment did intend to kill, and in t
did kilL State v. Russo (DeL) 77 Aa 7
745, 1 Boyce, 588.
To constitute "murder in the first
gree," there must be, not only an intait
to kill on the part of the slayer, but th(
must be a premeditated design to kill
efTect death. Keigans ▼. State, 41 South. 8
887, 52 Fla. 57.
'Murder of the first degree" is when
homicide is committed with sedate, deUben
mind and formed design to kill, though 1
deliberate and formed design exist only fbi
moment State v. Harmon (DeL) 60 AtL 8(
868, 4 PennewiU, 580; State ▼. Blackbi
(Del.) 75 AtL. 536, 539, 7 Pennewill, 479.
A homicide committed under such c
cumstances that the law implies malice is i
always murder in the first degree, but
such only where there exists at the time
the part of accused a premeditated design
effect the death of the person killed or of a
human b^ng. Hedger v. State, 128 N. W. :
90, 144 Wla 279.
"Murder in the first degree" is not <
termined by a design to kill, unless that <
sign originated in, or resulted from, a sede
deliberate mind, or in other words, at i
time the design is formed, the noind must
calm, sedate, and deliberate. Wynne
State, 127 S. W. 197, 199, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 3
(citing Farrer v. State, 42 Tex. 271).
To constitute "murder in the first degre
there must be both an intent to kill and a <
liberate and premeditated design to kj
which design must precede the killing
some appreciable space of time. It ne
not be long, but it must be sufficient for soi
refiection on the matter and a choice to b
or not to kill. People y. Boggiano, 72 N.
101, 179 N- y. 267.
MURDBB IN FIRST DEOREB
496
MURDBB IN FIRST DBORBB
To constitute '*morder In the first de-
ee,** tbe killing most be willful, premedltat-
i, and deUberate, but willful intent, pre-
editatlon, or deliberation need not exist for
\y prescribed length of time before the
Ime is committed; it is sufficient that there
premeditation and design to kill distinctly
rmed in the mind at any time before or
the time the shot is fired. State v. McMnl-
1, 71 S. W. 221, 224, 170 Mo. 60&
The law defining **marder in the first de-
ee*' does not fix any InTariable role as to the
Dgth of the time that must elapse between a
rmed design to kill and its execution, but
Lly requires that the killing must hare been
^liberate and that a formed design to kill
Isted. Snowberger t. State, 126 S. W. 878,
12, 58 Tex. Or. R. 680.
If one actually forms the purpose mal-
lously to kill another, and deliberates and
"emeditates upon it, and then does the act,
i commits "murder in the first degree," no
atter how short the time may have been,
but the time necessary for one thought to
How another between the purpose and its
[ecution. Wickham ▼. People, 08 Pac. 478,
tl, 41 Ck>lo. 845.
To constitute "murder in the first degree**
is not essential that there should be any
)preciable space of time between the intent
> kill and the act of killing; i. e., any in-
rral "capable of being appreciated or duly
timated." The intent to kill must be form-
1 deliberately and with premeditaticm ; but,
hen 80 formed, there need be no appreda-
e space of time between the intent and
le act People ▼. Suesser, 75 Pac. 1003,
m, 142 Gal. 354.
To constitute "murder in the first de-
ree," there need be no appreciable space of
me between the intention to kill and the
:t of killing — ^they may be as instantaneous
) successive thoughts of the mind — and it is
lly necessary that the act of killing be pre-
Kled by a concurrence of will, deliberation,
ad premeditation; and where such is the
ise, the killing is murder in the first degree,
> matter how rapidly the acts of the mind
ay succeed each other, or how quickly they
i&j be followed by the act of killing. People
Tee Foo, 89 Pac. 450, 452, 4 Cal. App. 730.
A killing in a combat which engenders
Dt blood is not "murder in the first degree,"
I the absence of premeditation. Osburn y.
tate, 73 N. E. 601, 604, 164 Ind. 262.
"In order to constitute 'murder in the
ret degree,' where only the question of mal-
« is involTed, and not robbery, or some of
lose extraneous matters made murder in the
rst degree by the statute, the intent to
UI must be formed in a mind that is cool,
eliberate, and sedate. The intent to kill,
)rmed in a mind that is not cool, deliberate,
Dd sedate, is not murder in the first degree."
ianning T. State, 86 8. W. 1149, 48 Tex. Cr.
1.55.
It ii not necessary, under our statute. In
order to constitute murder in the first degree,
that the murder should be committed by
means of poison, or by lying in wait, or that
it shall be committed in the perpetration or
attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, or mayhem ; but any kind of willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing. Is "mur-
der in the first degree.** A murderous pur-
pose to draw some one into a dispute, and
then strike him down with a deadly weapon,
is sufficient to support a finding that the hom-
icide was deliberate and premeditated. State
T. Vinso, 71 S. W. 1084, 1037, 171 Mo. 576
(quoting and adopting State ▼. Fairlamb, 25
S. W. 897, 121 Mo. loc dt 144).
"To constitute 'murder in the first degree*
there must have been an unlawful killing
done, purposely and with deliberate and pre-
meditated malice. If the person has actu-
ally formed the purpose maliciously to kill
and has deliberated and premeditated upon
it before he performs the act, and then per-
forms it, he Is guilty of murder in the first
degree, however short the time may hare
been between the purpose and its execution.
It Is not time that constitutes the distinctive
difference between murdor in the first degree
and murder in the second degree. An un-
lawful killing with malice, deliberation, and
premeditation constitutes the crime of mur-
der in the first degree. It matters not how
short the time, if the party has turned it
over in his mind and weighed and deliberated
upon It" Reed v. State, 106 N. W. 649, 651,
75 Neb. 509.
"In order to warrant a verdict of "mur-
der in the first degree,* malice must be shown
by the evidence to have existed (that is, the
jury must be •satisfied from the evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the killing
was a consummation of a previously formed
design to take the life of the person killed,
and that the design to kill was formed de-
liberately with a sedate mind; that is, at
the time when the design was formed, the
mind of the person killing was self-possessed
and capable of contemplating the consequenc-
es of the act proi>osed to be done) . There is,
however, no definite space of time necessary
to intervene between the formed design to
Idll and the actual killing ; a single moment
of time may be sufficient ; all that is required
is that the mind be cool and deliberate in
forming ita purpose, and that the design to
kill is formed." Gregg v. State (Tex.) 100 S.
W. 1161, 1163.
Rev. Laws, c 207, 1 1, declares that mur-
der committed with deliberately premeditat-
ed malice aforethought, or in the commission
or attempt to commit any crime punishable
with imprisonment for Ufe, or committed
with extreme atrocity or cruelty, is murder
in the first degree, and punishable with death.
In a prosecution for such offense, the court
diarged that the words "deliberately pre-
I
MURDBB IN FIRST DBGREB
496
MURDER IN FIRST DBGRBB
I
^']
meditated malice aforethought" meant Bimply
"thought upon, resolved upon beforehand, not
a thing done suddenly, not a thing that cornea
into the mind of a sudden, and is done be-
fore there is time to think about it, but a
thing thought upon or planned some time be-
fore, or thought upon long enough before the
act is done so that it can reasonably be said
to have become a purpose of the mind," that
''no particular length of time is necessary"
and illustrated the same by stating that if a
robber with a dirk or pistol turns a corner
and meets a bank messenger with a roll of
bills, and determines in one moment to get it,
and the next shoots or stabs the messenger
dead, takes the package, and flees, hts mal-
ice was deliberately premeditated, though it
occupied only a few seconds to accomplish.
Held, that both the definition and illustration
were proper. Commonwealth v. Tucker, 76
N. B. 127, 138, 140, 141, 180 Mass. 467, 7 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1056.
An instruction that, to constitute ''mur-
der in the flrst degree,'' there must be proof
of malice and premeditation, and that if ei-
ther of these elements Is absent there can be
no conviction for that grade of homicide, that
a '^premeditated design or purpose'* is one
resulting from thought and reflection, a de-
sign conceived and aftwwards so deliberat^y
considered as to become resolved and fixed,
that when the design to take human life is
formed after deliberation, and there Is ade-
quate time and opportunity for deliberate
thought, then, no matter how soon the felo-
nious killing follows the formation of the
settled purpose, it is murder in the flrst de-
gree, that there need be no appreciable space
of time between the formation of the inten-
tion to kill and the killing, but that it Is as
much "premeditation" If it enters Into the
mind of the guilty agent a moment before
the act as if it entered years before, and that
it is only necessary that the act of killing be
preceded by the concurrence of will, delibera-
tion, and premeditation, but that, when there
is no time and opportunity for deliberate
thought, the unlawful killing cannot be mur-
dor in the flrst degree, is correct. Welty ▼.
State and.) 100 N. B. 73, 81.
Intent
"Murder in the flrst degree" cannot be
predicated on the mere existence of an in-
tent to kill at the time of committing the
crime, State v. Mangano, 72 Atl. 366, 367, 77
N. J. Law, 544.
It is not necessary that a prior Intention
to do the act of killing be conceived for any
particular period of time in order to consti-
tute murder in the flrst degree. Ferguson v.
State, 122 S. W. 236, 237, 92 Ark. 120.
If there was a fixed, deliberate, and se-
date purpose to kill, usually termed "specific
intent to take life," willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, although in the course of mu-
tual combat» the offense was 'inorder of tbe
flrst degree." State y. Taylor, 50 & E. 247.
252, 57 W. Va. 228.
To constitute "murder in the first de-
gree," the killing must be intentional, must
be deliberate and premeditated, and no kill-
ing can be murder in the flrst degree unless
the act of kilUng is preceded by a willful, de-
liberate, premeditated, and specific intent to
kilL State v. Marx, 60 Atl) 690, 692, 78 Gonn.
la
Under Biills' Ann. St | 1176, providing
that murder in the perpetration of robbery
shall be deemed murder in the flrst degree,
the intent is immaterial, so that, where aer-
eral conspire to rob, and one of the consphB-
tors commits murder in the perpetration of
robbery, the others are responsible for his act,
though murder was not originally intended.
Andrews v. People, 79 Pac. 1031, 1033, 33
Colo. 193, 108 Am. St Rep. 76.
"Under Code, I 4728, all murder whlcb
is perpetrated by means of poiaon is 'murder
in the ftrst degree.' Hence a Iwmicide com-
mitted by the administration of poison, with
a bad motive or intent, Is murder in the first
degree, no matter whether there was spe-
cific intent to kill." State v. Bums, 99 N. W.
721, 722, 124 Iowa, 207 (citing SUte v. Van
Tassel, 72 N. W. 497, 103 Iowa, 6; State
V. WeUs, 17 N. W. 90, 61 Iowa, 629, 47 Am.
Bep. 822; State v. Bertoch, 88 N. W. 967,
112 Iowa, 195).
The distinctive feature of "murder in tbe
flrst degree" is a willful, deliberate, malidoiis.
and premeditated intent to take life, and, al-
though it is not indispensable that the pre-
meditated design should have existed in the
mind of the slayer for any particular length
of time before the killing, yet to constitute
murder in the flrst degree it is indispensable
that the evidence should show that the kill*
lug was not only done with malice but that
it was preceded by a clearly formed design to
kill, a clear intent to take life. Howard r.
State, 100 S. W. 756, 757, 82 Ark. 97 (cith«
Bivens v. State, 11 Ark. 460; Fitpatrlck v.
State, 87 Ark. 239).
Under CJode, i 4728, providing that the
killing of a human being by means of a will-
ful, unlawful, and felonious administration of
poison is "murder in the flrst degree," an In-
dictment for homldde so committed is not
objectionable for falling to allege a spedfie
intent A homicide so committed cannot con-
stitute murder in the second degree or man-
slaughter, and hence a spedflc intent to kill
is not an essential allegation In the indict-
ment State V. Bobinson, 101 N. W. 634, 635,
126 Iowa, 69 (citing State v. Van Tassel, T2
N. W. 497, 103 Iowa, 9 ; State v. Wtfls, 17 N.
W. 90, 61 Iowa, 629, 47 Am. Bep. 822; Bpps
V. State, 1 N. Bl 491, 102 Ind. 639).
If a person takes the life of another by
an act naturally calculated to produce that
HURDEB IN FIRST DEGBEB
497
MUBDEB IN FIBST DEQBEE
isalt. In the absence of any explanatory dr-
imstanoe or drcumatancee rendering the
>micide excusable or justifiable, or criminal
L some degree less than the highest, or cre-
:ing a reasonable doubt in regard to one of
icb contingencies, the law presumes that he
itejided the result effected, and he is guilty
! murder in the first degree. Cupps y. State,
r N. W. 210, 214, 120 Wis. 504, 102 Am. St
ep. 996.
Pen. C!ode 1901, { 172, declares that *'mur-
;r^ is the unlawful killiug of a human be-
ig with malice aforethought Such malice
express or implied. Section 173 declares
lat all murder perpetrated by poison or by
3y other Und of willful, deliberate, and pre-
editated killing, or which is committed in
le perpetration of certain crimes, is murder
i the first degree, and all other kinds of
urder are in the second degree. Held, that
le word "other" in section 173 was used to
ipply the sense of addition to the enumera-
on; and hence an instruction that it was
[>t essential to a verdict of murder in the
rst degree by poison that there should be
roof that defendant administered the poison
i decedent with a specific intent to kill him
as proper ; malice being implied. Eytin^
Territory, 100 Pac. 443, 445, 12 Ariz. 131.
Penal Law (GonsoL Laws, c. 40) § 1044,
ibd. 1, proYides that the killing of a human
eing is '*marder in the first degree" when
)mmitted from a deliberate and premeditat*
1 design to effect the death of the person
Llled or of another. Subdivision 2 provides
is murder in the first degree when com-
litted without a design to effect death while
i the commission of a felony. Section 610
rovides that, upon the trial of an indict-
ment, the prisoner may be convicted of the
rime charged therein or of a lesser degree
r the same crime. Held, that altiiough mur-
er in the first degree as defined by section
Hi, subd. 1, is broad enough to embrace
lurder in the second degree or manslaughter
\ either degree, where accused was tried for
lurder under section 1044, subd. 2, the power
f the jury to* convict of a lesser degree could
ot be exercised, since an intent to kill is not
necessary ingredient to the crime, and it
Bs enough to show beyond a reasonable
oubt that the killing vras done in commit-
ng or attempting to commit a felony. Peo-
le V. Schleiman, 90 N. B. 950, 951, 197 N. Y.
33, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1075, 18 Ann. Oas.
3&
In a prosecution for statutory murder in
le first degree, the state claimed that accus-
i killed deceased with premeditated design,
he court (barged that premeditated design
fas simply an intent to kill, that "design"
leant "intent," and that both words implied
remeditation, that premeditation did not
iclude sudden intent and that whether it
e described by the words "actual intent"
design,*' or '^premeditated design" was im-
8 WDB.& P.2D Skb.— 32
material; ^at the intent was understood to
be premeditated because without mental ac-
tion the purpose could not be formed ; that
when there were no circumstances to prevent
the presumption, the law would presume that
the unlawful act was intentional and mali-
cious; that in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, he who takes the life of another
by some act naturally calculated to produce
death would be presumed to have intended
that result and to be guilty of murder in the
first degree, it being presumed that such per-
son intended the result that followed, and \
must be guilty of murder in the absence of
evidence that the homicide was Justifiable or
excusable or such as to raise a reasonable
doubt on the question; thus that where ac-
cused fired a shot the weapon being aimed at
a vital part of the body, and death ensued
as a natural result the presumption of fact
as to the intention to take life, in the absence
of any explanatory circumstances, makes a
prima facie case for the prosecution, the
state not being required to negative any prob-
ability that there were circumstances reduc-
ing the homicide below that of murder in the
first degree, or excusing or Justifying it
Held, that such charge was correct in so far
as it related to statutory murder in the first
degree under the facts proved. Hedger v.
State, 128 N. W. 80, 90, 144 Wis. 279.
Blalioe dr motlTe
Malice is an essential element of "mur-
der in the first degree." State v. Beese (Del.)
79 Atl. 217, 220, 2 Boyce, 434.
To establish "murder of the first degree,"
it must be shown that the killing was com-
mitted with express malice aforethought
State V. Borrelli (Del.) 76 Ati. 605, 606, 1
Boyce, 349.
First degree murder is included within
the term "felonious homicide" and malice is
an essential ingredient thereof. State v.
Busso (Del.) 77 Ati. 748, 745, 1 Boyce, 538.
"Murder of the first degree" is where the
killing was done with malice aforethought.
State V. Primrose (Del.) 77 Ati. 717, 719, 2
Boyce, 164.
"Murder in the first degree" occurs where
the killing was done with express malice
aforethought State v. Beese (Del.) 79 Ati.
217, 221, 2 Boyce, 434.
"Murder of the first degree" exists where
the kUling is done with express maUce afore-
thought, and express malice aforethought ex-
ists where the killing is done with a sedate,
deliberate mind and formed design to kill.
State V. Brelawski (Del.) 84 Aa 950, 952.
"Murder of the first degree" is committed
when the killing is done with express malice
aforethought ; that is, with a sedate, deliber-
ate mind, and formed design to kill. State v.
Miele (Del.) 74 Ati. 8, 9, 1 Boyce, 33; State
V. Uzzo (Del.) 65 Aa 775, 777, 6 PennewiU,
f
MURDER IN FIRST DEGREE
498
MURDER IN FIRST DEQREB
212; State y. Short (Del.) 82 Aa 239, 241,
2 Boyce^ 491.
If a person puts poison in flour with in-
tent tliat it shall be cooked and eaten by B.,
but it is eaten by C, who dies therefrom,
such person will be guilty of murder, though
he had no malicg against C. Ohelsey ▼. State,
49 a E. 258, 259, 121 Ga. 840.
An instruction that, if any person in the
perpetration, or in the attempt to perpetrate,
a robbery shall take the life of the person in-
' tended to be robbed, he is guilty of "murder
in the first degree" is erroneous as eliminat-
ing malice. Gates ▼. State, 103 S. W. 869,
860, 51 Tex. Or. B. 449.
"Murder," within Rev. St 1908, | 1024,
cL 4, providing that murder perpetrated by
any act greatly dangerous to the lives of oth-
ers, but indicating a depraved mind regard-
less of human life, shall be "murder in the
first degree," Is such as is committed by an
act greatly dangerous to the lives of persons
other than the one killed, and showing a
reckless disregard of human life; and it
therefore does not include a killing resulting
from intentional shooting of the Individual
slain, and where there is no element of what
is termed ^'universal malice" shown. Longi-
notti V. People, 102 Pac. 165, 168, 46 CJolo. 173
(citing and adopting Darry v. People, 10 N. Y.
120 ; Mitchell v. State, 60 Ala. 2q; Jewell v.
Territory, 43 Pac. 1075, 4 Gkl. 53 ; and Gold-
ing V. State, 8 South. 811, 26 Fla.
Revisal 1905, i 3631, declaring that mur-
der by means of poison, lying in wait, etc.,
or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, or
premeditated killing, shall be murder in the
first degree, and that all other kinds of mur-
der shall be murder in the second degree,
classifies the different kinds of murder at
common law, without giving any new defini-
tion, and the malice essential to constitute
murder in the first degree need not arise
from personal ill will, but may exist where
there has been a wrongful and intentional
killing without lawful excuse or mitigating
circumstances. State v. Banks, 57 S. E. 174,
176, 143 N. C. 652.
Murder may be committed without any
motive. It is the intention, deliberately
formed after premeditation, so that it be-
comes a definite purpose to kill, and a conse-
quent killing without legal provocation or ex-
cuse, that constitutes "murder in the first de-
gree." The existence of a motive may be
evidence to show the degree of the offense, or
to establish the identity of the defendant as
the slayer; but motive is not an essential
element of the crime, nor is it indispensable
to a conviction of the person charged with
its commission. State v. Adams, 50 S. B.
765, 768, 138 N. C. 688.
Mvrder in second des^ee dlstingnlshed
"Murder in the first" and "murder in the
second degree" are distinguished, in that
specific intent to kill is essential to the
fense in the first degree. Reed v. State, ]
S. W. 206, 206, 102 Ark. 525.
The distinction between murder in 1
first and second degrees is that in *'murd»
the first degree" a specific intent to take 1
must be shown, while in murder in the seco
degree it is not necessary to prove such
tent Petty v. State, 89 S. W. 465, 406,
Ark. 515.
Under Kirby's Dig. i 1766, declaring tt
all murder by means of poison, lying in wi
or other malicious or premeditated killing,
which shall be committed in the perpetrati
or attempt to i)erpetrate arson, rape, n
bery, burglary, or larceny, shall be deem
"murder in the first degree," when the fi
of killing alone is proved, it will be presun
that the crime is murder in the second <
gree. Ferguson v. State, 122 S. W. 236, 2
92 Ark. 120.
Where there existe a design deliberati
formed in the mind of accused to take 11
and death ensues from his act, the homid
is "murder in the first degree"; but wh(
there exists no design to take life, but dea
resulto from an unlawful act of violence, a
there is no adequate provocation, the hoi
cide is murder in the second degree. Sti
V. Honey (Del.) 66 AtL 764-766, 6 Pennew
148.
The statute, providhig Uiat all mur^
in robbery or in the perpetration of robb€
is "murder in the first degree,*' eliminal
murder in the second degree in homid
committed in robbery or in the perpetrati
of robbery, and the killing of one in the p
petration of the robbery of another is "mi
der in the first degree." Milo v. State, 1
S. W. 1025, 1029, 59 Tex. Or. R. 196.
Revisal 1905, i 3631, declaring that mi
der by means of poison, lying in wait, et
or by any other kind of willful, delibera
or premeditated killing, shall be "murder
the first degree," and that all other kinds
murder shall be "murder in the second (
gree," classifies the different kinds of mi
der at common law, without giving any n<
definition. State v. Banks, 57 S. E. 174, i:
143 N. C. 652.
The degree of murder under the statu
declaring that murder perpetrated by a
kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditat
killing shall be "murder in the first degree
and all other kinds of murder shall be mi
der in the second degree, depends on t
question whether the crime was willful, c
liberate, and premeditated, and on that qu<
tion it becomes material whether accus
was in such a condition of mind by reas
of intoxication as to be incapable of deliber
tion and premeditation. Brennan v. Peop
86 Pac. 79, 81, 87 Colo. 256.
The characteristic quality of "murder
the first degree," and that which distingui^
MURDER IN FIRST DFXShREB 499 MURDER IN SECOND DEGREE
I It from murder in the second degree or
ly other homicide, is the existence of a set-
ed purpose and fixed design on the part of
le assailant that the act of assault should
suit In the death of the party assaulted ;
lat death being the end aimed at, the ob-
ct sought for and wished. The distlnctiye
laracteristlc of murder in the first degree
premeditation. When the act of killing is
>t done in the commission or attempt to
^mmit some felony nor by poison, or lying
I wait, the killing must be done willfully,
^liberately, maliciously, and with premedita-
on. Turner v. Stete, 108 S. W. 1139, 1142,
L9 T«m. 663, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 988, 123
m. St. Rep. 758, 14 Ann. Gas. 990 (quoting
ale ▼. State, 10 Terg. [18 Tenn.] 561 ; Swan
State, 4 Humph. [23 Tenn.] 136 ; Lewis Y.
tate, 3 Head [40 Tenn.] 148).
A willful, deliberate, and premeditated
Llling, or a killing done in the perpetration,
r attempted perpetration, of robbery, is
murder in the first degree." Otherwise a
Uling is "murder in the second degree,*'
here accused unlawfully and with malice
forethought killed decedent, and in deter-
lining the degree any evidence of the men-
i\ status of accused is proper. State r.
ohnny, 87 Pac 8, 8, 29 Nev. 203.
An unlawful killing, done purposely and
1th deliberate and premeditated malice, is
murder in the first degree," and it matters
ot how short the time may be between the
me of the formation of the purpose to kill
nd its execution, if the person committing
le crime has deliberated upon it "Murder
1 the second degree" consists in an unlaw-
il killing done purposely and maliciously,
at without deliberation and premeditation,
[amblin y. State, 115 N. W. 860, 853, 81
reb. 148, 16 Ann. Can. 569.
The only essential difference between
murder in the first degree" and **murder in
be second degree" is that the former is com-
litted after deliberation and premeditation,
rhich elements do not inhere in the lower
rade of the crime, but all the elements of
mrder in the second degree are included in
tie statutory definition of murder in the
rst degree. To render one who is not pres-
nt and does not aid or assist in a murder
uilty thereof, by reason of a former con-
piracy with the slayer, it must appear that
tie murder was within the contemplation of
tie conspiracy, or was the natural and prob-
ble outcome thereof. State t. Keleher, 87
'ac 738, 739, 74 Kan. 631.
In a prosecution for murder, the court
barged that '"malice is also necessary to
lurder in the first degree. The distinguish-
Qg feature, so far as malice la concerned, is
hat, in murder of the first degree, malice
iQst be proven to your satisfaction beyond a
easonable doubt as an existing fact, while
Q murder of the second degree malice will
le implied from the fact of an unlawful kill-
ing." Held that, if the instructions stood
alone, the latter part of the paragraph might
be erroneous, but as it was followed by an
instructioB defining malice as being that
which the law infers from certain acts, how-
ever suddenly done, as when the fact of an
unlawful killing is established and the facts
do not establish malice beyond a reasonable
doubt, though they tend to excuse or justify
the act, then the law implies malice, and the
murder is murder of the second degree, and
also that if the killing is unlawful and done
with implied malice aforethought, it would
be murder in the ^second degree, the instruc-
tions taken together were correct. Eggles-
ton y. State (Tex.) 128 S. W. 1105, 1109.
The next lower grade of culpable homi-
cide than **murder in the first degree'* is
**murder in the second degree." Malice is
also a necessary ingredient of the offense
of murder in the second degree. The dis-
tinguishing feature, however, so far as the
element of malice is concerned, is that in
murder in the first degree malice must be
proved to the satisfaction of the jury be-
yond a reasonable doubt as an existing fact,
while in murder in the second degree malice
will be implied from the fact of an unlaw-
ful killing. Implied malice is that which the
law Infers from or imputes to certain acts,
however suddenly done. Thus, when the fact
of an unlawful killing is established, and the
facts do not establish express malice beyond
a reasonable doubt, nor tend to mitigate, ex-
cuse, or justify the act, then the law implies
malice, and the murder is in the second de-
gree, and the law does not further define
murder in the second degree than if the kill-
ing is shown to be unlawful, and there is
nothing in evidence on the one hand showing
express malice, and, on the other hand, there
is nothing that will reduce the killing below
the grade of murder, then the law implies
malice, and the homicide is murder in the
second degree. Dobbs v. State, 113 S. W.
923, 927, 54 Tex. Or. R. 550.
MUBDEB IN SECOND BEOBEE
As felonious homicide, see Felonious
Homicide.
All murder not of the first degree is
"murder of the second degree." Waters v.
State, 114 S. W. 628, 632, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 322.
Ry Pen. Ck>de, § 352, "murder of the sec-
ond degree" is all murder which does not
amount to murder of the first degree. State
V. HUboka, 78 Pac. 965, 966, 81 Mont 455, 3
Ann. Gas. 934.
"Murder of the second degree" is all
murder not murder in the first degree^ as
defined by Rev. St 1887, { 6562. State v.
Phinney, 89 Pac. 634, 13 Idaho, 307, 12 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 935, 12 Ann. Cas. 1079.
To render one guilty of "murder in the
second degree," he must have inflicted an
act of violence on decedent which produced
'I I
MURDEB IK SECOND DEGREE 600 MURDER IN SECOND DEQREE
• i i: ■
t^
i
Nil
death, with the intention to kin decedent or
to do an act of violence from which ordina-
rily, in the usual course of events, death or
great bodily harm might result Fowler V.
State, 49 South. 788, 789, 790, lei Ala. 1.
"The law requires that, before a homi-
cide can be 'murder in the second degree,' it
must be unlawfully done, and upon malice
aforethought'* Thomas y. State, 74 S. W.
36, 38, 45 Tex. Cr. B. lU.
Where one person unlawfully kills an-
other with implied malice, the crime is "mur-
der in the second degree." State ▼. Short
(DeL) 82 Aa 239, 241, 2 Boyce, 491.
Killing with Implied malice constitutes
"murder in the second degree"; that is,
where the malice is not express, as in murder
in the first degree, but is an inference or con-
clusion of law from facts proved, where there
is no deliberate mind and formed design to
take life, but where the killing is done with-
out justification or excuse, and without pro-
vocation, or without sufficient provocation to
reduce the offense to manslaughter. State v.
Brooks (Del.) 84 Atl. 225, 227; Same v. Bre-
lawski (Del.) 84 Atl. 950, 952; Same v. De
Paolo (Del.) 84 Atl. 213, 214.
Where the killing with a deadly weapon
was established, or admitted, and the plea
was self-defense, the two presumptions that
the killing was unlawful and that It was done
with malice arose, and, wh^e accused merely-
rebutted the presumption of malice, the pre-
sumption that the killing was unlawful stood.
Justifying a conviction of "manslaughter,"
which is an unlawful killing, which becomes
"murder in the second degree" when it has
the added element of malice. State v. Fowl-
er, 66 S. E. 567, 151 N. C. 731.
Murder in the second degree is the un-
lawful killing of a human being with malice,
but without deliberation or premeditation.
Miller v. State, 40 South. 47, 48, 145 Ala.
677.
"Murder in the second degree" is the un-
lawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought, but without deliberation, pre-
meditation, or preconcerted design to kill.
State V. Bradley, 24 Ati. 1053, 1065, 64 Yt
466.
An instruction that "murder in the sec-
ond degree" is the killing of a human being,
"willfully, premedltatedly, and with malice
aforethought," la correct State v. Myers,
121 S. W. 181, 135, 221 Mo. 59a
"Murder in the second degree" is the kill-
ing of a human being willfully, premedltated-
ly, and with malice aforethought, but with-
out deliberation. State v. West, 100 S. W.
478, 481, 202 Mo. 12a
A killing with malice aforethought, but
without express malice is "murder in the sec-
ond degree." McMeans v. State, 114 S. W.
837, 839, 56 Tex. Cr. B. 69.
"Murder in the second degree" fs consti-
tuted by the absence of express malice upon
one side and extenuating drcumstanoes or
self-defense or adequate cause upon the other.
Wheeler v. State, 121 S. W. 166, 167, 56 Tex.
Cr. B. 647.
"Murder in the second degree" consists
design to take life, and without provocation
of the killing of another without a foriued
to reduce the offense to manslaughter, and
under the influence of a wicked or depraved
heart, or with cruel and wicked indifference
to human life. State v. Cephus (DeL) 67 Aa
150, 151, 6 PennewiU, 160.
Murder in the second degree is a killing
with implied malice ; that is, without design
or premeditation, but under the influence of
a depraved heart and with a cruel and wick-
ed indifference to human life. State v. Uzzo
(DeL) 65 Atl. 775-777, 6 Pennewill, 212.
Murder of the second degree is where
there is no sedate, deliberate mind and form-
ed design to take life, but when the drcnm*
stances show that the homicide waa commit-
ted under the influence of a wicked and de-
praved heart, and with a cruel and reckless
indifference to human life. State v. Harmon
(Del.) 60 Atl. 86e-«68, 4 PennewiU, 580.
"Murder in the second degree" is the kill-
ing of a human being without a sedate, delib-
erate purpose and formed design to take life,
but one which is committed suddenly, with-
out Justification or excuse, and without prov-
ocation sufficient to reduce the crime to
manslaughter. State v. Mills (Del.) 69 AtL
841, 842, 6 PennewiU, 497.
"Murder in the second degree" is where
the kiUing is done with impUed maUce ; that
is, without Justification or excuse or with-
out provocation or sufficient provocation to
reduce it to manslaughter. State v. Tilgh-
man (DeL) 63 AtL 772, 773.
"Murder of the second degree" ia where
there is no deliberate mind and formed design
to take Ufe, but where the kUling is maUcious,
and without Justification or excuse, without
provocation, or without sufficient provocation
to reduce the homicide to manslaughter.
State V. Adams (DeL) 65 Att. 510, 511, 6 Pen-
newiU, 178.
"Murder of the second degree" Is conmiit-
ted when the kUling is done with implied
malice, where there is no deUberate mind or
formed design to take Ufe or to perpetrate a
crime punishable with death, but where the
kilUng is without Justification or excuse, and
without sufficient provocation to reduce the
offense to manslaughter. State v. Miele
(DeL) 74 AU. 8, 9, 1 Boyce, 33; Same v.
Brown (DeL) 61 Ati. 1077, 10^8, 5 PennewiU,
339; Same v. Johns (DeL) 65 Aa 763, 764,
6 PennewiU, 174.
"Murder of the second degree" occurs
where the killing is done with implied mal-
ice; that la, where thend is no deUberate
MURDER IN SECOND DEGREE SOI MURDER IN SEOOm) DEGREE
1(1 or formed design, to take life, but where
killing was done without Jnstlflcation or
nse, or without proTOcation to reduce the
nse to manslaughter. State v. Reese
1.) 79 Ati. 217, 220, 2 Boyce, 434 ; Same ▼.
Fell (Del.) 61 AU. 966, 971, 5*Pennewill, 24.
"Murder of the second degree" is the kiU-
wlth implied malice, inferred from the
is proved, where there is no deliberate
id or formed design to take life, but where
killing is done without Justification or ex-
e, and without provocation sufficient to re-
e the offense to manslaughter. State t.
jso (Del.) 77 Atl. 743, 746, 1 Boyce, 588;
ue V. Roberts (Del.) 78 Atl. 305, 810, 2
ce, 140.
"Murder of the second degree'* is when
killing is done with implied malice, not
h a deliberate or formed design, but with-
Justification or excuse, and without prov-
tion, or sufficient provocation to reduce
offense to manslaughter. State v. Prim-
s (Del.) 77 Ati. 717, 719, 2 Boyce, 164.
''Murder in the second degree" is where
re is no such deliberate mind and formed
ign to take life, but where, nevertheless,
killing is malicious and without Justiflca-
I or excuse, without any provocation, or
bout sufficient provocation to reduce the
nicide to the grade of manslaughter,
te V. Emory (DeL) 58 Aa 1036, 1038, 5
inewill, 12a
Where there is no deliberate mind or
med design to take life, or to perpetrate a
»ital crime, but where the killing is done
bout Justification or excuse, and without
vocation, or sufficient provocation to re-
» the offense to manslaughter, it is "mur-
of the second degree." State v. Borrelli
L) 76 Aa 605, 606, 1 Boyce, 349.
"Murder in the second degree" is where
killing was done with implied malice;
ere there was no deliberate mind or form-
lesign to take life or to perpetrate a crime
lishable with death; but where the killing.
B done without Justification or excuse and
bout provocation, or without sufficient
ivocation to reduce the offense to man-
oghter. State v. Brown (Del.) 61 Ati.
7, 1078, 5 Pennewill, 339.
"Murder in the second degree" is the kiU-
of a human being without a deliberately
med design to take life, or to perpetrate
attempt to perpetrate a crime punishable
h death, but without Justification, excuse,
sufficient provocation to reduce the homi-
e to manslaughter. State v. Collins (Del.)
Atl. 224. 226, 5 Pennewill, 263; Same v.
II (Del.) 62 AtL 147, 148, 5 Pennewill, 192.
"Murder in the second degree" is proved
ere it is satisfactorily shown that the
ling was done with a sedate, deliberate
rpose and formed design to take life, or in
•petratlng or attempting to perpetrate any
me punishable with death, but is usually
shown to have been done suddenly, without
Justification or excuse, and without provoca-
tion sufficient to reduce the homicide to man-
slaughter or in the committing or attempting
to commit a noncapital felony or an act
of violence from which malloe is presumed.
State V. Wilson (DeL) 62 AtL 227, 230, 5
Pennewill, 77.
"Murder in the second degree^' Is con-
stituted by the absence of express malice on
one side and extenuating circumstances or
self-defense or adequate cause on the other;
and where the one who killed another laid
in wait for him and shot him, adequate cause
and self-defense were not in the case, and the
killing could not be lower than murder in
the second degree. Wheeler y. State, 121 S.
W. 166, 167, 56 Tex. Cr. R. 547.
"Murder in the second degree" is defined
in Comp. Laws 1897, {1064, as "every mur-
der which shall be perpetrated without a de-
sign to effect the death, by a person while
engaged in the oommission of a misdemeanor,
or which shall be perpetrated in the heat of
passion without design to effect death, but
in a cruel and unusual manner or by means
of a dangerous weapon, unless it is commit-
ted under such circumstances as constitute
excusable homicide or which shall be perpe-
trated Unnecessarily either while resisting
an attempt by the person killed to commit
any offense against person or property or
after such attempt shall have failed." Ter-
ritory V. Hendricks, 84 Pac. 528, 524, 13 N.
M. 300.
"Murder in the second degree" is : First,
all murder which shall be perpetrated with-
out a design to effect death by a person while
engaged in the commission of a misdemean-
or; or, second, all murder whidi shall be
perpetrated in the heat of passion without
design to effect death, but In a cruel and un-
usual manner, or by means of a dangerous
weapon, unless it is committed under such
circumstances as constitute excusable or Jus-
tifiable homicide; or, third, all murder
which shall be perpetrated unnecessarily, ei-
ther while resisting an attempt by the person
killed to commit an offense against the per-
son, or property, or after such attempt shall
have failed. Ck)mp. I^iws 1897, i 1064. An
instruction that premeditation and malice
aforethought are not elements of the crime
of murder in the second degree, and defining
it as the kiling of a human being by the use
of a dangerous weapon without premedita-
tion and without malice aforethought, is er-
roneous. Territory v. Gutierez, 79 Pac. 716,
718, 13 N. M. 138.
A killing in a combat which engenders
hot blood is not "murder in the second de-
gree," unless the elements of purpose and
malice concur in the act Osbum v. State,
78 N. E. 601, 604, 164 Ind. 262.
To constitute "murder in the second de-
gree" in Texas, the statute only requires that
MUBDER IN SECOND DEGREE 502 MURDER IN SECOND DEGREB
the klllng be done in a passion aroused with-
out adequate cause. Redman y. State, 108
S. W. 365, 367, 52 Tex. Or. R. 591.
If a design to kill is formed in a mind
excited by passion, or disturbed by any in-
adequate cause, and cooling time has not
elapsed before the execution of the design,
the homicide is not greater than "murder in
the second degree." Manning y. ^tate, 85
S. W. 1149, 48 Tex. Or. R. 56.
**Murder in the second degree" is the
wrongful killing of a human being with mal«
ice aforethought, but without deliberation.
It is where the intent to kill is In a heat of
passion, executed the instant it is conceiyed,
or before there has been time for the passion
to subside. State y. Robertson, 77 S. W. 528,
530, 178 Mo. 496.
One who intentionally and premeditated-
ly kills another with a deadly weapon, but
while smarting under the insult and passion
aroused by yile epithets spoken of him in his
presence and hearing by deceased, is guilty
of ••murder in the second degree." State y.
WUliams. 84 S. W. 924, 927, 186 Mo. 128 (cit^
ing State y. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State y.
EUis, 74 Mo. loc. cit 218, 219; State y. Rob-
inson, 73 Mo. 306; State y. McKenzie, 76
S. W. 1015, 177 Mo. 699).
. To reduce a murder from the first to
the second degree, it is not necessary that
the homicide should occur in a sudden trans-
port of passion. A passion is not required
to be sudden, nor is it necessary that there
be a transport of passion, and if the mind of
the slayer is not cool and deliberate when
the intent is formed, but is laboring under
any excitement or passion, this will reduce
the homicide to the second degree. It is an
undue limitation and restriction, calculated
to cause a conyiction of "murder in the first
degree," for a charge on "murder in the sec-
ond degree" to require the jury to belieye
that accused shot decedent in a sudden trans-
port of passion. Kannmacher y. State, 101
S. W. 238, 242, 51 Tex. Or. R. lia
Though deceased brought on the difll-
cnlty by calling defendant names, and struck
the first blow, yet, it having been With his
hands, and he not haying offered to strike
him with anything else, and defendant hay-
ing from the first cut and slashed deceased
with his knife, and continued it after de-
ceased had fallen, mortally wounded, a con-
viction of "murder, in the second degree" is
justified. Hatchell v. State, 84 S. W. 234,
237, 47 Tex. Or. R. 380.
Mere words or epithets, however oppro-
brious or insulting, cannot justify the killing
of the person who uses them, but his killing
by one while in a violent passion aroused by
such language, though not deliberate, is
"murder in the second degree," if done will-
fully, premeditatedly, and of malice afore-
thought State y. Ballance, 106 & W. 60,
64, 207 Mo. 607.
"If a person to whom opprobrious ei
thets or insulting gestures are applied
thereby aroused to a sudden heat of passio
and, before such passion has had time i
cool, with a deadly weapon kills the perse
who applies such opprobrious epithets <
gestures to him, then such killing is doi
without deliberation, and a homicide con
mitted under such circumstances is "murd^
in the second degree.'" State y. Brown, 1
8. W. 1111, 1112, 181 Mo. 192.
Defendant, with another, went into
saloon of decedent, and there proposed i
throw dice for the drinks, and invited dee
dent to throw and also to drink, both (
which decedent refused to do, using at tl
time insulting language toward defendan
Thereupon, after drinking, defendant, wit
his companion, left the saloon. While wall
ing away defendant suggested to his compai
ion that decedent had it in for him (compai
ion) as the reason why he had insulted d<
fendant, to which his companion replied thu
decedent had nothing against him, but tlu
he (defendant) was the man decedent wa
after. Defendant's oompanion then left hln
and about 15 minutes later defendant n
turned to decedent's place with a pistol, an
In a renewal of the difficulty shot decedeni
Held that, if defendant's intent to kfU wa
formed at the time of the first meeting, o
after the conversation with his companioi
and he then went for a pistol, and his mini
was Infiamed by the insulting language el
ther at the time it was spoken or in the sut
sequent conversation with his companion, aix
cooling time had not elapsed before he n
turned and shot decedent, he was guilty o
no greater offense than "murder in the sec
ond degree." Rice v. State, 103 S. W. 115(
1168, 51 Tex. CJr. R. 255.
Our statute declares murders committe
by lying in wait, by poison, and in attemp
to perpetrate certain felonies, and all othe
willful, deliberate, and {Premeditated mui
ders, to be of the first degree, and all othe
kinds of murder at common law, not here!
declared to be manslaughter or justifiable o
excusable homicide, to be "murder in the sec
ond degree." Those murders committed in i
heat of passion engendered, not by what wa
legal provocation at common law to reduce i
homicide from murder to manslaughter, bD
by opprobrious epithets or other insults, snffl
dent to arouse the same heat of passion whid
would be caused by a technical, legal pro?
ocation, are of second degree. An instmc
tion that, if deceased used words toward
defendant whidi were a reasonable provoca
tion for an assault by defendant on deceased
defendant is only guilty of manslaughter h
the fourth degree was properly refused, sine
such provocation by mere words would onl;
reduce the grade of the offense to murder iJ
the second degree, where the party provoker
used a deadly weapon with which he killer
his opponent State y. Gartrell, 71 S. W
i
MURDER m SECOND DEORBB 603 MUKDKt IN SECOND DEGRBB
15, 1053, 171 Mo. 489 (quoting and adoptliig
ite v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247).
The killing of a human being with mal-
aforethought, without premeditation or
iberation, is, generally i9>eaking, "murder
the second degree." Hence an instruction
it the intoxication of accused should be
Lsidered in determining the degree of
murder was improperly refused. State v.
lliams, 07 N. W..902, 006, 122 Iowa, 115.
"Murder In the second degree** la the
Dugful killing of a human being with mal-
aforethoui^t, but without deliberation,
lere the court, on a trial for murder, had
ined "premeditatedly" as "thought of be-
ehand," and "malice aforethought" as
aning that the killing was done with mal-
and premeditation, an instruction that, if
e defendant did unlawfully, premeditated-
and of his malice aforethought, but with-
; deliberation, as defined in these instruct
OS, kill the deceased," etc., to find him
Ity of "murder in the second degree," was
; objectionable in that it omitted to tell the
y that, to constitute that degree of mur-
', the homicide must be committed "will-
ly- or "intentionally." State ▼. Marsh, 71
W. 1003, 1004, 171 Mo. 523.
Any error in defining "murder in the seo-
1 di^ree** as the felonious killing of a
[nan being could not have misled the jury,
ere the court subsequently defined it as the
Dnious killing of a human being by one of
ind memory and discretion with malice
rethought, whidi might be either express
implied, and such charge was afterwards
leated. State v. Tweed, 68 S. B. 189, 152
G.843.
Where, in a prosecution for murder, the
LTt properly presented the issue of self-de-
ise, and correctly defined murder in the
ond degree, and then charged the Jury to
1 defendant guilty if he shot deceased with
run, which was a deadly weapon, and that
±. shooting was not under the immediate
luence of sudden passion, produced by an
equate cause, and was not in defense of
Qself against an unlawful attack, etc., the
iige is not erroneous, as nojpirhere charg-
: that the killing must be unlawful or that
±, killing was done on malice, nince, to Jus-
7 a conviction of murder in the second
^ee, facts must be found which would
ke the killing unlawful under drcumstanc-
which would imply malice. Pratt ▼. State,
r S. W. 827, 829, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 167.
An instruction, on a trial for murder al-
ed to have been committed in the perpetra-
Q of burglary by setting fire to the house
rglarized and occupied by decedent, that if
cedent occupied the house, and if accused
>ke and entered the same with the intent to
ladulently take corporeal personal proper-
of value then and there in the house, and
thout the consent of decedent, and if ac^
cused, acting with implied malice af6re-
thoui^t, set fire to the house, and by reason
thereof decedent was burned and died there-
from, etc., accused was guilty of "murder
in the second degree," etc, sufficiently defined
arson and burglary. Jones v. State, 110 S.
W. 741, 742, 63 Tex. Or. R. 131, 126 Am. St
R^. 776.
In a prosecution for homicide, the court
charged that, if a person by his own wrong-
ful act brings about the necessity of taking
the life of another to prevent being killed
himself, he cannot claim that the killing is
in self-defense, but the killing will be imputed
to malice; that a person provoking a difficul-
ty with another with the willful intention of
killing the latter or of doing him serious bod-
ily harm is guilty of murder, though he may
have done the killing suddenly and without
deliberation to save his own life, and if the
Jury believed beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant by his acts or language, or both,
provoked the difficulty with deceased, and
cause deceased to attadc defendant with a
gun, and defendant, pursuant to his original,
unlawful and willful Intention to kill deceas-
ed, shot and killed him to save his own life,
the homldde would be "murder in the second
degree." Held a correct charge on the issue
of provoking a difficulty. Woodard v. State,
Ul S. W. 941, 943, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 86.
Where accused Intentionally shot deco-
dent with a pistol and killed him, and the state
failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the killing was done with deliberation and
premeditation, accused was guilty of "murder
in the second degree." State v. Jones, 59 S.
E. 353, 354, 145 N. a 466.
Where accused admitted that he killed
decedent while holding the pistol so close
to her body as to scorch her clothing, and he
oflTered no excuse therefor except decedent's
refusal to surrender a child of the parties,
and that he fired to make her release the
child, he was at least guilty of "murder in
the second degree." State v. Thompson, 69
S. B. 254, 255, 153 N. C. 6ia
Defendant and decedent, brothers, had an
altercation, in which a knife was used, and
defendant was ordered from their mutual
home, and he returned an hour later, secured
his clothing and a gun, and in a renewal of
the difficulty klUed decedent. Held, that if
the intention to kill was formed through
passion, without adequate cause^ and a suffi-
cient time had not elapsed for his mind to
cool to the extent of contemplating the con-
sequences of his act, he was guilty of no
greater offense than "murder in the second
degree." Dixon v. State, 103 S. W. 399, 401,
51 Tex. Cr. R. 555.
Accused admitted the shooting of dece-
dent twice with a rifle, inflicting wounds ei-
ther of which would produce death, and re-
lied on self-defense. The killing took place
MURDBR IN BEOOSD DEGREE 504 MXTRDER IK SECOND DEGREE
in the woods while the parties were hunting.
Both had whisky with them, and accused ad-
mitted that he was a little drunk at the time
of the shooting. There was no motive for
the killing. The evidence showed a quarrel
between them after a deer had been killed.
Held to justify a finding of "murder in the
second degree" within St 1808, I 4339, defin-
ing murder in the second degree, as a killing
perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous
to others and evincing a depraved mind,
though without any premeditated design to
effect the death, instead of finding him guilty
of murder in the first degree. Where the
case was one where the jury might conclude
from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that murder either in the first or second
degree had been committed, but, not being
wholly convinced that the greater offense
had been perpetrated, the jury properly gave
accused the benefit of the doubt, and found
him guilty of murder in the second degree.
LUlystrom v. State, 132 N. W. 132, 133, 146
Wis. 625.
Pen« Code 1886, art 710, provides that
every person who shall unlawfully kill any
person with malice aforethought, either ex-
press or implied, shall be guilty of murder,
and that all murder committed in the per-
petration of robbery Is murder in the first
degree, and that all murder not of the first
degree is murder of the second degree.
White's Ann. Code Or. Proc art 664, pro-
vides that if the defendant pleads guilty,
he shall be admonished of the consequences
of such plea, and no such plea shall be re-
ceived unless it appears that he is sane and
is uninfluenced by fear or hope of pardon.
Article 655 provides that where a defendant
in a case of felony persists in pleading guilty,
if the punishment of the offense is not abso-
lutely fixed by law, a jury shall be impanel-
ed to assess the punishment on evidence sub-
mitted to enable them to decide thereon.
Pen. Code 1895, art 712, provides that if a
person pleads guilty to murder, a jury shall
be summoned to find of what degree of mur-
der he is guilty. Held, that when an accus-
ed pleaded guilty of murder, and his plea
was accepted by the court after examination,
and evidence was introduced before a jury
which conclusively showed that the murder
was committed in the perpetration of rob-
bery, the court was not compelled to submit
the issue of second degree murder, under ar-
ticle 712. Neither was the court in error in
not defining for the jury murder in the first
degree. Miller v. State, 126 S. W. 864, 865,
58 Tex. Cr. R. 600.
Intent
Where there was a fixed purpose to do
bodily harm, without killing, and death re-
sulted, it was "murder of the second degree."
State ▼• Taylor, 60 S. £. 247, 262, 67 W. Va.
228.
Malice is an essential element of "murdei
in the second degree." State t. Bcodo (DeUJ
79 AtL 217, 220, 2 Boyce, 434.
"Murder in the second degree" is a kill
ing done with Implied malice. State v. Wig
gins (Del.) 78 Atl. 632, 635, 7 PennewlU. 127
Same v. BorrelU (Del.) 76 Atl. 605, 606, ]
Boyce, 349; Same v. Underhill (DeL) 69 Atl
880, 882, 6 Pennewlll, 491.
If the killing is shown to be unlawful
without any other proof, malice is implied, »
as to make the slayer guilty of second de
gree murder. Wilson v. State^ 129 S. W
613, 614, 60 Tex. Or. R. 1.
"Murder of the second degree" Is com
mitted where the killing Is with malice afore
thought implied by law, arising as an infer
ence or conclusion of law from the fact
found. State v. Blackburn (Del.) 76 AtL 536
639, 7 PennewlU, 479.
Where a killing is committed under th<
influence of a depraved heart or with crue
indifference to human life, the law implle
malice, and makes the offense "murder of th^
second degree" ; the killing neither being de
liberate nor in the heat of passion. State v
Primrose (Del.) 77 Atl. 717. 719, 2 Boyce. 164
A charge that when an unlawful killinj
is established, and the facts neither show ex
press malice nor tend to mitigate, excuse, oi
justify the act, the law implies malice, &m
the killing constitutes "murder in the secoD<
degree," is a correct definition of murder ii
the second degree. Burns v. State (Tex.) 14^
S. W. 356, 364.
"The crime of 'murder in the second de
gree' necessarily Involves an act done witi
malice aforethought but that term, used ii
defining the crime, is technical rather thai
descriptive. It does not necessarily requln
an intent to murder. Malice aforethough
may be Implied where there is no intent t
kill but an intent to commit a felony, froo
which death results, although that result L
unintended. That death resulting from i
criminal attempt to commit an abortion con
stltutes murder in the second degree is 1]
this state well settled." State ▼. Gibbons
120 N. W. 474, 475, 142 Iowa, 96.
An instruction with reference to "mui
der in the second degree" that malice was no
an essential ingredient of that offense, th<
distinguishing feature being that in murde
in the first degree malice must be proved be
yond a reasonable doubt, while in murder ii
the "second" degree malice will be impliei
from an unlawful killing, where the facts d(
not reduce it to manslaughter, that implies
malice is that which the law infers from cei
tain acts, however suddenly done, as whei
the fact of an unlawful killing is established
and there are no facts which establish tbi
existence of express malice, and none whicl
MURDER IN SECOND DEQREB 605
MUSICAL INSTRUMENT
id to reduce the kllUng to manslaufrhter or
excuse it, tben the law Implies malice, cor-
^y defined second degree murder. Ed-
irds y. State, 135 S. W. 540, 546, 61 Tex. Cr.
307.
A charge that implied malice is what the
w infers from or imputes to certain acts,
wever suddenly done, as when the fact of
unlawful killing is established, and the
ns do not establish express malice beyond
reasonable doubt, nor tend to mitigate, ex-
se, or justify the act, then the law implies
ilice and the murder is in the second de-
ee, was not upon the weight of the evi-
Dce, but was a general definition in ef-
!t that where an unlawful killing is shown,
which accused is guilty, and the evidence
es not show express malice or facts Justi-
LDg or excusing the homicide, or reducing
to maDslaughter, such killing, being unlaw-
I, is **murder in the second degree," stating
B distinguishing features between murder
the first degree, murder in the second de-
&e, and manslaughter. Carson v. State, 123
W. 590, 502, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 394, 136 Am. St.
!p. 98L
Murdev Im flrst deffrea dlstia««isk«d
See Murder in First Degree.
ITBDEK IN THIRD DEGREE
'^Murder in the third degree," as defined
Comp. Laws 1897, | 1065, is "every kUling
a human being by the act, procurement, or
Ipable negligence of another, which under
e provision of this act is not murder in the
St or second degrees and which is not ex-
sable or justifiable homicide, as now de-
led by law." Territory v. Hendricks, 84
LC. 523. 524, 13 N. M. 300.
USEUM OF ART
As educational corporation, aae Bdnca-
tional Corporation.
USHROOMS
TruflEles in tins are dutiable as "mush-
oms in tins," by similitude, under Tariff
:t July 24, 1897, c. 11, 1 1, Schedule G, par.
1, 30 Stat 170. Von Bremen, MacMonnies
Co. V. United States, 168 Fed. 889, 94 a
A 801.
The provision in paragraph 241, Sched-
e Q, i 1, c 11, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, 30
at 170, for "mushrooms prepared or pre-
rved," does not include mushrooms dried
erely by evaporation, which are dutiable
ider paragraph 257 of said act, 30 Stat 171,
\ '^vegetables in their natural state." Kraut
United States, 139 Fed. 94.
Mushrooms dried in order to preserve
tern and placed In hermetically sealed tins
Dlding from 30 to 46 pounds, are within the
roTision in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c 11,
1, Sdiednle G, par. 241, 30 SUt 170, relat-
ing to 'Mushrooms prepared or preserved, in
tins, jars, bottlies or similar packages," rather
than paragraph 257, 80 Stat 171, relating to
'^vegetables in their natural state." Choy
Chong Woh ft Co. v. United States, 158 Fed.
879, 82 a C. A. 608.
MUSIC
MUSIO TEACHER
As wage-earner, see Wage-Earner.
MU8I0AX.
"A well-recognlsEed definition of •musicaV
is of or pertaining to music or the perform-
ance of music." ^olian Co. v. Hallett & Da-
vis Piano Co., 184 Fed. 872, 880.
MU8I0AX. OOMPOSmOH
'*A innsical composition' is a rational
collocation of sounds apart from concepts,
reduced to a tangible expression from which
the collocation can be reproduced either with
or without continuous human intervention."
White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co.,
28 Sup. Ct 319, 324, 209 U. S. 1, 52 L. Ed.
655, 14 Ann. Cas. 628.
In Rev. St | 4952, the author or propri
etor of any "musical composition," on com-
pliance with the provisions of the copyright
act, being given the exclusive liberty of copy-
ing and vending the same, the words "musi-
cal composition" undoubtedly relate to the
intellectual conception of the composer. The
act confers protection to only the material
sembhince in which the musical composition
finds expression. A perforated record or
sheet designed to be played with mechanism,
is not to be protected. White-Smith Music
Pub. Co. T. Apollo Co., 139 Fed. 427, 480.
MU8I0AX. IN STRUMEHT
Certain metallophones and mouth organs
or harmonicas, having at least one full oc-
tave, and capable of playing a musical air,
but not so finished as to musical qualities
that they would be used by musicians, being
fitted rather for the amusement of children,
are dutiable as ••toys," under paragraph 418,
Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11 (30 Stat 191),
and not as "musical instruments," under
paragraph 453 of said act (30 Stat 193).
Borgfeldt v. United States, 124 Fed. 473, 474.
Rev. St 1899, % 3018, forbids a dramshop
keeper to keep, exhibt, or use, or suffer to be
kept, exhibited, or used in his dramshop, a
piano, organ, or other musicdl instrument
whatever, "for the purpose of performing up-
on or having the same performed upon in
such dramshop." While a Reglna Concerto,
which is a musical machine set playing by
dropping a coin in a slot, and thereby releas-
ing the spring setting the machinery in mo-
tion, is a musical instrument, and winding
it up and dropping a coin in the slot consti-
tutes perfbrming on it, it is not such a "musi-
cal instrument" as th« Legislature meant to
MUSIOAL IKSTRUMEKT
606
MUST
designate in the statute, which meant the
keeping of an instrument with the intention
of the dramshop keeper to perform on it
himself or engaging some one else to do so ;
the word "having" in the phrase "having the
same performed on" not being synonymous
with "permitting," but importing making an
arrangement to have an act done. Thiebes-
Stlerlin Music Co. v. Weiss, 121 S. W. 1099,
1101, 142 Mo. App. 598.
A mechanical piano player is a "musical
instrument." ^olian Co. v. Hallett & Davis
Piano Co., 134 Fed. 872, 880.
MXT8ICIAH
As servant, see Servant
MUST
Words like •'may,'* '•must,*' •^shall," etc.,
are constantly used in statutes without in-
tending that they shall be taken literally,
and in their construction the object evidently
designed to be reached limits and controls
the literal import of the terms and phrases
employed. Fields v. United States, 27 App.
D. C. 433.
As mandatory
May construed as must, see May.
The word "must" is not always to be con-
strued as mandatory. It has been construed
as directory only. People ex rel. Jerome v.
Goff, 98 N. Y. Supp. 66, 67, 49 Misc. R^p. 72
(citing In re Hennessy, 68 N. B. 446, 164 N.
Y.
"It is true the word *mu8tr is sometimes
construed as 'may'— permissive — ^but ttiis
only when the context requires it. Where the
context plainly shows the provision to be
mandatory, the word 'must* is a command,
and cannot be construed as permissive, but
must be given the signification which it im-
parts." Glbbs V. Gibbs, 73 Pac 641, 653,
26 Utah, 882.
Const, art 2, | 20, declaring that "the
style of the laws of this state shall be," etc,
is mandatory and must be complied with;
the word "shall" being equivalent to "must."
State ex rel. Gouge v. Burrow, 104 S. W. 526,
529, 119 Tenn. 376, 14 Ann. Cas. 809.
The word "must," in Code Civ. Proc. i
483, providing that, where the complaint sets
forth two or more causes of action, the state-
ment of the fticts constituting each cause of
action "must" be separate and numbered, and
section 607 providing that defendant may set
forth as many defenses as he has, and that
each defense "must" be separately stated and
numbered, is a mandatory word, and the
provisions are mandatory, and the court can-
not disregard them. Stem v. Marcuse, 103
N. Y. Supp. 1026, 1027, 119 App. Div. 47a
As used in Rev. St 1899, i 2627, pre-
scribing the order of trial in criminal cases,
and providing that the prosecuting attorney
must first state the case, the word "must" is
used in a mandatory or imperative sense.
Hence it is not permissible for hired counsel
to open and close to the Jury on behalf of the
state. State v. Price, 85 S. W. 922, 928» 111
Mo. App. 423.
In a statute providing for a hearing and
determination of by the Supreme Court of an
election contest the provision that on the
presentation of the petition, the court " 'must'
proceed to a summary canvass of the vote"
should not be construed as depriving the
court of its discretion to determine whether
the petition presented facts Justifying such
action. Mets v. Maddox, 106 N. Y. Supp.
702, 708, 121 App. Div. 147 (concurring opin-
ion of Judge Rich).
The word "must" in Municipal Court
Act f 26, subd. 6, providing that actions to.
recover a penalty or a fine for a violation
of any provision of the Sanitary Code must
be brought in the district where the viola-
tion happened or occurred, when that sub-
division is read in connection with subdivi-
sion 4, providing that, if an action is brought
in a different district it may nevertheless be
tried therein unless transferred to the proper
dlstdct before trial* on demand of the defend-
ant made on or before Joinder of issue, is
not mandatory in the sense of taking away
Jurisdiction from a court other than the one
spedfled as the place of trial, but simply
gives the defendant an absolute right of re-
moval to the proper district if demand is
made at the proper time and in the proper
way. Department of Health of City of New
York V. Halpin, 81 N. Y. Supp. 679, 681, 40
Misc. Rep. 248.
The word "must," as used in Pol. Code,
i 4645, providing that the clerk of the district
court must give each Juror, when excused
from service, a certificate, signed by himself
under seal, stating the amount due him, etc,
and on its presentation to the county treas-
urer the amount must be paid, etc, indicates
that the duty of the clerk becomes imperative
as soon as a Juror is entitled to his pay, and
that the duty of the treasurer is imperative
as soon as a certificate properly issued by
the district court is presented to him. Bx
parte Farrell, 92 Pac. 786, 786, 36 Mont 254.
Code Cr. Proc | 466, provides that:
"The application for a new trial *must' be
made before Judgment, except an application
made under subdivision 7 of section 465,
which may be made at any time within one
year, and except in case of a sentence of
death, when the application may be made at
any time before execution." The court says:
"The learned Judge at special term in his
opinion herein said: Not always is the word
'must^ to be construed as mandatory." "That
is quite true, but considering the history of
these provisions, the prior state of the law,
and that new trials in criminal cases an per-
HUST
607
MUTUAL
misslble by statute only, it seems to me tbat
the words are too plain and Imperattre to
permit of sueh construction. It is like a stat-
ute of limitations. If the motion for a new
trial 'may' be made after judgment, 'may'
a motion upon the ground of newly discov-
ered evidence other than capital be made aft-
er a year?" People ex rel. Jerome ▼. Gourt
of (General Sessions, OS N. T. Supp. 067, 560,
112 App. Div. 424.
Code Oiv. Proc | 1070, provides that,
when a notice of pendency of action is filed
with the complaint, personal service of the
summons "must" be made upon defendant
within 00 days after the filing, or else, be-
fore the expiration of that time, publication
of the summons must be commenced, or serv-
ice thereof must be made without ttie state.
Section 1074 authorizes the court in its dis-
cretion to cancel a lis pendens if a plaintUT
filing the notice unreasonably neglects to pro-
ceed in the action. Held, that the provision
of section 1070 is peremptory, and a failure
to comply with it is a form of unreasonable
neglect which requires the court to cancel the
notice; and hence where a lis poidens was
filed November 14, 1907, and an amended
summons and complaint was filed November
18, 1907, and the summons and complaint
were not served on defendant until' January
20, 1908, no attempt being made to serve it
until January 0th, and no attempt made to
efl^ect substituted service, the Us pendens
should be canceled. Brown v. Mando, 109
N. Y. Supp. 720, 126 App. Dlv. 880.
Oode Civ. Proc. § 134, as amended, pro-
vides that no court other than the Supreme
Court "must" be open on any of the holidays
mentioned in section 10, except to give in-
structions to Juries on their request, to re-
ceive a verdict or discharge a Jury, or for the
exercise of the powers of a magistrate in a
criminal action, and tbat injunctions and
writs of prohibition may be Issued on any
day. Previous to the amendment of 1907 the
section read no court "shall" be open nor
shall any Judicial business be transacted,
etc., provided that the Supreme Court and
the superior courts shall always be open for
the transaction of business, and that injunc-
tions and writs of prohibition may be issued
on any day. Among the holidays mentioned
in section 10 is any day appointed by the
Governor for a holiday. Section 133 provides
that courts of Justice may be held and Judi-
cial business transacted on any day except as
provided in section 134. Section 136 provides
that, if any day mentioned in section 184
happens to be the day appointed for the hold*
ing of a court or to which it is adjourned,
it shall be deemed appointed for or adjourned
to the next day. Held, that section 134 as
amended March 19, 1907, still means what it
has always meant, that the superior court
shall not on a legal holiday transact any
judicial business outside of the constitutional
and statutory exceptions, notwithstanding
the substitution of the word '^usf for
"shall" ; and hence a sentence pronounced on
a day ai^inted by the Governor as a legal
holiday was void. S)x parte Smith, 93 Pac.
191, 198, 194, 162 CaL 606.
MUTATIS MUTANDIS
Where profits are defined by a certain ar-
ticle, all the provisions of which are to apply
to the relations between the parties springing
into existence after the expiration of the eon-
tract '^mutatis mutandis," these latter words
mean necessary changes in details to conform
to a single vital alteration, and suggest a re-
versal of the relative positions of the parties
under the contract, which was to continue the
same In other respects. Copeland v. £>aton,
95 N. EL 291, 209 Mass. 139, Ann. Ca& 1912B,
621.
MUTE
See Stood Mute.
MUTILATE— MUTIUTION
"Mutilate" is defined by the Standard
Dictionary as follows: '*To cut off or deprive
of a Umb or essential part of, as an animal
body ; maim ; cut or break off, or otherwise
remove any part of, as a statue; disfigure;
to retrench, remove, expunge, or delete an
essential or material part of , so as to render
incomplete or imperfect, as a literary com-
position; as to mutilate a speech." The
main idea of such a definition is the removal
of an essential part, so that the whole is
rendered imperfect A railroad ticket is not
mutilated, within the meaning of a stipula-
tion on tiie face thereof that It should not
be good for passage If mutilated in any
way, where both pieces are presented to the
conductor at the same time, and it is ap-
parent that they are parts of the same ticket,
and that together they form the entire ticket
Young V. Central of Georgia R. Co., 47 S. B.
666, 120 Oa. 26, 66 L. R. A 486, 102 Am. St
Rep. 68, 1 Ann. Cas. 24.
Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art 470, provides
that, when an indictment or information has
been lost, mutilated, or obliterated, the dis-
trict or county attorney may suggest the fact
to the court and another Indictment or in-
formation may be substituted. Held, that the
county attorney had no authority to change
the date of filing on an information and com-
plaint, and that such change constituted a
mutilation, rendering the same nugatory.
KeUy V. State, 127 S. W. 644, 69 Tex. Cr. R.
14.
MUTUAL
The words 'Mutual'* and ''mutually," as
applied to an exception in the charter of a
vessel, providing for allowances for demur-
rage and dispatch money, that delay from
i!
MUTUAL ACOOUNTS
608
MUTUAL AOCX)UNTS
\U'
:J
M
ill
causes b^jond control of the parttos shall be
"always mntually excepted," cannot he con-
strued in the sense of reciprocal In respect
to the same broken engagement, but should be
understood as meaning that the exception
was intended to protect the parties from lia-
bility to each other, whoiev^ performance of
any covenant was prevented or delayed by
any exception. Pool Shipping Co. t. Samuel,
200 Fed. 86, 118 O. 0. A 264.
IfUTUAX. AOOOUKTS
An account of a miller for supplies fur-
nished on the credit of a physician, pursuant
to his orders, and an account of the physician
for professional services rendered the miller
and his family during the period of the fur-
nishing of the supplies, consist of reciprocal
demands constituting a mutual current ac-
count, within Code Oiv. Proc. f 886, declaring
that a cause of action on a mutual current
account accrues from the time of the last
item proved in the account on either side.
Miller V. Longshore, 131 N, Y^ Supp. 1041,
147 App. r>iv. 214.
An account of loans between the lender
and tile borrowing firm, kept on the firm's
books or on slips of paper, did not constitute
a ''mutual, open, and current account," with-
in Code Civ. Proc. N. Y. i 886, providing that
In an action to recover a balance due on a
mutual, open, and current account, where
there have been reciprocal demands between
the parties, the cause of action was deemed
to have accrued from the time of the last
item proved in the account on either 8id& In
re Oirvln, 160 Fed. 197.
That one party kept one side of the ac-
count and the other party the other side
thereof is immaterial in determining whether
there were mutual accounts. Lapham v.
Kansas & Texas Oil, Gas & Pipe Line Co., 123
Pac. 863, 87 Kan. 65, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 813.
A current account kept by a husband of
his transactions with his wife's money does
not constitute a "mutual account," nor is an
account mutual where it simply contains
items of money, received and paid, nor one
in which there were but three items of credit
during a period of five years ; cash items be-
ing also held to form no part of a mutual,
open, and running account In re Girvin, 160
Fed. 197.
A husband transferred his business and
accounts due him to his wifat who executed
to him a power of attorney to manage the
business for her. At the time of the transfer,
a debtor was indebted to the husband for
goods sold at various timea After the trans-
fer, an account therefor was rendered the
debtor, who made a cash payment, and at
various times delivered materials to the hus-
band. Subsequently the wife reassigned the
account to the husband. Held, that the ao>
count was an open account as distinguished
from an account stated, since mutual ac-
counts are made up of matters of set-off, an^
there must be a mutual credit founded on i
subsisting debt on the other side, or an ex
press or an implied agreement for a set
off of mutual debts. Culver v. Newhart, 12
Pac. 975, 18 GaL App. 614.
A bill alleging damages to property grow
ing out of the laying of a pavement ant
change of grade and praying for an account
ing, alleging that it was necessaiy to raia
plalntilTs residence, surface her yard, ao^
various other things, does not state a cans<
wherein "the accounts to be investigated an
mutual," within Const 1890, | 161, relatiiu
to causes of which the chancery court and cLr
cult courts have concurrent Jurladictloii
Murphy v. City of Meridian (Miss.) 00 South
48. .
Where an officer of a corporation, actbi
as general manager with the knowledge aiui
consent of the other officers and others inter
ested, kept the books of the corporation in tlu
usual course of business, and during tiM
period of his service as manager credited
himself from time to time with salary aiMi
charged against such credits items of cash it
ceived from time to time during such period
the account between him and the coiporatioG
was a "mutual, open account," within Bern. A
BaL Code, 1 166, declaring that in an actioi
on a mutual, open account the cause of actioii
accrues from the time of the last item pror
ed in the account on either side ; there beins
nothing to show that the officer had not
actually received the amounts charged fron
time to time. Blom v. Blom Codfish Co., 121
Pac. 596, 71 Wash. 4L
Items on both sides required
Under Rev. St | 4226, providing that tlM
cause of action for the balance due on i
mutual and open account current accmes al
the time of the last item proved therein, il
is proper to charge that such an account 'ii
an account consisting of credits as well as
debits, charges, and credits, between the par
ties. An account in which A charges B
with a number of items extending through t
considerable time, but in which B. has nc
credits, is not a 'mutual and open accoonl
current' " Dunn v. Howard, 41 N. W. 707. 75
Wis. 546 (citing and adopting Hannon r
Engelmann, 6 N. W. 791, 49 Wis. 282; Fiti
Patrick V. Estate of Phelan, 16 N. W. 606, K
Wis. 254).
Payments alone iasnillolent
The claim for services and the 47 itenu
of expenses set forth in the petition, witli
proper credits of payments thereon, constl^
tute one account only. The answer challais&
the correctness of the charge for services aiuJ
of the it^ns of expenses therein, and seta
forth S4 items of alleged payments which, li
correct, should have been included in the ao
count Held, that no "mutual accounts" were
involved. Lapham v. Blansas & Texas Oil,
Gas ft Pipe Line Co., 123 Pac 863, 87 Kan
MUTUAL ACKX^UNTS
609
MUTUAL COMBAT
;, Aim. Cas. 1913D, 818 (citing 5 Words and
tirases, p. 4647).
Where the items of an account are all
i one side, there being none on the other
ie, exc^t credits of payment, or where the
icoont consists mer^ of matters of charge
I the one side and demands of set-off on the
her, it is not a ^'mutual account" Hoosier
)U8t. Ck>. y. National Bank of Commerce of
iattle, 73 N. E. 1006, 1008, 86 Ind. App. 270.
A '*mntual acoonnt" implies a reciprocity
dealing between the parties to the account,
id is made up of matters of set-off wherein
eh party has a right of action against the
her; and a set-off can be pleaded only
lien the ri^t of action is against the plain-
r in the same capacity as that in which he
prosecuting his claim; and an individual
ligation is not a matter of set-off to a part-
rshlp claim or to a claim by the plaintiff
a representative capacity; nor can a
irtnership debt be a set-off to a claim by
le of the members of the partnership ; and,
I a general payment on an open account be-
reen them, the account would not for that
ason have been rendered mutual, since the
ere payment of money upon an account
»es not have that effect, but operates simply
I a reduction pro tanto of the claim. Flynn
Seale^ 84 Pac 268-266, 2 Cal. App. 666.
Where the items of an account are all
1 one side as between a shopkeeper and
B customer, and where goods are charged
id payments credited, there is no "mutual-
f which will prevent the statute from
rring the account Under Rev. Code Civ.
'DC. S 64, providing that an action for a
lance due upon an open account, where
ere have been reciprocal demands, shall
deemed to accrue from the time of the
St item proved on account on either side,
I account consisting entirely of charges on
e side and a payment on account on the oth-
is not a mutual account ,* the important pre-
quisite being a condition of mutuality and
dprocity of dealing sufficient to reasonably
Btity the inference of an understanding be-
een the parties that the items of one ao-
unt are to be set off against the items of
e other, so far as they go. McArthur v.
cCoy, 112 N. W. 155, 167, 21 S. D. 814 (quotr
ir Bouv. Law Diet.).
UTUAIi AOBEEMENT
A "mutual agreement*' implies an offer
id acceptance, or a promise for a promise,
id means a reciprocal agreement, or one
at requires something to be done or for-
me by either party for the other. Gross-
in V. Schenker, 100 N. B. 89, 206 N. Y. 466.
UTUAXi AHD DEPENDENT COVE-
NANTS
Where a written contract for the sale
land recited the payment of a sum down
the purchaser, and required him to pay
e remainder of the purchase money on a
specified date, and further provided that on
such payment being made the vendor should
"on demand thereafter" cause to be executed
to the purchaser "a good and sufficient deed
in fee simple of the premises above described,
free and clear of all legal liens and incum-
brances," the covenants for payment of the
purchase money and for the delivery of the
deed conveying a good title were "mutual
and dependent," and a tender of performance
by the vendor in accordance with the contract
was a condition precedent to his right to
maintain an action to recover the purchase
money from the purchaser. Michigan Home
Colony Co. t. Tabor, 141 Fed. 832, 386, 72
C. C. A. 480.
MUTUAX. AND OPEN ACCOUNT
See Mutual Accounts.
MUTUAX. AND REOIPBOOAX.
Where a husband and wife, advanced in
years, and each owning separate property,
agreed that they would have their wills
made, and he made a will giving her a life
estate in his property, and she conveyed her
property to him, the deed to take effect on
her death, but it did not appear that any
agreement was made between them as to
the terms of the will, or that one was to be
the consideration for the other, a contention
that the deed and the will were "mutual and
reciprocal," and for that reason irrevocable,
was without merit Sappingfleld v. King, 90
Pac. 150, 49 Or. 102, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1066.
MUTUAX. ASSENT
Element of sale, see Sale.
"Mutual assent" is assent to the same
thing in the sahie sense and under a common
understanding of the stipulations agreed to.
Martin t. Thrower, 60 S. B. 825, 8 Ga. App.
784.
MUTUAX. COMBAT
"Mutual combat" can exist where there
is "mutual intent" to fight, though only one
of the parties strikes a blow. Lee v. State,
58 S. R 676-678, 2 Ga. App. 481.
"Mutual combat," within the meaning of
Pen. Code, i 73, providing that, if a person
kill another in his defense, it must appear
that the danger was so urgent and pressing
that to save his own nfe the killing of the
other was absolutely necessary, and that it
must appear also that the person killed was
the assailant, or that the slayer had in good
faith endeaivored to decline any further
struggle, is a mutual fight following a mutual
intention to fight with felonious purpose.
Wamack T. State, 60 S. B. 288, 290, 3 Ga.
App. 590.
A charge that if defendant believed a
deceased had taken possession of a field
claimed by him, and would be there with an
armed party on the morning of the killing,
and they had made threats against the life
r i ' '
MUTUAL CONSENT
610
MUTUAL 0KBTS
I [
i \
■J
^#^
I
of defendant, and defendant, knowing all
these things, voluntarily organized a party,
arming them with deadly weapons for the
pnrpose of meeting such parties in deadly
conflict, and a conflict ensued and the de-
ceased was killed, then such conflict was a
"mutual combat,'* and all parties intentionally
engaged in it are guilty of murder, was not
under the theory of the prosecution errone-
ous. Driggers v. United States, 95 Pac 612,
21 Okl. eO, 129 Am. St R^. 823, 17 Ann.
Cas. 68.
MUTUAX. CONSENT
To constitute a contract, the agreement
must be mutual and communicated to each
other, and "consent is not mutual" unless
the parties all agree upon the same thing in
the same sense. Humphrey t. Timken Car-
riage Co., 75 Pac. 528. 533, 12 Okl. 413.
MnrUAX. OONTBAOTg
See Mutuality of Contract
For a contract to be "mutual,** an obliga-
tion must rest on each party to do or permit
to be done, something in consideration of the
act or promise of the other; that is, neither
party can be bound, unless both are bound.
Cal Hirseh & Sons Iron & Rail Co. v. Para-
gould ft M. B. Co., 127 S. W. 623, 148 Mo.
App. 173.
MnrUAX. OOVENANT8
See Mutual and Dependent Coyenants.
MUTUAX. 0BEDIT8
"Mutual debts or mutual credits," with-
in the Bankruptcy Act, proYiding that, in
all cases of "mutual debts" or "mutual cred-
its" between the estate of a bankrupt and a
creditor, the account shall be stated and one
debt shall be set off against the other, and
the balance only shall be allowed or paid,
are established on proof that an insolvent
has money on deposit in a bank subject to
check, and also owes the bank on a promis-
sory note, the money deposited being the
money obtained on the note, and the bank
may, before the insolvent is declared a bank-
rupt, credit the amount of the deposit on the
debt due on the note. West v. Bank of La-
homa, 86 Pac. 469, 471, 16 Okl. 328.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, providing
that, in all cases of mutual debts or mutual
credits between the estate of a bankrupt and
a creditor, the account shall be stated and one
debt shall be set off against the other, and
only the balance paid. The Bankruptcy Act
of 1867 had a substantially similar provision
taken from the earlier English acts, under
which it was decided that "mutual credits"
must in their nature terminate in debts, or a
debt be in the contemplation of the parties.
Some of the latter English cases arose under
the more recent English acts, in whidi th^
term "mutual dealings" was used, and this
the court said is a much more comprehensive
term than "mutual credits." It was held
that the act of 1898 does not authorise ti
setting off against the daim of a landlord f<
rent under a lease to the bankrupt of an ui
liquidated daim for damages in favor of tl
bankrupt sounding in tort and arlsliig ind
pendently of the contract of lease. In i
Becker Bros., 139 Fed. d66» 367.
A bailment contract transferring tt
possession of a mercantile business to tl
bankrupts to operate the same for a yea
provided that for the use of the propert;
the bankrupts should pay to the bailor ce
tain percentages on sales, and rent and L
suranoe; that the bankrupts should keep tl
stock up to within $500 of the original inv«
tory value; that on tomination of tbe cm
tract the bailor should pay any inventory «
oess up to $500; and that the bankrupt
should be liable for any defidenoy. On tii
termination, of the contract the Inventoi
excess amounted to $1323.42, but the banl
rupts were indebted to the bailor on aceoui
of unpaid insurance and percentages on sale
etc., $679.73. Held, that such items w^
"mutual debits and credits," as defined I
Bankr. Act July 1, 1896, c 541, | 68 (30 Sta
566), providing that sudi daims BbsU be m
off in bankruptcy. Walther v. Williams Me]
cantUe Co., 169 Fed. 270, 94 O. G. A. 646.
A daim for money expended as quai
surety for a bankrupt is a "mutual credit,
within section 68 of the bankrupt act pn
vlding inter alia that in all cases of mutui
credits between the estate of a bankrupt an
a creditor, the account shall be stated, au
one debt shall be set off against tlie othei
eta Wagner v. Bumham, 73 AtL 990, 99:
224 iPa. 586.
Wh&e^equity usually follows the statute
allowing a set-off or counterclaim in an a<
tlon at law, and while ordinarily a mei
claim or account will not furnish ground fo
equitable relief, and while equity will Intei
vene and effect a set-off only when, unde
the strict rules of law. Justice cannot be ei
fectuated, equity. Independent of statute, an
under its general jurisdiction, will grant n
lief where, though there are mutual and it
dependent debts, there is a mutual credit b<
tween the parties founded on the existence o
some debt due by the crediting party to tb
other ; "mutual credit" meaning mutual trust
Tuttle V. Blsbee, 120 N. W. 699, 144 Iowa, S
MUTUAX. nBAUHCW
'Itfutual dealings," within the statute o
Hmitations applicable to an account ma
consist of one item or many items on eac]
side of the account It Is tbe nature and no
the extending of the dealings that give tbei
the character of mutuaUty. B^amln i
Webster, 65 Me. 170, 171.
MUTUAXi ]>£BTS
"Mutual debts or mutual credits," witli
in the Bankruptcy Act providing that, in a]
cases of "mutual debts or mutual creditaf
MUTUAL DEBTS
611 MUTUAL REIJEF ABSOOIATION
ween the estate of a bankrupt and a cred*
r, the account aball be stated, and one
>t shall be set off against the other, and
i balance only shall be allowed or paid, are
abllshed on proof that an insolvent has
ney on deposit in a hfBLikk. subject to check,
1 also owes the bank on a promissory note,
i money deposited being the money ob-
ned on the note, and the bank may, be-
'e the insolvent is declared a bankrupt,
Klit the amount of the deposit on the debt
& on the note. West v. Bank of Lahoma,
Pac. 469, 471, 16 Okl. 82a
A firm note to a bank, assumed by an in*
vent partner on dissolution, became his
Uvidual indebtedness, and such debt with
k amount due him as a depositor, independ-
t of any partnership consideration, became
itual debts within Bankruptcy Act (Act
ly 1, 18d8, c. 641, 30 Stat 666), I 68, allow-
; set-offs. Hooks v. Gila Valley Bank ft
ust Ck>., 100 Pac 806^ 12 Ariz. 816.
A bailment contract transferring the pos-
Esion of a mercantile business t6 the bank-
)ts to operate the same for a year provid-
that, for the use of the property, the
ikrupts should pay to the bailor certain
rcentages on sales, and rent and insurance.
Lt the bankrupts should keep the stock up
within $500 of the original inventory val-
that on termination of the contract the
llor should pay any inventory excess up
$500, and that the bankrupts should be
ble for any deficiency. On the termlna-
n of the contract, the inventory excess
lounted to $1,323.42, but the bankrupts
re indebted to the bailor on account of un-
Id insurance and percentages on sales, etc.,
r9.73. Held, that such items were "mutu-
debits and credits" as defined by Bankr.
t July 1, 1898, c. 641, | 68, 30 Stat 565,
)vidlng that such claims shall be set off
bankruptcy. Walther v. Williams Mer-
itile CJo., 169 Fed. 270, 94 C. C. A. 646.
UTVAL TZRE IN8UBAKCE OOl^
PANT
A mutual fire Insurance company organ-
d under the laws of the state is an assoda-
n to provide mutual relief for loss by fire,
d all policy holders are members, and each
B the same proportionate interest, and is
ble to the same proportionate extent J.
Lamb & Co. v. Merchants' Nat Mut Fire
8. CJo., 119 N. W. 1048, 18 N. D. 268.
UnrAI. TNHVMAMOB
*' 'Mutual insurance' is essentially differ-
t from 'stock insurance,' and much of the
igation that has grown out of this species
insurance has been owing to inattention to
Ls difference. Its original design was to
ovide cheap insurance by means of local
Bociationa, the manors of which should
sore each other. Such associations are in
^ nature adapted only to local business,
ley need many by-laws and conditions that
are not required in sto<^ companies; and it
is necessary and equitable that eadi person
who gets insured in them should become
subject to the same obligations towards his
associates that he requires toward himself."
J. P. Lamb A Co. y. Merchante' Nat Mut
Fire Ins. Co., 119 N. W. 1048, 1049, 18 N. D.
268 (quoting with approval from May, Ins.
1146).
MUTUAX. IRRI6ATIOH OOKPANT
An irrigation company organized under
the laws of the state, which derives no reve-
nue from the operation of its canal and con-
ducts its business solely to irrigate the lands
of its stockholders, is, de facto, a **mutual
irrigation company** as defined by Cobbey's
Ann. St 1909, { 6845. Swanger v. Porter, 128
N. W. 516, 87 Neb. 764.
MUTUAX. MISTAKX:
To constitute a "mutual mistake** so as
to authorize reformation of an instrument
the minds of the parties must meet in a com-
mon intent Potter v. Frank, 76 AtL 489,
106 Me. 166.
In an action on a contract findings held
not to show a mutual mistake, entitling de-
fendant to equitable relief from the contract
for a breach of which plaintiff seeks to recov-
er damages. C. H. Toung Co. v. Springer,
129 N. W. 773, 113 Minn. 882.
A "mutual mistake," which will justify
the reformation of an instrument is a mis-
take reciprocal and conunon to both parties,
where each alike labored under the same
misconception in req;>ect to the terms of the
instrument Equity will not reform a writ-
ten contract unless the mistake is proved to
be a mistake of both parties, but may rescind
and cancel a contract upon the ground of
mistake of fftcts material to the contract by
one party only. Coleman v. Illinois Life
Ins. Co. (Ky.) 82 8. W. 616, 617 (citing Bots-
ford V. McLean [N. Y.l 45 Barb. 478; Prit-
chett V. Frlsby [Ky.] 68 S, W. 10; Bush v.
Starks [Ky.] 65 S. W. 589; Reeder v. I^wis
A Mason Turnpike Road, 7 E^y. Law Rep.
373; Tandy's Assignee v. Hatcher A Co., 9
Ky. Law Rep. 161; Stockhoff A De Witt v.
Brannin, 14 Ky. Law Rep. 717).
A mistake in a conveyance as to the sub-
Jee^matter surveyed, superinduced by Igno-
rance of the true description of the land
which the grantor intended to sell and the
grantee intended to buy, when participated
in by both parties, is a "mutual mistake of
fact" which equity will correct American
Ass'n T. Williams, 166 Fed. 17, 93 a C. A. 1.
MUTUAX. BEXJEF ASSOCIATION
A "live stock insurance company" incor-
porated under Rev. St 1895, art 642, subd.
46, authorizing the incorporation of fire, ma-
rine, life, and live stock insurance companies,
to conduct a live stock insurance company
, on a mutual or co-operative plan without
MUTUAL STANDARD
512
MUTUALITY OP OONTBAOT
capital stock, and to issue policies of indem-
nity on live stock to its members, Is a live
stock insurance company conducted on tbe
mutual or co-operative plan, and is not a
"mutual relief association" within article
3096, providing that nothing in the title-
title 58, entitled "Incorporation of Insurance
CJompanies" — shall apply to mutual relief
associations. State v. Burgess, 109 S. W.
922, 101 Tex. 524.
MUTUAX. STAHDABD
The term "mutual standard,'* as used
with reference to mutual standards in the
construction of ambiguous words or clauses
in contracts, means the meaning in which
an ambiguous word or phrase was used and
accepted by both parties to the contract or
undertaking to expiess in writing the terms
of the actual agreement. It is subject to the
modification that a clear and unambiguous
meaning will not be overthrown by resort to
parol to determine what the parties actually
meant West v. Hermann, 104 S. W. 428, 47
Tex. Civ. App. 131.
MUTUAXi WILL
See, also. Reciprocal WilL
A Joint will is a single instrument con-
taining the wills of two or more persons.
A "mutual will," or, more strictly speaking,
a reciprocal will, is one by which each testa-
tor makes testamentary disposition in favor
of the other. Bower v. Daniel, 95 S. W.
847, 357, 198 Mo. 289 (citing Schumaker v.
Schmidt, 44 Ala. 454, 4 Am. Rep. 135; In re
Diez, 50 N. Y. 88; Cawley's Estate, 20 Ati.
567, 136 Pa. 628, 10 L. R. A. 93).
A "joint will" is one where the same in-
strument is made the will of two or more
persons and is jointly signed by them, being
not necessarily either mutual or reciprocal,
while "mutual wills" are the separate wills
of two persons reciprocal in their provisions.
A will that is both joint and mutual is one
executed jointly by two or more persons, the
provisions of wliich are reciprocal, and which
shows on its face that the devises are made
one in consideration of the other. A joint
will which is not reciprocal is simply the in-
dividual personal will of each of the persons
signing it and is subject to the same rules as
apply to several wills. Frailer v. Patterson,
90 N. E. 216, 243 111. 80, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.)
506, 17 Ann. Gas. 1003.
A testamentary disposition contained tn
one writing disposing of property held joint-
ly is a "joint will" ; whereas, the same docu-
ment, if it refers to and deals with property
held separately, would be a "mutual wilL"
Deseumeur v. Rondel, 74 Atl. 703, 76 N. J.
Eq. 894.
MUTUALITY OF OONTBACT
See Mutual €k>ntracts.
''Mutuality of contract" means that an
obligation rests upon each party to do or
permit to be done something in consideration
of the act or promise of the other; that is,
neither party is bound unless the both are
bound. Where a contract under which plain-
tiff was to cut and deliver, at defendant's
factory, timber of certain dimensions at a
certain price, did not bind plalntilf to fur-
nish any specified quantity thereof, but
left him at liberty to cease cutting and deliv-
ering at any time, there was no mutuality
of contract Campbell v. American Handle
Co., 94 S. W. 815, 816, 117 Mo. App. 19.
"'Mutuality of contract' means that an
obligation must rest on each party to do or
permit to be done something in consideration
of the act or promise of the other; that is,
neither party is bound unless both are
bound." Where it was alleged that plaintifiC
promised to marry defendant on his request,
and that defendant promised plaintHDT to so
marry her on his request, the agreement was
unenforceable for lack of mutuality ; defend-
ant's engagement being a mere option to
marry plaintiff. Smythe v. Greacen, 91 N.
Y. Supp. 450, 457, 100 App. Div. 275.
"Mutuality of contract" means that an
obligation must rest upon each party to do
or permit to be done something in considera-
tion of the act or promise of the other; that
is, neither party is bound unless both are
bound. A contract by which a city gave de-
fendant the privilege of sorting and appro-
priating to his own use refuse at specified
dumps of the department of street <deaning
for one year, in consideration of a certain
weekly payment, the dty reserving the
right to at any time change the locations and
Increase the number of dumps, was not void
for want of mutuality; there being an im-
plied obligation on the part of the city to pro-
vide for one year the refuse for defendant's
use at the places named in the contract
City of New York v. Paoli, 116 N. Y. Supp.
544, 546, 63 Misc. R^. 411 (quoting and
adopting definition in Laclede Construction
Co. V. Tudor Iron Works, 69 S. W. 884, 169
Mo. 137).
" 'Mutuality of contract' means that an
obligation must rest on each party to do or
permit to be done something in considera-
tion of the act or promise of the other ; that
is, neither party is bound unless both are
bound." Where plaintiff contracted with
third persons to make excavations for them
for railroad side tracks, on the agreement of
defendant railroad company, held out by It
as an inducement for his making the excava-
tion contract, that it would furnish the can
and take away the dirt, tliere is no lack of
mutuality in the agreement between plaintiff
and defendant St Louis, I. M. dt S. R. Co.
V. Clark, 119 S. W. 825, 827, 90 Ark. 504.
An engagement lacks ''mutuality*' where
one party is bound and the other is not ; for
example, where one offers to supply another
with such goods of a certain kind as he may
MUTUALITY OF CONTRACT
RLS
MTT
cho<Me to order or may wish during a cer-
tain time, and the other accepts the offer.
In audi caae, there la no consideration for
the promise or offer; tor the promisee has
not bound himself to anything and has incur-
red no legal liability at alL Steinwender-
Stoffreg«i Ooffee Co. v. F. T. Gu^ither Gro-
cery Co. (Ky.) 80 S, W. U70, 1171 (citing 7
Cyc. p. 827).
A contract is void for lack of "mutual-
ity^ where there is no consideration for the
promise of one party to furnish or sell so
much of the commodity as the other may
want, except the promise of the other to
take and pay for so much of the commodity
as he may want, and there is no agreement
that he shall want any quantity whatever,
and no method exists by which it can be
determined whether he will want any of the
commodity, or what quantity he will want
Higble V. Rust, 71 N. B. 1010, 1011, 211 111.
883, 108 Am. St Rep. 204.
"Where there is an agreement founded
on a consideration, it is not invalid for want
of 'mutuality' because one party has an op-
tion and the other has not; or, in other
words, because it is obligatory on one and op-
tional on the other. So want of 'mutuality'
cannot be set up as a defense by the party
who has received the benefit simply because
it was left optional with the other as to
whether he would enforce his right" Pitts-
burg Vitrified Paving & Building Brick Co.
V. BaUey, 90 Paa 808, 805, 76 Kan. 42, 12
L. R. A. (N. S.) 745 (quoting and adopting
definition in 9 Cyc. p. 334).
A contract between an iron company and
a railroad company, evidenced by a writing
reciting that the iron company obligated Itr
self to furnish such rails of a certain kind
and splice bars as it might have, without
any showing of any contract or act of the
railroad company recognizing the existence
of the contract between the parties, is void
for lack of mutuality. Cal Hirsch ft Sons
Iron & Rail Co. v. Paragould & M. R. Ck>.,
127 S. W. 623, 148 Mo. App. 173.
A contract of employment, reciting that
the employ^ *'is to begin .service for" the em-
ployer on a specified date "and as manager
of local agencies for" the employer at a
specified salary, "it being mutuaUy under-
stood that the said position here given" the
employe 'Is for five years," and the abiUty
and willingness of the employ^ "to perform
the duty of his position are also a part of
the essentials" of the agreement, Is not void
for want of "mutuality"; there being an ob-
ligation on the employ^ to serve for five
years and on the employer to cofitinue him
in the service fbr such period. The word
"mutually" means reciprocally given and re-
ceived. It means an Interdwnge of promises
betweai the parties that the thing stated is
agreed to. ButteridL Pub. Co. v. Whitoomb,
8 WDS.& P.2D Skb.— 88
80 N. IB. 247, 248, 225 IIL «(», 8 L. B. A.
(N. 8.) 1001
MUTUAXiITY OF IJBaAL RIGHT
The term "mutuality of legal right," as
used in the rule that specific performance
will not be decreed unless there is mutuality
of legal right as well as of remedy, means
only that the contract must be binding on
both parties, i. e., that it is nudum pactum.
Naylor v. Parker (Tex.) 139 S. W. 93.
See HutuaL
mrXUAIXT A0KirOWI.BI>GED
See Acknowledge — Acknowledgment
MUTtTALLT BOUHB
The words "mutually bound," as used in
Civ. Code, | 1301, with reference to the obli-
gations of coterminous owners in respect to
the maintainence of boundaries and fences
between them, necessarily suggest that the
burden must rest equally upon each, and
as applied to fences, this burden includes
one-half of the ground upon which the fences
shall rest Hoar v. Hennessy, 74 Paa 452,
454, 29 Mont 253.
BfUTtTAIXT INBEBTED
Rev. St 1899, § 4487, provides that, if
any "two or more persons are mutually in-
debted" in any manner whatsoever, and one
of them commences an action against the
other, one debt may be set off against the
other, though such debts are of a different
nature. Held, that where plaintiff was in-
debted to defendant on certain judgments,
and plaintiff claimed that defendant was li-
able for damages for conversion of personal
property, plaintiff and defendant were not
"mutually indebted," defendant's daim be-
ing in contract, while plaintiff's was in tort ;
and hence the claims could not be set off.
Caldwell v. Ryan, 108 S. W. 533, 210 Mo. 17,
16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 494, 124 Am. St Rep. 717,
14 Ann. Cas. 814.
MY
All my estate, see AIL
All my lands, see All.
All my property, see All.
A mortgage, though using the pronouns
*T» and "my," being signed by both husband
and wife, included the wife as well as the
husband, though she was not named in the
body of the instrument, and wa» therefore
sufficient to cover the grantors' homestead
interest in the land. Bray v. Bllison (Ky.)
88 S. W. 96, 97.
While the words "I** and "my" In a mort-
gage ordinarily refer to the actor or speaker,
who expresses himself through the drafts-
man, the connection in which they are used
may sometimes make it doubtful to whom
they refer, and th^y will not be considered
MT:
BU;
MY
••I
tQ. htive. Ipeoi .1M> tiocKl, wltere^ tiie effect Wtftald
be to burden the mortgagee with b condition
which the mortgagor conld not Impose.
Jones V. N^orrlB^ 60 S. B. 714, 715, 147 N, O.
84.
If7 Mtate
An agreement to sell "my estate," with-
out any provision as to the vendor's title,
did not clearly show that the land was free
from incumbrance or define the title to be
conveyed, so that parol evidence was admis-
sible to show that it was understood that the
deed was to be subject to a lease on the prop-
erty. Jenndnga v. Pqffer, 88 N. B. 1036, 208
Mass. 634.
Where certain real estate had been con-
veyed for the use of testatrix for life, with
remainders over, by a deed providing that
she at any time, by any writing or writings
sealed and attested, might revoke, annul,
change, and alter all and every use or uses,
estate or estates, previously and expressly
limited and declared concerning the premises
granted, testatrix properly executed such
power by a will reciting that as to all "my**
estates, real and personal, and "with intent
to execute all powers vested" in her, she
gave, devised, bequeathed, and appointed
the property as follows, etc Du Bols v.
Walnut. 70 AtL 796, 221 Pa. 285.
My ezeentor
A will, empowering "my executor" to
compromise claims and to sell and dispose
of property, and providing that, in case of
the executor's death, it is testator's wish
that designated other persons act as trus-
tees and executors, with all the powers vest-
ed in the original executor, vests the legal
title to the real estate, with power to sell
and convey the same in the executor, as
trustee under the will, and not by virtue of
appointment by the court Haggart v. Ean-
ney, 84 S. W. 703, 704, 73 Ark, 344.
My farm
A devise of "my farm" includes, not only
the testator's homestead, but also other outr
lying lots, which had been used by the tes-
tator in carrying on the business of farming
for years before he wrote his vrlll, and which
had been referred to in business transactions
as his farm. ScovlUe v. Mason, 57 AtL 114,
115, 76 Conn. 459.
My luuid and seal
The clause in a will, "I have hereunto
set my hand and seal," does not necessarily
Import that testatrix signed her name with
her own hand, as it became her hand 11 her
name was written by some one at her direc-
tion to the same extent as If she had written
it with her own hand. Elston v. Montgom-
ery, 90 N. B. 8, 242 IlL 848, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
42a
My ]io«aa and lat
"In WarveUe on Vendors, f 185, it h
said that a description as 'my house an^
lot' imports a particular house and lot ren
dered certain by the description that it U
the one that belongs to 'me.'" Moayon v
Moayon, 72 8. W. 38, 88, 114 Ky. 855, 60 L
R. A. 415, 102 Am. 8t Rep. 803.
My land
The words "my land," prefixed to an un
certain description of a tract of land in i
certain section wherein a testator devising
the land had but one tract, would remove thi
uncertainty. In re Lynch's Estate, 75 Pac
1086, 1088, 142 CaL 878.
My lesal lieirs
A clause in a will providing for the divl
sion of property among "my legal heirs" re
fers to the next of kin and legal heirs of thf
testator, and does not include the next ol
kin or legal heirs of his wife. Miller ▼. Met
calf, 58 Atl. 743, 744, 77 Conn. 176.
My moaeys» bonds, ete.
A bequest to a hospital of "my moneys
bonds, notes, and money in savings bank*
Included railroad stock and scrip, when con
sidered in the light of the other provlsloiu
and the general constnictlon of testator'^
will, which provided for the payment of all
testator's debts and two small legacies, thei
disposed of testator's live stod^, household
furniture, and land to the hospital, whlcli
left to be disposed of merely notes, bonda
money in savings bank, and the railroad
stock and scrip; the stock and scrip beini
avails of the bonds, and the testator's evi
dent intention being to dispose of the bulk
of his whole estate to the hospltaL Scovillc
V. Mason, 57 Aa 114, 115, 76 Conn. 450.
My property
Testator gave all "my^ furniture and
stock and the farm on which "I now reside"
to his wife for life, with remainder over, and
directed that all legacies should be paid oat
of "my" estate. The residuary clause par-
ported to pass only "my" property. Held, that
the will disposed only of testator's separate
property, and dfd not purport to dispose ot
community property, so as to require the
wife to elect whether to take under the will
or her own property. Sauvage v. Wauhop
(Tex.) 143 S. W. 259.
"My property," and the "property I pos-
sess," mean one and the same thing. Thom-
as y. Blair, 85 South. 811, 818, 111 La. e7&
My wife
A bequest in a will to ''my odd wif^. C"
is to 0. as testator's wife, and, if she failed
to answer that description, the gift to her
would fall. The words "my wife," as used
here, are not words of description to desig*
MT
616
MTIZJTIS
te the legatee, but rather to indicate the
aracter or capacity in which alone she
Hid take. CoUard t. Gollard (N. J.) 67 AU.
0. 102.
IfywiU
Insured assigned all Ma right, title, and
terest In certain life insorance policies to
nistees to be named in my wlllt** for plain-
tiff's use. Held to mean the trustees named
in the document finally admitted to probate
as the will of insured. Frost v. Frost, 88 N.
B. 446, 202 Mass. 100, 27 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 18^
132 Am. St Rep. 47&
MYELITIS
As disease^ see Disease.
N«P«
616
MAMB
N
'Ml
N. P.
The Initials "N. P.** will be xecognised
by the court as the usual and ordinary abbre-
viation for the official title of a notary pubUc.
Towler t. Carlthers, 61 S. B. 1182, 1188, 4
6a. App. 617; WiUiams t. Lobban, 104 S. W.
58, 69, 206 Mo. 399 (citing Sumner t. Mitch-
ell, 10 South. 662, 29 Fla. 179, 14 L. B. A. 816,
80 Am. St Bep. 106; Rowley t. Berrian, 12
lU. 198) ; Worl^ t. Adams, 69 8. B. 929, 981,
lUVa.79Ql
N.W.
The abbreTiation '"N. W.** in the column
headed *Tart of Section," is sufficient to
identify the land as the northwest quarter of
the section named in the assessment roll.
Beggs T. Paine, 109 N. W. 822, 16 N. D. 436
(distinguishing Power t. Bowdle, 64 N. W.
404, 406, 8 N. D. 107, 21 L. R. A. 828, 44 Am.
St Bep. 611; Power ▼• Larabee^ 49 N. W.
724, 2 N. D. 141).
NAKED
NAKED POWEJBl
A '^naked power,** or a power simply col-
lateral and without interest, 'is when, to a
mere stranger, authority is given of disposing
of an interest, in which he had not before,
nor hath, by the instrument creating the
power, any estate whatever." Weaver v.
Bichards, 108 N. W. 882, 887, 144 Mich. 896, 6
L. B. A. (N. S.) 866 (quoting and adopting
definition in Chancellor Kent in Bergen v.
Bennett [N. YJ 1 Gaines Gas. 1, 16, 2 Am.
Dea 281).
NAME
See Ohrlstian Name; Fictitious Name;
Good Name; Legal Name; Nickname;
Surname; Trade-Name.
As property, see Property.
As trade-mark, see Trade-Mark.
Identity of names, see Idem Sonans.
Ignorant of name, see Ignorant *
Suffix Sr. as part of, see Sr.
By the common law since the Norman
Conquest, a legal name has consisted of one
"Christian name," or that which is given one
after ,his birth or at baptism, or is afterwards
assumed by him in addition to his family
name, and of one "surname," or family name,
which Is that derived from the common name
of his parents, or borne by him in common
with other members of his family. Schaffer
T. Levenson Wrecking Ga, 81 Att. 434, 82 N.
J. Law, 61.
In law, the name of a person consists of
one given name and one surname; the two,
using the given name first and the surname
last, oonstltottng sndi poroonls legal
and to be ignorant of either the given or su
name is to be ignorant of the person's nan
within Code Civ. Proc. | 148, providing tha
when plaintifl shall be ignorant of the nan
of a defendant, such defendant may be de
ignated in any pleading or proceeding by ao
name and description, and that, when hi
true name Is discovered, the pleadinsr <v P»
ceeding may be amended according^, an
that plaintilf must state in the veriflcation c
his petition that he could not discover tt
true name, and the summons must contal
the words ''zeal name unknown" and a cop
thereof be perscmally served upon defaidan
McNamara v. Ounderaon, 181 N. W. 188, 18<
89 Neb. 112.
•*The word 'Junior,' 'Jr.,* or words c
similar import are ordinarily mere matters o
description, and form no part of a person'
legal 'name^' and to omit or add sndi appeUi
tion or cognomen is harmless error, both 1
civil and in criminal proceeding.** Wlndoi
V. State, 72 S. W. 193, 194, 44 Tex. Or. B. 61^
FoUbmm
, In giving constructive notice to a defend
ant not sued on a written instrum^it signe
by himself, his legal name includes his fnl
first Christian name and surname. Bntler i
Smith, 120 N. W. 1106, 1107, 84 Neb. 78, 2
L. B. A. (N. S.) 436.
On service by publication on defendant i
a suit to foreclose a mortgage where he is nc
sued on a written instrument signed by him
self, notice to "B. B. Ballard** not ahowla
his Christian name is insufficient McCab
V. Bquitable Land Co., 129 N. W. HUB, 1011
88 Neb. 468.
As indleatins identity
A person's name is the designation b,
which he is known and called in the communi
ty in which he lives andis best known. Lose
V. Plainfield Savings Bank, 128 N. W. UOl
1108, 149 Iowa, 672, 81 L. B. A. (N. &) 1112.
The word "name" is defined as "a wort
by which a person or thing Is denoted ; th
word or words by which an Individual, pei
son, or thing, or class of persons or things
is designated and distinguished from others.
Koth V. Pallachucola Club, 61 8. EL 77, 7S
79 S. C. 614; Uihlein v. Gladieux, 78 N. £
363, 366, 74 Ohio St 282 (citing Bouv. Lai
Diet 467).
A "name** Is a word or words, desigiu
tion, or appellation used to disttngnlflh a pei
son or thing or class from others, and word
indicated by single letters are only less adapt
ed to that purpose than words indicate
by several letters. Griffith v. Bonawits, 10
N. W. 327, 329, 73 Neb. 622.
'*A man's 'name* \a simply the sound <»
sounds by which he Is commonly desigiuito
KAICE
617
NATKkK
his f ellowB, and by which they distinguish
m. It l8 a mere means of description.
»metimes a man is known by several dlf-
rent names, and It was formerly the costom,
drawing Indictments, to charge him under
i the names by which he was known, con-
cting them with the words 'alias dictus,'
with simply 'alias.* These words mean
herwlse called* or 'otherwise.* *' State v.
)ward, 77 Pac. 60, 61, 30 Mont 618.
An indictment for rape on an illegitimate
lid, whose mother married when tlie child
\a three years old, which glyes as the sur-
nie of the child the surname of the hus-
Dd of th« mother, is sttffldlently supported
proof that after the marriage the child
Ls generally known by such name; a has-
rd not necessarily bearing its mother's
me ; a "name** b^ng one or more words to
signate a person or thing. People v. Gray,
N. E. 268, 278, 261 IlL 431.
IClddle name or faltlal
It is necessary in court proceedings to
rrectly give all the initials in a person's
me, though at common law mistakes in a
ddle name or initial were not materiaL
may t. Bigham, 99 Pac. 21, 22, 61 Wash.
2, 19 L. B. A. (N. S.) 906.
"The common law recognizes but one
ristian 'name,' and a middle initial may
dropped or changed at pleasure. Its pres-
^ or absence or difference affects nothing,
tiile a letter of the ali^abet does not con-
tute a name, yet the initial letter of the
rlstian name is so commonly used that
Is to be regarded, not as the name of some
ler person, but as an abbreviation of the
rlstian name of the person intended." II-
ois Cent R. Ck). v. Hasenwinkle, 83 N. E>.
), 816, 232 lU. 224, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 129.
The middle name \b no part of the name,
cl under Acts 33d Gen. Assem. c 118, relat-
: to notice to owners of land in a drainage
trict, a notice to "EJmma Forsythe Jones,?
ose maiden name was "FOrsythe," was a
Bdent notice to "Bknma Jones." Collins
Board of Sup'rs of Pottawattamie County
wa) 138 N. W. 1095, 1097.
LM£]>
See Herein Named.
A trustee who Is named in the way the
tator has provided to perpetuate the trust
"named in the will," within the meaning
Pub. St 1901, c. 185, S 2, cl. 12, authorizing
i probate court to appoint the trustees nam-
In the will. Carr v. Coming, 62 Atl. 168,
), 73 N. H. 362.
APHTHA
A commercial comi)ound, of which one of
i substantial parts is nai^ttia, but which,
en compounded with other ingredients, be-
nes a distinct product, is not within Bev.
WB, c 102, § 106, punishing the sale or
keeping for sale of "naphtha" under an as-
sumed name; but where the contributed
parts merely supply color to the fluid, with a
slight thickening, making the mixture ad-
hesive when applied, the Jury must deter-
mine whether the article does not remain es-
sentially naphtha, which is a product of pe-
troleum intermediate between the associate
products of gasoline and benzine, all of which
do not differ in their essential nature, but
vary only in the degree of Inflammability
when brought into contact with radiant heat
Gately v. Taylor, 97 N. E. 619, 621, 2U Mass.
60, 39 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 472.
NAPKIN
As printed matter, see Printed Matter.
NARROW
The word "narrow,** as used in the def-
inition of "galloon" as a "narrow, tapelike
fabric used for binding hats, shoes, etc.,"
is a relative term of varying meanings. It
Is easy to ooneelve of a tapelike fabric so
narrow as to come within the definition, and
equally easy to conceive of one so wide that
it must fall without it There is nothing
in the dictionary which indicates just where
the dividing line occurs. Certain woven cot-
ton articles, from 1 to 2Mi inches wide, chief-
ly used as hat bands for trimming men's
hats, are not galloons, under Tariff Act Aug.
28, 1894, c. 349, I 1, Schedule I, par. 263,
28 Stat 629. United States v. Walter H.
Oraef ft Co., 127 Fed. 688, 689, 62 a 0. A.
414.
NARROW OHANHEI.
"Narrow channels," within the meaning
of article 25 of the inland navigation rules
(Act June 7, 1897, 30 Stat 96), are bodies
of water navigated up and down in opposite
directions, and do not include harbor wa-
ters, with piers on each side, where the ne-
cessities of commerce require navigation in
every conceivable direction. Tested by such
rule, the Hudson river above Tw^ity-Third
street. New York, and within the city limits
is not a narrow channeL The Number 4,
161 red. 847, 860, 88 C. C. A. 666; The Is-
lander, 162 Fed. 386, 386, 81 C. C. A. 611.
The Hudson river in the vicinity of
Tonkers, where it has a single deep and
straight channel for a number of miles, is
a "narrow channel," within the meaning of
the inland navigation rules. The Benjamin
Franklin, 146 Fed. 18, 15, 76 a a A. 43.
NATION
See Comity of Nations.
**The terms 'state' and ^nation* are ose^
in the law of nations, as well as In comxx^OY^
parlance, as importing tbe same thing; a'kx^
imply a body of men, united together, "to
procure their mutual safety and advai^*^«S^
by means of their union. Sncb a Bcx^l^^t:^
KATIOK
518
NATIVE WINK
has its affairs and interests to manage; it
deliberates, and takes resolutions In com-
mon, and thus becomes a moral person, hav-
ing an understanding and a will peculiar to
itself, and is susceptible of obligations and
laws." Cherokee Nation t. Georgia, 5 Pet
1, 52, 8 L. Bd. 25 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
The term "nation," as applied to the In-
dian nations, means a people distinct from
others. The Indians have always been re-
garded as having a semi-independent posi-
tion when they preserved their tribal rela-
tions, not as states, not as nations, not as
possessed of the full attributes of sovereign-
ty, but as a separate people, with the pow-
ers of regulating their internal and social
relations, and thus far not brought under
the laws of the Union, or of the state with-
in whose limits they reside. Glenn-Tucker
V. Clayton, 70 S. W. 8, 18, 4 Ind. T. 511.
NATIONAI. BANK
A "National bank" is a corporation, the
powers of which are defined and limited by
the acts of Congress authorizing the creation
of such institutions. Hansford v. National
Bank of Tif ton, 78 S. B. 405, 406, 10 Ga. App.
270.
"National banks" are federal instrumen-
talities, subject to the paramount authority
of the United States. An attempt by a state
to define their duties, or control the con-
duct of their affairs, is abisolutely void wher-
ever such attempted exercise of the author-
ity conflicts with the laws of the United
States, and either frustrates the purpose of
the national legislation, or impairs the effi-
ciency of those agencies of the federal gov-
ernment to discharge the duties for the per-
formance of which they were created. Schles-
inger v. Kelly, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1083, 1087, 114
App. Div. 546 (citing Easton v. Iowa, 23 Sup.
Ct 288, 188 U. S. 220, 47 L. Ed. 452; Davis
V. Elmira Savings Bank, 16 Sup. Ct 502, 161
U. S. 275, 40 L. Ed. 700).
"'National banks' are instrumentalities
of the federal government, created for a
public purpose, and as such necessarily sub-
ject to the paramount authority of the Unit-
ed States." The coverture of the legatee of
shares of stock in a national bank, when
her name was placed upon the bank's books
as a stockholder, and when she received the
certificate of stodc, does not protect her
against a personal judgment at law for the
amount due as a shareholder under an as-
sessment made by the Ck>mptroller of the
Currency to pay the debts of the bank, al-
though a married woman may be incapa-
ble, under the local law, if making or bind-
ing herself personally by contract, if such
law does not incapacitate her from becom-
ing an owner of such stock, by bequest or
otherwise. Christopher v. Norvell, 26 Sup.
Ct 502, 505, 201 U. S. 216, 50 L. Ed. 732, 6
Ann. Cas. 740 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion In Davis v. Elmlni Sav. Bank, 16 Sup.
Ct 502, 508, 161 U. S. 275, 283, 40 L. Ed.
700, 701).
"For some purposes a 'national bank' Is
a public institution, notwithstanding it is
the subject of private ownership. It may
issue bills, which circulate as part of the
currency of the country. It Is subject to ex-
amination, and, in a large measure, to the
supervision, of the (Comptroller of the Cur-
rency. It is examined at stated periods, and
may be the subject of special examination
by order of the Comptroller. But it is own-
ed by shareholders, like other banking in-
stitutions." Any legal right which a stock-
holder of a "national bank" may have to
obtain an inspection of its books may be en-
forced in the state courts by mandamus, In
view of the provision of the act of August
13, 1888 (25 Stat 483, c. 806), that, for ac-
tions against national banks at law or in
equity, they shall be deemed citizens of the
state in which thoy are located, and that in
such cases the federal circuit and district
courts shall have jurisdiction only as in
cases between individual citizens of the same
state. Guthrie v. Harkness, !f& Sup. Ct 4,
7, 199 U. S. 148, 50 L. Ed. 130, 4 Ann. Cas.
433.
"A 'national bank' is an instrumentality
of the United States; its circulating notes
are guaranteed by the United States; and
if the United States should be compelled to
pay them, the United States has a para-
mount lien on the assets of the bank for re-
imbursement The administration of the
bank's assets is therefore vested in the
Comptroller of the Currency as an officer of
the United States. He appoints the receiver,
and directs his acts. The individual liabili-
ty of a stockholder can only be enforced by
his order. The provision is as much for the
benefit of the stockholders as for the United
States, and it is indiq;)ensable to the bring-
ing of a suit against the stockholder. In
other words, the liability dates from the or-
der of the (Comptroller." Bankin v. Barton,
26 Sup. Ct 29, 30, 199 U. S. 228, 50 L. £».
168.
NATIONAI. BANK NOTES
As legal tender, see Legal Tender.
NATIONAL BANK OFFIOEB
See Officer (of corporation).
NATIVE
NAnVE WINE
The words "native wine," as used In
Rev. Laws, c. 100, | 1, prohibiting the sale
of intoxicating liquor without a license, ex-
cept "sales by the makers thereof of native
wine or of dder manufactured in this com-
monwealth," mean wine made in the ooounon-
wealth, and not wine made in any of the
states in the Union. Commonwealth t» Pe-
tranlch, 66 N. E. 807, 188 Mass. 217.
MATUBAIi
619
NATURAIi OONSEQGSNCJEB
NATURAL
An Instractlon that no form of words
was necessary to constitute a contract, but
that, if the ^'natural" inference from what
appeared to have passed between the parties
was .that their minds met presently in an
agreement, a valid contract was made, what-
ever might have been the verbal expression
used, is not prejudicial because of the use of
the word "natural" Instead of the better
word "reasonable." An inference can hard-
ly be reasonable without being natural Sic-
ard V. Albenberg Go^ 118 N. W. 179, 180, 186
Wis. 622.
HATlTBAIi AFFBOTIOK
"Natural affection" is such as naturally
exists between near relatives, as a father and
child, brother and sister, husband and wife,
and it is regarded in law as a good considera-
tion. The word "father" is interchangeable
with "mother" in so far as relationship is
concerned, and the presumable natural af-
fection of a child for the mother is a good
consideration to support a contract Worth
V. Daniel, 67 S. B. 898, 900, 1 Oa. App. 15
(quoting and adopting definitions in 2 Bout,
Law Diet p. 269; Black's Law Diet 6).
KATVBAI. BOUKBABT
Courses and distances must, as a gener-
al rule, give way to a call for a natural
boundary, because a natural boimdary, if
fixed, is unchangeable, and more likely to be
the true call than courses and distances. A
well-known and established line of an adja-
cent tract is a "natural boundary" within
the rule that courses and distances give way
to a natural boundary, because the line is
more certain than course and distance. Wil-
son Lumber & Milling Co. v. Button & Bour-
bonnais^ 68 S. E. 2, 4, 152 N. C. 537.
The line of another tract of land is a
**natnral boundary" if, at the time a deed
calling for it is made; the line Is indicated by
visible marks, so that it can be identified
and located, or if it can be otherwise located
with reasonable certainty. Lance v. Rum-
bough, 68 S. O. 857, 360^ 150 N. 0. 19.
HATURAX. 0ATJ8B8
Other natural causes, see Other.
"It is not essential that the negligence
should be the direct cause of the injury. It
suffices that it is the natural and probable
cause. It is the 'natural cause' when either
it acts directly in producing the injury, or
sets in motion other causes so producing it
and forming a continuous chain in natural
sequence down to the injury, thus linking the
negligence with the injury by a chain of
natural and consequential causation, al-
though the former may be neither tlie imme-
diate nor the direct cause of the event * But
such causation cannot be proximate cause in
law to arouse liability, unless an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person ought, in the
exercise of such intelligenoe, to have foreseen
that an injury might probably result from
the negligence under like circumstances."
Meyer v. Milwaukee Electric By. A Light Co.,
93 N. W. 6, 8, 116 Wis. 336 (citing Deisen-
rieter v. Kraus-Merkel Malting Co., 72 N^ W.
735, 97 Wis. 279; Dehsoy v. light Co., 85 N.
W. 973, 110 Wis. 412; Seaver v. Town of
Union, 89 N. W. 163, 113 Wis. 322).
NATUBAIi OEMEKT
"Natural cement* * is the quick-setting
product of a low temperature kiln burning
a cement rock of irregular composition.
Donaldson v. Roksament Stone Co., 170 Fed.
192, 193.
KATUBAI. OONBrnOK
The phrase "natural condition," in an
ordinance requiring any person who opens or
excavates a highway to restore the same to
Its "natural condition," is applicable to the
erection of electric light poles, as the phrase
means only that the street is to be restored
to the condition which is natural to the
street with the contemplated improvements
for which the excavation is required. "No
street that has been improved at all is, strict-
ly speaking, in a 'natural condition*; it can
only be in a condition natural to a street"
Cook V. North Bergen Tp., 59 Aa 1035, 1036,
72 N. J. Law, 119.
KATURAI. OOVUBQXnSNCEM
A "natural consequence" of an act is the
consequence which ordinarily follows it ; the
result which may reasonably be anticipated
from it The Santa Rita, 173 Fed. 413, 417
(quoting and adopting definition in Cole v.
German Savings & Loan Soc., 124 Fed. 115,
59 C. C. A. 595, 63 L. R. A. 416).
"A 'natural consequence' is one which
has followed from the original act complain-
ed of, in the usual, ordinary, and experienced
course of events; a result, therefore^ which
might reasonably have been anticipated or
expected. Natural consequences^ however, do
not necessarily include all such as, upon a
calculation of chances, would be found pos-
sible of occurrence, or such as extreme pru-
dence might anticipate, but only those which
ensue from the original act without any
such extraordinary coincidence or conjunc-
tion of circumstances as that the usual course
of nature should seem to have been departed
from." Winfree v. Jones, 61 S. O. 153, 154,
104 Va. 39, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 201 (quoting
and adopting definition in Watson, Damages,
§33).
For the purpose of civil liability, those
consequences, and those only, are deemed
"natural" and probable which a person of
average competence and knowledge, being in
the like case with the person whose conduct
is complained of, and liaving the like oppor-
tunities of observation, might be expected to
foresee as likely to follow such conduct The
doctrine of "natural and probable" conse-
NATURAL CONSEQUENCES
520
NATURAL JUSTICE
quences is illustrated in the law of negli-
gence, and there the substance of the wrong
itself is failure to act with due foresight
The negligent delay of a carrier in moying
goods intrusted to it for transportation, not
so unreaaonable as to amount to a conyer-
sion, would not raider it liable for the loss
of the goods after they hare been carried
to their destination, if they are there de-
stroyed by an act of God before delivery.
Rodgers ▼. Missouri Pac. R. Go., 88 Pac. 886,
76 Eiin. 222, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 668, 121 Am.
St. Rep. 416, 12 Ann. Cas. 441 (quoting with
approval from Pollock, Torts).
For damages to be the "natural and prox-
ixpate consequence" of a breach of contract
of carriage by failure to deliver the goods
within a reasonable time, the loss must be
immediately connected with the supposed
cause of it, and, if in the ordinary course of
events a certain result usually follows from
a given cause, the immediate relation of the
one to the other is established. Williams v.
Atlantic Ck>ast line R. Co., 48 South. 209,
212. 66 Fla. 735, 24 L. R. A (N. S.) 134, 181
Am. St Rep. 169 (citing Michigan Gent R.
Go. V. Burrows, 33 Mich. Q.
KATUBAI. BitAnr
As used in Laws 1910, c. 183, which cre-
ates a special drainage district to provide ef-
fectual drainage by artificial drains or other
drainage facilities, and provides for a cohi*
mission to develop a drainage system by
artificial canals and by improving all natural
drains, the words "natural drains" mean a
natural water course, including creeks,
streams, brooks, or rivers, and the act is
therefore in violation of (}onst § 90, par. ''q,"
prohibiting the Legislatuie from passing spe-
cial laws relating to water courses. Belzoni
Drainage Commission v. Winn, 68 South. 778,
779, 98 Miss. 369.
NATURAL EFFECT
The rule of law requires that the dam-
ages recoverable from a wrongdoer must be
the natural and proximate effects of his de-
linquency. The term "natural" imports that
they are such as might reasonably have been
foreseen. Smith v. Public Service Corpora-
tion of New Jersey, 76 Ati. 937, 938, 78 N. J.
Law, 478, 20 Ann. Cas. 161.
NATURAL FLOWERS
Statice wreaths, which have all the ap-
pearance of "natural flowers • • ♦ pre-
served," are dutiable under the enumeration
of such articles in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, a
11, I 1, Schedule G, par. 261, 30 Stat 170.
Bayersdorfer A Co. v. United States, 171 Fed.
286,287.
NATURAL FOOL
A "natural fool" is one that hath no
understanding of his nativity and therefore
is liy law presumed never likely to obtain
any. Hauber ▼• Leibold, 107 N. W. 10i2,
1044, 76 Neb. 706 (quoting and adopting M
nition of Blackstone, dted in Clark y. Robij
son, 88 HL 408, 60S9*
NATURAL OAS
Aa mineral, see MineraL
As property, see Personal Propertj
Property.
"Natural gas" is a mineral, and is a pai
of the land until severed. Osbom v. Arkai
sas Territorial Oil ft Gaa Co^ 146 & W. 12
124, 108 Ark. 176.
NATURAL GUARDIAN
The father is the "natural guardian** c
his chUd. In re Knott, 126 N. W. 1040, 104!
162 Mich, la
Under Kirby's Dig. 1 3767, and under tti
common law, the father, unless ineompetei
or unfit, is the "natural guardian" and ei
titied to the care, custody, and education c
his minor children, and, even as between tl:
fiither and the mother, the custody In tli
father is generally allowed unless the chlh
on account of tender years, or being a f(
male, imperatively requires that attentio
which a mother only can supply. But b<
tween the parent and the grandparent or an
one else, the law prefers the former as cui
todian of the child, unless the permit ia ii
competent, or unfit because of his or her poi
erty or depravity to provide the proper phyt
ical comforts and moral training. Baker y
Durham, 120 S. W. 789, 790, 96 Ark. 656.
NATURAL IN0RZIA8S
Testator devised shares of stock of
corporation in trust to pay to his daughtc
the income during life, and at her death t
divide the same between her children an
grandchildren. After testator^s death, tli
corporation issued additional shares under
resolution reciting that it accumulated a sni
plus, and that it was desirable to increae
the capital to a certaiii sum, and that addj
tional shares to the amount of the aurpla
capitalized be issued to the stodsholden
Held, that under Civ. Code 1910, f 3667, pre
viding that the natural increase of the prof
erty belongs to the tenant for life, and ai^
extraordinary accumulation goes to the re
mainderman, the additional shares attache
to the corpus can go to the remainderman
the words "natural increase ct the property,
as applied to corporate stock, meaning divl
dends. Jadcson v. Maddox, 70 S. E7. 866, 86(
136 Qa. 31, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1216.
NATURAL JUSTICE
By "natural Justice," in the role tiial
where one makes a will contrary to natura
justice, that fact may be considered witJ
other facts, means that which la founded ii
equity, honesty, and right, and "natural Jaa
tice" requlrea that a parent shall care foi
his children. The fftct that testatrix, 7<
yenrs of age^ gave the bulk of her pvopertg
KATOBAL LIFE
S2l
NATURAL PREMIUM
% public library to the exduckm of her
i sisters and her brother liiing in other
es did not show lack of testamentary ca-
ity; there having been litigation tending
unbitter them, and their relations not be-
intimate. Spencer v. Terrjr'B Bstate^ 94
W. 372, 374, 133 Mich. 30.
TURAXi UFB
See Daring Natural Life; Imprisonment
for life or Less Than Natural Life;
Quarterly During His Natural Ufa
TURJkli MOHUMEHT
The limitation on the rule that a body
water appearing on the original govern-
it sorrey and plat as the boundary of a
;:t of land is a ''natural monument," and
I constitute the boundary, however dis-
t from the poaition indicated for it by the
mder line, and that, where the meander
i is drawn on one aide of one of the reg-
r surrey lines, the one-quarter line, or the
-sixteenth line, the boundaries cannot be
ended across such line to reach the wa-
front, especially if soch survey line ap-
rs on the government plat as a boundary
% lot conveyed to another, is inapplicable,
ere, though in some places the meander
» falls south of the east and west one-
teenth line and west of the north and
th one-sixteenth line^ yet at other points
located north of the one and east of the
er, thus conclusively refuting the infer-
e that the government intended that the
line should be confined within either pf
h one-sixteenth linea Brown v. Dunn,
N. W. 1007, 1008. 135 Wis. 374.
The mouth of the second right-hand fork
a stream called for in a survey is a "nat-
1, indestructible monument," which will
vail over courses and distances. Morgan
Renfro, 00 S. W. 311, 313, 124 Ky. 314.
lTitraXi mother
Mother as including, see Mother.
lTURAL ORJEOT of KI8 ROURTT
If a person has sufficient capacity to
uprehend perfectly the condition of his
perty, his relations to the persons who
old or should or might be the objects of
bounty, and the scope and power of the
tvisions of his will, he has testamentary
»acity; the term ''natural objects of his
mty*' does not mean that he should know
i recognize every distant relative who is
it led to inherit from him under the exist-
: canons of descent, and does not include
isins to the second and remoter degrees
propinquity, but refers to his near rela-
es. In re Campbell's Will, 138 N. T. Supp.
W, 1007.
LTURAI. ORUOATIOir
'*! think it incontestably true that the
tural obligation' of private contracts be-
een individuals in iociety ceases and is
converted into a civil obligation, by the very
act of surrendering the right and powtf of
enforcing performance into the hands of the
government The right and power of enforc-
ing perfiormance exists, as I think all must
admit, only in the law of the land, and the
obligation resulting from this condition is a
dvil obligation." Ogden v. Saunders, 12
Wheat. 213, 320, 6 L. Bd. 006 (per Trimble,
J., dissenting).
NATURAL OFPSPRmO
As kelr
A deed of land to a woman and her '^chil-
dren, the natural offspring of her body," cre-
ates an estate tail, the quoted words being
equivalent to the expression "heirs of her
body," whidi estate by statute is dianged to
a life estate in the first holder with a re-
mainder in fee to the first taker after ter-
mination of the life estate Dempaey v. Da-
vis» 136 S. W. 075, 076^ 08 Ark. 570.
NATURAL PERSON
Corporatloo distinguished, see Corpora-
tion.
Under the bankruptcy act providing that
any "natural person*' may be adjudged an in-
voluntary bankrupt, the word '*person" does
not include an Infant or a lunatic In re
Kehler, 153 Fed. 235, 237.
" 'Natural persons' are such as the God
of nature formed us." A "natural person" is
a man, woman, or child. John C Orr Co. v.
Cushman, 104 N. Y. Supp. 510, 511, 54 Misc.
Etep. 121 (quoting and adopting definition in
Blackstone and 2 Abb. Law Diet p. 151).
The provision of the bankrupt act ex-
empting a person engaged chiefly in farming
from liability to be adjudged a bankrupt does
not apply to a corporation. The use of the
phrase "natural person," when construed in
connection with, the i^vase "except wage-
earners and those chiefly engaged in farm-
ing," and all that follows it, excludes corpo-
rations from the exception. In re Lake
Jackson Sugar Co., 120 Fed. 640, 648.
NATURAL POaaSBSION
"Natural possession" is that by which a
man detains a thing corporeally, as by occu-
pying a house, cultivating ground, or retain-
ing a movable possession. Oiv. Code, art.
3428. Such a possession in its nature must
be visible, open, and public. Albert Hanson
Lumber Co. v. Baldwin Lumber Co., 52 South.
537, 530, 126 La. 347.
NATURAL PREmUM
The term "natural premium plan," is
used in the law of insurance to represent
what is commonly known as the "assessment
plan," or the writing of insurance by com-
panies limiting th«ir assessments to sucb
sum as is necessary to cover the actual coet
of insurance from one renewal period to an-
other. Westerman v. Supreme Lodge Knights
I;
NATURAL BIGHTS
522
NATURAL WATBR COURSE
of Pytbias, 94 8. W. 470, 481, 196 Mo. 070, 6
U R. A (N. S.) 1114.
NATURAL RIGHTS
The rigbt to demand that property pass
by inheritance or will is a ''natural" and in-
herent right, which cannot be wholly taken
away or substantially Impaired by the Legis-
lature, but is subject only to reasonable reg-
ulation. Nunnemacher v. State^ 108 N. W.
627, 628, 129 Wis. 190, 9 L. R. A (N. S.) 121,
9 Ann. €as. 711. But see Magoun t. Illinois
Trust A Sav. Bank, 18 Sup. Ot 694, 696, 170
U. a 283, 42 L. Ed. 1037; PuUen v. Wake
County Com'rs, 66 N. 0. 361, 363.
NATURAL STATE
See Arrowroot in Its Natural State.
Pearls in their natural state^ see Pearl.
Hanks and balls of dried and salted cab-
bage, the salting and manipulation of which
were done as a preparation, fitting the cab-
bage for cooking purposes, and intended to be
permanent, are dutiable as vegetables "pre-
pared or preserved," under Tariff Act July
24, 1897, c. 11, t 1, Schedule G, par. 241, 30
Stat 170, and not as vegetables in their "nat-
ural state," under paragraph 267, 80 Stat
171. Sun Kwong On ▼. United States, 177
Fed. 696, 696.
NATURAL WANT
A finding of the master directed to find
and report whether an upper proprietor's use
of a stream by maintaining a dam across it
was reasonable, that the stream was so small
that the amount of water flowing in it during
certain seasons of the year was barely suffi-
cient under the best conditions to supply the
"natural" wants of the users thereof, was a
finding that the upper proprietor's use was
unreasonable because the stream was so
small that at times it furnished barely
enough water for the domestic uses of lower
proprietors; the term "natural wants'* design
natlng domestic uses. Lawrie v. Sillsby, 74
Aa 94, 95, 82 Vt 505.
NATURAL WATER COURSE
See, also. Water Course.
A "natural water course" \s a stream
having defined bounds and continuity of flow.
Jennings v. Bohner, 134 N. Y. Supp. 943, 944.
A "natural water course" is a natural
stream flowing in a deflnlte bed or channel
with banks and sides, and having a perma-
nent source of supply. McHenry v. City of
Parkersburg, 66 S. B. 750, 753, 66 W. Va. 533,
29 L. R. A (N. S.) 860 (dtlng 2 Bouv. Law
Diet 468, 1219; Neal v. Ohio Blver E. Co.,
34 S. B. 914, 47 W. Va. 316).
A living stream, with a well-defined
channel, is a "natural water course." Wilson
V. Pennsylvania R. Co., 113 N. Y. Supp. UOl,
1103, 129 App. Div. 821.
A water course with well-defined ban]
which is the natural outlet of lakes, ai
through which the waters will reach a coi
mon place, is a "natural water course
though it is called a swag or a swamp or
creek, and whether its course is straight (
crooked. Hastie v. Jenkins, 101 Pac. 4S
496, 63 Wash. 2L
It is not essential to the existence of
"natural water course" that the supply shou
be living water, but it may be surface wat
collected on a large watershed which cuts f(
Itself a well-defined channel ; nor is it nece
sary that there should be a constant and co
tinuous flow of water. Brown v. Schn^dc
106 Pac. 41, 81 Kan. 486, 135 Am. St Be
396; Palmer v. WaddeU, 22 Kan. 352, 355.
To constitute a "natural water coursi
it \b not necessary that the flow of water 1
sufficient to wear out a channel having we!
marked sides and banks; but, if the surfa<
water uniformly or habitually fiowB over
given course having reasonable limits as
width, the line of its flow is a water coun
Hull V. Harker. 106 N. W. 629, 630, 130 low
190 (citing lAmbert v. Alcorn, 33 N. E. S
144 111. 313, 21 L. B. A 611).
A depression or slou£^ s^[)aratlng an 1
land from the Mississippi river, so that
time of high water it became an arm of tl
river with water flowing into it at the nor
end and emptying at the south end, and al
forming a drain for surface water, was
"natural water course." St Louis Merchanl
Bridge Terminal By. Ass*n ▼. Schults, 80 :
B. 879, 882, 226 IlL 409.
Where the flow of water through an a
tlflclal ditch for many years was such i
would constitute a "natural water course"
the flow had begun without artificial aj
a finding that it was a water course to whii
the same rules of law apply as are appllcab
to natural water courses was warrante
Stimson V. Inhabitants of Brookllne, 83 N.
893. 894, 895, 19Y Mass. 568, 16 L. R. A (1
S.) 280, 125 Am. St Rep. 382, 14 Ann. Ob
907.
After high-water channels are artificial
opened, and the cuts connecting them wi
the main stream are used by the parti
opening them and such use Is acquiesced
as branches of the main stream for the perit
of limitations, they become natural channel
and owners of land adjacent thereto are e
titled to the same rights as those on ti
main channel. Hough v. Porter, 95 Pac 73
98 Pac. 1083, 1101, 61 Or. 318.
To constitute a "natural water course
it is not necessary that there should be
stream with well-defined banks and bed, (
that the water fiow at all seasons of the yea
but, where the conformation of the land
such as to give surface water flowing fro
one tract to another, a fixed determlna
course, so as to uniformly discdiarge it on tl
NATUBAIi WATEB COURSE
628
NA TURB
Tlent tract at a fixed and definite point,
} course thus Bniformly followed by the
ter In Iti flow Is a water conrae. Town of
l8 lyArc T. Convery, 90 N. a 666^ 668,
» lU. 51L
Where surface water In a hilly region of
:h bluffs seeks an outlet through a gorge or
rine during the rainy season and by its
BT assumes a definite and natural channel,
1 such has always been the case so far
the memory of man runs, such accustomed
innel through which the water fiows pos-
ses the attributes of a "natural water
irse." The flow of the water need not be
itinuous, and the size of the stream is im-
teriaL Jaquez Ditch Co. t. Garcia (N. M.)
I Pac. 891, 898.
LTUBAL WSA& AHD TEAR
A lease by which the lessee not only
reed to exerdse er&ry precaution in the
i of the leased ma<±inery, but agreed to
nune all coat of repairs, and, at expiration
the t^m, turn oTer the machinery and
lipment in perfect condition, '^saving nat-
il wear and tear,** required the lessee to
iLe whole damage to machinery resulting
•m accidents, like the fracture of an engine
ift, though not resulting from its negli-
ice; "natural wear and tear" signifying
ar resulting from friction and the gradual
iring apart of Joints, rivets, and other por-
ns in the operation of the machinery. Pe-
r V. 8t Louis Brass Mfg. Co., 123 S. W.
L2, 1015, 146 Mo. App. 187 (citing ;faques ▼.
uld, 4 Gush. [58 Mass.] 884 ; Thompson T.
mmings, 39 Mo. App. 537 ; Green y. Kelly,
N. J. Law, 544; Waddell y. De Jet, 23
tith. 437, 76 Miss. 104; Mcintosh v. Lown
Y.] 49 Barb. 560; Lockrow ▼. Horgan, 58
Y. 635).
iTURALIZATION
See Lawfully Naturalized.
As dvil action, see Oiyil Action— Case —
Suit— Etc.
Order as judgment, see Judgment
''Naturalization** creates a political sta-
I which is entirely the result of legislation
Ck>ngress, and, in the case of a person not
-u a citizen, naturalization can be obtained
y in the way in which Congress has pro-
led that it shall be granted, and upon such
howing of facts as Congress has determin-
must be set forth. In re Knight, 171 Fed.
), 301.
ITURE
See Crime against Nature; Intensely Al-
kaline Nature; Local Nature; Style
and Nature.
The contention that an indictment charg-
( sul)oniatlon of perjury before a federal
grand jury did not sufBdently aet fbrth "the
nature and cause of the accusation," within
the meaning of Ckmst U. 8. Amend. 6, be-
cause it did not '^aet forth Ip some definite
way the matter or thing which was under
investigation at the particular time, so that
the defendant may know as to what particu-
lar controversy the alleged false testimony
is claimed to be material, .and how to meet
the allegation of materiality,*' is too frivo-
lous to serve as the basis of a writ of error
from the federal Supreme Court to a circuit
court, to review a conviction under such in-
dictment, where the description therein of
the proceeding in which the perjury was com-
mitted is as foUows: "• * • SitUng as a
grand jury • ^ ^ and, among other mat-
ters, inquiring into certain criminal viola-
tions of the laws of the said United States
relating to the public lands and the disposal
of the same, and the unlawful fencing there-
of, which had then lately before been commit-
ted within the said district" Hendricks ▼.
United States, 32 Sup. Gt 818, 315, 228 U. 8.
178, 56 L. Ed. 394.
Of act
An instruction on insanity. In a prosecu-
tion for homicide, that, if accused was suffi-
ciently sane to know the nature and quality
of his act, he was then legally responsible
therefor, was not objectionable for failure to
also require that he was sufficiently sane to
know that his act in killing deceased was
wrong; the term "nature of act" being de-
fined to mean the attributes which constitute
the thing and distinguish it from all others,
while "quality of act** is the power to clearly
and distinctly apprehend its nature, so that,
if a person has sufficient mental power to
fully appreciate and know what he is doing,
he must necessarily know that the killing of
a human b^ng is wrong. Montgomery v.
State (Tex.) 151 S. W. 818, 817.
Of proposition submitted to Toters
A requirement that the voter be apprised
of the "nature** of a public utility means that
the ballot title shall in specific language noti-
fy him only of the kind, sort, or character of
such public utility. A ballot title reading,
"Shall the city of W. ♦ • • incur an in-
debtedness • • • for an electric plant in
and to be owned exclusively by said city?
♦ ♦ ♦ ** was sufficient to apprise the voter
of the nature of such utility, within the con-
templation of Const, art 10, § 27, as constru-
ed in Coleman v. Frame, 109 Pac. 928, 26 Okl.
193, 31 L. E. A. (N. S.) 656, wher^n it is
stated that the proposition submitted "must
be stated in such specific language as to ap-
prise the voter of the 'nature* of the specific
utility the city wishes to purchase, construct,
or repair.*' City of Woodward v. Raynor,
119 Pac. 964, 966, 29 OkL ^3 (dUng State ▼-
Murphy, 48 Pac 628, 128 Nev. 390; State ▼-
Birchim, 9 Nev. 96; also citiD« Webster's
International Diet).
Ml
NAVAL STORES
624
NAVIGABLB
II
NAVAL STORES
'^he term 'naval stores' Includes rosin,
turpentine, products of crude turpentine, tar,
and rosin oIL" Interstate Commerce Com-
mission ▼. LoulsYllle & N. B. Go^ 118 Ted.
613, 617.
In Florida, where the production of spir-
its of turpentine and rosin, otherwise known
as '*nayal stores/' constitutes one of the
state's leading lndusti:le6, the courts will
take judicial notice of the fact that such
naval stores are the manufactured products
of the gum extracted from pine trees. Knight
V. Kmplre lAud Co., 45 South. 1025, 1026, 55
Bla. 301.
NAVIGABLE
See Not Navigable; Point of Naviga-
bility.
Improvement of, as taking property, see
Taking (In Eminent Domain).
Improvement of navigable water, see
Improvement
Navigable stream as highway, see High-
way.
See, also. Floatable Stream.
In Bngland the term ''navigable waters"
Is synonymous with tidewaters. Olds v. Com-
missioner of State Land Office, 112 N. W.
952, 958, 150 Mich. 134 (quoting and adopting
IlUnols Cent R. Co. v. Illinois, 18 Sup. C5t
110, 146 U. S. 387, 36 L. Ed. 1018).
A nontldal stream, which was not me-
andered In the survey by the United States
In 1823, Is prima fade a nonnavigable stream.
In determining the navigability of a fresh-
water stream, navigable for only a part of
the year, not less than all of the following
considerations should be considered: Wheth-
er the stream is suitable for valuable float-
age for a sufficient length of time for its
beneficial use by the public; whether the pub-
lic or only a few individuals are Interested
in transportation on it, or any great public
interests are promoted in its use for trans-
portation; whether it has been previously
used generally, and how long it has been and
will be used, by the public; and whether it
was meandered by government surveys, or
included therein. Blackman v. Mauldln, 51
South. 23, 25, 164 Ala. 337, 27 U R. A. (N. S.)
670.
A meandered lake is "navigable," under
St 1898, 1 1596, making navigable all streams
meandered by the government Runyard v.
Oettlng Bros. Ice Co., 125 N. W. 931, 932,
142 Wia 471.
The part of a river above falls and above
the ebb and flow of the tide is not a ''naviga-
ble river" at common law. Charles C Wil-
son ft Son V. Harrisburg, 77 Ati. 787, 788, 107
Me. 207.
The term "navigable" at common law
and in a legal sense means a streatn in which
the tide ebbs and flows, and the fact that a rii
eriequitea largeone and capableof fnmisl]
ing considerable water power does not chang
the rule, nor does the fact that the river ma;
in certain portions of it be a navigable streai
in fact, for that merely affects the questio]
of the pubUc right to transportation over it
Laws 1786, p. 834, c. 67, permitting th
commissioners of the land office to grant Itna
under "navigable rivers" as they might deei
necessary to promote the commerce of th
state, provided the grant should be made t
the adjacent owner, is only applicable to
tidal stream and does not extend to a not
tidal stream, though in fact navigable. Fu
ton light. Heat ft Power Co. v. State, 11
N. Y. S. 1000, 1006, 1013, 62 Mlsa Rep. 181
At common law a '^navigable river^ ws
confined to rivers or arms of the sea in whic
the tide ebbed and flowed, all fresh water rii
ers being nonnavigable; but all streams a<
tually capable of navigation were commo
highways for commerce. Fulton light, Hefl
ft Power Co. v. State, 94 N. B. 198^ 202, 20
N. Y. 400, 87 L. R A. (N. S.) 307.
A river Is "navigable" if tiie tide ebb
and flows therein, or if it is in fact navigabi
during some season of the year for the floai
age of boats, lighters, rafts, logs, etc In i
Delaware River at Stllesvllle, 115 N. Y. Supi
745, 750, 131 App. Dlv. 403.
Aetval maTlsaliiUty
Though by the English common la?
"navigable waters" are tidal waters only, 1
the United States those waters are navigab]
in contemplation of law which are navigabi
in fact McGUvra v. Ross, 161 Fed. 39l
399; Smart v. Aroostook Lumbw Oo., 68 At
527, 531, 103 He. 37, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) lOS
(citing The Daniel BaU, 10 WalL [77 U. S
557, 19 L. Ed. 999 ; Brown v. Chadboume. 2
Me. 9, 50 Am. Dec 641; Treat v. liord, 4
Me. 552, 66 Am. Dec. 298 ; Lancey y. Cllffon
54 Me. 487, 92 Am. Dec. 561; The Montell
20 WaU. [87 U. S.1-430, 22 L. Ed. 891; Heal
V. Joliet ft C. R. Co., 6 Sup. Ct 852, 116 U. i
191, 29 L. Ed. 607; Rhodes v. Otis, 33 Ali
578, 73 Am. Dec. 439 ; Moore v. Sanborne,
Mich. 519. 59 Am. Dec. 209; Thunder Ba
River Booming Co. v. Speechly, 31 Mich. 33<
18 Am. Rep. 184); Klnkead v. Turgeon, 10
N. W. 1061, 1062, 74 Neb. 573, 1 K R A. 0
S.) 762, 121 Am. St Rep. 740, 13 Ann. Ca
43.
The term "navigable," as applied to wi
ters, Includes streams navigable In fbc
though not subject to the ebb and flow of tt
tide, though the term does not necessarily e^
tend to streams that are only capable of nt
for pleasure boating, fowling, cutting Ice, c
skating. Hobart v. HaU, 174 Fed. 433, 46"
While the common-law rule as to navigi
ble waters Is In force in Illinois In so far a
it relates to the questions of boundary an
ownership, yet, on the question of navigi^bi
Ity, the common-law rule that waters ai
NAVIGABLB
526
NAVIGABLB
arigable^ only where ttie tide eblw and
IW8 is not the law, and waters nayigable in
ct are navigable in law; the test b^ng
tiether they are of sufficient depth to af-
rd a chann^ for useful commerce or prac-
»ble public utility. Schult« t. Warren, 75
E. 783, 785, 218 HI. 106, 18 L. B. A. (N. 8.)
5.
A stream, in order to be "navigable,**
Qst be of common or public use for the
rriage of boats and lighters, and of bearing
> and floating vessels for the transportation
property conducted by the agency of man.
is navigable in fact only when it affords a
lannel for useful commerce, and Is a prao
ml utility to the public as such, and in its
dinary natural condition famishes a high-
ay over which commerce Is or may be car-
ed in the customary modes of conducting
tmmerce by water. It is not sufficient that
is available in places for rowboats or i
nail launches, or that hunters and fisher- '
en pass over the water in boats used for
lat purpose. People v. Economy Light & '
ower Co., 89 N. B. 760, 771, 241 111. 290;
chulte V. Warren, 75 N. B. 78», 785, 218 IlL |
L9, 13 L. B. A. (N. S.) 745.
The term "navigable waters,** as applied ,
> the dominion of the national and state i
>vemments over shore lands and the rights
hich they have or can convey, means waters '
hldi are navigable in fact and not simply j
dal waters. McOilvra v. Boss, 30 Sup. Ct i
r. 31, 215 U. a 70, 78, 54 L. Ed. 95.
The term "navigable stream** is not lim- 1
ed to a tidewater stream, but the question
I each case is whether it is in fact naviga-
te; that is,, used or susc^tible of being'
Bed, in its ordinary condition, as a highway |
)r commerce, over which trade and travel '
re or may be conducted in the customary
K)de8 of trade and travel on water. Willow
Iver, an indirect tributary of the Mississippi,
ftpable of floating logs at certain seasons of
tie year and carrying rowboats, although
ot meandered, and so shallow that in places
tie boats have to be pushed, is a public "navi-
able stream.*' Willow River Club v. Wade,
6 N. W. 273, 276, 100 Wis. 86, 42 L. R. A.
05.
In general: those rivers are ''public and
avigable" in law which are navigable in
act State ex reL atizens* Blectric Lighting
: Power Co. v. Longfellow, 69 S. W. 374, 377,
69 Mo. 109 (quoting and adopting definitions
D Gould, Waters [3d Bd.] t 40).
A stream running into the sea, and in
rhich the tide ebbs and flows, is "navigable
rater,*' and subject to the Jurisdiction of the
Jnited States as far up as It is actually nav-
gable for the purposes of interstate and for-
lign commerce. United States v. President
(tc, of Jamaica & R. Turnpike Road, 183
r^ 098, 601.
"If a stream is ^navigable in fact it is
lavigable in law.* Qould, Waters (9d Bd.) §
67. The capability of being used for pur-
poses of trade and travel in the usual and or-
dinary mode is the test and not the extent
and manner of such use. • • • NavigaUll-
ty cannot be affected by the conditions on
the adjacent land, such as there being a
large town on the shore, with numerous
streets and wharves, or whether ^ • ^
one riparian owner has a monopoly of the
land, with no public road to the water, thus
cutting off access to the land. It is the nav-
igability of the water that is the test*' State
V. TMf opd, 48 S. B. 586, 587, 136 N. C. 603.
A stream is ''navigable" legally if it is
navigable in fact A stream which is only nav-
igable for three or four miles from its mouth
at high tide by small boats drawing from
three to four feet of water, and is floatable
for its entire length, is not a navigable
stream within Act Sept 19, 1890, c. 907, i
10, 26 Stat. 454, prohibiting the creation of
an obstruction not authorized by law to the
navigable capacity of any waters over which
the United States has Jurisdiction. State ex
rel. Pealer v. Superior of Chahalls County.
109 Pac. 340, 841, 58 Wash. 565.
A "navigable river*' is a natural high-
way for commerce. The Cumberland river
is navigable in fact from its mouth to a point
far above Nashville, and it is therefore a nat-
ural highway for commerce between two or
more states, and, as such, is the property of
the public constituting the country at large,
and Jurisdiction over it for purposes of inter-
state commerce is in Congress. Ryman
Steamboat Line v. Commonwealth, 101 8. W.
408, 125 Ky. 253, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1187.
A river in fact nonnavigable, which is
declared by Laws 1844-45, p. 299, a public
highway, is not thereby made a navigable
river, within Rev. St 1899, § 8278, as amend-
ed by Laws !l903, p. 234, § 1, and re-enacted
by Laws 1905, p. 180 (Ann. St 1906, p. 3917),
authorizing the Improvement of a nonnaviga-
ble stream for the drainage of lands, for a
"public highway" is a way open to all per-
sons, and all streams which are actually ca-
pable of floating and of permitting the pas-
sage of ordinary boats are "navigable.*'
State ex rel. Applegate v. Taylor, 123 S. W.
892, 919, 224 Mo. 393.
Oapacity for navigation
Any water, to be "navigable,** must be
susceptible of use for purposes of commerce,
or possess the capacity for valuable floatage
in transportation to market of the products
of the country through which it runs, and
must be of practical usefulness to the public
as a public highway in its own state and
without the aid of artifldal means; a theoret-
ical or potential navigation or one that is
temporary, precarious, and unprofitable not
being sufladent Hurst v. Dana* 122 Pac.
1041, 1042, 86 Kan. 947.
A "navigable stream** is one capable of
bearing on its bosom, either for tha whole or
V
I' V
f
rl;
NAVIOABLB
526
NAVIGABLB
. a part of the year, boats loaded with freight
In regular course of trade. The mere rafting
of timber or transporting wood in small
boats at certain seasons of the year is not
sufficient to render the stream navigable.
Seaboard Air Line B. Go. ▼. Sikes, eo S. B.
09, 4 6a. App. 7.
A "navigable stream" is one which is
large enough to float a boat of some size, en-
gaged in carrying trade, and implies the pos-
sibility of transporting men and things.
Burns v; Crescent Gun & Bod Club. '41 South.
249, 251, 116 La. 1038. /V^'^
The words ''navigable streanr' ordinarily
mean a stream navigable in ^w^ one of suffi-
cient capacity to permit of saw logs being
floated down the same at high water, and of
small row boats. being used thereon to some
extent, and such meaning must be attributed
to such words when used in a statute, in the
absence of ambiguity suggesting that a differ-
ent meaning might have been intended, which
is discoverable by Judicial construction. Vil-
lage of Bloomer v. Town of Bloomer, 107 N.
W. W4, 979, 128 Wis. 297.
It is not necessary that the waters should
be "navigable" in all their parts, or that the
navigable portion is open for use all the year,
in order that the public may have a right
of navigation where the waters are deep
enough and flt for such use. Schulte v. War-
ren, 76 N. B. 783, 785, 218 111. 108, 13 L. B.
A. (N. S.) 745; People v. Bconomy light ft
Power Co., 89 N. B. 760, 767, 241 111. 290.
A slough emptying into the sea, which
during the ebb and flow of the tide is naviga-
ble for scows and for rafting and booming
logs, is a "navigable stream." Dawson v.
McMillan, 76 Pac. 807, 808, 34 Wash. 269.
A stream has '^navigable capacity" when
it is capable of being navigated over any
part of the waters in their normal condition.
Hubbard v. Fort, 188 Fed. 987, 996.
Streams in the state of Idaho are "navi-
gable" if used either for transporting freight
or passengers by boats, or for floating lum-
ber, logs, wood, or any other product to mar-
ket The rule applied in that state is stat-
ed in Black's Pomeroy on Water Bights, t
218, as follows: "In those states, where lum-
bering is a principal industrial interest, it has
been found necessary to establish a new rule
in respect to the use of the streams, which is
not founded upon any principle or precedent
of the common law, but solely on the local
exigencies and customs. This rule is that a
fresh water stream which is capable of being
used for the purpose of floating down logs
to mills or to market, although it may be
too small to admit of navigation, is *navi-
gable' (or, more properly, 'floatable*), and a
public highway in the sense that the general
public have an easement of passage over it
for that purpose, though the title to the bed
of tlie stream may remain in tlie riparian
owner subject to such public easement." T
rule generally applied \b that "to be 'navii
ble* a water course must have a useful <
pacity as a public highway of transport
tion"; but, where the streams of a state a
more generally used for floating timber th
for carrying passengers or freight, this n
does not apply. Johnson v. Johnson, 05 Pi
499, 607, 14 Idaho, 561, 24 L. IL A. (N. I
1240 (quoting Harrison v. Fite, 148 Fed. V
78 C. C. A. 447) ; Moss ft Bros. ▼. Barney,
Pac. 613, 14 Idaho, 69&
*To be 'navigable^ a water course mi
have a useful Capacity as a public highw
of transportation. Mere depth of wat
without profitable utility, will not render
water course navigable in the legal sense,
as to subject it to public servitude, nor w
the fact that it is sufficient for pleasure boi
ing or to enable hunters or fishermen to flo
their skiffb or canoea" Harrison v. Fite, 1
Fed. 781, 784, 78 a 0. A. 447.
A channel in a tide river which at hi
tide Is navigable with a rowboat, and whi
at full tide is navigable for boats, is a '^na
gable channel," though at low tide there
not much water therein. Judson v. Tide ^^
ter Lumber Co., 98 Pac. 877, 379, 51 Wai
164.
A lake on wliidi a steamboat carry!
pleasure parties is operated, and on whi
numerous small boats are used for rowi
and fishing, the average depth of water bei
16 feet, is a "navigable water." Kalez
Spokane Valley Land ft Water Co., 84 Pi
395, 396, 42 Wash. 43.
A lake not of sufficient siae to warn
its use for maritime or commercial purpof
is not ''navigable" within the definition
navigable waters, and such a lake is propei
subject to individual ownership by the lii
rian owners. City of Geneva v. Henson, 1
N. T. Supp. 688, 593, 140 App. Div. 49.
Where a lake had a total area of 9
acres, 499 of which were covered to a dep
of over 25 feet with a maximum depth of
feet, and boats of considerable dimensio]
as well as smaller craft at different tim<
had plied on its waters, and booms of loj
piles, shingle bolts, and other timber pro
ucts had been transported from place
place thereon, as well as moored in booi
while awaiting the process of manufactuj
the lake was navigable, though little us
for navigation. Brace ft Hergert Mill Co.
State, 95 Pac. 278, 281, 49 Wash. 326.
The extended application of the right
the public to use "navigable streams,** whet
er tidal or nontidal, even those of inconsidc
able size, as highways for transporting mc
chandise, rafting and driving logs, and pi
pelling boats, has made the terms "navigabl
and "fioatable" practically synonymoi:
Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 68 Atl. 52
631, 103 Me. 37, 14 L. IL A. (N. S.) 1083 (d
Ing Knox v. Chaloner, 42 Me. 150).
NAVIOABLB
NAVIOABLl
A '^miTlsable stream*' li a hii^way open
the use of alL State «z reL Oaenther t.
larleston light A Water CkK, 47 8. H 979,
3, 68 S. a 540.
A body of water de^ enough in places
r hunters and fishermen to nse It for small
ats is not legally ''navigable*' as a whole,
t there may be a public right of navigation
the places where the water is deep oiough
r use. Schulte v. Warren, 76 N. B. 783,
5, 218 IlL 106, 18 Lu B. A. (N. S.) 746.
Baae-^Floatace of loss
A river capable of floating logs Is a navi-
ble stream. In re Southern Wisconsin
►wer Oo., 122 N. W. 801. 806, 140 Wis. 246;
ettherby v. Meiklejohn, 13 N. W. 607, 608,
Wis. 78 ; Stevens Point Boom Co, v. Reil-
44 Wis. 295, 306; Oohn v. Wausau Boom
L. 2 N. W. 546, 648, 47 Wis. 314.
That a stream is capable of floating logs
ereby aititling the public to a right of high-
ly therein for that purpose is wholly insuffl-
>nt to establish that it is ''navigable'' with-
St 1806, t 3874, authorizing the erection
id maintenance of a dam across any stream
»t navigable. Allaby v. Mauston BUectric
arice Co., 116 N. W. 4, 6, 186 Wis. 846, 16
& A. (N. S.) 420.
A stream which in its natural state can
t practicably used for the floating of shin-
e bolts to market is a "navigable stream.'*
onroe Mill Co. v. Menzel, 77 Pac. 813, 816,
\ Wash. 487, 70 L. B. A. 272, 102 Am St
ep. 906.
Where streams were large oiough to be
led for floating logs and for oonmierce the
"eater part of the year, one being about a
lie long, 300 feet wide, and from 6 to 8 feet
«p, and the other 2 or 3 miles long, 50 feet
Ide at its mouth, and 10 or 12 feet deep in
gh water, they were navigable streams,
nder Sayles' Ann. Ov. St 1897, art 4147,
^fining "navigable stream," the public would
ive a right to the use of such streams as
Lvigable public highways whenever they
ive sufficient water for such purpose,
range Lumber Oo. v. Thompson (Tex.) 126
W. 604, 606.
A stream capable of transporting rafts
! railroad ties for several months during
Le spring of the year, without the aid of
en on the banks thereof, \b "navigable,"
Ithin the meaning of the law for that pur-
ose and subject to the use of the public
lerefor, and the rights of the riparian own-
rs to the soil adjacent to and underlying the
Bd of such stream are subject to this right
r easement in the public, which rests upon
le necessities of commerce; and, where it
ppears that there was no other practical
rate by which ties could be transported to
uirket, the adjacent owners would have no
Ight to interfere with one using the stream
NT the commercial purposes indicated. Mo-
Kinney T. IVorChciitt, 88 8.'W. 861* 869, U4
Mo. App. 146L
Aetval «so
A stream which is used only a few times
in many years by a boat for a picnic or ex-
cursion Is not "navigable," within the mean-
ing of Laws 1860, p. 224, c. 140, § 28, subd. 6,
autliorising railroads to cross streams, but
providing that nothing in the acts shall be
oon^tmed to authorize the erection of any
bridge across any navigable stream or lake.
People T. New York, O. A W. By. Ca, 117 N.
Y. Supp. 1048, 1061, 133 App. Div. 476.
Oontlmiial naTlcability
Any stream sufficient duripg the high-
water season to be used for floating logs or
timber to market or the place of use is "navi-
gable^" and to tliat oxtent find for that pm>
pose is a public highway; and it is not neces-
sary that sm^ stream be navigabie the whole
year for such purpose or any purpose. Idaho
Northern B. Oo. v. Post Fiills Lumber A Mf^
Co., 119 Paa 1006, 1101, 20 Idaho, 605, 88 U
B. A. (N. S.) 114. But it is sufficient that the
stream have periods of navigable capacity,
ordinarily recurring from year to year, and
continuing long enough to make it useful as
a highway. A C Conn Co. v. Little Suamico
Lumber Mfg. Co., 43 N. W. 680, 74 Wis. 662.
The court's instruction, in an action for
the obstruction of a Jitream so as to interfere
with the rafting of logs, that a navigable
stream is one capable of being used at all
times or periodically during ttie year for
times long enough to make it susceptible of
beneficial use to the public as a means of
transportation, sufficiently defined a "naviga-
ble stream" for the purpose of the case, and
defendants requested instruction upon the
same matter was properly refused. Burr's
Ferry, B. A a By. Co. v. Allen (Tex.) 140 8.
W. 368, 860.
A stream is a ''navigable" or "floatable^*
one if, by the increased precipitation at sea-
sons, recurring periodically with reasonable
certainty, the flow of water will be sufficient
to be substantially useful to the public for
transportation. Hot Springs Lumber A Mfg.
Co. V. Bevercomb, 56 S. B. 680, 682, 106 Va.
176, 9 L. B. A. (N. S.) 804.
A stream which had been successfully
used for more than 20 years during the win-
ter for floating logs to the market from a
distance at least 10 miles above plaintiff s*
mill was a "navigable stream" at the mill,
notwithstanding opinions of witnesses ttiat
the stream was not navigable. TrulUnger ir.
Howe, 07 Pac 648, 68 Or. 210, 22 U B. A^
(N. S.) 545.
The navigability ot a stream is sho'^vrx
where It appears that, a great many ye«Lir»
previously, boats navigated it at certain ae«L-
sons of the year, and there is no eviaeno^
that its condition baa changed. Miller Sl X^xlx.
NAYIOABLB
628.
navigabcj: watbbb
▼. EkiterpclM Oanal & Land Co., T5 Pa^ 770,
771, 142 GaL 208, 100 Am. St R^ 116.
In an action for damages for placing ol>-
Btmctions in a bayou and river alleged by
plaintiff to be nayigable, thus preventing him
from floating logs placed therein to market,
an instruction to find for plaintiff, if the
jury believed from the evidence that he had
placed logs in the bayou and rivor, and fut^
ther believed that said bayou and river ''were
navigable for the purpose of floating said logs
to market," is Inaccurate, as such waters
might have been navigable at the time that
plaintiff wished to market his logs and not
navigable at other times, and the stream to
be navigable must be capable of use by the
public, either at all times during the year,
or for times long enough to make them use-
ful to the public as a means of transporta-
tion. Orange Lumber Oo. ▼. Thompson (Tez.)
113 S. W. 503, 504.
NatuTAl BATlcability
According to the general deflnition, wa-
ter is "navigable" when in its ordinary state
it forms by itself or its connection with other
waters a continued highway over which com-
merce is or may be carried in the customary
mode, and a stream not naturally navigable^
but made so by artificial means, \s not nav-
igable water in a legal sense. State ex rel.
Lyon V. Columbia Water Power Co., 63 S. B.
884. 887, 82 S. C. 181, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 435,
129 Am. St Rep. 876, 17 Ann. C^s. 343.
A stream Incapable of carrying logs with-
out the construction of dams to increase the
volume of water is not "navigable" for float-
ing logs. La Velne v. Stack-Gibbs Lumber
Co.,. 104 Pac. 606, 667, 17 Idaho, 51, 134 Am.
St Rep. 253. .
E}very stream, which in its natural state
is capable of floating logs or other commer-
cial and floatable commodities for any prac-
tical period of time, is to such extent and
for sndi time a "navigably stream," and the
bed thereof is for such purposes subject to
the regulation of the state. Mashburn v. St
Joe. Improvement Co., 113 Pac 92, 95, 19
Idaho, 30, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 824.
Whether a stream is "navigable^' must
be determine^ with reference to its natural
condition. Where a stream is in fact nav-
igable in its natural state, it may be improved
to enlarge its usefulness for the public's
benefit. People v. Economy Light & Power
Co., 89 N. B. 700, 769, 241 IlL 290.
A river which in its natural condition,
unaided by artificial means, is susceptible to
public use to float vessels, rafts, or logs, is
a navigable or floatable stream according to
the law of Maine, though not a navigable riv-
er in the technical sense of the common law.
Charles C. Wilson ft Son v. Harrisburg, 77
Ati. 787, 789, 107 Me. 207.
A stream, to be "navigable" or floatable
for saw logs, must be capable, in its natural
condition, at ordinary incurring freshets, of
being successfully and profitably used for
that purpose, and a stream not navigable or
floatable in its natural condition cannot be
made so by artlflcial means. Where a stream
is such that in its natural condition sawlogs
cannot be floated therein, except at extreme
high water, continued for a few hours at a
time, and then only small logs, it is not a
navigable stream for the purpose of floatr
age. Kamm v. Normand, 91 Pac 448, 451,
50 Or. 9, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 290, 126 Am.
St. Rep. 698.
Pnblie termiiki neeesflavy
A "navigable body of wateif* Is one
which the public has a right to use tor nav-
igation. The term Includes all waters hav-
ing suflScient capacity to float water Aaft
for a period long enough to be of oommer
cial value, or to float to market the products
of the country through which the WAt&c ex-
tends 00 as to be useful to the population
along its bank& The stream must be of
some value to trade, commerce^ or agricol-
ture, and the term therefor excdudes waten
which are merely capable of floattng a skiff
for pleasure. To be useful for commercial
purposes, the water must connect with other
waters or lead from one public place to an-
other, so as to be in the path of comm^ce.
A stream which leads from a public river to
a private house, or to which the public had
no access, except at one point where the
highway approaches it, is not navigable so
as to render it a public highway. A "nav-
igable body of water** must have a terminus
by which the public can enter it and auother
from which it can leave it, but it need not
lead from one county to another. The rights
of the public in a body of water are entirely
dependent on its capacity for navigatioD.
King V. Muller, 07 Ati. 380, 884, 73 N. J.
Eq. 32 (citing 1 Famham, p. 100; S Fftm-
ham, p. 2407).
NAVIOABLE WATERS OF THE UHIT.
ED STATES
The term "navigable waters of the Unit-
ed States" applies: First, to all waters capa-
ble of sustaining or being used for interstate
or foreign commerce, covering every part of
any body of water, tidal or otherwise^ any
portion of which is capable of such use ; and,
second, to all waters under the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States and over which the District Court of
the United States can exercise its peculiar
admiralty Jurisdiction. United States t.
Banister Realty Co., 155 Fed. 583, 593.
Where a river within a state was nav-
igable for some distance from its mouth, and
was actually navigated by small steamboats
and river craft for the purpose of carrying
up groceries, supplies, clothing, loggers' to<^
etc., to the head of navigation, and returning
with farmers' products, a bill was maintain-
able in the federal courts to restrain a boom
KAVIOABLB WATERS
629
NBBXSAT
^mpuiy from maintaining a boom in the
iver in such a manner as to be an obstruc-
on to navigation, though tlie river waa
^iefly valuable for floating logs, and there
^8 no inoof of actual carriage of goods on
le river in interstate commerce. To render
river navigable in law, it muft be navigable
I f^ct A river is navigable in fact when
is used, or is susceptible of being used,
bile in its ordinary condition, as a highway
>r commerce, over which trade and trav^
re or may be conducted in customary modea
r trade and travel on water. "Navigable
aters" of the United States, within the
leaning of the Acts of CongreBS, in contra-
Istinction with the navigable waters of the
:ate8, are those waters which fbrm, in their
rdiuary condition, by themselves or by unity
ith other waters, a continued highway, over
hich commerce is or may be carried on with
ther states or foreign countries in the cus-
)mary modes in which such commerce is
inducted by water. The term "navigable
aters of the United States*' has reference to
^mmerce of a substantial and permanent
tiaracter. United States v. Wishkah Boom
c. 136 Fed. 42, 45, 47, 68 0. C. A. 692
riting The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. [77 U. S.]
57, 563, 19 I*. Ed. 999; Leovy v. United
tates, 20 Sup. Ct 797, 177 U. S. 621, 44 L.
d. 914).
State waters distiacalshed
The Erie Canal, which, though lying
holly within the state of New Torlt, forms
part of a continuous highway for inter-
i&te and foreign commerce by connecting
ake EHe with the Hudson river, is a "nav-
^ble water" of the United States, as con-
radistingulshed from a navigable water of
\ie state. Perry v. Haines, 24 Sup. Gt 8,
1, 191 U. S. 17, 48 L. Ed. 73.
"Navigable waters" lying within thelim-
:s of a state are both state and national in
tieir character, with a paranM>unt right of
Dotrol or regulation in the general govem-
lent, when Congress chooses to exercise the
athority over the same. But, until such ao-
tiority is exercised, the jurisdiction and pow-
r of the state to authorize the erection or
onstmction of bridges over the same is clear-
er establiabed. Act Ctong^ Blandi 8, 1899, t
0, 30 Stat 1151, which provides that "the
reation of any obetnictton, not affirmatively
uthorised by Congress, to the navigable
apacity of any of the waters of the United
itates, is hereby prohibited," is prospective
urely, and not intended to take away from
railroad company, which, under a duly
uthorized grant from a state, has constnict-
d a bridge over a navigable interstate river,
he implied power to make all necessary re-
pairs. Kansas City, M. ft B. R. Co. v. J. T.
Vlygul ft Son, 33 South. 965, 967, 968, 82
iiss. 223, 61 L. R. A. 578 (quoting and adopt-
Qg Rhea v. Newport News ft M. V. B. Co.,
0 Fed. 16).
8 Wnaft P.2D Seb.— 34
NAVIGATE
ITAVIGATXOir
See Dangers of Navigation; Inland Nav-
igation; Practical Improvement of
Navigation; Right of Navigation.
As commerce, see Commerce
Obstruction of navigation, aee Obstruct-
Obstruction.
"Navigation" is defined by Bouvier as
whatever relates to traversing the sea in
ships ; the art of ascertaining the geographi-
cal position of a ship and directing its course.
The construction of a dock, while it may be
useful to individuals engaged in navigation,
is not involved in the public right of naviga-
tion as understood by the law. Trustees of
the Freeholders ft Commonalty of Town of
Brookhaven v. Smith, 90 N. T. Supp. 646,
651, 98 An;>. Div. 212.
NAVY
tbe navy, sea Belonr—
Belonging to
Belonging.
NE EXEAT
Under the English practics, the "Vrit of
ne exeat" regno was a prerogative writ which
Issued to prevent a person from leaving the
realm. In America it has been treated, not
as a prerogative writ, but as a writ of right
in the cases in which it is properly grantable.
Lamar v. Lamar, 51 S. B. 763, 123 Ga. 827,
107 Am. St Rep. 169, 8 Ann. Cas. 294.
'^The object of a writ of *ne exeat' is to
secure to the plaintiff the presence of the
defendant at the termination of the suit, ei-
ther by his detention or by his giving equitable
bail." Dunsmoor v. Bankers' Surety Co., 91
N. E. 907, 908, 206 Mass. 23.
A writ of "ne exeat," at common law,
was simply a writ to obtain equitable bail.
It was issued by a court of equity, upon ap-
plication of the complainant against the de-
fendant when it appeared that there was a
debt positively due, certain in amount, or
capable of being made certain on an equi-
table demand not suable at law (except in
cases of account and possibly some other
cases of concurrent Jurisdiction), having con-
veyed away his property, or under other cir-
cumstances which would render any decree
ineffectual. Davidor v. Rosenberg, 109 N.
W. 925, 180 Wis. 22, 118 Am. St. Rep. 986.
A writ of •^e exeat" is one of right, and
not prohibited by the constitutional provision
regarding imprisonment for debt It is little
more than an order to hold to equitable bail,
the party generally getting rid of it by giving
security to abide the event of the litigation.
Gooding v. Reid, Murdock ft Co., 177 Fed. 684,
686, 101 C. C. A. 310 (citing Dean v. Smith,
23 Wis. 483, 99 Am. Dec 198; 2 Story, Eq.
Jur. [10th Ed.] i 1469; preface to Warner'a
1st Am. Ed. of Beames' Ne Exeat Regno;
Si
!»1
NEAR
530
NBAR BBBB
Patterson t. McLaughlin, 18 Fed. Gas. 1826, 1
Cranch, C. C. 352 ; Union Mut Life Ins. CJo. v.
Kellogg, 24 Fed. Gas. 611 ; In re Rosser, 101
Fed. 662, 41 C. C. A. 497; EInos v. Hnnter, 4
Oilman [9 IlL] 211; Mltford & Tyler's PI. ft
Pr. In Equity, p. 144 ; Gibson's Suits in Ghan-
eery [1907], note to section 866).
NEAR
See As Near as May Be; At or Near;
In or Near; Property On or Near Prem-
ises.
''Near" means "adjacent to, close by, not
ter from." It is a relative term, and its
precise Import can only be determined by
surrounding facts and circumstances. Kll-
gore V. Jackson, 118 S. W. 819, 821, 66 Tex.
GlT. App. 99 ; Karczenska t. Gity of Ghicago,
88 N. B. 188, 189, 239 IlL 483.
As an indeflnite term
"Near" is a relative term, the precise
Import of wMch can only be determined by
the surrounding facts and circumstances in
the case in which it is used, and so an aver-
ment that plaintiff lived near a telegraph
station is not equivalent to an allegation that
he lived within a mile thereof. Western Un-
ion Telegraph Go. v. Klitzke, 89 N. B. 406,
406. 46 Ind. App. 660.
Stating that plaintiff was in front of and
"near" to defendant's car alleged to have in-
jured her when It started was not sufficient-
ly certain to warrant a conclusion that the
starting of the car was negligence as matter
of law ; the word "near" being an indefinite
word which may mean a foot, a chain, or any
other distance. Gobe v. Malloy, 88 N. B.
620, 622, 44 Ind. App. a
The word "near," in the Vrooman act
(St 1886, p. 147), as amended by St. 1891, p.
196, providing for the posting of notices in
street assessment proceedings **on or near the
chamber -door of the city coundl, etc., is a
relative term, and its meaning must be de-
termined by reference to the subject-matter,
and the posting of the notices on a bulletin
board in the dty hall in which the council
chamber was located was sufficient where such
bulletin board was In plain view from the
main entrance of the hall, and so placed as
to be likely to bring the notices to the atten-
tion of persons visiting the council cham-
ber, though the bulletin board was far remov-
ed from the council chamber. Haughawout
V. Perdval, 119 Pac. 649, 650, 161 GaL 491,
Ann. Gas. 1913D, 115.
As Allowins diflcretioii as to plaoe
The word •'near," as applied to space, can
have no positive or precise meaning. It is
a relative term depending for Its significa-
tion on the subject-matter in relation to
whldi it is used and the circumstances under
which it becomes necessary to apply It to sur-
rounding objects. A charter granting a rail-
road a right to cross a river "above" or
"near^ a certain town conferred a rlc^t 1
locate its bridge "below" such town. Pe
rick V. Raleigh & P. S. R. Go., 66 8. E. 87
883, 143 N. G. 486, 10 L. R. A. (N. &) «
(quoting and adopdng the deflnition in Fa
River Iron Works Co. v. Old Golony St P. I
R. Go., 6 All^ [87 Mass.] 221; Wood, Nui
§274).
The title of Acts 1909, c. 1, an act to pn
hlbit the sale of intoxicating liquors as
beverage "near" any schoolhouse, where
school is kept, whether it be in session or no
cannot be said not to warrant the provisio
of the act prohibiting such a sale within ton
miles of such a schoolhouse, especially whei
such provision has repeatedly been made b<
fore under a like title; the word ••near" b<
Ing a relative term, the proper import c
which is dependent on the sense sjid coi
nectlon in whidi it is used, considered U
gether with the purposes to be accompllshe<
J. W. Kelly & Go. v. State, 132 8. W. 19:
201, 123 Tenn. 616.
Giv. Gode 1902, { 208, provides that at a
general elections held in the state the san
shall be conducted at the polling prednd
fixed by law in the various counties, dtle
and towns, the location of which shall be a
designated, and then declares that, at tb
Waverly prednct, in IL Gounty, the poUlD
place shall be "at or near the fork of tb
Rice Greek spring and Gamden road." He]<
that it could not be said as a matter of U^
that a polling place located a quarter of
mile from the crossing of the stream an
road was not properly located **near" sue
point Vemer v. Muller, 71 8. E. 654, ^
89 S. G. 117.
Om synenyBftoss
See On — Upon.
The call from the third to the fourt
comer of a survey of land, made under wu
rant of the state of Kentucky and afterward
carried into a patent issued by the state, wa
from a stake on the top of Gumberland Mooi
tain, ''thence south, 60 degrees west, 8^2
poles, to a stake near Gumberland Gap." I
the course and distance be followed, it woul<
carry the fourth comer several miles withl
the state of Tennessee; whereas, if the Un
be ran following the state line along the cree
of the Gumberland Mountains in a genera
southwesterly course^ it would strike the cez
ter of the Gap at the Tennessee line. Helc
that the words "near Gumberland Gap
should be constraed to mean at or in Gun
berland Gap, and that, as so construed, sad
natural object would control the calls fo
course and distance, and fix the comer a
the center of the Gap. Davis* Heirs i
Hinckley, 141 Fed. 706, 710; Davis ▼. Fann
er, 141 Fed. 703, 707.
HEAR BEER
"Near beer" is an imitation of beei
Manus v. State, 66 & B. 1037, 7 Oa. App. 373
NEAR BEER
631 NEAREST BliOOD RELATIONS
One who has paid the tax Imposed by
Is 1908, p. 1112, known as the '*near beer
t,** and has obtained a license thereunder,
not entitled to keep on hand at his place
business any alcoholic, spirltnons, malt,
intoxicating liquors, but only such liquors
, if drunk to excess, will not produce intoxi-
tion. Cassidy v. State, 72 S. E. 939, 941,
Ga. App. 123.
The court will take judicial notice of the
inlntoxicating qualities of "near beer/' a
rm currently used to designate all that
Eiss of malt liquors which contain so little
cohol that they will not produce intoxica-
>n, though drunk to excess, and including
1 malt liquors not within the purriew of the
neral prohibition law. Loh v. City of Ma-
tt, 70 S. E. 149, 150, 8 Ga. App. 744.
Act March 12, 1906 (Laws 1908, p. 275, c
!9), known as the **Byrd Liquor Law," is
Ltltled *'An act to define and regulate the
Lie, distribution, rectifying, manufacture
id distilling of intoxicating liquor and malt
averages, and to impose a license thereon,"
id defines what shall be deemed intoxicat-
ig spirits, including beer, etc., therein, and
K?tlon 23% provides that "malt bererage"
lall mean the by-products of a brewery, but
ust be nonlntoxicating, and shall not con-
in more than 2% per cent of alcohol, and
lall only be sold by the manufacturer to the
istomer and in quantities of not less than
le-half dozen bottles or more than four doz-
1 bottles at a time; that the name "malt
average" shall be blown in the bottles in
le manner stated, with the name and ad-
ress of the manufacturer, and that no per-
>n shall place in such bottles liquid odn-
dning more than 2% per cent volume of al-
)hol, and prescribes a penalty for its vlo-
Ltion. Held, that the section was intended
» regulate the manufacture and sale of all
asses of malt liquors not containing 2%
sr cent, alcohol, "malt beverage" being syn-
nymous with "small brew" and "near beer,"
Qd was a valid exercise of the state's gener-
l police power, as well as of the authority
ranted by Ck>nst | 62 (Ck>de 1904, p. ccxxiii),
athorizing the General Assembly to enact
iws regulating or prohibiting the manufac-
ire or sale of intoxicating liquors ; that see-
on of the Ck>nstitutlon not being designed to
mit but to enlarge the police power over
itoxicants. Commonwealth v. Henry, 65 S.
. 570, 572, 110 Va, 879, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.)
33.
"Near beer" ts a term used to designate
a malt liquors which contain so little al-
>hol that they will not produce intoxication,
longh drunk to excess, and includes all malt
qnors not within the purview of the general
rohibition law. Campbell ▼. City of Hiom-
srUle, 64 8. E. 815, 818, 6 Ga. App. 212.
As iatoxieatlns liquor
See Intoxicating Liquor.
NEAR COMPAOT PART OF TOWN
The phrase "near the compact part of a
town" in Rev. St c. 52, |-86, providing that
no engine or train shall run across a highway
near the compact part of a town at a speed
greater than 6 miles an hour, unless the rail-
road maintains a flagman, a gate, or certain
signals at such crossing, is not limited to the
largest or principal compact part of a town,
but applies to any compact portion, and in-
cludes a village with church, schoolhouse, en-
gine house, store and dwelling houses, in all
at least 25 buildings, and all situated within
350 feet of the central point Moore v. Maine
Cent R. Co., 76 AtL 871, 872, 106 Me. 297.
NEAR RELATIVES
The term "near relatives," in a petition
for leave to appeal from a decision admitting
a will to probate, averring that the petition-
ers are "near relatives" and heirs at law of
the deceased and entitled to a distributive
share of the estate if the will should be set
aside, is used as synonymous with the term
"heirs," and is sufficient to show that the pe-
titioners are beneficially interested in the es-
tate and entitled to appeal. Perry y. Scaife,
106 N. W. 920, 921, 126 Wis. 405.
TO
As on, see On — Upon.
NEAREST
There is a shade of difference between
the words "next" and "nearest" The word
"next," in a certificate of membership of a
mutual benefit society, providing for payment
of a benefit on the death of a member to the
beneficiary named, who under the by-laws
must be either the wife, children, adopted
children, parents, etc., and, if the member
outlived the beneficiary named and died with-
out naming another beneficiary, the benefit
was to go to the member's "next" living re-
lation in the order named, is used as a syno-
nym of "nearest," and refers to the member
and not to the beneficiary. Therefore, where
a member named his wife as beneficiary, and
she died, and he married again, leaving a
second wife, without having changed the
beneficiary, the second wife, and not his
children, took the benefit Speegle v. Sover-
eign Camp of Woodmen of the World, 58 S.
B. 435. 436, 77 S. C. 517.
NEAREST BLOOD RELATIONS
The words "my nearest blood relatives,"
used in wills, generally mean such persons
as take under the statute regarding the dis-
tribution of estates of intestates, but any
reasonably different meaning may be given
thereto when necessary to effectuate the in-
tention of the testator. In re Sander's E2s-
tate, 105 N. W. 1064, 1065, 126 Wis. 660, 5
Ann. Cas. 508.
No one is "nearest" in degree of blood,
if aome one else be "nearer." In re Weaver'a
ITliCQSSARIES
534 KECESSARILiT AFFECT JUDGM£N1
ground of the client's minority. Sattoo ▼.
Ueinzle, U5 Pac. 560, 561, 84 Kan. 756, 84
L. R. A. (N. 8.) 238.
Under Bev. Laws, c 145, i 26, requiring
guardians to Irae tor and receive debts due
their wards, and to represent their wards
in all actions unless some other person Is
appointed aA guardian ad litem or next
friend, and section 28 providing for guardians
ad litem for minors in suits in which the
latter may be interested, services of an at-
torney in settling the estate of a deceased
person, in which a minor is interested, are
not "necessaries" for which the minor is
liable, in the absence of an employment of the
attorney by the minor's guardian. Mclsaac
V. Adams, 76 N. B. 654, 190 Mass. 117, 112
Am. St Rep. 321, 6 Ann. Ga& 729.
A buggy is not a "necessary" to an infant
not engaged in any business requiring the use
of a buggy, nor attending school, so as to
make it necessary for htm to ride to and
from schooL Hefflngton v. Jackson ft Norton,
96 S. W. 108, 109, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 560.
Olothlas, ed«eatiim» food* lodstnc* and
The question of what are "necessaries*'
for an infant depends largely upon his rank,
social position, and like circumstances. Gen-
erally speaking, necessaries for an intent in-
clude support and maintenance, food, lodging,
clothing, medical attendance, and education
suitable to his station in life. McLean v.
Jackson, 76 S. B. 792, 12 Ga. App. 51.
"What may be included in the term
^necessaries' is a question upon which the
authorities are not entirely harmonious, but
certainly the term is not so limited as to in-
clude only what is necessary to the actual
support of life, and it is usually held to be
sufficiently extensive to include articles fit
to maintain a particular person in the state,
station, and degree in life in which he is, so
that things may be necessary for one person
which would not be necessary for another in
a different station in life (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in Clark on Contracts [2d Ed.]
156). 'Necessaries' are defined by Mr. Green-
leaf to be such things as are useful and suit-
able to the party's state and condition in life,
and not merely such as are requisite for bare
existence." In order to determine the ques-
tion whether or not the contract of an in-
fant for a course in stenography was a
contract for necessaries, in the sense in
which the term '^necessaries" is used to ren-
der the contract binding upon such infant,
the evidence in the case should show the
state, degree, and condition in life in which
the infant is whose contract is under con-
sideration; and it should also affirmatively
appear that the parents or guardian of such
infant failed or refused to furnish the al-
leged necessary. Mauldin v. Southern Short-
hand ft Business University, 55 S. B. 922, 1
Ga. 681, 8 Ann. Gas. 130.
QnMtioa of law or faet
Articles suitable and which would
beneficial to an infant are not ex vl term
necessaries, but the question is for tlie juj
Nielsen v. International Textbook Co., 75 A
380, 831, 106 Me. 104, 20 Ann. Caa. 591.
ICEOESSARIES (For Vossola)
The "necessaries" for which the masl
of a vessel may, in a proper case, bind 1
vessel means whatever is fit and proper 1
the service on which a vessel Is engagi
The Pleroma, 175 Fed. 639, 64a
NECESSARILY
See Unnecessarily.
As used in an instruction that, if pla
tiff was employed by defendant, plaintiff i
sumed all the dangers "necessarily" inddc
to such employment, but plaintiff did not i
sume any dangers arising from or caused
defendant's carelessness and negligence, t
word "necessarily" means inevitably, not
be avoided even by the exercise of the hi|
est degree of care, and such instruction is <
roneous as Imposing too high a degree
care. Reickert v. Hammond Packing Co^ 1
S. W. 525, 527, 136 Bio. App. 565.
NEOESSARXXiY AOQUIBED KHOW
EDGE
'*By 'necessarily acquired knowledge*
meant that which arises from the obvio
and open negligence which the servant mi
have seen and known in performing his wo
by the use of ordinary care." Galveston,
ft S. A. Ry. Co. V. Stoy, 99 S. W. 135, 15
44 Tex. Civ.. App. 448 (citing Bonnet v. 6i
veston, H. ft S. A. Ry. Co., 33 S. W. 334,
Tex. 72; Missouri, K. ft T. Ry. Co. v. Hu
nig, 43 S. W. 508, 91 Tex. 347; Peck v. Pe<
87 S. W. 248, 99 Tex. 10; El Paso ft S. ^
R. Co. V. Vizard, 88 S. W. 457, 39 Tex. O
App. 534).
KEGESSAKILY AFFECT JXTBGMEirr
Code Civ. Proc. | 1068, provides that
writ of review shall issue only where an in!
rior tribunal has exceeded its jurisdictl<
and there is no appeal or other adequa
remedy. Section 956 provides that, upon i
appeal from a Judgment, the court may i
view the verdict or decision and any inti
mediate order or decision excepted to whi
involves the merits or "necessarily affects ti
Judgment," h^d that, though no appeal U
from an order dismissing or refusing to di
miss an action, an erroneous order denyl
plaintiff's motion to dismiss the action affec
the Judgment thereafter rendered on tl
merits against the plaintiff, so that such c
der may be reviewed on appeal from tl
Judgm^it, and hence a writ of review w
not lie. Huntington Park Impw Go. v. Suf
KBCESSAUXiT ANP BOhKLY
686
KBOBSSABT
lor Court ot Los Angeles County* 121 Pftc
01, 703, 17 CaL App. t>92.
nBCE8SABXI.Y AKB SOLEIiT
The requiremeiit of an aoddent policy
tiat deatb must have resulted "necessarily
jQul solely" from accidental Injury Is satis-
^ed, where the Injury was the predominating
jui efficient cause of the deatiit and that oth-
r conditions were set in motion by the in-
ory which may have contributed to the death
i immaterial Continental Casualty Co. y.
k>lTln, 95 Pac. 666, 668, 77 Kan. 661.
nBCESSABILY COMTXirEII TO HOITSE
A policy insuring against diseases pro-
ided for a weekly Indonnity for the period
in assured ''should be necessarily confined to
he house." Held, that the clause, in the
ase of a person taking treatment for tuber-
ulosls, meant confined to any part of the
loose, either inside or upon the porches at-
ached to it on the outside. Dnlany v. Fi-
lellty & Casualty Co. of New York, 66 AtL
tl4, 617, 106 Md, 17.
A health indemnity policy provided for
Miyment for the number of consecutive days
ifter the first week ttiat insured was neces-
sarily and continuously confined within the
louse and r^^arly visited by a physician by
reason of illness contracted after the policy
lad been in force for 30 days. Plaintiff was
:aken ill in a hotel while in Florida, where
le was treated by a physician, and, after gat-
ing somewhat better, was transported in a
Pullman car to his home, where it was de-
termined that it was necessary for him to
indergo an operation by surgeons in a near-
t>y city. He was operated upon, attended by
them daily by being taken to them in a car-
riage from his hotel near by and occasional-
ly walking to them when able, and on being
returned to his home was yet under the
treatment of physicians and confined to his
bouse, exc^t occasionally when he sat on
the porch, and was once driven to his place
ot business without taking any part in busi-
Qess matters. At another time he was taken
to the physicians* office, and with these ex-
ceptions he was in the house and much of
the time in bed. Held, that the policy did
Dot require that plaintiff should be literally
confined within the walls of his house all
the time, and that he was necessarily and
continQonsly confined within the house with-
in the terms of the policy. Ramsey v. Gener-
al Accident, Fire & life Ins. Co., 142 S. W.
763, 160 Mo. App. 236.
KECX»SABII.T IHGI^UDEB
To be "necessarily included*' in the of-
fense charged, the lesser offense must not
only be part of the greater in fact, but it
mast be embraced wittiin the legal definition
of the greater as a part thereof. Peoi^e v.
Kerrick, 77 Pac. 7U, 712, 144 CaL 46.
Code Cr. Proc i 444, provides that on
an indictment for crime consisting of differ-
ent degrees the Jury may find defendant not
guilty of the crime charged in the indict-
ment, and guilty of any degree inferior
thereto, or of an attempt to commit the
crime. Section 446 provides that in all other
cases defendant may be found guilty of any
crime the commission of which is necessarily
included in tliat witk wliich he li charged
in the indictment Penal Law (Consol. Laws,
c. 40) i 404, provides that a person who with
intent to commit a crime therein breaks and
enters a building, etc., is guilty of burglary
in the third degree. Section 405 provides
that a person who, under circumstances or
in a manner not amounting to a burglary,
enters a building or any part thereof, with
intent to commit a felony, or a larceny or
any malidons mischief, is guilty of a misde-
meanor. Held, that the words ''necessarily
included'* in said section 445 should not be
so construed as to require that the lesser of-
fense for which a conviction may be had
must be so included in the statutory defini-
tion of the crime for which defendant is in-
dicted, but it suffices that the acts constitut-
ing the lesser crime be charged in the indict-
ment and duly proven, and hence one charg-
ed with burglary in the third degree may be
convicted of an unlawful entry with intent to
commit a larceny, where the Indictment
charges the commission of all the acts neces-
sary to establish the latter crime. People v.
Miller, 128 N. T. 8. 549, 600, 143 App. Div.
251.
HXOBSSAAXIiY DTOUBBIBD
Code Civ. Proc 1 1033, allowing recovery
of disbursements "necessarily** incurred in
the acticm, does not make the premium paid
a surety company for a replevin bond, pro-
cured pendente lite by a plaintiff ultimately
successful, a proper item of costs; it not be-
ing a necessity to plalntilTs cause of action
that he take into possession the property
pending the action, but a privilege granted on
filing the bond, and the filing of the bond by
a surety company likewise being a privilege,
and not a necessity. Williams v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. By. Co., 103 Pac. 885, 156 Cal. 140,
134 Am. St Rep. U7, 10 Ann. Cas. 1260.
NECESSARY
See Proper and Necessary.
The word "necessary** must be consider-
ed in the connection in wliich it is used, as it
is a word susceptible of various meanings.
It may import absolute physical necessity or
inevitability, or it may import that which
is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suit-
able, proper, or conductive to the end sought.
Bexroth y. HoUoway, 90 N. B. 87, 45 Ind.
App. 36.
Though plaintiff in an employe's person*
al injury action alleged in his complaint that
it was "necessary** for him to do his work in
KECE8SART
S8«
NSaBSSABT
a particalar way, it was not error to refuse
to Instruct that he was bound to prove that
allegation, and to instruct, in lieu thereof;
that it was not essential that plaintiff was
absolutely required to do his work in that
way if the method he adopted was custom-
arily pursued and was a reasonably safe
method; it not appearing that plaintiff in-
tended to use the term '"necessary" in its re-
stricted sense as meaning indispensable. EUl-
leen v. Barnes-King Development Go., 127
Pac. 89, d3, 46 Mont 212; State ▼. liarron
(N. M.) 128 Pac. 485, 491.
The word "necessary" has no fixed mean-
ing or character peculiar to itself. It is flex-
ible and relative. It is an adjective express-
ing degrees, and may express mere conven-
ience or that whidh is indispensable or an ab-
solute physical necessity. It may mean some-
thing which in the accomplishment of a given
object cannot be dispensed with, or it may
mean something reasonably useful and prop-
er, and of greater or lesser benefit or conven-
ience, and its force and meaning must be de-
termined with relation to the particular ob-
ject sought, and is a relative and compara-
tive term, depending upon its application to
the object sought, the character of and rea-
sons for the convenience as public or pri-
vate, and its adaptation to the public needs
or public convenience, and especially is this
true where it is based upon a condition or
state of affairs in which the public are di-
rectly interested, and as to which a public
duty is imposed upon a public instrumental-
ity, as a railroad. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Go.
V. Baugh, 94 N. B. 671, 978, 175 Ind. 419.
The word "necessary** is a somewhat
elastic term, and according to Webster's Dic-
tionary may mean such as must be; impos-
sible to be otherwise; not to be avoided; in-
evitable; or, according to Bouvier's Law
Diet., it may mean that one tiling is conven-
ient, or useful, or essential to another. In
an action against a railroad company to re-
cover for the death of employes of a contrac-
tor, the court' instructed the Jury that if it
was contemplated in the construction con-
tract tliat the workmen should use the tracks
in going to and from their work, or that such
use was practically necessary, such use of
the trade did not constitute the employes
trespassers or mere licensees, but they were
there by the invitation of the company. It
is plain from the context that in the instruc-
tion under consideration the word "necessa-
ry** was used in Its primary sense as given
in Webster's Dictionary, especially as the
court in another Instruction said: "If, on the
contrary, the Jury believe from the evidence
that such use was neither contemplated nor
necessary, as aforesaid, then the mere use of
said tract, by said employes, even with the
company's knowledge, whether for the sake
of convenience or otherwise, constitutes them
mere licensees, and as such the defendant
owed them the same duty as to trespassera"
Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Denny's Adm'r, 66
BL 821, 328, 106 Ya. 86S.
**To have been 'necoBsaxy,* the admix
tration of chloroform must have 'such
would be; that cannot be otherwise;* or
'such that it cannot be disregarded or on
ted; indispensable, requisite, essential, nei
ful, required.' " Mella y. Northern S. S. C
162 Fed. 499, 511 (quoting and adopting Ce
Diet).
The word "necessary," as used in B
St 1898, c. 48, providing for the taxation
railroads according to gross profits, and s
tion 1038, subd. 14, declaring tbat all 1
track, right of way, depot grounds, a
buildings, macdiine shops, rolling stock, a
all other property neoeasarily used in op
ating any railroad, shall be exempt fr^
taxation for any purpose, except spedal
sessments for local improvementa, met
neither inevitable nor merely conTenient
profitable, but refers to a stage of utility
materialty to the general business of a oo
men carrier less than the first and greai
than the latter of such expressions. Chi<
go, St P., M. ft O. R. Co. V. Douglas Coun
99 N. W. 1030. 1031, 122 Wis. 273.
The word ''necessary," in St 1898,
4075, giving the privilege of secrecy to
information, required by a physician fn
patient in attending the latter professional
necessary to enable prescription for sc
patient, will not receive any technical or i
duly restricted meaning, and the testimo
and opinion of a decedent* s attending phj
dan as to her mental capacity, based enU
ly on information derived from her sta
ments or the physician's observation wb
treating her professionally, and for the pi
pose of such treatment, are properly exdi
ed in a proceeding contesting the proU
of decedent's wilL In re Hunt's Will, 100
W. 874, 876, 122 Wis. 460 (citing In
Bniendl's WiU, 78 N. W. 169, 102 Wis. 45).
**When it comes to determining what
"necessary* for the conduct of the busing
and transaction of tlie affairs for which.
corporation has been chartered, it must
course, be understood that what is meant
a due and profitable prosecution of its la
ful purposes; that the 'necessity' conte
plated is a relative one having reference
economy, convenience, efficiency, and succe
and that some latitude is to be allowed
the discretion of the corporation itself
deciding what, from time to time, is or
not in that sense, necessary.** Folk v. St^
Capital Savings ft Loan Ass'n, 63 Atl. lOJ
1016, 214 Pa. 529.
The term "necessary or in use in t
proper operation," in Comp. Laws 1897,
6277, providing that specified railroad tax
shall be in lieu of other taxes, except so
real estate as is owned and can be convey*
by such corporations, and not actually occ
pied in the exerdse of its franchises, and n
KSCBS8ARY
B37
NB0BS8ABT
necessary or in use in the proper operation'*
>t ita road, indndes land owned by a rail-
oad but in the possession of private indl-
iduals and need ezdnsiTely by them in
belr indlTidnal bnslness for wood and coal
ranis and sheds and storage of grain, and
iuch property is taxable as other real estate.
}rand Rapids & I. Ry. Co. ▼. City of Grand
lapids, 100 N. W. 1012, 1018, 187 liCLch.
;S7, 4 Ann. Cas. 1195.
The declaration in an action for injn-
ies to an employ^ in a coal mine while
)lacing a loaded car on a side track alleged
liat it became ^'necessary" for tibe employd
n the performanoe of his dnty to place the
r&r on the side track. The evidenee showed
liat it was convenient, and tended to great*
J facilitate the performance of the work to
>lace the car on the side track, which was
lot more than 200 feet from where it was
loaded, instead of taking it from one-fourth
:o one-half a mile distant Held, that the
;>roof sQstained the allegation; the word
*necesBary" not meaitfng Indispensable, nn-
lYoidable, or that whldi mnst be, bnt mean-
ng reasonably convenient Brooks v. Chl-
»go, W. ft V. Goal Ck>., 84 N. B. 1028, 1081,
234 DL 872.
The word "necessary," as used in an
igreement permitting the cohstmctlon of a
switch necessary for the accommodation of
1 railway company, does not mean absolutely
requisite, bnt is equivalent to the words
'reasonably convenient" Reeser v. Phila-
lelphia ft R. R. Co., 64 Ati. 878, 8T7, 215 Pa.
L36.
The word "necessary,** as used in an
iillegatlon, in a railroad company's com-
plaint to restrain the enforcement of an or-
ler requiring the construction of a connec-
tion with another road, that all the land it
wsiB required to use for such connection was
'necessary" to enable it to handle its traffic,
meant nothing more than that the lands
nrould be reasonably convenient Pittsburgh,
C, C. ft St L. R. Co. V. Railroad Commission
of Indiana, 86 N. E. 828, 834, 171 Ind. 189
(citing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4705).
As ezpedieiit or appropriate
In determining what is reasonably nec-
essary in making a public improvement, and
what the authorities in charge are therefore
empowered to do, the word "necessary" does
Qot mean indispensable, but includes what-
ever is appropriate to render the improve-
ment effective. Meriwether v. Board of Di-
rectors of St Francis Levee District, 166
Fed. 817, 819, 91 O. C. A. 286.
The word "necessary,'* as used in Rev.
St a 34, I 26, making it the duty of the
county board of each county to provide a
suitable courthouse when "necessary^ and
the finances of the county will Justify it, **\b
not to be interpreted as referring to such
measures as afe absolutely and indispensably
bat as including all appropriate
means whidi are conducive or are adapted
to the end to be accomplished, and which in
the Judgment of the board will most advan-
tageously effect it** Coles County v. Qoeh-
ring, 70 N. B. 610, 617, 209 DL 142.
As imvelvljic diseretiom
The words '^rhen nsosesary," as used in
a atatotSb making It the doty of the court,
whether feqnested or not, to Instmet the jary
on all qvesttons of law necessary for their in-
formation, which instruction shall include,
whenever necessary, the subject of good d^r^
acter, do not mean that it is discretionary
with the court as to including, in its instruc-
tions, good character, when there is evidence
upon which to base the instruction. The prov-
ince of the court is to guide the Jury by prop-
er instructions upon the facts in proof and
not to consider the necessity of an instruc-
tion which practically, if that rule should be
adopted, would permit the court to determine
whether the fiicts in proof would have any
effect upon the conclusion to be reached, and
the court must instruct on good character
whenever there Is testimony as to good char-
acter in evidence. State v. Anslinger, 71 8.
W. 1041, 1048, 171 Ho. 600.
As material er relevant
Code Olv. Proc. | 885, making It a prereq-
uisite to the granting of an order for the
appointment of a referee to take depositions
of the officers of a corporation that the affi-
davit show that it Is ''necessary*' for use on
a motion, etc., requires thBt it diall appear
first that the person sought to be examined
can, and if compelled will, swear to the facts
desired, and that the facts to which he can
swear are relevant to the proceeding. Cal-
vet-Rogniat v. Mercantile Trust Co., 98 N.
Y. Supp. 241, 248, 46 Misc. R«p^ 20.
In Code Civ. Proc | 870 et seq., and gen-
eral rule of practice 82, requiring, for the
examination of an adverse party before trial,
a showing by affidavit that the testimony is
material and necessary, the words '^material'*
and 'Necessary*' are not used synonymously,
even if the word ''necessary** does not mean
indispensable to the making of an issue.
Koplln V. Hoe, 108 N. T. Supp. 602, 603, 128
App. Div. 827.
In Code Supp. 1907, | 3060al4, provid-
ing that, where a negotiable instrument is
wanting in any "material particular,** the
person in possession has prima fade author-
ity to complete it by filling up the blank
therein, etc., the word "material** was not
used as synonymous with "necessary,** so as
to restrict the right to filling in an omission
essential to the completion of a negotiable
instrument, but included all omitted matter
usually found in such instruments, and where
a negotiable note was delivered to the payee
complete, except fbr the filling of a blank
left for the place of paym^t, the payee
had pilma fiicle authority^ befbre indondng
fjl .
! ^•
■'. f<^?:
I
NECESSABT
588
NX9CESSART
/•^
it to a bona fide holder for yalne before ma-
turity* to fill the blank so as to make the
note payable at a place other than that
where the maker resided. Johnston v. Hooy-
er, 117 N. W. 277, 278, 139 Iowa, 14S.
As prolmble, usual, and ordinary
In prosecutions for homicide, tn charg-
ing as to the presumption that persons in-
tend the ordinary results of th^r acts, the
words "necessary," **probable," "usual," and
"ordinary" are substantially synonymous.
Beauregard t. State, 131 N. W. 847, 351, 146
Wis. 280.
As reasonably necessary
The phrase "necessary ballast," as used
in a contract for necessary ballast for a trac-
tion company's tracks, means the ballast rea-
sonably necessary to complete the road for
the purposes for which it was built, and the
contract is not void for want of mutuality
of obligation, where the necessary amount
can be determined from the testimony of ex-
perts. Blue Grass Traction Co. v. Hedges
A Adair, 104 S. W. 870, 372, 139 Ky. 358.
NEGESSART <Ib Eminent Domain)
As eonTenient
The word **necessary,*' as used In a stat-
ute authorizing the taking of land necessary
for canals, does not mean absolute and indis-
pensable, or that, without the use of the land
in the given case, the work could not possibly
go on. That would be the same as extreme
necessity. The Legislature used the word in
a more reasonable and popular sense. It is
sufficient that the land used and the materi-
als taken from it are needful and condudve
to the object and more convenient in the ap-
plication and less valuable, and the use of
them less injurious to the owner than any
that might readily be selected. There must,
from the reason of the thing and the nature
of the case, be great latitude of discretion in
the selection of land and the materials. Un-
der Canal Law (Laws 1894, p. 635, c. 338) |
70, providing that the superintendent of pub-
lic works may take any lands, the appropri-
ation of which, for the use of canals and the
works connected therewith, shall in his Judg-
ment be necessary, section 71 (page 636) au-
thorizing a permanent appropriation, and
section 72 (page 636) authorizing a temporary
appropriation, the determination as to neces-
sity of appropriation, which need not be an
absolute necessity, and as to whether a per-
manent appropriation of the lands be neces-
sary or whether a permanent easement or a
temporary use of the lands will be sufficient,
is for such superintendent acting in good
faith and with sound discretion. People v.
Fisher, 83 N. B. 482, 485, 190 N. Y. 468 (quot-
ing Jerome v. Ross [N. Y.] 7 Johns. Gh. 315,
339, 11 Am. Dec. 484).
As indispensable
The word '^necessary," as used in the
rule that a party having the right of con-
demning private property for public pnrposi
can only condemn such amount thereof as
"necessary," is not meant to be used in tl
sense of indispensable. Necessity for publ
use is not such an imperative necessity thi
would render the contract of a railroad, f(
instance, impossible without the anoiount <
land in Question. Piedmont Cotton Mills
Georgia Ry. A Electric Co., 62 S. B. 52, 5
131 Ga. 129 (citing 15 Oyc p. 633).
Evidence that the tracks proposed to I
located over and across the streets sought t
be appropriated are necessary in the use an
operation of the switching yards of the rai
road company does not authorize a trii
court to find that sudi tracks are necessai
within Rev. St | 3283, authorizing the rai
road company to appropriate so much of an
street as may be necessary for the purpose
of its road. Village of Rockport v. Clev*
land, C, G. A St L. Ry. Co., 97 N. S3. 133, 13i
85 Ohio St 78.
As reasonably neoessavy
The word "necessary," in acts involvin
the right of eminent domain, does not mea
"absolutely necessary or indispensable,'' b«
"reasonably necessary," to secure the end ]
view. Sayre v. City of Orange (N. J.) 67 At
933.
"Necessary accommodations," to maintai
which a carrier can condemn lands, are sue
as are reasonably suitable and us^al, an
are not limited to those which are absolute!
necessary. Chicago, I. A L. Ry. Co. v. Baugl
94 N. B. 571, 573, 175 Xnd. 419.
As used in Rev. Codes, i 7334, providin
that, before property can be taken by em
nent domain, it must appear that the use 1
authorized by law, and that the taking is ne(
essary to such use, the term "necessary^ doe
not import absolute necessity, but only sud
as may be characterized as reasonable, 1
view of the purpose to which the propert;
sought to be condemned is to be devoted an<
the benefits to accrue therefrom to the puli
lie. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. McAdow, 12
Pac. 473, 474, 44 Mont 547.
The word "necessary," as used in Bal
linger's Ann. Codes A St | 4335, providini
that a corporation formed for the construe
tion of a railroad shall have power to cros
or Join its railway with any other railwa:
before constructed, and that, if the two coi
porations cannot agree as to the amount o
compensation, it may be ascertained in tb(
manner provided by law for the taking o
lands necessary for the constructioii of it
road, does not mean an absolute "necessity,"
or that there shall be no other place for th<
location of the road, but means a reasonable
i^ecessity, depending upon the drcumstancei
of the particular case. State ex reL Keni
Lumber Co. v. Superior Court of King Coon
ty, 90 Pac. 663, 665, 46 Wash. 516.
NBCESSABT
S89
iraOES84BT GHABOBS
The word "neceadty** in Code 1904» |
L038, as amended by Acts 1008, c. 349, au-
ihorlzing any city or town to acquire land
lecessary for the acquisition and operation
>f waterworks and other public utilities, but
x> property shall be condemned, unless the
lecessity therefor shall be shown to exist*
loes not mean absolutely necessary, but rea-
lonably necessary for the greatest benefit to
Lhe public with the least inconvenience and
expense. Miller ▼. Town of Pularid, 75 8. B.
r67, 768» U4 Ya. 86.
HBCS88ABY ABB FBOPEB
The words "necessary and ivoper,** as
osed in the provision of the federal Oonstita-
Hon declaring that Congress shall have pow-
&r to pass all laws which are "necessary and
proper^ for carrying into execution the pow-
er to regulate ecmmieroe between the states,
etc., do not imply the employment of only
Buch means as are absolutely necessary to
effect the object sought, but Include as well
all the means which in the Judgment of Con-
gress may be proper to carry out the power
80 granted. United States y. Hoke, 187 Fed.
992, 994.
The allegation in an information that
the board of county commissioners did not
make "necessary and proper** rules and regu-
lations to prevent the outbreak and spread
of contagious and infectious diseases is not a
sufficient allegation that no rules or regula-
tions in regard thereto had been made. Cor-
ker V. Pence, 8S Pac. 388, 891, 12 Idaho, 152.
BBGESSABT BBUMB
Code 1907, | 6766, provides that the court
of county commissioners shall have general
supervision of tiie public roads within the
county, and may establish new roads and
duinge or discontinue old ones, and shall
have power to maintain public roads, bridg-
es, and ferries, so as to render travel safe.
Section 3024 confers on such court the same
powers over bridges as it has over public
roads. Section 3025 provides that whenever
a bridge on the line between two counties is
necessary, and the work is too great to be
done by the overseers, the same must be built
at the Joint expense of such counties. Held,
that the court of county commissioners of
one county cannot without the concurrence of
the court of another county make the latter
county liable for the expense of erecting a
bridge on the line of the two counties, for a
bridge, becomes necessary within the mean-
ing of this act only when it has been declared
80 by the concurring judgment of th^ commis-
Bloners* courts of both countieB. Pickens
County V. Greene County, 64 South. 998, 999,
in Ala. 377.
mOEBBABY CHAHQBS
The word ''necessary,** as used in a eon-
tract allowing the state to make necessary
ebanges in the plans and q)eclflcations tor
a canal improvement, should not be coi^
strued as meaning indispensably requisite,
and the construetion of the clause in which
it occurs is not to be limited to the particu-
lar contract in whidi the clause is found, as
the contract is for only a portion of an entire
improvement and must be construed in the
lii^t of the whole work, and it may be con-
strued as meaning reasonably necessary, and
the changes provided for as being those need-
ful, requisite, or desirable, but not extrava-
gant or wastefnl of public funds, or made
without the exercise of sound discretion, or
arbitrary or such as substantially changed
the nature of the cost of the work. What
changes are necessary in the contract is a
question for the courts. Ferguson Con-
tracting Co. V. State, 126 N. Y. Supp. 80S,
8U, 70 Misc. Rep. 472.
A ccHitnct for the eoDStmction of a sec-
tion of the state baife canal, including a
lock, reserved to the state the right to make
deductions from the work, or such changes in
the idans as might be necessary, and that the
contractor should make no claim for any
loss of profits resulting from any change so
made, and stated that the contractor had sat-
isfied himself by investigation as to the con-
ditions afCecting the work, and that he would
make no claim against the state because of
estimates and repr.@sentations by any agent of
the state, and that the contract should not
be invalidated by any changes so made.
Held, that the provision for changes neces-
sarily implied reasonable necessity therefor,
and where, by reason of the underlying char-
acter of the earth, it became impossible to
construct the lock on the section covered by
the contract, and the state for that reason
eliminated the construction thereof within the
section, such change did not constitute a
breach of the contract by the state nor en-
title the contractor to recover profits lost by
reason thereof. Kinser Const Co. v. State,
97 N. n. 871, 874, 204 N. Y. 381.
NBOEflSART CHARGES
All Other Necessary charges, see All
Other.
A vote of a tovm required the selectmen to
insert in any franchise granted a street rail-
way company certain conditions enumerated
as to the rails to be laid, and the portion of
the street to be paved, and required the com-
pany to employ resident laborers at uniform
wages, and that there should be but one fare
of five cents to any point in another town.
A second vote provided for a eomraittee to
confer with the selectmen, or independently
attend and represent the town on all ques-
tions of franchises, etc., to be granted to any
street railway company, which committee
was authorised to employ counsel, and a
third vote instructed the treasurer to bor-
row 9300 to carry the second vote into tf ect
Held, that the three votes, must be construed
KE0B8SABT OONCLUSION
MO
NECE8SABT EXPENSES
•8 a whola, and as In aereral of tbe oondi-
tlona, the town had no corporate interest, the
scheme as a whole did not constitute a *'nec-
essary charge,** within Rev. Laws, c. 25, 8
16, anthorizing town officers to appropriate
money for necessary charges arising in the
town. Flood y. Leahy, 06 N. B. 787, 188
Mass. 232.
ITEGESSARY CONOLU8XOH
The word ''necessary," as used in an in-
struction that negligence must he hased on
and be a reasonable, logical, and necessary
condosion from the facts and circumstances
shown by the eyidence, meant beyond the pos-
sibility of a doubt, and therefore rendered
the instruction erroneous. Daluin y. O. W.
Chase & Son Mercantile Go., 94 S. W. 914, 951,
197 Mo. 288.
NEOESSABY OOST OF PBESBBVIKO
ESTATE OF BAKKBUFT
The claim of a landlord for rent of prem-
ises occupied by the receiyer and trustee of
a bankrupt is entitled to rank as a preferred
daim under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c 541,
I (14b (1)> 80 Stat. 563, as a necessary cost
of preserying the estate. The trustee's com-
missions rank under subdiyision 8 as a cost
of administration. An allowance made to the
attorney for the trustee for services ordina-
rily falls within the same subdiyision, al-
though, when such seryices were necessary
to preserye the estate, such claim may be
classified under subdiyision 1. In re Grignard
Lithographing Co., 158 Fed. 567, 55&
KEOEMABT DILIGEECB
"Necessary diligence" is tliat degree of
diligence which men, ordinarily engaged in
and acquainted with a particular kind of
bustness, would use in their own affairs.
Sanderson y. Brown, 57 Me. 308, 312.
HEOESSABT BISBUBSEMENTS
Under Code Ciy. Proc. | 1866, proyiding
that "a party to whom costs are awarded in
an action is entitled to include in his Mil
of costs 'necessary disbursements* as follows:
^ * * The legal fees paid stenographers
for per diem or for copies; • • • the
reasonable expense in making transcript for
the Supreme Court" — ^the fact that copies of
the testimony were ordered during the trial
and prior to a final decision, being paid for
by the parties obtaining them, did not pre-
yent a recoyery of the amount paid for them
within the limitatioa fixed by statute; such
copies being necessary to secure a reyiew of
the casa Montana Ore Purchasing Co. y.
Boston A Montana ConsoL Copper A Silyer
Min. Co^ 84 Pac 706, 707, 33 Mont 400.
If a witness can recoyer compensation
from the litigant wHo procured his attend-
ance, the sum so paid would undoubtedly be
a "necessary cost of disbursement" in the
action. Anderson y. Ferguson-Bach Sheep
Co., 86 Fae. 41« 42, 12 Idaho, 4]«, 10 Ann.
Cas.895.
HEOESSABT EASEMEHT
The term "necessary," used to describe
the easement which may be established by
an implied reseryation where there has been
a unity of possession and a subsequent sale
of a portion of the land oyer which the ease-
ment is claimed, means there can be no other
reasonable mode of enjoying the dominant
tenement without the easement ; there should
be an element of absolute necessity. Qierry
y. BrizBolara, 116 8. W. 668, 671« 89 Ark.
809, 21Ii. B. A. (N. a) 508 (citing Crosland
y. Rogers, 10 8« B. 874, 82 & U 180).
HEOE88ABT EZFE]r8E8
Any and all neoessary expaDses^ see Any*
Other necessary expenses, see Other*
Of administrator
Under Code Ciy. Proc. | 2730, proyid-
ing that an administrator may be allowed
such necessary expenses actually defrayed
by him as appears Just and reasonable, s
litigation can be treated as "neoessaiy" only
when it has been prosecuted, not only in
good fbith, but also in the exercise of a
reasonable judgment In re Hufs Estate,
115 N. Y. Supp. 984, 989, 62 Miac Rep. 600
(citing Matter of Huntley, 85 N. T. Supp.
113, 18 Misc. Rep. 375; Matter of Stanton,
84 N. T. Supp. 46, 41 Misc. Rep. 278; St
John y. McKee [N. Y.] 2 Dem. Sur. 286; Es-
tate of Peyster, 6 N. Y. St Rep. 884).
Of bvildlac aaiA Umm aasoetotjgm
The acquisition of a place or home by a
building and loan association for the con-
duct of its business is a ''necessary expense,"
within Ky. St 1903, | 868. making proyislon
for the allowance of necessary and proper
expenses from moneys accumulated. Home
Sayings Funds Co. Bldg. Ass'n y. Driyer, 112
8. W. 864, 866, 129 Ky. 754.
Of etty
Furnishing light and water for public
purposes is a ''necessary purpose," and the
cost thereof is a "necessary expense" of mu-
nicipalities furnishing the same. Wadsworth
y. aty of Concord, 45 S. E. 94a 950, 138 N. C
587.
The construction of water and electric
light plants is a necessary expense, within
Const, art 7, i 7, proyiding that no municipal
corporation shall contract any debt, except
for the "necessary expenses'* thereof; unless
by yote of the majority of the yoters therein,
and the indebtedness therefor need not be
approyed by popular yote ; but under Code,
IS 8800, 3821, authorizing municipal corpora-
tions to leyy taxes, and proyiding that their
debts shall be paid only by taxation, they
haye power to contract and provide for pay-
ment for such improyements, in the absence
of a charter proyiaUm forbidding them to dc
WBOBBaABY XZPSNSE8
(Ml
KBCE8BABY FOOD
■o. l^weett T« Town ot Mt Alxy* 45 8* B,
1029, 1000, 184 N. C. 126, 63 Lw B. A. 87a
101 Am. St Rep. 825.
The protectton of a town from fire and
disease by providing water and sewerage Is a
'Necessary expense/* within the meaning of
Const, art. 7, ^ 1, and Rerlaal 1005, | 2074,
providing that no municipal corporation shall
contract any debt, pledge its ftdth, or loan
its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or col-
lected by any officers of the same except
for the necessary expenses thereof, nnless by
a vote of the majority of the qnallfled voters
therein, and, therefore a vote of the people
is not reqnired to render bonds issned to pro-
vide waterworks and a sewerage system val-
id, in the absence of statutory restrictions en-
acted under Const art 8, | 4, making it the
duty of the Legislature to restrict the power
of cities to tax, borrow money, contract debts,
or loan their credit Underwood v. Town of
Asheboro, 68 8. E. 147, 152 N. C. 641.
The expense of maintaining the streets
of a town in a proper manner is a ''neces-
sary expense," within Const art 7, i 7, for-
bidding a municipality to contract a debt, etc.,
except for a necessary expense^ without a
popular vote. Town of H^idersonville v. Jor-
dan, 63 S. B. 167, 168, 150 N. C 85.
In the absence of any legislative restric-
tion on taxation and the contracting of debts,
there is no objection to the issuance of
bonds for the necessary expenses of a town,
without a popular vote authorizing the same;
and bonds issued by a town, for the pur-
pose of extending and enlarging its water
and sewerage system and making street im-
provements, fall within the class of "neces-
sary expenses." Town of Murphy v. C. A.
Webb ft Co., 72 S. E. 460, 461, 156 N. C. 402.
Working the roads is a "necessary ex-
pense," within Const art 7, i 7, forbidding
the levy of any tax by municipal corpora-
tlODs except for the necessary expenses there-
of unless by a vote of the majority of the
qnallfled voters. Crocker v. Moore, 53 S. B.
229, 230, 140 N. a 429.
Of eM&demaatioB proeeedlngs
The use of automobiles by commissioners
of appraisal in condemnation proceedings
Is not a ''necessary expense" or "necessary
traveling expense," which under Laws 1905,
€. 725, I 5, and chapter 724, { 32, is to be al-
lowed them, there being railroads, on which
many trains run, going very near all parts
of the lands, and livery teams being acces-
sible; the statute contemplating the ordi-
nary method of traveL In re Bensel, 124
N. T. Supp. 716, 723.
Of dlstviet attorMy
County Law (ConsoL Laws 1900, c 11) I
240, subd« 1, provides that the expenses neo-
tssarlly incurred by the district attorney In
criminal actions or proceedings arising in
his own county are a county charge. HeLd
to Invest a district attorney with much dis-
cretion in determining what expenses are
necessary; the term- ''necessary expenses"
being a flexible one, to be applied in the dis-
trict attorney's discretion, depending on the
circumstances of each particular case. Peo-
ple ex reL Koetterltz v. Board of Sup'rs of
Herkimer County, 132 N. Y. Supp. 808, 810,
148 App. Div. 392.
Of axeeution of will
On appeal from the decree of a probate
court proving a will, the executor named in
the will may, if acting In good faith, prose-
cute the probate in the appellate court at
the expense of the estate, and the reason-
able expenses incurred by him in so doing,
are "necessary expenses incident to admin-
istration.'' Hazard v. Bugs, 14 R. I. 6, 9.
Of snardiaa
A Judgment against the ward tat costs is
not a liability of the guardian ad litem, and
payment thereof by him is not, under ordi-
nary drcumstanoes, to be recognized as a
necessary expenditure. In re McNaughton's
Will, 118 N. W. 997, 1006, 138 Wis. 179.
Of sekooU
Graded school districts are public quasi
corporations within the term "municipal cor-
poration," as used in Const art 7, | 7, pro-
hibiting any city, town, or other municipal
corporation from contracting debts except
for necessary expenses, unless by vote of the
qnallfled voters; so that a graded school
district could not issue Ixmds to erect a
school buildiug unless their issue was ap-
proved by a majority of the qualified voters ;
the erection of a school building not being a
"necessary expense" within section 7. Ellis
V. Trustees of Graded School of Oxford, 72
S. E. 2, 3, 156 N. a 10
Of shraUr
The sum allowed a sheriff for "neces-
sary expenses," under the statute, covers
reasonable help and expenses in transporting
and delivering convicts and lunatics to the
penitentiary and asylum. Lenhart v. Cam-
bria County, 64 Aa 876, 216 Pa. 25.
Of state
Under Const art 6, H 30, 81, requiring
the general appropriation bill to embrace
nothing but appropriations for the "ordi-
nary" expenses of government, and prohibit-
ing the appropriation of money except in
specified cases, among which Is included de-
fraying the "necessary" expenses of govern-
ment unless by a two-thirds vote of the Leg-
islature, extraordinary expenses may be "nec-
essary," and may be authorized by a ma-
jority vote. State v. Moore, 88 S. W. 881,
883, 76 Ark. 197, 70 K R. A. 67L
KEGESSABY FOOB
Rev. St 1909, | 4492, provides that if
any father without lawful excuse neglects to
provide audi Infant with "necessary" food.
NEOESSART FOR THE JOURNEY S42
N£iOB^AAT 1NJI7RT
1!
I '-.
etc., he shall be punished. Defendant and
his wife separated, the wife going to her
father's house, taking with her one child of
the marriage, and another was born at the
house of the wlfe^s father, and both the chil-
dren were there supplied with all necessary
food, etc. Defendant after the separation
contributed nothing to their support Held,
that "necessary*' food, clothing, and lodging,
as used In the statute, Is food, etc., which the
Infant actually needed at the time ; and that
as the Infant children were receiving neces-
sary food, etc., defendant was not guilty.
State v. Thornton, 134 S. W. 519, 620, 232
Mo. 2d8, 82 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 841.
HEOESSART FOB THE JOURHET
See Money Necessary for the Journey-
NEOESSABY FUBHITUBB
The words "necessaiy furniture," as used
In Illinois Administration Act, | 74 (Starr &
C. Ann. St 1896, c. 8, par. 74), allowing the
widow certain articles of property, such as
bedsteads, bedding, and household and kltdi-
en fumlture, necessary for herself and fam-
ily, must be construed with referenoe to the
drcumstanoes and mode of life of the par-
ties, and mean the ordinary and appropriate
furniture for such homesteads. Olllett ▼.
Glllett, 69 N. B. 942, 946, 207 IlL 136 (qnot^
Ing Strawn y. Strawn, 63 IlL 263).
NEOESSART IMPUOATION
Plain Implication synonymous, see Plain
Implication.
By "necessary Implication" as used In
the rule that It Is possible for a testator to
dispose of property by necessary Implication
from his will, taken as a whole, Is meant so
strong a probability of Intention that an In-
tention contrary to that which Is Imputed to
the testator cannot be supposed. Coberly ▼.
Earle, 54 S. B. 336, 339, 60 W. Va. 295 (cit-
ing Bartiett v. Patton, 10 S. E. 21, 33 W. Va.
71, 5 L. R. A. 523; Graham y. Graham, 23
W. Va. 36, 48 Am. Rep. 364; Beard y. Beard,
22 W. Va. 130; Irwin v. Zane, 15 W. Va.
646).
"Necessary Implication" means, not nat-
ural necessity, but so strong a probability
of an Intention that an intention contrary to
that which \b Imputed to the testator cannot
be Imposed. Galloway y. Durham, 81 S. W.
659, 660, 118 Ky. 544, 111 Am. St Rep. 300
(quoting 1 Ves. A B. 468).
"Necessary Implication," In cases on the
construction of Instruments, means, not nat-
ural necessity, but so strong a probability of
Intention that an Intention contrary to that
which Is Imputed cannot be supposed. Tut-
tie y. Wooiworth, 77 Ati. 684, 686, 74 N. J.
Eq. 810.
The phrases **plaln Implication" and
"necessary Implication*' haye exactly the
same meaning, when used In reference to the
donstraetlon df deeds. By these Is not mea
a physical necessity, but a logical necessll
Where a clause Is enlarged In Its effect t
yond the Import of the words used on ti
theory of an Intent established by an imp
cation, it must be necessary to so enlarge
In order to glye effect to the plain and e
press proylslons of other clauses, or the pro
ability of Intent must be so strong that ti
contrary thereof cannot be supposed. Gt\
fin y. Fairmont Coal Ck>., 63 S. E. 24^ 66, I
W. Va. 480, 2 L. R A. (N. &) Ulfi.
HEC3ESSABY nrDEBTEDNESS
The word '^necessary," as used in ti
Constitution and laws of Montana, proyl
Ing for the extension of the constitution
limit of municipal Indebtedness when su<
Increase Is "necessary" to construct a sewe
age system or procure a supply of water, <
ratification by a yote of the taxpayers, d
fines the condition of affairs which requii^
the additional Indebtedness. The oonditic
must be such as to create the neoesatty.
a municipality Is dot Indebted in .any amom
at all, or If it has the necessary funds in i
treasury, no additional indebtedness can I
Incurred; nor can It be said that any n
cesslty has arisen demanding it A city coul
only ayall Itself of the prlyllege of extenslo
when the financial condition of the dty n
quired a resort to it, and could not arUtr
rlly declare a debt to be in the extended Ub
It when the dty was not Indebted to the coi
stituttonal limit Bntier y. Andrus» 90 Pa
785, 786, 85 Mont 575.
HEOESSABY INJURT
"The 'necessary Injury' resulting to
parent from the negligent killing of his mine
child, within the meaning of the damage m
(Rey. St 1899, S 2866), consists in the la
of serylces of the deceased during mlnorlt;
the cost of nursing, surgical and medical a
tendance, and appropriate funeral expenses
Coleman y. Hlmmelberger-Harrlson Land
Lumber Co., 79 S. W. 981, 987, 105 Mo. Ap
254 (quoting and adopting definition In Rali
y. St Louis, I. M. ft 8. By. Co., 71 Mo. 16
86 AnL Rep. 469).
The term "necessary Injury," as used 1
Rey. St 1809, f 2866, relating to damages 1
death actions, authorizing damages not e^
ceedlng |5,000, as may be deemed fklr an
just with reference to the 'Necessary injur;
resulting to the surylylng parties, etc., doc
not Include more than pecuniary injui:
Brunke y. Missouri A K. Telephone Co., S
8. W. 84, 85, 112 Mo. App. 623.
Under Rey. St 1890, | 286?, anthorisln
an action for the death of a person caused b
wrongful act, etc, and section 2800, proyldin
th^t the jury may glye audi damages as the
may deem fair and just with ref^ence **i
the necessary Injuries resulting from" sue
death, the measure of daoaages In an actio
by a paroit for tbe wrongfol death of hJ
NSf^asaSAMY lilTiaATION
543
NBCKSSART PARTIES
minor J50II does not include* loss of comfort
and society of. the son ; the words "neces-
sary injury" meaning "pecuniary injury,"
and confining dadiages to property los&
Marshall v. Consolidated Jack Mines Co., 95
5. W. 972, 973, 119 Mo. App. 270.
HEOESSARY UTiaATIOH
Iiitigation to determine doubtful ques-
tions as to the liability of transferees for the
inheritance tax, and delays occasioned there-
by, is "necessary litigation or other unavoid-
able delay," within Laws 1908, p. 09, c 44, |
6, providing that in such case the penalty of
10 per cent, interest for nonpayment of the
tax shall not be imposed. State v. Pabst, 121
N. W. 351, 301, 139 Wis. SOL
NECESSARY PARTIES
See Not a Necessary Party.
Persons who not only have an interest
in the controversy, but an interest of such a
nature that a final decree cannot be made
without affecting that interest, or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconslstait
with equity and good conscience, are "nec-
essary parties." Disbrow v. Creamery Pack-
age Mfg. Co., 115 N. W. 751, 752, 104 Minn.
17; Perkins v. Hendryx, 149 Fed. 520, 528.
The words "necessary" and *indispen0a*
ble^ have sometimes been considered synony-
mous, and parties in equity have been classi-
fied as "necessary parties" and "proper par-
ties." Bailroad Oomonission of Georgia v.
Palmer Hardware Co., 53 S. B. 193, 195, 124
6a, 033.
A distinction has been rec(^^nized be-
tween necessary and indispensable parties, to
ascertain whether some of those, who under
the established rules of equity pleading and
practice were deemed necessary, may not,
under su(^ rules, be dispensed with as par-
ties, that equitable relief in a given case may
not wholly faiL Mathieson y. Craven, 104
Fed. 471, 475.
"'Necessary parties,' when the term is
accurately used, are those without whom no
decree at all can be effectively made deter-
mining the principal issues in the cause."
Leonard v. Pierce, 75 N. B. 813, 315, 182 N.
Y. 431, 1 L. R. A (N. S.) 101 (quoting and
adopting definition In Pomeroy's Remedies ft
Remedial Rights, S 329>.
All persons who are interested in the
subject-matter of a suit, and who will be
affected by the results thereof, are "necessa-
Tf parties." Sweeney v. Foster, 71 S. B.
648, 550, 112 Va. 499. Such as beneficiaries
and trustees. Mitau v. Roddan, 84 Pac. 145,
147, 149 CaL 1, 0 L. R. A. (N. S.) 275; Benton
V. Benton, U6 Pac. 535, 530, 84 Kan. 091. Or
the owners in proceedings to condemn land.
Kansas City Interurban Ry. Co. v. Davis, 95
S. W. 881, 884, 197 Mo. 009, 114 Am. St Rep.
790. Or the p«rsoos,lji whom the titl^ vested
on the death of the grantee in a deed sougnt
to be set aside for fraud. Hagan v. Mcl>er-
mott, 115 N. W. 138, 140, 134 Wis. 490. But
not an agent to whom a deed absolute in
form was executed as security for a debt to
the principal. In re Russell's Estate, 84
Pac. 155, 150, 148 Cal. 708.
"Necessary parties" are all those who
have an interest in the subject and object of
the action, and all persons against whom
relief must be obtained to accomplish the
object of the suit McLean v. Farmers* High-
line Canal & Reservoir Co., 98 Pac 10, 19,
44 Colo. 184.
"Parties in equity are: (1) Formal pai>
ties. (2) Persons hav&ng an interest in the
controversy, and who ought to be made par-
ties in order that the court may act on that
rule which requires it to decide on, and final-
ly determine, the entire controversy, and do
complete Justice, by adjusting all the rights
involved in It These persons are commonly
termed 'necessary parties'; but if their Inter-
ests are separable from those of the parties
before the court, so that the court can pro-
ceed to a decree, and do complete and final
justice, without affecting other persons not
before the court, the latter are not indis-
pensable parties. (3) Persons who not only
have an Interest in the controversy but
an interest of such a nature that a final
decree cannot be made without either affect-
ing that interest, or leaving the controversy
in such a condition that its final termination
may be wholly inconsistent with equity and
good conscience." "The relation of an in-
dispensable party to the suit must be such
that no decree can be entered in the case
which will do Justice between the parties ac-
tually before the court, without injuriously
affecting the rights of such absent party."
United States v. AUen, 179 Fed. 13, 21, 103
C. C. A 1 (quoting and adopting definition
in Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. [58 V. S.] 130,
139, 15 L. Ed. 158 ; Waterman v. Canal-Louisi-
ana Bank & Trust Co., 30 Sup. Ct 10, 215 U.
S. 33, 49, 54 L. Ed. 80).
The use of the word "indispensable," as
distinguished from "proper" or "necessary,"
parties is stated in the citation of a case
holding that an indispensable party is one
whose interest in the subject-matter of the
controversy is such that a final decree cannot
be rendered between the other parties to the
suit without radically and injuriously affect-
ing his interest, or without leaving the con-
troversy in such a situation that its final
determination may be inconsistent with equi-
ty and good conscience. Defendants who
were joined in a suit in a state court to
recover an interest in lands only as trustees
holding the paramount title in trust, and
whose title aa such was not disputed, held
not indispensable parties, whose dtizensMp
and residence in the same state as com-
plainant would prevent a removal of the
cause by the other defendants, who were the
KECESSART PARTIES
644
KECESSART RBPAIB8
real parties In interest Lawrence ▼. South-
em Pac. Co., 166 Fed. 241, 243 (citing Rogers
y. Penobscot Min. Co., 154 Fed. 606, 88 C.
C. A. 380).
Proper parties distinsnisl&ecl
Persons legitimately made parties to
snits in equity may belong to three classes:
First, proper parties ; second, necessary par-
ties; and, third, indispensable parties. The
phrases •'proper parties/* "necessary parties,"
and "indispensable parties," in their techni-
cal sense, are distinguishable from one an-
other; each denoting a separate and inde-
pendent class. But in a broader sense the
first is the most, and the last the least, com-
prehensive class, for "proper parties** may
or may not be either necessary or indispensa-
ble, and ••necessary parties'* may or may not
be indispensable. In the same broad sense
an indispensable party is both a necessary
and a proper party, and, though a necessary
party may or may not be indispensable, he
is nevertheless a proper party. The dis-
tinction between a necessary and an in-
dispensable party, while doing violence to
the English language in its usual accepta-
tion, has been recognized for the purpose of
determining the question whether some of
those who, under the well-established roles
of equity pleading and practice, were deem-
ed necessary parties may not, under existing
rules governing pleading and practice in
equity, be dispensed with as parties in order
that equitable relief in a given case may not
wholly falL Mathieson ▼. Craven, 164 Fed.
471, 476.
••Necessary parties" to a suit are parties
who are so vitally interested in the subject-
matter that a valid decree could not be ren-
dered without their presence, whether there
was an objection to a failure to make them
parties or not; but where they are only
"proper parties," the right to complain that
they were not made parties may be waived
by delay. Biggs v. Miller (Tex.) 147 S. W.
682, 687.
KE0ES8ABY POUOB OBDIHAN0E8
City and VUlage Act (Hurd*s Rev. St
1903, p. 291) art 5, i 1, subds. 4, 9, 15, 20,
41, 66, 78, 96, empowering cities to regulate
traffic on the streets and sidewallis, to li-
cense, tax, regulate, suppress, and prohibit
peddlers, to make all regulations which may
be necessary for the promotion of health, and
to pass all ordinances and make all regula-
tions necessary to carry into effect the pow-
ers granted to such cities, etc. Held, that by
the word ••necessary" Indispensable was not
intended, but power was conferred on the
dty to pass all ordinances whidti would be
conducive to the promotion of the health,
safety, and welfare of its inhabitants, which
power may reasonably be held to Include
the power to pass an ordinance regulating
in a reasonable manner the handling of oils
in tank wagons, or other wagons or vehicles >
on the streets of the dty. Spiegler t. (
of Chicago, 74 N. B. 718-721, 216 IIL U4.
HE0E8SABT POWSBfl
Of oorporatioa
The power given to a railway compi
to do all acts Inddental to the malntens
of the road Indudes the right to lay <
duits in its right of way to conduct wt
to its buildings, whether the right of \
traverses private property or a dty str
being a reasonably ••necessary" Inddent
the maintenance of the road. Mayor, c
of City of Canton v. Canton Cotton Wi
house Co., 36 South. 266, 272, 84 Bilss. 26^
L. R. A. 561, 106 Am. St Rep. 428.
KEGE8SARY PURPOSSS
Furnishing l^ght and water for pul
purposes is a "necessary purpose,** and
cost thereof Is a ••necessary expense" of i
nlcipalities furnishing the same. Wadswo
V. City of Concord, 45 S. B. 948, 960, 133
a 587.
HEOESSABY KEPAZBS
A covenant by a tenant to make "nee
sary repairs" means only such repairs
the tenant finds necessary for his nse of
premises, and does not require him to ]
the premises in better condition than tJ
were at the beginning of the tenancy. Ti
ley V. Smith, 101 N. Y. Snpp. 382, 385.
App. Div. 708 (dting and constmiiig Wli
V. Albany Ry. [N. Y.) 17 Hun, 9^.
The words "necessary repairs," in an
der enjoining county officers from doing n
work or spending money under a cert
resolution, and from expending money af
an annual levy was exhausted, excepting
the making of necessary repairs to roa
legally designated for expenditure of moi
in their repair, means emergency repairs
such repairs on roads as were necessary
make travel safe, so that the duty of I
county to travelers upon its highways mi{
still be discharged. Webster v. £>ouglas C
77 N. W. 885, 888, 102 Wis. 181, 72 Am.
Rep. 87a
A party wall agreement, providing tl
each party shall contribute equally if it sh
become ••necessary'* to repair and reboi
cannot be deftoted by either party sayi
it is not necessary to r^Mdr or rebuild. Mi
pal V. Jackson, 118 N. Y. Supp. 513, 617,
Misc. Rep. 407.
To Tvssel
Although the master of a ship tn a fi
eign port has authority to procure all si
plies and repairs ••necessary" for the saft
of the ship and the due performance <Ji t
voyage, on the credit of the owner, he mi
be restricted to such repairs and supplies
are in a Just s^ise necessary for the afa
under the actual circumstances of the voyai
and a soit against the Qvma for thdr vali
im
KE0E68ARY RISK
646 NSGBSSARY TO HOLD MINING OLAIH
Lnnot be maintained wlthoat proof Chat such
(pairs and aappUes were neceetaxy. Wblt-
m v. Tladale, 43 Me. 461, 462.
EGES8ART BISK
Laws 1002, p. 1750, c 600, | 8, piOTldlng
mt an employ^, by entering on or contia-
Lng in the employer's service, shall be pre-
imed to have assented to the necessary risks
r the employment, such risks including those
iherent in the nature of the business, after
le employer has exercised due care for the
Lfety of employ^, and complied with laws
^gulating such busineds, distinguishes be-
veen "necessary risk'* and "obvious risk,"
hich latter may be due to the master's fail-
re to perform his duty. Hurley v. Olcott,
19 X. Y. Supp. 430, 435, 134 App. Div. 631.
The New York statute defining "neces-
ary risks" as those ''inherent in the nature
t the business, which remain after the em-
loyer has exercised due care in providing
or the safety of his employte," is but dec-
iratory of the common law. Logerto v. Cen-
ral Bldg. Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 604, 607, 128
lPp. Div. 840 (citing Benzing ▼. Bteinway,
N. E. 449, 101 N. Y. 547). See, also, O'Neii
. Karr, 97 N. Y. Supp. 148; 150, 110 App. Div.
71; Wynkoop y. Ludlow Valve Mfg. Co., 98
r. Y. Supp. 1076, 1077, 112 App. Div. 729.
The risk of injury to a servant who, at
be suggestion of his foreman, thrust his
isnd into a wooden box, in which a screw
rith sharp blades was rapidly revolving, in
rder to loosen cement in a chute leading
ato the box, knowing the cement was liable
0 fall in such quantities as to drive his arm
gainst the screw, was not a "necessary risk"
t the business, which are the only risks that
n employ^ is conclusively presumed not to
issume, as provided by Employers' Liability
Let (Laws 1902, p. 1750, c. 600, | 3). Vaughn
. Glens Palls Portland Cement Co., 93 N. Y.
Jupp. 979, 980, 105 App. Div. 136.
rSCESSABT BOAB
The term '^necessary plantation roads,"
IB used in Code 1906, | 4058, requiring their
onstmction and maintenance t^ railroads,
neans roads necessary to the plantation to
rhich they are annexed, and, wliile an occa-
lonal and isolated use of the crossing by
others would not relieve the company from
iabUity to maintain it, the company is not
K)imd to maintain the crossing in good con-
lition and make r^;>airs necessitated by con-
ttant heavy driving, done by others than the
^wner with his consent Illinois Cent R. Co.
r. HcQowan, 46 South. 55, 66, 92 Miss. 603:
toUey V. Cavallier, 46 South. 55, 56, 92
)iia8.603.
Where a proposed railroad, only 12 miles
^ length, to be built as an independent road,
voQid serve only a small locality, would
probably not earn running expenses, and
^onld be financially disabled from the start,
1 finding by the board of railroad commission-
8 WxmA P.2n Skb.-36
#n ffiat it was ''necessary and eonveiUflntr'
was erroneoBs. I^eople ex rti. Potter v.
Board of Bailroad Com'rs of State of New
York, 108 N. Y. Supp. 288, 289, 124 App. D|y.
47.
mCSMABT SEIiF-BEFEHSB
See Self-Def ense.
XEOEMABT SUFPU3B9
Food supplies ordered by the master of
a fishing schooner, who was alao managing
owner, for the use of the crew on a fishing
Toyage, under the usual lay contracts, In the
absence of any showing of bad faith on his
part will be* presumed to be supplies "nece»-
sary" for the employment of the vessel, with-
in the meaning of the Maine statute giving
a lien for such mipplles, and the court will
not undertake to determine that certain of
the articles were "luxuries" for which the
vessel is not liable. The term luxuries'* Is
an entirely relative term. The Mary F. Chis-
holm;i33 Fed. 598, 600.
Ky. St I 4426a, sabd. 9, provides that
the board of education shall lay before the
fiscal coTurt the educational needs of the
county, and the county shall levy a tax for
school purposes, not exceeding 20 cents on
each $100, and the proceeds of the tax shall
be turned over to the county superintendent,
and the county board shall expend the money
for certain designated purposes. Including
the purchase of "necessary supplies" and the
"extension of the school term" in the sub-
districts ; and that upon petition of 10 voters
of a subdistrlct the board of education shall
submit to a vote the question whether an ad-
ditional tax shall be levied, and when levied
it shall be the duty of the sheriff to collect
It and hold It subject to the order of the
county board, for the benefit of the subdis-
trlct voting such tax. Held, that such ad-
ditional tax was to be expended, under the
order of the board of education, for tiie sole
use of the subdistrlct levying It, and for the
purposes enumerated In the statute, and the
board had no power to use an additional tax
levy for the purpose of transporting children
to and from school ; such purpose not being
mentioned in the statute and not coming
within the terms ''necessary supplies" or "ex-
tension of school term." Shanklin v. Boyd,
142 S. W. 1041, 1042, 1048, 146 Ky. 460, 38
Ix R. A. (N. a) 710.
NECE8SABT TO HOLD MINIKa CI.AIM
Comp. Laws, | 231, provides that certif-
icates of location and of labor and Improve-
ments necessary to hold claims need not be
sworn to, but must truly state the required
facta Held, that the words '^necessary to
hold claims'* did not refer to "certificates of
location," but only to the words "labor and
Improvements," which referred to the provi-
sions of the federal statutes requiring the
expenditure of $100 annually in labor or im-
provements In order to hold a mining claim
li. !
\i.
NECES8ABY TRAVELIKa EXPENSB 54$
KECBSSITT
1.1
prior to the Issaanoe of patent. F6nl ▼.
Campbell, 92 Pac 206, 209, 29 Nev. 578.
NECESSARY TBAVELIHa EXPEITSE
The use of automobiles by commissioners
of appraisal in condemnation proceedings is
not a "necessary expense" or ''necessary trav-
eling expense," which under Laws 1905, c.
725, i 5, and chapter 724, | 32, is to be allow-
ed them, there being railroads, on which
many trains run, going very near all parts of
the lands, and livery teams being accessible;
the statute contemplating the ordinary meth-
od of traveL In re Bensel, 124 N. X. Snpp.
716, 723.
NECESSARY VEGETABXJB8
The term ''necessary,'* as used in Code
dv. Proc. I 1390, providing that all "neces-
sary vegetables" actually provided for family
use should be exempt from levy, is a word
of qualification, and qualifies the extent of
the exemption. McCarthy v. McCabe, 116
N. Y. Supp. 829, 832, 181 App. Div. 896.
NECESSARY WAY
See Way of Necessity. ^
NECESSITIES
See Actual Necessities: As Their Neces-
sities Might Require.
Plumbers* supplies are "necessities" of
life and a staple commodity, and a combina-
tion controlling such supplies to the extent
that it either does, or tends to, prevent or
restrain competition may be prohibited.
Knight A Jillson Co. v. MUler, 87 N. E. 823,
832, 172 Ind. 27, 18 Ann. Cas. 1146.
NECESSITY
See Inevitable Necessity; Law of Neces-
sity ; Paramount Necessity ; Public
Necessity; Way of Necessity.
The word "necessity," in common use,
connotes different degrees of necessity. It
sometimes means indispensable; at others,
needful, requisite, incidental, or conducive.
In its primary sense, it signifies a thing
or act without which some other thing or act
cannot be done or exist The word ''neces-
sary,'* as applied to the determination of an
agent's power to do an incidental act, should
be held to mean an act or measure requisite
to enable him to discharge his main duty —
something more urgently required than is
signified by the words, "appropriate," "suit-
able," or "expedient." St Louis Gunning Ad-
vertising Co. V. Wanamaker A Brown, 90
S. W. 737, 743, 115 Mo. App. 270.
For class legislatioii
By "necessity," which permits legisla-
tion on a subject to be divided into classes, is
meant practical, and not absolute, necessity.
Pepin Tp. v. Sage, 129 Fed. 657, 665, 64 C.
C. A. 169 (citing State ex reL Board of Court-
l house and City Hall Com'rs of City of 11
neapolls and County of Hennepin y. Cooley,
N. W. 153, 66 Minn. 551).
For eonduot o£ 1rasln«ss and trmaai
tlon of affairs by eorporation
"When it comes to determining what
'necessary' for the conduct of the busln
and transaction of the affairs for whi
a corporation has been chartered, it mn
of course, be understood that what is mef
is a due and profitable prosecution of
lawful purposes ; that the 'necessity' conte
plated is a relative one, having referei
to economy, convenience, efficiency, and si
cess; and that some latitude is to be allow
to the discretion of the corporation its
in deciding what, from time to tlme^ is or
not, In that sense, •necessary."* Folk
State Capital Savings A Loan Ass'n, 63 A
1018, 1016, 214 Pa. 629.
For easement to enjoy property
Under the rule that all continuous ai
apparent quasi easements as are reaaonal
necessary to the Enjoyment of the propez
granted pass to the grantee, mere inconvc
ience will not constitute such necessity. T
test of such necessity is held to be the qm
tion whether the grantee might at a leasc
able expense procure for himself an enjo
ment of a similar easement Two i>ersoi
OMming in common land on which were t\
houses, partitioned It by deed, giving ea
one of the houses, the boundary line being
an alley between the houses and providii
that the alley should be kept oi>en for ti
use and benefit of the owners of the lots, fc
ever, but making no mention of the drain ai
stairway on the dividing line. Held that,
not being reasonably necessary that eitb
grantee should have the part of the dra
or stairway on the land of the other mai
tained, no easement was to be implied. 6a
nor V. Bauer, 39 South. 749-751, 144 AJ
448, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1082 (citing Tied. Be
Prop. § 609; Walker v. Clifford, 29 Sout
588, 128 Ala. 74, 86 Am. St Rep. 74; Wash
Easem. [4th Ed.] 107).
For forwarding sltipment by any ««
rier
Plaintiff shipped two cars of phospha
rock from a point on defendant's railros
to a point in another state, the rate state
in the bills of lading being that fixed by
joint schedule filed by defendant and otbi
connecting carriers. The bills of lading, hoi
ever, contained a provision that the carri<
should have the right **ln case of necessitj
to forward by any carrier, and that in sue
case plaintiff should bear the additional riE
and cost Defendant delivered the cars i
Cincinnati to a railroad which was not
party to the through schedule, and plalnti
was required to pay a substantially higlu
rate. Held, that the fact that there was
congestion of traffic at Cincinnati becaus
of which the connecting carrier xefused (
KECESSITT
647
KECESSITT
ceire tbe curs and fheir retentloii bj Oe-
ndant would bave brought about a oon-
stlon and blockade of its own Une did not
eate a '^necessity" within the meaning of
e bills of lading which anthorlEed defend-
it to subject plalntifr to the Increased cost,
^iDg dne to insufficiency of equipment on
3 own part and that of its connecting car-
er. Dickerson v. Louisville & N. B. Ck>.,
17 Fed. 874. 879.
For vvivate way
Cases of necessity, contemplated in that
-oTision of the Gonstitatlon which declares
lat in cases of necessity' private ways may
) granted upon jnst compensation first be-
ig paid, do not arise «zo^ where the way
»u^t to be laid oat is absolute indis-
snsable to the applicant as a means of
Aching his proper^. If there is in ezls^
ice a way suitable for all the purposes for
hich the property is to be used, a ''case of
H^essity" does not arise, even though such
ay may be leas convenient than the one pro-
)8ed. Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Flem-
ig, 45 8. B. 664, 666, 118 Ga. 690 (quot^g
Id adopting Chattanooga, R. ft S. R. Co.
Philpot, 87 S. B. 181, 112 Ga. 1S3).
Fov svit bjr admiaifltrator
Where an administrator, being an at-
»rney, finds it necessary to institute a suit
L behalf of the estate and associates another
ttomey with him, and he and the other at-
^rney jointly render professional services to
le estate, the administrator is entitled to a
!«dlt on the settlement of the administration
I the probate court to the extent of the rea-
)nable value of such services. Tyson, J.,
i a dissenting opinion, said: 'The 'neoes-
ity' spok^i of in our cases, authorising an
[lowance for compensation upon proof of it
>r professional services rendered by an
dministrator in a case like this, is one aris-
ig out of the duty of the administrator to
aforce the collection of the claim by suit,
Dd not out of any contract he may make
1th counsel to render him assistance in its
)Uection.'' John v. Sharps, 41 South. 686,
S8, 148 Ala. 665.
fEGESSITT (Saadajr lAbor)
The term ''necessity," as «nployed in the
unday statutes, is not an absolute, un-
▼oidable, physical necessity, but rather an
conomic and moral necessity, and the ne-
essity may grow out of or be incident to a
articular trade or calling. Lane v. State
rex.) 150 S. W. 637, 638 (quoting 6 Words
nd Phrases, p. 4729).
By the word "necessity,'' as it rdates to
be exemption of work of necessity on a day
rhen work is forbidd^a, we are not to un-
^rstand a physical and absolute necessity,
»ut a moral fitness or propriety of the work
ioDe, under the circumstances of sach par-
icalar case. SUte v. Lewi^, 72 Pac. 121, 123,
ilWash. 51S»
The word "necessity^ in Befv. 8t 1899, 1
2240, prohibiting labor on Sunday, excepting
works of necessity, should be construed rea-
sonably and neither too literally nor too
liberally. State v. Chicago, B. ft Q. R. Co.,
143 S. W. 785, 787, 239 Mo. 196.
The word ''necessity," in Kirby's Dig. |
2030, making it unlawful to work on Sun-
day except to perform "customary household
duties of daily necessity, comfort, or charity,"
does not mean an absolute unavoidable physi-
cal necessity, but rather an economic and
moral necessity. Barefleld v. State, 107 S.
W. 886, 85 ATk. 184.
The sending of a telegram by a husband
to his wife, notifying h^ that he would not
return as expected, is a "work of necessity,**
within Bums' Ann. St 1908, | 2864, prohibit-
ing any work on Sunday, save that of char-
ity and necessity. Western Union Telegraph
Co. V. Fulling, 96 N. B. 967, 49 Ind. App. 172.
The fact that in gath^lng a crop it is
somewhat less expensive and more conven-
ient to work seven days in the week, rather
than six, does not make such gathering a
"work of necessity," within St. 1904, p. 477,
c. 460, I 2, making it h criminal offense to
do any manner of labor, business, or work,
except works of necessity and charity, on
Sunday. Commonwealth v. White, 77 N. SL
636, 637, 190 Mass. 678, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.)
320.
Gen. St. 1902, | 1369, prohibits any
secular business or labor except works of n^
cessity or mercy, or engaging in any sport
between midnight of Saturday and mid-
night of Sunday. Section 1870 makes it a
penal offense to be present at any concert of
music, dancing, or other public diversion on
Sunday. Held, that the act of seUing tickets
on Sunday to a moving picture show to be
held in an opera house on that day, and
thereby pnnnotlng attendance at a place of
public diversion, where It was unlawful for
any one to be present, was not a "work of
necessity or mercy." State v. Ryan, 69 Atl.
586, 537, 80 Conn. 582.
Pen. Code 1895, | 420, has made it legal
to operate passenger and mail trains on Sun-
day. Therefore any work necessary to the
running of such trains is a "work of neces-
sity," within Pen. Code 1895, | 422, prohibit-
ing the pursuing of business or work on the
Lord's day. Kellam v. State, 67 S. Bl 683,
7 Ga. App. 575.
Pen. Code 1895, | 420, making it a mis-
demeanor to run freight or excursion trains
on Sdnday, but allowing regular trains car-
rying mail or passengers to run on that
day, is an expression of public policy as to
the legality of running the excepted trains on
Sunday, and a legislative construction that
the running of mail and passenger trains is
within the exception to section 422, making it
a misdemeanor to pursue one's business on
Sunday, if not a "work of necessity or char>
i:;
KEOE6SITT
548
NEED
Ity." Southern By. Go. v. Wallls, 9S S. E.
870, 872, 138 Ga. 568, 80 Ia. R. A. (N. S.) 401,
18 Ann. Gas. 67.
Courts, in construing the term ''neces-
sity" as used in statutes relating to the stat-
ute prohibiting work on the Sabbath except-
ing work of necessity, is given a liberal rath-
er than a literal Interpretation, and It la
"not an absolute, unavoidable, physical neces-
sity that is meant, but rather an economic
and moral necessity." Where a belt in a
mill employing 200 persons broke on a Satur-
day through an tlnexpected defect, and could
not be repaired that day because gasoline
could not be procured in a town of 8,000
inhabitants, the repairing of it Sunday mern-
ing, without which the mill would have to
be shut down Monday, as, after the belt was
glued, it had to dry 18 hours before it could
be used, was a work of necessity, within the
statute. State v. CJollett, 79 S. W. 701, 702,
72 Ark. 167, 64 L. R. A. 204 (quoting Shipley
V. State, 82 S. W. 489, 83 S. W. 107, 61 Ark.
216, 219).
St 1898, 1 4595, provided that any person
who shall keep open his shop, warehouse, or
workhouse on Sunday, or shall do any man-
ner of labor, business, or work, except only
works of necessity and charity, should be
punished. Held, that the exception of
"works of necessity and charity" related to
"labor, business, or work" only, and hence it
was no defense to a prosecution for keeping
open a shop, warehouse, or workhouse that
it was done for necessity or charity. Stark
V. Backus, 123 N. W. 98, 101, 140 Wis. 557.
BepAirins belt la mUl
Courts, in construing the term "neces-
sity" as used in the statutes whldi forbid
work and labor on the Sabbath, have general-
ly given It a liberal, rather than a literal,
interpretation. It is not an absolute, un-
avoidable, physical necessity that is meant,
but rather an economic and moral necessity.
Where a belt in a mill employing 200 persons
broke on a Saturday, through an unexpected
defect, and could not be repaired that day,
because gasoline could not be procured in a
town of 3,000 inhabitants, the repairing of it
Sunday morning, without which the mill
would have to be shut down Monday, as,
after the belt was glued, it had to dry 18
hours before it could be used, was a "work
of necessity," within the exception of the
law against Sabbath breaking. State v. Col-
lett, 79 S. W. 791, 792, 72 Ark. 169, 64 L. R.
A. 204 (citing Shipley v. State, 82 S. W. 489,
88 S. W. 107, 61 Ark, 219).
Keeping barber sbop open and shavins
It is not a "work of necessity," within
the exception to the Sunday law, for a bar-
ber to ply his usual avocation on that day
by cutting the hair of and shaving a cus-
tomer. State V. Kuehuer (Mo.) 110 S. W. 605.
The shaving of a customer by a barber is
worldly labor in the course of his ordinary
calling, and is not A *<work of neoesaitjr," p
mitted by Pen. Code 1895, f 422, to be dc
on the Lord's day. McCain v. State, 58 S.
550, 551, 2 Oa. Ai^. 889 (citing State r. Fn
erick, 45 Ark. 847, 55 Am. R^. 559-
Sale of ioe or fresh aieat
"Necessity" is an elastic term. It d(
not mean that which is indispensable, t
it means something more than that which
merely needful or desirable. No doubt
thing which is merely needful or deslral
to the residents of a town might be a "nee
alty" to the residents of a great city, i
also, that whidi was a luxury a century a
may have become now a '^eoessi^." Th(
is always, however, a tendency to dalm i
customed luxuries as necessities falling wii
in the exception of the Sunday law as to wc
of necessity. The obvious intention of a sfe
ute making It an offense for a person to
work on Sunday, unless such work is a wo
of "necessity," is to set apart one day for n
from ordinary labor, so as to give opportnnJ
to all f6r leisure and the contemplation of t
higher things of life. This purpose woi
be defeated if the courts should hold evE
work a "necessity," the interruption of whl
would break into the ordinary habits of t
community, or produce a degree of public
convenience or discomfort. The continual
on Sunday of ordinary sales or deliveries
ice or fresh meat is not a work of ''nee
sity" in a town. State v. James, 02 S.
214, 81 S. C. 107, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 617, 1
Am. St Rep. 902, 16 Ann. Cas. 277.
NECKTIES
The word ••neckties," in Tariff Act 2i
24, 1897, I 1, Schedule I, par. 314 (80 St
178, c 11), relating to artldes of wearing t
parol of every description, including neckt
not specially provided for, is not a term
commercial designation. Goldenberg Broa
Co. V. United States, 124 Fed. 1003, 1004.
NECKWEAR
The word "neckwear,** In Tariff Act Ji
24, 1897, i 1, Schedule I, par. 314 (30 St
178, c. 11), relating to artldes of wearing i
pairel of every description, indndlng nee
wear not specially provided for, is not a tei
of commercial designation. Groldenberg Bn
ft Ck). T. United States, 124 Fed. 1008, KX
NEED
See If Needed.
The word "need*** as used in a clause
a will providing that, •if at my decease ai
of said heirs are not 21 yearn of age, I ir
that the money going to them be invested 1
the trustees in good dty bonds or in bod
good savings bank, and if said heirs are n
in need of the money it shall remain invest
until they become of age," imports aomethii
ii.
iM^il
N£ED
549
NEGATIVE EASEimMT
Ifferent from mere dc«li« f er the pajment of
specified som at a apedfled time. The main
arpose is to preserve the legacies until tiie
snefldaries attain majority, and advance-
lent may be made from time to time as a
)und judgment and wise discretion may die-
ite. In the Ught of all attendant circum-
^nces. Smith v. Haynea, 89 N. E. 168, 160,
[K2 Mass. 631.
Tlie words, "the ties yon may need" dor-
ig 1809, or '^es as needed," as used In a
)ntract for the furnishing of ties for the con-
traction of a railroad, though plain in their
rdinary meaning, are susceptible of various
leanings, accordingly as the context in
rhicfa they appear may throw light upon
iiem or the subject-matter with respect to
rhich they are used. Laclede Const Go. v.
'. J. Moss Tie Ck>., d4 S. W. 76, 90, 186 Mo. 26.
The word "needed," as used in BalUn-
er's Ann. Oodes ft St I 4166, dedarlng that
tie right given to eondemn the use of watw
ball not extend further than to the riparian
ights of persons to the natural ilow of water
brough lands on or abutting on streams or
ikes as the same exists at common law, and
3 not Intended to allow the taking of water
torn any person that is used by the person
iimaelf for irrigation or that is needed for
hat purpose, meant water necessary to irri-
gate the land of a littoral or riparian owner
?bich he has under irrigation at the time
kis rights are sought to be oondemned, or
rhich be int^ds to and will place under irri-
;ation within a reasonable time, and that,
IS to such water, no condemnation could be
lad. State ex rel. Liberty Lake «Irr. Go. v.
Superior Court for Spokane County, 91 Pac.
168, 969, 47 WadL 810.
A request for bids for coal for a dty
isked for coal to be delivered ''as needed"
md also as fast as "required." The bids of*
fered to deliver at such times and in traidi
ruantities as the dty might direct, and the
>ody of the contract stated in one place that
he coal should be delivered promptty *'as or-
lered," and in another, that on failure to
make delivery '*as ordered," the city might
Either forfeit the contract or buy coal at the
:^ontractor'8 expense in the open market
Beld, that the words *'oxder" and "direct"
ihould be construed as syncmymous with the
vord "require," and that the word "require"
teas used as the substantial equivalent of
■^need." McLean County Coal Co. v. City of
Bloomington, 84 N. E. 624, 627, 234 111. 90.
Defendants, who were operatora of a
brewery, contracted for 6,000 bushels of malt
to be delivered "as needed," and at the aid
of the contract plaintiff granted defendants
an option to receive 2,000 bushels more at the
same rate 'in case same Is needed." Held,
that the word "needed" was not used in the
sense of "desired" or "wanted," disconnecidd
with the conduct of defendants' business, but
meant required for defendants' brewery busi-
ness, and hence, the market having advanced,
defendants could not exercise the option that
they might sell the malt at a profit Hettiger
V. Davenport Malt & Grain Oo^ 189 B. W.
1072, 1073, 145 Ky. 89.
NEEDED BEPAXaS
If one county resolves upon sudi a
course, and proceeds to replace three wooden
spans with steel at three times the cost nec-
essary to rebuild them as originally construct-
ed, there being seven or eight times that
many spans in the entire bridge, it cannot re-
cover from the other county as for "needed
repairs." Platte County v. Butler County,
186 N. W. 489, 440, 91 Neb. 132.
ITBEDFVXi BUXItDIirGS
Post offices are among the other "needful
buildings," for the erection of which, as well
as of "forts, magazines, arsenals, dodEyards,"
it is assumed that land will be bought, -and
fbr which land has been bought, hy the gov-
ernment all over the United States, pursu-
ant to Const art 1, f 8, cL 17. Battte v.
United States, 28 Sup. Ct 422» 423, 209 U. S.
86, 52 L. Bd. 670.
See Buyer's Needs.
NEEDLE
See Hand Sewing Needle.
ManuiCactures of, see Manufactures—
Manuftictured Articles.
lfEEDI.E OASES
Not dutiable as articles composed in part
of steel, see Articles within Tariff Act
NEGATIVE
KBOATiVfi BASmBnT
A "negative easement^ is a right in the
owner of the dominant tenement to restrict
the owner of the servient tenement in respect
of the tenement in the exercise of general and
natural rights of property, such as rights of
light and air. Bemere v. HcFarland Real
Estate Co., 114 8. W. 631, 084, 134 Mo. App.
290.
The right of an owner of a dominant
tenement to restrict the owner of the ser-
vient tenemeot in the exercise of general and
natural rights of property, is sometimes call-
ed a "negative easement" Such an ease-
ment was created where the owner of a
building conveyed three inches of land to
an adjoining owner, with the right to use
his party wall, in consideration of a cove-
nant by the grantee, stipulated to run with
the land, that she would not during a speci-
fied time use the building to be erected for
a saloon. Uihlein v. Matthews, 04 N. B. 792,
793, 172 N. T. 164.
■lii
Si
I;
NBaATIVE KKOWLEDGB
550
NEGATIVE TESTIMONY
M
XEGATXTE KNOWXXDGS
TestLmony that a fact did not occur,
founded on a . witness' failure to hear or
see a fact which he could supposedly have
heard or seen If it had occurred, is based on
what is called "negative knowledge." Cot-
ton V. Willmar & Sioux Falls Ry. Co., 109 N.
W. 836, 887, 99 Minn. 366, 8 L. R, A. (N. S.)
648, 116 Am. St. Rep. 422, 9 Ann. Cas. 935
(citing 1 Wigmore, Et. § 664; 2 ElUott, Ev.
§ 969; 6 Thomp. Neg. | 7866; 6 Current
Law, 1369).
"Negative knowledge" is the testimony
that a fact did not occur, founded on the
witness' failure to hear and see a fact which
he would supposedly have heard or seen if
it had occurred, and the only requirement is
that the witness should have been so situat-
ed that, in the ordinary course of events, he
would have heard or seen the fact, had it
occurred. Hoffard v. Illinois Cent Ry. Co.,
110 N. W. 446, 449, 138 Iowa, 643, 16 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 797 (quoting and adopting definition
in Wigmore, Ev. f 664).
HEGATTirE PREGNAH T
A "negative pregnant" is such form of a
negative expression as may carry with it an
affirmative. Lemke v. Lemke, 111 N. W. 138,
139, 78 Neb. 626.
A "negative pregnant" in a pleading is a
negative implying also an affirmative, and is
such a form of negative expression as may
carry with it an affirmative. Nobadi v.
Scott, 119 Pac. 295, 29T, 20 Idaho, 668.
A "negative pregnant" is a denial preg-
nant with an admission of a substantial fact
which is apparently controverted, or one
which, though in form of a traverse,^ really
admits the important fact contained in the
allegation. Electrical Accessories Co. v.
Mittenthal, 87 N. B. 684, 686, 194 N. Y. 478.
Under the system of code pleading, a
general denial is as broad as the allegations
denied, and a general denial of an allegation
of value or damages cannot be treated as a
"negative pregnant," and an admission of
any value or damages lees than the sum al-
leged. McGrath v. Valentine, 167 Fed. 478,
476, 93 C. O. A- 109.
A denial that the defendants are Indebt^
ed to plaintiff in the precise sum charged in
the petition, and that the use and occupation
of the premises is worth the sum mentioned
in the petition, is a "negative pregnant," and
is no denial at all ; and where such a plead-
ing is filed by way of an answer the allega-
tions of the petition are treated as admitted.
Jackson v. Green, 74 Pac. 602, 603, 13 OkL
314.
Where a plaintiff alleges that he is and
has been for the last 10 years the owner and
in possession of land, an answer denying that
plaintiff is and has been for the last 10 years
the owner and in possession of the land, is
in form a "negative pregnant" J. I. Poirl
Lumber Co. v. Hill, 77 S. W. 906, 908,
Ark. 62.
A finding by a Jury that a sheriff hi
not neglected and failed to present and ha
approved his official bond as sheriff, and tal
the oath of office, within the time prescrib
by law, amounts to a "negative pregnant
and should be treated as an admisaion of t
implied fact State ex leL Russell v. Be
78 S. W. 982, 984, 84 Tex. GiT. App. 435.
Under Municipal Court' Act (Laws 19C
p. 1638) f 160, providing that the answ
must contain a denial of each material i
legation of the complaint controverted,
complaint alleging that in the month
April, 1904, plaintiff did work, etc., for d
fendants, is not sufficiently denied by i
answer denying that in the month of Apr
1904, plaintiff did work, etc, for defendant
but failing to deny that he did ao at ai
other time ; it oonstituting a "negative pre
nant" Levin ft Meyer Contracting Ca
Jackson, 92 N. Y. Supp. 807, 306, 46 Mii
Rep. 446.
NEGATIVJB TESTHCOKY
Where one of two witnesses, havii
equal facilities for seeing or hearing a thin
swears that it occurred, and the other th
it did not, the testimony of neither la neg
tive, within the rule that the existence of
fact testified to by a positive witness is rat
er to be believed than that of one who swea
that it did not occur. Civ. Code 1895, 1 61€
Hunter v. State, 62 S. E. 466, 4 Ga. App. 7«
Where the witnesses of tbe state testifi^
that defendant drew his pistol and had it
Ills hand during the difficulty, and defen
ant's witnesses testified that they did not s
him have any pistol, it was error to <diar]
that if some witnesses were present and hi
opportunity to know the facts, and tliere wi
anoULer class of witnesses who testified thi
they did not know, the law requires tiie jiu
to believe the positive testimony, and thj
"positive testimony" is that of witnesses wl
know the ftiets, and "negative testimony"
that where the witness "doesn't know tl
facts, or didn't see it" Daniel v. State, (
S. B. 639, 4 Oa. App. 843.
On an issue whether a gong of defen
ant's street car, by wliich plaintiff wj
struck, was sounded as the car approadi<
a crossing, a police officer on the car, wt
saw the motorman set the brake when tl
accident occurred, testified that no gong wi
sounded, because as soon as the accident hai
pened he remembered the fact, and knew tiu
the question of warning by b^ or gong wi
an important one; that he supposed the i
Jury was caused by car going in the opposii
direction, because no gong was sounded c
the one he was on; that his hearing wi
good, and his attention was not diverte
Plaintiff testified that he was listening for
|M|.;
I If ill"
NZQATtV^E TESTIMONY
tei
KEQLEdT
!ar coming in tbe oppfoedte direction from the
>ne from wblch he had alighted Jnst prior
^0 his Injnry, hecause he knew one might be
x>ming at any time, and that he heard no
^ng or bell. Sel4, that SEUch testimony was
not negative in the sense that It was over*
t)ome, as a matter of law, by testimony of
defendant's employ^ that the gong was
sounded. Testimony is negative only when
It tends to prove the nonexistence of a f^ct
by reason of a mere fWure of a witness to
observe and remember its existence, but, if
the evidence asserts such an observation as
to the existence of the fttct and the recollec-
tion of what that observation was, denial of.
Its existence based thereon is affirmative ev-
idence that the fact does not exist Ck>el v.
Qreen Bay Traction Co., 138 N. W. 28, 25, 147
Wis. 229.
In a prosecution for homicide, the conrt
properly defined and distinguished positive
and n^atlve testimony: ''The testimony of
those vTitnessee who swore positively that
they saw the pistol in the hand of the pris-
oner, and that he fired the fatal shot while
the pistol was in his hand, is what the law
terms 'positive testimony.' They swear posi-
tively that they saw the existence of a fact
The testimony of the witnesses who said
that they saw the prisoner and the deceased
in a struggle at the time when the last shot
was fired, but they did not see the pistol,
and did not Icnow in whose hand the pistol
was, is what the law terms 'negative testi-
mony.' The reason the law gives greater
weight to positive testimony than to nega-
tive testimony Is because the witnesses who
swore to positive testimony swore to what is
a ftict, an existing fact, or else they delib-
erately swore to a falsehood, while those who
swore to negative testimony may be telling
the truth, and yet the fact may exist which
they did not see. If one witness swears that
he saw Sheriff Markham in the courthouse in
Durham on a certain date, the sheriff was
there, or else the witness told a lie. Anoth-
er witness might say: 'I was in the court>
house on that occasion, but I did not see
Sheriff Markham in there.' That witness
may be telling the truth and may be con-
scientious, and yet it may be a fact, notwith-
standing, that Sheriff Markham was in the
courthouse. And for that reason the law
says yon must attach greater weight to posi-
tive testimony than to negative testimony."
State V. Murray, 51 S. B. 776, 189 N. O. 640.
NEGLECT
See Culpable Neglect; Excusable Neg-
lect; Failed and Neglected; Inadver-
tence, Surprise, and Excusable Neg-
lect; Omissions, Neglects, and De-
faults; Ordinary Neglect; Wanton
Neglect; Willful Neglect
Gross neglect, see Gross Negligence.
"The word "neglect,' as sometimes used,
imports an absence of care or attention in
the doing or omission of a given act, or it
may be used In the sense 9t an omission or
failure to perform some act To neglect is
not always synonymous with to omit
Whether the use of the term Is intended to
express carelessness or lack of attention re-
quired by the circumstances, or to express
merely a failure to do a given thing, depends
upon the connection In which the term is
used and on the meaning Intended to be ex-
pressed. * * * In Webster's Dictionary the
verb *neglect' is defined as meaning 'not to
attend to with due care or attention; to for-
bear one's duty In regard to; to suffer to
pass unimproved, unheeded, undone.' In the
Standard Dictionary the word is defined as
meaning 'to fftil to perform through careless-
ness'; and in the Century Dictionary: '(1)
To treat carelessly or heedlessly; forbear to
attend to or treat with respect; be remiss In
attention or duty toward. (2) To overlook or
omit ; disregard. (8) To omit to do or per-
form; let slip; leave undone; tail through
heedlessness to do or in doing (something).'
As defined in the penal statutes of several
of the states, the word 'neglect' is said to
Import 'a want of sudi attention to the na-
ture or probable consequences of the act or
omission as a prudent man ordinarily be-
stows in action in his own concerns.' " H.
Hackfeld ft Co. v. United States, 26 Sup. Ot
460^ 468, 197 U. 8. 442, 49 K Ed. 826 (quo^
ing 5 Words and Phrases, p. 474^^.
The absence of "ordinary diligence," de-
fined by Civ. Co4e 1896, § 2898, as that care
which every prudent man takes of his own
property of a similar nature, Is. termed "neg-
lect" Objection has sometimes been made
to the qualifying words "sUght," "ordinary,"
and "gross," as applicable to negligence, and
the courts of some jurisdictions have pre-
ferred to use the term "ordinary neglect"
or "negligence," as applicable to a want of
due care under the circumstances, maintain-
ing that at last "ordinary diligence" in the
light of the circumstances Is all that is re-
quired. Southern Railway Co. v. Davis, 66
S. B. 181, 132, 182 Ga. 812.
The word "neglect," as used in Rev. St
Idaho, I 4100, providing that when a per-,
son's death is caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another, his heirs and personal
representatives may maintain an action for
damages against the person causing the
death, stands in the same category with
wrongful act, and implies some omission of
duty. The death of a free passenger on a
railway train, not due to the omission on the
part of the railway company of any duty ow-
ing to deceased, cannot be considered as caus-
ed by the neglect of the railroad company,
and hence the heirs or personal representa-
tives of the deceased cannot maintain an ac-
tion under the section. Northern P. R. Co. v.
mSQUSOT
W2
NxaLEor
Adams, 24 Sop. Ot 406. 400. 192 U. S. 440,
48 L. Ed. 513.
•«Gare" and "carefalness** are antonyms
for "neg:leet" and **negligence.*' Negligence
is a conclusion of law, and so also are state-
ments In the findings by the jury that work
was done carefally. Avery v. Noidyke ft
Marmon G6., 70 N. D. 888, 808, 84 Ind. App.
541.
The "neglect" mentioned In the statute
defining the liability of a dty for Injuries to
pedestrians on defective sidewalks means the
want of ordinary care, and the dty must,
to escape liability, use ordinary care to keep
defects out of Its streets. Berry v. City of
Greenville, 65 S. B. 1030. 1031, 84 S. 0. 122,
19 Ann. Ga& 978.
An InstnictloQ In an action against a
town for Injuries to a traveler, caused by
a defective bridge, that It was the duty of
the town to keep the bridge reasonably safe
for the amount and kind of travel that might
be expected to pass over it, and that, if the
town was chargeable with any fault In re-
spect of such duty, the liability attached, and
the town was liable for accidents caused by
reason of defects existing through the fault
of the town, "and this without notice to It
or regardless of the question of 'neglect,'"
etc., was not erroneous because of the use
of the quoted phrase; the word "neglect"
therein being used In its ordinary legal sense,
and it being apparent that the part of the
charge quoted was Intended to mean that
the liability of the town was not to be made
to depend on the question whether or not it
had exercised ordinary care in the mainte-
nance of the bridge. Graves v. Town of
Waltsfleld. 09 Att. 187, 140, 81 Vt 84.
Since in this state the liability of a mu-
nicipal corporation for Injuries caused by de-
fects in street and sidewalks is absolute, an
instruction that this was a latent defect, for
which the defendant was responsible by rea-
son of its neglect in not repairing the side-
walk, the word ''neglect" could not have been
used in its ordinary legal sense, and must be
deemed to have been used to signify mere
failure to repair, although it did not appear
that the corporation had had any knowledge
of the defect Campbell v. City of Elklns.
52 S. B. 220, 222, 58 W. Va. 308, 2 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 159.
R. L. 1905, § 3696, in limiting the time
within which the priorities of right of ad-
ministration thereby conferred must be as^
serted, uses the word "neglect" synonymously
with "fall." In re Lis' Estate (Minn.) 139 N.
W. 300. 307.
The words "fail," "refuse," and "neg-
lect." as used in St 1903, i§ 795, 797, pro-
viding that any railroad company which
"shall fail, refuse and neglect to comply with
the provisions" of the act shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor, are used interchangeably,
and mean sometbing mora than in xmBrt
able and accidental violation of the stati
Chesapeake ft O. B. Oo. v. Commoawealtb,
S. W. 5e6» 568, 119 Ky. 519.
Hie purpose of Rem. ft BaL Code, f 8(
providing that if any railroad company at
"refuse or neglect" to obey any order of
Railroad Commission, the company shall
subject to a penalty. Is to impose a pens
for neglect or refusal, and where a compi
falls to perform an act reqidred by an on
within the time spediled tfaereiii. It is 1
material whether the failure resulted fr
willful refusal or neglect, or from mere n
.management; the word ''neglect" mean
omission, or forbearance to do a thing ti
can be done, or that is required to be do
and it does not generally imply carelessn
or imprudence, but simply an omission
perform. State ex reL Railroad Commissi
of Washington v. Great Northern Ry. (
123 Pac. 8, 12, 68 Wash. 257.
As used in Gen. 8t 1902, f 2499, authoi
ing an action by a wife against her husba
for support when he neglects to support b
"neglect" means more than a mere omlssj
or failure without fault It imports ozc
sion accompanied by some kind of culpabll
in the conduct of the husband; the design
the statute being to oompd the unwilU)
and not to constrain those who have act
fairly and reasonably in the performance
the duty. Lathrop v. Lathrop, 63 AtL 5
515, 78 Conn. 650.
"Neglect," within Rev. St 1889, I 22
declaring that every able-bodied married m
who shall "neglect" or "refuse" to supix
his family shall be deemed a "vagrant," ai
ea from an inattentive state of mind, wi
of care for, and utter disregard of the oblii
tion resting on tlie husband to sui^wrt i
f^moily, whereas the word "refuse" impoi
a willful disavowal or disregard of so
obligation; and hence where a physician
good habits aideavored to establish a pn
tice, maintained an office where he wait
for patients, and attoided to such caUs
he had, contributing hia entire income fn
his practice to the support of his wife a
hims^, he was not a "vagrant," so as to €
title his wife to a divorce under section 291
declaring that when the husband shall
guilty of such conduct as to constitute him
"vagrant," within the meaning of the li
respecting "vagrants." the wife may be <
vorced, though he did not succeed in eami
enough to support both of them, and a
was compelled to contribute to their suppc
from her separate means. Gallemore v. Gi
lemore, 91 S. W. 406, 410, 115 Mo. App. 11
Of oAeial d«ty
Under Rev. St 1896, art 790, providb
that no county shall be sued unless the dal
on which sudi suit is founded shall ha
first been presented to the county oommi
sioners' court fbr aUowanoeb and such con
':■■•!
majJBxrc
BSa
KEGIatiWiaX CHILD
than taATe neglected or refused to tndtt tbe
(aiiie» "n^lect*^ la snffleieiitljr shown by etrl-
tence that the court has. been glTOi a lea-
lonable time within which to act, and has
Uled to allow the daioL Williams t. Bowie
^nnty (Tex.) 128 S. W. 199. 200.
Under a statute providing that, if any
XMnmissioner or other county officer shall
'neglect" to perform any act which it is his
luty to perform, he shall forfdt his offlee and
»e removed, the dnty mnst be personal, and
lie act must be one which the officer has tbe
egal capacity and authority to perform, or
le cannot be guilty of neglect The purpose
>f the statute is to prevent persons from
continuing to hold office whose inattention
x> duty endangers the public welfare, and
±e 'Neglect" oontamiriated must disclose d-
^er willfulness or indifference to duty so
persistent or in affairs of such importance
^at the safely of public interests is threat-
sned. Irregularities in the publication of
statements of sums of money allowed and
in advertisements for bids for bridge repair
v7ork, failure to publish estimates of ezpen-
litures upon which tax levies were made,
and failure to advertise for bids for the re-
pair of a bridge do not constitute legal causes
For the removal of a county commissioner
From office on the ground of neglect of duty.
State ▼. Kennedy, 106 Pac 8S7, 841, 82 Kaa
373.
A sheriff, who, notwithstanding public
feeUng against a negro charged with murder,
failed to order the Jail doors closed, or to take
any precaution to prevent a lynching, being
under Ck>de 1907, H 132, 7191, the legal cus-
todian of the Jail chargeable with the duty
of excluding intruders, was subject to im-
peachment under Const 1901, f 138, provid-
ing that, when any prisoner is taken from
Jail and killed owing to the neglect of the
sheriff, the sheriff may be impeached, for
••neglect** as applied to a public officer, means
a failure on his part to perform some of the
duties of his office; State! eX rel. Oarber v.
Cazalas, 60 South. 296, 102 Ala. 210, 19 Ann.
Gas. 886 (quoting 5 Words and Phrases, p.
4740).
Omlssioa distliiciilshed
Code Civ. Proc. § 1511, provides that,
**if an executor • ♦ ♦ neglects for two
months after his appointment to give notice
to creditors as prescribed, * • ^ the court
must revoke his letters" and appoint anoth-
er executor. Pen. Code, f 7, subd. 2, pro-
vides that the term "neglect" imports a want
of such attention to the nature or probable
consequences of the act or omission as a pru-
dent man ordinarily uses In acting in his
own concerns. Held that construing section
1511 in view of the policy of the law to ef-
fectuate testator's expressed will as tatr as
possible, it gave the court a wide diacsetlon
In removing executors thereunder, and an ex-
ecutor should not be removed if the failure
to publish the notice within the required
time is kitlsfactorlly ecneused; the terms ''to
neglect" and "to omitf not behig synonymouSr
since' to neglect lb to omit by carelessness «r
design; While an omission may be ivroluntary
and inevitable. In fe ChadiMttnie's Sstate,
114 Pac. 1012, 1018, 15 Oal. Appi 863.
As surprise
See Surprise.
NBGXiEOT AHB BiaPITSAXi
See, also, Befuse — RefusaL
Plaintiff contracted to procure consign-
ment to defendant of some of the product of
silk mills, and defendant argeed to pay com-
missions on the sale of the product consign-
ed. The contract was to continue for a year,
and thereafter from year to year until ter-
minated by notice, and It provided that on
"neglect and refusal" of plaintiff to perform
his agreement, and at the expiration of the
agreement, defendant might sell the goods on
hand. The company owning the mills refus-
ed to consign any product to defendant so
long as plaintiff was retained as sales agent,
and defendant was so notified. Held, that
plaintiff, on being unable to continue to con-
sign goods, was guilty of a breach of con-
tract, the inability to continue not being
"neglect and refusal," and defendant was
Justified in canceling the contract for the
future, and might enter Into a contract with
the company fdr the consignment of future
goods. Napier ▼. Splelmann, 111 N. Y. Supp.
1009, 1016, 127 App. DlT. 711.
HEGXiEGT TO TAKE OATH
Under Const art 1, 1 7, which provides
that an officer who refuses or neglects to
take the oath or affirmation of office shall be
deemed to have refused the offiice, and a new
selection shall be made, and under Code
1912, art 20, | 1, which requires constables
to so qualify within 30 days after their ap-
polntmentf neglect of a constable to take the
oath, etc., within that time, deprives him of
the office; the term "neglect to take the
oath," as used In the Constitution, meaning
neglect of an appointee to take the oath
within tbe time required by law. Little v.
Schul, 84 Atl. 649, 653, 118 Md. 454.
HEOXtEOTIiD CHILD
The words "neglected children,** as used
in Act No. 82, p. 134, of 1906, entitled "An
act defining the power of the district courts
of this state and the dty courts, with refer-
ence to the care, treatment and control of
dependent neglected, incorrigible, and de-
linquent children, under the age of 16 years,"
mean any children who are destitute, home-
less, abandoned, or depending on the public
for sm^port or who have not proper care or
guardianship. In re Parker, 43 South. 54,
55, 118 La. 471.
Laws 1907, c. 41, f 1 (Bums' Ann. St
1908, I 1642), defines a "dependent <±lld" as
one under the age stated who is dependent
NBGUGBNCB
554
NBQUQBNCB
upon tbe public for sopport, or who is deiti*
tute, homeless, or abandoned, and section 2,
Boms' Ann. St 1906, f 1643, defines a "neg-
lected child" as one who has not proper
parental caie or gnardianship. Held, that
children were neither "dependent" nor ''neg-
lected," so as to charge their father for con-
tributing to their neglect under the statute^
where their mother, after unsuccessfnlly at-
tempting to procure a divorce, had taken
them to her sister's and refused to bring
them to the home which the father offered to
furnish on condition that she return to it
Wheeler v. State (Ind.) 100 N. B. 25, 20.
NEGLIGENCE
See Actionable Negligence ; Oomparatiye
Negligence; Concurrent Negligence;
Confession of Negligence ; Constructiye
Neg^gence; Contributory Negligence;
Criminal Negligence; Culpable Negli-
gence; Discovered Negligence; Gross
Negligence; Hazardous Negligence;
Imputed Negligence; Intentional Neg-
ligence; Legal Negligence; Notice of
Negligence; Ordinary Negligence;
Proximate Contributory Negligence;
Slight Negligence; Wanton Negligence;
Willful Negligence.
Negligence or otherwise, see Otherwise
"Negligence" has been variously defined
by the courts of this state ; but, after all, the
different definitions mean substantially one
and the same thing. It has been termed the
want of ordinary care ; that is, the want of
such care as a reasonably prudent and care-
ful man would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances. It has been termed the failure
to observe, for the protection of the interests
of another, that degree of care, prudence,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. Lenkewicz v. Wilmington City E.
Co. (Del.) 74 Aa 11, 13, 7 Pennewill, 64.
"Negligence" is a failure to observe, for
the protection of another, that degree of care
which the circumstances justly demand.
Warren v. Harlan & HolUngsworth Corp.
(Del.) 84 Ati. 215, 219; Gatta v. Philadel-
phia, B. & W. R. Co. (Del.) 88 AtL 788, 2
Boyce, 551; Temple v. Gilbert, 85 Atl. 880,
882, 86 Conn. 335 ; Florida R. Co. v. Sturkey,
48 South. 34, 85, 56 Fla. 106.
" 'Negligence* is thus defined by the text-
writers: 'Negligence,' in its civil relations, is
such an inadvertent imperfection by a re-
sponsible human agent in the discharge of a
legal duty as immediately produces, in an or-
dinary and natural sequence, a damage to
another. The inadvertency or want of due
consideration of duty fe the injuria, on
which, when naturally followed by the dam-
num, the suit is based. 'Negligence,' consti-
tuting a cause of civil action, is such an
omissiop by a responsible person to use that
degree of care, diligence, and skin which
was his legal duty to use for the protectic
of another person from injury, as in a na
ural and continuous sequence, causes unii
tended damage to the latter. 1 Thompson o
Negligence (1st Ed.) p. 185, approved tt
following definition of 'negligence' by WlUe
J., in Vaughan v. Railroad, 5 HurL ft I
Exch. 678, hi which it is said: 'Now, the de
inition of negligence is the absence of cai
according to drcumstanoes.' In McMaho
V. Pacific Express Co., 84 S. W. 478, 182 M(
641, our Supreme Court said: 'Negligenc
consists in doing something which a reasoi
ably prudent man would not have done ui
der the circumstances, or in fftiling to d
something which a reasonably i»n4ent mai
under the circumstances, would have done.'
Holden v. Missouri R. Ck>., 84 S. W. 183, 13<
108 Mo. App. 665 (citing Wharton, Neg. § 3
1 Shearman ft Redfield, N6g. I 8).
The component parts of "negligence** ar
(1) a legal duty to exercise due care ; (2)
breach of that duty ; (8) the absence of di^
tinct intention to produce the precise dan
age, if any, whidi actually follows. Rid
mond V. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 113 S. ^
708. 710, 188 Mo. App. 463 (citing Bindbeuta
V. Street Ry. Co., 48 Mo. App. 468).
The law of "negligence," which mean
the law of actionable negligence, as applie
in most jurisdictions, embraces the doctrin
of the assumption of risks on the part of ai
employ^ and the doctrine of contrihutor;
negligence; also the doctrine announced ii
Billings V. Breinig, 7 N. W. 722, 46 Mich. 6B
71, that although disobedience of a statut
may be conclusive evidence of negligence, i
condition of recovery by one urging dlsobedi
ence is that such disobedience must be th<
proximate cause of the injury complained oi
or that it contributed to the Injury. Synefl
zewski V. Schmidt, 116 N. W. 1107, 1108, 15
Mich. 488.
''Negligence" in its essence is alwayi
concrete. Hence its proof must always res
upon testimony that tends to the establisb
ment of concrete acts either of omission oi
of commission. There is no such thing ai
negligence at large. Wydsoff v. Birch, T
Ati. 248, 246, 76 N. J. Law, 646 (citing Bi«
V. Unger, 46 AU. 503, 64 N. J. Law, 596).
"If a property* owner exercises his righ
to connect his premises by a private draii
with a public sewer, he not knowing of i
defect therein which, by reason of such cod
nection, will produce injury to such property
and such injury is caused before he knowi
of the danger, or, knowing thereof, has rea
sonable time to guard against the^ same, hi
instrumentality in the matter will not pre
dude him from recovering compensation foi
the injury, if it is referable to 'negligence
on the part of the city. 'Negligence' in sud
an action may consist of a failure to adopt i
plan for the sewer, failure to ezerdse ordi
NXGUGBNOS
665
NEOLIOEKOB
mrj eaie in coastractliiff the sunet or fall-
ire to act with reasonable promptneas to
"emedy defects in the plan, causing direct in*
Inries to abutting property after notice of
nch defects." Hart ▼. City of NeUIsriUe,
L04 N. W. era, 706, 126 Wis. 640, 1 K R. A.
[N. S.) 952, 4 Ann. Cas. 1066.
In an action for injuries to a passenger
illeged to have been occasioned by a lurch
>f the train as he alighted, an instruction to
9nd for plaintiff, if, inter alia, defendant
"negligently or carelessly gave the [train] a
mdden or violent Jerk," defines •'negligence"
in language not susceptible of criticism by
defendant, not requesting a d^lnition of such
term. Louisville St N. B. Oo. ▼. Deason (Ky.)
96 S. W. 1116, 1118.
"Negligence^ of a railroad company,
whereby fire is communicated to adjacent
premises, may consist in not being provided
with the best appliances to prevent the un-
necessary escape of fire frojn its locomotives.
In not keeping such api^ances in repair, in
not keeping Its right of way free from com-
bustible material, in operating its looomo-
tives BO as to unnecessarily scatter fire, and
in not arresting the spread of fire after it
has been set by its engines from its negli-
gence on its light of way. liouisville ft N.
R. Go. y. Fort, 80 8. W. 429, 434, 112 T^nn.
432 (citing Thomp. Neg.).
As aet of ocMnuBlssloB or onlssim
"Negligence" may consist in the omission
to act as well as in acting. Lewy Art Co. v.
Agricola, 63 South. 146, 160, 169 Ala. 60.
"Negligence" impliss some act of omis-
sion or commission wrongful In itself. Whit*
worth V. Shreveport Belt R. Co., 36 South.
414, 420, 112 La. 863, 66 U R. A. 129 (citing
Bckert v. Long Island R. Ck)., 48 N. Y. 603,
3 Am. Rep. 721).
"Negligence" is doing what the ordinary
man is not accustomed to do, not what he is
in the habit of doing. Goodale v. York, 69
Aa 526, 626, 74 N. H. 464.
"Negligence" may be active or passive,
consisting in heedlessly doing an improper
thing or in heedlessly refraining from doing
ttie proper thing. Easier v. Sacramento Qas.
& Electric Co., Ill Pac. 630, 632, 168 Oal. 614,
Ann. C^s. 1912A, 642.
"Negligence" is the failure to do some-
thing which in the exercise of ordinary care
ought to have been done, or the doing of
something which in the exercise of ordinary
care ought not to have been done. Lewis v.
Holier & Smith, Ina, 186 Fed. 403, 406.
"Negligence^ consists in the doing or
omitting to do some act which a person in
the exercise of ordinary care and prudence
wonld not do or omit to do, and which act,
if done or omitted by him, contributed and
helped to produce the Injuxy complained of.
EyansviUe lb T. H. R. Co. ▼. Mills, 77 N. B.
606--612, 87 Ind. App. 698.
''Negligence^ is the ftOlure to do what
a prudent person would ordinarily have done
under the circumstances of the situation, or
doing what such person under the circum-
stances would not have done. The duty la
indicated and measured by the exigencies of
the occasion. International ft G. N. R. Oa
V. Trump, 94 S. W. 908, 906, 42 Tex. Oir.
App. 686 (quoting and adopting the definition
in Houston & T. a R. Oo. v. Milam [Tex.]
68 e. W. 736).
Even an expert may be gpHty of ••negli-
gence" in doing what, at the time, his Judg-
ment approves. Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v.
Aitken, 26 Sup. Ot 817, 818, 196 U. S. 689,
49 L. Ed. 610.
••Negligence" by a physician consists In
doing something which he should not have
done in the treatment of a case, or in omit-
ting to do something he should have done.
McGraw v. Kerr, 128 Paa 870, 873, 23 Colo.
App. 163.
Brnmm Oawtiaws m^ prmdemi persom
••Negligence^" in actions for pefsonal in-
jury, means the doing of some act which a
cautious and prudent man would not do, or
neglecting to do some act whidi a cautious
and prudent man would not neglect Pro-
dent men often depart from common usage In
the performance of duty without overstep-
ping the boundaries of reasonable care. If
they did not, there would be little, if any,
progress made in any craft The law does
not call a man careless because he refuses to
place himself in bondage to custom. The ad-
vancement of art science, trade, or handi-
craft requires that human effort be given a
wider field of operation than that already
occupied. Therefore a given act is denomi-
nated as negligent not that it is violative of
custom, but because it Is a thing no prudent
man would do. Brunke v. Missouri ft K. Tel-
ephone Co., 90 S. W. 768, 764, 116 Mo. App.
36.
Same— Ordinarily earefnl person
"Negligence" is a failure to do that
which a man of ordinary care would do un-
der the same or similar circumstances, or do-
ing that which such a man would not do un-
der such circumstances. Missouri, K. ft T.
Ry. Co. of Texas ▼. Parrott 92 S. W. 796,
100 Tex. 9; Houston ft T. C. R. Co. v. Beard,
93 S. W. 632, 42 Tex. CIt. App. 427.
•—Person of Itishost decree 9>i eavo
and pmdonoo
Where, In an action for injuxles to a paa-
senger, the court in one paragraph of its
charge, defined nei^gence as foUowa: •*Tha
word or term 'negligence/ as applied to a per-
son or corporation engaged in the transpor-
tation of passengers for hire, is the failure
to do anything which a person of the high-
est^degrea of care aud pmdence engaged in
KSGLIOEKOn
656
NEGUQDNOS
the same kind of employment woald bave
done or performed under similar drcum-
stanoes, or tlie doing of anything which a
person possessed with the highest degree of
care and prudence engaged in the same kind
of business would ha?e refrained from doing
under like or similar circumstances" — and
a paragraph immediately preceding stated
that *the term 'a very high degree of care*
means that degree of care which a person
possessed of the highest degree of care and
prudence engaged in the same kind of em-
ployment, would exercise under like circum-
stances," it was held that, when the defini-
tion of the term "yery high degree of care"
was read into the paragraph defining negli-
gence, it was in perfect harmony with the
principle announced by the Supreme Court
in International ft G. N. Ry. Co. v. Welch,
24 S. W. 390, 86 Tex. 204, 40 Am. St Rep.
829. Central Texas & N. W. R. Co. t. Smith
(Tex.) 73 S. W. 637. 638.
-Person of ordinary care, pru-
denbe» and oantion
In an instruction that "negligence^' is a
failure to do thai wnich a person of ordinary
care, prudence, and caution would do under
like or similar circumstances, or the doing
of that which a person of like prudence and
caution would not do under the same circum-
stances, tile words "like prudence" meant ''or-
dinary prudence." St Louis Southwestern R.
Co. V. Dixon (Tex.) 91 S. W. 626, 627.
Same— Person of ordinary pmdenoe
and care
An instruction that "negligence" con-
sists in doing something which a person of
ordinary prudence and care would not have
done or would not have omitted to do under
the same or similar circumstances is not as
clear as it might be, but is not reversible er-
ror. Dubois V. Luthmer, 126 N. W. 147, 149,
147 Iowa, 315.
Same— Person of ordinary pmdenoe
and intellieence
While the ordinary test of "negligence"
is whether a man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence would have done or omitted
the act in question under the circumstances,
yet there are circumstances under which the
law does not permit an act or its omission to
be excused because some persons would have
been willing to undertake it, for the hazard
may be apparent and serious. Stone v. Un-
ion Paa R, Co., 100 Pac. 362, 35 Utah, 305.
It is not strictly accurate, but not revers-
ible ertor, to instruct that "negligence'' is
the failure to do that which a person of ordi-
nary prudence and intelligence would do un-
der the same or similar circomstances, or the
doing of that which a person of ordinary
prudence and intelligence would not do un-
der the' same or similar drcnmstances.
Houston S^ T. C. R. Co. v. Qray, 86 S. W. 838,
839, 38 Tex. (Div. App. 2^ (citing Houston &
T. a Ry» Co. T. BrowB, 65 & W. 44, 37 Tex.
Civ. App. 095; Houston ft T. C Ry. Go.
Kothnuum, 84 S. W. 1089, 87 Tex. Qiv. M
546).
Same Ordinarily pmdent pereom
"NegUgenpe" is the failure to exerci
such care as ordinarily prudent persons e
ercise under lilie or similar circumstance
Kentuclcy & I. Bridge ft R. Co. v. Shrad<
(Ky.) 80 S. W. 1094, 1095.
"Nes^ence" is the failure to do whi
an ordinarily prudent person would do und«
the circumstances. Brown v. Oregon-WaaJ
ington R. & Nav. Co., 128 Pac 38, 41, 63 0
396.
"Negligence^ Is the doing of aomethii
which one of ordinary prudence would m
have done, or the omissiMi ot aomethii
which such person would have done, und(
like circumstances. Houston ft T. C R. C
v. Alexander, 132 S. W. U9. 120, 103 Tex. 59
One is not gi^llty of "negligence^* by rei
son of an act or omission which would d<
lead an ordinarily prudent man, giving tJt
matter thought, to apprehend danger from i
Cowett V. American Woolen Oo^ 60 AtL 7a
704, 100 Me. 65.
What a person of ordinary prudeiK
would or would not do under the particuhi
circumstances is the true test of "negligence
Houston ft T. C. R. Co. v. Everett (Tex.) S
S.W. 17,18.
The test of "negligence" is what a perso
of ordinary prudence would or would not d(
and not what ordinarily intelligent and pn
dent men would or would not do. Houston <
T. C. R. Co. V. Brown, 85 & W. 44, 45, 37 Te:!
Civ. App. 505.
An instruction that "negligence" is tb
doing of an act which an ordinarily pruden
person would not do in like circumstances 1
erroneous, as ignoring the fact that negli
genoe may consist in careless omission to ad
Stolces V. Sac City, 130 N. W. 786, 788, 15
Iowa, 10.
Assuming the existence of a duty, an<
where only ordinary care is required, '*nei;
ligence" is properly defined as the failure u
do what an ordinarily prudent person wouh
have done under' the circumstances, or tin
doing of that which an ordinarily prodeni
person would not bave done. Alabama City
G. & A. Ry. Co. V. Bullard, 47 South. 57S
580, 157 Ala. 618 (citing 5 Words and Phras
es, p. 4744).
"Negligence" is not a mere technioai
term, but means "a lack of due diligence o\
care; omission of duty; heedlessness," an(]
in a legal sense is no more nor less than ttw
failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree ol
oare, precaution, and vigilance which the cir-
cumstances justly demand, whereby such oth-
er person suffers injury ; and as applied to
an act done iA 4ischarge of a duty imposed^
MEOLIGENOB
5ST
NEOIilGBNOB
is a ftdlure to do what aa ordlaailly pro-
snt person would hare done nnder the dr-
imstances of the sitaation, of a doing of
mt which snch a person, nnder the existing
>Ddition8 would not have done. St Louis ft
. F. R. Co. T. Franklin (Tex.) 128 S. W.
L50. 1165.
An Instruction that '^egHgsnce,'* as used
i the charge, meant the faihirs to do that
hich a person of ordinary prudence would
are done under the same or similar drcum-
Ances, or the doUig of that whidi such a
erson would not have done nnder such elr^
amstancee, that ''ordinary care," as used in
le charge, meant that degree of oaie which
person of ordinary prudence would ex«r«
ise under the same or similar drcumstanees,
roperly stated the ju^'s duty to look to the
Bicts and circumstances as they existed at
lie time the act was done as the standard by
rhich the act was to be Judged. Houston &
\ G. R. Co. ▼. Johnson, 127 & W. &38, Ml,
03 Tex. 320.
The question of "negligienee'' is deter-
[ilnable by what an ordinarily prudent per-
on would have done under the same or siml-
iT drcumstancea If a person of ordinary
rudence, standing in the place of an engineer,
rould have k^pt a lookout and discovered the
kuming bridge in time to have stopped the
ngine or slackened its speed, so that plain-
er, the fireman, could have alighted with
easonable safety before reaching the bridge,
he failure of the engineer to do what such
person of ordinary prudence would have done
vould constitute negligence. Missouri, K. ft
r. R. Co. V. Keaveney (Tex.) 80 S. W. 387,
8Kst»— KaasomaUe and prmdeAt
"Negligence** is the failure to do what a
reasonable and prudent person would ordi-
larily have done under the circumstances of
\he situation, or doing what such a person,
mder the existing circumstances would not
tiave done. Gelselman v. Schmidt, 68 AtL
202, 204, 106 Md. 680; Blrsch v. Citizens'
EHectric Co., 83 Pac. 940, 942, 36 Mont 574.
[quoting and adopting definition in Baltimore
fe P. R. a>. V. Jones, 95 U. S. 439, 24 L. Ed.
506) ; Flaherty v. Butte Electric By. Co., 107
Pac. 416, 418, 40 Mont. 454, 135 Am. St Rep.
B30; Thompson v. Chicago, M. & St P. By.
Co., 180 Fed; 728, 725, 111 C. C. A. 261 ; In-
ternational ft G. N. B. Co. V. Trump, 94 8. W.
903, 906, 42 Tex. Oiv. Ai^. 536 (quoting and
adopting the definition in McDonald v. inter-
national & G. N. B. Co., 22 S. W. 389, 86 Tex.
1, 40 Am. St Rep. 803) ; Western Unk>n Tele-
graph Co. y. Catlett, 177 Fed. 71, 76, 100 O.
G. A.489.
"Negligence" is a failure to do^ what rea-
sonable and prudent persons would ordinarily
have done under the circumstainces and situa-
tions. L. W. Pomerene Co. v. White, 97 N.
W. 232, 283, 70 Neb. iTl (citing Omaha St
Ry. Co. V. Craig, 58 X W. 209,- 39 Neb. 691);
'Negligence'* Is the failure to do what a
reasonable and prudent penon would ortt*
narily have done under the cfieumstanoss of
the situation, or doing what such a person,
under the existing circumstances, would not
have done. The duty is dictated and meas-
ured by the exigencies of the occasion.
Klenk v. Oregon Short line R. Co., 76 Pac.
214, 215, 27 Utah, 428 ; Mason ft Perkins v.
Post, 54 & B. 311, 818» 105 Va« 494, U I«» R.
A. (N. &> 1088 (quoting and adopting the defi-
nition in Baltimore ft P. &. Ca v. Jones, 95
U. S. 489, 24 L. Ed. 606).
" 'Negligence* has been defined to be the
omission to do something which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations whi<^
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human af-
fairs, would do, or doing something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do.
It must be determined in all cases by refer-
ence to the situation and knowledge of the
parties and all the attendant circumstances.
What would be extreme care under one con-
dition of knowledge and one state of drcnm-
stances would be groos negligence with differ*
ent knowledge and in changed circumstances.
Hie law is reasonable in its Judgments in
this respect It does not charge culpable neg-
ligence upon any one. who takes the usual
precautioBS against aoddeBt which careful
and prudent men are aecustomed to take un-
der similar drcumstanoes." Globe Naviga-
tion Co. ▼. Maryland Casualty Go., 81 Pac
826, 829, 39 Wash. 299 (quoting the Nitro-
glycerine Case, 15 WalL 524, 21 L. Bd. 206).
"NegUgence** is the failure to do what a
reasonable and prudent person would ordi-
narily have done under the circumstances of
the situation, or doing what sudi a person
under the existing circumstances would not
have done. The essence of the fault may lie
in omission or commission. Washington
Mills V. Cox, 157 Fed. 634, 640, 85 a 0. A.
154 (quoting and adopting definition in Balti-
more ft P. B. Co. V. Jones, 95 U, 8* 489, 24
L. &d« 506).
''Negligence^' is the omission to do some-
thing which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations which ordinarily regu-
late the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or doing something which a prudent and rea-
sonable man would not do. Bodgers v. Mis-
souri Pac. Ry. C^., 88 Pac. 885, 75 Kan. 222,
10 L. B. A. (N. S.) 658, 121 Am. St Rep. 416,
12 Ann. Caa.. 441.
** 'Negligence' is the omission to do some-
thing which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regu-
late the cdudnct of human affairs, would do,
or doing something which a priident and rea-
sonable man would net do» It must be de-
termined in all cases by reference to the
situation and knowledge of the pavtfes ahd
all the atlendsht drcumstaaces." Southern
Ry. Co. V. Ohatman, 53 S^ B. 683, 607, 124 Gai
1026, 6 L. R. A. <N. 8i>^2»)4^ABn. Oas. 6«k -
NBOUGBNOB
068
NEOUGBNOB
"NegUgenofr" is 'tlie omission to do some-
tbing which a reasooahle man, guided by
those oonsideratlons which ordinarily regu-
late the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or the doing of something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do." ▲ rea-
sonable man can be guided only by a reason-
able estimate of probabilities. Southern R.
Co. V. Carter, 51 South. 147-148. 164 Ala. 103.
'" 'Negligence' is the "omission to do some-
thing which a reasonable man, guided upon
those considerations which ordinarily regu-
late the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or doing something which a prudent and rea-
sonable man would not do, proTided, (tf
course, that the party whose conduct is in
question is already in a situation that brings
him under the duty of taking care." North-
em P. R. Co. 7. Adams, 24 Sup. Ct 408, 409,
102 U. S. 440, 48 L. S3d. 613 (quoting PoUock,
Torts» p. 855).
Bout. Law Diet defines ''negligence" to
be the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by the considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of hu-
man affairs, would do, or the doing of some-
thing which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. Proof that a telegraph com-
pany failed to transmit a message correctiy
is prima fade evidence of its negligence.
Strong ▼. Weston Union TeL Co., 100 Pac.
910, 916, 18 Idaho, 889, 80 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
409, Ann. Ca& 1912A, 55 (citing 4 Words and
Phrases, p. 8168).
An instruction defining "negligence" as
the omission to do something which a rea-
sonable man, guided by those ordinary con-
siderations which ordinarily regulate human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something
which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do, is substantially correct. Perryman v.
Chicago City R. Co., 89 N. E. 980, 988, 242 lU.
e— BeaaoiiAliley earefnly mnd pru-
dent maa
"Negligence" is the want of ordinary
care, tIz., such care as a reasonably prudent
and careful person would exercise under sim-
ilar circumstances. It is never presumed
but must be proved ; and the burden of prov-
ing it rests on the party alleging it It may
arise from overt acts, or from the failure to
perform a duty. Bowen v. Baltimore & P.
Steamboat Co. (Del.) 84 Ati. 1022, 1025.
"Negligence" is the failure to do what a
reasonable and prudent person would ordi-
narily have done under the circumstances,
or doing what such a person would not have
done. CJhicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Watson,
127 Pac. 693, 094, 36 Okl. 1.
"Negligence" may be defined tn a general
way as the doing of a thing which the dic-
tates of common prudence or foresight would
indicate ought not to be done, or which a
reasonably careful and prudent man would
not luive done^ having in mind the att^iding
conditions and drcumstanoes of the oecaslo
or the omission to do a thing which the san
prudence and foresight would say ought
be done, considering again the attending co
ditions and drcumstancea San Franciaco
P. S. S. Co. V. Carlson, 161 Fed. 851, 852, 1
C. 0. A. 46.
"Negligence" is the doing of somethii
which under the drcumstancea a ressoo&t]
person would not do, or the omission to (
something, in the discharge of a legal dat
which under the circumstances a reasosab
person would do, and which act of commi
sion or omiasion, as a natural conseqaeo
directly following, produces damages to t
other. Williams v. Belmont Coal & Ck>ke O
46 S. £. 802, 804, 55 W. Va. 84 (quotii
Washington v. Baltimore & O. B. Co., 17 ^
Va. 190).
lame Beaseaialily pmdMit persom
"Negligence" lis the omitting to do aom
thing that a reasonably prudent person wool
do, or the doing of something tiiat such pe
son would not do. Illinois Cent. R. O).
O'Neill, 177 Fed. 828, 388, 100 C. a A. 65&
" 'Negligence' is the omission to do wbi
a reasonably prudent person would ordiiuir
ly have done under the drcnmstances of U
situation, or doing what such a person node
the existing circumstances would not ha^
done. The duty thus imposed is dictated u
measured by the particular exigencies of tt
occasion, and the essence of the fault is e
ther in omission or commission; negUgew
being either active or passive. Negligence i
also defined as the juridical cause of the 1j
Jury, and therefore actionable or followed b
liability to another when it consists of sue
an act or omission on the part of a respoi
sible person as In ordinary sequence immed
ately results in such injury ; but it should t
added that the party complained of most b
the exercise of ordinary care have been abl
to foresee that harm or injury would resalt
Fuller V. Atlantic Ck>ast Line R. Co., 53 S
E. 297, 298, 140 N. C. 480 (citing Baltimore i
P. R. Co. V. Jones, 95 U. S. 439, 24 L. B
506 ; Carter v. Cape Fear Lumber Co^ 3
S. E. 828, 129 N. C. 203 ; Basnlght v. AUanti
& N. C. R. Co.. 16 S. B. 323, 111 N. C 592
Wharton's Neg. § 73).
eaaonably pnd«»t mad «aref>
"NegUgence" is the failure to obeem
for the protection of the interests of anotbei
that degree of care, prudence, and vigiltoc
which the drcumstanoes justly demaix
whereby such other person suffers injury. I
is the want of such care as a reasonably pn
dent and careful person would exercise m
der similar circumstances. Gatta v. Pbil'
delphla. B. & W. R. Co. (Del.) 83 Aa 788, W
2 Boyce, 551.
"Negligence" is the omission to do «>m<
thing which a reasonably prudent and can
raDQUOBNOB
669
NEGLIOBMOS
a person wonld^ or tbm doing something
hich such a person would not, do under like
fcumBtances. Arlunsas & Louisiana By.
o. y. Sanders, 99 8. W. 1109, UIO, 81 Ark.
M (adopting definition in 1 ThonoMon, Neg.
I 1, 2; citing Hot Springs B. Ga ▼. New-
lan, 36 Ark. 007).
Aa the teeaeh ev mmUaimt ef • legal
dmty
"Negligence" eonsists in doing or permit-
Ing an act by which a legal duty or oblige-
ion has been violated. Glaser ▼. Rothschild,
D S. W. 332, 884, 106 Mo. App. 418 (citing
iweeny v. Old (}olony & N. B. Co., 92 Mass.
LO Allen] 872, 87 Am. Dec. 644).
** 'Negligence,' to be actiMmble, must oc-
ur in breach of a legal duty arising out of
ontract or otherwise, owing to the person
ustaining the loss.'' Blinneapolis General
Slectric (}o. ▼. Gronon, 166 Fed. 651, 662, 92
X G. A. 846, 20 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 816 (quoting
ind adopting definition in CHeTeland, C., G. ft
)t L. R. Co. ▼. Ballratine, 84 Fed. 935, 28 a
1 A. 572; citing National Sav. Bank t.
nrard, 100 U. S. 195, 25 U Ed. 621; Kahl
T. Lore, 37 N. J. Iaw, 5).
A necessary element of actionable negli-
gence is the existence of a duty on the part
)f defendant to protect plaintiff from the in-
|ary complained ot "Negligence'* is the
breach or omission of a legal duty; it in-
[^ludes two subordinate ideaa— duty and the
performance of that duty. Todd t. Padflc
Ry. & Nay. Go., 117 Pac 300, 59 Or. 249 (cit-
ing 5 Words and Plirases, pp. 4748-4746).
'"Negligence* is a breach of legal duty.
It must be shown. It will not be presumed.
The burden of proof rests with the party as-
serting or charging 'negligence.' " Meyers ▼.
Ruddock Orleans Gypress (}o., 43 South. 44a
450, 118 La. 805 (quoting and adopting state-
ment tn Black, Law ft Prac. Ace. Gas.).
An essential ingredient to any concep-
tion of "negligence" is that it involTes the
violation of some legal duty which one per-
son owes another— a duty to take care for
the safety of the person or property of the
other. This duty may be assumed by con-
tract, or it may be imposed by Implication of
law. Phcentx Light ft Fuel Co. v. Bennett,
74 Pac 48, 50, 8 Aria. 314, 63 L. R. A. 219.
An essential ingredient of any concep-
tion of the law of "negligence" is that it in-
volTes the violation of a legal duty which
one person owes another, the duty to take
care for the safety or property of the other;
and the converse proposition is that, where
there is no legal duty to exercise care, there
can be no actionable negligence. Saylor v.
Parsons, 98 N. W. 500, 602, 122 Iowa, 679, 64
U R. A. 542, 101 Am. St Rep. 283 (quoting
Tbomp. Neg. § 3).
''Negligence^' is a shortage of legal duty
that causes injury. The fact that an act is
in violation of law doen not dispense with an
^ttiry aa to tiie ration which that act sua-
tains to tlie injury complained of, and if It
is not an efficient cause of injury there is no
liability. Where a train was obstructing a
highway czossing in violation of law, and
plaintiff, mistaking a signal for an invitation
to cross, attempted to cross between two cars
and was injured, the proximate cause of the
accident was not the obstruction, and the
railroad company was not liable, (^rbin v.
Grand Trunk R. Gd., 63 Aa 138, 139, 78 Vt
458.
^'Negligence^' whidi ia actionable is the
infringement of the legal right of another,
or in other words the violation of a duty im-
posed by law in respect to another. The
mere neglect of a railroad company to cut
down trees on its right of way in the vicinity
of a grade creasing ia not in itself such "neg-
ligence," in the absence of any statute re-
quiring it to keep its right of way free from
unnecessary obstruction to a view of the
tracks by persons using an adjacent highway,
although it ^ may be considered' with other
circumstances in determining whether the
company exercised care in the operation of
its cars at a particular time. Gowles v. New
York, N. BL ft H. R. Go., 66 Att. 1020, 1021,
80 Gonn. 48, 12 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1067, 10 Ann.
Gaa.48L
''Negligence*' is the breach or omission of
a legal duty. Defendant, an electric light
company, furnished its linemen with several
pike poles Gong poles having an iron ferule
and an iron pike in the end) of the character
and construction customarily used in bracing
electric light poles while removing the same.
One of these pike polee had become dull at
the point and unfit to be used with safety.
While plaintiff was on an electric light pole,
stripping the wires, one of his fellow serv-
ants picked up and used the blunt pike pole,
which did not fix the electric light pole so as
to properly hold the same, and it In conse-
quence fell, whereby plaintiff was injured.
Held, that defendant had properly fulfilled
its dutt of furnishing suitable tools and ap-
pliances, and the injury was in no way the
result of its negligence. Xowne v. United
Electric Gas ft Power Ck)., 81 Pac. 124, 125,
146 Gal. 766, 70 L. R. A. 214, 2 Ann. Gas. 906.
''Negligence" is the breach of legal duty.
It is immaterial whether the duty is one im-
posed by the rule of common law requiring
exercise of ordinary Care not to injure an-
other, or is imposed by statute designed for
the protection of others. The only differ-
ence is that in the one case the measure of
legal duty Is to be determined upon common-
law principles, while in the other the stat- .
ute fixes it, so that the violation of the stat-
ute constitutes conclusive evidence of negli-
gence, or, in other words, negligence per se.
The sale of kerosene in violation of Laws
1908, p. 108, i 2, requiring the names and
grades of distillates of petroleum to be mark-
ed on the receptacles in which they are sold,
and.making it a misdemeanor not to do so, ia
It ^^H
I ^B|
^saXJOBNGS
B60
NBOUOBNOB
**iiegUgeiK^' per aa P^t^rson r* Standard
OU Co., 106 Pac 937» 340, 65 Or. 611, Ann.
Oaa. 1912At 626 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in Osborne t. McMasters, 41 N. W.
643, 40 Minn. 103, 12 Am. St Rep. 096).
Oarele«n&ess dlsttnguiiilied
"Negligence" implies an omifision to do a
thing which a person ought to do, while
"carelessness" implies heedlessness or inatr
tention. Larkin t. Taylor, 6 Kan. 433, 446w
Oegreea of aedlseaoe. -
There are three degrees of "negligence^':
First, slight negligence iuTolvlng an absence
of that degree of care and yigilanoe which
persons of extraordinary prudence and fore-
sight are accustomed to use; second, ordi-
nary negligence, involTing failure to exercise
in any given situation such care as the great
mass of mankind ordinaiily exerdBe under
the same or similar circumstances; and,
third, gross negligence involying a failure to
exercise any care to avoid inflicting injury to
the person or property of others, recklessly
or wantonly acting or failing to act to avoid
such injury, evincing such utter disregard of
consequences as to suggest a willingness, sub*
stantially equivalent to intent,, to injure and
denominated such constructively, and dassa-
ble with actual intent as regards duty to
compensate for the injury. Astrin v. Chicago,
M. & St P. R. Co., 128 N. W. 265, 268, 143
Wis. 477, 31 L. E. A- (N. S.) 158.
A classification of "n^llgence" as
"slight," "ordinary," and "gross" has been
quite gttierally abandoned, and the more ra-
tional view adopted that any want of or-
dinary care constituted actlcmable negligence.
Sherwood v. Home Savings Bank, 109 N. W.
9, 12» 131 Iowa, 528.
In Iowa actionable '^negligence" does not
depend on its degree, and the differentiation
into gross, ordinary, and slight negligence
means little more than a matter of compara-
tive emphasis in the discussion of testimony.
Denny v. Chicago, R. I. ft P. Ry. Co., 130 N.
W. 368, 364, 150 Iowa, 460.
Under Ky. St 1903, { 6, giving a cause
of action for a death caused by another's
"negligence,*^ gross negligence need not be
sho#n. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry.'^Oo. v.
Evans* Adm'r, 110 S. W. 844, 848, 129'Ky. 152.
An instruction as to the division of "neg-
ligence" Into slight, ordinary, or gross can-
not be usefully applied In trials bjC cases;
their signification varying according; to, the
circumstances, until there are so many real
exceptions that the words can scarcely be
said to have any real application. Oregon
Co. V. Roe. 176 Fed. 715, 718, 100 0, a A.
269.
Degrees of negligence are not recognized ;
for, though the terms "wanton, willful, and
reckless" are sometimes used in characteriz-
!Bg conduct, yet ^the law applies only the
word "negligence,*' whi<di is a failure to per-
form a daty, and, though the law reoognfa
degrees in oare, very high care, and ordtau
care, the failure to exerdae the highest <
gree of care required is only negligen
though failure to exercise ordinary care
also negligenoa Young v. St Louis, L M.
S. Ry. Co., 127 8. W. 19, 26, 227 Ma 907.
As «»ttt ef dlllKeaaee
Negligence is not a tiling, but a relatfa
"The word "Bi^ligehce' impliea a duty to i
due diligence, and such a duty may be ow
to one person, and not to another." Best
& M. R. & V. Sargent, 67 AH. 688» 691, 72
H. 465 (quoting Mowbray v. Merryweathi
[1895] 2 Q. B. DiV. 640, 647).
"Negligence," relatively to the safety
any particular person, is the breach of soi
diligence due to that person. Where no dn
of diligence appeare relatively to the pen
injured, there can be no presumption of \
breadi. "Negligence** causing an injury dc
not give a right of action to the person i
jured, unless there is some diligence due
such pereon at the time with reference to t
particular conduct in question. Southern
Ca T. Cash, 62 S. E. 823, 826, 181 Oa. 637.
Am doimg "wkmt a pmdeat luut w»i
BO^ do
If one does what the great body of oQi
prudent men do, under a like situation, be
not "negligent" Tallman v. Nelson, 125
W. 1181, 1183, 141 Mo. App. 478.
As a f aot
"Negligence*! in one sense la a quail
attaching to acts dependent on and arisi
out of the duties and relations of the part
concerned, and is as much a fact to be fou
by the Jury as the alleged acts to- which
attaches by virtue of such duties and re
tions. Patton-Woraham Drug Co. v. Dreim
(Tex.) 123 S. W. 705, 708.
" 'Negligence,' in one sense, la a qotialJ
'attaching to acts dependent upon and arisi
out of the duties and relations of the parti
concerned, and is as much a fact to be fou
by the Jury as the alleged acts to which
attaches by virtue of such duties and re
tions. * * * It is not a conclusion tp
testified to by witnesses, but an inference
be deduced f rem the facts and circumstam
disclosed by the evidence.** Tiborsky v. C
cago, M. & St P. Ry. Co., 102 N. W. 549, 51
124 Wis. 243 (citing Townley v. Chicago,
& St P. Ry. Co., 11 N. W. 55, 63 Wis. 63
Kaples V. Orth, 21 N. W. 633, 61 Wis. 53
Hart V. West Side R. Co., 57 N. W. 91,
Wis. 489, 490, 21 L. R. A. 743, .^ Am. St Bi
877).
As an Imf ereaoe of f aat
"'Negligence' is something Invisible, 1
tangible, and, for the most part, incapable
direct proof, like sensible facta or physii
events. It. U, in general, a matter of inft
ence from other facts and drcumstaiK
which admit of direct proof, and wUcb m
;: V
NnouaENOs
661
NfiGLIOSa^OB
lalae a jjnresiunpUoii of the truth of the naln
fact to he proTed« Theoe facts and circnm-
stances must be mch as would warrant a
Jury in Inferring from them the fact of neg-
ligence by reasoning in the ordinary way,
according to the natural and proper relation
•f things and consistently with the common
sense and experience of mankind." Beebe v.
St. Louis Transit Co^ lOa S. W. 1019, 1026,
206 Mo. 419, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 760 (qupting
and adopting the definition in Callahan t.
Wame, 40 Mo. 136).
As tmXtmrm of dmtj
"Negligence" is a failure of duty. Shaw-
nee Light & Power Ck>. t. Sears, 95 Pac. 449,
466, 21 Okl. IB (citing Haynes v. Gas Ck>., 19
S. E. 344, 114 N. O. 206, 26 L. B. A. 810, 41
Am. St Bep. 786).
Failure to do a duty is "negligence."
Beyer y. Hamburg-American S. S. Ck>., 171
Fed. 582, 583.
"Negligence" must depend on a duty owed
by one person to another which is negli-
gently performed. Southern By. Co. ▼. Smith,
50 South. 390, 392, 163 Ala. 174 ; Coin v. John
H. Talge Lounge Co., 121 S. W. 1, 6, 222 Mo.
488. 25 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1179, 17 Ann. Cas. 888;
Hufft V. St Louis A S. P. B. Co., 121 a W.
120. 222 Mo. 286; Cohen v. Koster, 118 N.
Y. Supp. 142, 144, 133 App. Div. 570; Kenne-
dy v. Hawkins, 102 Pac. 733, 734, 54 Or. 164,
25 L. B. A. (N. S.) 606.
EJvery action of "negligence" depends
upon a duty owing by defendant to protect
plaintiff, failure to perform such duty, and a
resulting injury to plaintiff. City of Laporte
T. Osbom, 86 N. BL 995, 996, 48 Ind. App. 100.
In the absence of a duty yiolated, there
can be no "negligence." Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. Ca of Texas y. Byrd (Tex.) 124 S. W. 788,
739.
"Negligence" may result from omission
respecting duty. Bandle ▼. Birmingham By.,
Light & Power Co., 53 South. 918, 921, 160
Ala. 314.
''Negligence" is the anttthesis of duty.
Where there is no duty, there cannot be neg-
ligence. Thomas v, Cincinnati, N. O. ft T. P.
R. Co., 105 S. W. 879, 380, 127 Ky, 159.
There can l)e no **negligence" Mliere
there is no breach of duty. It must appear
that defendant owed a duty and also that
be did not perform it. Boanoke By. & lUec-
tric Co. T. Sterret, 62 S. H 385, 387, 106 Ya.
533, 19 L. B. A. (N. S.) 316, 128 Am. St Bep.
9T1.
Broadly speaking, "negligence" is a
breach of duty. Harrington v. Bqtte, A. &
P. Ry. Co., 95 Pac. 8, 10, 37 Mont 169; 16 L.
R. A (N. S.) 395.
**Negligence" implies a failure to do
something which duty or prudence requires
should hav^ beep done. GiU v. Fugate, 78 a
W. 188, 191,117 5:y.?57..
3 WDS.& P.2n SEB.-86
'*The word 'negligence* implies a duty
as well as its breach, and the fact of negli-
gence can never be found in the absence of a
duty." Bobbins v. Baltimore & O. B. Co., 59
S. E. 512, 513^ 62 W. Va. 535 ; Huchlngson
T. Texas Cent B, Co., 118 S. W. 1123, 1126,
55 Tex. Civ. App^ 229 (quoting Little Bock &
Ft S. By. Co. V. Lawton, 18 S. W. 543, 55
Ark. 428, 15 L. B. A. 434, 29 Am. St Bep,
48).
"Negligence" presupposes the existence of
a duty to protect from injury, and failure to
perform that duty, from which an injury te-
suits. St. Louis, I. M. ft S. By. Co. v. Bhoden;
128 S. W. 798, 800, 93 Ark. 29, 187 Am. St.
Bep. 73, 20 Ann. Cas. 915.
The first element of ''negligence" is a
duty. If there is no duty, there can be no
negligence. If the defendant owed a duty,
but did not owe it to the plaintiff, the action
will not lie. Texas Cent B. Co. v. Harbison,
85 S. W. 1188, U39, 96 Tex. 499.
"Negligence" is the failure to discharge
a duty, and may consist of the omission of a
duty, or the doing of that which \s contrary
to a duty. Where there is not a duty, there is
no negligence. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. By.
Co. V. Harrod's Adm'r, 116 S. W. 699, 701, 132
Ey. 445.
"Negligence" is a breach of that duty
which one person owes to another by reason
of the relation existing between them, the
duty in each particular case being tested by
What an ordinarily prudent person wotild do
in a like situation. C^ilberg v. Standard
Furniture Co., 115 Pac. 837, 838, 63 Wash.
414, 84 L. B. A. (N, S.) 1079.
"Negligence" is negative in its character.
It is the omission to perform some duty. It
implies nonfeasance, and is contradistin-
guished from misfeasance; Davenport v.
Southern B. Co., 124 Fed. 983, 984.
"Negligence" is the violation of duty by
omission or commission, which creates a men-
ace, and whoi it becomes effective by caus-
ing injury to a blameless person liability fol-
lows. Birch V. City of New York, 106 N. Y.
Supp. 104, 105, 121 App. Div. 395.
"Negligence" consists in the violation of
a duty owed by one person to another,
whether the duty arises from relations of the
parties, or is created by statute under the
police power of the state. Wells v. Joslin
Mfg. Co., 82 Atl. 258, 260, 33 B. I. 498.
The burden is on plaintiff, in an action
for negligent injuries, to show that defendant
owed him a duty and failed to perform it
Mehler v. Flsch, 120 N. Y. Supp. 807, 809, 65
Misc. Rep. 549.
Where there is a breach of a duty due
to all persons, the liability of the wrong-
doer does not depend on privity between him-
self and the person injured. Hasbrouck v.
Ar^iour ft Co., 121 N. W. 157, 160, 139 Wis.
^367, 23 L. B. A. (N. S.) 87a
I Jf-
NEQLI6EN0B
662
NEOIilOBNCS
"Negligence" is the breach of some duty
whldi a person owes to another, and where,
by such breach of duty, Injury is caused as a
proximate result thereof, then such negli-
^nce is actionable, and the injured person
may recover damages therefor, provided he
himself did not contribute thereto materially
by negligence on his part Indianapolis & M.
Rapid Transit Co. v. Edwards, 74 N. B. 533,
634, 86 Ind.'App. 202.
To constitute a good cause of action for
injuries through "negligence," there should
be stated a right on plaintifTs part, a duty
on defendant's part, respecting such right,
and a breach of such duty resulting in plain-
tiff's injury. City of Havre De Grace v.
Fletcher, 77 Aa 114, 116, 112 Md. 662.
''Negligence" is a breach of duty. Wl|ere
there is no duty, or no breach, there is no
negligence. An injury that is a natural and
probable consequence of an act of negligence
is actionable. But an injury which could not
have been foreseen nor reasonably anticipat-
ed as the probable result of an act or omis-
sion is not actionable, and such an act or
omission is either the remote cause, or no
cause whatever, of the injury. Kreigh v.
Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co., 152 Fed.
120, 122. 81 C. C. A. 338, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.)
684 (citing Cole v. German Savings & Loan
Soa, 124 Fed. 113, 115, 59 C. C. A. 593. 505,
63 L. R. A. 416).
"'Negligence,' among workmen, is a
breach of the duty which each owes to the
others, and not a breach of the master's duty,
if he has exercised the care that is required
of him." Atchison & Eastern. Bridge Co. v.
Miller, 80 Pac. 18, 29, 71 Kan. 13, 1 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 682.
"'Negligence' has been defined to be a
failure of duty." On proof that a live wire,
carrying a deadly current, fell into a public
street, it might well be said that some one
has failed in his public duty. Booker v.
Southwest Missouri R. Co., 128 S. W. 1012,
1016, 144 Mo. App. 273. ^
The elements involved In a cause of ac-
tion for "negligence" are the exist^ice of a
duty to protect plaintiff from injury, failure
to perform such duty, and resulting injury.
J. M. Pace Mule Co. v. Seaboard Air line Ry.
Co. (N. C.) 76 S. E. 513, 515.
"Negligence" is a breach of duty. In
order for it to exist, there must be both a
duty and a breach of it It is the duty of
tho court in its instructions to advise the
Jury of the duties which the law Imposes up-
on the parties, and, where there is conflict in
the evidence, it is the function of the Jury to
determine whether these duties imposed by
law have been violated. The Jury is the
Judge of the fact, and not of the law. Mid-
land Valley R. Co. ▼. Bailey, 124 Pac. 987.
988, 84 Okl. 193.
"Negligence* is a failure to perform
duty which one owes to another, as whe
a railway company tnila to make due inspe
tion of a public sidewalk maintained by
across its right of way and to make it re
sonably safe for pedestrians, as the n»
thereof might be discoverable by means (
such inspection." Wabash R. Co. v. De Hai
65 N. E. 192, 194, 32 Ind. App. 62.
" 'Negligence' constitutes no cause of t
tion, unless it expresses or establishes son
breach of duty." There can be no recovei
from a railroad company for personal inji
ries from the negligent collision of its car
which overturned, crashing into plaindf!
house, causing her great fright, on the allegi
tlons of mere fright alone, as the compaii
owed plaintiff no duty to protect her froi
fright Ewing v. Pittsburgh, C. ft St. Ll R
Co., 23 Atl. 340, 147 Pa. 40, 14 U R A. 86
30 Am. St Rep. 709.
"The law of 'negligence' is based on tl
relative duties of one person to another. 1
establish negligence, a breadi of some dni
of this kind must be shown." Where a tel
graph agent delivered a telegram to a perse
other than the addressee, but having a siii
liar name, and the discrepancy was notice
by the person to whom it was delivered, tl
telegraph company was not chargeable wit
negligence. Bowyer v. Western Union Tc
Co., 106 N. W. 748, 130 Iowa, 324, 5 L. B. J
(N. S.) 984.
"Negligence" consists In doing, or omi
ting to do, an act by which a legal duty <
obligation is violated. Monroe v. Atlant
Coast line R. Co., 66 S. E. 315, 316» 151 !
C. 374, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 193.
"Negligence" in its technical sense ei
braces failure to discharge a legal duty to a
injured person. Goodwin v. Columbia Tti<
phone Co., 138 S. W. 940, 943, 157 Mo. Ap]
59a
There can be no "negligence" whei
there is no legal duty. Cumberland Tel<
graph ft Telephone Co. v. Martin's Adm'r. 1
S. W. 718, 116 BCy. 554, 63 L. R. A. 469, IC
Am. St Rep. 229.
"Negligence," as used in the law, ma
be defined as the failure to discharge a legi
duty, whereby injury occurs. There can I
no negligence where there is no duty impo(
ed. FrankUn v. Tracy, 77 S. W. 1113, llli
117 Ky. 267, 63 L. R. A. 649.
Failure to perform a duty imposed b
statute or ordinance la "negligence." Fen
V. CUrk, 103 Pac. 944, 945, 11 C&L AiH>. T.
"Negligence," as distinguished from tli
common-law definition, may arise from tb
failure to discharge a duty Imposed by
statute or municipal ordinance. Strottma
V. St Louis, I. M. ft S. Ry. Co., 109 & li
769, 788, 2U Mo. 227 (ittssenting opinion).
niBOUQENGff
668
NEOUGflNOS
The measure of legal duty Is usually ex-
ressed po6itlyely» by statltig what codsU-
utes due care, rather than negatiyely, by
tatiug what constitutes ''negligence,*' which
s the unintentional failure to pertprm the
iuty imposed by law. Baymond v. Portland
L Co., 62 Aa 602, 605, 100 Me. 629, 3 L. R.
L (N. S.) 9i.
''Negligence'' is defined as "the unloten-
lonal failure to perform a duty implied by
aw, whereby damage naturally and proxi-
oately results to another." Southern Ry.
:o. V. Chatman, 53 S. B. 692, 697, 124 Oa.
LQ26, 6 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 283, 4 Ann. Gas. 675.
"Negligence" is the failure to perform a
Inty imposed by law, or to exercise that care
yhich a man of ordinary pmd^ice would
laye exercised under existing circumstances,
ind, where conditions change, the degree of
»re required changes with them. Pritchett
J. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. B. 828, 884, 157
^. C. 88.
"'Negligence^ in its gItII relations is
mch an inadvertent imperfection, by a re-
sponsible human agent, in the discharge of
I legal duty, as immediately produces, in an
irdinary and natural sequence, a damage to
mother. OThe inadyertency, or want of due
»>n8ideratlon of duty, is the injuria, on
vphich, when naturally followed by the dam-
Dom, the suit is based." Wharton, Neg. I 3.
In Hoepper y. Southern Hotel Co., 44 S. W.
257, 142 Mo. loc dt 380, the f oUowing lan-
guage of Cnannell, B., in Smith v. Railroad,
U R. 6 C. P. 20, Is approvingly quoted, to wit:
"I quite agree that where there Is no direct
evidence of negligence the question what a
reasonable man might foresee is of im-
portance in considexlng the question whether
there is evidence of negligence for the jury or
not; but when it has been determined that
there is evidence of negligence^ the person
guilty of it is equally liable for its conse-
quences, whether he could have foreseen them
or not" Foley v. McMahon, 90 S. W. 113,
Hi 114 Mo. App. 442.
In an action for Injuries to a servant, the
burden Is on plaintiff to establish defendant's
"negligence," vla-t failure to discharge its
legal duties toward him. Smith v. Philadel-
phia, B. <& W. R. Co., 73 Atl. 818, 819, 111
Md.274.
A railroad company must give the statu-
tory signals when approaching |i highway
crossing, and a failure to do so is "negli-
gence," within Klrby's Dig. | 6595, providing
that railroad companies are liable for dam-
ages caused by the omission to give statutory
signals. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v.
Drew, 147 8. W. 50, 53, 103 Ark. 374.
;• of duty
"Negligence" is ordinarily predicated in
terms of Imowledge, and liability attaches
only in case the def aidant knows, or by the
exercise of ordinary cax^ could know. In an
action for injuries received in a street by oe
ing struck by a bottle that was thrown by
W. from the roof garden of a hotel, there was
no evidence to show that W. was boisterous,
or that he threatened any one, and no evi-
dence from which it could be inferred that
he would throw the bottle in question. An
instruction as to the liability of the hotel
company that if the jury believed that W.
threw the bottle from the roof garden, and
plaintiff was injured thereby, and if at the
time he was intoxicated, and his behavior
was such as would indicate to a man of aver-
age prudence that he might throw a bottle to
the street below, and that these facts were
known, or by ordinary care could have been
known, to the defendant or its agents, then It
became the duty of the defendant and Its
agents to remove W. from the roof garden or
otherwise control him, and that the law In
that event is for the plaintiff, Is not errone-
ous, as basing the liability of defendant on
knowledge rather than on belief, or reason-
able grounds for belief. Bruner v. Seelbach
Hotel Co., 117 S. W. 873, 376, 133 Ky. 41, 19
Ann. Cas. 217.
As failure to azerelse eare Jvatly de-
maaded In eireiuiastaiiees
"Negligence" is the failure to observe for
the protection of another that degree of care
which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.
Fisher v. City of New Bern, 53 S. EL 842, 345,
140 N. C. 506, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 542, 111 Am.
St Rep. 857; McCartney v. People's R. Co.
(Del.) 78 AU. 771, 772, 2 Boyce, 191 ; Walls v.
People's R. Co. (Del.) 80 Atl. 355, 358; Mor-
gan T. Oronogo Ciixle Min. Co., 141 S. W. 735,
740, 160 Mo. App. 99; Valente v. American
Bridge Co., 73 AU. 395, 400, 6 PennewUl,
556; Florida R. Co. v. Sturkey, 48 South. 34,
35, 56 Fla. 196 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in Jacksonville St Ry. Co. v. Chappell,
21 Fla. 175) ; Smith v. Detroit United By.,
U9 N. W. 640, 644, 155 Mich. 466 ; Linthicum
V. Truitt (Del.) 80 AU. 245, 248, 2 Boyce, 338 ;
Columbia Box & Lumber Co. v. Drown, 156
Fed. 459, 462, 84 C. C. A. 269 (quoting and
adopting definition in Cooley, Torts, p. 630) ;
Buchanan v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co., 75
AtL 872, 876, 1 Boyce, 83; Weldon v. People*s
R. Co. (Del.) 65 Atl. 589, 590; Black's Adm'r
V. Ta. Portland Cement Co., 51 S. E. 831, 104
Va. 450 (quoting and adopting definition
Cooley, Torts, p. 630) ; Queen Anne's R. Co.
V. Reed (Del.) 59 Atl. 860, 862, 5 Pennewlll,
226» 119 Am. St Rep. 301 (quoting Cooley
Torts.)
"Negligence" in a legal sense is a fail-
ure to observe, for the protection of the in-
terests of another person, that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circum-
stances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. While the obligation
to ez^xise care in the conduct of one's busi-
ness varies under different circumstances,
there always remaina the duty to exercise
\i
n
:U:
.'■; ^:
ii
5i
•!:!
NEGLIOEKCB
664
NBGLIGENOB
such reasonable care aa elhoidd be exercised
by a person of ordinary prudence under like
circumstances. Szymanski t. Blumenthal, 56
Atl. 674, 675, 4 Pennewlll, 511, 103 Am. St
Rep. 182 (citing TuUy t. Philadelphia, W. ft
B. B. Co., 47 Atl. 1019, 2 PennewiU, 037, 62
Am. St Rep. 420).
"Negligence," in a legal sense, has been
defined to be the failure to obserye, for the
protection of the interests of another person,
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers Injury.
In an action for injuries to a servant while
riding on a private railroad by derailment of
the cars and the fall of a car frame, caused
by a defective bolt used to fasten the same,
defendant was not guilty of negligence, In
failing to promulgate rules for the govern-
ment of its servants in the operation of cars
on the railroad in question. Jemnlenski v.
LobdeU Car Wheel Co., 63 AtL 835, 037, 0
Pennewill, 885.
" 'Negligence,' in a legal sense, is failure
to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, pre-
caution, and vigilance which the circumstanc-
es justly demand, whereby such other person
suffers injury.' Any failure upon the part
of the master to observe for the protection of
his servant that reasonable degree of care
which the circumstances of the particular
case justly demand Is actionable 'negiigenee,'
and is not within the influence of the doctrine
of assumed risks." Black v. Virginia Port-
land Cement Co., 51 a E. 881, 832, 104 Ta.
450 (quoting and adopting Cooley, Torts, p.
Under Code 1906, | 1085, providing that
in all actions against railroad companies for
injury to persons or property, proof of in-
jury inflicted by the running of locomotives
or cars shall be prima fade evidence of a
lack of reasonable skill and care on the part
of the servants of the company, proof of an
Injury raises a presumption of negligence,
casting the burden of proof on the railroad
company; and as "negligence" is a failure
to observe, for the protection of another per-
son, that degree of care which the circum-
stances justly demand, proof that the equip-
ment of a train was proper and that the serv-
ants of the company kept a vigilant lookout
is, in the absence of any proof as to the con-
dition of the person injured, insufficient to
rebut the statutory presumption. New Or-
leans, M. & C. R. Co. V. Cole, 57 South. 556,
568, 101 Miss. 178.
As fftilwe to use greatest esve
In an action for injuries to a passenger,
alleged to be due to the negligence of defend-
ant's employes, the court properly instructed
that "negligence" meant the fWure to use
the utmost care that would be used by a very
prudent person under like circumstances^
Contreras t. San Antonio Traction Co. (Te^
83 S. W. 870.
Fault mjnonjTxovm
See Fault
FoveseelMC «if eet
Failure to guard against that whl<^ h
never occurred and which is very unlikely
occur, and which does not naturally snggc
itself to prudent men as something whi
should be guarded against, is not "nes
gence.'* Ryan v. Cortland Carriage Goo
Co., U8 N. Y. Supp. 56, 57, 133 App. Div. 4(
"Negligence" in law is careless condu
under such circumstances that an ordlnari
prudent person would anticipate some Inja
to another as a rea»mably probable resi
thereof. JoluUison v. Webster MUg. Co^ 1
N. W. 832, 833, 139 Wis. 181.
"Negligence" cannot exist unless the
is a duty to the person Injured, and It oug!
not be deemed negligence to do or to ft
to do an act when It was not anticipate
and should not have been anticipated, that
would result In Injury to any one Mnrpl
V. Galveston, H. & N. Ry. Ca (Tex.) 06
W. 040, 945 (citing St Louis S. W. Ry. Co.
Texas V. Pope, 86 S. W. 5, 98 Tex. 535; Texi
& P. Ry. Co. V. Bigham, 38 S. W. 162, 90 Te
226, 227 ; Brush Electric Light & Power C
V. Le Fevre, 57 S. W. 640, 93 Tex. 607, 49 :
R. A. 771, 77 Am. St. Rep. 898).
"'Negligence* involves not only knov
edge of a defect, but an appreciation of tl
danger to be apprehended therefrom. HeD<
it is that, if the danger attending the use <
a sidewalk is not so open and obvious as i
suggest itself in an appreciative way to tl
mind of an ordinarily prudent person, i
entry upon such* walk cannot be said l
amount to 'negligence' as matter of law
Arnold v. City of Waterloo, 104 N. W. 44
443, 128 Iowa, 410.
An act cannot be held to be negllgei
when there was no reasonable ground fc
supposing that it would cause injury to ac
one. "Negligence" -cannot be Imputed becaus
of the failure to perform a duty so suddeni
and unexpectedly arising that there is no o]
portunity to comprehend the situation an
act according to the exigency. McKee ^
Harrlsburg Traction Co., 60 AtL 498, 49
211 Pa. 47.
"Negligence" consists of conduct whic
common experience or the special knowledg
of the actor shows to be so likely to prodac
the result complained of, under the dreun
stances known to the actor, that he is hel
answerable for that result, although it wa
not certain, intended, or foreseen. Schl^n
mer v. Buffalo, R. & P. &. Co., 27 Sop. C
407, 409, 206 U. S. 1« 12> 51 U Ed. 68L
"Negligence" Is the proximate cause c
an injury when one of ordinary sense ougt
to have foreseen that l«lie act would probabl
NBGLIGENOB
666
NEGLIGBNCB
salt in such injury or some like injurious
QseQuence, and whether one of ordinary
gadty onght to have foreseen the probable
nsequences of the act is to be inferred from
consideration of all the facts and cinsum-
inces surroonding the case, and is a ques-
m for the court, and not a.proper subject
an interrogatory addressed to a Jury;
id hence^ in an action against a street rail-
sty company for injury to a passenger while
Ighting, a question whether it was reason-
>ly probable in the circumstances that she
Duld, after the conductor gave the signal to
op the car leave her seat and take a posl-
}n that would be rendered perilous by the
opping of the car in the manner in which
was stopped, could not properly be decided
r an answer to an.interrogatory. Richmond
treet & Intemrban Ry. Co. v. Beverley, 84
. B. 568, SS», 80 N. B. 721, 43 Ind. App.
"Negligence" consistB in conduct which
»mmon experience or the special knowledge
I the action shows to be so likely to produce
le result complained of, under the drcum-
:ances known to the actor, that he is held
Qswerable for that result, although it was
Dt certain, intended or foreseen. "Railroad
>mpanles, like natural persons, must so use
lelr property and privileges as not to injure
le rights of others, and in running and op-
rating their cars must ezerdse care pro-
Drtionate to the danger of injury to others.
7hen, in the exercise of such care, ordinary
intlon and prudence requiring the giving of
ignals or warning, the failure to do so is
legligence.' " Where trainmen, in charge
t a train obstructed a crossing, in the exer-
ise of ordinary care ought to have antid-
ated that persons in the act of crossing
light be on or between or about the cars,
nd that not to give warning before moving
lie train would result in injury, their failure
» give such warning was "negligence." Ge-
as r. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 08 Pac. 274,
78, 33 Utah, 156, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1074
inotlng and adopting definition in Schlem-
aer v. Buffalo, R. ft P. R., 27 Sup. Ct 407,
05 U. S. 1, 51 li. Bd. 681).
Frand dlstinffiilslied
"'Negligence' is to be carefully distin-
;nished from 'fraud! ; the distinction arising
Q the element of inadvertence. 'Fraud* Is in-
ariably intentional, either actually or con-
tnictiyely ; 'negligence* is never so." Stand-
ird Marine Ins. Co., Limited, of Liverpool,
^Qg. V. Nome Beach Lighterage ft Transp.
0., 133 Fed. 636, 648, 67 C. C. A. 602. 1 L.
•• A. (N. S.) 1095. .
latent distfwgnisfced
"NegUgence" is not a matter of intention,
uid it Is proper to reftise to permit a witness
:o state why a particular act was not done ;
be not doing of su<^ act being the baids of
^e charge of negligence. Walk^ v. Chicago
k A. a Co., 14» m. App; 408» 411.
Purpose or design Is foreign to "negll-
gence.** Pittsburgh, C, C. ft St L. Ry. Co. v.
Ferrdl, 78 N. B. 988, 989, 89 Ind. App. 516
(citing Parker v. Pennsylvania Company, 34
N. B. 604, 184 Ind. 678, 28 L. R. A.
"Negligence" excludes the idea of inten-
tion. A count in a complaint alleging that
defendant was a common carrier, and that
it so negligently conducted its business that
by reason of such negligence plaintiff's intes-
tate, who was a passenger on one of its
trains, received personal injuries which caus-
ed his death, states a cause of action for
simple negligence. Louisville ft N. R. Co. v.
Perkins, 44 South. 602, 604, 152 Ala. 183.
laieatlonal wroBV dUtiacnislied
The distinction between '"negligence" and
intentional wrong, as relating to the llaUlity
for the sale of dangerous or harmful articles,
is important as bearing on the civil liabil-
ity for consequences for injuries. If a ven-
dor sell a machine, knowing it defective and
dangerous, he is liable ; but, if he sell with-
out knowledge of the defect or danger, he is
not liable, though he be careless or negligent.
Knelling v. Roderick Lean Mfg. Co., 75 N. E.
1098, 1101, 183 N. Y. 78, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 303,
111 Am. St Rep. 691, 5 Ann. Cas. 124.
"Negligence," generally speaking, wheth-
er it be ordinary or gross, is merely an omis-
sion to perform a duty, and is not an affirma-
tive wrongful act, though there may be in-
stances where gross negligence is of an af-
firmative character, and amounts to an in-
tentional wrong, or a reckless disregard of
the rights of others. Schulte v. Louisville ft
N. R Co., 108 8. W. 941, 943, 128 Ky. 627.
MaUee dlstlacvished
The doing of an act without tliat ordi-
nary prudence and discretion which persons
of mature mind and sound Judgment are pre-
sumed to have constitutes "negligence," but
will not alone warrant an inference of "mal-
ice." Malice Is distinguishable from mere
negligence, in that it arises from some pur-
pose, while negligence arises from absence of
purpose. The characteristic of negligence Is
inadvertence, or an absence of an intent to
injure. This does not imply that the act was
done Involuntarily or unconsciously, but
merely that the person doing it was not con-
scious that the act constituted a want of
reasonable care. Jenkins v. Oilligan, 108 N.
W. 237, 238, 131 Iowa, 176, 9 L. R. A. (N. 8.)
1087 (citing Pickens v. South Carolina ft G.
R. Co., 32 S. B. 567, 64 8. C. 49^.
Misf easaaoe distingnished
"Negligence" is negative in its <diaracter.
It is the omission to perform some duty. It
implies nonfeasance, and is contradistinguiflb-
ed from misfeasance. Bavenport v. South-
ern R. Co., 135 Fed. 960, 967, 68 C. a A. 444.
lememt dlsttasnislied
Gen. St. 1901, § 5858^ providing that nii-
road companies shall be liable for
NEGLIGENCE
966
NEGIilGBNOE
to any employ^ of said companies in conse-
quence of any negligence of their agents, or
of any mismanagement of ttieir engineers or
other employes to any person sustaining such
, damage* does not make a distinction between
agents on the one hand, and engineers and
other employes on the other, nor between
"negligence" and mismanagement, but by the
act a company is made responsible for any
mismanagement of its engineers or other em-
ployes to any person sustaining damage there-
by. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. CJo. v. Kellerman,
8T S. W. 401, 404, 39 Tex. OIt. App. 274.
Nuisanoe distlnsvisl^ed
See Nuisance.
As ovdlaairjr mesUsoaA*
"The term 'negligence,' without any qual-
ification, means ordinary negligence." Chica-
go, B, I, & P. Ry. Co. V. Lacy, 97 Pac 1025,
1027, 78 Kan. 622 (citing Kansas Pac. Ry. Co.
y. Pointer, 14 Kan. 37).
As question of faot or law
"Negligence," as well as contributory
negligence, in the great majority of cases, is
a mixed question of law and fact Ewing ▼.
Lanark Fuel Co., 65 S. B. 200, 205, 65 W. Va.
726, 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 487.
The burden Is on plaintiff of proving ac-
tionable negligence, notwithstanding the rule
making "negligence" for the jury where rea-
sonable men might differ on the question.
Baugher v. Harman, 66 S. B. 86, 87, 110 Va.
316.
The rule of res ipsa loquitur not being
invoked, it is error to authorize a jury in an
action for personal injuries to render a ver-
dict for the plaintiff without proof of "negU-
gence." White v. Illinois Collieries Co., 145
III. App. 417, 419.
In absence of proof of negligence by de-
fendant in permitting the stairway in its
store to be in a faulty or dangerous condi-
tion, "negligence" cannot be imputed as a
matter of law from the happening of an acci-
dent on the stairway. Belsky v. Fourteenth
Street Store, 121 N. Y. Supp. 321, 322.
"Negligence" is in the main a question
of f^ct, or rather whether it exists or not in
a special case is a question of fact for the
jury. All that the law has ever determined
on the subject is that it consists in failing
to bestow due care to the matter in hand —
failing to do that which due care requires to
be done, or doing that which such care for-
bids. Whether a trolley car conductor was
negligent in failing to assist a passenger onto
the car is a question of fact, depending upon
all the circumstances as they appeared to the
conductor at the time, or as they should have
appeared to a person in the exercise of that
degree of care which the law requires him to
exercise. Richardson v. Augusta ft A. R.
Co., 61 S. B. 83, 84, 79 a C. 635 (citing Simms
V. South Carolina Ry. Co., 8 S. B. 301, 27
a C. 268).
As Mlative tc
**Negligenoe" is a relative term, to be
determined on the facte of each case. Quinn
V. West Jersey ft S. R. Co., 74 Aa 466, 78 N.
J. Law« 539.
"Negligence" is a r^ative term, and
what would be negligence in one situation
might not be in another. Gallagher v. City
of Tipton, 113 8. W. 674, 675, 676, 133 Mo.
App. 557.
"Negligence" is a relative term, and
where there is no duty there can be no ac-
tionable negligence. Coin v. J. H. Talge
Lounge Co., 121 8. W. 1, 6, 222 Mo. 488, 25
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1179, 17 Ann. Cas. 888.
"Negligence" is a relative term, and Im-
plies the neglect of some djity. Cole v. Jonea^
141 S. W. #89, 690, 159 Mo. App. 472.
"Negligence" is not absolute or Intrinsic,
but is always relevant to some circumstance
of time, place, or person. Connell v. New
York Cent ft H. R. R. Co., 129 N. T. Supp.
666, 669, 144 App. IMv. 664.
There can be no "negligence^' where
there is no duty to use care, for negligence is
the breach of some duty that one person
owes to another, and consequently it is a
relative term, and varies with the circum-
stances of each particular case. West Vir-
ginia Cent ft P. Ry. Co. v. State, 54 AtL 669,
671, 96 Md. 662, 61 L. R. A. 574.
"Negligence" can neither be affirmed
nor denied until the conditions under which
the act was performed are known. Negli-
gence primary and contributory is essential-
ly relative and comparative and not abso-
lute. State, to Use of Hall, v. Trimble, 64
AtL 1026, 1028, 104 Md. 317 (citing United
Railways ft Blectric Co. of Baltimore v.
Watkins, 62 Ati. 234, 102 Md. 267).
"Negligence" is a relative term, and de-
pends upon the circumstances of each par-
ticular case. What might be negligence un-
der some circumstances, at some time or
place, may not be negligence under other
circumstances, at another time and place.
Johnson v. Tazoo ft M. V. R. Co., 47 South.
785, 786, 94 Miss. 447, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 312
(citing 29 Cyc. p. 417).
"Negligence" is a relative term, and its
existence must be determined in view of the
surrounding circumstances; the test being
whether the person charged acted as an ordi-
narily prudent man would have done in the
same or similar circumstances. Lyman v.
Dale, 136 S. W. 760, 761, 156 Mo. App. 427.
" 'NegUgence^ is a comparative and not
a positive term, and its use is relative,
whether applied to the negligence of the de-
fendant or that of the plaintiff. For this
reason in most cases it becomes a qQeettom
of fact for the Jury to detennine who was.
ncglifcpt under the drcomatanoes of the
case. The degree of care which in one case
is insufficient to relieve from a chaxie ot
NBGLIQBNGB
667
NBGX^OJfiNGB
negiigence In anotber might constltiite more
than ordinary prudence and caution." King
T. Green, 94 Pac. 777, 778, 7 CaL ApiK 473.
"Negligence" ia essentially relatiye and
comparative, not absolute. It is not eren
an object of simple apprehension, apart from
the circumstances out of which it grows. Aa
these circumstances necessarily vary in their
relations to each other, under different sur-
roundings, they inevitably change their orig-
inal signification and import Hence it is
intrinsically true that those things which
would not, under one condition, constitute
negligence would, on the other hand, under a
different, though not necessarily an opposite,
condition, most unequivocally indicate its
existence. Mattingly v. Montgomery, 68AtL
206, 206, 106 Md. 461 (quoting and adopting
definition in Cocke v. Baltimore Traction
Co., 81 Aa 828, 80 Md. 554).
"Negligence" cannot be defined ^and
measured by any precise standard. It is al-
ways relative to particular facts and circum-
stances upon which it is sought to be predi-
cated. Aa a general rule, it ia a question
for the Jury to determine, from the facts
and the logical inferences therefrom. It is
only in cases where the facts are without
dispute, or the deduction inevitably that of
no negligence, that the court can say, as a
matter of law, that no negligence was prov-
en. Wikberg v. Olson Co., 71 Pac 611, 512,
188 CaL 479.
" 'Negligence' is a relative term. What
would be negligence under one set of circum-
stances might be due care under another.
The degree of care varies with the circum-
stances. The greater the danger, or the
greater the importance of the matter in hand,
the greater the degree of care required to
constitute due care; that is, such as a per-
son of ordinary care and prudence would
ezerdae." Bolton v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
65 S. B. 987, 938, 84 S. C. 67.
" 'Negligence' is essentially relative In
the abstract it is nullity. It does not, and it
cannot in the nature of things, exist It ia
metaphysically impossible to evolve a con-
cept of negligence apart from the facta which
give rise to it, and independently of some
imposed or implied correlative duty. The
duty must be essentially related to the par*
ticular circumstances, and a variance in the
circumstances necessarily begets either a
modification of the duty or else extinguishes
it altogether. Thus the duty which a rail-
road company owes to a passenger whom it
la carrying on its train Is widely different
from the duty it owes to a trespasser on its
tracks; not only because the rights of the
two are different, but because the attendant
circumstances and facts creating the recipro-
cal ilghta in each instance are dissimilar.
This difference in rights and in duties springs
from a divergence in the circumstances out
of which they respectively grow. Conse-
quently a condition which would in one case
give rise to an infeience of negligence woold
be wholly insufficient to justify its deduc-
tion in the other. United States fixp. Co. v.
Everest, 83 Pac. 817, 820, 72 Kan. 517 (quot^
ing and adopting definition in City Pass. Ry.
Co. V. Nugent, 38 Ati. 779, 781, 86 Md. 349,
35©.
" 'Negligence' ia essentially relative and
comparative, not absolute. It is not even an
object of simple apprehension, apart from
the circumstances out of which it grows.
As these drcumstancea necessarily vary in
their relations to each other, under different
surroundings, they inevitably change their
original signification and import ♦ ♦ •
The existence of 'negligence* is therefore to
be sought in the facts and surroundings of
each particular case. • • ♦ Where the
nature and attributes of the act relied on to
show negligence contributing to the injury
can only be correctly determined by consider-
ing all the attending and surrounding dr-
cumstancea of the transaction, it falls with-
in the province of the Jury to pass upon and
characterize it, and it is not for the court to
determine its quality as matter of law."
Sheridan v. Baltimore & O. B. Co., 60 Atl.
280, 282, 101 Md. 50 (quoting and adopting
definUion In Cooke v. Traction Co., 31 Atl.
327, 80 M)d. 551; citing Fltzpatrlck v. Balti-
more & O. R. Co., 35 Md. 32; Baltimore &
O. R. Co. V. State, to Use of Dougherty, 36
Md. 366; Same v. State, to Use of Miller,
29 Md. 252, 96 Am. Dec 528).
The degree of caution, both by a carrier
and a passenger, is to be estimated in a
measure by the hazard to life and limb.
•*Care" and "negligence" are relative terms,
and mean such care and vigilance as a
prudent, rational person would exercise un-
der like circumstances. Dougherty v. Mis-
souri R. Co., 81 Mo. 325, 331, 51 Am. Rep.
239 (citing Flynn v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.
B. R. Co., 78 Mo. 195, 47 Am. Rep. 99).
ReokleMsesB distlngnlglied
See Reckless — Recklessly — Recklessness.
Aa waat of eare
"Negligence" is the want of care under
the circumstances. But there can be no re-
covery of damages, unless there has been a
breach of legal duty. Welch v. Carlucd
Stone Ck)., 64 Aa 392, 393, 215 Pa. 34, 7 Ann.
Cas. 299.
"Want of care Is 'negligence,' not assump-
tion of risk." Lee v. St Louis, M. & S. E. R.
Co., 87 S, W. 12, 21, 112 Mo. App. 372.
''Carefulness" is an antonym for "neg-
ligence." Negligence is a conclusion of law,
and so also are statements in the findings
l^y the Jury that work was done carefully.
Avery v. Nordyke & Marmon Co., 70 N. E.
888, 893, 34 Ind. App. 541.
Where a child employed in a factory was
injured, "negligence" on his part meant his
failure to exercise such care as a boy of his
MBOLraSNCB
668
NBOLIOBKCIO
lutelUgenoe, capacity, and expetlence, as
shown by the evidence, wonld have usually
exercised in the same situation and dxcnm-
stances. Morgan v. G. Hager A &k)ns Hinge
Mfg. Ck>., 91 S. W. 688, 042, 120 Mo. App. G90.
Same— Careful aad pradent person
"'Negligence' is the failure to ezei*cise
such care as is ordinarily exercised by care-
ful and prudent persons under the same or
similar circumstances in the same or similar
business/' Louisville ft N. R. Go. v. Garter
(Ky.) 112 S. W. 904, 906.
"Negligence" in respect to the duties of a
youthful employ^ in the operation of a ma-
chine means a want of that degree of care
which the majority of careful and prudent
persons of his age, intelligence, and discre-
tion are accustomed to exercise for their
own protection under like or similar cir-
cumstancc& Cohanlcus Mfg. Go. v. Bogers'
Guardian (Ky.) 96 S. W. 437, 439.
game Person of cmmaamL seas# watd
prndeaoe
"Negligence" Is defined as a want of that
care which a man of common prudence and
of common sense ordinarily exercises in like
employment. To constitute it, there must be
a disregard of some duty or rule of conduct
prescribed beforehand, or arising so mani-
festly from the facts as to leave no doubt
of its existence, and it is of the essence of
actionable negligence that the party charged
should have knowledge that the act com-
plained of was such an act of omission or
commission as might, within the domain of
probability, cause some such an Injury as
that complained of. JAnooln Gas ft Electric
Light Go. V. Thomas, 104 N. W. 153, 154, 74
Neb. 257 (citing Whart Neg. I 8; Deering,
Neg. I 2).
Same— Mian of ordinary oare and pra-
donoe
"Negligence," in reference to the main-
tenance of a track in a mMe, means the ab-
sence of that care to keep and maintain it in
a reasonably safe condition for service that
a man of ordinary care and prudence, under
the circumstances of the business, consider-
ing its perils, dangers, and necessities, would
have used. Western Goal ft Mining Go. r.
Honaker, 96 S. W. 861, 864, 70 Ark. 629.
Same— iCan of ordinary pradenoo
By "negligence" is meant a failure to use
such care and precaution as a person of or-
dinary prudence would use under like dr-
eumstances. Bifissouri, K. ft T. Ry. Go. of
Texas V. Wood (Tex.) 81 S. W. 1187, 1188.
"Negligence" is the failure to exercise
that degree of care under given circumstances
which one of ordinary prudence would exer-
cise under similar circumstances, and the
circumstances considered are those which
are known to the actor, but he will be charg-
ed with knowledge of what he could have
known by exercising ordinary care. Sted-
man v. O'Nell, 72 Aa 928, 926» 82 Cowl 100,
22 U B. A. (N. SO 1229.
"Negligence;" such as to preclude a re-
covery for injuries, is merely the absence of
such care as a person of ordinary prudence
would exercise under similar circumstances.
Meyers v. Ghlcago, R. I. ft P. B. Go., 77 S.
W. 149, 151, 103 Mo. App. 268.
An instruction that "by 'negligence' is
meai^t the failure to exercise that degree of
care which a l>erson of ordinary prudence
usually exercises under like or similar cir-
cumstances," given in an action for death
by coming in contact with a live wire, was
erroneous; the duty of those manufacturing
and using electricity being to use the utmost
care to protect others from danger. Man-
gan's Adm'r v. Louisville Electric Light Go.»
91 8. W. 703, 704, 122 Ky. 476, 6 L. B. A. (N.
S.) 459 (citing and adopting Schweitzer's
Adn^'r v. Gitizens' Cfeneral Electric Go. [Ky.]
52 S. W. 880; Thomas v. Maysville Oas Go.,
56 S. W. 153, 108 Ky. 244, 58 L. B. A. 147;
Macon r. Paducah St By. Go., 62 S. W. 496,
110 Ky. 680).
Same— Person of ordinary reason and
pradenoo
. When, in order to determine whether one
has been guilty of "negligence," his conduct
is compared with that of reasonable persons
under similar circumstanoes, the comparison
must be directed to a person of ordinary rea-
son and prudence. The standard of duty is
not the foresight and caution which some
particular man is capable of exercising, but
the foresight and caution of the average pru-
dent man, or of a reasonable man standing
in the shoes of the person charged with neg-
ligence. Hoard v. State, 95 S. W. 1002, 1003,
80 Ark. 87 (citing Webb's PoUock, Torts [Am.
Ed.] 540).
Same' Ordinarily oarefvl and j^ndent
person
"Negligence" is the failure to use such
care as ordinarily careful and prudent per-
sons ordinarily exercise under the same or
similar eircumstancea Gomelius v. S^Qth
Govington ft G. St By. Go. (Ky.) 93 8. W.
643, 644; Felver r. Gentral Electric By. Co.,
116 S. W. 980, 988, 216 Mo. 196; aty of Gov*
ington T. Whitney (Ky.) 99 S. W. 887, 338.
Samo— Ordinarily pradont man In Ida
own affairs
"The terms 'neglect,' 'negligence,' 'neg-
ligent,' and 'negligently,' when so employed,
import a want of such attention to the na-
ture or probable consequences of the act or
omission as a prudent person ordinarily die*
plays in acUng in his own concerns." Ladow
V. Okla)ioma Qaa ft Slectiio Go., 119 Pac.
250, 257, 28 Okl« 15 (quoting and applying
Gomp. Laws OkL 1909, 1 2880).
"Negllgenee^" for which a tag Is UaMe^
"consists in the want of ordinary skill in
navigation and of the exercise of such care*
NBGUGENOE
668
NB6UQSN0B
and diligence in handling tbe tow as a man
of ordinary prudence would exercise in the
preservation of his own property." The duty
imposed upon a tug is to use the caution and
sidll which belong to prudent navigators.
The Samuel B. Bonker, 141 Fed. 480 (dting
The Niagara, 20 Fed. 162; The Florence, 88
Fed. 302).
An instruction defining "negligence" as
the failure to exercise that degree of care
and diligence that an ordinarily prudent per-
son would exercise in his own affairs under
like or similar circumstances, was not objec-
tionable as eliminating acts of commission.
German Ins. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.,
104 N. W. 361, 363, 128 Iowa, 386.
An instruction that the terms "negli-
gence," "negligent," and "negligently" import
a want of such attention to the natural or
probable consequence of the act or omission
as a prudent man ordinarily best9ws in act-
ing in his own concerns, being in the exact
language of Rev. Codes 1905, | 9622, is suffi-
cient, especially where no more specific in-
struction was asked. Zllke v. Johnson, 132
N. W. 640, 644, 22 N. D. 76. Ann. Gas. 1913E,
1006.
Same— Ordinarily pmdent person
"Negligence" is the omission of the care
that ordinarily prudent men will exercise un-
der similar circumstances. Heinz v. Balti-
more & O. R. Co., 77 Ati. 980, 983, 113 Md.
682; International & G. N. R. Co. v. Schu-
bert (Tex.) 130 S. W. 708, 709.
"Negligence" in a particular case is the
failure to exercise such care as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under the
same or similar drcumstanoes. Boyles v.
Ttf as & P. R. Co. (Tex.) 86 8. W. 986, 937.
"Negligence," as applied to a passenger
suing for injuries, means the failure to use
that degree of care that would be exercised
by an ordinarily p^ident person under the
same circumstances. Williams v. Galveston,
H. & S. A. R. Co., 78 S. W. 45, 47, 34 Tex.
Civ. App. 145.
"Negligence" is the want of that care
which ordinarily prudent men use in the
same circumstances, and as even ordinarily
prudent men, when caught in a trap where
they must act instantly, miscalculate and
misjudge, that one caught in a passage near
a railroad with a frightened team mistaken-
ly concluded that the safest course would be
to try to cross the track, and so came near-
er to the track than he otherwise would,
would not necessarily be negUegnce. Moore v.
Maine Cent R. Co., 76 AU. 871, 876, 106 Me.
297.
"'Negligence' is the omission to exer-
cise such care as an ordinarily prudent man
would exercise in the same or like circum-
stancea To choose, under all drcumstances,
the safer of two courses of action, is not ex-
pected or reQUired of any one. It two alter-
native oounies reauixing prompt choice and
action are put before a man, and cdther ap-
pears to be reasonably safe, if he chooses the
one that turns out to be less safe than the
other, he is not to be convicted of negligence
for choosing the course which proved, by
subsequent events, to be less safe than the
other." Bhroeder v. St Louis Transit Co.,
86 S. W. 968, 971, 111 Mo. App. 67.
A railroad track in active use is per se
a warning of danger, admonishing every one
that a train is liable to pass over it at any
time, and no one, whether passenger, li-
censee, or trespasser, can approach such a
track so near as to be hit by a passing train
without first both looking and listening to
ascertain whether a train is approaching
which might injure him, nor can he fre-
quent or walk over a private railroad yard
covered by many tracks, employed constantly
for through travel, switching) etc., without
looking and- listening and exercising the ut-
most degree of vigilance; the term "negli-
gence" under such circumstances meaning
the want of such care as ordinarily prudent
persons usually exercise under similar cir-
cumstances. Hart V. Northern Pac R. Co..
196 Fed. 180, 185, 116 C. C. A. 12.
"Negligence" is the want of such care
and caution as an ordinarily prudent man
would exercise under the same circumstanc-
es. An instruction defining negligence to be
the want of such care and caution as an
"ordinary" prudent man would exercise un-
der the circumstances was not erroneous be-
cause of the use of the word "ordinary," in-
stead of the "ordinarily." Ft Worth ft D.
O. Ry. Co. V. Partin, 76 S. W. 236, 237, 33
Tex. Civ. App. 178.
The test of "negligence" is: Did the hu-
man agent in charge af the instrumentality
causing the injury complained of act with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person
under the same circumstances would have
exercised, and, if he did, there is no action-
able negligence. Wilkerson v. St. Louis &
S. F. R. Co., 124 S. W. 543, 546. 140 Mo. App.
306.
An instruction that by the term "negli-
gence" is meant the want of that degree of
care that an ordinarily prudent person would
have exercised under the same or similar
circumstances ii correct Meng v. St Louis
ft S. Ry. Co., 84 S. W. 218, 215, 108 Mo. App.
553.
Where an instruction defining "negli-
gence" as the want of such care "as a pru-
dent person would exercise," instead of "an
ordinarily" prudent person was the only in-
struction in the case defining negligence, and
was referred to by defendant in its instruc-
tions as giving the definition of negligence,
defendant thereby adopted it, and could not
complain on appeal that it was erroneous.
Spaulding v. Metropolitan St Ry. Co., 107
S. W. 1049^ 1051, 129 Mo. App. 007.
NEGLIGENCE
670
NEGLIGBNGK
SamtH-Persoa of ordinary lAtoUisenoe
and pmdeaoa
"Negligence" is failure to use that de-
gree of care which one of ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence might reasonably be ex-
pected to use in the particular circumstances.
Lundy v. Southern Bell Telephone ft Tele-
graph Ck>., 72 S. E. 558, 664, 00 S. C. 25.
Santo— Pn&dent and jiist man
" 'Negligence' is the absence of such
care and regard for the rights of others as
a prudent and just man would and should
have in the same situation." Long y. Louis-
ville ft N. R. Co., 107 S. W. 203. 205, 128
Ky. 26, 13 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1063, 16 Ann. Cas.
673.
8amo— BeasonaUj pmdont porson
"Negligence" is the failure to use such
care as a reasonably prudent man would or
should use under similar circumstances.
Heidelbaugh v. People's R. Co. (Del.) 65
Atl. 587, 6 Pennewill, 209.
"Negligence" is the failure to use such
care as a reasonably prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances. Ric-
cio V. People's R. Co. (Del.) 82 Ati. 604, 606.
"Negligence" is a failure or the neglect
by one to exercise that same care and cau-
tion that a reasonably prudent person would
exercise at the same place and under the
same circumstances. Jennett v. Louisville
ft N. R. Co., 162 Fed. 392, 393.
8amo— RoasonaUj prmdont and oarof nl
porson
"Negligence" is the failure to use such
cai:e as a reasonably prudent and careful
person would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances. Baldwin y. People's R. Ck>., 76
AtL 1088, 1093, 7 PennewiU, 81; Welch y.
Baltimore ft O. R. Co., 76 Atl. 50, 7 Penne-
will, 140; Louft y. C. ft J. Pyle CJo.. 75 AtL
619, 622, 1 Boyce, 192; Benson v. Wilming-
ton City R. CJo., 75 Atl. 793, 794, 1 Boyce,
202; Louisville ft N. R. Co. v. Lynch, 126
S. W. 362, 365, 137 Ky. 696; Dungan v. Wil-
mington City R. Co. (Del.) 58 Atl. 868, 869,
4 Pennewill, 458 ; Eaton v. Wilmington City
R. Co. (Del.) 75 Atl. 369, 870, 1 Boyce, 435 ;
Garrett v. People's R. Co. (Del.) 64 Atl. 254,
256, 6 Pennewill, 29.
"Negligence" is the want of such care as
a reasonably prudent and careful person
would use under similar circumstances.
Freeman v. Wilmington ft P. Traction (3o.
(Del.) 80 Atl. 1001, 1002; Braunstein v. Peo-
ple's R, Co. (Del.) 78 Aa 609, 611, 2 Boyce,
55.
"Negligence" is the failure to use such
care as a reasonably prudent and careful
person should exercise under similar cir-
cumstances. Robinson y. Huber (Del.) 63
AtL 873, 874, 6 Pennewill, 21.
"Negligence" is the want of such care as
a reasonably prudent and careful person
would exercise under similar circumstance
Certain things are negligence in law, whet
er active or positiye negligence is proved <
not A violation of a statute providing tbi
no person shall operate a motor vehicle c
the public highways unless he has obtaliif
a license is negligence per se, and rendei
the wrongdoer liable for an injury resultii
from such misconduct C!eochi y. Lindsa
(Del.) 75 Aa 376, 377, 1 Boyce, 185.
Samo— Vory eantlonSy prndent, aa
oompetont porson
"Negligence," as applied to a defendai
railroad company, sued for injuries to a pa
senger, only means a failure to use that big
degree of care that would be exercised b
a very cautious, competent and prudent pe:
son under similar circumstances. Willian
V. Galveston, H. ft S. A. R. Co., 78 S. W. 41
47, 34 Tex. Civ. App. 145.
"Negligence," when applied to a railroa
company and its employes and servant
while receiving and transporting passenger
means the failure to use that degree of cai
which very cautious, prudent and compete!
persons usually exercise. St. John v. GuL
C. ft S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex.) 80 S. W. 235, 23(
8amo— Very pmdent porson
"Negligence" of a motorman toward a
alighting passenger is a failure to use tbs
high degree of care that a very prudent pei
son would have used under like circnn
stances. San Antonio Traction Co. v. Waj
ren (Tex.) 85 S. W. 26, 27.
Samo Roqnirod by oiroumotanoos
"Negligence" is the absence of care, tn
cording to the drcumstanoes. Martin i
City of WiUiamsport 57 Aa 1063, 206 Pi
590; Drink water v. Quaker City Cooperag
Co., 57 Ati. 1107, 208 Pa. 649; AndersoD ^
Hays Mfg. Co., 56 Atl. 345, 348, 207 Pa. lO
63 L. R. A. 540; James McNeil ft Bro. 0>. y
Crucible Steel Co. of America, 56 Ati. 106(
1069, 207 Pa. 493 (citing Anderson v. Haj
Mfg. Co., 56 Ati. 345, 207 Pa. 106, 63 L. R i
540).
"Negligence" is absence of care ac
cording to the circumstances. There was n
negligence on the part of a contractor 1
placing a mortar bed on the side of a street
near which he was erecting a building
where the city, under its powers, had grant
ed him such privilege. White v. Roydhoust
60 Ati. 316, 211 Pa. 13.
"Negligence^* is a failure to observe, fo
the protection of another, that care wbid
the circumstances demand. Culbert v. Wil
mington ft P. Traction CJo. (Del.) 82 Aa 108]
losa.
**Negllgence" is failure to exercise the dc
gree of care which prudence requires unde
the circumstances of each particular <ft8c
Campbell v. United Rys. Co. of St LouU
147 8. W. 788, 701, 243 Ma 141.
KBGUGENCn
671
KBOUOBNCHD
*'Negllgei^'* is ttie failure to exerdse
the care appropriate to the circmiMtanoes of
the particnlar case. George N. Pleroe Go. t.
Wells Fargo ft Oa, 189 Fed. 061, M2» 110
C. C. A. 646.
" ^Negligence' Is a tellnrs to use in the
perf oimance of a duty owing to the Individ-
ual that degree of care» skill, and diligence
which the drcomstanoes of the case reason-
ably d^nand." State, to Use of Oardin ▼.
Mcaellan, 86 S. W. 267, 268, U8 Tenn. 616,
8 Ann. Gas. 902.
The test of "negligoic^' is not what an
ordinarily pmdent person would do or omit
to do generally, but what an ordinarily
prudent person would do or omit to do under
circumstances like and similar to those sur-
rounding the person whose conduct is under
test In other words, "negligence*' is the
want of care required by the circumstances.
Olmstead y. Oity of Olympla, 100 Pae 602,
601, 59 Wash. 147.
** 'Negligence* is merely a f aUuie to be-
stow the care and skill the situation de-
mands, and hence it is more accurate to call
it simply negligence. The ^Lassillcation of
negligence into three degrees is no longer
recognized in this 9tate." Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co. V. Walters, 96 Pac. 346, 347, 78 Kan. 39
(quoting and adopting definition in 21 A. ft
E Enc of Law t2d Ed.] 469).
"In each case the 'negligence,' whatever
epithet we give it, is failure to bestow the
care and skill which the situation demands,
and hence it is more strictly accurate, per-
haps, to call it simply "negUgenoe.' And this
seems to be the tendency of nK>dem author-
ities. * * * In the case before us, the
law, in the absence of special contract, fixes
the degree of care and diligence due from the
railroad company to the persons carried on
Its trains. A failure to exercise such care
and dLUgence is 'negligence.' It needs no
epithet properly and legally to describe it."
Chicago, R. I. ft P. R. Go. y. Hamler, 74 N. B.
705, 710, 215 in. 025, 1 L. R. A. (N.. S.) 674,
106 Am. St Rep. 187, 8 Ann. Cas. 42 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in New York C.
R. Co. V. Lockwood, 17 Waa 857, 21 L. Ed.
«27).
Hnw 6 B cqnired by duty
Many definitions have been given of
'^negligence," among others, that it is a
violation of the duty to exercise care. "Neg-
ligence" implies a voluntary act or omission.
Weeks V. Auburn ft Syracuse Electric Ry.
Co., 113 N. Y. Supp. 636, 638, 60 Misc. Rep.
400 (citing Dowd v. New York, O. ft W. R.
Co., 63 N. B. 641, 170 ;N. Y. 160).
''Negligence" is a breach of duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care under the circum-
Btances. Vaughn v. Wm. J. Lemp Brewing
Co., 132 S. W. 293, 296, 152 Mo. App. 48.
"Negligence" involves the violation of a le-
gal duty which one owes to another in respect
to cate for the safety of the person or prop-
erty of that other. Sharkey v. Skllton, 77
Aa 960, 952, 83 Conn. 603.
*^egllgence" is the violation of an obli-
gation to exercise care. That obligation
may inhere in the relations into which par-
ties have been brought by contract, but it
is not an incident to the making of the con-
tract Shinkle, Wilson ft Kreis Go. v. Bimey
ft Seymour, 67 N. B. 716, 717, 68 Ohio St 828.
•^Negligence" consists" in a legal duty to
use care, and its breach, without intention to
produce the precise damage which follows,
and, in order to be "actionable negligence,"
must be followed by damage to plaintiff, re-
sulting in a natural and continuous sequence.
Interstate R. Co. v. Tyree, 65 8. B. 500, 501,
110 Va. 38.
"Negligence" is the violation of the duty
enjoining care and caution in what one does,
but the duty is a relative one, and whez« it
has no existence toward a particular party,
there can be no such thing as negligence in
the legal sense of the term. Hlckey v. Chi-
cago City Ry. Co., 14S III App. 197, 207^
An instruction In a personal injury ac-
tion that "negligence" means the failure to
use "that degree of care which the law re-
quires^ that is, ordinary care^ or the doing
of that which ordinary care • • ^ would
dictate should not be done," is not open to the
objection that matters of omission are ex-
cluded from consideration. Struble v. Bur-
lington, C. B. ft N. Ry. Co., 108 N. W. 142,
144, 128 Iowa, 15&
••Negligence," constituting a cause of ac-
tion, is such an omission by a H*spon8ible per-
soiwto use that degree of care, diligence, and
skill, which it was his legal duty to use for
the protection of another person from Injury,
as in a natural and continuous sequence caus-
es unintended damages to the latter. Pull-
man Co. V. Cavlness, Ue S. W. 410, 411, 53
Tex. Civ» App. 540; Chesapeake ft O. Ry. Ca
▼. Farrow's Adm'x, 55 8. fi. 569, 570, 106 Va.
137, 10 Ann. Ca& 12.
The words "negligence" and •'wrongful
act" are sufficiently broad to embrace every
degree of tort that can be committed against
the person. Negligence, constituting a cause
of dvll action, has been defined as such an
omission by a responsible person to use that
degree of care, diligence, and skill, which it
was his legal duty to use for the protection
of another person from injury, as in a natu-
ral and continuous sequence causes unintend-
ed damage to the latter. The word Implies
a breach of duty, and a person cannot be
legally negligent, so as to subject him to
damages, except in respect to others to whom
he owes a duty. Howard's Adm'r v. Hunter,
104 8. W. 723, 724, 126 Ky. 685,
•• •NegUgence,' constituting a cause of
dvU action, is such an omission by a respon-
sible peEson to. ese that degree o< care^ diU-
'.[V
M
NBGUGENGE
672
KBOUGENCB
gence, and skill, whidi it was his legal duty
to use for the protection of another person
from Injury, as in a natural and continuous
sequence, causes unintended damage to the
latter. An essential element of negligence,
as is shown from this definition, is, as in all
other species of tort, a legal duty. Without
such legal duty, and a breach of it, there
can be no negligence or any other species of
tort" Where an employer fails to furnish an
employ^ medical attendance, as he has agreed
to do, the employe's cause of action is not in
tort for negligence, but is for breach of con-
tract Galveston, H. ft S. A. By. Oo. ▼. Hen-
negan, 76 S. W. 452, 454, 83 Tex. Civ. App.
314.
'*There can be no 'negligence' in i^ legal
sense unless there is a violation of a legal
duty to exercise care." Therefore a railroad
comimny, owning real property abutting on a
street is not required to construct a fence
sufficiently strong to provide against the con-
tingency of a crowd of trespassers going on
the inclosed property and pushing the fence
over on a person walking in the street; such
injury not being the reasonable and proxi-
mate result of the defective fence. Grogan
V. Pennsylvania B^ 82 AtL 024, 925, 213 Pa.
340.
" 'Neglig^ice' can in law only be predi-
cated upon a failure to use the degree of care
required by law in the discharge of a duty
imposed thereby." Where a car cleaner, at-
tempting to dimb over a string of cars likely
to be moved at any minute, was knocked off
and killed through the cars being pushed in
the ordinary way In switching operations
under the charge of other employ^ who had
no reason to expect that he was on the cars
or intended to try to cross over between
them, and could not see him, they were not
negligent Hall v. Houston ft T. O. B. Ca
(Tex.) 125 8. W. 946, 949.
''Negligence" on the part of a railroad
company is the omission on its part to do
something which persons conducting a rail-
road with reasonable care and caution should
do. McCk>rmlck v. Detroit, Grand Haven ft
M. B. €k>., 104 N. W. 390, 391, 141 Mich. 17
(citing Flagg v. Chicago, D. ft 0. G. T. J. By.
Co., 55 N. W. 444, 96 Mich. 30, 24 L. B.
A. 835).
It is the duty of a carrier of passengers
to exercise the highest degree of care that
would be used by every prudent person un-
der the same or similar circumstances to
avoid and prevent injury to passengers upon
its cars, and a failure to exercise such high
degree of care constitutes "negligence.'' Gal-
veston, H. ft S. A. By. Oo. v. Norton, 119 S.
W. 702, 706. 55 Tex. Civ. App. 478.
"Negligence," when applied to carriers
of passengers, means the failure of a per-
formance of duty, imposed by law for the
protection of others, to exercise thiit high
degree of care in acting and refraining from
acting which very competent and pmd
persons would usually exerdke under
same or other similar dreomstances.
Louis Southwestern By. Co. ▼. Harrison,
S. W. 38, 32 Tex. av. App. 368.
onie degree of care required by a can
of passengers and the precise duty whid
owes to them is clearly defined in the h
The carrier owes to the passenger the ei
dse of the utmost care and dUigence wb
human foresight can use, though not an
surer of the safety of the passenger,
breach of that duty is "negligence," and
any injury results therefrom, and is the c
sequence thereof, an action will lie at
suit of the person thus injured. It is
breach of the duty which is owed that con
tutes the cause of action. Philadelphia,
ft W. B. Co. ▼. Allen, 62 Atl. 245, 246, ]
Md. 110 (citing Baltimore City Pass. By.
V. Nugent, 88 AtL 779, 86 Md. 849, 39 L. B
161).
As WM&t of due, proper* and ordlni
Due care defined, see Due Care.
Ordinary care defined, see Ordinary Q
''Negligence" is the want ct due a
Wofford V. Clinton Cotton Mills, 51 S. B, J
919, 72 S. C. 346 (quoting and adopting d
nition in Carter v. Columbia ft G. B. Co.,
8. C. 24, 45 Am. Bep. 754).
" 'Negligence' is but the abs^ice of <
care." Comovski v. St Louis Transit (
106 S. W. 51, 56, 207 Mo. 263.
The simplest definition of '^egUgen
is absence of due care under the drcumsta
es. Nord v. Boston ft M. CoosoL Coppei
SUver Min. Co., 75 Paa 681, 684^ 80 Mont
"Negligence" is the want of due cai
that is, of such care as an ordinarily pnid<
man would exercise under the same or si
lar drcumstancea Seininski ▼. Wllmingi
Leather Co. (Del.) 83 Ati. 20, 24.
" 'Negligence* is the opposite of due caj
where due care is found there is no nei
genoe. If there is a want of due care, U
there is negligence.*' Baymond v. Portland
Co., 62 Atl. 602, 605, 100 Me. 629, 3 L. B.
(N. S.) 94.
"Negligence** rests in tort It is the i
sence of due care which is a duty lying
the root of the social compact Charlton
St Louis ft S. F. B. Co., 98 S. W. 629. 6
200 Mo. 413.
"Negligence** is the failure to exercise (
proper degree of care in the performance
some legal duty which one owes another a
causing unintended damages. Foot v. Si
board Air line By., 64 S. B. 843, 84i 142
C. 52.
There are no degrees of "negligenc
There are degrees of care, and a failure
exercise that proper degree of care as t
law requires is "negUgenoai'' Battan v. O
']
NSQLIQB2N0B
673
NEOLIGENGB
tral mectric Ry. Co^ 96 8. W. 786, 787, 120
Mo. App. 270 tauottng aad adopting deftDitton
in Magrane t. St Loois ft S. B. CkK, 81 S. W.
1158» 183 Mo. U^.
Where an aoddent proceeds from an act
of sncb a character that when due aire is
tak«:i in its performance no injnry ordinarily
oisiies from it in similar cases, it will be pre-
sumed to be ''negligent" Pratt y. Missouri
Pac Ry. Oo., 122 S. W. 1126, 1127, 139 Ma
App. 502.
While the term ''negligence'* is popularly
used to mean an act or omission which is
wrongful under the circumstances, as result-
ing from the failure to exercise the proper
care for the protection of others, without re-
gard to resulting injury to any particular
person, the legal conception of "actionable
negligence," for which recovery may be had.
Is such an omission to use the degree of care
for the protection of another from injury as
should have been used under the circumstanc-
es and which in a natural and continuous se-
quence causes damage to the latter. Cress-
well y. Wainwright 134 N. W. 094, 699. 154
Iowa, 167.
One lawfully using electricity to operate
a street railroad system in a ctty must ex*
erdse such constant care as a man of reason-
able prudence would exercise, considering
the obligation to protect persons from danger,
and the care must be commensnrate with the
danger; '^negligence" consisting in the want
of proper care, in ylew of the drcumstances.
Birmingham By., light & Power C?o. y. Mur-
phy, 56 South. 817, 819, 2 Ala. App. 58a
"Negligfflice" has been defined to be the
"absence of care^ aceording to the drcum-
stances." Also in "its ciyil relations is such
an inadyertent imperfection by a responsible
human agent in the discharge of a legal du-
ty, as immediately produces, in an ordinary
and natural sequence, a damage to another.
The inadyertency, or want of due considera-
tion of duty, is the injuia on whidi, when
naturally followed by the damnum, the suit
is based." According to another work, "neg-
ligence" consists of "an omission by a respon-
sible party to use that degree of care, dili-
gence, and skill which it was his legal duty to
use for the protection of another person from
Injury, as, in a natural and continuous se-
quence, causes unintended damage to the lat-
ter." Again, "negligence consists in doing
something which a reasonably prudent man
would not haye done under the circumstances,
or in failing to do something which a reason-
ably prudent man, under the circumstances,
would haye done." All these definitions mean
the same thing, yiz., that "negligence" is the
absence of due care, and due care is a care
adjusting itself to the circumstances of the
case. Dean y. Kansas City, St. L. & 0. B. Co.,
97 S. W. 910, 917, 199 Mo. 386 (quoting in
order Wharton, Neg. | 3; Shearman & Bed;
field, Neg. I 8 ; and McMahon y. Padflc Bip.
Co., 84 S. W. 478, 132 Mo. 641).
As WM&t of ordinary eare
Ordinary care defined, see Ordinary Care.
"Negligence" is the lack or want of ordi-
nary care. Tobias y. People's R. Co. (Del.) 80
AtL 868, 860; Murray y. St Louis Transit
Co., 75 & W. 611, 612, 176 Mo. 183.
"Negligence" is the failure to use or ex-
ercise ordinary care. Adkisson's Adm*r y.
Louisyille, H. ft St L. R. Co. (Ky.) 110 S. W.
284, 286; LouisyiUe ft N. R. Cb. y. Joshlin
(Ky.) 110 S. W. 382, 386; LouisyiUe & N.
R. Co. y. Logsdon, 71 S. W. 906, 906, 114 Ky.
746; Cross y. Illinois Cent R. Ck). (Ky.) 110
8. W. 290, 292; LouisyiUe Ry. Co. y. Boutel-
Uer (Ky.) 110 S. W. 867, 860; Cincinnati, N.
O. ft T. P. Ry. (}o. y. Byans* Adm'r, 110 8.
V{. 844, 848, 129 Ky. 162; LouisyUle ft N.
R. Co. V. Roth, 114 S. W. 264, 268, 130 Ky.
759 ; Nashyille, C. ft St L. R. Co. y. Russell,
110 S. W. 317, 319, 129 Ky. 14; Galveston,
H. ft S. A Ry. CJo. y. Hubbard, 76 S. W. 764,
33 Tex. Ciy. App. 343; Reybum y. Missouri
Pac. Ry. Co., 86 S. W. 174, 176, 187 Mo. 565.
"Negligence" consists of the failure to
use ordinary care under the circumstances.
Smith's Adm'r y. Norfolk ft P. Traction Co.,
68 S. E. 1006, 1006, 109 Va. 453.
"Negligence" is the ftdlure to do some-
tiiing that the doer in the exercise of ordinary
care should haye done. Shemw^ y. Owens-
boro ft N. R. Co^ 78 & W. 448, 449, 117 Ky.
666.
*^e^gence" is the absence of ordinary
care, and ordinary care is that degree of
care which an ordinarily prudent person
would exercise under circumstances Uke or
simUar to those shown. LouisyiUe, H. ft St
U Ry. Co. y. StUlweU, 184 8. W. 202, 204,
142 Ky. 330.
"NegUgence" is a want of the care ordi-
narily exercised by the great mass of persons
under Uke circumstances. Bandekow y. Chi-
cago, B. ft Q. Ry. Co., 117 N. W. 812, 813, 136
Wis. 841.
"NegUgence^ is the want of the ordinary
care which a reasonably prudent man would
exercise under like circumstances. Butler y
Wilmington City R. Co. (Del.) 78 Atl. 871, 872,
2 Boyce, 262.
"NegUgence" is a want of "ordinary
care" ; that is, such care as persons of ordi-
nary prudence usuaUy exercise under similar
circumstances. Dorrls y. Warford, 100 S. W.
812, 813, 124 Ky. 768, 9 L. R. A (N. S.) 1090,
14 Ann. Cas. 602.
"NegUgence" is the want of ordinary
care ; want of such care as a reasonably pru-
dent and careful man would exercise under
Uie circumstances. Short y. Philadelphia, B.
ft W. R. Co., 76 AtL 863, 864» 7 Pennewill,
loa
: :
NBOLIGBNOB
574
NEOLIOBKOIB
"N^ligence" has been defined to be the
^t^ant of ordinary care ; that Is, the want of
such care as a reasonably prudent and care-
ful man would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances. Boudwin v. Wilmington City R.
Co. (Del.) 60 AU. 865, 4 PennewUl, 881; Mac-
Feat V. Philadelphia, W. & B. B. Co. (Del.) 62
AtL 898, 905, 5 Pennewill, 52; Campbell y.
Walker (DeL) 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce, 41.
''Negligence" is the want of ordinary
care, or such care as persons of average pru-
dence would exercise under the same circum-
stances. A mere error in judgment is not
necessarily negligence. Carney y. Concord
St Ry., 57 AtL 218, 222, 72 N. H. 864.
" 'Negligence' is defined to be Injury oc-
casioned to another by want of ordinary care,'
etc" Bacon v. Kearney Vineyard Syndi-
cate, 82 Pac. 84, 85, 1 Cal. App. 275.
"Negligence" was properly defined as a
want of ordinary care and failure to exercise
that care which a man of ordinary prudence
would haye exercised under the circumstanc-
es, or a failure to perform some duty im-
posed by law. Jones y. American War^ouse
Ck)., 51 S. E. 106, 108, 138 N. a 546.
Want of ordinary care is "negligence,"
but want of extraordinary care, or that care
which is customarily exercised by extraor-
dinarily careful people, is "slight negligence,"
and the latter does not affect the rights of
parties injured. Hackett y. Wisconsin Ceat
Ry. Co., 124 N. W. 1018, 1022, 141 Wis. 464.
"By the term 'negligence' is meant the
failure to obsenre ordinary care." Postal
Telegraph Cable Co. y. Terrell, 100 S. W.
292, 293, 124 Ky. 822, 14 L. R A. (N. S.) 927.
Statement in a charge that " 'negligence,'
as that term is used in this charge, means the
failure to exercise ordinary care," is sufil-
cient. In connection with the preceding para-
graph, defining "ordinary care" to be "the ex-
ercise of that degree of care which a person
of ordinary prudence would exercise under
like or similar circumstanoes." Rapid Trans-
it Ry. Co. y. MiUer (T^) 85 8. W. 439.
"Negligence" is the failure to exercise
the ordinary care of prudent men under all
the attending circumstances. Stephenson y.
Corder, 80 Pac. 938, 939, 71 Kan. 475, 69 L. R.
A. 246, 114 Am. St Rep. 500 (quoting Thomp.
Neg. I 50).
"Negligence" is the failure to exerdse or-
dinary care, such care as a reasonable man
under like circumstances would exercise. In-
ternational Mercantile Marine Ck>. y. Smith,
145 Fed. 891, 893, 76 C. C. A. 423.
"Negligence" is the failure to use ordi-
nary care, which is such care as an ordina-
rily prudent person would usually exercise
under circumstances similar to those proyen
In the case under inyestigatlon. Henderson
aty Ry. Co. y. Lockett (Ky.) 98 S. W. 303.
"Negligence" is the failure to exercise
ordinary care. And "ordinary care" is that
degree of care which an ordinary, prude
and careful person would exerdse under t
same or sbnilar circumstances. Gulf, C
S. F. Ry. (Do. y. Hays, 89 8. W. 29, 32,
Tex. Qy. App. 162.
"Negligence" is properly d^lned In ani
struction as a failure to use ordinary ca
and ordinary care which ordinarily prude
persons are accustomed to exercise under 11
or similar circumstance& LouisylUe & N.
Co. y. I^nch, 126 8. W. 362, 863, 866, 137 E
"Negligence" Is a failure to exercise ort
nary care, or a degree of care that would
used by a person of ordinary prudence uod
the same or similar circumstance& Moo
y. linden Ry. CJo., 76 S. W. 672, 674^ 176 3i
528.
"Negligence" has been termed the wa
of ordinary care; that is, the want of so
care as a reasonably prudent and carel
man would exercise under similar drcoi
stances It has been termed the failure
obsenre, for protection of the interest of a
other, that degree of care, precaution, aj
yigilance which the circumstances justly c
mand, whereby such other person suffers i
Jury. Goldstein y. People's R. Co. (DeL)
AtL 975, 976^ 5 PennewUl, 306.
"Ordinary care" means sndEi care m
prudence as an ordinarily prudent pers
would exercise under the drcumstances c
tailed in eyidence, and "negligaice" mee
the failure to exercise ordinary care. Heb<
ling y. City of Wartensburg, 108 a W. 86^ {
204 Mo. 604 (quoting and adopting the deft
Uon in Cohn y. Kansas City, 18 & W. 91
108 Mo. 892).
The word "negligraice," as used in i
instruction for the wrongful death of an e
ploy6, means the failure to use ordinary caj
Illinois Cent. R. Co. y. Cane's Adm'x (E:
90 S. W. 1061, 1064.
Defining "n^ligence" as a ftdlure to €
erdse ordinary care was held to state tl
proper test of "negligence," though the ca
inyolyed the life of an infant four years ol
Hanley y. Ft Dodge Light & Power Co., 1<
N. W. 598, 594, 133 Iowa, 326.
"Negligence" has been termed the wa
of ordinary care; that is, the want of 8U(
care as a reasonably prudent and carefnl m
would exercise under similar drcumstana
It has been termed the failure to obseire, f
the protection of the interests of anoth<
that degree of care, precaution, and yigllan
which the circumstances Justly demao
whereby such other person suffers injur
Di Prisco y. Wilmington City R. Co. (De
57 AU. 906, 909, 4 Pennewill, 627; Bowrii
y. Wilmington Malleable Iron Co. (DeL) i
Ati. 369, 371, 5 Pennewill, 694.
Where the charge of negligence is a ge
eral one, and plaintiff shows that the inju]
complained of occurred under such drcai
stances that it may be reasonably inf ern
NBQLIGENCB
675
NEGLIGENOD
that. If ordtnaxT tare had been used by de-
fendant, the injury would not hare resulted,
he thereby makes a pxlma fade case, and
easts on defendant the burden of proving due
care. Freeman y. Freeman, 125 S, W. 624,
526, 141 Mo. App. 359.
"Negligence** is the want of ordinary
care; that is, the want of such care as a
reasonably prudent and careful man would
exercise under like circumstances. What
constltates ^'negligence" is a question of law
for the court, but whether "negligence' ex-
isted in the particular case is a question of
fact for the Jury. Neal ▼. Wilmington & N.
G. Electric R. Go. (Del.) 58 Att. 838, 889, 8
Pennewill, 487.
"'Negligence' is the want of ordinary
care according to the circumstances, and the
circumstances are everything in considering
this question. The ordinary care of a busi-
ness man in his own affairs is one thing,
and the ordinary care of a gratuitous man-
datory is quite another matter. The one
implies an oversight and knowledge of every
detail of his business; ^e other suggests
such care only as a man can give in a short
space of time to the business of other persons
from whom he receives any compensation."
Mason v. Moore, 76 N. E. 932, 937, 73 Ohio
St 275, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 597, 4 Ann. Gas.
240 (quoting and adopting definition in Swent-
Eel V. Penn Bank, 23 Ati. 405, 414, 147 Pa.
140, 15 L. R. A. 305, 30 Am. St. Rep. 71^.
Where strict accuracy of expression re-
qnired an instruction that an employer must
exerdse ordinary care to furnish. his em-
ployes with reasonably safe places in which
to work, the omission of the words "exercise
ordinary care" is not ground for reversal,
where the Jury were told that the employer
is liable only for his negligence, and that
negligence is the failure to use ordinary care.
Kamera v. Missouri Boiler Works, 106 Paa
806, 807, 82 Kan. 432.
An instruction that "ordinary care,'* as
oesd in instructions given in an action
against a railroad for the death of a traveler
in a collision with a train at a crossing,
meant such care as ordinarily prudent per-
sons would exercise under circumstances sim-
ilar to those proven in the case, and that
''negligence'* was the failure to exercise or-
dhiary care, was correct Louisville & N. R.
CkK V. Lucas' Adm'r (Ky.> 08 S. W. 808, 813.
"Negligence^* on the part of a railroad
company is the failure on its part to use
ordinary care; '*that is, such degree of care
as an ordinarily careful and prudent person
wonld have used under the circumstances."
Where the court defined "negligence" of a
railroad company to be the failure to use
Bnch care as an ordinarily prudent person
wonld use under similar circumstances, the
refusal of a charge containing substantially
tlie same definition, and the qualification
tbat, in determlnlDg whether an act is neg-
ligence, the jury will take into consideration
all the circumstances and will not view the
situation from a retrospective point of view,
was not erroneous. Galveston H. ft N. By.
Ck). V. Olds (Tex.) 112 S. W. 789. 702.
Since the term "negligence" has been
construed to mean "want of ordinary care,"
it would have been the better practice had
the trial court used the latter term instead
of the former word in his submission of
questions to the Jury, under Laws 1907, c. '
254, providing that in an action for injuries
against a railroad company the Judge should
submit to the Jury the questions, first, as to
whether the company, or any officer, other
than the person injured, was guilty of negli-
gence, and, second, if that question is an-
swered in the afllrmative, whether the person
injured was guilty of negligence, etc. Jensen
V. Wisconsin Cent Ry. Co., 128 N. W. 982,
985, 986, 145 Wis. 826.
"Negligence" is the want of "ordinary
care." As applied to a street car motorman
in the case of a collision with a vehicle, it
means the neglect to use "ordinary care"
in observing it or to check the car so as to
avoid hitting it Petersen v. St Louis Trans-
it Co., 97 S. W. 860, 863, 199 Mo. 331.
A charge that "nei^lgencQ" as applied to
a passenger is a fWure to exercise ordinary
care for his own safety—that is, such care as
an "ordinarily prudent person" would exer-
cise under the same or similar circumstances
— was not erroneous in fiilling to require the
passenger to use such care as a "person of
ordinary prudence" would exercise. St Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Parks, 90
8. W. 343. 345, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 480.
Defining "negligence'* as the want or
failure to use ordinary care — that is, that
degree of care which an ordinarily prudent
person would use under like circumstances to
avoid injury or accident—- does not define the
degree of care required of a carrier in re-
spect to a passenger getting on a car, which
is, in substance, "such a high degree of fore-
sight as to possible dangers, and such a high
degree of prudence in guarding against them,
as would be used by very cautious, prudent
and competent persons under similar cir-
cumstances." Green v. Houston Electric Co.,
89 S. W. 442, 443, 40 Tex. av. App. 260 (cit-
ing International ft G. N. Ry. Co. v. Hallo-
ren, 53 Tex. 53, 37 Am. Rep. 744; Interna-
tional ft G. N. Ry. Co. V. Welch. 24 S. W. 300,
86 Tex. 203. 40 Am. St Rep. 829).
"Negligence** has often been defined by
the court to be the want of ordinary care;
that is, the want of such care as a reasona-
bly prudent and careful man would use un-
der similar circumstances. Recovery on the
ground of negligence may be had for sudden-
ly starting a street car while a passenger is
in the act of aUghting therefrom, if it is
shown to be the fault of the company, and
that injuries to the passenger were caused
T ■ 1
JBTSQUGENGB
676
VBSGIJGBNCB
.M
I ■!
! t
t
i i1
i''!!
i!'i
'15
thereby. Benson v. Wilmington City B. Co.
(Del.) 76 Atl. 793, 794, 1 Boyoe, 202.
In an action against a railroad for in-
juries to an employ^ through a defective car
step, an instruction that if defendant, through
its inspectors and repairers, exercised ordi-
nary care to see that the equipnient of the
car was In reasonably safe condition, "and
were not guilty of negligence," the verdict
must be for defendant, was not misleading
as adding, by the use of the words "and were
not guilty of negligence," something to de-
fendant's duty beyond the exercise of ordi-
nary care; the court having clearly defined
"negligence" as the failure to use ordinary
care, m Paeo & S. W. R. Ck). v. 0*Keefe, 110
S. W. 1002, 1003. 60 Tex. av. App. 579.
In an action for delay In delivering a tel-
egram, an instruction defining "negligence"
as the failure to use ordinary care to deliver
the message, and instructing that if, because
of such failure, plaintiff was unable to be
with his father before his death, he could
recover such damages, if any, as he suffered
on account of defendant's negligence, was
not objectionable as asserting as a fact that
plaintiff was unable to be with his father
before his death In consequence of defend-
ant's failure to deliver the telegram prompt-
ly. Western Union Telegraph Go. v. Hack
(Tex.) 128 S. W. 921, 923.
In conducting the affairs of a hospital,
its officers and agents are as liable to com-
mit acts of negligence as are the officers and
agents of a railroad or other business cor-
poration. Men in general are not uniformly
careful. Experience shows that "negligence"
— the failure to exercise ordinary care — ^is
to be expected when men engage in industrial
pursuits. It may, not inappropriately, be said
to be necessarily incidental in the accom-
plishment of most practical results through
the agency of man. Hewett v. Woman's Hos-
pital Aid Ass'n, 64 Atl. 190, 193, 73 N. H. 666,
7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 496.
Am want of reaMmable eare
"Negligence" is a failure to exercise rea-
sonable care. Jarrell v. Blackbird Block
Coal Co., 186 S. W. 754, 766, 154 Mo. App.
652.
"Negligence" is the want of reasonable
care, or a failure to use such care as an ordi-
narily careful man would use in like circum-
stances. Klair V. Philadelphia, B. ft W. B.
CJo. (Del.) 78 AtL 1085, 1086, 1098, 2 Boyce,
274.
"Negligence" is the absence of reasonable
care. What is reasonable care depends on
the conditions of danger or lack of danger.
In some cases very little care suffices to ful-
fill the rule of reasonable care, while In oth-
ers the highest degree of care is required
to do so. Warth t. ECastriner, 100 N. Y. Supp.
278, 279, 114 App. Dlv. 766.
An instmction defining '^egUgenoeT'
"the want or omission of reasonable caie i
diligence, the failure to do something wl
a reasonable person guided by those c
siderations which ordinarily regulate
conduct of human affairs, under the drci
stances would do, or the doing of sometb
whi<^ such person under such circnmstan*
would not do," was proper. Martin r. 1
Moines Edison Light Oo., 106 N. W. 359, i
131 Iowa, 724.
As waat of oave aad pmdeaoe
The degree of negligence necessary
fasten liability upon a person is that deg
which is quivalent to lack of such care i
prudence as ordinary men habitually exen
for their own personal safety. The Gene
De Sonis, 179 Fed. 123, 126.
Sam*— Msn of ordinary tetelllsenec
An instruction that the term "negUgen
means the want of that care and prude
which a man of ordinary intelligence wo
exercise under all the circumstances of
situation is erroneous, where the case is 1
tomed on negligence, and defended on
ground of contributory negligence, since
does not correctly define the term, and si
the word "Intelligence" is not a synonym
either "caution," "prudence," or "care,"
a very intelligent man may be a very imp
dent one, or an unusually or unneoessai
cautious one, and he is not the man who ex
dses ordinary care' about his own concei
and therefore the use of the word 'inu
gence" instead of the term "prudence" 1
nished the jury no definition of negUgei
Van Cleve v. St Louis, M. ft S. B. B. Co.,
S. W. 632, 684, 124 Mo. App. 224.
As want of ordinary oaro and prada
"NegUgence** consists of the fiiilure
use ordinary care and pmd^noe under
circumstances. One who has a reasons
basis for belief that afiother is aware o\
source of danger may act on the assoi
tion that the latter is aware of it, and ^
make reasonable eftorts to save hlms^; 1
a motorman having a reasonable basis
the belief that an adult person on the tn
is aware of the approach of the car may v
sume that he will get out of danger as i
car approaches; but a motorman sound
his bell cannot assume that all within he
ing will take notice that a car is an>roa
ing, and he can make no such assumptioD
justification of his failore to take reasons
precautions untO at least he has reasons
grounds for believing that his warning
heeded or the presence of the car reoognis
and that the p»soh threatened is compete
to protect himself by the exercise of ordini
care. Blley v. CoiiSQlidated B. Go.» 72 i
662« 663.^82 Conn. 105, 21 L. &. A. (N. 8.) 8
MEGLIGBNOB
677
KEGLIGBMCB
As waat of f oMilskt miA
A charge that "negUgence," as api^ed
o railroads oigaged in the tranqiortatloii
If paonoDgere, is a talliire to exercise sndi a
ilgh degree of foresight as to possible dan-
gers and sacli a high degree of pmdence in
niardlng against them as would be used by
rery cautions, prudent, and competent per-
lons under the same or similar dicumstane-
s, correctly defines ''negligence" as applied
x> the duty owed by a carrier to its paasen-
sers, and Is sufiicient when taken in connec-
tion with a further charge that the railroad
loes not, by accepting a passenger, become
in insnm of his safety, but is only bound to
use a high degree of care, eta St Louis
Southwestern Ry. Ck>. of Texas t. Parks, 90
B. W. 343, 845, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 480.
As want of reasonable diUsemoe, eav-
tiont aad forestsbt
Failure of a master to exercise such rea-
sonable diligence, caution, and foresight as
t prudent man would exercise under similar
circumstances to guard employte against in-
luries is "negligence." Sandldge v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. By. C50.. 183 Fed. 867, 872, 113 C.
0.A668.
WillfmlaeflB dlsttncvlsliodl
Mere ''negligence*' and "willfulness" are
not synonymous terms. Southern By. Go. t.
Davis, 65 S. E. 181, 132, 132 Ga. 812.
An act done willingly and on full infor-
mation is not done negligently. Negligence
is the result of inattention or oversight
Dean v. St Louis Woodenware Works, 80
8. W. 292, 296, 106 Mo. App. 167.
Negligence cannot be of such degree as
to become willfulness. Cleveland, C, G. &
St. L. By. Go. V. Starks, 02 N. E. 54, 66, 174
Ind. 346.
There are no degrees of negligence, and
n^igence, no matter how reprehensible, can
never approximate willfulness. Vandalia B.
Go. V. Clem, 96 N. B. 789, 790, 49 Ind. App. 94.
The term "negligence" suggests only inad-
vertence or want of ordinary care, and, how-
ever great may l>e the degree of such want of
care, so long as Inadvertence remains, will-
Ailness is excluded. Bideout t. \nnnebago
Traction Co.. 101 N. W. 672, 674, 123 Wis.
297, 69 L. B. A 601.
The term "willful negligence" is a mis-
leading and contradictory expression. Con-
duct cannot be both "wiUful" and *'negU-
sent,** as "negligence" involves inattention,
And "willfulness," intention. Anderson v.
Minneapolis, St P. A 8. 8. M. B. Co., 114
^- W. 1128, 1126, 108 Minn. 224, dissenting
opinion (citing 8 Words and Phrases, pp.
7468, 7835; Bolin ▼. Chicago, St P., M. ft O.
Hy. Go^ 84 N. W. 446, 106 Wis. 833, 81 Am.
St Bep. 9U; Louisville ft N. B. Cb. v. Per-
^08,44 South. 602, 152 Ala. 183; Lake Shore
8 Wds ft P 2n SxB.— 4^7
A M. 8. By. Co. V. Bodemer, 29 N. B. 682^
ld9 ni. 696, 32 Am. St Bep. 218).
"Willfulness" implies design. It involves
conduct wMch is quasi criminal. "Willful-
ness" and "negligence" are held Inconsist-
oit Purpose or design is foreign to negli-
gence. WlUfulnesB cannot be inferred from
a mere knowledge on the part of operatives
of the presence of the injured party. Be-
fore it will be inferred, such optatives must
have knowledge also of the inability of the
injured party to avoid the Injury. Pitts-
burgh, C, C. ft St L. By. Co. v. Ferrell, 78
N. E. 968, 989, 39 Ind. App. 616.
"An inadvertent ftillure to observe due
care indicates mere 'negligence,' but an ad-
vertent or conscious failure to observe due
care passes beyond mere negUgence into 'wan-
tonness' or 'willfulness.'" Tinsley v. West-
em Union Telegraph Co., 61 S. B. 913, 914,
72 8. G. 360.
In order to constitute willfulness or vnui-
tonness or reckless indifference to probable
consequences, the act done or omitted must
be done or omitted with a knowledge or a
present consciousness that injury will prob-
ably result ; and this consciousness is not to
be implied from mere knowledge of the ele-
ments of the dangerous situation a person
may be in and negligent and Inadvertent acts
in respect of the peril. Duncan v. St Louis
ft S. r. B. Co., 44 South. 418, 422, 162 Ala.
118.
Where defendant's conduct resulting in
an injury is willful, it is no longer negli-
gence, and hence the defoise of contributory
negligence cannot arise ; such defense being
only applicable where negligence is charged
against defendant Hawks v. Slusher, 104
Pac. 888, 884, 66 Or. 1, Ann. Gas. 1912A, 491.
"Negligence" may result from omission
respecting duty. An "act" or "wrongful act"
denotes affirmative action or performance,
and an expression of will or purpose as dis-
tinguished from "omission" or "wrongful
omission," which denotes a negative and in-
action. Bandle v. Birmingham By., light A
Power Co., 63 South. 918, 921, 169 Ala. 314.
Negligence and carelessness are general-
ly esteemed as not only not willfulness, but
rather the opposite. Schooler v. Harrington,
81 8. W. 468, 469, 106 Mo. App. 607 (follow-
ing Gibeline v. Smith, 80 S. W. 961, 106 Mo.
App. 646).
"Willfulness" snd "negligence" are dia-
metrically opposed ; negligence importing in*
attention, inadvertence, and indifference,
while willfulness imports intention, purpose,
and design; and there being no negligence
with, and no willfulness without, Intent
Barrett ▼. Cleveland, C, C. ft St L. By. Co.,
96 N. E. 490, 492, 48 Ind. App. 668.
A conscious act or neglect is willful,
though there is no evil intent but willfulness
implies something more than mere failure to
!i-
NBOLIGENOB
578
NEQLIOBNCE PBR SK
1 M
I.-!!.
Iti
.:: i
use ordinary care; there being a dear 4Uh
tlDctlon between a "negligent omission** and
a "wilUnl faUnre*' to act Cook y. Big Mud-
dy-Carterville Mining Co., 04 N. E. 90, 94,
249 111. 41.
"Willfulness" means something more
than mere oversight, carelessness, neglect,
or eyen shiftlessness. True, in the legal
sense of the word, an intentional act is or-
dinarily willful; but the Intentional act in
opening a gate or leaving it open does not
necessarily imply an intention that cattle
shall pass through such gate on a railroad
track. Glaus v. Chicago Great Western Ry.
Co., HI N. W. 15, 16, 136 Iowa, 7.
"Willfulness^ or "wantonness,** as ap-
plied in cases of injury to a person by a
breach of duty, where the peril of the person
injured is known, means a direct intent to
inflict injury, or an act done or omitted, with
the consciousness that the act or omission
will probably eventuate in injury. Anniston
Electric & Gas Co. v. Rosen, 48 South. 798,
799, 802, 159 Ala. 195, 183 Am. St Rep. 32.
. "Willfulness" is the intentional doing of
some act or the failure to do some act, ac-
cording to one's own. will, regardless of the
right of others, when the party knows, "or
is under legal obligation to know," that the
doing or the failing to do such act might
cause injury to other persons. Geddings v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 75 S. E. 284, 91
S. C. 477.
"'Negligence' and 'willfulness* are the
opposites of each other. They indicate radi-
cally different mental states. • • • Neg-
ligence is also to be carefully distinguished
from fraud; the distinction arising in this
case, as before, upon the element of inadver-
tence. Fraud is invariably intentional, ei-
ther actually or constructively ; negligence is
never so." Standard Marine Ins. Co., Lim-
ited, of Liverpool, Eng., v. Nome Beach Light-
erage & Transp. Co., 133 Fed. 636, 647, 648,
67 C. C. A. 602, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1095.
"'Willfulness* and ^negligence* are the
opposites of each other; the former signify-
ing the presence of intuition, and the latter
its absence." Rldeout v. Winnebago Traction
Co., 101 N. W. 672, 676, 123 Wis. 297. 69
L. R. A. 601 (quoting and adopting definition
in Cleveland, C, C. & St L. Ry. Co. v. Miller,
49 N. E. 445, 449, 149 Ind. 490-501),
"'Willfulness' and 'negligence* are the
opposites of each other; the one signifying
the presence of intention or purpose, the oth-
er its absence. This distinction has not al«
ways been observed. Consequently there are
cases that use the terms 'gross* or 'willful'
negligence to designate willful injuries. Late
cases have made the distinction clear. And
the principle of the responsibility of the will-
ful wrongdoer for all the consequences of his
misconduct is really an old one." Morrison
y. Lee^ 118 N. W. 1025, 1029, 16 N. D. 377.
U R. A. (N. S.) 560.
"'Willfulness' and 'negligence' are
opposite of each other; the former signify
the presence of intention, and the latter
absence. Negligence arises from inattenti
thoughtlessness, while wiUfulnesB cannot
ist without purpose or design, * ^ ^ a
when willfulness is the essential in the
or conduct charged to the party witli
wrong, the case ceases to be one of ne
gence." Memphis St Ry. Co. y. Roe, IDS
W. 343, 346, 118 Tenn. 601 (quoting i
adopting the definition in Cleveland, C, C
St. L. R. Co. V. MiUer, 49 N. E. 445, 149 I
490).
The conflict in instructions sobmltt
the issue of negligence of defendant and
issue of a willful wrongful act cannot
harmonized on the theory that the term "i
ligence," as used in the flrst instruction, c
ers willful acts, since "negligence" sign!
the absence of care and implies a failure
duty and excludes an idea of intentio
wrong, while "willful negligence" implies
intentional failure to perform a manii
duty. Tognazzlnl v. Freeman, 123 Pac. 8
543, 18 Cal. App. 468.
An instruction that "wiUful" is what
word implies, it means an act proceed
from a will, done of a purpose, an intent
to do it, and that "willfulneBs" is an
which proceeds from the will so as to mi
the act a purpose act, was not error, wh
the court in connection therewith illustra
the difference between "negligence" and "^
fulness." Talbert v. CJharleston & Westi
C. Ry., 51 S. B. 564, 72 S. C. 137.
A complaint for willful injury m
show that the injurious act was purpos
done, with an intent to inflict willfully a
purposely the particular injury complaii
of; "willfulness" being a desire or intent
produce a certain result, and inconsist<
With negligence. Southern Ry. Co. v. 1
Neeley, 88 N. B. 714, 715, 44 Ind. App. 126
NEOUOENOE PEB 8E
The words "per se," when used as
scriptive of negligence, merely refer to i
method by which Its existence is to be asc
tained from the facts. Piatt y. Soutb<
Photo Material Co., 60 S. B. 1068, 1071^ 4 (
App. 159.
It is well settled that, in order that
act shall be "negligence per se," it mi
have been done contrary to a statutory du
or it must appear so opposed to the dictai
of common prudence that it can be a
without hesitation or doubt that no care
person would have committed it St Loi
Southwestern R. Co. of Texas v. Hawti
108 S. W. 736, 740, 49 Tex. Qy. App. f
(quoting Gulf, C. ft S. F. Ry. Co. y. Gaascaii
7 S. W. 227, 69 Tex. 545).
KEGUaiSKCS PER SB
579
NXGLIGENT HOMJdDS
It Is not negUgence per se to rlae from
seat and step to the side of a slowly moT-
ig open car which is coming to a stop, for
cte purpose of getting upon the mnboard to
Light when the car does stop. Davis t. Cam-
en, G. & W. R. Co., 63 AtL 848, 844, 73 N.
. Law, 415 (citing Scott y. Bergoi Ckinnt:^
Faction Co., 43 Atl. 1060, 63 N. J. Law,
08 ; Ck)n8olidated Traction Co. y. Thalheim-
r, 37 Ath 132, 59 N. J. Law, 474).
Aa oadMiom of mmim required bj statwto
It has been declared that "the omission
i specified acts of diligence prescribed by
tatute or by a valid municipal ordinance Is
negligence per ae.' ** G^ierally a court can-
lot instruct a jury that certain acts consti-
nte ''negligence per se," bat there is an ex-
eption where a statute or municipal ordi-
lance requires the performance of the act
Southern R. Co. y. Davis, 65 S. B. 131, 182,
32 Ga. 812 (citing Central Railroad ft Bank-
ng 0>. T. Smith, 8 S. BL 897, 78 Ga. 699; 6
Swords and Phrases, p. 4764).
'There are certain things whldi amount
x> 'negligence In law,' whether any positive
>r active negligence be proved or not The
rlolation of an ordinance of this dty Is of
itself (per se, as we may say) an act of neg-
ligence, which only requires to be proved to
render a wrongdoer liable for any injury re-
sulting from such misconduct In such case,
tiowever, the defendant would not be liable
unless the violation of the ordinance— that is,
the excessive speed of the train— caused the
accident complained of; nor would the de-
fendant be liable If the Injury was caused l^
the negligence of the deceased. l%e law
does not permit any one to recover damages
from another for an injury if his own neg-
ligence has contributed thereto, or where by
the exercise of reasonable care he could have
avoided If MacFeat v. Philadelphia, W.
& B. R. Co. (DeL) 62 Atl. 898. 905, 906, 6
Pennewlll, 62.
A violation of Acts 1906, c. 169, making
It an offense for an engineer to run his lo-
comotive across the tracks of any other rail-
road without first coming to a stop and as-
certaining that there is no train approaching,
is negligence per se. Louisville & N. Ry. &
LighUng Ck>. v. Hynes, 91 N. Bl 962, 964, 47
Ind. App. 607.
NEGLIGENT
See, also, Negligencei
"A 'negligent act' is an Inadvertent act."
Brown v. Boston ft M. R. B., 64 Atl. 194,
201, 73 N. H. 668.
The phrase ''act of negligence," as ap-
plied to the conduct of servants, Includes any
condnct whether evinced by movement of the
organs of speech or some oUier physical move-
tnent, and hence where a conductor told a
Maenger to Jump from a train as It was In
motion, when In fuet It wmA.hot in motiox:,
and the passenger became excited and jumped
and was injured, the statement of the con-
ductor amounted to an "act of negligence."
Staines v. Central R. Ck>. of New Jersey, 61
Aa 386, 72 N. J. Law, 268.
The terms "negligent delay" and "un-
reasonable delay" are used interchangeably
and are of the same meaning. Chicago, R.
I. ft P. Ry. Co. v. GlUett (Tex.) 99 S. W. 712,
713.
If acts are such as an ordinarily prudent
person would have committed under the same
circumstances, they are not "negligent."
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Massie's Adm*r, 128
S. W. 330, 332, 188 Ky. 449.
An Instruction that the terms 'Negli-
gence," "negligent," and "negligently" Import
a want of such attention to the natural or
probable consequence of the act or omission
as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in act-
ing in his own concerns, being In the exact
language of Rev. Codes, 1906, | 9622, is suffi-
cient, especially where no more specific in-
struction was asked. Zilke v. Johnson, 132
N. W. 640, 644, 22 N. D. 76, Ann. Gas. 1913E,
1006.
mOUeEHT HOMIOIDB
In a prosecution for "negligent homi-
cide," the court should instruct that, in the
act of defendant of handling the pistol with
which he shot deceased, there must be an ap-
parent danger of causing the latter's death.
Saye v. State, 99 S. W. 661. 662, 664, 60 Tex.
Cr. R. 669.
Broadly speaking, In the case of homicide
by shooting, In order to entitle the state to
a conviction for "negligent homicide" the
jury should be required to find first that the
shooting was accidental or unintentional and
that it was under circumstances from which
the law would raise the imputation of neg-
ligence. Joy V. State, 128 & W. 684, 689, 67
Tex. Cr. R. 03.
Under the express provisions of Pen.
Ck>de 1S96, art. 686, there must be an appar-
ent danger of causing the death of a person
ictlled or another, in order to constitute the
offense of "negligent homicide" denounced t>y
article 684, providing that, if a person in
the performance of a lawful act shall i>y neg-
ligence and <;areleesne8s cause the death of
another, he shall be guilty of "negligent hom-
icide in the first degree." Ctorden v. State
(Tex.) 90 a W. 636, 637.
In view of Pen. Code 1895, arts. 683-689,
693, 604, to constitute '^negligent homicide,"
the act must be unlawful and a misdemean-
or, and must be accompanied by want of
proper care and caution, and there must be
apparoit danger of causing the death of the
person killed, and no apparent Intention to
kill. Talbot V. State^ 126 & W. 906^ 907, 68
Tex. Gr. R. 324.
i;
I '■
1
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'H
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i ;
1
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V
;■>■ U'
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HI
i i
NBGLIOENT HOMICIDE
* 580 KSGOTIABIiE BIIiL OF SXCHAKt
Defendant, keeper of a bagnio, had trouble
with a man therein, and he went out, being
immediately followed by deceased and his
party. The testimony for the state was that
the defendant then called for a pistol, aimed
it towards the party, and fired, saying, *'Run
you, • • • run," and that on her going
inside, being asked if they ran, she said,
"Yes." She and her witnesses testified that
no shot was fired from the house. Held, that
"negligent homicide" was not in the case, but
manslaughter, of which she was convicted,
was the lowest grade of homicide of which
she could be found guilty. Clifton v. State,
84 S. W. 237, 239, 47 Tex. Or. E. 472.
NEOLIOEirr OPERATIOH
''Negligent" operation is the failure to
use the proper means at hand in a proper
and careful way aa persons of ordinary pru-
dence do under like conditions for th^ own
safety. Central Coal ft Iron Co. y. Pearce
(Ky.) 80 S. W. 449, 450.
mSOUOEXT OB UHU^WFUI. XTBE
Where a fire insurance policy contained
an exertion that the company would not be
liable for loss caused by explosion of any
kind u^ess fire ensued, and in that eyent for
the damages by fire only, a loss occurring
solely from an explosion, not by a preceding
fire, or an explosion which occurred from the
contact of escaping natural gas with a lighted
match, are within the exceptions of the pol-
icy; the rule being that the ignition of the
explosive substance must be caused by an ac-
tual combustion involuntarily or illegally
started, which is called a negliisent or unlaw-
ful fire, and not a harmless combustion such
as a lighted match, burning gas Jets, or a
lighted dgar, which are called innocent fires.
Stephens v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 123
S. W. 63, 66, 139 Mo. App. 369.
NEOLIGENTLT
The words "carelessly" and •'negligently^
are synonymous. Southern Ry. Co. v. Horine,
49 S. B. 2S5^ 121 6a. 386; Mascot Coal Co.
V. Garrett, 47 South. 149, 151, 156 Ala. 290
(citing 1 Words and Phrases, p. 974).
An interrogatory as to whether defend-
ant's locomotive was operated properly, the
complaint alleging that it was carelessly oper-
ated, is improper as calling for a conclusion ;
the word *^properly," as used, being the an-
tonym of '^negligently.*' Southern Ry. Co. v.
De Pauw (Ind.) 90 N. E. 27, 29.
The word "negligently'' means the fail-
ure to exercise ordinary care. Toebbe v. City
of Covington, 141 S. W. 421, 423, 145 Ky. 763.
The term "negligently," when applied to
the failure of a carrier of passengers to per-
form its duty to safely carry its passengers,
means the failure to use the highest degree of
care; and the "highest degree of care" means
the utmost care exercised by prudent and
skillful persons in the management and oper-
ation of trains. Loulaville & N. R. O
Kemp's Adm'r, 149 S. W. 836, 836, 149
344.
Under an allegatloii In a petition agi
a railroad company for negligent tread
of plaintiff employe at the company's hosi
stating that the surgeon furnished "care
ly and negligently and unnecessarily"
formed a specified operation, the words "(
lessly and negligently" are not synonyi
with "unnecessarily" ; the latter term negi
ing necessity for the operation, while
other terms refer to the manner of peif<
ing the operation. Williams v. Union Pa
Co. (Wyo.) 124 Pac 506, 608.
An instmctlMi that the terms '*n
gence," ^'negligent," and 'Negligently" im
a want of such attention to the natura
probable consequence of the act or omi£
as a prudent man ordinarily bestows In
ing in his own concerns, being in the e
language of Rev. Codes 1906, S 9622, is i
cient, especially where no more specific
struction was asked. Zilke r. Johnson,
N. W. 640, 644, 22 N. D. 76, Ann. Gas. 19
1006.
The clause of an instruction deds
plaintiff entitled to recover if defendant "
ligently failed to stop said automobile i
enough to prevent frightening said hoi
does not charge defendant with Uabiliti
the mere finding that the horses were fr]
ened by the automobUe, the word "neelig
ly" referring to the duty to stop as define
the instructions, requiring defendant to n
tain a vigilant watch and to stop at the
pearance of danger, and the instmctioiu
quiring, as a conditioo to recovery, that
fondant's failure should have been the pi
mate cause of the Injury. &&V9 ▼• Hui
116 S. W. 468, 466, 184 Mo. Appt 66&
NEGOTIABLE
See Not Negotiable;
The term "negotiable meaxis that ai
dorsee for value without notice becomes
owner of the paper unaffected by equities
defenses existing between the original
ties. Bank of Sampson v. Hatcher, 66 S
808, 810, 161 N. G. 359, 134 Am. St. Rep.
NEGOTIABLE BUX OF EXCKANGl
An instrument directing the drawo
pay to the order of the payee named a s]
fled sum to be deducted from money due
drawer on loans, and accepted by the dra
is not a negotiable bill of exchange wi
Negotiable Instruments Law (ConaoL I
1909, c. 38) i 210, defining a biU of exchi
as an unconditional order in writing addi
ed by one person to anothw, signed by
person giving it, requiring the person
whom it is addressed to pay on demanc
at a fixed or determinable fotore time a i
certain in money to order or to bearer,
is only an equitable assignment of moi
NBaOTIABLE IN FORM
581
NEOOTZABLB IN8TJEIUMXNT
due or to become due from tbe drawee to
tbe drawer, and liability arises either if the
proceeds of the moneys to be advanced on
tbe loans come into the drawee's hands, or
if through some act on his part performance
of the contract out of which such funds might
have otherwise arisen was preyented, and the
payee may not recover on the instrument in
the absence of evidence establishing either
of such facts or an estoppeL Tisdale Lumber
Co. V. Piquet, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1021, 1022, 153
App. Dlv. 266.
KEOOTIABIiS nr FORM
The term "negotiable in form," as applied
to a participation receipt issued by the agent
of a corporation to holders of its bonds,
would not imply that the receipts would
be negotiable in the sense of the law mer-
chant so as to pass to an innocent holder for
value. It would Imply that such receipt
would be transferable by the holder to a
third party, who would acquire the rights
of the origliial holder, no more and no less.
Cells V. Brown, 144 Fed. 742, 767. 76 0. C
A. 606. .
HEOOTIABZ.E nrSTBUMEMT
Bona fide holder of, see Bona Fide Hold-
er.
Fictitious name in, see Flctttioua Name.
Issue of negotiable instruments, see Is-
suance— Issue.
A ''negotiable instrument" is a written
promise or request for the payment of a
sum certain in money to order or bearer.
Cornish v. Woolverton, 81 Pac 4, 7, 82 Mont.
456, 108 Am. St Rep. 698 (citing Qv. Code,
13991).
A provisio9 for payment to order or
bearer is in general necessary to create "ne-
gotiable paper." Wettlaufer v. Baxter, 126
S. W. 741, 743, 187 Ky. 362, 26 L. B. A. (N.
8.) 804.
A "negotiable instrument" is one that is
simple, certain, and unconditional, and is so
defined by the law merchant It has always
been held, both at the common law and by
the decisions of most states, that any Instru-
ment which does not come within this defini-
tion should not be construed to be a negotia-
ble Instrument Randolph v. Hudson, 74 Pac.
946, 948, 12 Okl. 6ia
An instrument in writing, signed by the
drawer and containing an unconditional or-
^r to pay a sum certain in money at a fixed
future date to the order of a specified person,
&nd addressed to a drawee named therein,
was a "negotiable instrument" Bothwell v.
Conun, 123 S. W. 291, 292, 135 Ky. 766.
As defined by ssctions 4626 and 4627,
^mp. Laws 1909, a '*negotlaUe instrument"
^ a written promise or request for the pay-
loent of a certain sum of money to order or
bearer, and must be made payable in money
^^7, and without any condition not certain
of fulfillment Farmers^ Loan & Trust Co. v.
McCoy ft Spivey Bro&, 122 Pac 126, 126, 82
OkL 277, 40 L. R. A. (N. &) 177.
A writing providing that for value re-
ceived the signers jointly and severally prom-
ise to pay another or order a certain sum at
a certain bank with interest and without any
relief from valuation of appraisement law,
being duly signed and dated, was a negotia-
ble instrument within Revlsal 1905, | 2161,
and the following sections. Myers y. Petty,
60 a B. 417, 168 N. C. 462.
To constitute a "negotiable Instrument,"
the fact of the maturity of the instrument
at some time must be morally certain, and a
written agreement to pay money upon the
confirmation by Congress of a land grant was
not negotiable. Joseph v. Catron, 81 Pac.
439, 442, 13 N. M. 202, 1 Lw R. A. (N. S.) 1120.
A mere contract of employment specify-
ing compensation for services is not a nego-
tiable instrument within Act June 80, 1841
(Laws 1841, p. 627, c. 601, as extended by
Gen. St 1867, c. 230, | 21 ; Pub. St 1901, e
246, H 21, 22), specifying the negotiable paper
subject to trustee process. Steer v. Dow, 71
Ati. 217, 218, 76 N. H. 95, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.)
263.
Checks issued to employ^ payable only
in merchandise at the employer's store are
not negotiable instruments payable to bearer,
and possession of them by a third person
raises no presumption that he is entitled to
the rights of the employ^s^ and, in the ab-
sence of evidence that the third person has
acquired such right, he cannot recover. At-
toyac River (Lumber Co. v. Payne, 122 S. W.
278, 280, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 327.
An instrument acluiowledging receipt of
an automobile chassis to be delivered only on
return of the receipt properly indorsed was
not negotiable, a ''negotiable Instrument" be-
ing a written promise or request for the pay-
ment of money to order or to bearer, the
word 'Indorsed" as there used not being as If
used with reference to commercial paper.
Manny v. Wilson, 122 N. T. Supp. 16, 18, 137
App. Dlv. 140.
Under Negotiable Instruments Law (Con-
soL Laws 1909, c. 38) H 20, 27, providing
that an instrument to be negotiable must be
in writing, and signed by the maker and pay-
able to order or to bearer, and providing that
an instrument is payable to order when It is
drawn to the order of a specified person, or
to him or his order, an instrument whereby a
person agrees to pay a specified sum at a
designated place without mentioning any per-
son to whom the payment shall be made, or
without making the payment to bearer, is not
a negotiable Instrument Hilborn v. Penn-
sylvania Cement Co., 129 N. T. Supp. 957,
960, 145 App. Dlv. 442.
av. Code 1895, I 3991, provides that a
"negotiable instrument" is a written prom-
ise or request for the payment of a certain
NSaOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
582
NXGOTIABI/E INSTRUMENT
u
It
4>
«rum of money to order or bearer. Section
3d92 provides that a negotiable Instrument
must be made payable in money only, iand
without any condition not certain of fulfill-
ment Section 3996, as amended by Laws
1899, p. 124, provides that a negotiable in-
strument may contain a pledge of collateral
security, with the authority to dispose there-
of, also a provision for reasonable attorney
fee, or both. Section 3997 provides that a ne-
gotiable instrument must not contain any
other contract than such as is specified in
this article. Laws 1903, p. 238, | 3, subd. 2,
provides that an unqualified order or promise
to pay is "unconditionar* within the meaning
of this act, though coupled with a statement
of the transaction which gives rise to the In-
strument Held, that a paper containing an
order or contract for goods, and a note prom-
ising to pay for them, is not a negotiable in-
strument, where, if the note be detached, the
order for goods would be destroyed. State
V. Mitton, 96 Pac. 926, 927, 928, 87 Mont 366,
127 Am. St Rep. 732.
An instrument in the form of a letter,
addressed to the general agent of an insur-
ance company, acknowledging receipt of a
life Insurance policy, and requesting him *'to
place the said policy in force from this date,
and I promise to pay to you or to your or-
der the first annual premium amounting to
$256.55, as follows: Check inclosed, $125.00.
On Dec. 1, 1904, $131.55. Thomas R. Were"
— is a "negotiable instrument." Equitable
Trust Co. V. Were, 132 N. Y. Supp. 351, 352,
74 Misc. Rep. 469.
Under Negotiable Instruments Law
(Laws 1897, c 612, | 20), which provides that
an instrument, to be negotiable, must be in
writing and signed by the maker or drawer,
must contain an unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money, must be
payable on demand at a fixed or determin-
able future time, and must be payable to or-
der or to bearer, and section 22, which de-
clares that "an unqualified order or promise
to pay Is unconditional within the meaning
of this act, though coupled with ♦ • • a
statement of the transaction which gives
rise to the Instruments," an Instrument in
the form of a letter, addressed to the gen-
eral agent of an Insurance company, dated
April 19, 1905, which, after acknowledging
receipt of a life insurance policy requested
him "to place the said policy in force from
this date, and I promise to pay you or your
order the first aniyial premium, amounting to
$53.10, as follows:
Cash paid W. B. Watts $21.24
On July 10th, 1905 10.00
On Sept 10th, 1905 10.00
On Nov. 10th, 1905 11.86
$53.10
"Arthur N. Taylor,"
«— is a "negotiable instrument"; the mere
fact that its language shows that the con-
sideration for the promise was an Indebt
ness for an unpaid balance of a premii
upon a policy of insurance upon defendai
life which had been delivered to him i
operating to make it nonnegotiable, ud<
the statute or the customs and usages of m
chants. Equitable Trust Co. of New York
Taylor, 131 N. Y. Supp. 475, 476, 146 A]
Div. 424 ; Same ▼. Newman, 181 N. Y. Su]
1118, 146 App. Dlv. 953.
A claim against a county for services
not a '*negotiable instrument," and a purch
er thereof takes it subject to the del&ase
payment or any other defense the coi
ty might have had against the assignor. P
Ty County v. Eversole (Ky.) 98 S. W. 10
1020.
BiU of ladiac
See BiU of Lading.
Certiiloate of deposit
See Certificate of Deposit
Certifleate of stock
See Certificate of Stock.
CHieolui
Checks are "negotiable instruments^ tx
at common law and under the express pro
sions of Ey. St 1903, | 478. Boswell v. Q
zens' Sav. Bank, 96 & W. 797, 799, 12S I
485.
A postdated check is a *^egotiable
strument," subject to the laws relative to i
gotiable paper. Symonds y. BU^» 74 N.
926, 188 Ma8& 47a
As ol&ose In aotion
See Chose in Action.
Oomity bonds
A statute creating a county sanita
commission for Jefferson county, authorii
the Issuing of "negotiable bonds of Jeffers
county," due at the time designated then
and requiring the levy of a special anni
tax, the proceeds to be held exclusively a(
sanitary fund and applied exclusively to t
payment of interest on the bonds and 1
keeping In repair this county sanitary a:
tem ; any surplus to be used for payment
the principal of the bond. Held, that a i
gotiable bond of Jefferson county was m«
ly the general obligation of the county to p
at all events and out of any funds. Blrmii
ham Trust & Savings Co. v. Jefferson Coun
34 South. 398, 400, 137 Ala. 375.
Mionieipal bonds
Municipal bonds payable to bearer a
negotiable Instruments, and the rights a
liabilities of the makers and holders of su
of them as have come Into existence sic
the passage of the Negotiable Instnunei
Act (8 Comp. St 1910, p. 8732) are detemi
able by the provisions of that act Linbarg
V. Board of Education of West New York,
Aa 235, 237, 83 N. J. Law, 446.
NEGOTIABIiB IHSTBUIONT
58a
]gKK>TL£BLB NOTV
PMtml moteey oitUr
In the eetablishment and operation of
Lbe postal money order aystem, the goyem-
nent is not engaging in commercial transac-
tions, bat exercises a goyemmental power
For the pnbllc benefit; and it follows that
noney orders are not negotiable Instmments,
mbject to the defenses permitted to bona
ide holders for yalif^ by the law merchant,
rhe statute also imposes limitations and re-
»trictions inconsistent with negotiability.
Bolognesl T. United States, 188 Fed. S8S, 887,
111 G. G. A. er, 86 L. R. A. (N. &) 148.
Promissory note
See Promissory Note.
Wairamtfl
Village warrants are not "negotiable In-
Btmments*' in such a sense that defenses
available against the original payee are cut
off by transfer to a bona fide holder. Field
V. Village of Highland Park. 104 N. W. 893,
394, 141 Mich. 69 (citing Wall v. Monroe Co.,
103 U. S. 77, 26 L. Bd. 480).
Under the Negotiable Instrument Act of
Iowa (Acts 1902, c. 130, I 2; Code Supp.
Iowa 1907, 1 3060a2), which provides that the
sam payable by an instrument shall be a
sum certain within the meaning of the act,
"although it is to he paid • • • with ex-
change, whether at a fixed rate or at the cur-
rent rate," an obligation of a county, nego-
tiable in form and issued under a statute
permitting It to be made negotiable, is not
nonnegotiable bemuse It Is made payable *^
New York or Chicago exchange.** Security
Trust Co. of Rochester, N. Y., y. Des Moines
County, Iowa, 198 Fed. 831, 884.
HEGOTIABI.E HOTB
A "negotiable promissory note" is an
tmeonditlonal promise in writing to pay a
sum certain in money to order or to bearer.
Wettlaufer y. Baxter. 125 S. W. 741, 743,
137 Ky. 362, 26 L. K. A. (N. S.) 804 (citing
NegoUable Instrument Law [Ky. St I 3720b;
Russell St i 1897] U 1, 184).
Reyisal N. C. 1905, | 2334, proyldes that
a '^negotiable promissory note," within the
meaning of the chapter. Is an unconditional
promise in writing, made by one person to
another signed by the maker engaging to
pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable
^me a certain sum in money to order or to
bearer, j. W. Perry Co. y. Taylor Bros., 62
S. E. 423, 148 N. C. 362.
Any uncertainty in any of the essential
elements of a note to make it negotiable de-
a^TB its negotiability as an Inland bill of
exchange. A note is not negotiable as an
inland Mil of exchange, unless on its face
Its dats is certain, and contains an uncondi-
tional promise to pay a certain sum of money
^ a fixed time in a hank of the stata A
note dated "Mount Ayr, Indiana," payable
^Q t designated future date to a person
named "at the Bank of Blount Ayr," is a ne-
gotiable note within Boms' Ann. St 1908, |
9076, declaring a note payable to order of
bearer in a bank in the state is negotiable,
since it will he presumed that the bank nam-
ed in the note is a bank in the town named.
Halstead y. Woods, 95 N. B. 429, 481, 48
Ind. App. 127.
A note payable to a corporation is a
'*negotlable instrument,** capable, when in-
dorsed in blank, of being transferred from
hand to hand, and against which the maker's
trustee in bankruptcy can ayall himself of
only sach defenses as were ayallable to the
maker, not including collateral issues between
the indorsers subsequent to deliyery. In re
Schwarz, 200 Fed. 309, 310.
A "negotiable promissory note" generally
is made payable to a person or order and is
for a comparatlyely short period of time,
while a bond generally is made payable to
bearer, and baa a long time to nin. Owing
to the distinction between bonds and notes,
county commiMJonera authorised to issue
new bonds and exchange them for outstand-
ing ones are not authorized to exchange
them for promissory notes. Commissioners
of Muskingum County y. Stote, 86 N. B. 562.
567, 78 Ohio St 287.
By the law merchant in order to be "^ego-
tlable" a note must be payable to the order
of some person or to bearer. Under Comp.
St Neb. 1901, 1 3880, which proyldes that "all
bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange,
foreign and inland, drawn for any sum or
sums of money certain, and made payable
to any person or ord^r, or to any person or
assigns, shall be negotiable by Indorsement
thereon so as absolutely to transfer and yest
the property thereof In each and eyery in-
dorsee successlyely," as construed by the
Supreme Court of the state, a written guar-
anty, signed by the payee on the back of a
note payable to his order, constitutes an in-
dorsement with an enlarged liability, and
transfers the legal title free from equities
between the maker and payee. Leahy y.
Haworth, 141 Fed. 850, 866, 73 O. C. A. 84,
4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 657.
The essential requisites of a "negotiable
note" by the law merchant *'are a date and
an unconditional promise to pay money in a
certain sum, at a certain time, and at a
certain place.*' The negotiability of a note
is not destroyed by a recital of the consider-
ation and that the title of the property for
which it is glyen shall remain in the payee
until It is paid, and, if not paid at maturity,
then the property shall be sold and the pro-
ceeds applied to the debt hut a further stipu-
lation that partial payments to any amount
less than the principal shall be considered as
rental for the property renders the amount
payable uncertain and destroys its negotia-
bility. Gilpin y. People's Bank, 90 N. B. 91,
92, 45 Ind. App. 52.
MXG^OTIABIiB NOTB
5S4
KEaOTIABLB KOTB
Under Negotiable Instrament Law, Laws
IS97, p. 765, c 612, | 820, proyldlng that a
'Negotiable note" Is an unconditional written
promise by one to another, signed by the
maker, to pay to order or bearer, and that
where a note Is drawn to the maker's order
It Is not complete till Indorsed by him, the
complaint in an action on a note payable to
the maker must allege its indorsement by
him. Edelman y. Rams, 109 N. Y. Supp. 816,
817, 58 Misc. Rep. 561.
A writing signed by a party, and stating
that a certain amount is due a person men-
tioned therein without reciting that it was
executed "for value received," is not a "ne-
gotiable note," for under Rev. St. 18d0, I
457, an Instrument to be a negotiable instru-
ment must contain the quoted words. Loch-
er v. Euechenmlester, 98 S. W. 92, 97, 120 Mo.
App. 701.
Under Negotiable Instrument Law, St.
1898, I 1675, subd. 2, as amended by Laws
1899, p. 684, a 856, making a note negotiable
If "the sum payable is a sum certain,
• • • although it Is to be paid • • •
with costs of collection or an attorney's fee
in case payment shall not be made at ma-
turity," a note is negotiable which provides
for an attorney's fee only on collection by
attorney after dishonor. First Nat Bank
of Shawano v. Miller, 120 N. W. 820, 821,
139 Wis. 126, 131 Am. St Rep. 1040.
A note, properly signed by the maker,
containing an unconditional promise to pay
a sum certain in money at a specified future
time, to the order of a specified person, is a
"negotiable instrument" Mechanics' &
Farmers' Sav. Bank v. Katterjohn, 125 S.
W. 1071, 1072. 137 Ky. 427, Ann. Cas. 1912A,
439.
A provision in an interest-bearing note
that if the Interest be not paid semiannual-
ly it shall become as principal and bear the
same rate of interest does not make the
amount of the note uncertain, so as to render
it nonnegotiable, and such note is a "negoti-
able instrument" Brown v. Vossen, 87 S. W.
577, 578, 112 Mo. App. 676.
Under a statute defining a "negotiable
instrument" and providing that it must be
made payable in money only, without condi-
tions not certain of fulfillment, and must not
contain any other contract than that speci-
fied, a note providing that, if not paid when
due, both principal and interest shall bear an
increased rate of interest, is not negotiable.
Cornish v. Woolverton, 81 Pac. 4, 6, 8, 32
Mont 456, 108 Am. St Rep. 59a
Under Acts 1899, c. 94, relating to "nego-
tiable Instruments" and providing that an
instrument to be negotiable must be in writ-
ing, and must be payable to order or bearer,
etc., a note not payable to either order or
bearer Is not a "negotiable instrument"
Gilley V. HarreU, 101 S. W. 424, 425, 118
Tenn. 115.
A note given December 16, 1908, payab
In lastallmeBts three months apart, f^<
contains a stipulation that; If it is pa
within 15 days from date, a discount Qf 5 p
cent will be allowed, being uncertain as
the amount necessary to satisfy it at ti
time of its execution, is nonn^otiabl
Farmers' Loan ft Trust Ck>. v. McCk>7 & Spi
ey Bros., 122 Pac 125, 426, 32 OkL 277, :
L. R. A. (N. S.) 177.
A note containing a stipulation wheret
the sureties, guarantors^ indorsers, and mal
ers waive notice of the granting of any e
tension of time for payment and waive tl
right of defense on the ground that extei
slon has been made without notice to them (
either of them, is not a "negotiable proml
sory note," within the meaning and intei
of the negotiable instrument law of tb
state. Union Stockyards Nat Bank of Soul
Omaha v. Bolan, 93 Pac 508, 510, 14 Idab
87, 125 Am. St Rep. 146 (citing Sees. Lav
1903, p. 380).
Rem. & Bal. CJode, S 3392, declares tbi
an instrument to be negotiable, must contai
an unconditional promise to pay a sum ce
tain in money, must be payable on demand (
at a fixed or determinable future time, ax
must be payable to order or to bearer. Se
tlon 3394 declares that an unqualified ord<
to pay is unconditional, though coupled wit
an indication of a particular fund out <
which reimbursement is to be made or a pa
ticular account to be debited with the amouj
or a statement of a particular transactio
which gives rise to the instrument but tbi
an order or promise to pay only out of
particular fund is not unconditional. Hel
that, where a note was payable on demam
it was not rendered nonnegotiable becais
It contained a statement that It was give
to take up the freight and rehandling of
certain car, the proceeds from resale of sue
car to apply on the note, there being notbii
therein making payment dependent on Vi
sufficiency of the proceeds of the resale <
the material on the car or preventing a d'
mand for full payment Independent of sue
proceeds at any time; the test being wbetb<
the general credit of the maker accompanii
the Instrument First Nat Bank of Snoh^
mlsh V. SulUvan, 119 Pac 820, 821, 66 Was!
375, Ann. Gaa 19130, 930.
Under the statute providing that a "b(
gotiable instrument" must be made payabl
in money only, and without any condition nt
certain of fulfillment one of the essentli
qualities of a ''negotiable promissory note
is absolute certainty as to the sum of mone
to be paid, a certainty which must appea
on the face of the note. Therefore, if an
part of the amount is dependent on any coi
tingency, or where it is necessary to offe
proof other than the instrument itself, tb
negotiable character of the Instrument 1
destroyed. Cotton v. John Deere Plow Co
78 Pac 321, 14 OkL 60S.
NEGOTIABLE NOTE
NEGOTIATE
Under Negotiable Instrnments Aot 18^
(Acts 1887, p. 783, c 74, | 1; Gen. St c. 234,
M 4171, 417Q, an lAstnunent, signed by tbe
maker, and dated, promising to pay a stated
ELmount at a certain bank one year after
late, was a "negotiable promissory note."
St Paul's ESpiscopal Ghardi t. Fields, 72 Atl.
L43, 140, 81 Conn. 67a
A '^negotiable promissory note** is an un-
ronditional promise In writing made by one
person to another, signed by the maker, and
engaging to pay, on demand or at a fixed or
ieterminable future time, a sum certain in
money to order or to bearer. Baumeister ▼.
Kuntz, 42 South. 886, 887, 53 Fla. 340.
B. & G. Oomp. II 299-302, provide in ef-
fect that all property not exempt from execu-
tion shall be subject to attachment, and that
personal property capable of manual deliv-
ery, and not in possession of a third person,
shall be attached by the sheriff taking it into
tils possession, and garnishment proceedings
&re provided to reach personal property not
[sapable of manual delivery and in possession
of a third person. Section 4586 defines a ne-
gotiable promissory note as an unconditional
promise in writing engaging to pay on demand,
or at a fixed or determinable time, a certain
sum in money. Held, that a negotiable
promissory note belons^g to defendant, in
tils possession, and bearing no indorsements,
wha subject to attachment and sale under ex-
ecution. Fishbum v. Londershausen, 92 Pac
1060. 1061, 50 Or. 363, 14 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 1284,
15 Ann. Gas. 975.
Gourt and Practice Act 1905, | 601, subd.
11, provides that debts secured by bills of
exchange or negotiable promissoiy notes Shall
be exempt from attachment on any warrant
of distress or any other writ, original, mesne,
or judidaL Held, that an overdue promis-
sory note iB still negotiable within the stat-
ute, and hence the amount due thereon is
exempt from process of foreign attachment
Oakdale Mfg. Go. v. Glarke, 69 Atl. 681, 29
R.I. 192.
A note reciting that the principal and
interest are payable at a designated place,
but if any part of the principal or interest
Is not paid at maturity it shall bear Interest,
and if the note is placed in the hands of an
attorney for collection or suit is brought
thereon an attorney's fee of 10 per cent., in-
cluding interest, shall be taxed as costs or
included in the judgm^it, is a "nonnegotia*
ble instrument" Dickerson v. Hlggins, 82
Pac. 649, 650, 16 Okl. 588.
HEOOTIABIiE PAPEK
See Gurrent Negotiable Paper.
HEGOTIABILITT
The first requisite to the "negotiabiltty"
of a paper is that it should be a **note,'*
and, as a **note'' must be an obligation for
the payment of a certain sum of money, a
provision thiat if eollectioa Is made throiigh
an attorney, or by legal proeeos,. the maker
will pay all costs and expehses Including 10
per cent of the amount collected as attorney's
fees, renders the note nonnegotlable. Green
V. Spires, 50 S. B. 5M, 596, 71 8. a 107, 4
Ann. Gas. 2ttL
NEGOTIATE
To '^negotiate" means to treat with an-
other or others; to arrange for or procure
by negotiation; to put into circulation by
transference and assignment; to conclude
by bargain, treaty, or agreement; to transfer,
to pass, to sell; or to procure by mutual iur
tercourse and agreement with another. Au-
rora State Bank v. Hayee-Eamea ESlevator
Go., 129 N. W. 279, 280, 88 Neb. 187 (quoting
5 Words and Phrases, pp. 4771, 4772).
The word "negotiate," as used in a peti-
tion, which alleges that defendant authorized
plaintiif to negotiate a sale of a lease for
defendant, should be construed to mean con-
versation in arranging the terms of a con-
tract Northrup v. Diggs, 106 S. W. 1123,
1126, 128 Mo. App. 217.
"An instrument is 'negotiated* when it is
transferred from one person to another. in
such manner as to constitute the transferee
the holder thereof.*' Wettlaufer v. Baxter,
125 S. W. 741, 748, 137 Ky. 362, 26 I* R. A.
(N. S.) 804.
"Negotiated," in the usual technical and
legal sense used by law-writers In speaking
of commercial paper, means to transfer for
a valuable consideration under rules of com-
mercial law. The term is sometimes used as
meaning to discuss or arrange for a sale or
bargain, or the preliminaries of a business
transaction; also, to sell or discount nego-
tiable paper, or assign or transfer it by in-
dorsement or delivery. The term as used in
Rev. St 1909, i 1275, which provides that be-
fore a school bond shall be negotiated it shali
first be presented to the State Auditor for
registry, means the selling and putting in
circulation by delivery in consummation of
the sale. State ex reL GarroUton School
Dist V. Gordon, 133 S. W. 44, 47, 231 Mo. 547
(quoting and adopting definitions in Web-
ster's New Unabridged Diet and Black's Law
Diet).
Where an order authorized a dty finance
oonunittee to "negotiate" notes for the city's
benefit, the term *iiegotiate" was sufficient
to Include the entire transaction of asking
for bids, or ascertaining the discount by
private Inquiry, and deciding upon the
amounts, the rate, and the time on which
the notes should be given. Brown v. Gity of
Newburyport, 95 N. E. 504, 606, 209 Mass.
259, Ann. Ga& 1912B, 495.
Under the provisions of thi^ negotiable
instruments law (Gomp. St 1909, c. 41) that
every person negotiating an instrum^t by
HJSaOTIATB
688
KEaOTIATIOK
deUyeiy Wlirraiiti that it is genuine, and that
he has good title, and article 8, i SO, of such
law, providing that an instroment ia nego-
tiated when it is transferred to another so
as to make the transferee the holder, the
word "negotiating" means putting into cir-
culation by assignment of a claim, by indorse-
ment, to dispose of by sale, and in 5 Words
and Phrases, p. 4771, it Is said : "To 'nego-
tiate' means to conclude by a bargain, treaty,
or agreement, to transfer, to sell; and the
power to negotiate a bill or note is said to
be the power to indorse and deUver it to
another, so that the right of action shall also
pass, and negotiation means the act by
whi<^ a bill of exchange or note is put into
circulation by being passed by one of the orig-
inal parties to another person." National
Bank of Commerce of Lincoln t. I^rmers' &
Merchants' Bank, 128 N. W. 522, 628, 87 Neb.
841.
Where a broker's contract of authority
authorized him* to negotiate for the sale of
the lands in question at $5 an acre for 80
days, and the owners bound themselyes to
execute good conveyances to such purchaser
as the brokers might produce on payment of
the price, the term "negotiate" imported au-
thority on the part of the brokers to make
a binding sale agreement, and the contract
did not therefore limit their authority to find-
ing a purchaser ready and able to pay the
price. Combes t. Adams, 63 8. EL 186, 188,
160 N. C. 64.
Rev. St 1900, i 1276, provides that be-
fore any school bond "shall obtain validity
or be negotiated, such bond shall first be
presented to the State Auditor, who shall
register the same," etc Held, that the term
"obtain validity" meant to become clothed
with validity as a present and subsisting
obligation, and the term "negotiated" meant
that the bonds should have been sold and
put in circulation by delivery in consumma-
tion of the sale ; and officers of a school dis-
trict, after bonds have been voted, may ad-
vertise for bids and accept a bid for bonds
before they have been registered by the
State Auditor; and hence such acts of the
officers furnish no reason for refusing regis-
tration. State ex rel. Carrollton School Dist
No. 1, Tp. 63, R. 23, v. Gordon, 183 S. W.
44, 47, 231 Mo. 547.
According to the express terms of Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law, | 60 (Laws 1897,
p. 728, c. 612), "an instrument is 'negotiat-
ed' when it is transferred from one person
to another in such manner as to constitute
the transferee the holder thereof. If pay-
able to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery;
if payable to order, it is negotiated by the
Indorsement of the holder completed by de«
livery." 'The popular meaning of 'negoti-
ate* is the same." Rogers v. Morton, 95 N.
Y. Supp. 4», 60, 46 Misa Rep. 494.
Voting trust certificates of a corporation
were turned over to a committee, which was
authorized '^ negotiate in behalf of
owners for the sale of the pooled stoc
Further authority was given to s^ not 1
than two-thirds of such stock at such prl
as might be approved in writing by the oi
ers. The committee made an agreement
sale, the terms c«f which were net onen
and the price was adequate. The asreem
for sale may have been optional; but, if
the purchasers proposed to execute it fi
when the agreement was questioned by
stockholder. It was made by the commit
in good faith. The sale was within the
press authority of the committee. Weit»
Burrage, 76 N. E. 608, 190 Mass. 267.
* Acts Mo. 1906, pp. 247, 248, | 30, I
vides that an instrument is negotiated wl
it is transferred from one person to anot
in such manner as to constitute the tn
feree holder thereof: if payable to bearei
is negotiated by delivery; if payable to
der, it is negotiated by the Indorsement
the holder completed by delivery. Sect
31: "The indorsement must be writt»i
the instrument itself or upon a paper
tached thereto." Under this statute a nc
tiable note payable to order will not pass
mere delivery. Sublette v. Brewington,
S. W. 1160, 139 Mo. App. 410.
NEGOTIATIOV
"Negotiation'* means traffic or conclus
by bargain or agreement Bverson v. G
eral Accident Fire ft Life Assur. Ck>rp., L
ited, of Perth, Scotland, 88 N. E. 668, (
202 Mass. 169.
"Negotiations" is a very broad term,
emblraces everything from the first appro
of the one who desires to purchase to
one from whom the purdiase is to be m
to the final consummation of the contracl
purchase. No interest either legal or equ
ble, in the subject-matter of the negotiati<
is acquired by merely beginning them, i
no right is vested in the negotiator until
negotiations reach a stage where the pei
desiring to purchase could compel a com
ance of the property from the owner, i
until such state is reached the purchaser
no right which can be the subject of bai^
Allen & Holmes y. Powell, 64 S. E. :
138, 125 Ga. 438.
"Negotiation" means the act by wl
a bill or note Is put into circulation by
ing passed by one of the original parties
another; and presentation of the check
payment is not a negotiation of the ch(
within the meaning of the negotiable iusi
ments law. Aurora State Bank v. Ha;
Eames Elevator Co., 129 N. W. 279, 280,
Neb. 187.
" 'Negotiation' means the act by whic
bill of exchange or promissory note is
Into circulation by being passed by one
the original parties to another person." I
ment by a bank of a check drawn upoi
N.EQQTIATI02^
58T
N£iaHBOBB00II
cs not constltote the tMmk a liold«r with-
the meaniiig of Negotiable Ixustrnmenta
LW, proYlding that an instnuiient la nego-
tted when It Is tranaferred, so as to oon-
tute the transferee a turfder thereot Na-
>iial Bank of Commerce of Lincoln y.
Limers' ft Merchants' Bank, 128 N. W. 622,
3, 87 Neb. 841 (quoting and adopting the
flnltlon In 5 Words and Phrases, p. 4771).
To make one a holder In due course of
negotiable note payable to order, it must
L ve been indorsed to him ; Revisal, 1906, f
T8, defining negotiation of such a note as
dug by the indorsement of the holder and
»mpleted by delivery, and, without proof
indorsement, the note is held subject to
^y valid defense which the maker has, In-
udlng that of fraud. Woods t. Finley, 60
. E. 502, 603, 163 N. 0. 401.
In an admission that a note sued on was
idorsed by the several defendants "on or be-
>re negotiation," the words ''on or before*'
ccluded "after," and the word "negotiation*'
Ignifled deliyery; that term being generally
escriptiye of all those acts by which a note
T bill is put into circulation or passed in
ts drcnlation, including delivery in Issue,
raiMBfer by delivery, or transfer by indorse-
nent. Edward Knapp ft Ck>. v. Tidewater
>>al Co^ 81 Aa 1068, 1006, 86 Oonn. 147.
In an affidavit for continuance because
>f inability to obtain counsel to prepare the
c^ase and to represent him on the trial, re-
citing that the negotiations for the employ-
ment of counsel had been commenced but
never consummated, the word "negotiations"
has a well-defined professional meaning.
Carpenter t. Commonwealth (Ky.) 02 S. W.
552.
NEGRO
As citizen, see Citizen.
See, also, Colored Person.
A "^egro" is defined as a "black man,
especially one of the race who inhabit trop-
ical Africa, and who are distinguished by
crisped or curly hair, flat noses and protrud-
ing lips," and the word also includes their
Ascendants In America and elsewhere, but
the word Is also loosely applied to other
dark and black-skinned races and to mixed
breeds. The word '*negro" of itself, unqual-
ified, does not necessarily include within its
meaning persons possessed of only an admix-
ture of negro blood, notably those whose ad-
mixture Is 80 slight that even an expert
cannot be positive. An octoroon Is not a
'^person of the negro pr black race" within
^ct No. 87 of 1908, I 1, making concubinage
between a person of the Caucasian or wliite
face and t rierson of the negro or black race
a felony. State v. Treadaway, 52 South.
^. 5U, 126 La. 800, 130 Am. 8t Rep. 514,
^' Ann, Cas. 12W.
HEGBO cmui
Child as induding, gee OMld--Chlldreii
(In Statute^).
NEIGHBORHOOD
See Same General Neighborhood.
The phrase "general locality" and the
word •*ndghborhood*' imply a considerable
territory, and cannot be used in a legal senae
as describing a circle on a street of a diniu-
eter of about six feet. Morlarty v. City of
New York, 116 N. Y. Supp. 523, S24, 132 App.
Div. 10.
Etymologically and by common under-
standing In the vicinity' mearijj La the neigh-
borhood, and 'neighborhood,' as appUed ta
place, signifies nearness. *Ifi the vieiulty'
does not even mean adjoinliig to or abutting
on, but merely dose by, or neighboring coun-
try.'* Jones V. Rogers, Sa South. 742, 745,
85 Miss. 802.
Where the value of land is of necessity
to be deduced from a consideration of the
price of properties in the neifrhborbood^ with
reference to comparative locations, Improve-
ments, and other incidents, the court cannot
say that a '^neighborhood" has reference oih
ly to adjacent property, or attempt to fix a
standard of measurement, and say as a matp
ter of law that the similar property concern-
ing which inquiry may be made is such only
as may be found within a given number of
feet, yards, or blocks of the property con-
demned; that being a matter as to which the
trial court is vested vrith discretion to draw
the line in each case as shell seem Juat un-
der all the circumstances developed by the
testimony, and that, unless ubuiie of mwh
discretion is shown, its ruling will uot b#
held reversible error. Youtzy v. City of
Cedar Rapids, 129 N. W. 351, 150 lowa^ 53.
The market value of a particular piece
of realty sought to be condemned is to be
measured by the price usually ^^Iven for »uch
property in that nelghborbood. making due
allowance for differences of position a, aoU,
and improvements, and In large cities the
word "neighborhood" is a relative one, so
that the field which a witness may take Into
consideration in forming an opinion of tbe
selling price of land in the vldnlty of certain
property sought to be taken should be rea-
sonably adjacent thereto and of the same
general character as the immediate locality
in which the property sought to be taken la
situated. Rea v. Pittsburg & C. B, Co,. 18
Ati. 73, 79, 229 Pa. 106, 140 Am. St Rep. 721.
Act approved February 23, 1907 (St-
1907, p. 16, c. 26), provider that whenever 50
or a majority of the owners, who are aldo the
owners of a majority of the lands of any
farming or other comimiinity or neighborhood
within this state, which lands lie in one
body, and are liable to overflow or damage
from the waters of any umiavlgable stream.
i'l
'li
NISIOHBORHOOD
S88
NEITHSB PARTY* VIC
i
tnd may be protected by the same system of
works, desire to provide for the protection
of such lands, they may petition the board
of supervisors in the county in which the
lands of the conmiunity or neighborhood and
within the proposed district or the greater
portion thereof are situated for the organisa-
tion of such protection district Held, that
these provisions do not limit the area of any
district to a territory which might after-
wards be determined by a court to be a sin-
gle community or neighborhood, or give the
court power 'to declare the district organi-
zation invalid if it should find that the
boundaries included two or more such com-
munities or neighborhoods, as the term ^'com-
munity" refers rather to the people who re-
side in a given locality, in more or less prox-
imity, than to the territory which includes
them, and the term "neighborhood" describes
a territory of indefinite size and without
fixed limits, and therefere a district may be
organized which embraces two or more com-
munities or neighborhoods, provided the lands
lie in one body, and are liable to damage
from the same stream and may be protected
therefrom by the same system of works.
Keech v. Joplin, 106 Pac. 222, 227, 157 Cal. 1.
As Vance of aeqnaiatanoesliip or Imsi-
The term •'neighborhood," in the rule
that a person called to impeach the reputa-
tion of a witness must reside in the neigh-
borhood of the residence of the witness, com-
prises the natural radius of repute, and in-
cludes thie territory wherein one resides,
moves, circulates, does business, and has in-
tercourse with his fellows; and it is not
confined to the same village, town, or city,
and a person residing in a town less than
14 miles distant from a. town in the same
county in which a witness resides may testi-
fy as to the reputation of the witness, es-
pecially where he does business in the latter
town. People v. Loris, 116 N. Y. Supp. 236,
237, 238, 131 App. Div. 127 (citing Greenl. on
Ev. [15th Ed.] 451; State v. Henderson, 1
S. E. 225, 29 W. Va. 147; Peters v. Bourneau,
22 111. App. 177; Chess v. Chess [Pa.] 1 Pen.
& W. 32, 21 Am. Dec. 450 ; Hadjo v. Gooden,
13 Ala. 718 ; Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 380, 73
Am. Dec. 422; State v. Mk:Laughlin, 50 S.
W. 315, 149 Mo. 19; WalUs v. White, 15 N.
W. 767, 58 Wis. 26; Burr- Jones, Ev. [2d Ed.]
1097; Best, Ev. [International Ed.] p. 255).
The general rule is that, to impeach a
witness by proof of bad character, the predi-
cate is a knowledge of his character in the
community or neighborhood in which he re-
sides, the terms "community" and "neigh-
borhood" meaning in a general way where
the witness is well known and has estab-
lished a reputation, and the inquiry is not
necessarily confined to his domicile; and
hence, where it appeared that, though a wit-
ness, resided in Baltimore, he had an estab-
lished toosiness in Mobile, and spent much
Us time there, evidence as to a knowled^
of his ofaaracter in Mobile was admissible i
a predicate for impea<Ailng testimony. Ric
aid P. Baer ft Oo. r. Mobile Cooperage
Box Mf^. Ck>., 49 South. 92, 98, 96, 150 Al
49L
KEIOHBORHOOD BOAB
As highway, see Highway.
KElOMBOnaOr
The word "neighboring,** in Act Mlin
14, 1879 (P. L. p. 316), is sufficiently exte
sive in its meaning to make the act app]
cable to municipalities in the sanoe county i
which gas may conveniently be conveyc
from a central plant The word '^neighbo
ing" is of indefinite meaning, and it has be<
construed in some cases as possessing a na
row signification, while in others it is giv(
a broad construction. Its meaning must d
pend upon the circumstances and the subjec
matter with which we have to deal. Wii
the improvement in means of commnnicatio
municipalities which were remote became
a fair sense "neighboring" mnnidpalitic
When used in respect to a commodity whii
may be distributed as readily and as a
vantageously as gas, the term cannot I
limited to adjoining municipalities. It nu
at least be held to be broad enough to 1
elude municipalities within the same conn
to which gas may conveniently be conveys
from a central plant Millville Imp. Co.
Pitman, Glassboro & Clayton Gas Co., 67 A
1006, 1006, 75 N. J. Law, 410 (dlstinguis
ing Madison v. Morristown Gaslight Co., I
AU. 439, 65 N. J. Eq. 356).
NEIGHBORS
Louisiana Rev. Civ. Ck)de, art 070, pi
vides that every one is Inmnd to keep fa
buildings in repair so that neither all D(
any part of the material composing the
may injure the "neighbors or passengers'* n
der penalty of all losses and damages th
may result from the owner's negligence
such respect Held applicable only to pc
sons "outside" the building, such as neig
bors or passers-by injured by the fall of tl
building or some part thereof, and does d
apply to persons lawfully in the building i
guests, tenants, etc. Frank y. Suthon, li
Fed. 174, 17a ,^
NEITHER PARTY, ETC.
The entry of ''Neither party, no furth^
action, same cause," means that by agre
ment neither party further appears in coa
in that suit, and it also Involves a stipul
tion that the plaintiff shall maintain no fn
ther action for the same cause. The plai
tiff's cause of action is extinguished. 6e
dron V. Hovey, 56 AU. 583, 98 Me. 139l
N£PHfiW
589
KBT
iEPHEW
The word "n^pbew" Is deflaed m *^e
on of a brother, or sister; or of the brother-
Q-law or a sister-ln-law" ; **the son of a
irother or sister. But in a beqnest would
lot include, without special mention, nephews
md nieces by marriage"; "in Bnglish law
be son and niece, the daughter, of a brother
r sister; and great-nephews or great-nieces
xe not embraced by the terms, and, as a
ift is naturally to blood relatlTee, a nephew
r niece by marriage — that is, the nephew
r niece of the testator's husband or wife —
3 prima facie excluded, as also would be the
rives or widows of a blood nephew.*' Boyd
. Perkins, 113 S. W. 95, 06, 130 Ky. 77 (dt-
ng Webstier's Diet; Bouv. Caw Diet; Schou-
^r. Wills [2d Ed.] I 689.
As brotker
See Brother.
Ormadnepliew
Testator gave a legacy to his nleoe Kate,
^ughter of Dr. H. W., and to Dr. H. W. a
pecified sum for himself and his other chil-
ren, and he gave legacies to any niece or
epbew whom he had omitted, excepting the
hildren of Dr. H. W., for whom he had
lade provision. Testator was a widower,
fho had never had any children, and left
unriving him a number of nieces and nep-
ews, and grandnieces and grandnephews,
lescendants of sisters who died before the
xecotion of the will. Tbere were two Drs.
1. W., father and son; the father being the
ather of the niece Kate. Testator had a
iece Mrs. P., Who was ondtted from the
nil, and the legacy to her was on her death
aid to her children. Held, that the words
niece or nephew" did not embrace grand-
ieoes and grandnephews. White v. Old, 75
L E. 182. 184, 113 Va. 709.
The testator was a widower, and left
0 children or descendants. He left surviv-
Dg 1 brother, and 16 nephews and nieces,
nd several grandnephews and grandnlece&
lany of the nephews and nieces had married
nd had children, and some had died leaving
hildren. The will contained bequests m
avor of all his nephews and nieces with one
xception. It also contained legacies to a
umber of grandnephews and grandnieces,
hildren of deceased nephews and nieces,
ind, after making provisions for the surviv-
Dg brother and various other persons, pro-
ided that all the rest ef the property not
hereinbefore disposed of should be given to
lis '^nephews and nieces," to be divided
mong them in the proportion whic^ the prt-
ious gifts made to them bore to each other,
leld. that the words "nephews and nieces"
ontained In the residuary clause Included
Tandnephews and grandnieces. Leasic v.
Wchards, 101 N. Y. Supp. 652, 116 App.
Mv. 274 ; Leask v. Hoagland, 80 N. B. 919,
"20, 188 N. Y. 291.
NERVE FOOD
On motion for a pteUminary injunction
in a suit by the mannf aotnrsr of a secret
preparation alleged in the bill to be a bever-
age and "nerve food," or compound for the
nervous system, and a restorative agent of
value in restoring lost nervous energy, and
also of value as a stomachic, to restrain in-
fringement and unfair competition, on which
affidavits were presented by defendants to
the effect that the expression "nerve food"
as applied to a compound of such oharacter
was a misrepresentation, not only being sd-
entlflcally a meaningless phrase, but as im-
porting the possession of nerve nourishing or
stimulating properties which it could not
possess, and complainants in reply produced
affidavits that its actual formula had been
submitted to physicians who testified that it
was properly described as a nerve food, the
weight of the evidence showed that complain-
ants had a reasonable basis for believing
their representations made to the public that
it was a "nerve food." Moxie Nerve Food
Go. of New England v. Modox Go., 158 Fed.
487, 48a
NERVOUS
The word "nervoos" is a generic term
having many different meanings, and evi-
dence that ever since the accident plaintiff
had been ''nervous," without any particular
indication as to what was meant by that
term, where counsel disclaimed an intention
to show injury to the nervous system as an
item of damage, simply means that the plain-
tiff was excitable and easily agitated or an-
noyed as the result of her physical injury,
not that she was suffering from a nervous
disease caused by the accident Adcock v. Or-
egon R., etc, Co., 77 Pac. 78, 79, 45 Or. 173.
NET
See GUI Net ; Trammel Net; Wing Nets.
Use of the word "net" indicates that
something is being deducted. Georgia R. &
Banking Co. v. Wright, 132 Fed. 912, 914.
Where furs were sold "net," that expres-
sion means that the seller was required to
defray the cost of delivery. Fleet v. Hirtz,
66 N. E. 858, 861, 201 111. 594, 94 Am. St.
Rep. 192.
"Net" means free from charges or deduc-
tions obtained after deducting all expenses;
the words **net to us," in a telegram sent
by plaintiff offering to sell butter to. defend-
ant for 17 cents per pound "net to us," means
that the price is to be 17 cents, free from all
charges and deductions. Floral Creamery
Co. V. Dillon, 75 AtL 82, 85, 83 Conn. 65.
Where one states to a broker that he
will sell land for a certain sum "net^ to him,
the broker on proouring a purchaser is enti-
tled to no commissleo unless the sum reoeftv-
'J
1^1
ii
NOT.
590
N£T IfiAKNIKOS
11
ed exceeds the spedfled net price; the word
"net" meaning that which remains after de-
ducting all charges and outllLy. Wolverton
V. TutUe, d4 Pac. 961, 063, 51 Or. 601.
Testator gave personal property in trust,
the income of which was to be paid to certain
legatees during their liyes, and devised the
remaining f our-flfths of the estate in trust to
pay a certain part of the "net rents, inter-
est, or income" to each of his three nieces,
and upon their death payment of the "rents,
interests, or income" of their respectiTe
shares w&s to be paid over to their respective
children during their lives. Two of the three
nieces, to whom the bulk of the estate was
given, were made executrices and trustees,
with a provision for their successors, but
without any express provision for their com-
pensation. Held, that the word "net," used
to qualify the "rents, interest, or income"
payable to the residuary legatees, if not in-
advertent, did notHshow any intention of the
testator to impose upon their interests the
burden of bearing all the expenses of the
trust Leach V. Cowan, 140 S. W. 1070, 1075,
126 Tenn. 182, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 188.
Where a contract employing plaintiffs to
sell defendants' property provided that it
must be sold at a price to net the owners
not less than $125 per acre, and that the
commission must be added to that amount,
the contract did not authorize the brokers to
retain as their commission all of the price
above $125 per acre obtained, but only en-
titled them to a reasonable compensation.
AUen V. J. A. Glopton Realty Go. (Tex.) 136
S. W. 242, 243.
NET ASSETS
Under a statute providing that "net as-
sets" means the funds of an Insurance com-
pany available for the payment of its obliga-
tiond in the commonwealth after deducting
therefrom losses and "claims for losses," an
insurance company whose assets exceed by
about $30,000 its liabiUaes, not including
claims against it aggregating $300,000, based
on policy holders disputing the validity of
settlements for losses, is insolvent, and the
insurance commissioner may apply for a re-
ceiver and enjoin the company from carry-
ing on further business as authorized by the
statute; the phrase "claims for losses" in-
cluding all pending claims, whether finally
adjudged valid or invalid. Cutting v. Amer-
ican Ins. Co., 83 N. E. 396, 397, 197 Mass. 131.
NET CASH
"Net cash" as between buyer and seller
means that the buyer shall pay the "net
price" to seller. Plaintiff procured a con-
tract authorizing him to sell defendant's tim-
ber land on a 5 per cent, commission; and,
having found a purchaser, presented to de-
fendant for his signature an option giving the
grantee the right to purchase within 60 days.
Defendant, . before signiag the option, but
without any conversation with plaini
changed the same so as to read that
price was "net cash" to him. Held, that si
alteration meant that the price was net c
to defendant as between himself and the i
chaser and had not reference to def endaj
contract with plaintiff for commissions. L
V. Scatcherd, 146 Fed. 1, 8, 77 O. C. A. 1.
NET CREDITS
As credits, see Credits.
NET EARNINGS
The "net earnings rule" is a method
determining the value of a special francti
by . ascertaining its earning capacity;
franchises being assumed to be worth tJ
sum which, if placed at interest at a del
mined rate, will produce the amount wh
the franchise earns. In determining the t
able value of a waterworks franchise, los
due to functional as well as physical de{
dation should be charged as an expense
operation. Earnings in an adjoining boroi
from the sale of about one-half of the a
pany's output are properly included. A gr
sum, covering uncollectible accounts, 1
than 1 per cent of the gross earnings, ^
properly deducted. An item for fanning
penses should not be deducted as a cost
operation^ The amount of land neceasi
for proper operation and for preservation
the water supply is largely a question
determination by the directors; but landp
chased to prevent its acquisitioa by some <
else should not be included. One of the i
tors of the net earnings rule governing i
taxable value of a waterworks franchise
the amount of capital invested in land. 1
net earnings rule for determining the v&
of a special franchise requires an ascertj
ment of the gross earnings, the gross opei
ing expenses deductible therefrom, as well
a fair and reasonable return on the port
of the capital invested in tangible propei
and the balance, if any, capitalized at a f
rate, represents the value of the special fn
chise. People ex rel. Queens County Wa
Co. V. Woodbury, 128 N. Y. Supp. 522, 5
143 App. Div. 618.
Bums' Ann. St 1901, H 849^-8499. 85
8638, 8555, requiring railroads to make sta
ments giving the amount of the cap!
stock, annual gross and net earnings, e
when considered in the light of the hlsU
of legislation on the subject of railroad t
aticm and the construction placed on si
legislation, require the ascertainment of 1
value of railroad property for taxation, whi
valuation includes all the property of i
railroad, except that specifically exempt, a
the state board of tax commissioners in
sessing the property of a railroad must in
into consideration its money on hand or
deposit and the money on hand cannot
retaxed as money; the word "earnings** s
nifying proney, and "net earnings** the si
received in excess of opMerating expens
KET BARKIKOS
691
IVET PBOCEED8
nark T. VandaUa R. Oo^ 86 N. B. 881. 854,
72 Ind. 409.
Dividends can lawfully be declared and
ilstrlbnted only out of the actual, legitimate
let earnings of the corporation; and the dif-
erence between the present value of all the
orporate assets and the amount of all loss-
s, expenses, and liabilities, including the
apital stocky constitutes "net earnings** for
he purpose of dividends. It follows that an
nsolvent corporation cannot have net earn-
ngs out of which dividends can be lawfully
ledared and paid. Mangham v. State, 75 8.
C. 508, 610, 11 Oa. Aw- 440.
•
fET mCOMB
Of estate
An executrix, under the authority of a
vni and the contract constituting a partner-
;hip, carried on the business of the decedent
uid earned a profit. The will directed the
executors to sell the residuum of the estate
uid receive the profits, and also the profits
>f the partnership business when wound up,
md the ''net income" thereof, and also pro-
dded for its distribution' anoong certain
:nists. Held, that the profits of the partner-
ship made by the executrix were a part of
the fund to be distributed. In re Marx's Es-
:ate, 90 N. Y. Supp. 834, 336, 49 Misc. Rep.
280.
Testator devised to his executors in trust
For the benefit of his widow for life $200,000,
the "dividends, rents and profits" thereof to
^ to and belong to the widow, to her sole and
separate use during her natural life, with re-
version after her death to the uses and ap-
pointments recited in the will. Held, that the
words "dividends, rents, and profits," as so
ased, were synonymous with "net income,"
and hence the accretions to the fund during
the widow's life, detemdned on the basis of
the market value of the securitiee in which
the fund was invested, passed to the remain-
dermen on the termination of the life estate,
and not to the estate of the widow. Board-
man V. Mansfi^d, 66 Atl. 169, 170, 79 Conn.
634, 12 U B. A. (N. S.) 793. 118 Am. St Rep.
178.
Where a will created a trust, giving the
trustee authority "to manage, invest, alter
the investments, and reinvest the assets
^ * * in trust as he may deem best, and
the *net income' of said estate" to be applied
to the use and benefit of the trustee for life,
with remainder over, and the trustee invested
^iDds of the estate in real estate which was
nonproductive, the . trustee was entitled to
any increase in the value of the real estate
after the investment Billings v. Warren, 74
N. B. 1050-1053, 216 111. 281.
Where a testator gave his wife and un-
married daughters the use of his residence,
together with the total income of his estate
&<ter deducting taxes, the total income in
▼lew of the deduction of taxes meant the
''gross Income," which is the entire amount
that the use of the principal yields, as con-
tradistlngulshed from "net income^" which
means what is left of gross income after all
expenses on behalf of up-keep are deducted.
Schmidt y. Schmidt, 84 AU. 620, 631, 80 N. J.
Bq.864.
Of railroad
The net income of a railroad for purpos-
es of taxation is the difference between the
gross receipts and expenses as they would
have been under reasonably economical and
prudent management State v. Nevada Cent
R. Co., 81 Pac 99, 102, 28 Nev. 186, 113 Am.
St Bep. 884.
Laws 1867, p. 1275, c. 489, authorized
a corporation to construct an elevated rail-
road in New York City, and section 9 provid-
ed the corporation should pay 6 per cent of
its '^et income" from passenger traffic upon
Manhattan Island to the city in such manner
as the Legislature might thereafter direct as
compensation for use of the streeta Laws
1868, p. 2034, c. 855, I 2, provided that the
company pay <iuarterly to the city comptrol-
ler 6 per cent of its net income for the im-
provement of the streets through which the
road was constructed. Sections 2 and 3 also
provided that such payments should be the
legal compensation in full for the use and
occupancy of the streets, and the claims of
the city should constitute a prior lien on the
railway. Held, that it was the legislative
intention that the compensatioQ to the city be
actual and substantial, and by "net income*'
was meant the gross passenger traffic receipts,
less the general expenses of operating the
road, and the amounts paid for general taxes,
the rental damages to abutting owners for
trespass upon their interests in the streets,
and interest on the corporation's mortgage
bonds are not to be deducted in determining
the "net income" ; they being general charges
against the corporation, and not against the
passenger traffic. City of New Tork v. Man-
hattan Ry. Co., 104 N. T. Supp. 609, 119 App.
Div. 240; Id., 84 N. Bi 745, 746, 192 N. Y. 90.
NET PERSOKAIi ESTATE
Under Sanb. & B. Ann. St I 2172, de-
claring that the widow, on filing her election
to take the provisions made for her by law,
instead of the provisions made by her hus-
band's will, is entitled to the same share of
his personal estate as if he had died intestate,
provided that such share shall not exceed a
third of his "net personal estate," there is
deducted from the personal estate, before her
share is taken out, not only the expenses of
administering an intestate estate, but the ad-
ditional ones of probating and carrying out
the provisions of the will. Ford v. Ford, 59
N. W. 464, 466, 88 Wis. 122,
MET PROOEEBS
As proceeds, see Proceeds.
Earnings as, see Bamlngs. .
VET PBOCEEDS
Nirr P&OFTCB
Where title owner of a mbiiiis property
ga^e an option to porcbase, with prlTilege
of proepeotlng and mining ore, and it was
agreed that all ore found which might be
anaoeptible of milling shoold be sold by ench
owner, and the net proceeds applied on the
purchase price, the ^'net proceeds" in such
case is synonymous with **net profits.** Hall
▼. Abraham, 75 Pac. 882, 884, 44 Or. 477.
Where defendant gaye D. a permit to
cut logs upon his land for an agreed price
per thousand to be holden to pay stumpage,
and all supplies furnished by the former, and
D. employed plaintiff to cut under the permit,
and, after the latter had labored two months,
the defendant gave him a memorandum in
writing, agre^ng to pay him his wages out
of the net proceeds of the lumber when sold,
and, where the logs sold for more than
enough to pay the stumpage and not enough
to pay for both stumpage and supplies, the
term "net proceeds" in the memorandum
meant the proceeds of the lumber after de-
ducting pay for the stumpage, but without
any deduction baying been made for the sup-
plies. Warren y. Thatcher, 12 Me. 351, 352.
Where a will providing that, "after the
payment of debts and legacies above named,
I direct that a diyislon of the 'net proceeds'
into parts, one for eadi of my childr^i, as
follows," etc., and the question was whether
the will manifested an intention to have the
real estate sold and the proceeds divided, it
was held that the term '"net proceeds," as
used therein, referred to the money which
would come ff om a sale of the property. May
v. Brewster, 73 N. B. 546, 547, 187 Mass. 524.
A contract between an inventor and a
manufacturer, which recites that the inventor
has invented an improvement in kilns for
drying lumber, for which an application for
a patent has been filed, that the manufacturer
is desirous of acquiring an undivided half
interest in the invention and patent to be ob-
tained therefor, to be issued to the parties
as owners, and which declares that the in-
ventor sells to the manufacturer an undivided
half interest in the inventloni and gives to
the manufaoturer the right, free of royalty,
to manufacture and use kilns at plants control-
led by him, that the manufacturer may li-
cense others to build for their own use kilns,
or may himself build and sell to others, in
either case charging "such royalty, license
fee, or other consideration" as to him may
seem best, and shall, inunediately on the re-
ceipt thereof, pay to the inventor one-half of
the net proceeds, and that the manufacturer
shall use his best endeavors to introduce the
kilns into the market and sell licenses to oth-
ers to. use the same, and to keep accounts of
licenses granted and the proceeds thereof,
creates a joint adventure, and the inventor
is entitled to an accounting with the manu-
facturer to determine the amount of net
profits, after deducting losses on sales and
azpenaea Incurred, taieluding attorney's
and costs in making coUectioos; fbe t
"net proceeds'* being equivalent to "net i
its.** Williams V. Walsh Mfg. Co., 135 N
954, 957, 109 Mich. 676. (Per Moore. C
and McAlvay, Steere, and Brooke, JJ.;
tra, Ostrander, Blair, Stone^ and Bird, JJ
NET PROFITS
See First Net Profits.
"Net profits" have been defined aa
gain that accrues on the investmoit, aftei
ducting the losses and expenses of the 1
ness. City of Erie v. Erie Gaa ft Mineral
97 Pac 468, 469, 78 Kan. 348.
"Net profits" are the dear gain of a
ture, after deducting from the net yalu
all assets on hand the capital invested ani
outstanding liabilities. Thurston y. Hami
85 N. E. 82, 83, 199 Mass. 151.
The "net profits*' of a busineBa, a
centage of which an employ^ shaU reoeiyc
his services, is what remains after all le
mate exi)enses thereof have been paid,
thur Jordan Co. v. Gaylor, 76 N. E. 419,
86 Ind. App. 640.
Net profits may be construed to n
what is left after deducting from the sel
price the actual cost price, together witl
expenses incidental to the procurement oi
property. Ck>oke v. Cain, 77 Pac. 682-68^
Wash. 358.
Under exceptional circumstances aho^
an intended distinction there may be a dl
ence in the meaning of the term "net pro
and "profits," but usually they mean the s
thing. Thomas v. Columbia Phonograph
129 N. W. 522, 523, 144 Wis. 470.
"Net profits*' is defined as what rem
as the clear gain in a business after ded
ing the capital invested, the expenses in
red, and the losses sustained. Grawfor
Calkins, 186 N. W. 369, 870, 170 Mich. ;
Di Palma v. Weinman, 121 Pac. 88, 40, 1<
M. 302.
"Net profits** of a corporation are the
gains which have been actually realized
which could be quickly distributed witl
loss by sale of assess. Stevens v. Uni
States Steel Corp., 69 Atl. 905, 906, 912,
N. J. Eq. 378 (citing and adopting definil
in Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 3
162, 40 N. J. Eq. 114).
In determini^ig, whether the books o
malting company showed a "net profit," sc
to Justify the declaring, of a dividend, an
crease of 15 per cent in the bulk of bai
which takes place when it is manufiictu
into malt was properly inventoried as hsT
the value of barley, it ai^)earing that t
was the trade custom. Estimated iwofits
be made by a manufacturing company on
ders for the future delivery of goods to
made from raw material not yet purdia
are not '*net profits" within Stock Corpc
NBT PROFITS
593
NET PROFITS
tion Law, | 28 (Laws 1892, p. 1820, e. 688),
and New Jersey General Corporation Law, S
80 (P. L. p. 286), t>oth dedaring tbat dlTtdeiidfl
shall be made only from net profits. Hutch-
inson ▼. Gnrtlss, 92 N. Y. Supp. 70, 72, 45
Misc. Rep. 484.
In ascertaining the ''net profit" derived
from carrying on any ordinary manufactur-
ing business, the gross profit to be derived
therefrom is to be divided, first, into a fair
rental for the factory, based on the cost of its
reproduction ; second, interest on the working
capital ; third, cost of operating and adminis-
tration ; and the balance, if any, is "net prof-
it" See V. Hepponheimer, 61 AU. 843, 847, 69
N. J. Eq. 36.
The term ''net profits," aa used in P. L.
1904, p. 275, providing that a corporation
shall not pay dividends except from its sur-
plus or from the net profits arising from its
business, is not synonymous with "surplus,"
nor used in the sense of an excess of the
value of its present assets over the par value
of its outstanding capital stock, and "it does
fiot necessarily follow that net profits mean
the difference between net earnings and what
may be called operating expenses. Sudi prof-
its may be called annual profits, and it may
be that by net profits the Legislature meant
the net profits upon the whole of the com-
pany's business from its organization. If
either of these meanings is adopted, the dec-
laration of the present dividend is Justified.
There was an excess of gross earnings over
the operating expenses of the current year,
and the value of the present assets exceeded
the value of the actual assets with which the
company began business." Goodnow v. Amer-
ican Writing Paper Co., 69 Aa 1014r-1016, 73
N. J. Bq. 692.
A contract between a corporation en-
gaged in the manufacture of wire cloth, and
another for the establishment of the new
business of manufacturing and selling wire
rope, provided that the corporation should
furnish caplUl to the extent of $50,000, if
the sales did not exceed $100,000 a year, rep-
resented by proper buildings with power and
machiuery, and by the amount of capital
necessary to purchase or provide the wire
necessary for the production of rope to the
amount named per annum. The contract fur-
ther provided that the parties were each to
receive one-half of the net profits, and, in
ascertaining net profits, taxes on the capital
employed and other charges as usual were
to be made. Held, that charges for the de-
predation of buildings and machinery, for
power furnished by the corporation to the
wire department, for repairs, for insurance,
and for loss of finished product destroyed
while in a warehouse hired, maintained, and
managed by the wire rope department, were
proper charges against the gross earnings
for the purpose of determining the net profits.
3 WDS.& P.2d Seb.— 38
Stone V. WHght Wire Co., 86 N. ¥L 471, 472,
473, 199 lilass. 306.
Where the owner of a mining lease sold
two-thirds interest therein to be paid for out
of the first "net profits" out of the mine,
sueh profits comprised the first excess of
current receipts for ore taken out of the
ground over aild above the current expenses
for producing the ore and the necessary,
charges for repairs and betterments, and
the purchasers were not to be reimbursed
for moneys expended in the development of
the mine, sinking of shaft, erection of mill,
purchase of machinery, etc, which constitut-
ed capital before an account of the first ''net
profits" was estimated. Crocker v. Barteau,
110 S. W. 1062, 1066, 212 Mo. 859.
"Net profits," participation in which con-
stitutes a person a partner, contemplates a
sharing of the loss as well as the profits,
while gross profits mean the aggregate sales
made after deducting cost, import duties,
and carriage, and participation therein would
not raise a presumption of partnership.
Fechteler v. Palm Bros, ft Co., 138 Fed. 462,
469, 470, 66 C. C. A. 336.
The term "net profits," in a contract em-
ploying one to take charge of departments in
a mercantile establishment for an annual sal-
ary and a per cent of the net profits of the
departments in his charge, means the prof-
its realized in the departments, without de-
duction for interest on the capital invested
therein. Daintrey v. Evans, 132 N. T. Supp.
126, 128, 148 App. Div. 275.
The term "net profits" in a contract, ap-
plied to a course of dealing involving succes-
sive transactions, implies an element of time,
and, unqualified by custom, usage, or other
words, refers to termination of the particu-
lar venture, or it may refer to expiration of
a fiscal period at the end of which profits
are to be computed, less than the period of
adventure, but if the business covers several
fiscal periods provided for computing com-
pensation, losses, and gains arising from mat-
ters covered by an earlier fiscal period, but
occurring after ascertainment of the profits
for that period, are carried into and increase
or diminish the net profits for the next or
some succeeding fiscal period, though the par-
ties may at the end of any fiscal period draw
profits thus computed. Thomas v. Columbia
Phonograph Co.,. 129 N. W. 522, 523, 144 Wis.
470.
In an action for failure to deliver a pur-
chased machine, where it appeared that the
purchase price was to be paid partly on ship-
ment, partly on installment, and the remain-
der in 12 months from shipment, with inter-
est, in arriving at the "net profits" which
plaintiff was prevented from making by fail-
ure of defendant to deliver the machine, the
interest on the investment, at least on the
deferred payment, together with all neces-
NET PROFITS
694
mST VALUK
P
8ary expenses (Including insaran<^ provided
for in the contract), should be taken into ac-
count. Fred W. Wolf Co. t. Galbraith, 87
S. W. 390, 391. 39 Tex. av. App. 351.
An accident insurance contract provided
for commissions to the agent consisting of
all policy fees collected and 33% per cent, of
the "net profits" on the monthly premium
business of the agency to be ascertained by
crediting the gross premiums received from
the collectors in the territory on monthly
premium business, to the account, and charg-
ing the same with the sums paid in losses
and claims on monthly premium business in
such territory and taxes and, after deduct-
ing the total debits from credits, the bal-
ance remainiiig shall constitute the "net prof-
its." Held, that losses for disability begin-
ning before the date the contract was ter-
minated and continuing to a later date were
properly chargeable against the business of
the agency in ascertaining the "net profits.*'
C. B. Perry ft Sons v. United States Health
ft Accident Ins. Co., 63 AtL 489, 490, 73 N.
H. 608.
A hotel lessee's measure of damage for
wrongful dispossession is such amount as
will compensate him for the injury, not ex-
ceeding the net profits of the business for
the unexpired portion of the term, and in
arriving at such profits it la proper to deduct
the gross expenses from the gross receipts
for the period in which the business was
run, and from the average profits thus ascer-
tained estimate the lessee's loss for the re-
mainder of the term, but it is improper to
credit uncollectible accounts as profits.
Orange Hotel Co. v. Townsend (Tex.) 130 8.
W. 701, 702.
As inoome
See Income.
KET RECEIPTS
The phrase "net receipts,** as used in
Laws 1869, p. 228, as amended by Laws 1879,
p. 179, providing that agents of foreign in-
surance companies shall return to the county,
town, etc., where the agency is situated, the
amount of the "net receipts" of such agency
for the preceding year, which amount shall
be subject to taxation as is other personal
property, means the amount remaining after
the operating expenses of the company have
been deducted from the gross receipts; and
the company is not entitled to have fire losses
paid in the county, etc., deducted from gross
receipts. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Hanberg,
74 N. B. 877, 878, 215 111. 37a
NET SUCCES8IOK
While the inheritance tax prescribed by
St 1905, c. 314, is not a tax on property as
such, but upon the privilege of succession,
the amount of the tax as to any beneficiary
is to be determined according to the value of
the "net succession"; that is, the value of
such property as remains to him after sal
fying lawful diarges. In re HIte's Ssts
118 Pac. 1072, 1078, 159 CaL 392, 32 !«, B.
(N. 8.) 1167, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1014.
NET TO US
The words "net to us," in a telegram «
by plaintiffs offering to sell butter to defei
ants for 17 cents per pound "net to u
meant that the price was to be 17 cents fi
from all charges and deductions. Floi
Creamery Co. v. Dillon ft Douglaai^ 75 A
82, 84, 88 Conn. 66.
NET VALUE
There is a distinction between "^et v
ue" and the "cash surrender value" of a li
insurance policy. Penn's Mut. Life Ins. (
V. Bamett's Adm'r, 90 S. W. 228, 232, 1
Ky. 26a
In construing Rev. St. 1899, 1 7897 (Ai
St 1906, p. 3752), which provides that po
des shall not be forfeited by reason of nc
payment of premiums where three-fourths
the net value of the policy is sufficient to i
cure temporary insurance, etc, "net value'*
a technical term, and is to be taken in i
technical sense. The "net value" of an J
surance policy, as computed under Rev. i
1899, t 7897 (Ann. St 1906, p. 3752), is t
excess of the total premiums paid, plus
per cent compound interest, over tbe i
tuarial cost of insurance. Rose v. Frank!
liife Ins. Co., 132 S. W. 613, 614, 153 h
App. 90.
"Net value** of a policy within the mea
ing of the statute is a sum which, with coi
pound interest at the rate of 4 per cent, p
annum and with the addition of future n
premiums, will provide for the payment
the policy when it matures according to t
combined experience of actuaries' table
mortality. Westerman v. Supreme Lod
Knights of Pythias, 94 S. W. 470, 480, 1
Mo. 670, 5 li. R. A. (N. S.) 1114.
The term "net value," as used in Re
St 1899, tt 7897, 7898, 7899, 7900, relating
insured's rights in life policies after defai
in payment of premium, is to be determln*
by construing such sections together. T^
term does not mean the provision for tJ
amount of paid-up insurance that insun
would be entitled to if demanded, but is t
arbitrary apportionment arrived at in tJ
method prescribed by section 7897, whh
"net value" is the same referred to in 8ecti<
7900, so that where insured, after havii
paid more than three annual premiums on i
endowment policy, payable on a specific
date or at death, made default in the pa
ment of premiums, and at the date of d
fault three-fourths of the net value, coi
puted as directed by section 7897, amounU
to $47.86, while the net value of the pald-i
insurance provided in the policy was on
$42.79, and the sum of $47.86 would porchaj
Hjpr WEIGHT
S95
NEW ACQUISITION
extmded insurance under section 7807 for a
term extending beyond the date of insured's
deatb, the amount of paid-up insurance so
stipulated in tbe policy was not sufficient
under section 7900 to make section 7897 in-
applicable, and hence insured's beneficiary
was entitled to recover the full amount of the
policy. Fahle v. Connecticut Met Life Ins.
Co. of Hartford, Conn., 184 8. W. ao^ 63, 106
Mo. App. 15.
NET 'WdOHT
The "net weight" of a cargo of lumber
means the weight of the lumber only, exclu-
sive of standards, supports, etc, used in pil-
ing the lumber on the car. State ex reL
Washington Mill Co. v. Great Northern Ry.
Co., 86 Paa 1056, 1057, 43 Wash. 658, 6 L.
R. A, (N. S.) 908, 117 Am. St Rep. 1084.
KETTIHO
See Cotton Netting.
NEURALGIA
See Coccyx Neuralgia.
NEURASTHENIA
See Traumatic Neurasthenia.
** 'Neurasthenia* is a somewhat inde^lte
term, applied to certain nervous conditions,
while 'myelitis' is a diseased condition, or
degeneration of the spinal cord, and Is re-
garded as a much more serious ailment than
that of •neurasthenia.*" In a i>ersonal in-
jury action, the weight of the evidence show-
ing that the injuriel had produced a condi-
tion of neurasthenia rather than myelitis,
as claimed by plaintilf, a verdict for |8,000
was excessive by at least $3,000; plaintifT
being 28 years old and earning $70 to $85 per
month. Robinson v. Spokane Traction Co.,
91 Pac. 972, 978, 47 Wash. 803.
NEURITIS
As disease, see Diseasew
NEUROSIS.
See Traumatic Neurosia.
NEUTRAL SPIRITS
"Neutral spirits," as the term suggests,
is a colorless liquid which has neither flavor
nor character, and is not a beverage at all.
It may be produced from any fermented sub-
stance, such as com, potatoes, and sugar
beets. It was formerly used exclusively in
tbe arts, but with the advent of cheaper
methods of production it has been palmed
otf on the public as a beverage with some-
thing to give it flavor and character. Levy
V. Uri, 31 App. D. C. 441, 445.
"Neutral spirits*' are made at very high
temperature for the j^urpose of carrying off
so far as possible every property exo^ al-
cohol and water, and, while whisky is aged
and matured for not less than four years in
charred oak barrels, neutral spirits require
no aging, but may be Immediately consumed,
and, as the name signifies, they contain nei-
ther t^ste, smell, nor color, and no amount
of aging such spirits will change it without
the aid of foreign matter. "Whisky," with-
in the Food & Drugs Act June 30, 1906, 34
Stat. 768, c. 3915, is the product of sound
grain, distilled at a low temperature so as
to retain in the distillate the congeneric
properties of the grain, which give to the
liquor, when matured by aging In charred
casks, its desirable potable character. "Neu-
tral spirits," which are distilled at a high
temperature, may be made from different ma-
terials and do not contain such properties,
and which are not rendered potable by aging,
although reduced by water to potable strength
and from which most of the fusel oil has
been removed, are not whisky nor a like sub-
stance with whisky. Woolner k Co. r. Ren-
nick, 170 Fed. 662-664. .
NEW
NEW B/L
The words "New B/L** mean a certain
form of a bill of lading known as the "new
bill of lading," containing a special clause as
to the time to be given for unloading a ves-
sel after arrival in port, and as to the amount
of demurrage for its detention beyond the
day specified in the bill of lading. Kenyon v.
Tucker, 23 Aa 61, 17 R. I. 529.
NEW ACQUISITION
Land is to be considered an ancestral es-
tate where it has come from or by or on the
part of the father or mother of the owner by
gift, devise, or descent either mediately or
immediately from them or from any person
in their respective lines, and will be a "new
acquisition" if derived from any source other
than by descent, devise, or gift from any
relative in the paternal or maternal line,
as by a son from father or mother for a val-
uable consideration. Martin v. Martin, 135
S. W. 348, 349, 08 Ark. 03.
An allotment acquired by a Creek citizen
by selection and certificate of allotment or
by patent is a new acquisition within Mansf.
Dig. Ark. S 2531 (Ind. T. Ann. St 1899, f
1839), providing that where intestate shall
die without descendants, if the estate be a
new acquisition, it shall descend to the father
for his lifetime, with remainder to the col-
lateral kindred of intestate in the manner
provided by that act. Shulthia v. MacDou-
gal, 162 Fed. 881, 837.
The heirs who take under such provi-
sion and their estate are determined by
Mansf* Dig. Ark. c 49, which provides that,
on the death of a person intestate, unmar-
ried, and leaving no children, the estate, if it
NEW ACTION
596
NEW ASSETS
came from the father, shall go to the father,
and If from the mother shall go to the moth-
er, *'bnt if the estate be a new acquisition it
shall ascend to the father for his lifetime
and then descend in remainder to the collat-
eral kindred of the intestate." A child
whose father was a member of the Greek
Tribe, but whose mother was not, was born
May 6, 1901, and died in November of the
same year. He thus became entitled to en-
rollment in the tribe, but had not received his
allotment at the time of his death. Held
that, technically, the Arkansas statute did
not apply to the situation, since the land to
which the decedent was entitled and which
was the common property of the tribe did
not, strictly speaking, come to him by grant,
inheritance, or purchase, but by a division of
lands held in effect by a tenancy in common,
to an interest in which he was bom as a
member of the tribe entitled to enrollment
therein; but that, applying the statute by an-
alogy, such land was not a "new acquisition,"
but came to him by the blood of his tribal
parent, or, within the meaning of the statute,
"from his father," and that therefore, on his
death and the subsequent allotment his fa-
ther took the full title, and not merely a
life estate. Shulthis ▼. MacDougal, 170 Fed.
529, 533, 95 C. O. A. 616.
NEW ACTION
See Commencement of New Action.
The words **new action," in Wilson's Rev.
ft Ann. St 1903, § 4221, providing that where
any action is commenced within due time and
a Judgment for plaintiff is reversed, etc.,
plaintiff may commence a "new action" with-
in one year after the reversal, means an ac-
tion for the same cause as that of the former
action; the statute only intending to save to
plaintiff the right to commence a new ac-
tion for the same causes as in his original
action. Hatchell v. Hebeisen, 82 Pac. 826,
827, 16 Okl. 223.
NEW AND ADDFTIONAI. 80UBCB8
Laws 1905, p. 2023, c. 723, | 2, requires
the submission of maps and profiles and ap-
proval of the State Water Commission before
taking or condemning lands for new or ad-
ditional sources of water supply. Held, that
the word "source" may refer to a lake, etc.,
as a source of supply, or to any well-defined
watershed from which percolating water
might be taken, and the statute did not ex-
clude a whole territory in which a city has
Incidentally procured some part of Its supply,
the limitation on "new and additional sourc-
es" meaning sources which had not been ap-
propriated at the time of the statute. Queens
County Water Co. v. O'Brien, 115 N. Y. Supp.
495, 498, 131 App. Div. 91.
NEW ANB USEFUL ART
A system of transacting business discon-
nected from the means for carrying out the
system is not within the most liberal inter-
pretation of the term ''art," and, unless tl
means used are novel and disclose invei
tion, the system is not patentable as a "ne*
and useful art," within the provisions <
Rev. St. f 4886. Hotel Security Checkixi
Co. V. Lorraine Co., 160 Fed. 467, 469, 87 (
O. A. 451, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 665.
NEW ASSESSMENT
The term "new assessment^ and it
term "reassessment," in St Paul City Cha:
ter, I 57, refers to a new apportionment c
the benefits, and in making a "new asses
ment" or "reassessment*' the board of pnblJ
works has authority to establish an entire!
new district and to include therein all pro]
erty benefited by the improvement, whethc
embraced within the original district or no
State ex rel. Eaton t. District Court of Ran
sey County, 104 N. W. 553, 556, 95 Mlon. 5a
NEW ASSETS
Where land conveyed by testatrix undi
a deed absolute on its face, but held under
court decree for the executrix to be a mor
gage, was redeemed by her, it was •'new aj
sets," within Rev. Laws, c. 141, i 11, prorlc
ing that, if new assets come to an execute
after two years from the time of his giviu
bond, he shall be held to account therefor i
an action of a creditor, the same as if tli
assets had been received within two year
if the creditor's action is commenced with!
one year after notice of the receipt of tl
assets and within two years after they ai
actually received ; and a creditors' suit, con
menced within one yea? after reconveyanc
of the redeemed property to the executrix
was not barred. Horton y. Robinson, 98 ?
B. 681, 682, 212 Mass. 24&
Where a debtor conveyed property t
trustees, reserving the right to any surpln
remaining after pasrment of creditors namec
and at his death this possible right was sui
posed to be of no value, and was not ti
ventoried, but 12 years thereafter the bene
ficiaries accepted certain stock in a real es
tate trust then formed, in satisfaction o
their claims, and it was then found tha
there was a surplus, it was held that thi
surplus was "new assets" within Pub. St <
136, I 11, making an administrator liable t
suit by a creditor on account of assets re
ceived after two years from the time of git
ing bond, provided the suit be commence^
within two years after the assets are actn
ally received and within one year afte
plaintiff has notice of their receipt Qulncj
V. Quincy, 46 N. B. 108, 109, 167 Mass. 53C
Rev. Laws, c. 142, | 10, relating to insol
vent estates, provides that a creditor wh<
does not present his claim for allowance tn
the commissioners, or to the court where d<
commissioners are appointed, within the tim<
prescribed by that court, shall be barred, bn
that, if "further assets" come into the hand!
of executor or administrator after the decree
NEW BILL
597
NEW CAUSE OF ACTION
f distribution, tbe claim may be proved and
aid. Held, that the term "farther assets'*
i substantially the same as "new assets,"
rhicb belated creditors are permitted to
each under chapter 141, | 11, relating to
olvent estates, and in general does not in-
lnde property for which the administrator
AS been charged, or the property into which
Dch property, or any part theceof, has been
hanged, or the natural increment of such
roperty; ahd where an administrator did
lot include in the inventory, nor in his first
ior second and final account, certain land,
T the proceeds of the sale thereof, if he
mew that the land belonged to his intestate
Dng before the decree of distribution, and
lad it in his control well within the two-
ear period from his appointment, neither
be land nor the proceeds of its sale would
« "further assets," but, if his knowledge of
Dtestate*s interest in such tract did not come
o him until after two years from his ap-
)ointment, the proceeds of their sale would
)€ "further assets." Fay v. Haskell, 93 N.
S. 641, 643, 207 Mass. 207.
VEW BILL
If the amendment or substituted bill
presents a measure that has no relation to
he bill as originally introduced, it cannot
(tand, for it is in substance a new measure
>r bill. . If the substitute has a clear rela-
ion to the subject of the original bill, it can
)e said to be germane, and will not be treat-
^ as a new bill. A bill to provide for a
^rd of county auditors for a designated
»)iinty was introduced and referred to a
committee. The committee reported the bill,
cirith a substitute identically like the original
bill, except that another county was substi-
tuted for that of the county mentioned in the
original bill. Under the definition this change
made tbe substitute a new bill. People ex
rel. Board of Supers of Kent County v. Loom-
Is, 98 N. W. 262, 265. 135 Mich. 556, 8 Ann.
Cas. 751.
HEW BOOK
Under tbe copyright statutes as they
stood prior to Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35
Stat 1075, as well as by the express provi-
sion of section 6 of such act, the addition of
Dew matter to a copyrighted book in a second
or subsequent edition makes it a "new book"
subject to copyright as an original work.
West Pub. Ck>. V. Edward Thompson Ck>.,
176 Fed. 883, 837, 100 O. G. A. 808.
VEW BUHiDIllO
Building a one-story kitchen in the rear
of another building is the erection of a "new
building" within the meaning of an ordinance
prohibiting the erection of wooden build-
ings. If a building be so changed in plan,
stmctDre, dimensions and general appear-
ance that it might in common parlance be
called a "new building," it is a violation of
the ordinance. State v. Long Branch Ooiii't%
25 AtL 274, 276, 55 N. J. Law, 108.
Within a city ordinance making it un-
lawful to construct any wooden building
within the fire limits, no fixed rule can be
laid down stating what is to be deemed a
"new building" and what a "repairing."
Where a building, 42 feet long, 24 feet 8
inches in width, and about 10 feet in height
at the highest part outside of a raised part
at one end with a skylight which was about
17 feet high at its highest point, had the
roof with the skylight removed and the
building raised in height except in the front,
and on the rear 16 feet of the upper part
was an addition with a peaked roof 16 feet
long and about 17 feet to the peak and
about 12 feet to the base of the roof, thus
making the building all of the same height
without any change in its height or appear-
ance in front and with no change in appear-
ance at the sides, except by reason of the in-
creased height, it was not a "new building**
and was not within the ordinance. Mayville
V. Rosing, 128 N. W. 398, 894, 19 N. D. 98,
26 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 120.
HEW BUnilESS
Kirby*s Dig. S 6969, makes it the coun-
ty assessor's duty whenever any person shall
commence any new business after the reg-
ular assessment to assess the value of such
business and make an extra assessment and
file it with the clerk who shall extend the
taxes thereon. On May 1, 1909, plaintiffs
owned a stock of merchandise at a building
on M. street consisting of dry goods, etc.,
purchased for $18,000. In June, 1909, they
were assessed for personalty in the sum of
$10,000, and in October they leased the F.
building and carried into it some shopworn
goods from their store on M. street which
were sold at a sacrifice by the plaintiffs* reg-
ular employte, and no separate books were
kept, the money received each day being
taken over to the M. street store, and no
new goods were purchased for the F. build-
ing. Held, that the business at the F. build-
ing was not a "new business*' within the
statute. Froug-Smullion & Co^ v. Pulaski
County, 147 S. W. 72, 73, 108 Ark. 397.
MEW CAUSE OF ACTIOIT
The expression "new cause of action*'
can be taken, when used on the subject of
amendment, as intending nothing more than
a new right or claim arising out of the same
transaction. If it were not so — that is, if the
new cause of action was one arising out of a
wholly different transaction from that laid
in the complaint — then it would constitute
what we have sometimes designated as an
entirely new cause of action, and one which
could not be introduced into the complaint
hy amendment, if objected to. Identity of
transaction is therefore the basis for the in-
troduction by way of amendment of counts
on new claims or rights -arising out of the
1J3BW, CAUSE OP ACTION,
598
NEW MATTER
same. Nelson ▼. First Nat Bank, 36 South.
707, 709, 139 Ala. 678, 101 Am. St. Rep. 52.
Within the statute of Umltations* an
amended complaint sets up a "new cause of
action*' composed of the right of plaintiff
and the obligation, duty, or wrong of defend-
ant, where the new allegation deprives de-
fendant of any defense he had to the origi-
nal action, where the evidence that would
have proved the original complaint will not
prove the new, where the new allegations, if
in reply, would have amounted to a depar-
ture, where the amended complaint sets up
a title not before asserted, or where a judg-
ment on the first complaint would be no bar
to a judgment on the amended complaint
Where the original complaint in an action
for injuries to a lineman of an electric light
and power company alleged a negligent fail-
ure to properly insulate live wires, an amend-
ed complaint, alleging the negligent failure
to turn off the electric current passing
through the wires^ sets forth an additional
charge of negligence, but did not set up a
new cause of action so as to make the stat-
ute of limitations applicable^ since the facts
alleged in either the original or amended
complaint would bar another action for the
same cause Raley v. Evansville Gas &
Electric Light Co., 90 N. B. 783» 784, 45 Ind.
App. 649.
NEW CONSTBUCTIOK
Under Rev. Codes, § 2419, authoriidng
directors of irrigation districts to fix rates
of tolls and charges for water against per-
sons using its canals, or to levy assessments
to defray expenses of the operation, repair
and improvement of such portion of its
works as are In use, the laying of a pipe line
caused by the lawful removal of a ditch by
municipal authorities is a repair or improve-
ment the funds for defraying which may
be included in a maintenance assessment or
in increased toll rates, and is not a new con-
struction which must be defrayed by a spe-
cial assessment under section 2391, or a bond
issued under section 2396. City of Nampa v.
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist, 115 Pac. 979,
982, 19 Idaho, 779.
NEW COUNTY
When a county is changed in its terri-
tory by the addition of territory, it becomes a
'*new county,*' although the name be un-
changed, and although it be accomplished by
a law which in terms attaches the territory
to the old county. Taking territory from
one county and adding to another is with-
in the provision of Const art 10, | 2, that
no organized county shall ever be reduced by
the organization of "new counties" to less
than 16 townships, except on the decision of
a majority of electors residing in each coun-
ty to be affected thereby. Board of Sup'rs
of Bay County v. Edmunds, 102 N. W. 998,
999, 139 Mich. 466.
Authority granted by the Oonatltat
to grant new counties does not mean to re
ganize an old county under a new name,
must mean a new county, an additional co
ty, and not a reorganization, rebounding,
renaming of an old county. McDonald
Doust 81 Pac. 60-63, U Idaho, 14, 69
R. A. 220.
NEW DEBT
See Creation of New Debt
NEW FUNCTION
A claim under the patent laws for
''new function*' cannot be sustained in 1
absence of an element of novelty or un^
pectedness. General Electric Co. t. Y(
Electric Mfg. Co., 139 Fed. 568, 570, 71
C. A. 552.
NEW INN
P. L. 1891, p. 311, providing that af
a license has once been granted to keep
inn or tavern, or to sell spirituous liquo
the filing of a petition for a renewal sigi
by applicant shall confer power upon the
censing board to renew the license for one y<
in cities of the fourth class, and that the fr
holders who may have recommended t
former application shall not be eligible
signers for a new application for one yc
ttom the granting of such renewal, a
that the act shall not affect applications 1
new inns and taverns, saloons or vlctualU
houses in such cities, applies only to t
licensing of places which had been alrea
licensed when the act was approved. Lee
y. AtlanUc City, 79 Aa 812, 813, 80 N.
Law, 557.
NEW MATTER
In pleading
A defense can consist only of *^ew m;
ter," that is, matter which, taking all of t
allegations in the complaint to be true»
nevertheless a defense to the action, so
as payment a general release, fraud, t
truth of a libelous publication, eta Ia
norowitz v. Ott, 82 N. T. Supp. 880, 40 Mi
Rep. 551.
"New matter*' in a pleading is matt
for defense not provable under a general c
niaL Schultz v. Greenwood Cemetery,
N. Y. Supp. 180, 182, 46 Misc. Rep. 299.
The term "new matter," in Rev. Cod(
N. D. 1899, § 5273, subd. 2, requiring the a
swer of defendant to contain a statement
any "new matter" constituting a defense
counterclaim, means matter extrinsic to t
matters set up in the complaint as a Imu
of the cause of action; a def^ise which co
cedes that a cause of action once exlste
but has been determined by some subseque
transaction. The distinction between defer
es admissible under a denial and those whi<
are new matter depends primarily upon tl
structure of the complaint and th^ materl
NEW MATTER
599
KEW PROMIBB
LYerments of fact which it contains. All
^cts whidi directly tend to disprove any
me or more of these averments may be offer-
idi nnder the general deniaL All facts which
lo not thus directly tend to disprove some
>ne or more of these averments, but tend
to establish a defense independently of them,
»nnot be offered under the deniaL They
ire new matter, and must be specially plead-
sd. Hogen v. Klabo, 100 N. W. 847, 849, 18
^^. D. 319 (citing Manning v. Winter [N. Y.]
r Hun, 482; Qreenway v. James, 84 Mo.
528; Plercy v. Sabin, 10 OaL 22, 70 Am. Dec
382; Ghurdiill v. Baumann, 80 Pac. 770,^90
CaL 541; Pom. B^n. ft Rem. Rights, | 073).
"New matter constituting a defense,"
i^thin the rule requiring such matter to be
pleaded, is matter not embraced within the
statement of fftcts made by the plaintiff,
but existing outside of the narrative which
tie has given and such that proving it to be
true does not disprove a single averment of
fact in the complaint or petition, but mere-
ly prevents or destroys the legal conclu-
sion as to the plaintiff's right and the de-
fendant's duties which would otherwise have
resulted from all those averments admitted
or proved to be true. Montgomery v. Sea-
board Air Line Ry., 03 S. E. 987, 989, 73 8.
C. 608.
Where the complaint was so drawn that
it could be claimed that the action was
brought for damages under a common-law
liability as well as under the Employer's Lia-
biUty Act (Ck>nsol. Laws 1909, c. 31, ff 200-
204), the defendant, under a general denial,
could prove failure to serve the 120-day no-
tice, under the Employer's Liability Act, and
failure to bring the action within one year
after date of accident; and hence these
were not "new matters" proper to be set up
as a defense under authority of Code Civ.
Proc S 500. Kelliher v. New York Cent &
H. R. R. Co., 136 N. Y. Supp. 266, 269, 77
Misc. Rep. 330.
HEW OB ADDITIONAI.
If a change simply adds to a mall con-
tractor's service it is "new or additional serv-
ice," being of the same kind within a provi-
sion in his contract providing for perform-
ance of such service without additional com-
pensation. Proffit V. United States, 42 Ct.
a 248, 259.
The phrase **new or additional service,"
in a contract for the carrying of mails re-
quiring the contractor to perform new or
additional services that the Postmaster Gen-
eral may order, etc., is not one of exact
meaning, and the court must give to it a
reasonable construction with a view of doln^
Justice between the parties. An increase in
the service required on a mail route, as the
resalt of the establishment of a new distribut-
ing station in the city of New York, amount-
ing to more tlian 300,000 miles of additional
tnasteat service, and involving an additional
expenditure of nearly $10,000 for ferry tolls,
cannot be required by the Postmaster Gen-
eral without extra compensation, onder the
authority reserved to him in the contract to
call for new, additional, mail messenger, or
transfer service without additional compen-
sation. United States v. Utah« N. & C. Stage
Co., 26 Sup. Ct 69, 72, 199 U. & 414, 50 L.
Ed. 251.
A statute providing that no municipal
corporation shall have power to condemn
lands "for any new or additionai sources of
water supply, until it has first submitted the
maps and profiles therefor" to the state water
supply commission, does not apply to a pro-
ceeding by a manidpal corporation to con-
demn an established and fully equipped plant
of a water company ; such plant not being a
"new and additional" source of supply. Vil-
lage of Waverly v. Waverly Water Co., lOJ
N. Y. Supp. 1070, 1071, 117 App. Dlv. 336.
KEW PLAGE
The words any "new place," as used in
an act regulating the sale of liquors (P. L.
1005, p. 42), means a place for which a license
has not previously been granted upon a
direct application. The mere transfer of a
license to a place leaves it stiU a "new place"
for the purposes of this act. Wright v.
Board of Excise of City of BUaabeth, 66 AU.
1061, 75 N. J. Law, 2a
In order to constitute a place for which
a license to sell intoxicating liquors is ap-
plied for a "new place,** within the meaning
of the act of 1906 (C. S. 2908, pi. 84), it must
appear, in cases where the premises had for
some years previously been used continuously
for such purpose, that there has been a
substantial abandonment of the business.
Pames v. Board of Exdse Com*rs of City of
Elizabeth, 82 Atl. 313, 314, 82 N. J. Law, 285
(quoting and adopting definition in Eckersly
V. Abbott, 74 Atl. 813, 79 N. J. Law, 157).
An inn or tavern in which the occupants
have for many years retailed liquor under a
license granted annually did not become a
"new place** within P. L. 1906, p. 199. forbid-
ding the granting of a license to a "new
place*' within 200 feet of a church merely be-
cause an occupant was refused a license,
where he again applied, at the first opportu-
nity, for a license, and it was granted. Eck-
ersly V. Abbott, 74 AU. 313, 314, 79 N. J.
Law, 157.
MEW PROMISE
See, also. Acknowledge — ^Acknowledg-
ment
A direct admission by a debtor within six
years prior to the commencemmt of the ac-
tion of a subsisting debt which he is liable
and willing to pay is sufficient evidence of
a "new promise*' to bar limitations. Barker
V. Heath, 67 AU. 222, 224, 74 N. H. 270.
t
NEW TlilAL-
602
NEW TRJAIi.
or verdict by a court or jnry. Where a
Judgment of conTietlon is reversed on the
ground of error, overruling a demurrer to
the indictment, a new trial will be ordered,
subject to the discretion of the trial court as
to resubmitting the cause to the grand jury.
State V. Eddy. 82 Pac 707. 46 Or. 625.
The term "issue of fact" in Rev. Ck)des.
I 6793. defining a new trial as a re-examina-
tion of an issue of fact after a trial, when
considered in connection with section 6723,
refers only to ap issue arising on formal
pleadings, and though, under section 7712,
the provisions as to new trials apply to pro-
bate proceedings, a motion for new trial In
such proceedings does not lie in the absence
of formal pleadings raising an issue of fact
Where two ex parte applications for letters
of administration are heard together as au-
thorized by Rev. Ck>des, f 7441, and no issue
is joined as to the competency of either of
the persons seeking to act as administrator,
a motion for new trial, after granting one of
the petitions and denying the other, does not
lie. In re AntonioU's Estate, 111 Pac 1083,
1084. 42 Mont 219.
Under Code Civ. Proa i 656. defining a
"new trial" as a re-examination of an issue
of fact, and section 657, providing that a
verdict or other decision of fact may be re-
view;ed on an appeal from an order denying
a new trial, the question whether the judg-
ment is authorized by the pleadings cannot
be raised or reviewed on an appeal from an
order denying a new trial, irrespective of the
issues presented by the pleadings, and not-
withstanding the findings may be at variance
with such issues. Schroeder v. Mauzy, 118
Pac. 459, 461. 16 Cal. App. 443.
Under a statutory definition that a "new
trial" is the re-examination in the same court
of an issue of fact, after a verdict, report
of a referee, or decision by the court, a mo-
tion for a new trial is not proper unless an
issue of fact has been fully determined by a
jury verdict or its equivalent, and there can
be no "new trial" on issues of law, as such
issues can be Investigated on appeal without
previous re-examination by the trial court
On motion for a new trial, only those errors
of law which vitiate the conclusions of fact
need be called to the trial court's attention,
and. if the facts have been agreed to or have
been eliminated so that the controversy de-
pends upon a question of law, a motion for
a "new trial" is not necessary. Wagner v.
Atchison. T. k S. F. Ry. Co., 85 Pac. 299, 73
Kan. 283,
Rev. St 1892. f 6436, provides that a
new trial shall be granted for cause only, and
when it is granted it shall take place in same
court as the first trial was had and shall
be conducted in accordance with the pro-
visions of this chapter for the firdt trial, so
far as the same are applicable. Held, that
.the words "new trial" mean the rehearing
of the case from the beginning. Day ten
U. R, Co. V. Dayton ft M. Traction Co.,
N. E. 195, 196, 72 Ohio St. 429, follofi
State V. Judges of Court of Conmion PI
of Hamilton County, 69 N. E. 659, 09 0
St 372.
Under B. & C Comp. | 159, provid
that the findings of the court shall be de
ed a verdict, and may be set aside in
same manner and for the same reasons, i
section 173, defining a new trial as a
examination of an issue of fact after a t
and decision, and section 174, specifying
manner in which a verdict or other dedc
may be set aside and a new trial grant
and providing that a new trial may be gn
ed "on the motion of the party aggrieve
the court cannot on its own motion set a^
its filed findings after the filing by a parts
a motion for judgment; the court not li
ing been imposed on by fraud or collusioi]
the parties or otherwise. Scott ▼. Ford,
Pac. 99, 101, 62 Or. 288.
A judgment for one of the defendant:
corporation, was reversed on appeal on
ground that the findings were not justi
by the evidence, without any specific dii
tions as to the further proceedings in
case. After remand plaintiff, having rec
ered against the other defendants, mo
for judgment against the corporation defe
ant, which the court granted, the order re
ing that the cause came on to be heard
plaintiff's motion for judgment against
fendant corporation on remittitur from
Court of Appeals, and it appearing to
court that all questions of fact were fins
adjudicated by the judgment against the c
er defendants, and, good cause being sho
therefor without objection, it was orde
that judgment be rendered against the c
poratipn. Held, that such proceedings
not constitute a new trial, to which the c
poration defendant was entitled, as defii
by Code Civ. Proc. S 666, and that the ju
ment was therefore erroneous. Riley v. :
ma Vista Ranch Co., 89 Pac. 849, 850,
CaL App. 26.
Under Code Civ. Proc | 656, definini
new trial as a re-examination of an issue
fact in the same court, where the case v
tried on an agreed statement of facts wh
the parties stipulated was to be conside:
as the court's findings in the case, a mot
for new trial would not lie on the groi
that the decision was contrary to law,
that point could only be raised on appc
Quist V. HiU. 99 Paa 204. 207. 164 CaL 7
Code Civ. Proc. | 1012, provides that
a case specified in the section where 1
parties consent to a reference, and a n
trial of the action tried by the referee d
ignated is granted, the court must upon i
plication of either party appoint anotl
referee; Held, that where the conrt refni
to confirm the referee's report, and ref«
NSW TBIAIi
NBW WATEB'
the matter tD be again heard and detemdned,
it In effect grants a new trial within the
meaning of the section, and the re-reference
should be to a new referee. White y. White,
122 N. Y. Snpp. 885, 886, 138 App. Diy. 272.
As defined by Code Civ. Proc { 265
(Gen. St. Id05, | 5160), a '*trlal*' is a judicial
examination of the issues, whether of law
or fact, in an action; and a '*new .trial"
(Code GlT. Proc. S 806 [Gen. St 1905, | 5202])
is a re-examination in the same court of an
issue of fact aftar a verdict by a jury, re-
port of a referee, or a decision of a court
The same section prorides that the former
verdict report or dedaion shall be Tacated,
and a new trial granled on the applleatioii
of the party aggrieved (which section 809
[section 5205] provides must be by motion
on written grounds) for certain causes apec-
ified affecting materially the substantial
rights of such party. Some of the causes
specified are any order of the court by
which the party is prevented from having a
fair trial; that the decision is not sustained
by sufficient evidence^ or is contrary to law ;
error of law occurring at the trial and ex-
cepted to at the time. Code Civ. Proc. | 306
(Gen. St 1905, | 5202). Strictly construed,
then, as defined by the Code, a "trial** in-
Tolyes the judicial examination of all the
issues of law and f^ct in an action, whUe
a ''new trial** involves only the reexamina-
tion of an issue of fact That this strict
construction is not applicable to new trials
of ordinary actions in which the law ap-
plicable varies to the varying facts pleaded
or proven is apparent, when we consider the
grounds for which new trial "shall be grant-
ed" as prescribed, some of which involve
only a question of law. These must be re-
examined both on the hearing of the motion
for the new trial and upon the new trial,
if granted. Issues of law are not ordinarily
framed In an action by the petition and an-
swer or by the answer and reply in the
sense that a proposition of law is asserted
in one pleading and denied in another; but
such Issues may arise in many ways at
almost every stage of the action, and are
sometimes determinative of the action and
sometimes not Sometimes they arise in the
course of the trial, and sometimes before
tile trial is commenced. It goes without
saying that there can be no new trial until
there has been a trial; and, by a fair con-
struction of the Code, It must be such a
trial as results or should result In a verdict,
a report of a referee, or a decision by the
court which Involves and determines the
facts in issue. Otherwise there could be no
new trial "of the Issue of fact" It follows
therefore that whenever a trial has been had
upon issues of fact, which trial results in a
verdict, report of a referee, or a decision
which determines , such facts, elUier party
who feels himself aggrieved may file his
motion for a>inew trial on the grounda and
within the time prcacribed,. and, until such
motion is disposed ot the action is still
pending, and the statutory time for pre-
paring a case-made for an appeal does not
begin to run. Darling v. Atchison, T. 4 8.
F. By. Co., 93 Pac 612, GUT, 76 Kan: S93.
Default JudgnteAt
An order vacating a default decree of
divorce and allowing defoidant to answer
in accordance with L. O. L. | 69, is not an
appealable order within section 648, provid-
ing that appeals will lie from final judg-
ment and decrees^ in effect determining the
action and orders setting aside the judgment
and granting a new trial, for the order is not
a final one determining the suit, and neither
Is it an order granting a new trial whldi
is defined by section 178 as a re-examination
of an issue of fact in the same court after
judgment, for this order only vacates a de-
fault, and there has been no trial which is
defined by section lie as the judicial exam-
ination of the issues between the parties.
Taylor ▼. Taylor, 121 Pac. 481, 432, 61 Or.
257.
Degree of offense
A '-new trial'* Is defined by St 1893, art.
14, c 68, as a re-examinatlon of the issue
in the same court before another jury after
verdict has been given, and the granting
of a new trial placea the parties in the
same position as if no trial had been had,
and therefore one who has been convicted
of manslaughter under an indictment charg-
ing murder may,, on being granted a new
trial, be tried for murder. Turner v. Ter-
ritory, 82 Pac. 600, 661, 16 Okl. 567.
Under Const, art. 1, f 1, par. 8 (Civ.
Code 1896, f 5705), providing that no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense, save on his own motion for a new
trial, a person indicted for murder and
convicted of manslaughter obtaining a new
trial may be again tried for murder, and
cannot successfully interpose a plea of
former acquittal of murder. Brantley v.
State, 64 S. E. 676, 678, 132 Oa. 573, 22 U B.
A. (N. S.) 959, 131 Am. St Bep. 218, 16 Ann«
Cas. 1203.
Direoted verdioi
Under Code, | 3755, defining a "new
trial** as a re-exanoinatlon in the same court
of an issue after a "verdict of a jury,** or
a decision of the court the court may grant
a new trial after a directed verdict for
error in directing the verdict Bottineau
Land 4 Loan Co. v. Hint2se, 126 N. W. 842,
843, 150 Iowa, 646.
HirW WATEB
Benefits of an irrigation syston were
classified under two heads; one of "old wa-
ter,** and the other of '*new water.*' The
term "old water** referred to existing water
I
NEWLY DISCOYERED EVIDENCE 604
NEWSPAPER
1
ri
M
rights at the time of the purchase of the ca-
nalf and "new water** referred to rights yet
to be acquired by the enlargement of the ca-
nal. No benefits under the head of "old
water*' were apportioned to plalntilTs land,
and the canal had not been enlarged so as
to acquire any "new water.*' Held, that un-
til such enlargement occurred, or it was
made to appear that the canal company had
sufficient water to supply plaintifTs demand
without interfering with prior users, he could
not acquire a perpetual water right by the
temporary use of water from the canal when
prior users were not demanding their full
rights. Gerber t. Nampa & Meridian Irr.
Dist, 100 Pac. 80. 87, 16 Idaho, 1.
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
"Newly discovered evidence*' is evidence
in existence at the time of the trial but
which could not by reasonable diligence have
been procured. Gassidy v. Johnson, 84 N.
S. 835, 837, 41 Ind. App. 696.
Evidence Is not newly discovered which
at the time of the trial is known to the plain-
tiff in interest, who had taken upon herself
the prosecution of the case, and which any
inquiry of her would have made known to
the nominal plaintiff. Emmet v. Perry, 60
AU. 872, 873, 100 Me. 139.
Where, on the issue of payment, plain-
tiff testified that receipts offered in evidence
were forgeries, he was not entitled to a
new trial on the affidavit of a handwriting
expert that the signatures to the receipts
were forgeries, since the proffered testimony
was not "newly discovered evidence" but
was merely newly made evidence which could
easily have been produced on the original
trial. Heintze v. Graham, 116 N. Y. Supp.
548, 550.
Under Bums' Ann. St 1901, | 568, subd.
7, providing that a new trial may be granted
for newly discovered material evidence which
could not with reasonable diligence have
bpen produced at the trial, where evidence
was discovered by a party some time before
the court made its finding, but no attempt
was made to have the court consider the
evidence before the finding was announced,
it was not "newly discovered evidence" so as
to constitute a ground for a new trial. Burk
V. Matthews Glass Co., 81 N. E. 88, 89, 40
Ind. App. 81.
By "newly discovered evidence'* warrant-
ing a new trial is meant testimony that
comes to a party*8 knowledge after trial, and
hence, where during the trial defendant ob-
tained knowledge of the importance of an
absent witness and did not ask leave to
withdraw its announcement of ready for
trial, and aak a oontinuanee to secure his at-
tendance, but proceeded with the trial, it
could not claim a new trial on the ground
of newly discovered evidence. Bl Paso
Soathwestem R. Go. y. Barrett, 101 a.
1026, 1029, 46 Tex. GIt. App. 14
NEWS
NEWS AGENT
As passenger, see Passenger.
HEW8BOT
As passenger, see Passenger.
NEWSPAPER
See Daily Newspaper; Some Newi
per; Weekly Newspaper.
Publication of newspaper, see Pnbl
tton.
See, also. General Girculatlon.
A "newspaper,** In the popular senBe^
publication issued at regular stated inters
containing, among other things, the cun
news, or the news of the day. Times Pi
ing Co. V* Star Pub. Go., 99 Pac. 1040, 1
51 Wash. 667, 16 Ann. Gas. 414.
A "newspaper** is defined as a publ
tion issued at regular stated intervals, <
taining, among other things, the cun
news or news of the day. A publica
printed daily, except Sundays, and legal
idays, and devoted to the disseminatioi
news on a great variety of topics of inte
to the general reader, but giving spe
prominence to legal news, including the ;
ceedings in the Supreme Gourt of the s
and of the local courts sitting in the etati
a newspaper. Puget Sound Pub. Go. ▼. Ti
Printing Go., 74 Pac. 802, 804, 33 Wash-
(citing 21 Am. ft Eng. Enc. Law [2d Ed.
533).
A weekly publication, printed and d
lated in a city, containing the current n
and matters of general interest, as weU
the local happenings, is a "newspaper,*^ w
in the meaning of the statute requiring
publication of city ordinances, although
circulation may be very limited. Kai
Gity V. Overton, 75 Pac. 549, 550, 68 E
560.
A paper regularly published in a cen
dty for 20 years, and in general circnlat
having among its subscribers, bankers, i
estate agents, rental agents, architects, be
ing companies, public and private cont
tors, public service corporations, and at
neys, and containing a large and varied
vertising list covering many lines of b
ness, and publishing news concerning <
ordinances, resolutions of the dty coui]
building improvements, transfers of real t
personal property, building permits, oo
proceedings, and probate matters, pul
sales, together with brief items of local i
foreign news of general interest and misi
laneous items of interest to the. gene
reading public on political, sodal, moral,
ligious and other subjects, is a newspai
MerriU t. Gonroy, 109 N. W. 175, 77 K
228.
NBWaPAPXB
605
NSW8PAPJCB
A "newspaper/* In the popular aco^ta-
Hon of the word, la a publication Issued at
stated intervals, containing, amonc other
things, the current news (citing 21 Am. &
£ng. Encyc. of Law, p. 583). A 4-page, 6-
colunm, publication containing local and
general news and correspondence, and also
legal, professional, and business adYertising,
and apparently intended for general circu-
lation, and altered in the United States mails
as second-class matter, was a ^'newspaper,"
where the eyidence showed that it had been
published for ten years, and had a circula-
tion in four counties of the state and in a
majority of the states of the Union. The
genenll circulation of a newspaper is neces-
saiily comparative. No fixed number of sub-
scribers is required to constitute general cir-
culation. A newspaper's circulation does not
necessarily mean that it is read by all of the
people of the county or township. Ruth y.
Ruth, 79 N. B. 623, 624, 39 Ind. App. 290
(citing Lynn v. Allen, 44 N. £. ^, 145 Ind.
584, 33 L. R. A. 779, 67 Am. St Bep. 228).
''Finance and Commerce^** a daily paper
published in Minneapolis, is a newspaper
qualified as a medium of ofBdal and legal
publications, under B. It, 1906, S 6616. Olson
V. Bibb Co., 136 N. W. 886, 117 Minn. 214,
Ann. Gas. 1913D, 877.
Under Code, i 3636, providing that pub-
lication of an original notice required for
commencing an action must be in some
**newBpaper^ printed in the county where
the petition is filed, publication In a dally
paper published regularly In the city where
suit is brought for four years, with an actual
paid subscription of more than 200 copies
per day, not made up of subscribers of one
class, containing advertising covering many
lines of business, publishing the latest news,
and reporting items of local and foreign
news and others of interest, including trans-
fers of property, and all news relating to
court proceedings, and that has for more
than three years been admitted to the mails
under rules governing admission of all other
newspapers, and is the official paper of the
district court of the county, is sufficient, as
such paper is a "newspaper." Brlce v.
Graves, 121 N. W. 604, 606, 142 Iowa, 722.
Under St 1888, c. 390, { 86, requiring
tax sale advertisements to be published In
''a" newspaper, and under section 43, requir-
ing tax deeds to state "the newspaper** in
which the advertisement was published, a
tax sale based on cost of advertising in two
newspapers is void, the word "newspapers"
ia St. 1889, c. 334, | 3, authorizing a charge
tor advertising in "newspapers,*' meaning
copies of the newspaper in whldi the adver-
tisement was published. Shurtlefl v. Pot-
ter, 92 N. B. 331, 206 Mass. 28a
Printers' affidavits as to the publication
of notices of tax sales declaring that the pa-
per had been published in the county for the
legal period, one stating U» pohlication for a
period of more than three years, and the oth-
er for more than two years, sufficiently
showed that the newspaper was a legal news-
paper within the description specified by St
1818, I 1130. Bouchler v. Hanmier, 123 N.
W. 182, 134, 186, 140 Wis. 648.
As vapev la fhigHsli
Where a notice is required to be publish-
ed by pilnting in a newspaper, the notice
must be published in BngHsh in a newspaper
printed in Kngllsh. A publication in Bug-
lish of a notice in a French newspaper is
insufficient. Gonners v. Citj of liowell, 95
N. B. 412, 416, 209 Mass. Ill, Ann. Gas.
1912B, 627.
(Considering the object designed and the
practical means of accomplishing the object,
the manifest legislative Intent in the re-
quirement of section 788 of the General Stat-
utes of 1906 that the notice "shall be pub-
lished in the several newspapers printed in
the county*' was to ihclude only such "news
papers** as are devoted to the publication of
current news in general and are circulated
among all classes of the people, and not to
include publications designed chlefiy or whol-
ly for the purposes of only a portion of the
entire public The English language is the
means recognised by our law for communi-
cation and information; and, while a paper
printed in a foreign language may be a
"newspaper," it may not be within the pur-
view of a statute requiring the publication of
legal notices designed for the information of
all the people, where the statute contains
nothing to indicate an intention to include
such publication. Tylee ▼. Hyde, 62 South.
968, 969, 60 Fla. 889.
NSWSPAPEm OF OSHERAL OIBOUIJU
TIOV
PoL Gode^ I 4469, defines "newspaper of
general circulation" as a newspaper publish-
ed for the dissemination of local or telegraph-
ic news and intelligence of a general charac-
ter, having a bona fide subscription list of
paying subscribers, and which shall have
been established, printed, and published, in
the state, county, dty, dty and county, or
town, where such publication, notice of pub-
lication, or official advertising is given or
made^ for at least one year. A newspaper de-
voted to the interests, or published for the
entertainment, of a particular class, profes-
sion, trade, calling, race, or denomination, or
any number thereof. Is not a newspaper of
general circulation. In re Malone, 74 Pac.
991, 992, 141 Gal. 331.
Bvldence held to show that a certain
newspaper was a ^'newspaper of the county
having general drculatton therein" within
Wilson's Rev. A Ann. St 1906, | 4006, so that
a certificate of partnership required to be
published by Wilson's Rev. A Ann. St 1908,
if
»i>
i I
I H
t !
11
i i
1)
'; I I
I
|i. ! '?
in
KBWSPAPfiR
606
NEXT laOECTlOK
§8001, Was properly published therein. Hea-
ler y. ColdPOtt, 116 Pac. 787» 29 Okl. 216.
A daily noon publication was an 8-page
paper, 18 by 23 Inches in size, with 8 columns
to the page, and contained telegraphic, sport-
ing, political, and theatrical news and adver-
tisements with an editorial column. The ^m-
pany also published an evening paper by
another name, and the noon publication in
question had formerly been known as the
noon edition of the evening paper, and was
principally devoted to sporting news. The
publishers of the noon paper bid for the city
printing to be published therein. The paper
at that time had no regular subscription list,
but about IjOOO copies were sold dally by
newsboys. Subsequently the paper had a
subscription list of 360 and an average daily
circulation of 1,083. Held, that the paper,
at the time the bid was submitted, was a
'^newspaper" within Seattle City Charter,
art 4, § 31, requiring that the dty official
newspaper be a daily newspaper of general
circulation, etc., though it sometimes contaia-
ed news published the day before in the eve-
ning paper. Times Printing Co. v. Star Pub.
Co., d9 Pac. 1040, 1041, 61 Wash. 667, 16 Ann.
Cas. 414.
Under PoL Code, | 4400, defining a
"newspaper of genial circulation*' as one
which shall have been established, printed,,
and published at regular intervals for at
least one year preceding the date of publica-
tion, where a newspaper had been published
weekly for part of a year, and daily for
the balance of the year preceding the filing
of a petition to have it declared a newiq;)aper
of general circulation, it was published at
"regular intervals" for one year within the
statute, which does not require the interval
between the dates of publication to be equal
from beginning to end, but only to be regular
and not spasmodic or occasional. In re
Tribune Pub. Co., 108 Paa 667, 12 CaL App.
754.
NEWSPAPER OF OPPOSITE POLZTL-
OAIi FAITH
Under Laws 1003, p. 435, c 182, | 1,
subsec. 29, amending Laws 1898, p. 371, c. 182
(Second-Class Cities Law), providing for the
designation by the common council of two
dally newspapers having the largest circula-
tion and of opposite political faith as official
newspapers of the city, a newspaper which
supports no party, and advocates the princi-
ples or candidates of no party, but which is
the personal organ of its publishers and pro-
prietors, at times supporting the candidates
and principles of either the Republican or
Democratic parties, as its officials may de-
termine, is not a "paper of opposite political
faith'' to any regular party paper. People
ex rel. Troy Press Co. v. Common Council
of City of Troy, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1046, 1047,
114 App. DlT. 354.
NEXT
As mMuresi
There is a idiade of dilferenoe bet^
the words "next" and ^'nearest" The n
"next" in a certificate of membership c
mutual benefit society, providing for i
ment of a benefit on the death of a meo
to the beneficiary named, who under the
laws must be either the wife, children, ad
ed children, parents, etc, and, if the men
outlived the beneficiary named and died ^
out naming another beneficiary, the bei
was to go to the member's "next" 11^
relation in the order named, is used as a
onym of "nearest" and refers to the men
and not to the beneficiary. Therefore w]
a member named his wife as beneficiary
she died and he married again, leavin
second wife without having changed the b
fidary, the second wife and not his chiU
took the benefit Speegle v. Sovereign O
of Woodman of the World, 68 & S. 435,
77 S. O. 617. ^
Oen. St 1902, § 788, provides that, ^
a final judgment is roidered in any cans
which a party may be entitled to a wri
error to the Supreme Court, he may ap]
from such judgment to the next term of o
which would have cognizance of the wri
error. Accused was convicted on Noveo
11, 1911, and the next term of the Supr
Court was January 16th. Section 563
vides that the writ of error, which is an
dependent action begun by the filing o
complaint in the Supreme Court, and the
ing out of the writ as dvil process musi
returned at least 30 days before the sit
of the court Held that, as the word *^(
means nearest in order and immediately
lowing, the writ of order in this case
returnable to a term beginning January 1
and an appeal cannot be filed to a later U
State V. Caplan, 84 AtL 280, 283, 86 0
61&
As vef arrtnc to sftwe BMnatb
The word "next," in a writ of ▼enin
sued June 12, 1906, commanding the slv
to serve the writ upon the jury commiss
ers, and requiring them tio summon the
rors to appear before the oonmion pleas o
held on the 22d of June next, at 10 o'd
etc., meant the next 22d day of June in
year, especially in view of the fact that
next term of the court after June 12th
June 22d. State v. Washington, 64 & EL
887, 82 S. C. 341. (citing 6 Words
Phrases, p. 4796).
K£aLT 0AU8E
As proximate causey
Cause.
see Prozii
NEXT ZXECTIOK
Const art 10, | 6, providing that in
of vacancy in the Supreme Court the c
may be filled by the i^and committee i
NEXT ELECTION
607
NEXT MUNICIPAL ELECTION.
le next aimiial election, refers to tbe next
onual election of public offioerpb In le Opin-
^n of Judges, 51 AtL 221, 222, 28 R. I. 685.
The words "next election," as used in
. L. 1901, p. 338, S 18, providing that ac-
sptance or rejection of the act should be
abmitted to a popular vote at the '*next
lection** whether general, municipal, or spe-
lal, etc^ did not refer to the '*next election'*
eld after the passage of the act Had such
een the intention of the Legislature, it was
omparatively easy to specify a date for a
pedal election, or to designate a general
lection. Therefore, in support of the consti-
utionality of the act, it is fair to take the
rords "next election" as applying to the
rst general election that shall be held in any
ounty, not at the time possessing the dis-
Lnctive featifres, after it shall thereafter
cqolre those features. Albright t. Sussex
k)unty Lake & Park Commission, 58 AtL 612,
116, 68 N. J. Law, 523.
lEXT EVENTUAL K8TATB
See Eventual Estate.
IBXT FBIEND
As party, see Party.
Guardian ad litem distinguished, wee
Guardian Ad Litem.
''A *next friend' is one who, though not
regularly appointed^ represents in a suit a
?arty thereto who is not sui juris." Jack-
ion V. Counts, 54 S. B. 870. 871, 106 Va. 7.
The office of next friend is to represent a
person under disability in the litigation, be-
ing authorized to appear only when there is
Qo legal and statutory representative dis-
charging that duty. Upton's Committee v.
Bush, 121 S. W. 1005, 1008, 135 Ky. 102.
The guardian and next friend, in con-
ductiiig a dvil action, are a "species of at-
torney, whose duty it is to bring the rights
of the infant to the notice of the court," and
the authority of each is limited to the pro-
ceeding in which he is appointed. Williams
T. Cleaveland, 56 Ati. 850, 853, 76 Conn. 426.
Rev. St. 1895, art 3408u, provides that
any minor having a sufficient cause of action
and who has no legal guardian can bring suit
in any of the courts by "next friend," and
such next friend shall have the same rights
concerning such suit as if he were guardian,
etc The **next friend" is merely a trustee
who voluntarily assumes the task of repre-
senting the minor fn the litigation and in the
suit stands as the representative of the mi-
nor. Biggins V. Gulf, O. & S. F. B. Co. (Tex.)
110 S. W. 561, 563.
The relation of "proche in ami** to the
action is that of ah officer of the court spe-
^lly appointed to enforce and preserve the
fights of the infant In whose behalf he itcts.
He may employ an attorney, carry the suit
on to judgment, >and may, if there is no regu-
larly constituted guarcUan of the infant, re-
ceive the money recovered of the defttadant,
and thereupon may enter m valid satisfiio-
Uon of the judgment. State ex rel. Lane v.
Ballinger, 82 Pac 1018, 1020, 41 Wash. 28,
8 L. B. A. (N. &) 72.
NEXT OEHEBAIi ASSEMBLY
Act Oct 14, 1879 (Laws 1878-79, p. 125),
authorizing the Governor to suspend a rail-
road commissioner, and providing that the
Governor shall report the fact of 8ns*^t*n-
sion and the reason therefor to the "next"
General Assembly, means the General As-
sembly nearest in point of time, and, if the
General Assembly is in session when the sus-
pension is made by the Governor, it is his
duty to make his report to that General As-
sembly. Gray v. McLendon, 67 S. B. 859,
878, 184 Ga. 224.
NEXT OEHEBAIi ELECTIOK
The phrase "next general election,** as
used in Wilson's Bev. ft Ann. St 1903, |
8750, which provides that a person appointed
to fill a vacancy shall serve until the next
general election, means the next regular elec-
tion at which that particular class of officers
is to be chosen. Wainwright v. Fore, 97
Paa 881, 833, 22 Okl. 887.
The term "next general election,** as used
in Laws 1905, p. 18, | 10, providing that all
officers appointed by the act should hold
their respective offices until after the "next
general election," so far as the office of clerk
of the district court is concerned, means
the "next general election" held to fill that
office in the judicial district, and a per-
son holding such office is not ousted by the
election of a successor at a general election
called by the Governor for the election of
other officers than clerk of the district court
State ex rel. Livesay v. Smith, 90 Pac 750,
751, 35 Mont 523, 10 Ann. Cas. 1138.
KEXT HIGHEST BI]>DER
The phrase "next highest bidder,** as
used in Act CaL March 11, 1901, relating to
the granting of a street railway franchise by
a municipality to the next highest bidder
on the failure of a successful bidder to make
the requisite deposit within a specified time,
refers to bids already made, and not to a
bid or bids to be made. It expresses the re-
lation between bids in existence — those al-
ready made and pending before the council.
It is only in comparison with the next high-
est of those that the words have significa-
tion. Pacific Electric B. Co. v. Los Angeles,
24 Sup. Ct 586, 589, 194 U. S. 112, 48 L. Ed.
806.
NEXT MTTNIGIPAI. ELECTION
The words "next municipal election,** as
used in an act concerning the government of
cities, and requiring that the act be submit-
ted to the voters at the municipal election
after its approval, means the next election
after the municipality comes into the dasSi
NEXT MUNICIPAL ELECTION
608
NEXT OF KIN
affected by the legislation. Seymour y. City
of Orange, 65 Ati. 1038, 1034, 74 N. J. Law,
549 (citing Ross y. Board of Chosen Free-
holders of Essex County, 55 Atl. 310, 69 N. J.
Law, 291 ; Fagan v. Payen, 50 Ati. 568, 75 N.
X Law, 851).
The phrase "next municipal or charter
election," in P. L. 1894, relative to cities of
the first class and providing that members of
certain municipal bodies shall be elected at
the "next municipal or charter election,"
would as to existing cities be the first elec-
aon after the passage of the act and as to
any future cities the first election held in
the same. Fagan t. Payen, 59 AtL 568, 569,
75 N. J. Law, 851.
NEXT OF KIN
''The term 'next of kin' is used to signify
the relatives of a person, sometimes in the
sense of nearest blood relatives and at other
times in the sense of relatives entitled to
take under the statute of distribution." Gra-
ham V. Whitridge, 57 Atl. 609, 617, 58 Atl. 36,
99 Md. 248, 66 L. R. A. 40a
The words "next of kin," as used in
Code Civ. Proc. | 2643, relating to letters of
administration with will annexed, where
there is no executor qualified to act, and pro-
viding in subdivision 3 that where the re-
siduary, principal, or specified legatee, or the
guardian of a minor, entitled to letters, ei-
ther do not exist or will not accept adminis-
tration, letters shall issue to one or more of
the next of kin, must be limited to such of
the next of kin as are entitled to share in the
unbequeathed assets of the estate, and who
are therefore persons interested therein ; and
a person having no such right is to be ex-
cluded. In re Goggin's Estate, 88 N. Y. Supp.
557, 559, 43 Misc. Rep. 233.
In Rev. St c. 70, | 2, giving a right of
recovery for wrongful death to the wife and
"next of kin," the quoted words mean those
standing in that relation in a technical sense.
Dukeman v. Cleveland, C, C. & St L. R. Co.,
86 N. E. 712, 714, 237 111. 104 (quoting and
adopting definiUon in Chicago, P. ft St L. R.
Co. V. Woolridge, 51 N. B. 701, 702, 174 IlL
830, 334).
The words "next of kin" as used in the
statute relating to wrongful death mean
those who inherit from the deceased under
the statutes of descent and distribution. Bo-
linger V. Beacham, 106 Pac. 1094, 1096, 81
Kan. 746.
Bums' Ann. St 1908, i 285, giving a
right of action to the personal representative
for death by wrongful act, provided that the
damages must inure to the exclusive benefit
of the widow and children, if any, or next of
kin, recognizes two classes of beneficiaries,
the widow and children and next of kin;
and, if there are persons of the first class en-
titled to damages, they will take exclusively,
and granddkildren are not "children*' wttii
the statute, but come within the second dai
and may take as beneficiaries if there a
none of the first daas, nor are minor childr
"next of kin" within the statute, thongh th
are in fact decedent's next of kin. Pittsbai
C, C. & St L. Ry. Co. V. Reed, 88 N. B. Id
1082, 44 Ind. App. 635.
Under a statute providing that ''wh
the title to any real estate of inheritance
to which the person having such title shi
die intestate, came by descent, gift or devi
from the parent or other kindred of the J
testate and such intestate die without ct
dren, such estate shall go to the kin next
the intestate of the blood of the person frc
whom such estate came or descended if a
there be," property devised by testatrix
her grandchildren who are children of t
daughter, with the provision that at t
death of one of the grandchildren, a grai
daughter, the property should vest in I
heirs, the property vested in equal parts
her death in her mother, and her brother
the "next of kin" to the exclusion of her i
ther. Pierce v. Pierce, 14 R. I. 514, 517.
In the absence of a contrary intent, a g
to "next of kin" is a gift to the nearest of fe
in the strictest sense, excluding persons w
might take by representation under the st
ute of distribution ; e. g., a brother or sisi
takes to the exclusion of children of a decei
ed brother or sister. Claris ▼. Mack, 126
W. 632, 634, 161 Mich. 545.
Aa kin UtIhc at time
A devise to "heirs" or "next of kin"
construed as referring to those who answ
that description at the time of the testato
death or who would have taken, by descei
had he died intestate, unless a different !
tention is plainly manifested by the wi
Suman v. Harvey, 79 AtL 197, 201, 114 ¥
241.
"Next of Wn," in the statute fixing t
order of preference in which letters of admi
istration shall be granted, means perso
who are next of kin at the death of the inti
tate, and who inherit the estate left by t
decedent, and the addition of the words '1u
ing an inheritable interest in the estate*' ad
nothing. In re Bills' Estate, 88 N. E. 3^
342, 43 Ind. App. 620.
Under a will giving the residuary esta
to the executors, in trust to pay the incoi
to B. for life, and providing, "From and aft
the death of B., I direct my executors aj
trustees to convey my entire residuary estai
with all accumulations of interest then (
hand, to my heirs at law and next of kj
whomsoever they may be," the gift over aft
the death of the life tenant is to testatoi
next of kin living at the death of the life te
ant In re Cooper's Will, 96 N. X. Suj^u. «
564, 109 App. Div. 566.
KE3CT OF KIN
N£XT OF KIN
Ab Bcarest 1il«od relatloas
Primarily a decedent's "next of Mn** are
be persons nearest In degree of bipod sur-
"iving hlnL If a decedent leares neither par-
ent nor lineal descendant surylying, brothers
LBd sisters are "next of kin." In practical
ise in public statutes, "next of Un** ordina-
lly means those who take personal estate un-
ler the statute of distributions. In re Weav-
T's Estate, 119 N. W. 69, 70, 140 Iowa, eifi,
!2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1161, 17 Axin. Gas. 947.
Adopted ciaid
Under a statute providing that an action
!or death shall be for the exduslye benefit
>f the widow and "next of kin** of the de-
:eased person, the "next of kin" of a child
idopted under the statute concerning infants
(2 Gen. St p. 1714) are the "next of kin"
^7 blood. Heidecamp t. Jersey City H. & P.
St R. Co., 65 AU. 239, 69 N. J. Law, 284, 101
A.m. St. Rep. 707.
It is only as to the adopting parent that
the adopted child is made heir or next of
Un by the statute Gomp. Laws 1897, S 6780,
proYidtng that an adopted child shall beeome
the heir at law of the person adopting it;
and the adopted child, therefor, is not heir
by right of representation of the kindred of
the person who adopted It Van Derlyn t.
Mack, 100 N. W. 278, 280, 137 Mich. 146, 66 U
R. A. 437, 109 Am. St Bep. 669, 4 Ann. Oas.
879 (quoting Helms v. ElUott, 14 B. W. 930,
89 Tenn. 446, 10 L. R. A. 535).
As de«e0mdamt
See Descendant
Fatl&er
Where decedent leaves no widow or
child, but is survived by a father, mother,
and younger sister, the father is the sole
"next of kin." Swift & CJo. v. Johnson, 138
Fed. 867, 870, 71 C. C. A. 619, 1 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1161 (citing Gen. St 1894, | 4477 [d. 6]
1.4471 [cL 3]).
As Keirs •
See Heirs.
Heirs at Iaw
The conmion-law distinction between
"next of kin" and "heirs at law" does not ex-
ist In our statutes of descent, but heirs at
law are also the next of kin. L. T. Dlckason
Goal Co. T. Dlddll, 94 N. B. 411, 413, 49 Ind.
App. 40.
**Those who take personalty by inherit-
ance are technically 'next of kin* and not
heirs," Kalbach v. Clark (Iowa) 110 N. W.
599, 602, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 801 (dtlng and
adopting Tillman v. Davis, 95 N. T. 17, 47
Am. Rep. 1).
The term "next of kin" at least in<diide8
those entitled to take the personal estate in
case of intestacy. While it is doubtless used
iometlmeB as «yn<»nymoo8 with the broad
8 WDS.& PJ2d Sol— 89
tfgxdflcatlon of "hotrs at law,** the term
"heirs at law** is often used in ita popular
sense of including heirs in the legal sense,
those on whom the law casts title to realty
possessed by the intestate at the time of
his death, and next of kin as well. Treating
the latter term and the former only In their
legal sense, the one refers to those who take
the personalty of an intestate and the other
to those in whom the title to the realty
possessed by the intestate vests Immediately
on his death. In re Scaife's Will, 105 N.
W. 920, 921, 126 Wis. 406.
Where a will directed that on the death
of testator's widow, all his estate then re-
maining should be divided into three equal
parts, one to go to his son W. or to his
heirs should he have died, the word "heArs"
should be oonstmed to mean '*next of kin," or
those related by blood, entitled to take the
personal estate of one dying Intestate, and
did not include W.'s widow. Hess v. Zahn,
107 N. Y. Snw. 951, 858, 954, 57 Miac. Rep.
516.
Since the courts of Kansas have con-
strued the words "next of kin** In Qen. St
Kan. 1897, c. 96, M 418, 419, authoiiglng an
action for negligent death for tbe benefit of
decedent's next of kin, to mean those ^^lo
inherit from decedent under chapter 109, f
19, providing that where an intestate leaves
no issue nor wife, his estate shall go to his
parents, a father and mottier may sue for
the death of their son, dying intestate, with-
out wife or issue, in consequence of an injury
received in Kansas. Charlton v. St Louis
A & F. R. Co., 98 8. W. 629, 685, 200 Mo. 418.
Testatrix, by the fifth clause of her will,
bequeathed money to be invested and the in-
terest paid to testatrix's sister for life, and
on her death, to testatrix's daughter, and, on
the death of the daughter, the principal to be
divided between the issue of the dau^ter,
and, if no issu^ then to testatrix's next of
kin. The sixth clause devised the homestead
to the executors, the rent thereof to be paid
to the daughter during her life, and at her
death the homestead to be conveyed to the
child of such daughter, or the issue of such
child, and. In the event of the failure of
issue, then to testatrix's heirs at law. The
seventh clause bequeathed the residue of the
estate In trust, to be divided into two parts,
and the income of one part paid to the daugh-
ter during her life, and, on the death of such
daughter, the principal to be paid to her
issue, and, if she leave no issue, to testatrix's
next of kin. Held, that testatrix did not
Intend that her daughter should, in any
event, take a vested remainder in the corpus
of the trusts, subject only to her own life
estate; the words "heirs at law" and "next
of kin" not being used in their strict and
primary meaning, viz., the persons who, in
case of intestacy, would at the moment of
testatrix's death succeed to her property.
NKXT OF KIN
610
NEXT OF KIN
Salter y. Drowne» 98 N. B. 401, 402, 205 N.
Y. 204.
Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904, art 46, pro-
viding by sections 6, 14, and 21 for the
descent of real estate, declares by section 27
that if, in the descending or collateral line,
any parent shall be dead, a child or children
shall, by representation, be considered in the
same degree as the parent would have been
if living, and shall have the same share of
the estate as the parent would have been
entitled to if living, "provided that there Is
no representation admitted among collaterals
after brother's and sister's children"; and
article 93, § 129, provides: "After children,
descendants, father, mother, brothers and
sisters of the deceased, and their descend-
ants, aU collateral relations in equal degree
shall take, and no representation among
such collaterals shall be allowed." Testatrix
directed her estate to be converted into cash
and distributed among her "heirs at law
and next of kin, who' should be entitled
thereto under the laws of Maryland." Held,
in a contest between the first cousins of the
deceased and the children of a deceased first
cousin, that the children of the deceased first
cousin were not within the class described
by the will and took nothing thereunder.
Suman v. Harvey, 79 AU. 197, 201, 114 Md.
241.
Ulesitia&ate oUldrea
The term "blood relatives" or **heirs" or
"next of kin" may include illegitimate off-
spring, and where testator left his property
to his nearest blood relatives, and it appears
with reasonable certainty that when he made
the will he knew or ought to have known
that he had no blood relatives other than
Illegitimates, he used the terms to refer to
such persons. In re Sander's Estate, 105 N.
W. 1064, 1066, 126 Wis. 660, 5 Ann. Gas. 508.
The administrator of an illegitimate
child brought action for his wrongful death
under Bums' Ann. St. 1908, | 285, for the
benefit of his "next of kin," consisting of
his mother, his half-brothers, and his half-
sister by his mother's subsequent marriage.
Bums' Ann. St 1908, { 2998, provides that
illegitimate children may inherit from the
mother as if legitimate, and through the
mother, if dead, any property or estate which
she would, if living, have taken by gift, de-
vise, or descent, and by section 8002 the
mother of an illegitimate child dying intes-
tate wthout issue or other descendants in-
herits his estate; and, if such mother be
dead, her descendants or kindred shall in-
herit. Held, that the "next of kin'* included
such persons as were entitled to inherit the
personal property of the decedent, and that,
under sections 2998 and 3002, the mother and
the half-brothers and the half-sister were
the next of kin, and that the administrator's
action could be maintained for their benefit
li. T. Dickason Goal Co. v. Uddll, 94 li
411-413, 49 Ind. App. 40.
Manrlas* eoaneotioiM
The phrase "next of kin," whether
In a statute, will, or contract, includes
relations by blood, and not connectec
marriage, not even a husband and wife.
Graffenreld v. Iowa Land & Trust Co
Pac. 624, 635, 20 Okl. 687 (dtlng Supi
Goundl of Order of Chosen Friends v.
nett, 19 Atl. 785, 47 N. J. Eq. 39).
The phrase "next of kin," whether
in a statute, will, or contract, has by a
fectly uniform course of decisions been
to include only relations by blood, and
connections by marriage, not even a basl
and wife. Boyd v. Perkins, 113 S. W.
96, 130 Ky. 77 (citing Huting v. FeniK
R. I. 411; 2 Jarm., Wills, 661; Scfao
Wills, I 537).
The term "next of kin" does not inc
the widow of testator, In the absence of
evidence of an intent to include h^ in
class which the term Is employed to d«
nate. United States Trust Co. t. Miller,
N. Y. Supp. 938, 940, 57 Misc. Rep. 500.
The surviving husband is, within
Gode^ i 422, next of kin to his wife, and <
tied to recover damages for her wron
death. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Go. t. Tc
send, 81 Pac. 205, 206, 71 Kan. 524. 6 i
Gais. 191.
The words "next of kin" do not inc
a widow or husband. Hess v. Zahn, 10
Y. Supp. 951, 953, 57 Misc. Rep. 515.
Neither husband nor wife of a nep
or niece of a testator were his "next of 1
or of blood relationship, and hence mus
excluded in seeking those indicated
"heirs and representatives" of nephevt
niece surviving him. In re Nelson's Esi
74 Atl. 851, 857, 862, 9 Del. Gh. 1.
A husband is his wife's ''next of 1
where she dies intestate and without
dren or direct descendants, wi£hln Code
Proc. Kan. § 422a, providing that cez
actions for wrongful death may be broi
by deceased's "next of kin." Joplin J
Ry. Go. V. Payne, 194 Fed, 387, 889, 11
C. A. 305.
Rev. St Ohio 1892, | 4176, provides 1
when a person dies intestate and leave:
children or their legal repres^itatlves,
widow or widower shall be entitled as *i
of kin" to all the personal property, <
but, if the intestate leaves any children,
widow or widower shall be entitled to
first $400 and one-third of the remalnde
the personal property subject to distrlbui
A policy of insurance payable to the insur
heirs was by its terms to be governed
construed according to the laws of O
Held that, though in New York •'heirs" w
applied to successors to personal es
i V
NEXT OF KIN
6U
NEXT PBECEDINQ
means "next of kin/' and "next of kin** does
not include a widow, under the policy and
laws of Ohio, the widow is entitled to per-
sonal property as "next of kin,*' and should
share in the insurance with the insured's
children. Burns v. Bums, 82 N. £. 1107,
1108, 190 N. Y. 211.
Code GiT. Proc. i 1908, proyides that
damages recovered in an action for wrongful
death are excluslyely for the benefit of the
decedent's husband or wife and next of kin,
to be distributed as unbequeathed assets;
section 1904 declares that the damages may
be such as the jury deems Just compehsatlon
for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the
decedent's death to the person for whose
benefit the action was brought ; and sections
1905 and 1870 define ''next of kin" to include
all persons entitled under the statutes of
distribution of personal property to share in
unbequeathed assets of the decedent other
than a surviylng husband or wife. Held,
that in an action for wrongful death of a
married woman living apart from her hus<
band, leaving no descendants, the damages
recoverable were only such as resulted from
the pecuniary injury caused by her death to
her husband. Austin v. Metropolitan St By.
Co., 95 N. Y. Supp. 740, 741, 108 App. Div.
249.
Honreaident alien
A statute giving the ''next of kin" of one
wrongfully killed a cause of action does not
apply to nonresident aliens. Zelger v. Penn-
sylvania B. Co., 151 Fed. 848, 852.
Under Code Civ. Proc. | 1902, providing
that an executor or administrator of de-
cedent, who has left surviving a husband,
wife, or "next of kin," may maintain an
action to recover damages for wrongful
death, section 1905, providing that the term
"next of kin," as used in the foregoing sec-
tions has the meaning specified in section
1870, and section 1870, providing that the
term "next of kin" includes all those enti-
tled, under the provisions of law relating to
the distribution of personal property, to
share in the unbequeathed assets of a de-
cedent, after payment of debts and expenses,
other than a surviving husband or wife,
the administrator of a decedent whose "next
of kin" are aliens may bring such an action.
AlflBon V. Bush Co., 75 N. E. 230, 281, 182
N. Y. 893, 108 Am. St Rep. 815.
As relatlTe
See Relation— Relative.
As repreaentatiTe
See Legal Representative; Representa*
tive.
NxacT OF Knr nr equal degbee
Testatrix devised half of the residue of
her estate to the heirs of her late husband.
There were living 11 nieces and nephews and
8 i^randnieces and grandnephews of the said
husband at the d^th of testatrix. Held, that
his "next of kin in equal degree" within Rev.
St 1903, c. 77, I 1, rule 6, are his 11 nieces
and nephews living at the death of testatrix,
taking the residue so devised per capita and
not per stirpes. In re Ruggles' Estate, 71
Aa 933, 935, 104 Me. 383.
The statute of distributions having been
amended by the repeal of the proviso limit-
ing representation among collaterals to the
children of deceased brothers and sisters,
held, that the words, "and in case there be
no diild, then to the next kindred of equal
degree of or unto the intestate and their legal
representatives," are to be. read in connec-
tion with a prior clause directing distribu-
tion to the next of kindred "in equal degrees
or l^ally representing their stocks," and in
the distribution of personal property among
collaterals representation is limited to the
descendants of the stock represented by the
surviving "next of kin," as the words "next
of kin" must mean living persons. Smith v.
McDonald. 61 Atl. 453, 455, 69 N. J. EJq. 765.
HSXT OT KIHDRED
The words "next of kindred,** as used In
a wiU limiting a remainder on a trust es-
tate after the beneficiary's death to her next
of kindred, include the beneficiary's nephew
and niece in preference to her grandnephews
and grandnieces. Graham v. Whitrldge, 57
Ati. 609, 617, 58 Att. 86, 99 Md. 248, 66 L.
R.A.40&
The words "next of kindred," in Or-
phans* Court Act 1898, I 168 (P. L. p. 715),
directing disposition to the next of kindred
of equal degrees or legally representing their
stocks, mean representatives of those dead,
who if living would answer the same descrip-
tion as the actually living next of kindred.
Smith V. McDonald, 65 Atl. 840, 842, 71 N.
J. Eq. 261.
NEXT PREGEDINa
The words "during the year next preced-
ing," as used in Qen. St 1905, a 54, | 8,
providing that in making a selection of per-
sons to serve as jurors "each person who
shall have served as a juror in any capacity
at any term of court during the year next
preceding such selection shall be excluded
from the list of jurors for the then ensuing
year," clearly means the preceding year,
counting back from the time of the naaking
of the list State v. Hamilton, 87 Pac. 363,
365, 74 Kan. 461.
Code 1906, | 838, requiring notice of a
proposal to issue county bonds for three
weeks "next preceding," does not mean that
if the board falls to issue the bonds at the
meeting next after the publication of the
notice, it may not do so at a future time^
but jurisdiction is acquired, and may be ex-
ercised in the discretion of the board. West-
on V. Hancock Countyt 54 South. 807, 809, 98
Miss. 800.
KmCT SEaUIiAR TERM
ei2
HEXT TBBIC
jfBXT BSaULAK T9BM
See, also, N«ct Tana.
Defendant was given until the last day
of the next term of court to file a bill of ex-
ceptions. The next term should have been
held in February, and the following term in
May. Owing to the absence of the judge^ the
February term was not held. Held, that she
had until the last day of the May term with-
in which to file her bill of exceptions, since
the order extending her time did not give
her to any particular day of the year, but
to a certain day in the •'next regular term,"
which meant a term at which the court was
legally open for- the transaction of business,
and not the time at which it could and should
have been open, but was not because of the
absence of the Judge. Grant City v. Sim-
mons, IQl S. W. 187, 188, 167 Mo. App. 183.
HSXT 8E88I0H
The worda "at its next session," in Const
art C^ § 14,; authorizing the Legislature to
pass bills over the Governor's veto, and pro-
viding that, when the Governor witliin five
days after the adjournment of the Legisla-
ture vetoes a bill and files it in the office of
the Secretary of State, the latter shall lay
the same before the Lc^slature "at its next
session" as if it had been returned by the
Governor, mean the first session following,
whether regular or special, and a bill vetoed
by the Governor after the adjournment of
th;^ Legislature must be acted on at the fol-
lowing special session, and the action of the
Legislature in acting on it at the regular ses-
sion following the special session and passing
it over the Governor's veto Is ineffectual.
Woessner v. Bullock, 93 N. E. 1057, 1058, 176
Ind. 166.
HEXT StTOCEEDIirO
Where a demand for trial was made in
the superior court at the term at which the
indictment was found, and subsequently dur-
ing the term the indictment was transferred
to a city court fbr trial, the demand being maue
and the indictment transferred during a con-
current term of the city court, the next term
of the city court and not the concurrent
term, was the "next succeeding term" after
the demand, within the meaning of section
988 of the Penal Code. Castleberry ▼. State,
76 S. B. 74, 75, 11 Ga. App. 757.
In Act May 23, 1889 (P. L. 277, art. 1).
I 3, as amended by Act June 21, 1911 (P. L.
1102), providing that officers of a borough
shall hold their respective offices until the
first Monday in December of the first odd-
numbered year next succeeding the issuing of
letters patent to the borough as a city of the
third class, the words ^'next succeeding"
qualify tlie words "the first odd-numbered
year," and not the word "December." Com-
monwealth T. Langley, 82 Aa 66, 58, 283 Pa.
222. i
!15
See^ also, Next Regular Term.
An order that the action abate if
heirs are not made parties by the '*next tc
refers to the next civil term, and not u
intervening criminal term; and where pre
is served on them within that time, and v
in two years from defendant's death, tlu
fnsal to abate the action la not an abos
discretion. Moore ▼• Moore, 66 8. EL SOS,
151 N. O. 665.
Const art 1, | 10, declares that ixu
shall b^ administered without delay; B. i
Comp. I 1559, provides that if a defenc
whose trial has not been postponed on
application, or by his consent, be not broi
to trial at the next term of the conzi
which the indictment is triable, after 1
found, the court must order the indlctn
dismissed, except for cause; and B. A
Comp. I 1379, gives the court authority
postpone a criminal case to another tern
the statement of the district attorney. B
that the words "next term," as uaed in
tion 1559, excluded the current term at wl
the indictment was found, and hence
fendant was not entitled either to a tria
dismissal at that term. State t. Breaw
Pac; 896» 45 Or. 586.
Va. Code 1904, p. 1633, | 3060, prori
in section 3062, that there may be trie^
special term any dvil case not tried at
last preceding term, any motion cognixi
by the court, any criminal case which c(
be tried at a regular term, and any oon
versy ready for hearing at law or in chanc
though it could not have been heard at
preceding term; and section 3024, p. !<
provides that, where the reasons stated i
petition for quo warranto are legally
fident, the writ shall be returnable to
next term of the court Held, that a wri
quo warranto may not be returned to a i
dal term, the phrase "next term" in seel
3024 referring to a regular term, and
matter not being within section 3062. Sti
V. Pratt, 49 S. E. 654, 103 Va. 536.
Under section 27 of the act creating
city court of Camilla (Acts 1905, p. 1
providing that if a defendant stands rai
etc., then the judge shall commit tUm
trial at the next regular term, or ape
term, a contention that the word "ne
means nearest, and that the nearest tern
the one already in session, is too straine<j
be tenable. Heywood ▼. State, 54 S. B. 1
125 Ga. 262.
The phrase "next term," In a bail N
cdntainlng incorrect recitals as to the d
month, or year in which the court will c
vene or accused appear, coupled with a c
dition for accused to appear at the **n(
term," operates to render the bond val
Territory ex rel. Thacker ▼. Conner, 87 P
501, 592, 17 Okl. 135 (dting State ex i
Qibson T. Lay» 29i S. W. 999, 128 Mo. 0
[-.Jl
NBXT TERM
618
KIEOB
fState ▼. HcEUmney, 20 Mo. App. 584; Gay r*
State, 7 Kan. S94; 5 Oye. p. 96; Moonej t.
People, ai IlL ld4; Hunter ▼. State, 21 Ind.
351 ; Garry t. State* 39 Miss. 611; Feople t.
Welsh [N. Y.] 47 How. Prac 420; People ▼.
O'Brien, 41 111. 303; Proseck y. State, 88
Ohio St 606).
The word ''subsequent," in the act re-
quiring commissioners appointed by the Or-
phans' Ck>urt to set off dower to make their
report at the next or subsequent term after
their appointment, has the same meaning as
"next," and, if either word had been used
alone, it would have expressed the same idea.
Osbom T. Rogers, 19 N. J. £q. 429, 431.
Accused was indicted at the October,
1909, term of the district court, which ended
February 4, 1910. On February 8th a special
term of the court was convened at the re-
quest of accused to hear his motion to quash
the indictmoit Another special term was
convened on February 28th, and on March
7th the next regular term convened which
was to continue until May 31st, but the Leg-
islature by Act March 26, 1910, provided that
the regular term of such district court should
commence on the first Monday in January,
May, and October each year. Held, that ac-
cused was not entitled to a dismissal because
he had not been brought to trial at either of
such terms, since the "next term of court"
within CJomp. Laws 1909, f 7047, pityvldliiff
that, if an accused prosecuted for a public
offense whose trial has not been postponed
apon his application is not brought to trial ttt
the next term of court in which the indict-
ment is triable, the court must order the pros-
ecution dismissed, etc., refers to the next
regular term of the court as distinguished
from a special term held for a special pur-
pose, and the law becoming effective while
the March term was being held, operating to
terminate such term on April 30th, was sufD-
dent cause for not trying him during such
term, so that accused's right to a speedy trial
guaranteed by Bill of Rights, t 20, was not
violated, as his constitutional right to a
speedy trial was not contravened by delay ne-
cessitated by the .law itself. State ex rel.
Eubanks v. Cde, 109 Pac. 736, 744, 4 Okl. Cr.
25.
NEXT THXKO TO AIT XKPOflfllBIUTT
"Next thing to an impossibility," as used
In the testimony of an engineer with refer-
ence to the construction of a bridge so as to
pre?ent debris from being swept therefrom
either by the city's employes or by air cur-
rents onto the houses below, meant that any
further or additional construction to remedy
^e alleged defect was almost Impossible or
impracticable. Sadller v. New York, 93 N.
Y. Supp. 579, 683, 1Q4 App. Div. 82.
NFY.
Where a bill of lading read ''consignee
J* B. 8. Nty. W. H. J. & Co.*' the legend
'*N«r." is tquivateat to '"nottCy" and imposes
on the railroad company tiie duty to notify
W. H. J. & Co., and evidence to show such
meaning is admissible. Stoner v. Zacharay,
97 N. W. 1098, 1100, 122 Iowa, 287.
NICE
The word ''nice" is defined as "character-
ized by discrimination and Judgment, acute^
discerning, exactly fitted or adjusted, accur-
ate, apt, delicately constructed, hence easily
disarranged or injured; fragile, tender,
agreeable or pleasant in any way, pleasing to
the senses." Brophy v. Idaho Produce ft
Provision Co., 78 Pac. 498, 495, 31 Mont 270
(quoting Standard Diet).
NICKEL
Manufactures o4 see . Manufactures-
Manufactured Articles.
▲ "nicker* means 5 cents. Sims v. State,
57 8. B. 1029, 1 Ga. App. 776.
NICKNAME
**Mik9^' is not a universally recognized
abbreviation of "Michael," but is, strictly
speaking, a mere diminutive or nickname.
Ohlmann v. Clarkson Sawmill Co., 120 S. W.
1155, 222 Mo. 62, 28 L^ R. A. (N. S.) 432, 133
Am. St Rep. 606.
NIECE
To constitute Incest under Bums' Anil
St 1908, t 2352, punishing sexual Intercourse
between uncle and niece when construed in
connection with section 8357, making males
and females not nearer of kin than second
cousins competent to jnarry, the uncle and
niece must be related by blood; the word
"niece" in its primary sense including rela-
tionship by consanguinity. State v. Tucker,
93 N. E. 8, 4, 174 Ind. 715, 31 Ik R. A. (N.
S.) 772, Ann. Cas. 19iaA, 100.
As brotlMr
See Brother
Gvamdaieees
The words "nephews and nieces,** as con-
tained in the residuary clause of a will giving
to testator's "neiA^ews and nieces'' the resi-
due of his estate, included grandnephews and
grandnieces, and this, whether the previous
bequests in the will to them had been abso-
lute or in trust. Leask v. Richards, 101 N.
Y. Supp. 652, 666, 116 App. Div. 274.
Testator gave a legacy to his niece Kate,
daughter of Dr. H. W., and to Dr. H. W. a
specified sum for himself and his other chil-
dren, and he gave legacies to any niece or
nephew whom be bad omitted, excepting the
children of Dr. H. W., for whom he had made
provision. Testator was a widower, who had
never had any children, and left surviving
him a number of nieces and nephews, and
NIGGER
614
NITROGEN PEROXIDE
ill
4
grandnleces and grandnepbews, descendants
of sisters who died before the execution of
the will. There were two Drs. H. W., father
and son; the father being the father of the
niece Kate. Testator had a niece Mrs. P.,
who was omitted from the will, and the leg-
acy to her was on her death paid to her chil-
dren. Held, that the words "niece or neph-
ew" did not embrace grandnleces and grand-
nephews. White y. Old, 75 S. B. 182, 184,
113 Va. 709.
NIGGER
A '*nlgger" is a part of the machinery
of a sawmill, and consists of a piece of tim-
ber with Iron spikes along the upper side,
and Is used In striking and pushing heavy
logs onto the carriage and for turning them
thereon when desired. O'Brien v. Page Lum-
ber Ck)., 82 Pac 114, 39 Wash. 037.
NIGGERHEAD
The falling of a "nlggerhead," which
Is a large, hard substance found In coal, or
partly In the coal, and partly In the walls, Is
such a caving in as the statute requires mine-
owners or operators to furnish timbers to
guard against Pachko v. Wllkeson Coal &
Coke Co., 90 Pac. 436, 437, 46 Wash. 422.
NIGHT— NIGHTTIME
As after sundown
An instruction defining '^nighttime bur-
glary*' should give a definition of "nighttime"
as 80 minutes after sundown, and not before,
as provided by statute. Moray v. State, 135
S. W. 669. 570, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 547.
As between dnrkness and dawn
"Nighttime" is that period of time be-
tween the termination of daylight on the
evening of .one day and the earliest dawn of
the next morning. United States v. South-
em Paa Co., 157 Fed. 459, 461.
As between sunset and snnrlse
Pen. Code, S 824, In relation to burglary,
defines "nighttime" as meaning the period be-
tween sunset and sunrise. State v. Copen-
haver, 89 Pac. 61, 62, 35 Mont 342.
Under Rev. St 1898, 1 4334, defining "bur-
glary" as entering 'In the nighttime," etc,
and section 4338, defining "nighttime" as the
period between sunset and sunrise, a larceny,
to constitute burglary, must be committed In
the nighttime, and afllrmatlve proof that It
was so committed must be adduced; but
such proof need not be direct, but may be
circumstantial, in character. State v. Rich-
ards, 81 Pac. 142, 29 Utah, 310.
On a prosecution for burglary, an In-
struction that If defendant made the entry
charged 'in the nighttime, between sunset
and sunrise," he should be convicted, was
not erroneous on the ground that it took from
the Jury the question whether the burg^
was effected In the nighttime, but the Instr
tlon was proper aa declaring as a matter
law the meaning of "nighttime" as defined
Pen. Code, | 463. People v. Hlgglns, 96 P
683, 684, 9 CaL App. 267.
Evidence that a building was entered
accused "In the evening some time af
dark" was sufficient to establish bnrglary
the "nighttime** within Pen. Code, | 463, m
Ing burglary In the "nighttime" burglary
the first degree and defining ^'nighttime"
the period between sunset and sunrise. P
pie V. Mendoza, 118 Pac. 964, 965, 17 C
App. 157.
Disoemment of features as teat
Under Rev. Code 1893, p. 737, c 97
29, providing that search warrants shall i
authorize the searching of any dwell
house In the nighttime, the term "nlghttiii
means that space of time during which i
sun Is below the horizon, exc^t that spi
which precedes Its rising and follows Its t
ting, during which, by Its light, the coiu
nance of a man may be discerned. Petit
Colmary (DeL) 55 AU. 344, 346. 4 Pennen
266.
NIGHT WAI.KEB
See Common Night Walker.
NIGHT WATCHICAN
As laborer, see Laborer.
NISI JUDGMENT
As judgment, see Judgment (In Law).
NITROCELLULOSE
"Nitrocellulose,'* as referred to tn i
Von Freeden patent. No. 429,516, for a p
cess for making smokeless gunpowder fr
''nitrocellulose,'* is an explosive nitrate
cellulose, commonly known as gun cotton,
is made by digesting clean cotton In a m
ture of nitric and sulphuric add. There i
other nitrates of cellulose made with wc
acids and a short period of digestion, wh
are not gun cotton. Nltrocelluloee. or c
cotton, is soluble In certain liquids, such
ethyl-ether, methyl-ether, a solution of ca
phor In ether, etc. Wolff v. B. I. Du P<
De Nemours & Co.. 122 Fed. 944, 945.
NITROGEN PEROXIDE
"Nitrogen peroxide'* is a dark brown g
deepening in color as the temperature is
creased. It has a peculiarly repulsive od
and iB poisonous when Inhaled. While
sometimes bleaches. It more frequently i
parts color, especially as to protelds, whi
are an Important constituent of flour. It v
turn commeal and other com products a
rice products yellow, while tobacco is m«
darker by It Naylor v. Alsop Process C
168 Fed. 911, 917, 94 C. C. A. 315.
MIXBOOIiTCEBIN
615
NO OIHER
NITROGLYCERIN
An inf onnatloii for the malicloiu placing
of an ezploslYe near a dwelling house, de-
icriblng the ezploslTe aa ''nitroglycerin/' com-
monly known as "dynamite" or "giant pow-
der/' was not objectionable for indeflnite-
ness as to the explosion charged^ the sub*
stances all being nitroglycerin explosives.
People T. Swaile» 107 Pac 184, 180^ 12 CaL
App. 192.
NO
The single answer, "No," to the issoe,
was it a sale of goods for the purpose of
defrauding creditors? or was it to secure
the payment of a yalid debt? leaves it un-
certain as to the answer intended. Riske
V. Rotan Grocery Co., 84 8. W. 243, 244, 87
Tex. Civ. App. 494.
In an application for anployeri^ liabil-
ity insurance, the question and answer : "Q.
No explosives or chemicals used except as
herein stated? A No*'— do not constitute a
double negative, amounting to an affirmative.
Columbian Exposition Salvage Co. v. Union
Casualty ft Surety Co., 77 N. E. 12S» 220 IlL
172.
NO CAUSE OF ACTION
The direction of a verdict of "no cause
of action** at the close of plaintilTs proof, on
motion for nonsuit on the ground .of failure
to prove absence of contributory negligence,
is equivalent to a nonsuit because of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, and not because of
the insufficiency of the complaint Romaine
V. New York, N. H. ft H. R. Co^ 88 N. Y.
Supp. 248, 249, 91 App. Div. 1.
NO CHANGE
See There is No ChangSb
NO EFFECT
See Of No Effect
NO FURTHER ACTION
See Neither Party, Etc.
NO INTEREflT TO MISREPRESENT
The term "no interest to mtBrepresent,**
as used with reference to conditions requisite
to the admission of declarations of a deceas-
ed person respecting a boundary, means free-
dom from selfish motive or self-interest or
personal advantage; disinterested, not mere-
ly in the sense of having no pecuniary inter-
est, but in the broader sense of being abso-
lutely impartial and indifferent to the contro-
versy on trial. Turgeon v. Woodward, 78
Aa 577, 579, 83 Conn. 537.
NO lABORER NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
UNITEO STATES
The phrase "no mechanic or unskilled
laborer not a dtisen of the United States,"
as used in a dty charter, providing that no
such labors who has not declared his in-
tention to become such, and who has not
resided within the dty for one year next be-
fore entering thereon, shall be employed by
the dty, applies only to laborers not dtizens
of the United 8tate& Landswick t. Lane, 90
Paa 490, 491, 49 Or. 408w
NO-UCENSE TERRITORY
The term "no-license territory" Is de-
fined by statute as all parts of the state ex-
cept the premises actually occupied by li-
censees. This definition makes dear the leg-
islative understanding that the prohibitory
law is in force generally in license towns, ex-
cept in so far as it is rendered inapplicable
by the special license legislation. State v.
Langdon, 84 Aa 1099, 1101, 74 N. H. 50.
Under Acts 1910, c. 190, | 80, requiring
shipments of ardent spirits into local option
or no-license territory to be plainly marked,
showing the kind and quantity of spirits and
the consignee of the package, and section 19c,
defining "local option territory^ as territory
which, by vote under the local option law,
has declared against the issuance of licenses
for the sale of ardent spirits, and "no-license
territory" as territory in which, under the
provisions of that or some other act, no li-
cense for the sale of such spirits can be
granted, a conviction cannot be sustained for
failure to mark as spedfied a shipment into a
magisterial district, where licenses may be
issued under certain conditions, and which
voted against local option at the last local
option election, al^ough no licenses are actu-
ally in effect. Armstead v. Commonwealth,
74 8. E. 399, 400, U3 Va. 765.
NO OTHER
A provision in an election statute that
"no other names shall be placed upon the
ballot" than the names of those who have
filed a statement of their candidacy was not
intended to forbid voting for persons other
than those named on the ballot by inserting
thdr names in writing. Eckerson v. City of
Des Moines* U5 N. W. 177, 190, 137 Iowa,
452.
Code Civ. Froc. i 2476, provides that the
Surrogate's Court of eadi county has exdu-
sive Jurisdiction to grant letters testamentary
where a nonresident decedent dies without
the state leaving personal property in that
county and "no other." Subdivision 4 gives
such exdusive Jurisdiction where decedent
was not a resident of the state, and a petition
for probate of his will or for a grant of let-
ters of administration has not been filed in
any Surrogate's Court, but real property of
the decedent, to which the will relates, or
which is subject to sale for his debts, is situ-
ated within that county and "no other."
Section 2477 provides that, where personal
property of a decedent is within two or
more counties, under the drcnmstances sped-
fied in section 2476, subd. 8» or real estate of
NO PBRSOK
^16
NOLLE PBOSEQUI
the decedent is situated in two or more coun-
ties under the drcumstanoes specified in sub-
diylsion 4, § 2476, the Surrogates' Ck>urt8
of such counties have concurrent Jurisdiction
to issue letters testamentary. Held that,
where a nonresident decedent left personal
property in several counties and left real
estate in another county, and no letters of
administration had been issued in the state,
the Surrogates' Courts of the counties in
which there was personal property had con-
current jurisdiction to issue letters. The
words ''no other," as used in section 2476,
relate to exclusive Jurisdiction, and do not
affect the concurrent Jurisdiction which sec-
tion 2477 confers upon Surrogate CSourts,
where personal property is in two or more
counties. In re Arnold's Estate, 90 N. Y.
Supp. 740, 742, U4 App. Div. 244.
NO PERSON
The words "no person" in a criminal
statute are to be given their literal meaning,
and, when a statute provided that no person
should practice dentistry without having com-
plied with its provisions, there was no im-
plied exception of persons holding certificates
entitling them to practice as a physician or
surgeon. State v. Taylor, 118 N. W. 1012,
1013, 106 Minn. 218, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 877,
16 Ann. Cas. 487.
NO PERSON BID
The words, "No person bid," in a tax
deed, imply that the land "could not be sold"
to a private bidder. They express the pre-
cise idea to be conveyed by the statutory re-
cital, and are therefore 'equally good.' " The
deed is not void on its face because it sub-
stitutes the words "no person bid" for the
words "said property could not be sold" In
stating the necessity of a sale to the county.
Baughman v. Harvey, 93 Pac. 146, 160, 76
Kan. 767 (citing and adopting Bowman r.
Coclcrill, 6 Kan. 311).
NO PROPERTY
The words "no property," In Balllnger's
Ann. Codes & St | 6248, providing that "no
property" shall be exempt from execution is-
sued on a Judgment against an attorney or
agent on account of any liability incurred for
failure to account for money or other prop-
erty coming into his hands belonging to his
principal, are applicable only to personal
property, and the section does not apply to
homestead exemptions. Ervay r. Hill, 90
Pac. 690, 592, 46 Wash. 457.
NO PROPERTY FOUND
A return of "no property found" means
that defendant has no goods or chattels
whereof to levy the execution within Rev. St
1899, 8 4019, declaring that the circuit clerk
may not issue execution on a transcript Judg-
ment until after the Justice has issued an ex-
ecution and the constable has made return
that the defendant had no goods or chattels
whereof to levy the sama Hick t. Paris, ]
S. W. 716, 717, 124 Mo. App. 341.
NO UNDUE INFIiUENOB WAS HAD
Where the validity of assignments fr
testatrix to defendant is questioned, a ifa
ing that "no undue influence waa had or (
erdsed" is equivalent to a finding that 1
transaction was not the result of undue
fluence, and does not negative merely the
rect employment of undue influence, with<
taking into consideration the effect of the
fluence naturally arising from testatrix's
liance on defendant's protection and her i
predation of his kindness. Hobarf ■ Adi
T. Vail, 66 AtL 820, 823, 80 Yt 162.
NOBILITY
See Confer Title of Nobility.
NOBLESSE OBLHSE
"The French have a maxim, "Noble
oblige,' which means that those in comfor
ble circumstances and possessed of met
should set the example of obedience to 1
laws." State r. Ckdonial Club, 69 S. E. 7
777, 154 N. C. 177, 31 L. R. A. (N. a) 3
Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1079.
NOLLE PROSEQUI
A "nolle prosequi*' amounts to neither
acquittal nor a pardozL It is simply a c
charge of the particular Indictment as
which it is entered, and is no bar to a
ture indictment for the same offense. St
V. Brackin, 37 South. 863, 113 La. 879.
A "nolle prosequi" Is not a demun
general or special, nor is it an amendmi
in the broadest sense of the term. It e
braces only the withdrawal or abandonmi
of a count. Hudson t. McNear, 59 AtL 5
547, 99 Me. 406.
A nolle prosequi in criminal proceedii
is merely a declaration on the part of the
licitor that he will not then prosecute l
suit farther, and is not an acquittal,
though its effect is to discharge the defei
ant without day. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson,
S. B. 740, 741, 159 N. C. 265, 39 L^ R. A.
S.) 1215.
A "nolle prosequi" in criminal proee
lugs does not amount to an acquittal of 1
defendant, but he may again be in-osecol
for the same offense, or fresh process may
issued to try him on the same indictment
the discretion of the prosecuting oflicer. I
der a statute providing that a "nolle pro
qui" with leave shall be entered in all cri
inal actions in which the action has be
pending for two terms of court, and the (
fendant has not been apprehended, the pr
ecution of an Indictment for maintaining
nuisance at April term, 1906, was not end
hj the entering of a nolle prosequi with lee
NOLO CONTENDERE
617
NOMINAL DAMAOSB
» issue a capias» entered at November tenn,
L906, for whlcb defendant was arrested in
ranuary» 1009, so that the prosecotion was
ipon the original indictment, and was bar-
red by the statute. State v, Williams, 66 S.
£. 908, 968, 161 N. G. 600 Quoting and adopt-
ing definition in State y. Tliomton, 85 N. O.
267).
NOLO CONTENDERE
*The 'plea of nolo conleBdere^ is an im-
plied confession of the offense charged. The
judgment of conviction follows that plea as
vreU as the plea of guilty.* State r. Herlihy,
B6 Atl. 648, 646,* 102 Me. 310.
Under the common-law rule, which gov-
erns in the federal courts, to authorize the
court to entertain a plea of nolo contendere
the case must be within the class of misde-
meanors for which punishment may be im-
posed by fine alone, although the offense may
as weU be punishable by Imprisonment, at
tbe discretion of the court, either as an al-
ternative of fine or in addition thereto, or to
enforce payment of the dne; and sucb plea
cannot be accepted either in cases of felony
requiring infamous punishment to be impos-
ed on conviction, or in cases of misdemeanor
for which the punishment must be imprison-
ment for any time, with or witiiout fine. The
so-called plea of "nolo contendere^ Is not a
plea in the strict sense of that term in the
criminal law. It is not one of the pleas gen-
eral or spedal, open to the accused in all
criminal prosecutions and is allowable only
ander leave and acceptance by the court
When accepted by the court, it becoittes an
Implied confession of guilt, and for the pur*
poses of the case only equivalent to a plea of
guilty, but distinguishable from such plea in
that it cannot be used against the defendant
as an admission in any dvil suit for the same
act. Where a plea of nolo contendere was
tendered to an indictment containing counts
some of which charged offenses which requir-
ed i>unlsbment by both fine and imprisonment,
while on others a fine alone might be Impos-
ed, the action of the court in hearing evi-
dence, making a finding of guilty as charged
and sentencing defendant to both fine and
imprisonment, was Inconsistent with the ac-
ceptance of such plea, and the judgment of
conviction without a Jury trial was without
jurisdiction and void. When an indictment
contains counts charging offenses for which
the statute requires the Imposition of punish-
ment by both fine and Imprisonment and oth-
ers for offenses which may be punished by
fine alone, the court has authority to allow
a tendered plea of nolo contendere; but in
such case the further proceedings and pun-
ishment must be confined to the latter class
of counts to which alone the plea is applica-
ble. Tucker v. LniCed States, 196 Fed. 260,
262, 266, 267, 116 a C. A. 62, 4 U B. A. (N.
S.) 70.
As eoAvletlom
The plea of ''nolo contendere** is an im-
plied confession of the offense charged, and
the Judgment of conviction follows that plea
as well as the plea of guilty, and it is not
necessary that the court should adjudge that
the party was guilty, for that follows by nec-
essary legal inference from the Implied con-
fession. State T. Herlihy, 66 AtL 64S, 646,
102 Me. 810.
"Plea of *nolo contendere,* when accept-
ed by the court, is, in its effect on the case,
equivalent to the plea of guilty. • • •
The Judgment of conviction follows upon
such a plea, as well as upon a plea of guilty,
and such a plea, if accepted, cannot be with-
drawn and a plea of not guilty entered, except
by leave of court" State v. Siddall, 68 Atl.
684, 686, 108 Me. 144 (quoting and adopting
definition in Oommonwealth ▼. IngersoU, 14
N. E. 449, 145 Mass. 381).
NOMINAL
KOMIHAL DAMAGES
"Nominal damages" is defined as some
small amount, sufficient to cover and carry
tlfts costs. Batson v. Hlggtebotfaem, 68 S. E.
466, 467, 7 Qa. App. 886.
"Nominal damages'' is some very small
sum, as a farthing, a penny, or a sixpence.
Hasselbusch v. Mohmklng, 73 Atl. 961, 962,
76 N. J. Law, 691 (citing Sedg. Dam. p. 44).
A new trial will not, as a general rule,
be granted to enable the defeated party to
recover "nominal damages,*' which are such
as are to be awarded in a case where there
has been a breach of contract, and no actual
damages can be shown. Seattle v. New
York, N. H. ft H. R. B. Co.. 80 Atl. 709, 710,
84 Conn. 556.
The term ''nominal damages," lik« ''ex-
emplary damages," is purely relative, and
carries with it no suggestion of certainty as
to amount, though it generally refers to a
trivial sum awarded. Where a mere breach
of duty or infraction of right is shown with
no serious loss sustained, the amount may,
according to the drcumstances of each par-
ticular case, vary almost indefinitely, depend-
ing largely on the amount involved, a recov-
ery being properly classified as nominal dam-
ages where the violation of a right issue is
shown, substantial damages claimed, and
some actual loss proved, and yet the damages
are not susceptible of reasonable certainty of
proof as to their extent Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Glenn, 68 8. E. 881, 8 Ga.
App. 168.
"Nominal damages are a small and triv-
ial sum, awarded for a technical injury, due
to a violation or invasion of some legal right,
and as a consequence of which some dam-
ages must be awarded to • delemine the
right They are not given as an equivalent
for the wnmg, but in reeognitioii oC a teoli>
NOMINAL DAMAGES
618
NOMINEE
nical Injnry- There need be no actual dam-
age, however small. They are called nom-
inal damages, in contradistinction to actual,
substantial, or compensatory damages. They
are damages in name only, not In fact They
have been described as a peg on which to
hang costs ; but they are still recognized as
the subject of a substantial legal claim, and
the party is entitled to them if he can show
any injury to his right If he establishes a
cause of action — that is, an injury in its
technical sense — and falls to show any dam-
num, or damage, he can recover nominal
damages." Chaffln v. Fries Mfg. ft Power
Co., 47 S. B. 226, 228, 135 N. C. 95.
Where a legal right has been invaded
and real injury done, the damages, though
small, are actual, and not nominal, nominal
damages being those so small in amount as to
show that they were not Intended as any
equivalent or satisfaction to the party recov-
ering them; the term being a relative one,
and carries no suggestion of certainty as to
amount Moore v. Duke, 80 AtL 104, 197, 84
Vt 401.
NOMINAL PARTNER
The term ''nominal partner," as com-
monly understood, means "a person who is
not a partner at all^ but allows the use of his
name in the firm, generally to give it addi-
tional credit or to attract custom, thus in-
curring all the liabilities while deriving none
of the benefits of the association." Lasher v.
Colton, 80 N. E. 122, 123, 225 ni. 234, 8 Ann.
Gas. 367 (quoting and adopting definition In
2 Bates, Partn. 1 11.
NOMINATE
See, also, Ai^wlnt— Appointment; Pri-
mary Election.
The term "nominate" means to designate
by name, and not merely to refer to some
place where the name can be found. In re
Hopper, 132 N. Y. Supp. 730, 731, 73 Misc.
Rep. 369.
The terms "nominate" and "appoint" are
not synonymous, though there are some in-
stances where the terms may be used to
mean the same thing, and under St Gal.
1887, p. 67, c. 57, providing for the appoint-
ment of certain trust^s by the Governor with
the advice and consent of the Senate, an ap-
pointment is not completed by the transmis-
sion of the nomination by the Governor to
the Senate and the confirmation of the nom-
ination by the Senate. The appointment is
not made until the commission is Issued, and
issuing the same is the last act, and in is-
suing the commission the Governor is per-
forming an executive and not a ministerial
act, and is therefore acting under his discre-
tionary powers, and may or may not issue
the commission, although the Senate may
have advised it and consented that he should
make the appointment Harrington v. Par-
dee, 82 Pac. 88, 84, 1 Gal. App. 278 itit
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Granch [5 U. S.] 1
2 L. Ed. 60).
NOMINATION
See Gertlflcate of Nomination; Pa
Nomination.
The provision in Laws 1911, c €
amending Election Law, 1 831, that the nai
of candidates chosen by more than one
litical party or independent body shall :
appear more than once on the printed ofD<
ballot, discriminates against the political p
ties nominating a candidate also nomiiia
by another party in whose column alone
name appears, and violates the Gonstltnti
notwithstanding the definition in such ame
ing law o'f the term "nomination,'' which U
Its the right of all parties to nominate c
dldates to a selection in accordance with
act, and so does not Include the right
have the candidates' names appear on the
ficial ballot in the column of a particu
party. In re Hopper, 132 N. T. Supp. 7
731, 73 Misc. Rep. 369.
The act incorporating the dty of Gra
ton, providing for caucuses for the select
of candidates to be voted for at the first e]
tion, and ttiat all "certificates of nomlnati(
of candidates shall be filed at least nine di
before the first election, merely provides
the filing of certificates of nomination at c
cuses; and Gen. Laws 1909, c 11, f 18, p
viding for the filing of "certificates of ii<
ination " and "nomination papers," gOTernE
to the filing of nomination papers, since
statutes by long usage make certificates
nomination refer to nominations by caucui
while nomination papers relate to nomi
tions by individual voters. Greenough ▼. 'I
terman, 75 AU. 865, 866, 30 B. L 447.
NOMINEE
As officer, see Officer.
A candidate becomes a •Nominee"
public office only upon filing the certificate
nomination with the proper officers, wit
the meaning of Election Law (GonsoL La
c 17) I 136. In re O'Brien, 125 N. Y. Sn
269, 140 App. Div. 467.
In St 1898, § 34, pertaining to gen<
elections, and providing that if the nomi
die after the ballots are printed and no n<
ination shall be made as herein provii
the votes cast for him shall be counted i
returned, the "nominee" is the person d
has received the party nomination for an
flee. State ex rel. Bancroft t. Frear, 128
W. 1068, 1075, 144 Wis. 79, 140 Aul St. B
992.
Gomp. St. 1903, c. 26, § 32, provides tJ
in no case shall the candidate of any pol
cal party be entitled to be designated on i
official election ballot as the candidate
more than one political party, and shall
designated on the "official ballot" as the no
NOK
619
NON OBSTANTE VEREDICTO
ioee of tbe party in whose nomljiatlon his
name appears as tbe political party with
which he affiliatee. Held, that the words "can-
didate of any political party*' and the "nomi-
nee of the party" mean a person who has
been selected by a party as its candidate for
public office, and do not refer to one who is
desirous of becoming a candidate and whose
name is submitted to the choice of the vo-
ters at a primary election. A party's candi-
date and its nominee cannot be determined
until after a choice has been made at a pri-
mary. State ex rel. Adair T. Drezel, 106 N.
W. 174, 177, 74 Neb. 776^
NON
NOK COMPOS XBHTIS
See Blind of a Non Compos.
The words "non compos mentis^ mean a
total deprivation of reason. Slaughter y.
Heath, 57 & E. 69, 71, 73, 127 Ga. 747, 27
L. R. A- (N. S.) 1.
One is "non compos mentis'* as to his con-
tracts when he does not possess understand-
ing sufficient to comprehend the nature, ex-
t^it, and consequences of them. Nichols r.
Nichols, 66 Att. 161, 166, 79 Ck>nn. 644.
"The term iion compos mentis,' used by
the Code, embraces not only lunatics and idi-
ots, but also all persons of unsound mind."
Under the rule that, for the assumption of
continued maintenance of control, by a court
of chancery over the peiBon and estate of
one alleged to be of unsound mind, it is not
necessary to prove the entire absence of rea-
son, understanding, or memory, but only to
show incapacity to contract, evidence held
sufficient to sustain an order dismissing a pe-
tition for the discharge of the committee of
the person and estate of a person of unsound
mind." Johnson v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
of Baltimore, 65 Atl. 330. 334, 104 Md. 460
(quoting and adopting definition in Green-
wade V. Greenwade, 43 Md. 316).
NON I>ETIN£T
A plea of the "general issue" in detinue
is tbe equivalent of a plea of "non detinet"
at common law, and puts in Issue the plain-
tilTs right of recover. Byall v. Pearson
Bros., 41 South. 673, 148 Ala. 668 (citing Car-
lisle's Case, 26 South. 115, 122 Ala. 446).
NON EST FACTUK
"A plea of *non est factum' properly ten-
ders tbe issue whether the specialty was law-
fully sealed by the commissioners and, if so,
whether it is the deed of the defendants."
English V. Mayor, etc., of City of Jersey
aty, 42 N. J. Law, 275, 278.
In an action on a policy of life insuranee,
a plea that "the defendant did not enter in-
to the alleged contract sued on" was not a
plea of "non est factum," within Code 1896»
i 3353, form S3. Manhattan life Ins. Co. ▼•
Vemeuille, 47 South. 72, 73, 156 Ala. 592.
NON OBSTANTE V£BEDXCTO
A motion for Judgment notwithstanding
the verdict is not proper, where no motion
for a directed verdict was made at tbe elom
of plaintiff's case. I^ndis Mach. Ca v. Kon-
antz Saddlwy Co., 116 N. W. 333, 334, 17 N.
D. 310.
A "judgment non obstante^' is usually a
judgment entered by order of the court for
the plaintiff in an action at law notwith-
standing a verdict for the defendant. At
common law a judgment non obstante vere-
dicto could be entered only when the plea
confessed the cause of action and set up mat-
ters in avoidance which were insufficient, al-
thought found true, to constitute either a
defense or a bar to the action. In such case
the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment in
his favor notwithstanding a verdict for the
defendant The practice was adopted, says
Judge Pearson, to discourage sham pleas by
the defendant Hence it follows that at com-
mon law a judgment non obstante could only
be granted upon motion of the plaintiff, nev-
er for a defendant, and that its use was con-
sequently very restricted. This rule, howev-
er, has been relaxed in many jurisdictions,
especially where counterclaims are pleaded,
and where the code system prevails, and it is
held that such judgment may be rendered on
the pleadings for either party entitled to It
Irrespective of the verdict. In no case, how-
ever, can such a judgment be rendered for
any party, except when the pleadings entitle
the party against whom the verdict was ren-
dered to a judgment Where the court in an
action for personal injuries refused a motion
of nonsuit, and a motion to render judgment
on the issues, whether plaintiff contributed to
his injury by negligence, and the amount of
damages, judgment could not be appropriate-
ly rendered for defendant notwithstanding
the jury's negative answer to the first issue
and its finding of |3,000 damage on the sec^
ond issue. Shives v. Eno Cotton Mills, 66 8.
E. 141, 142, 151 N. C. 290 (citing and adopting
2 Tldd, Pr. 922 ; Rap. ft U Law Diet ; Black
Law Diet ; Cotton Mills v. Abemathy, 20 8.
E. 522, 115 N. C. 403 ; Walker v. Scott, 11 8.
E. 364, 106 N. C. 57 ; Riddle v. Town of Ger-
manton, 23 S. B. 332, 117 N. C. 387; Moye
V. Petway, 76 N. C. 329).
"A motion for a judgment 'non obstante
veredicto'— that is, that judgment be given
in. the mover's favor, without regard to the
verdict obtained by his adversary— is made
in cases where, after a pleading by the adver-
sary in confession and avoidance, and issue
joined thereon, and verdict for the adversary,
the unsuccessful party, in retrospective exam-
ination of the record, conceives that such
pleading was bad in substance, and might
have been made the subject of demurrer on
that ground. * * * In such a case^ thexflh-
•: i
NON SUI JURIS
620
NONFEASANOB
fore, the court will give Judgment for suc^
opposite party without regard to the verdict"
N. Frank & Sons v. Gump, 51 S. E. 358, 104
Ya. 306 (quoting and adopting definition in
4 Min. Inst [3d Ed.] pt 1, p. 946).
KOK BVl JURIS
The words "non sul Juris,** as applied to
a child, means that the child has not yet
arrived at what is called the age of adult dis^
cretion, so that the burden of proof Is on the
party claiming that the child was, as a matr
ter of fact, sui Juris. Grealish v. Brooklyn*
Q. C. ft S. R. Co., 114 N. Y. Supp. 682, 583,
130 App. Div. 238 (citing Gerbar v. Boorstein,
99 N. Y. Supp. 1091, 113 App. Div. 808).
The phrase "non sui Juris," as used in
an Instruction in a personal injury suit sub-
mitting it to the Jury to determine whether
or not the person injured, who was under six
years of age, was non sui Juris, means that
the child was not of sufficient age and dis-
cretion to care for his own safety, so that it
would be imprudent to go about alone. Kost-
enbaum v. New York City R. Co., 105 N. Y.
Supp. 65. 67, 120 App. Div. 160.
N0NG0NTIKU01I8 EA8EME1IT
A right of way is ''noncontinuoufl^ be-
cause to its use the act of man is essential
at each time of enjoyment Dee v. King, 69
Atl. 889, 841, 77 Vt 230, 68 L. R. A 860.
N0NEXPI.08I01I
A "constant pressure engine" is one in
which the cylinder pressure remains the same
during the outward travel of the piston while
the volume of flame increases. The pres-
sure is applied continuously. This mode of
operation is also called *'8low combustion"
and "nonexplosion." Columbia Motor Car
Ck). V. a A Duerr & Co., 184 Fed. 893, 898,
107 O. C. A. 215.
NONFEASANCE
*"Non feasance^ is the omission of an
act which a person ought to do." It is the
neglect or refusal without suflldent excuse
to perform an act which it is an officer's
legal duty to the individual to perform.
State, to Use of Cardin, v. McClellan, 85 S.
W. 267, 268, 113 Tenn. 616, 3 Ann. Cas. 992.
" *Nonfeasance' is the nonperformance of
some act which ought to be performed." The
directors of a county fair association are not
liable for the admission fee, for mere non-
feasance in failing to more securely protect
patrons in the grand stand from injuries
from a wild ball pitched or batted in the
game, which resulted in injury to one admit-
ted to the grand stand. Williams v. Dean,
111 N. W. 931, 933, 134 Iowa, 216, 11 L. R. A
(N. S.) 410 (dttng and adopting 111. Cent Ry.
v.. $^oulkes, 60 N. £. 890, 191 lU. 57).
Under Otr, Code Oal. | 2629, providing
that ''an insurer is nbt liable for a loss caus-
^ by the willful act of the insured, but he
is not exonerated by the negligence of U
insured, or of his agents or others," e
pressly made a part of a marine policy c
cargo, there can be no recovery f6r los" <
damage resulting directly from the act <
the master in designedly undertaking i
force the vessel through floating ice on
voyage to Alaska, with knowledge of tl
dangers to be encountered and witb amp
time to have avoided them, in order to a
rive more quickly at his destination and 9
cure a better market for his cargo. Sue
conduct is not mere negligence, but is
willful omission to perfbrm his legal dul
and an intentional conunission of a wrongfi
act The court, speaking through Chief Ja
tice Shaw, in Chandler v. Worcester Mutui
Fire Ins. Co., 3 Cush. (57 Mass.) 828 (an a
tion on a flre policy) said: "By an Intei
to burn the building we understand a pu
pose manifested and followed by some ai
done tending to carry that purpose into e
feet, but not including a mere *nonfeasanc(
Suppose the assured, in his own house, sec
the DurBbig coals in the fireplace it^ dow
onto the wooden floor, and does not brae
them away. This would be mere 'nonfea
anoe.' It would not prove an intent 1
bum the buildiiig; but it would ahow
'culpable recklessness' and indifference l
the rights of others. • • ♦ To what «
tent such negligence must go, in order t
amount to 'gross misconduct,' it is difficu
by any definitive or abstract rule of law, ii
dependently of circumstances, to designat
The doctrine of the civil law, that 'crass
negligentia' was of itself proof of fraud, c
equivalent to fraudulent purpose or desigi
was no doubt founded in the consideratio
that, although such negligence consists i
doing nothing, and is therefore a nonf&ii
a nee, yet the doing of nothing, when th
slightest care or attention would prever
a great injury, manifests a willingness, dh
ferlng little in character from a fraudulei:
and criminal purpose^ to commit surh ir
jury." Standard Marine Ins. Co., Uraita
of Liverpool, Eng., v. Nome Beach Liigtite]
age & Transp. Co., 133 Fed. 636, 648, 67 (
C. A. 602, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1095.
Misf easAMoe distlACitia^ed
"Nonfeasance** is doing nothing, whll
"misfeasance" is doing improperly. Stlewe
V. Borman, 37 S. W. 404, 105, 63 Ark. 30
"Nonfeasance" is the omission of a
act which a person ought to do, as distil
guished from "misfeasance," whl<di Is th
Improper doing of an act which a perso
might lawfully do. Southern Ry. Co. ^
Rowe, 59 S. E. 462, 466, 2 Qa. App. 557.
"'Nonfeasance' Is the total omission o
failure of the agent to enter upon the pei
formance of a distinct duty or undertakin
which he has agreed with his principal t
do. 'Misfeasance* means the improper d(
ing of an act which the agent might ISLwtuL
K0NFEA8ANCB
621
KOK7EASAK0K
ly do." Southern Ry. Co. V. Miller, 57 S. D.
1090, 1092, 1 Ga. App. 616 (quoting Und
adopting the definitions In Southern Ry. Go.
r. Grizzle, 03 S. B. 244, 124 Qa. 736, 110 Am.
St Rep. 191).
"Misfeasance" is the performance of an
act, which might lawfully be done, in an Im-
proper manner, resulting in injury to anoth-
er, while '^nonfeasance" is the nonperform-
ance of an act which should be performed-
Haynes' Adm'rs y. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P.
R. Co., 140 S. W. 176, 179, 146 Ky. 209, Ann.
Gas. 1913B, 719.
"Misfeasance** and "nonfeasance,'* as
used in connection with the acts of agents,
is often difficult of determination. ''Mis-
feasance" means a positive wrong. It may
involve also, to some extent, the idea of not
doing, as where the agent while engaged in
the performance of his undertaking does not
do something which it was his duty to do
under the circumstance& The distinction
to be observed between mere nonfeasance
and misfeasance was considered in Osborne
Y. Morgan, 130 Mass. 103 (39 Am. Rep. 437),
where the court said: ''It is often said in
the books that an agent Is responsible to
third persons for misfeasance only, and not
for nonfeasance. And it is doubtless true
that if an agent never does anything to-
wards carrying out his contract with his
principal, but wholly omits and neglects to
do so, the principal is the only person who
can maintain any abtion against him for the
nonfeasance. But if the agent once actual-
ly undertakes and enters upon the ezecntion
of a particular work, it Is his duty to use
reasonable care In the manner of executing
it, so as not to cause any injury to third
persons which may be the natural conse-
quence of his acts ; and he cannot, by aban-
doning its execution midway and leaving
things in a dangerous condition, exempt
himself from liability to any person who
suffers injury by reason of his having so left
them without proper safeguards. This is
not nonfeasance, or doing nothing, but it is
misfeasance, doliig Improperly." Where an
agent has complete control of a tenement
house, and constructs a new walk in the
court, leaving a large hole in the walk, and
plaintiff, a new tenant, without previous
knowledge of the existence of the hole, step-
ped into it after dark and was severely in-
jured, it is misfeasance of the agent render-
ing him liable, and not a mere nonfeasance.
Carson v. Qulnn, 105 S. W. 1088, 1091, 127
Mo. App. 525.
"A distinction ordinarily is taken be-
tween acts of 'misfeasance,' or positive
wrongs, and *nonfeasance/ or mere omissions
of duty. The mflster is always liable to
third persons for the misfeasances of his
servants in all cases within Uie scot)e of his
employment. The principal is also liable to
third ])ersonB for like misfeasances of* his
agent The agent Is also liable tx) third per-
sons for his own mfsfeasances and positive
^ongs, but he is not liable to tiiird persons
for his own nonfeasances or omissions of
duty in the coorse of his employment His
liability in such cases is to his prlndpaL
The distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance, between acts of direct positive
wrongs and mere neglects of agents as to
their personal liability, seems to be fovnded
on this ground. No authority whatever
from a superior to an inferior can furnish
the latter a jnst defense for his own posi-
tire wrongs or trespasses, for no man can
authorize another to do a poditlTe wrong.
But in respect to nonfeasanoe, or mere neg-
lects in the performanoe of duty, the re-
sponsibility therefor most arise from some
express or implied obligation between par-
ticular parties standing in privity of law
or contract with each other, and no man is
bound to answer for any such violations of
duty or obligation exoept to those to whom
he has become directly boimd nr amenable
for his conduct." Bryce v. Southern R. Co.,
125 Fed. 958, 962 (quoting and adopting def-
initions in Story, Ag. [9th Ed.] |{ 308,
"Xhere Is a distinction between 'non-
feasance' and 'misfeasance' or 'malfeasance* ;
and tbia distinction Is often of great im-
portanee in determining an agent* s liability
to third persons. In this connection, 'non-
feasance' means the total omission or failure
of an agent to enter upon tlie performance
of some distinct duty or undertaking, which
he has agreed with his principal to do. 'Mis-
feasance' means the improper doing of an
act which the agent mi^t lawfully do, or,
in other words, it is the performing of his
duty to his principal in such a manner as to
infringe Upon the rights and privileges of
third persons; and 'malfeasance' is the do-
ing of an act which he ought not to do at
iall. It Is not every omission or failure to
perform a duty that will constitute a non-
feasance, but only an omission to perform
such distinct duties as he owes to his prin-
cipal, as distinguished from those which he
owes to third persons, or the public In gen-
eral as a member of society. Nonfeasance
does not extend to the omission or failure to
do some act, whereby a third person Is in-
jured after he has once entered upon the
performance of Ms contractual obligations,
^'or example, if an ag^nt undertakes to per-
form certain acts f^r another, and he re-
fus€fb or falls to enter upon such perform-
^ince, it is- nonfeasance ; but if he once be-
gins the performance of such aets, and, in
doing so, falls or omits to do certain acts
which he eihould have done, whereby a third
person Is injured, it Is not a nonfeasance,
but a misfeasanoe. Misfeasance may In-
volve the omission to do something which
ought to be Hone; as where an agent en-
gaged ill the performance of his undertaking,
-omita ta do something which itiia.lila dnty
KONFEASANCB
NONJOINDER OF PARTIES
! ' iJ3
to 00 under the circamstances, as when he
dn^s not exercise that degree of care which
doe regard for the rights of others requires.*'
Where the owner of a building executed a
deed of trust thereon to secure bonds Issued
by the owner, and the trustee was made an
attorney in fact, irrevocable, to rent the
building, collect rents, pay taxes, and all
expenses connected with the management of
the building, and the trustee was to retain a
certain per cent of the moneys collected in
payment of such services, and the trustee
also assumed management of the building,
employed all servants connected with the
building, and paid them their wages, it was
held that the trustee was liable, as for a
"misfeasance," for injuries to one riding on
an elevator in the building owing to negli-
gence in the maintenance and repair of the
elevntor, or the negligence of the operator.
Orcutt V. Century Bldg. Co., 90 S. W. 1062,
1063, 1068, 201 Mo. 424, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.)
929 (quoting and adopting definition in Clark
& S. Law of Agency, | 696).
The failure of a gas company operating
as an agent of a city under contract for the
illumination of the dty streets to perform its
duty to keep service pipes from its mains to
the dty lamps in repair involves an affirm-
ative element of negligence amounting to
misfeasance, and it is liable to any one In-
jured in consequence thereof, for an agent
who undertakes and enters on the execution
of a particular work, must use reasonable
care in the manner of executing it, and he
cannot by abandoning its execution, exempt
himself from liability to any person suffering
injury by reason of his act, because that act
is not "nonfeasance," but 1b "misfeasance."
Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore City v.
Connor, 78 Atl. 725, 729, 114 Md. 140, 32 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 809.
The term "nonfeasance" refers to an
agent's omission to perform a duty which he
owes to his principal by virtue of the agen-
cy and for which he is responsible to his
principal only; but, whenever the agent's
omission consists of failure to perform a
duty which he owes to third persons, then,
as to such persons, his omission is "mis-
feasance" for which he is responsible. Ha-
gerty v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 98 Pac.
643, 645, 38 Mont. 69, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 356.
The distinction between "nonfeasance"
and "misfeasance" has been expressed by
the courts of this state as follows: "If the
duty omitted by the agent or servant de-
volved upon him purely from his agency or
employment, his omission is only of a duty
he owes his principal or master, and the mas-
ter alone is liable. While, if the duty rests
upon him la his individual character, and
was one that the law imposed upon him in-
dependently of his agency or employment,
then he is liable." Delay of the sole trans-
fer agent in issuing new stock at the in-
stance of an executor to certain desi^fnat
persons In lieu of stock held by decedent
account of failure of the comptroller to gi
consent pen^g determination whether t
stock was subject to the transfer tax la
was not a "misfeasance," though it was i
in fact taxable and the comptroller's «
sent was unnecessary. Dunham v. City Tn
Co. of New York, 101 N. Y. Supp. 87, 89, J
115 App. Div. 584 (quoting and adopting T
Antwerp v. linton, 85 N. Y. Supp. 318,
Hun, 417, 419).
NOmETNAKGIAI.
The temi "nonflnandal," as used in
fraternal insurance policy, means that t
policy holder Is not In good financial stai
ing with the order. Morgan v. Independc
Order of Sons & Daughters of Jacob of Am^
lea, 44 South. 791, 792, 90 Miss. 864.
NONFORFEITABLE
Where a policy of insurance provl^
that if insured, after paying two foil anni
premiums, should fail to pay any semlannt
premiums when due, its entire net reserve
the American Experience Mortality, and
terest at 4 per cent, yearly, less any indebtc
ness to the company on the policy, shall
applied by the company as a single premlu
at the company's rates to the purchase
nonpartidpating insurance for the t
amount insured by the policy, is called
"nonforfeitable" policy. Mutual Ben. Li
Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J., v. First Nat- Ba
(Ky.) 69 S. W. 1.
NONINTERVENTION WlUt
Under what is known in Washington
a "nonintervention will," by which fall po
ers were conferred on the executors to ta
possession of and wind up the estate of t
testator without any judicial prooeedin
whatever, except those necessary to establi
the will, and which devised and bequeath
all of testator's property absolutely to I
executors as trustees, with instructions to s
the same and use the proceeds as th^ein <
rected, the legal title to the testator's re
estate was vested in such trustees resaidlc
of the validity of the disposition made of ti
proceeds. Korsstrom v. Barnes, 156 Fed. 2^
283.
NONINTOXICATINO UQITORS
The words "nonintoxlcatlng liquors ai
beverages,'* as used in Acts 31st Leg. c. 20,
2, considered in connection with the evil i
tended to be corrected and with the hlsto
of the legislation upon the same subject, ha
reference to alcoholic or spirituous flak
either distilled or fermented, and do not i
dude liquids such as water, milk, etc i
parte Flake (Tex.) 149 S. W. 146, 151.
NONJOINDER OF PARTIES
''A nonjoinder, or, as expressed in tl
Code, 'a defect, of parties plaintiff or defeo
KONMAIIiABLB HATTER
628 KONRESID£NGfi— NONBIBSIDJEBIT
nV means sniBcleiit iMutle«» and baa no
Plication to a case of too many partiea, or
be Joining of a person liaying no interest in
he Utigatlon." Mader ▼. Piano Mfg. Go^ 97
7. W. 84S, 840, 17 S. T>. 553.
A newspaper without a wrapper, the
iddiess being written on the paper itself,
hongh containing scnrrilous and defamatory
natter, marked with blue pendl and so fold-
id as to expose the same to view, is not '*non-
Daiiable matter," within Cr. Code (Act BCarch
^ 1909, c 821) I 212, which provides that
ai matter otherwise mailable^ on the "enye-
ope or outside cover or wrapper" of which
anguage of a libelous or scurrilous character
nay be written, is nonmailable, and which
)rohibit8 the sending thereof through the
nails. United States v. Higglns, 194 Fed.
^,541.
EfOmCAViaABLB
To oonstitate a nonnavigabls lake^ no
particular dQ>th Is essential, nor is it neces-
sary that the water cover the entire bed at all
seasons, and it is enough if the body of the
water has well-defined banks, filled during
portions of the year. State r. Jones, 122 N.
W. 241, 242, 143 Iowa, 398.
In Kentucky, all rivers are nonnavigable
within the meaning of that term as used in
connection with riparian ownership. Robin-
son V. Wells, 135 S. W. 817, 818» 142 Ky. 800.
NONHEOOTIABIA
See Negotiable.
Under Rev. St 1909, S 8392, "providing
that for every loan made by a building and
loan association a "nonnegotiable note" se-
cnred by a first mortgage on real estate shall
be given, accompanied by a transfer of the
stock of the member, notes executed by stodc-
holders of a building and loan association are
not, while the association is a going concern,
assignable; the word "nonnegotlable" mean-
ing "nonassignable." Layton v. Hough, 152
S. W. 410, 415, 169 Mo. App. 218.
HOHOGGUPAHOT
Vaoaaay syMosiyiKOVs
In an action on an insurance policy pro-
viding that it was to become void if the build-
ings became vacant or unoccupied, the answer
alleged that the possession and occupancy of
the buildings described and of the insured
premises was changed, and said premises
ceased to be occupied as provided in the
policy. Held, that the answer was sufllcient
to raise the question of a vacancy, for the
terms **vacancy" and •'nonoccupancy*' are
used interchangeably and are equivalent In
meaning. Cone v. Century Fire Ins. Co., 117
N. W. 807, 308, 189 Iowa, 205.
HOKPEGinCIABT DAMAGES
Nonpecuniary damages are those the
amount of wliich cannot be determined by
any known rule, but depend upon the en«
lightened Judgment of an impartial court or
Jury. In this dass are Induded damages
for pain, suffering, loss of reputation, impair-
ment of faculties, etc L. W. Pomerene Co.
V. White, 97 N. W. 232, 234, 70 Neb. 171.
XOmUMIBEirOB— HOX&ESIDBVT
As person, see Person.
To be a Nonresident** within the meaning
of the statute authorizing removal of causes,
defendant must be a citizen of another state.
Parker v. VanderbUt, 136 Fed. 246, 249 (cit-
ing Martin v. Baltimore A O. B. Co., 14 Sup.
Ct 534, 151 U. S. 676, 38 L. Ed. 311).
A nonresident, within Code Pub. Gen.
Laws 1904, art 16, I 123, providing that
where it is unknown whether a nonresident is
living a bill may be filed against him as if
living, etc., is one who does not reside In the
state as defined in the law relating to attach-
ment Hollander v. Central Metal ft Supply
Co. of Baltimore City, 71 AtL 442, 448, 109
Md. 131, 23 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1135.
A 'Nonresident** is one who is not a reBi<
dent of a particular idace, and the term may
boused indiscriminately to describe one who
does not reside in a particular country, or
state, or county, or any of the smaller subdi-
visions of territory made for governmental
purposes, and the word may as well refer to
one not residing in a county as to one resid-
ing outside of the state. Watson v. Coon, 93
N. B. 289, 290, 247 IH 414.
The term 'Nonresident," as used in Civ.
Code Prac. S 616, requiring a nonresident,
before commencing an action, to give a bond
for costs, and section 617, providing that if
the bond is not given the action shall be dis-
missed, means a person whose legal resi-
denoe is not in this state but another state;
and does not Include a person whose legal
residence is in this state, though he is tem-
porarily an actual resident of another state.
Brwln V. Allen, 99 & W. 822, 828, 124 Ky.
458.
A citizen of another state is not neces-
sarily a "nonresident,*' as a person may re-
side in one state and be a citizen in another.
An allegation in a petitioa for removal that
defendant Is a citizen of a state other than
that in which the suit is pending is not equiv-
alent to an allegation that he is a 'Nonresi-
dent of that state" and does not show h^i
right to a removal. Irving v. Smith, 132 Fed.
207.
The words "nonresidentB of that state,"
as used In Act March 8, 1887, c. 873, 24 Stat
552, and Act Aug. 18, 1888, c; 866, 25 Stat
433, providing that any suit of a dvll nature
at law or in equity, of which the Circuit
Courts of the United States are given Juris-
diction, may be rwnoved into the Circuit
Court of the United States for the proper
district, by the defendant or defendants
therein, being nonresidents of that state, are
II
MdKBfESI>£>ENCS>-NONK£SII>EKT 624 NONBESIDEKCS-^OKilESIDE^NT
4i
I 'I
eqtilvaitot to the wordls '*iiot being citlBens of
that state.** MadifloiiTUle Traction Co. y. St
Bernard Mln. Co., ISO Fed. 789, 791 (dtlng
Martin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 14 Sup. Ct
583, 151 U. S. 676, 677, 88 L. Ed. 811).
Tbe words "nonresident defendant,** as
used In Ami. St Mo. 1906, | 384, providing
that no property or wages declared by statute
to be exempt shall be attached except In the
case of a "nonresident defendant** or a de-
fendant who Is about to move out of the state
with intent to change his domicile, has refer-
ence to one whose domicile Is out of the state,
and classed nonresident defendants with de-
fendants about to move out of the state with
Intent to change their domiciles. McDowell
r. Friedman Bros. Shoe Co., 115 S. W. 1028,
1082, 185 Mo. App. 276.
In an action to quiet title, certain defend-
ants, by their cross-complaints, sought to re-
cover possession of the property, and to re-
deem from a mortgage. These defendants
neter resided In thl^ state. Held, that these
causes of action were not saved from the bar
of the statute of limitations by Bums* Ann.
St 1906, 1 299, providing that the time during
which a defendant Is a nonresident shall not
be oompilted in any period of limitation, since
this does not apply to persons who at all
times have been nonresidents, and only ap-
plies where the person against whom, and
not in favor of whom, the cause of action ex-
ists, is a nonresident. Sinclair r. Ounzen-
hauser (Ind.) 98 N. E. 37, 54.
Uhder Rev. St. 1899, Sf 575, 577, provid-
ing that if the plaintilT shall allege in his peti-
tion, or at any time thereafter shall file an
affidavit stating, that part or lail of the de-
fendants ere nonresidents, or have absconded
or absented themselves from their usual place
of abode in this state, and that where the re-
turn on any summons Issued Is that defend-
ant cannot be found, service may be had by
publication, an affidavit in a tax action,
where the petition was silent as to that mat-
ter, and where summons Issued as against a
resident defendant, whicdi only alleged that
defendant had absconded and absented himr
self from his usual place of abode in this
etate, did not authorize service by publication
on the ground that defendant was a ''nonresi-
dent," since it appeared, both affirmatively
and negatively^ that defendant was a res-
ident and not a nonresident Parker v. Bur-
ton, 72 S. W. 668, 664, 172 Mo. 85.
Ky. St § 3014, provides that the agent or
agents of nonresident proprietors shall be
Civilly responsible for the license tax and
criminally responsible for carrying on busi-
ness in like manner as if they were proprie-
tors. HeOd, that th^ word '^nonresident" as
used In a city ordinance reproducing such
section and requiring every person, etc., en-
gaged In posting bills as a business to pay a
license fee, means one living without the cor-
porate limits of the dty, thougtr^ within the
state. liOgee v. City of Louisville, I8S^ S.
565, 667, 141 Ky. 867.
A person traveling about the count
wandering from place to place and from sti
to state, who took employment with a n
road company in Texas as a member of
gang taking up old and laying down n*
steel, which employment he intended to kc
only until he had raised $50, when he Intei
ed to leave the state, who slept in a boai
Ing car and had his washing done there, a
who was li^ured while in the railroad
employ, was not a resident of the county
which he received his Injury or <^ the eU
of Texas, but was a nonresident within t
meaning of the venue law (Acts 27th D
[Laws 1901, p. 81, c 27]), providing that
case plaintiff in a personal Injury salt agah
a railroad Is a nonresident of the state, 1
suit may be brought in any county in whi
the railroad may operate its road or have
agent Ft Worth & D. O. Ry. Ca v. Mow
110 S. W. 504, 607, 50 Tez. OLr. App. 287.
Evidence that a husband left his wife
another state, went to Nebraska, and conce
ed his residence from her for nine years, n
resented himself to be an unmarried nu
and conveyed land as such, that he suh
quently moved to another state, where
died, his wife never living in Nebraska t
after his death, is sufficient to sustain a fli
ing that she was a nonresident, within Con
St 1903, c. 28, I 20, limiting dower right
a nonresident to lands of which her husbsj
dies seised. Miner t. Morgan* 119 N. W. li
782, 83 Neb. 400.
Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902,
580) 1 25, si|bd. 3, provides that no person ha
ing a place in the dty for the regular trai
action of. business is deemed a *'nonresldeD
under the provisions of the act and sectl(
32 permits the order for service of summo
upo^ a defendant residing within the ci
after an alias summons has heea issued, u
on satisfactory proof that diligent effort h
been made to serve the summons and tbAt tl
place, of his sojourn cannot be found, or,
he is within the city, that he evades eerrit
so that personal service cannot be made. D
fendant.had an office in the dty at a certa
address, and plaintiff's attorney made a
fldavit that defendai^ called upon him at b
office before the action was begun. f1^
alias summonses were secured, and numeroi
efforts were made to serve defendant &i
plaintiff wrote him several letters at his Ne
Jersey residence, stating that suit would 1
brought and plaintiff was Informed by «
tomeys, who appeared spedaUy, but did D(
ace^t service, that they were attorneys f<
defendant though plaintiff had requested d
fendant*s attorney to enter an appeartno
and defendant's son stated to the pn
cess server tiiat his father came to the offi(
sometimes once a week, and sometimes ix
so often. Held, that a&^jrd^ for aubstitiite
NONRESIDEarOB— NONRESIDENT 826 NONIUSaiI>KNC]&-^NONR]BSU»ENT
•errloe was properly itsaed under tbe cir-
comatances; tke facts jDstlflying the belief
tbat defendant ima aeekix^ to evade personal
aervlce. TricoU ▼. McKenzle, 128 N. Y. Supp.
211, 212.
A mere casual or temporary absence of a
debtor from the state on business or pleasure
will not render him a "nonresident/* within
the meaning^ of the statute relating to attach-
ments. Flemlster Grocery Co, v. Wright Mer-
cantile & Lumber Co., 73 S. B. 1077, 10 Ga.
App. 702 (citing Stickney y. Chapman, 42 S.
E. 68, 115 Oa. 761).
In the absraice of a statute making a for-
eign corporation, for purposes of litigation, a
resident of every county in which it does
business, a foreign corporation is a "nonresi-
dent," within Comp. Laws, | 719, requirtng
the service of a short summons. In an action
in Justice's court against a nonresident, and
the service of a long summons does not give
the court Jurisdiction. Wells v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. of Baltimore^
Md., 125 N. W. 57, 59, 160 Mich. 213.
A corporation is "resident,** irrespective
of its domicile, when it does business in a
state and its officers reside there, upon whom
process may be served at their homes. Con-
versely, a corporation, no matter where in-
corporated, which does not do business in the
state and does not have officers residing there
upon whom process may be served, is ''non-
resident" Brand v. Auto Service Co.» 67 AtiL
19, 20, 75 N. J. Law, 280.
A corporation organized under the laws
of any one of the United States is in con-
templation of law a "citizen" and ^resident'*
of the state in which it is incorporated. Act
March a, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as cor-
rected and amended by Act Aug. 13, 1888,
c. 866, 25 Stat 438, provides for the removal
of causes In which there shall be controver-
sy between citizens of the state and foreign
states, citizens, or subjects, and section 2
declares that all such suits may be removed
to the Circuit Court of the United States for
the proper district by the defendant or de-
fendants therein being "nonresidents" of that
state. Held that where defendant was an
alien insurance corporation, it was a non-
resident of California within such act, though
it bad a branch office within the state for the
transaction of business. Baumgarten v. Al-
liance Assur Co., 153 Fed. 301, 302, 303, 304
(citing Shaw v. Quincy Mining Company, 12
Sup. Ct 935, 145 U. S. 444, 36 L. Ed. 768 ;
Miller v. Eastern Oregon Gold Mln. Co., 45
Fed. 348 ; Gilbert v. New Zealand Ins. Co.,
49 Fed. 884, 15 L. R. A 125; Barrow S. S.
Co. T. Kane, 18 Sup. Ct 626, 170 U. S. 100, 42
L. Dd. 064 ; In re Keasbey & M. Co., 16 Sup.
Ct273,160U. S.221,40Ij.Ed.402; Howard
V. Gold Beefii of Georgia, 102 Fed. 657; Shat*
3 WDS.& P. 2d Seb.-— 40
tuck V. North British k Mercantile Ins* Co^
58 Fed. 600, 7 C. a A« 386).
rugitlTs from Justiee
One may be a "nonresident of the state"
and also a fugitive from Justice or a fugitive
from Justice and still a resident of the state.
State V. Miller, 87 S. W. 484, 486, 188 Mo.
870.
Imtemttom
A person domiciled within the state, who
temporarily leaves it for medical treatment
for injuries, intending to return, is not a
"nonresident" Taylor v. Norrls, 93 N. Y.
Supp. 856, 357, 104 App. Div. 21.
If petitioner has been out of the state
for a year and a half with no intention of re-
turning or with the intention of returning at
some indefinite future time, he is a "non-
resident" within Code Pub. Qen. Laws 1904,
art. 16, 1 128, providing that where it is un-
known whether a nonresident is living or
dead, a bill may be filed against him as if
living, etc., and he may be proceeded against
as smA, though he may not intend to abandon
Ua.doB9icUe in the state. Hollander t. Cen-
tral Metal ft Supply Co. ot Baltimore City,
71 AU. 442, 448, 109 Md. 181, 23 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1185.
A person who has acquired under the
provisions of Code 1899, c. 41, the right to
have personal property exempted from forced
sale, does not forfeit It on the ground of
nonresidence until he begins to remove his
personalty from his place of abode in the
state to another state or country with Intent
to fix his residence in such other state or
country, although he may Intend to leave the
state permanently and has made complete
preparation so to do, and delivered his per-
sonal property and effects for shipment to
a point outside the state. Brown v. Beck-
with, 51 S. K. 977, 978, 68 W. Va. 140, 1 L. R.
A (N. S.) 778, 112 Am. St Rep. 955.
Defendant, after the Judgment sued on,
went to Idaho, where she lived with her
daughter in a rented house, and taught school
continuously, except durligg; vacations, when
she generally returned to Washington, al-
ways intending to return to Idaho before the
next school year. Her vlsts to Washington
were not to the place of her previous resi-
dence ; the house there having been deserted,
wrecked by the wind, and finally burned.
Held, that defendant became a nonresident
within Balllnger*s Ann. Codes 4k St. § 4S08
(Pierce's Code, t 292), providing that the time
that a person shall reside out of the state
shall not be a part of the time limited for the
commencement of ttie action. Dlgnam v.
Shaff, 98 Pac. 1113, 1114, 51 Wash. 412, 22
L. R. A. (N. S.) 996.
Nonresident domestio eorporatton
Code W. Va. 1006, c. 32, { 124, defines a
nonresident domestic corporation as one
KONRESIDENT ALIKK
626
K0K8UIT
! t^
whose principal place of busiiiesa or cbief
works is located without the state, and chap-
ter 124, 1 8a, declares that the State Auditor
shall be, and is constituted, the attorney in
fact for and on behalf of every nonresident
domestic corporation which by power of at-
torney shall appoint such Auditor and his
successors in oflSce attorney in fact to accept
service of process. Held, that the State Au-
ditor by virtue of the statute alone without act
on the part of the corporation is authorized
to accept service of process for it, and hence
where the corporation was chartered in West
Virginia, but none of its officers resided
there, jurisdiction was properly obtained by
service of process on the State Auditor. Wy-
lie Permanent Camping Oo. t. Ljmch, 105 Fed.
886, 896, 115 C. G. A. 288.
NONRESIDENT AI<I£N
A "nonresident alien," within Code, |
8368^ providing that, as against a purchaser
from a nonresident alien, the survivor shall
not be entitled to a distributive share in the
estate of deceased, if at the time of the pur-
chase the survivor was also a nonresident
alien, is a nonresident of the state, though a
resident of a sister state. In re Kennedy's
Estate, 135 N. W. 53, 55, 154 Iowa* 460.
NONSUIT
See Involuntary Nonsuit; Motion for
Nonsuit; Voluntary Nonsuit
Suffer nonsuit, see Suffer.
The term "nonsuit," as used in a court
rule providing that if service of a bill of
particulars is not effected on defendant by
the succeeding term a nonsuit shall be award-
ed, is to be taken in the sense of the non
pros, of the English practice or the dismis-
sal of the practice in this state. Souders v.
Carolina Portland Cement Co., 59 S. E. 467,
468, 8 Ga. App. 99.
A "nonsuit" is a Judgment given against
the plaintiff when he is unable to prove his
case or when he refuses to proceed to the
trial of the cause after it has been put at is-
sue, without determining the issue. A vol-
untary nonsuit is an abandonment of his
cause by the plaintiff, who suffers judgment
for costs to be entered against him by absent-
ing himself or failing to answer when called
upon to hear the verdict An involuntary
nonsuit takes place when the plaintiff on be-
ing called when his case is before the court
for trial neglects to appear, or when he has
given no evidence on which a Jury could find
a verdict. Wise v. Cohen, 99 N. Y. Supp.
663, 665, 113 App. Div. 859 (citing Deeley v.
Heintz, 62 N. E. 158, 169 N. Y. 129).
A Judgment for want of prosecution is a
nonsuit within the meaning of that term as
understood in the Virginiaa Henry Marcus
ft Son V. McClure, 59 S. E. 1055, 63 W. Va.
215.
The rule that a "Judgment of nonsuit" is
not a Judgment on the merits is so well set-
tled that discaasion la unnecessary- Badi
Judgment is no bar to another suit. Gutiu
V. Gilmer, 76 Pac 628, 631. 27 Utah, 496L
A "Judgment of nonsuit" la a decision 1
the court that the plaintiff has produced ]
evidence upon which facts may be foos
Hence the dismissal of an action against i
insurance company on motion of defenda
after plaintiff had established his applic
tion for a paid-up policy within six montJ
after default in payment of the premitu
that he had complied with all the other i
quirements of the policy authorizing such j
sue except the surrender of the policy J
self, which he had failed to find after a di
gent search, that he had tendered to ti
company a release of all liability under 8u<
policy, and that it refused to acc^t the i
lease and issue a paid-up policy, la a ''no
suitSi" Lindenthal v. Germania JAta In
Co., 66 N. E. 629, 630, 174 N. Y. 76.
A "Judgment of nonsuit," within Belli
ger^s Ann. Codes ft St { 5065, authorising tl
court to enter a nonsuit on motion of defai<
ant when on the trial plaintiff falls to pro^
a sufficient cause for the Jury, is the Jud
ment rendered against plaintiff in a leg
proceeding on his inability to maintain h
cause in court or when he refuses or neglec
to proceed to trial after issue Joined, ai
without determination* of the issues. M
Guire v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill O
102 Paa 237, 238, 53 Wash. 425.
A nonsuit is a Judgment based on the pr
cess or pleading, but, when rendered, tt
person nonsuited remains a party to the pr
cess or pleading as before, and it Is m
available to cure a misjoinder of parti<
plaintiff. Gowan v. Stevens, 76 AtL 147, U
83 Vt 85a
Where defendant rested at the close <
plaintiff's case and moved for a diemlssi
of the complaint, and plaintiff moved fc
Judgment, a Judgment for defendant was nc
one of **nonsuit,*' but one involving a detei
mination that plaintiff was not entitled t
recover on the facts as submitted to the conr
M. Zimmerman Co. v. New York Oily R. Co
95 N. Y. Sui^. 698, 599.
Where both parties introduced their ev^
dence, and plaintiff's evidence supported
Judgment for him, and defendant made d
motion for a Judgment of dismissal, a Juds
ment, though termed a dismissal, was a "final
decision, and deemed excepted to, withl]
Code Civ. Proc. | 647, and not a Ju<fgmeo
of "nonsuit,** within section 581, authorizin
a nonsuit, on motion of defendant, on plaintil
failing to prove a case. Saul v. Moscow
118 Pac 452, 454, 16 Cal. App. 506.
Where the county court disallowed i
claim against the estate of a decedent, indors
ing the disallowance on the back of the dain
and entering an order disallowing the dalo
and taxing costs against the claimant, tiu
NONSUIT
627
NON£»
jQdsment was not one of nonsuit, obrlonsly
beins intended as a final judgment, and not
falling within Code Civ. Proc. { 188, defin-
ing nonsntt, and Is appealable. Tucker t.
Tncker, 121 Pac. 125, 126, 21 Colo. App. 94.
''It has been said tbat 'a nonsuit is but
like tbe blowing out of a candle, which a
man at his own pleasure may li^t again.'
This is an apt Illustration, but it does not
mean that the plaintiff may re-enter the
court when he has once abandoned the fur-
ther prosecution' of Ms case, and avail him-
self of what had already been done at a
former trlaL That he will be entitled to the
fall benefit of the legal principle settled by
the appellate tribunal, if he has been driven
to a nonsuit and appeals, and that his ad-
versary will be concliided by it, so far as it
is applicable to the facts as established at
the next trial, is undeniable, but this is all
he has accomplished. He cannot enjoy any
greater advantage otherwise than if he had
taken a voluntary nonsuit and brought a
new salt for the same cause of action." City
of Hickory v. Southern By. Co., 50 S. B. 683,
685, 138 N. C. 811.
** 'Nonsuif is a process of legal mechan-
ics. The case is chopped oflT. Only in a clear,
gross case is this me^dianlcal treatment prop-
er. Where there is any doubt, another meth-
od is to be used— a method involving a sort
of mental chemistry; and the chemistB of
the law are the Jury. They are supposed to
be able to examine every molecule of the
evidence, and to feel every shock and tremor
of its probative force.** Corcoran v. Mer-
chants' & Miners* Transportation Co., 57 8.
E. 902, 964, 1 Oa. App. 741 (quoting from
Vickers v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co., 64 Ga.
307).
Retraidi distlngnlslied
See Retraxit
NOHTENAHT
The plea of ''nontenant" and an avowry
for rent in replevin puts in issue the demise
and tenancy as stated in the avowry or cog-
nizance and requires the defendant to prove
them, while the plea of "nothing in arrear*'
admits the tenancy as stated in the avowry
or cognizance and puts in issue the fact of
the rent being in arrear. Middleton v. Quig-
ley, 12 N. J. Law, 352, 356.
A denial in the answer in partition of
the allegations of the petition that petitioner
is a tenant in common with defendant, and
is seised in fee, raised an issue of fact, being
equiyalent to a plea of non tenent insimul by
which defendant denies that he and plaintiff
are tenants in common. Gregory v. Pinnix,
73 S. B. 814, 815, 158 N. C. 147.
NOHTBADIHO PAKTHERSHIP
"In partnerships not commercial in their
nature, such as those of lawyers, doctors,
and others, called 'nontrading,* one partner
cannot bind the other by the ezecntloa of
promissory notes, unless authority is express-
ly given or recognized by all the parties, or
implied from their general business habits.
The issue of negotiable paper by such part-
nerships is genially neither customary nor
necessary, and there is no Implied authority
from the existence of the partnership. The
partners can only be bound upon proof of
authority, and the burden of proof to estab>
lish such authority is upon the plaintiff.*'
Teed v. Parsons, 66 N. E. 1044r-1046, 202 lU.
455 (citing Ulery v. Ginrich, 57 IlL 531;
Pars. Partn. 199, note).
Partnerships, when considered with ref-
erence to the business In which they are en-
gaged, may generally be divided into two
classes, one of which is known as "trading"
or commercial partnerships, and the other as
"nontrading" or noncommercial partnerships.
Any member of an ordinary trading partner-
ship can bind the firm by the signing of the
firm name in the usual course of business as
a part of the usual routine of their affairs,
irrespective of restrictions in the articles of
partnership not brought to the knowledge of
the payee. In a "nontrading partnership,**
howe^r — ^that is, a partnership engaged in
some occupation which is not of a commercial
character — a partner does not generally pos-
sess the power to bind the firm, and the ex-
tent of his powers is not fixed by the rules of
law. The general rule is that the partners in
such a firm have no implied power to bind
the partnership, but each case is left to be
decided upon its particular facts, and one
who seeks to hold the firm bound upon a con-
tract made by a single member must be able
to show such acts as will warrant the conclu-
sion that the partner had been invested by
his copartner with the requisite authority to
make the contract. Smallhouse v. Morris
(Ky.) 107 S. W. 708, 709 (quoting and adopt-
ing definition in Alsop v. Central Trust Ca,
38 S. W. 510, 100 Ky. 375).
NOMlTSZiB
Abandonment of an easement necessarily
implies nonuser, but nonuser does not create
abandonment, however long continued. Ad-
ams V. Hodgkins, 84 AU. 530, 532, 109 Me.
361, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 741.
NONE
See If None.
NONES
What is now known as noon, or 12 o'clock
in the daytime, originally represented the
ninth hour of the day after sunrise, or about
3 o*clock p. m., and was the canonical hour
of "nones,*' at which was celebrated a reli-
gious rite. Rochester German Ins. Co. v.
Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., 87 S. W. U15, 1118, 120
Ky. 752, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 364, 9 Ann. Cas.
334 (ad<^ting deflniUon in Webst Diet).
NOOK
628
NORTH RIYKB
It.
ill
:Mi
NOON
In exact tiae 'iioon" meaos 12 o'clock,
midday. Andrecsik t. New Jersey Tube Go^
63 Atl. 719, 720, 73 N. J. Law, 664, 4 Ix R. A.
(N. S.) 913, 9 Ann. Gas. 1006 (quoting Cent
Diet).
In the state of New York "noon" is 12
o'clock m. standard time, as fixed by Laws
N. Y. 1892, p. 1491, c. 677, | 28. Globe &
Uutgers Fire Ins. Co. of New York r. David
Moffat Go., 154 Fed. 13, 21, 83 G. G. A. 91.
The word "noon" in an insurance ppUcy
means noon by sun time. Meier v. Phoenix
Ins. Co., decision of lower court oi Ohio, af-
firmed in the Supreme Court on an equal di-
vision, 65 N. E. 1129, 66 Ohio St 659. See
32 In& Law J. 192.
In construing a policy of insurance on a
vessel, ending at *'noon" of a certain date, it
is held that the. parties must be considered as
regarding the meridian of the place where
the contract is made, unless some other one
is mentioned in it Walker v. Protection Ins.
Co., 29 Me. 317, 321.
"Noon" is midday, and is merely a short-
er expression than "12 o'clock in the day
time." Where a policy expired on a certain
day at "noon," parol evidence was admissible
to establish that by a well-known custom of
the place where the contract was made the
word '*noon" was used to mean 12 o'clock
midday standard time, and was so intended
by the parties to the contract instead of 12
o'clock sun time; and so an instruction that if,
at the time the policy was issued, there exist-
ed at the place where the contract was made a
custom or usage with ref^ence to the mean-
ing of the word "noon" so well settled and
uniformly acted on, and of such continuance,
as to raise a presumption that the parties
knew thereof and entered into the contract
with reference to It such usage would govern
in determining whether the policy had ex-
pired, was proper. The insurer is not liable
for a loss which was inevitable at the time
the policy expired, provided the fire had not
then attacked the building. Rochester Ger-
man Ins. Co. V. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., 87 S.
W. U15, 1118, 120 Ky. 752, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.)
364, 9 Ann. Gas. 324.
KOON HOUR
As used in a promise to repair machin-
ery during the "noon hour," it meant the
time from 12 o'clock noon to 1 o'clock p. m.
Andrecsik v. New Jersey Tube Co., 63 Atl.
719, 720, 73 N. J. Law, 664, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.)
913, 9 Ann. Gas. 1006.
NOR
The word "nor," in a will whereby testa-
tor empowered the trustee to sell real estate,
with a proviso that no sale should be made
during the lifetime of either of the daugh*
ters Of testator without their consent "nor"
unless it is necessary to pay debts. Is use^
in the sense of ''or.** Reed r* Lonffstieet (N
J.) 63 Ati. 500, 601.
Or ooastmed a« jmmt
See Or.
NORI
AS seaweeQ, see seaweeci*
NORMAL OUTAGE OR WANTAGE
See Outage.
NORMALLY
The word •^normally'* Is defined "nM i
rule; regularly ; according to a rule, genera
custom," etc. Palmer t. Jordan ICaeh. Ca
186 Fed. 496, 504.
NORTH
The tenn '^orth" has two meanings; on
common, and the other technical. Unprofet
sional men generally mean, in statii^ conraei
the lines indicated by the compass, witboa
making any allowance for variation In tbi
needle; and even professional sorveyors, a
appears from the evidence, would not consid
er the true meridian as intended, unless spe
dally so informed. Jenny Lind Go. t. Bowei
11 GaL 194, 197.
NORTH HALT
The words "the north half," used In tin
conveyance of a part of a platted block o
land, mean the half of the block lying norti
of an east and west line drawn through tlu
block, unless the surrounding facts requir
that these words be given a different mean
ing. Lavis v. Wilcox, 133 N. W. 563, 11(
Minn. 187.
Under a conveyance of the "north half
of a tract of land, the east line of which l
of such a shape tiiat the north line is les
than one-half the leugUi of the south hoe
the grantee is entitled to one-half of the arei
of the tract, and not merely to one-half oi
the north and south length of the tract
Robinson v. Taylor, 123 Pac. 444, 445, 6{
Wash. 351, Ann. Gas. 1913E, 1011.
NORTH BIVER
The words "North river,'* as used in i
marine policy on a scow, containing the fol
lowing provision: ''Warranted by tbe fi»
sured to be employed exclusively in the
freighting business, and to navigate only Um
waters of the bay and harbor of New York
the North and Bast rivers, and inland waten
of New Jersey" — cannot be extended by con
structlon to include tributaries of the Hud
son in the state of New York, and therft tai
be no recovery under the policy f6r an injun
to the scow received while she was lying hi
a dock in Rondout Cre^ 2^ mUes firom the
NORTHERLY
NOT BEING
andson. Hastorf r. Greenwich Ins. Ck>., 132
red. 122, 124-
ffORTHEBIiT
Wbere a notloe of the opening of a new
road described it as mnnlng with a ''norther-
ly" course across the property of another,
iie fact that it ran 5 degrees 50 minutes west
}f north was immaterial. Riggs t. Winter-
>de, 50 Atl. 762, 765, 100 Md. 439.
BrORTHERHIiT
**Tbe term *northernly' In a grant, where
there is no object menticmsd to direet the in-
i!lination of the course toward the east or
nrest, means due north.** State ex rel. CAiand*
ler T. Huff, 79 S. W. 1010, 1012, 105 Mo. App.
^54 (quoting and adopting definition tn
Brandt ex dem. Walton t. Ogden [N. Y.] 1
Johns. 150).
HOBTHWBST
See N. W*
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
"Xoscitur a sociis"— it is known by its
associates. Thus, in 92 Ohio Laws, p. 44
(Act Feb. 27, 1806), forbidding the prescrib-
ing of any drug, medidne, or other agency
for the treatment of disease by a person who
has not obtained from the board of medical
registration and examination a certificate of
qtialiflcation, the word "ageney" rtiould be
limited by the associated words ''drug'* and
"medicine,'* and therefore dtd not Include the
system of healing known as ''osteopathy,"
which consists of rubbing or kneading the
body. State v. Liffring, 65 N. B. 166, 169,. 61
Ohio St. 39, 50, 46 L. R. A. 884, 76 Am. St
Rep. 858.
Under Rev. St Wis. | 1564, providing
that any tavern keeper or other person sell-
ing liquor on Sunday or election day shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, the general
words '*otber person" must, under the famil-
iar rule "noscitur a sodis," be taken to mean
a similar class of persons and not be extend-
ed so as to include all persons, and hence in-
cludes only persons whose business, at least
in part, is to sell Intoxicating liquors. Jen-
sen V. State, 19 N. W. 374, 375, 60 Wis. 577.
The words "estate" and "aUmony,*' in
Rev. St Wis. I 2364, authorizing the couvt
in divorce actions to adjudge to the wlCe ali-
mony out of the hu8band*s estate, are not
only associated within the rule "noscitur a
sodis" and to be understood in a kindred
sense, but are correlatives dependent one on
the other for eflTect and should be understood
in a corresponding sense. Blake v. Blake, 43
N. W. 144, 145, 75 Wis. 3^9 (citing Campbell
V. Campbell, 37 Wis. 219).
The doctrine of '*noscitur a sociis" ap-
plied to a mercantile instrument content
plates the ascertaining of the meaning of gear
eral words by reference to preceding special
words therein. A fire policy covering a
steamboat provided that "if gunpowder, cam-
phene, spirit gas, naphtha, benzine, or ben*
sole, chttnical, crude or refined coal or earth
oUs, should be kept or need on the premises
without written consent," the policy should
be void. In an action on the policy it ap-
peared that kerosene oil was used to light
the cabin and saloon of the boat after such
policy was issued. Held, that this win hot
prevent a recovery. Applying the maxim
"noscitur a sociis," and other rules of con-
struction, the provision above recited is held
to refer to "crude or refined coal or earth
oils," similar to the coal or earth oils and
other substances spedflcally named, in re-
spect to their dangerous and inflammable
character. Morse v. Buffalo Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 80 Wis. 534, 537, 11 Am. Rep. 587
(quoting and adopting definition In Broom,
Leg. Max. p. 451).
NOT
See Whether or Not
NOT A NBCEMABT PAKTT
The term "not a necessary party** means
that the suit can proceed just as well with-
out him, and in that event if his presence
has the effect to hinder or burden the case,
he may be dropped. Jones v. Kansas City,
Ft S. & M. R. Co., 77 S. W. 890, 893, 178 Mo.
528, 101 Am. St Rep. 434.
NOT A BS8FBOTABLB "S^OMAN
An indictment alleging that accused im-
puted to a married woman that she "was not
a respectable woman," without containing in-
nuendo averments alleging what the language
meant, and that as spoken and intended it
meant that she was unchaste, does not state
an offense under Pen. Code 1895, art. 750,
making a person falsely imputing to a female
a want of chastity guilty of slander. Woods
V. State, 124 S. W. 918, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 103.
NOT BE FATABUB
Where testator directs his executor to
pay all the collateral inheritance taxes on the
devises and legacies in the will as soon as
the same can be conveniently done, and the
executor pays the tax on the entire estate at
the time of its valuation, the commonwealth
cannot, on the death of the life tenant im-
pose any tax upon the remainderman under
Act May 6, 1887 (P. L. 79), providing that
the tax on estates in remainder shall not be
payable until the person liable for the same
shall come into actual possession ; the words
"not be payable" meaning only "shall not be
demandable.'* In re De Borbon's Bstatd, 61
AU. 244, 246, 211 Pa. 623.
NOT BEZNO
The term "without as used In an aver-
ment that building material was suffered to
remain in a street after night "without" be-
NOT COMPLETED
630
NOT OUIIiTY
ing yarded, is a direct ayerment that no
guards or lights were placed around the ob-
struction, and the pleading did not merely re-
cite such facts; the word "without** being
synonymous with "not being." City of La-
porte y. Osbom, 86 N. B. dd5, 097, 48 Ind.
App. 100.
NOT OOlffPIiETED
A contract which has neyer been begun
is a contract '"not completed' within the
time spedfled," within CJobbey's Ann. St
1903, § 5519, proyldlng for re-estimating and
reletting drainage contracts. Gutschow y.
Washington County, 104 N. W. 602, 603, 74
Neb. 37a
KOT DOUBTiHO
The words "desire," "request," "recom-
mend," "hope," "not doubting" used by tes-
tator in a will to express his desire that
the executor will conduct a fund in a speci-
fied manner, testator haying power to com-
mand, will not be construed as precatory
only, but as commands clothed In the lan-
guage of dyility, and to impose on the ex-
ecutor an enforceable duty, sufficient to cre-
ate a trust Trustees of Pembroke Academy
V. Epsom School Dist, 75 Atl. 100, 101, 75
N. H. 408, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 646.
NOT ENOUGH
Under a statute proyldlng that no ap-
peal shall be dismissed for insufficiency of
the undertaking, if a good and sufficient
undertaking be filed before the hearing on
motion to dismiss, the term 'Insufficient"
as applied to an undertaking on appeal,
must be construed as meaning such a one
as has some efficiency, but "not enough" to
meet the necessary requirements, and bears
the ordinary meaning of "not enough" ; that
is, importing degree in quantity or quality,
and not total absence. Pirrle y. Monle, 81
Pac. 390, 392, 33 Mont 1.
NOT EXEMPT
The words "not exempt from attach-
ment by law," in the poor debtor's act, re-
quiring an assignment of all the debtor's
estate, both real and personal, not exempt
from attachment by law, except only from
the assignment only such property as is
expressly exempted from attachment by stat-
ute relating to that subject and an assign-
ment by debtor In the language of the stat-
ute is sufficient to include eyery equitable
as well as legal interest in the real or per-
sonal property of the assigning debtor. Til-
linghast y. Bradford, 5 R. I. 205, 212.
The phrase "not exempt from execu-
tion," used In Rey. St 1898, § 3035, author-
izing application to the judgment of any
property of the judgment debtor not exempt
from execution, is equiyalent to the ex-
pression "not exempted by express statute
from execution," and so the Income from
personal property held in trust may be
reached; there being no statute exemptl]
it WiUiams y. Smith, 03 N. W. 404, 4fi
117 Wis. 142.
NOT OUILTT
A plea of "not guilty** puts In Issi
every fact which the commonwealth mu
establish to secure a conyictlon. Frazier
Commonwealth (Ky.) 114 S. W. 268, 2fi
By a plea of "not guilty" defendant d
nled eyery fact essential to his guUt Inclu
Ing his identity with the person who coi
mltted the homicide. People y. Wong Sai
Lung, 84 Pac. 844, 845, 3 GaL App. 2:
(adopting definition in Commonwealth
Briggs, 5 Pldc. [22 Mass.] 429).
Rey. St 1898, | 4891, providing th
a verdict on a plea of not guilty shall 1
either "guilty" or "not guUty." which ii
ports a conviction or acquittal on the offen
charged, and that on a plea of former co
viction or acquittal it shall be either *f or t]
state" or "for defendant" requires a verdi
on the latter plea, and, where defendaj
pleaded not guilty and autrefois acquit
was error to enter judgment on a verdict <
guilty. State v. Creechley, 75 Pac. 384. '
Utah, 142.
The plea of "not guilty,*' in a crlmln
action, puts in issue evefy material alleg
tion of the Indictm^it or information, an
like a general denial in a dvll action, cas
the burden of establishing the facts necc
sary to convict upon the prosecution. ]
civil actions, under a general denial, tl
plaintiff will recover unless his evidence
met and overcome by evidence of equal <
greater weight; and if the jury beUev^
from a consideration of all of the eviden
in the case that the preponderance, howev!
slight, is in favor of the plaintiff, he wj
be entitled to a verdict But in crlmln
cases. Id order to convict, the prosecution
required to prove every material allegatlc
of the indictment or information, every e
sentlal element of the crime charged, d<
only by a preponderance of the evidenc
but to the satisfaction of the jury beyond
reasonable doubt And if, upon consider
tion of all of the evidence in the case, thei
exists in the mind of the jury a reasonab
doubt as to the existence of any one <
more of these essential elements which mm
be proven to render the act criminal, tl
defendant is entitled to the benefit of thi
doubt, and should be acquitted. State
Pressler, 92 Pac. 806, 809, 16 Wyo. 214, )
Ann. Ca& 93.
A plea of "not guilty^ by one accuK
of crime is an express contention on h
part antagonistic to every ffect necessary i
be proved by the state in order to establis
his guilt; and, unless the accused admii
one or more of the facts whidi It devolT<
upon the state to prove, such fact must I
established by evidence. To assume thi
an Important fact in the case on trial hi
NOT aUILTY
681
KOT LESS THAN
t»ecn admitted, and to so instnict the jnrr,
nrhen no Buch admiSBlon has been made, ia
reversible error. Cooper v. State, 69 8. B.
W, 2 Ga. Ai^ 730.
Under B. ft G. Oomp. §{ 1836, 1356» a
defendant accused of a misdemeanor can ap-
pear for arraignment and enter a plea of
not g:uilt7 by counsel. Held, that a stipula-
tion entered into by the district attorney
and counsel for defendant that all the mat-
ters alleged in the indictment are true and
admitted, and that judgment should be en-
tered according to the facts and the law,
was In effect a plea of **not guilty" as it in
effect admitted the facts charged, but denied
that they constituted a crime. State t. Sul-
livan, 98 Pac. 493, 52 Or. 614.
iSFOBB DISP08SD OF
HOT
Under a will bequeathing an equal sum
to each of six diaritable institutions, but
providing that, if such bequests should ex-
ceefi one-half of the personal estate of
which be died possessed, such a proportion-
ate amount should be taken from each as
would reduce the sum thereof to one-half
of his personal estate, but that, if the sum
of the bequests should not equal one-half
of tlie personal estate of which he died pos-
sessed, such an equal amount should be
added to each bequest as would make the
sum of the bequests equal to one-half of his
personal estate, and directing the executors
to divide the remainder of the estate "not
hereinbefore disposed of as therein pro-
vided, the words "not hereinbefore disposed
of mean the half of the estate in value at
the time of the testator's death, which he
had set aside to meet the requirements of
the provisions of his will, and do not mean
that the residuary legatees should share
equally the interest and dividends and any
other property which might come to the
estate with the specific and general legatees.
In re Barton's Estate, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1087,
1090, 04 Misc. Bep. 242.
HOT HIS own
Tbe words **not his own," which are
essential to an allegation in a complaint for
trespass on inclosed lands or premises, not
the property of the person against whom the
complaint is made, is an exclusive negative,
denying any right, however small, and is
intended to include any right of the usu-
fruct, control, occupation, or of entry. A
complaint fiiillng to charge that the lands
on which defendant was alleged to have
trespassed were "not his own" is fatally de-
fective. Binhoff V. State, 90 Pac. 586, 587,
49 Or. 419.
HOT HITCHED
In an action for injuries to a person on
a street from collision with a runaway team,
where the petition averred that the team
was not hitched, a charge authorizing a re-
covery for plaintiff against the owner of
the team, if the Jury should find tliat the
team was left without any person in charge
and without exercising ordinary care to
securely, hitch it while the driver was ab-
sent, was not objectionable as authorizing a
recovery for negligence not alleged in the
pleading, as the law devolves upon the own-
er the obligation to exercise ordinary care
in hitching the team in some reasonably se-
cure manner, and the allegation that the
team was not hitched should be viewed in
the sense of the law under which, if the
team was insecurely hitched, when consid-
ered with respect to the obligation to exer-
cise ordinary care in that behalf, they
would be "not hitched" in the eye of the
law. Miller v. United Rys. Ck>. of St Louis^
134 S. W. 1045. 1047, 155 Ma Appi 52a
KOT XHOW
See Do Not Know.
WOT XHowmo
The words "not knowing," or 'Hiavlng
no reasonable grounds to suspect," or
••knew," or ••know," or ••had reasonable
grounds to suspect," wh^i used in an In-
struction in an action for Injuries to a
passenger while attempting to board a train
in consequence of the starting of the train,
relating to the knowledge or want of knowl-
edge of the conductor In starting the train
before the passenger had boarded it, are
legal eqnivalenta Choctaw, O. 4k O. R. Co.
V. Hlckey, 99 S. W. 839, 842, 81 Ark. 579.
NOT uses THAH
••When so many 'dear days^* or so
many days •at least,' are given to do an act,
or •not less than' so many days must Inter-
vene, both the terminal days are excluded."
In re Gregg's Estate, 62 AtL 856, 857, 213
Pa. 200 (Quoting and adopting the language
of Bnd. Interp. St | 391).
Act April 4, 1870, provides that county
commissioners, before contracting for the
erection of any buildings, shall by advertise-
ment invite sealed proposals according to
specifications kept open for the inspection
of all persons for at least four weeks before
the time appointed for (^)ening the pro-
posals. Held, that the phrase "not less than
four weeks" means at least four weeks and
the four weeks during which the advertise-
ment must be published or the same four
weeks during which the specifications must
be of record. The commissioners of a cer-
tain county fixed the time for opening the
bids for a new courthouse at July 19, 1903.
The specifications were deposited in the
office of the county commissioners for a
period longer than four weeks to such date,
and the advertisements were published in
two weekly newspapers in the county on
June 16th, June 23d, June 80th, and July
7th. Held, that the advertisements com-
plied with the requirements of the act that
the advertisement shall be published for not
{
.t
, J:
NOT LB8S THAN
6S2 NOT OTHERWIBB PROVIDED FOB
111
m
leos tten tour we^8 before tlie contract la
awarded. Oommonwealth ez leL Miller ft
Sona V. Brown, 59 AtL 479, 460, 210 Pa. 29.
An ordinance of the town of Central pro-
hibits the sale of intoxicating liquors, except
as is now provided by the dispensary law,
and for a ylolation of snch ordinance fixes
the penalty at *'not less than one hnndred
dollars, or not less than thirty days' impris-
onment, or thirty days' labor on the chain
gang, or thirty days' labor on the streets of
the town, at the discretion of the mayor's
court" Const, art. 5, § 21, provides tiiat
magistrates shall have exclusive jurisdiction
in criminal cases where the punishment does
not exceed a fine of $100 or imprisonment
for 30 days. Cr. Code 1902, § 12, provides
that magistrates shall have jurisdiction of
all offenses where the punishment does not
exceed a fine of $100 or imprisonment for
30 days, and may impose any sentence, with-
in those limits, singly or within the altema-
tlva The charter of the town of Central
(Laws 1885, p. 405, | 4) provides that the isr
tendant and wardens shaU have the same
jurisdiction in criminal matters as trial jus-
tices, so far as the same relates to the ordi-
nances of the town. Held, that the words
''not less than one hundred dollars," as used
in the ordinance, mean "one hundred dol-
lars," and therefore a prosecution for viola-
tion of the ordinance was within the jurisdic-
tion of the intendant Town of Central v.
Madden, 61 S. E. 1028. 1029, 81 S. O. 7.
NOT NAVIGABLE
The phrase "streams not navigable,"
within a statute providing that the right of
eminent domain may be exercised for stor-
ing and floating logs and lumber on streams
"not navigable," means streams not navigable
In fact. Potlatch Lumber Co. v. 'Peterson,
88 Pac. 426, 430, 12 Idaho, 769, 118 Am. St.
Rep. 233.
NOT NEGOTIABLB
The words "not negotiable," stamped on
the face of a bill of lading, do not prohibit
transfer of the bill and of the contract rep-
resented thereby by Indorsement and deliv-
ery, as, under Code Civ. Proc. § 449, any con-
tract is transferable and enforceable by suit
in the name of the assignee, but the transfer-
ror of such a bill has only his common-law
rights, and cannot avail himself of Factors'
Act (Laws 1830, p. 203, c. 179) § 3, providing
that au agent intrusted with the possession
of a bill of lading shall be deemed the true
owner thereof so far as to give validity to
any contract for the sale of goods thereunder.
Gass V. Astoria Veneer Mills, 118 N. Y. Supp.
982, 966, 134 App. Div. 184.
The words "not negotiable," stamped
on the face of the bill of lading, did not de-
stroy its assignability, but the sole effect was
to exempt the bill from the statutory pro-
visions relative thereto, and a bill, though not
negotlAble, may be transferred bj assif
ment; the asatgnee taldng subject to t
equities between the original parttea. ^
tional Bank of Bristol v. Baltimore A O.
Co., 69 AU. 1B4^ 188, 99 Md. 661« 106 Am. i
Bep. 321«
NOT OPEN FOB BV8INB8S
See Open for Business.
NOT OTHERWISE
The words "not otherwise,** in Pol. Ok
i 3366, providing that county boards of supi
visors shall, in the exercise of their pol]
powers, and for the purpose of regulati(
and "not otherwise," have power to Ucer
all and every kind of business not prohibit
by law, transacted, and carried on wltl
the limits of their respective Jurisdictioi
operate to curtail all power boards of supi
visors previously had to issue licenses a
charge therefor aa a revenue measure. PI
mas County v. Wheeler, 87 Pac. 900, 910, 1
Cal. 758.
NOT OTHERWISE EXCEPTED
Under Const. 1875, art. 5, § 6, conferri
on the circuit courts jurisdiction in all mi
ters, civil and criminal, not otherwise exce]
ed, the words "not otherwise excepted" i
not words of prohibition on the Legislatu
but simply words of description as to wl
jurisdiction is conferred absolutely on t
circuit courts, and hence, when constm
with section 7, declaring that the Genei
Assembly should have power to establi
courts of chancery, and directed the state
be divided Into chancery divisions and d
tricts, and Const 1901, | 148, declaring tl
the Legislature may confer upon the c
cult court or the chancery court the jur
diction of both of such courts. Acts 1894 1
p. 881, conferring chancery jurisdiction
the circuit court of Jefferson county, is e
unconstitutional. Bnsley Development Co.
Powell, 40 South. 137, 139. 147 Ala. 300.
NOT OTHERWISE ORNAMENTED €
DECORATED
In the tariff aet in a paragraph in relati
to articles of glass, the use of the phra
"not otherwise ornamented or decorate(]
after an enumeration of several process
by which an article may be ornamented
decorated, not only im^ies, but indicates^ i
understanding that this result of the enumi
ated processes is to be an ornament or dec
ration, in order to bring the article with
the terms of such paragraph. Utard v. Un:
ed States, 128 Fed. 422, 63 O. a A. 164 (c
Ing Koscherak v. United States, 98 Fed. 5fi
39 C. C. A. 166).
NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
Code 12^06, § 4561, provides for a soUcJ
or's fee of $50 for securing the conviction
any corporation for violating any law, ai
another section authorizes a fee of $7.50 f
^OT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR 633
NOT WHOLIiY WITHIN
each convictiaii of a misdemeanor not other-
wise provided for. Held that, slnee section
6388 makes the willful obstruction of a pub-
lic load a misdemeanor, but affixes no pen-
alty, the offense Is one "not otherwise pro-
vided for," for which the solicitor's fee is
but $7.50. Birmingham Waterworks Co. v.
State, 48 South. 658, 660, 150 Ala. 118.
The expression "not otherwise provided
for,** or "not specially provided for,'* in a
tariff provision, does not deprive the general
rule as to classification by spedflc designation
of Its ordinary application, so that a provi-
sion which specifically derdgnates goods, but
which is so qualified, shall not prevail over
words of a general description in another
provision containing no such qualification.
United States v. Schwarz, 140 FM. 802, 804.
HOT B£STBAIN£D BY LAW
The term "agreement," in Code Civ.
Proc. I 66, providing that the comp^isation
of an attorney for his services is governed
by agreemoit, express or Implied, which is
'^ot restrained by law," means an agreement
which is recognized by the law as a valid
agreement An agreement obtained for a con-
sideration which is valid, or upon induce-
ment which is expressly prohibited^ would
not be an agreement which was not restrained
by law. O'Neill v. Campbell, 103 N. T. Supp.
150. 152, 118 App. Div. 64.
HOT SAFE
The phrase '*not saf^' is a negation of
every degree of safety, and hence an instmc-
tlon, in an action against a railroad company
for injury resulting from a defective track,
merely relating to the condition of the track,
and not to an imposed duty, which was oth-
erwise covered, stating, "If you believe from
the evidence that the track of the defendant
at the place of the accident was not in a
safe condltton," etc., if erroneous in omitting
to qualify the phrase "not in safe condition,''
was to the advantage of defendant, and it
had no right to complain. Galveston, H. &
S. A. By. Oo. V. Roberts (Tex.) »1 8. W. 876,
884.
HOT 80 DTINO
By the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs
of his will, testator devised in fee simple
lands in severalty to his three sons. The
seventh paragraph of the will provided that,
if any or either of such children should die
leaving no issue living at the time of his or
her decease, the estate devised to the child
60 dying was to go to the other and remain-
ing "children or child not so dying in equal
proportions in fee simple In remainder for-
ever." Held, that the words "not so dying"
meant that the executory devisees should
be children of the testator not dying in like
manner or under the same circumstances as
the deceased dilld— that is^ leaving no child
or children, or descendant or descendants liv-
ing at the time of th^r decea8e-*«nd audi
words could not be changed so a^ to read "not
having so died," and since by this construc-
tion there will be no person who can take
under the seventh paragraph, as no living
person can fulfill the description, the seventh
paragraph must be regarded as ineffective
and insuflScient to restrain of limit the previ-
ous paragraphs of the will, and hence the
devisees in such paragraphs take a fee^mple
estate. Mills v. Teel, 92 N. B. 810, 812, 245
111.483.
NOT 8PE0IAIXT PBOVIDED FOB
See Not Otherwise Provided For.
HOT SUBJECT TO OOUBTEBMANL
A writing in the form of an order to ship
trees, ^though stated to be a contract and
not "subject to countermand," is not a con-
tract, and may be countermanded, where
there is nothing in the writing its^ to show
an agreement to deliver, and the order was
not accepted by the person to whom it was
directed or by his agent Mayo v. Roller, 28
Pa. Super. Ct. 91, 96.
NOT TO BE PSBFOBMEB
The provlflloD in a contract of sale of a
machine that the seUar would ke^ at a ob-
tain place a stock of all parts of the ma-
chine, so that, if any part of it broke, the
buyer could get the part needed for repairs
within 24 hours of giving an order, is not
within the statute of frauds, as an undetrtak-
ing "not to be performed within a year."
Janney Mf^. Oa v. Banta (Ky.) 88 S. W. 130,
131.
NOT TO BE PBETENTED
Testatrix bequeathed to certain named
persons both real and personal property to
be divided among them equally, and then pro-
vided that such shares should not be paid
until the respective donees should become of
age, but in the meantime should be deposited
in some bank or institution on interest, and
that her executor should not be prevented
from aiiplylng any share during minority of
the donee to* his maintenance. Held, that
the term "not to be prevented" included an
implied authorization to the executor to so
apply any of such shares. Weber v. Waldeck
(N. J.) 63 Atl. 495, 496.
NOT TO THE I.BTTEB
Where, in response to an issue, the jury
found that plaintiff substantially complied
with his contract, and the question was sub-
mitted twice tliereafter, to which the jury
replied, "No, not to the letter," such phrase
indicated an Intent to find a substantial per-
formance. Carnegie Public library Ass'n of
Brownwood v. Harris, 97 S. W. 520, 43 Tex.
Civ. App. 165.
NOT WHOXXT WITHAN
Ordinarily the words "not wholly within"
refer to a situation where a part Is within.
I
^ :?l
■: h
NOTARY
634
NOTB
"Not wholly" iB synonymotiB with "partly."
People ex rel. Donegan y. Dooling, 125 N. Y.
Supp. 783, 786, 141 App. Dir. 31.
NOTARY
See De Facto Notary-
A **iiotary" Is a public ofBcer whose duty
it is to attest the genuineness of any deeds
or writings in order to render them available
as evidence of the facts therein contained.
He is a public functionary, authorized to re-
ceive all acts and contracts to which parties
wish to give the character of authenticity, at-
tached to the act of public authority, to se-
cure their date, their preservation, and the
delivery of copies. The functions and au-
thority of a notary are defined by law, and
he cannot act as the mandatory of a vendor
for whom he draws up and passes a deed of
sale, since that is not one of the functions
conferred upon him by law, and hence the
purchaser cannot make a valid payment of
the price to him. Nolan v. Labatut, 41 South.
713, 718. 117 La. 431 (citing 2 Abbott's Dig.
p. 182; 6 Diet Droit Civil, p. 27 ; Breen v.
Schmidt, 6 La. Ann. 13; Brown v. Schmidt,
7 La. Ann. 349; Succession of O'Keefe, 12
La. Ann. 246; Lescouzeve & Abty v. Duca-
tel, 18 La. Ann. 470).
NOTAKT PUBUO
See N. P.
As holding an ofBce, see Officer.
As magistrate, see Magistrata
Notary's paraph, see Paraph.
Section 1750, Rev. St U. S., confers on
consular officers the power "to perform any
notarial act which any notary public is re-
quired or authorized by law to do within the
United States." Held, that such consular of-
ficer is a "notary public," within the meaning
of our statute, and authorized to take and
certify affidavits of depositions for use in the
courts of the state. Browne ▼. Palmer, 92
N. W. 315, 317, 66 Neb. 287.
The office of a notary is of great antiq-
uity, deriving its origin from ihe early Ro-
man Jurisprudence, and has for many cen-
turies been recognized by most, if not all, of
the Christian nations. The office is known
to international law, to the common law, be-
ing concerned more especially with the law
merchant branch, and to the civil law.
"Black's Law Dictionary defines a 'notary
public* as 'a public officer whose function it
is to attest and certify, by his hand and
official seal, certain classes of documents in
order to give them credit and authenticity
in foreign jurisdictions.' " Gharst v. St Lou-
is Transit Co., 91 S. W. 453, 465, 115 Mo.
App. 403 (quoting and adopting Black, Law
Diet).
NOTE
See Blue Notes; Field Notea
KOTE da OoaunerelAl Xaw)
See Action on a Note ; ApproTed Noti
Bankable Note; Demand Note; Go<]
Note; Less Note; Negotiable Not
Peddler's Notes; Promissory Not<
Secure a Note; Secured Bankabi
Note; Sold Notes; Take up Note.
Bought and sold notes, see Bong]
and Sold.
Issue of notes, see Issuance — ^Issue.
Maker of note, see Maker.
Note secured by trust deed as estate, m
Estate.
Other notes, see Other.
The first requisite to the "negotiaUlit]
of a paper is that it should be a '^note." an<
as a "note" must be an obligation for tl
payment of a certain sum of money, a pr
vision that if collection is made through s
attorney, or by legal process, the maker wi
pay all costs and expenses, including 10 p<
cent of the amount collected as attome;
fees, renders the note nonnegotiable Gm
V. Spires, 50 S. B. 664, 656, 71 S. a 107,
Ann. Ca& 261.
"Bangor, Sept 8, 1882. I, James Nei
comb, of Carmel, Maine, bought of Lemu
Nicholsy Bangor, Maine, one black hon
name Nig, 7 years old, for ($80.00) eighty d(
lars and interest on same until paid fc
which I agree to pay out of my next qua
ter's mail pay, which becomes due Jan.
1883, on route 184 from Carmel to Kendn
keag, which he is now carrying. The abo
horse is to remain said Nichols* until fnl
paid for. James Newcomb.'* Held, that ti
instrument contains a "note" given for pc
sonal property bargained and delivered, pa
able absolutely for a fixed sum in monc
within Bev. St a 111, | 5, providing that '^i
agreement that personal property bargains
and delivered to another, for which a note
given, shall remain the property of the pay
tin the note is paid is valid unless it Is nia<
and signed as a part of the note, nor whi
so made and signed in a note for more thi
$30, unless it is recorded like mortgages
personal property." Nichols v. Buggies, '
Me. 25-27.
Since the enactment of Acts 1908, ^
228, providing that makers of tokens, che<d
or other devices redeemable in merchandi
shall be liable on demand in current monc
a trade check in the form of a note payat
to bearer in merchandise is a note, with
the purview of the statute against the fc
gery of notes, orders, etc. State v. Whl
52 South. 238, 126 La. 119.
An instrument signed by E., reciting tli
on or b^ore a certain day "I promise to p
to the order of H. $300 rent for 90 acres
land at $4 per acre of L. plantation, for t
year 1901, value received," is not only
**note," but a contract embradn^r all t
terms of the contract between the parties
as to exclude evidence of an agreement Iqr
KOTB
636
KOTICE
to imt a fence aroiind the place to keep ca^
tie out Hightowor y. Henry, 87 South, 74B,
476.
A conditional sale contract required pay-
ment in 10 days either In cash or notes, de-
claring that all notes and open accounts shall
be drawn payable at Oklahoma City, with
10 per cent attorney's fees added, and that,
on default in the payment of any install-
ment, the seller might consider the entire in-
debtedness due; that the title to and the
ownership of all the goods should be in the
seiller untU the buyer's indebtedness had
been paid in money. Held, that the word
'^money** was used In contradistinction to
**notes," and did not include notes, so that
the acceptance of notes did not constitute a
payment sufScient to rest title to the goods
in the buyer. The term ''notes'* has refer-
ence to an evidence of indebtedness. In re
Gray, 170 Fed. 688| 643.
iLi credits
See Credits.
As debt
See Debt
As fond
See Fund.
As soodfl
See Goods.
See Money.
As property
See Personal Property; Proper^.
As property aetvally reoelTed
See Property Actually Beceived.
As soenrity
See Security.
As specialty
See Specialty.
NOTE OB MEMOBAKDUM IIT WBIT-
IHO
See Memorandum.
NOTHING IN ARREAR
Plea of nontenant distinguished, see Non-
tenant
The plea of "nothing in arrear" admits
the tenancy as stated in the aTowry or cog-
nizance, and puts in issue the fact of the
rent being in arrear. Middleton v. Quigley,
12 N. J. Law, 352, 856.
NOTICE
See Actual Notice; Blanket Notice; Cron-
structive Notice; Day*8 Notice; Due
Notice ; Explicit Notice; Further No-
tiLce; Immediate Notice; Implied No-
tice; Judicial Notice; Legal Notice;
Personal Notice; Purchaser without
Notice; Reasonable Notice; Requisite
Notice; Trespass Notice; With Notice;
Without Notice.
Date of notice, see Date.
Fifteen days' published notice, see Fif-
Four weeks' notice, see Four.
Issue of, see Issuance — Issue.
Of appearance as written instrument, see
Written Instrument
Of materialman's daim as pleading, see
Pleadii^.
Service of notice, see Service (In Prac-
tice).
See, also. Knowledge.
The term ''notice^" as used in Rev. St
1899, I 8028, requiring weekly publication of
notice of local option elections for four con-
secutive weeks in one paper, and such other
**notice" as the county court may think prop-
er, is not restricted to a publication in a
newspaper, but may include other legal forms
of notice, such as posting hand bills, etc.
State V. Morgan, 128 S. W. 839, 841, 144 Mo.
App. 35.
One who knew of deceased's death, was
present in the state during the first two
publications of the notice to present claims,
returned to the state, and had actual notice
of the publication for more than one month
prior to the expiration of the time for filing
claims, but yet failed to do so until long aft-
er that time had expired, was not one who,
"by reason of being out of the state," had no
''notice," "as provided in this chapter," to
present his claim, within the meaning of
Code Civ. Proc { 1493, and his claim was
therefore barred. MacGowan v. Jones, 76
Pac. 503, 142 CaL 593.
Though the statute provides that all no-
tices shall be served upon the attorney, and
not upon the party, such provision has ref-
erence more particularly to notices of mo-
tions and other proceedings served during
the pendency of the action, and does not
exclude the right of plaintilT personally to
serve a notice of the dismissal of his action
upon defendant, instead of on defendant's
attorney. Nelson v. Nelson, 126 N. W. 731,
735, lU Minn. 183, 31 L. B. A. (N. S.) 523,
137 Am. St Rep. 549.
A request to the chairman of the board
of trustees of a graded common school, sign-
ed by three members of the board, request-
ing him to call a meeting at a specified time
and place, was not a *'notice" to him of a
meeting of the board at such time and place.
Saunders v. O'Bannon (Ky.) 87 S. W. 1105.
Under a statute providing that a mate-
rialman shall not be entitled to a lien unless,
within 60 days, he shall give notice in writ-
ing to the owner or agent of his intention to
daim such lien, a 'Notice" given that claim-
ants claimed and should forthwith file their
claim of a mechanic's lien in the office of the
NOTICE
KOTIOB
<
derk of the circuit court was not fatally de-
fective for failure to recite that they "in-
tended" to claim such lien, as any phrase-
ology which clearly and distinctly apprised
the owner of the intention of the material-
man to claim the lien will satisfy the terms
of the section and efPeetuate Its design,
though the word "intention" be not used at
aU. The intention to claim a lien could not
be more definitely expressed than by the
statement that the lien is claimed and will
be forthwith filed. The owner was just as
fully informed by the notice given that the
claimants intended to file a lien claim as
she would have been had the notice specific-
ally stated that it was the intention of the
lienors to claim such a lien. Pulton v. Pap-
leU & Parlett, 64 Atl. 68, 59, 104 Md. 62.
A notice by a landlord served on the
tenant which demands possession within
three days, without stating the ground there-
for, and a notice served at the same time
which recites that the tenant has forfeited
the lease by underletting without the land-
lord's consent, must be construed as one no-
tice within Rev. St. 1908, §{ 2603, 2605, de-
fining unlawfi^ detainer, and requiring no-
tice in writing specifying the grounds of de-
mandant's right to possession. Hepp Wall
Paper & Mercantile Co. v. Deahl, 125 Pac.
491, 492, 53 Colo. 274.
Only such substantial compliance with
Laws 1899, p. 74, requiring notice to be giv-
en to municipal corporations of claims for
damages against them, stating the time,
place, and extent of such injury as near as
practicable, and the negligence which caused
It, as will enable the municipality to fully in-
vestigate the claim, and determine whether
it prefers to adjust it without suit, or to
contest its validity, is necessary. The form
of notice required to be given to a municipal-
ity of a claim for damages against it under
Laws 1899, p. 74, requiring such notice to
state the time, place, and extent of the injury
as near as practicable, and the negligence
which caused it, is not amenable to the strict
rules of pleading; and a claimant is not re-
quired to do more than state definitely and
specifically all the facts upon which he bases
his claim, so as to enable the municipality to
promptly investigate the merits thereof.
Kennedy v. City of Savannah, 68 S. £). 662,
8 Oa. App. 98.
Tke phrase "without notice," used in re-
lation to the taking of a note, usually refers
to some defense of the maker or to some
claim of title to it other than that of the
seller, with or without notice of which a
purchaser has taken it. Vansickle v. Wat-
son, 123 S. W. 112, 116, 103 Tex. 37.
"Notice" to the purchaser of a note may
be of two kinds: "Bhcplldt notice" of the
fraud or illegality, and "implicit" or ''gener-
al notice." *If the purchaser of notes at the
time of buying them had notice or knowledge
of some lUegsUty or knowledge of some f]
gallty or fraud which vitiated them, Uio>ii
he was not apprised of its nature, this woi
be such "general notice" as would aifect 1
title. Mere negligence, however gross, i
amounting to this willful and frauduli
blindness, will not of Itself amount to notii
but the Jury may and should consider 1
fact of such negligence as it may tend
prove such "general notice." Mack v. Sta
61 Atl. 472, 473, 78 Conn. 184.
A letter, sent by defendant to plalntll
attorney giving notice of appeal from 1
judgment of a Justice, but not shown to lu
been received, nor served bs required by st
ute, did not constittste a 'Notice of trii
within Bev. St. 1899, | 4074 (Ann. St 19
p. 2217), providing that, in order that m
an appeal be triable at the first term. If i
appealed on the day the judgment was n
dered, appellant, 10 days before such tei
must give the opposite party notice of 1
appeal. Knowledge by appellee's attorney
the taking of an appeal from a Justice's Jni
ment is not the equivalent of notice um
Rev. St 1899, | 4074 (Ann. St 1906^ p. 221
requiring the appealing party to give not
thereof, unless the appeal was taken on I
day Judgment was rendered. Lombard v. 1
ban, 126 S. W. 221, 222, 142 Mo. Appu ^S2
Actual or oonstraotiTS
"Notice" is defined by Wilson's Rev.
Ann. St 1903, | 10, as either actual or o
structive notice; sections 11 and 12 defini
actual notice as express Information of
fact and constructive notice as that impul
by law to a person not having actual noti
Cooper V. Flesner, 103 Pac. 1016^ 1020,
OkL 47, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1189^ 20 Ann. 0
29.
The word "notice" means actual notl
in Pub. St 1882, c. 144, | 9, providing th
when an account of a trustee is settled in 1
absence of a person adversely Interested s
without notice to him, such account may
opened on the application of such pers
Parker v. Boston Safe Deposit A Trust C
71 N. E. 806, 807, 186 Mass. 393.
Under Real Property Law (ConsoL La
1909, c 60) § 266, which provides that t
title of a purchaser for a valuable oonside]
tion shall not be affected, unless he had i
tice of the fraudulent intent of his imme
ate grantor, the words "notice of the frau^
lent intent" refer to actual, and not to cc
structive, notice. CJain v. Snyder, 135 N.
Supp. 443, 446, 76 Misc. Rep. e3a
Negotiable Instruments Law Tenn. I (
provides that, to constitute "notice" of
infirmity In the Instrument or defect in t
title of the person negotiating the same, t
person to whom It is negotiated must ha
had actual knowledge of the infirmity or t
feet, or knowledge of such facts that his i
tion in taking the instrument amounted
-i!
NOTICE
637
NOTICn
Ad faith. Slgfai Glty Baiddag Oou t, BaJlf
lOS S. W. 1068, 1071, U9 TeniL MS.
ReT. St a 73, i 12, wlijkch d^dares that
lie title of one who purchaaes property for a
raluable consideration cannot be defeated by
L tmst affecting the property, nnless the pur-
chaser has "notice" of the trust, while it
nay in peculiar instancea mean constructive
lotlce, in cases generally, including a case
¥here the trust reduces an absolute deed to
i mortgage, means actual notloe; and actual
Aotice as applicable to conveyances, does not
lecessarlly mean actual knowledge; It may
ye express or implied; it may be proved by
lirecC evidence, or implied from indirect or
drcumstantial evidence. The statutory ao>
taal notice is a conduaion of fAet capable of
toeing established by all grades of legitimate
evidence. Knapp v. Bailey, 0 Atl. 122-124,
79 Me. 105, 1 Am. St Bep. 295.
Under the statute imposing a liability
m a coimty for damages sustained by reason
sf a defective bridge constructed by the coun-
ty, where the chairman of the board of coun-
ty commissionerB has five days' '^notice" of
the defect, an actual notice is meant Parr
r. Board of Cbm'rs of Shawnee County, 78
Pac. 449, 450, 70 Kan. 111.
To constitute notice of an infirmity in a
negotiable bill indorsed before maturity, the
Indorsee must have actual knowledge of the
infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounts to bad faith, as provided by Ky.
St I 3720b^ subsec. 66 (Russell's St f 1925).
BothweU V. Corum, 128 & W. 291, 292, 135
Ky. 766.
Notice under Laws 1905, c. 142, | 80, ex-
empting a city from liability for injury caus-
ed by defective ways, unless notice of the
ansafe condition has been given to the mayor
or the dty clerk a reasonable time previous-
ly, must be actual as dlstingulahed from con-
stmctlve noUce. Gregorius v. Glty of Com-
Ins, 125 N. Y. Suppi 684, 686, 140 App. Div.
701.
A notice within a lire policy stipulating
for its cancellation on notice and repayment
of unearned premiums is a personal notice,
and a notice by publication requiring the
filing of claims against insurer, a foreign cor-
poration, in the state of its origin in pro-
ceedings for its dissolution, is insufficient,
and the policy holder in the state may sue
the corporation in the courts of the state,
and obtain a judgment to be satisfied out of
the securities deposited by insurer, as requir-
ed by CIly, Code 1902, | 1796. Frink v. Na-
tional \fut Fire Ins. Co., 74 S. E. 33, 35, 90
8. C. 644, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 221.
Rev. (Laws 1905, | 3850, providing that a
certified copy of a judgment of a court of
record aifecting title to realty or any Interest
therein may be recorded in any county where
any of the lands lie^ with the same effect as
a conv^anoe, to a recording act, and does
not make the record of such judgment notice
of the entry thereof, within the meaning of
section 4160, limiting the time within which
applications for relief from a judgment may
be made to one year from notice thereof.
Foster v. Coughran, 129 N. W. 853. 854, 118
&(lnn. 438.
"Bedtals In an unrecorded deed in one's
chain of title, or with which one is in privi-
ty, are 'notice' to him of the facts therein set
out • • • Constructive notice of recitals
in a prior unrecorded deed is as effective as
knowledge of such recitals." Bunge v. Gil-
bough (Tex.) 87 S. W. 832, 836.
Rev. Codes 1906, | 7205, provides that an
appeal must be taken by serving a notice on
the adverse party and by flUng it witii the
derk of the conrt Sectten 7882 provides
that servioe of any notice may be made by
moil, where the person making the service
and the penon upon whom it is to be made
reside in different places. H^d, that a notice
at appeal is a notloe within section 7882,
service of which may be made by mail, where
the parties reside in different places. Oooler
V. Bidness» 121 N. W. 88, 86, 18 N. D. 338.
A purchaser of real estate is chargeable
with notice derived from the recitals of his
deed, for anything which will put a prudent
man on Inquiry is notice. Adams v. Gossom,
129 S. W. 16, 20, 228 Mo. 566.
Bevisal 1906, | 2205, provides that to
constitute "notice" of an infirmity in a note
or defect in the title of the person negotiat-
ing It, the person to whom it is negotiated
must have had actual knowledge, or knowl-
edge of such facts that his action in taking
the instrument amounted to bad faith. Held,
that when a note was triansferred before ma-
turity without recourse, it was no defense as
against the Indorsee that it was given under
a contract for territory for the sale of a cer-
tain sash lock, and that the locks subsequent-
ly furnished pursuant to the contract were
not in accordance with the representations of
the payee, and that the note had been there-
fore obtakied by fraud; there being nothing
to show that the indorsee had any notice of
the fraud at the time of the transfer. Bank
of Sampson v. Hatcher, 66 S. E. 308, 309, 151
N. a 859, 184 Am. St Bep. 989.
Cobbey's Ann. St 1907, | 9255, providing
that, to constitute notice of an infirmity in an
instrument, the perscm to whom negotiated
must have actual knowledge thereof, or
knowledge of such facts that his taking the
instrument amounts to bad faith does not
change the rule that to constitute bad faith
by the purchaser of a negotiable instrument,
for value, before maturity, he must have ac-
quired it with knowledge of an infirmity, or
with a belief based on the dreumstances
known to him that there was a defense, or he
must have acted dishonestly. Benton v. Si-
NOTICB
638 KOTIOB
I
.\4^
kyta, 122 N. W. ei, 62, 84 Neb. 808, 24 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 1057.
Gen. St. Kan. 1909, | 6999, gives an ac-
tion for death of or injury to a railroad em-
ploy^ by the negligence of a fellow servant,
provided notice in writing shall have been
given by or on behalf of the person injured
to the railroad company within eight months
after the injury, and section 7000 provides
that such notice may be served by a written
copy thereof by the person Injured or any one
on his behalf, or, if he dies, by the person or
persons entitled to recover for the injury, on
any person designated by the railroad in the
county in which the action la brought, or, if
no such person has been designated or ap-
pointed, then upon any local superintendent
of affairs, freight agents, agent to sell tick-
ets, or station keeper. Held that, while sec-
tion 6999 makes the giving of notice a condi-
tion to a right of action for injuriea to or
death of a railroad employ^ occurring in
Kansas, the mode of service prescribed by
section 7000 is not a condition to such right,
and has no extraterritorial force, so that,
where an action is brought in Missouri for
the wrongful death of a railroad ^nploy^ in
Kansas, the service of notice in any proper
way, though not in compliance with section
7000, is sufficient Plaintiffs decedent, a rail-
road employ^, was killed in Kansas as the
result of a railroad's alleged negligence, and
within eight months the plaintiff filed a peti-
tion for decedent's wrongful death in the
courts of Missouri, setting forth in full the
negligent occurrence in Kansas resulting in
decedent's death, with the time and place,
etc. Summons was duly served within the
eight-month period, and defendant appeared
thereto. Thereafter the suit was dismissed,
and another one begun. Held, Uiat the first
suit constituted a sufficient '^notice" in writ-
ing to the railroad company to comply with
the requirements of Gen. St Kan. 1909, |
6999. Gen. St Kan. 1909, § 6999, requiring
notice of Injuries to a railroad employ^ to be
given by or on behalf of the person injured
as a condition to his right to sue, does not
require service of such notice by plaintiff
personally. Husted v. Missouri Pac. Ry. C5o.,
128 S. W. 282, 284, 143 Mo. App. 623.
A suit for specific performance of a con-
tract for the sale of land is notice of the
claim that plaintiff sets up from the time it
is commenced and docketed, and, if duly
prosecuted and not collusive, one purchasing
the land pending the suit is affected by the
decree therein, though the suit is in a county
other than the county in which the land is
located, under Civ. Code 1910, | 4533. Mar-
shall V. Whatley, 72 S. E. 244, 245, 136 Ga.
805, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 552.
Citation distinsvished
See Citation.
tt of aotim
See Commencement of Actton.
Olaim of rii^t diatiacvialied
The term "claim of right," as appll(
to adverse possession, is not synonymcr
with the word "notice." Swope v. Ward, i
S. W. 895, 897, 185 Mo. 316 (citing Whitak
v. Whltaker, 58 S. W. 5, 157 Mo. 342).
Faots pnttias on inquiiy
In law, that is "notice" of a fiict whii
would provc^e a reasonably prudent man
such inquiries as, pursued with reaaonafa
diligence, would lead to full knowledj
Hingtgen v. Thackery, 121 N. W. 839, 840, :
S. D. 329.
If a party has knowledge of such tnc
as would lead a fair and prudent man, usii
ordinary caution, to make further inquirk
and he avoids inquiry, he is chargeable wii
"notice" of the facts which by ordinary dl
gence he would have ascertained. Knapp
Bailey, 9 AU. 122-124, 79 Me. 19S, 1 Am. S
Rep. 295.
Whatever Is sufficient to put a sutw
qneaat purchaser on inquiry must be consl
ered "legal notice" to him of the fftcts inqnt
would have disclosed by the exercise of re
sonable diligence. Jennings v. Lents, 93 Pa
327, 329, 50 Or. 483, 29 L. B. A. (N. S.) M
"Notice" may be the existence of th
which, if looked at or listened to, and tin
followed up by such inquiry as ordinary pr
dence would suggest, would result in obtai
ing the knowledge sought to be charge
Warden v. Addington, 115 S. W. 241, 245, I
Ky. 296.
The word "trustee," fdllowing the nan
of the grantee in a deed, constitutes ''notio
and puts one on inquiry. Flitcraft v. Ccm
monwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co., 60 Al
557, 559, 211 Pa, 114.
"Notice" to a purchaser of adverse inte
ests need not be actual nor amount to fn
knowledge, but it should be information e:
citing apprehension in an ordinary mind, ai
prompt one of average prudence to make i
qulry. Implied notice to a purchaser of a<
verse interests arises from knowledge of pa
ticular facts unless the law charges notice t
registry or other token. Daly v. Rixzutt
109 Paa 276, 278, 59 Wash. 62, 29 L. B. J
(N. S.) 467.
"Whatever puts a party upon inquin
"amounts in judgment of law to *notice,' pr
vided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in ti
case of purchasers and creditors, and coal
lead to the knowledge of the requisite fact t
the exercise of ordinary diligence and unde:
standing." Kellogg v. Randolph (N. J.) C
Atl. 753, 754 (quoting and adopting d^hi
tion in Smallwood v. Lewin, 15 N. J. Bq. 60
"Actual possession of land is ^otio
equal to the record of a deed under whic
NOTICB
839
NOTICK
the party In possession claims. A purchaser
is botmd to Inqtilre by what right or title the
party in possession holds, and he will take
subject to that title, whatever it may be.'*
Merchants* ft Farmers' State Bank y. Dawdy,
82 N. B. e06, e07, 280 III. 199 (dtlng Joiner
Y. Dancan, 51 N. B. 828. 174 111. 252 ; Coarl t.
Olsen, 91 lU. 273).
" 'Notice' does not mean positive infor-
mation brought directly home to the parties
sought to be charged. Anything that will
put a prudent man upon Inquiry is notice;
and gross negligence in failing to make in-
quiry when the surrounding facts suggest
the existence of others, and that inquiry is
to be made, is tantamount in the courts of
equity to notice." Scoggin v. Mason, 108 S.
W. 831, 834, 46 Tex. Olv. App. 480 (quoting
and adopting definition in Connecticut Mut
liife Ins. Ck>. v. Smith, 22 S. W. 629, 117
Mo. 261, 38 Am. St Rep. 656).
Good faitli dlstiasnlshed
The terms "good faith" and "notice" are
Intimately related In Jurisprudence, but are
not of uniform meaning ; the former retain-
ing in some measure the popular sense of
honest belief, but its technical significance
depends largely on the doctrine of notice, as
developed in the progress of the equity sys-
tem. Considered with reference to and as
influenced by '^notice," the term "good faith"
bears several legal meanings according to the
subject-matter of the litigation in which it is
used. As applied to the purchase of a parcel
of land, the title to which passed from the
grantor by a prior recorded deed or incum-
brance, the constructive notice of the prior
conveyance which the record imparts pre-
vents one taking title subsequently from be-
ing a purchaser in good faith. Rev. St 1899,
I 8080 (Ann. St 1906, p. 1768), permitting
one who claims land in another's possession
to bar the occupant from compensation for
betterments by notifying him in writing of
the claim and its nature, does not make an
exception in favor of an occupant who be-
lieves the hostile title to be bad and makes
betterments regardless of such notli^e, since
'Notice" and "good faith" cannot so exist,
for it is an equity doctrine of universal rec-
ognition that he who takes with notice takes
subject to the claim, and the notice which
will suffice for this purpose does not mean
direct and positive information, but anything
calculated to put a prudent man on the alert.
Richmond v. Ashcraft, 117 S. W. 689, 692,
137 Mo. App. 191.
As Information or knowledge
"Knowledge" is not the same as "notice,"
but to constitute "notice," the "knowledge"
must be communicated in the prescribed way.
Wade V. Wade's Adm'r, 69 AtL 826, 827, 81
Vt 275.
''Knowledge" and "notice" are not al-
ways synonymous. Field v. Campbell (Ind.)
67 N. B. 1010, 1041 (citing Kirkham t. Moore,
65 N. E. 1042, 80 Ind. App. 549). '
"'Notice' is equivalent to Information,'
'intelligence,' or 'knowledge.' " Bova v. Norl-
gian, 67 Ati. 326, 327, 28 R. I. 319, 125 Am.
St Rep. 741.
"Notice" means information by whatever
means communicated; knowledge given or
received. Metcalf v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
112 N. W. 22, 24, 132 Wis. 67.
One's knowledge that he has been ap-
pointed to an oflice constitutes "notice" to
him, within Code 1912, art 70, | 11, which
provides that an office is forfeited by failure
to qualify within 30 days after receiving com-
mission or notice of appointment Little v.
Schul, 84 AtL 649, 655, 118 Md. 454.
"Knowledge" and "notice" are not synon-
ymous, for that which does not amount to
actual "knowledge" may constitute "notice."
The notice may be of such a character that
its effects amount to knowledge. On the
other hand, the party may be charged with
notice when in utter ignorance of that of
which he is presumed to be advised. Rosen-
berger v. Hawker, 103 N. W. 781, 782, 127
Iowa, 521.
The word "notice,'* as used in Bev. St
1899, § 3017, imposing a penalty for selling
liquors to a drunkard after notice from his
wife not to do so, is synonymous with infor-
mation, intelligence, or knowledge, and oral
notice to the managing agent of the dram-
shop keeper is sufficient Jackson County
ex rel. Farley v. Schmld, 124 S. W, 1074,
141 Mo. App. 229.
B. & a Oomp. I 10$, provides that the
court may at any time within one year after
notice thereof relieve a party from a judg-
ment or order taken against him through his
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect Held, that "notice," as used in the
statute, means "knowledge" Fildew v. Mil-
ner, 109 Pac. 1092, 1094, 57 Or. 16.
"A 'notice' to a purchaser of a note of
fraud, defect in titie, illegality of considera-
tion, or other fact which impeaches its validi-
ty in the transferror's hands signifies the
same as knowledge" Merchants* & Manu-
facturers' Nat Bank v. Ohio Valley Furni-
ture Co., 50 S. E. 880, 882, 57 W. Va. 625, 70
L. R. A. 312 (quoting and adopting definition
in Daniel, Neg. Instr. § 789).
The word "notice," used in negotiable in-
strument law, must be understood as mean-
ing actual knowledge as distinguished from
implied or constructive notice which arises
when a person is put on inquiry, and knowl-
edge is presumed. link v. Jackson, 139 S.
W. 588, 593, 158 Mo. App. 63.
A complaint alleging that an act by
which plaintiff, a passenger, was injured was
done with "knowledge" or "notice" of defend-
ant's agent does not state a cause of action
'■■H
Hh
B^^H
'im
j|H|
III
Ul
|HB
i^ffl
'Hbmi
Hli
Hfl
iuH
MOTICB
640
sroncn
m
tot^ Wantoimein ; *tiotice** not beltiig tbe
eqcdYalent of **lmowledge," and the averment
In the disjtmctiye not affirming either. Birm-
ingham By. & Electric Ck). y. Butler» 33
South. 33, 35, 135 Ala. 388.
Where, In an action against a county to
set aside a conveyance, a decree was taken
by default, the court, under L. O. L. I 103,
may, In Its discretion, within one year after
notice thereof, relieve a party from a Judg-
ment taken against him through his mistake,
Inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,
and has jurisdiction to entertain a motion
to set aside such decree when filed within
one year after knowledge of the decree was
acquired by the agents or officers of the coun-
ty, though not until more than one year after
the decree was entered ; "notice," as used In
such statute, being a synonym of "knowl-
edge." Chapman v. Multnomah Oounty, 126
Pac. 096, 998, 63 Or. 180.
••Notice," In connection with the rule
that purchasers of corporate stock In good
faith without ••notice" that It Is unpaid are
not liable for the balance due on it, must be
given the ordinary signification of that term,
and means knowledge that the stock was un-
paid, or knowledge of such facts as would
have put an ordinarily prudent man on in-
quiry, when the inquiry might reasonably be
expected to lead him to knowledge that the
stock was unpaid. OlUett v. Chicago Title A
Trust Co., 82 N. B. 891, 906, 230 lU. 378.
A distinction Is to be observed between
knowledge of the pendency of a suit and ''no-
tlce" thereof. Jurisdiction can be acquired.
If one does not submit himself to It, In no
other way than by, actual notice or by con-
structive notice. Actual notice Is given only
by personal service of process; constroctlve
notice by some form of substituted service.
Where there Is no service there Is no notice,
Irrespective of any knowledge which the de-
fendant may acquire Informally. Notice Is
given only by a service of process. Informal
knowledge will not supply It, and cannot be
relied upon to put the one acquiring the
knowledge on notice or to force him into
court to defend himself. National Metal Co.
V. Greene Consol. Copper Co., 89 Pac. 535,
537, 11 Ariz. 108, 9 L. E. A. (N. S,) 1062.
The word "notice," as used In L. O. L. {
108, permitting a court in its discretion, at
any time within a year after notice thereof,
to relieve a party from a Judgment taken
against him by mistake, etc, means ••knowl-
edge" by the moving party of the entry of a
Judgment. Evans v. Evans, 118 Pac. 177,
179, 60 Or. 195.
Rev. Codes 1905, | 6702, providing that
constructive notice Is notice Imputed by law
to a person not having actual notice, and
section 6703 providing that every person who
has actual notice of sufficient circumstances
to put a prudent man upon inquiry, and wfto
omits to make sacii Inquiry wlOi
diligence is deemed to have eoDstracCive :
tioe of the fact itself, since the enactsient
the negotiable instruments law, bare no i
plication to actions upon negotiable Inst
ments in the hands of indorsees before i
tnrity, if they ever had such application,
lug superseded by section 6358, defining i
tice in such case as actual knowledge of
firmity or defects or knowledge of such fa
as to amount to bad faith. American K
Bank v. Lundy, 129 N. W. 99, 101, 21 N.
167.
Am order
The word •'notloe,'* as used In Laws IS
c. 380, p. 583, providing that, if the party
sires more than the 10 days given by stat
within which to make and serve his cs
made, the court or judge before whom i
case was tried may on motion order an
tension of that time, which notice of ext
slon shall be filed with the derk of the cm
may well be held that the word •*notl
should be read ••order." Howard t. Carl
80 Pac. 61, 62, 71 Kan. 85 (citing Clark
Board of Com*rs of Mitchell County* 77 I
284, 69 Kan. 542, 66 U B. A. 9619.
See Prooesa
As proof
See Proof.
BeasoBAble aotioe
There is no difference In ttk^ meaning
••notice^' and ••reasonable notice," and whi
in an action against the town f6r damages
suiting from a defect in a highway, couo
for defendant admitted ••notioe," tbe ado
«Aon will have the same effect as though
had admitted ••reasonable notice." Larrai
V. Inhabitants of Searsport, 42 Me. 202, 2
To offioer» aseaty or attorney
*• 'Notice' communicated to, or knowlec
acquired by, the officers or agents of corpo
tlons, when acting in their official capacity
within the scope of their agency, becon
notice to or knowledge of the corporation 3
all Judicial purposes." Maryland Trust (
V. National Mechanics' Bank, 68 AtL 70,
102 Md. 608 (citing 13 Cya pp. 899, 400).
"Notice" to a township trustee of the
solvency of his brother, a defaulting tov
ship treasurer, was notice to Oie town^
within Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, S 6
30 Stat 562, relating to preferencea Paini
V. Napoleon Tp., 190 Fed. 637, 639.
In an action by the receiver of a d^w
tor to recover a deposit which the hank b
paid out on forged checks, the court refas
to admit in evidence the deposition of a <
ceased officer of the depositor to the eff<
that he had several interviews with one
the counsel for the bank, who was aleo a <
rector and a memlier of its esieootlve co
mittee, within one year aftar tbm retnia
1 "|:^ :i^'
NOTIOE
641
NOTICE OF DISHQNOB
tlie depositor of tbe forged ehbdkM, in which
he told sach oonnsel that the checks were
forged. Held reyerslble error, since the dep-
osition tended to show that the connsel was
acting for the hank, that he had knowledge
of facts which it was his duty to communi-
cate to the bank, and which It mnst be pre-
sumed he did communicate, and hence that
the bank had notice within the meaning of
Negotiable Instruments Law (ConsoL Laws
1909, c. 88) I 326, requiring notice to a bank
within one year after the return to the de-
positor of any forged Toucher, In order to
hold the bank liable. Shattuck ▼. Guardiao
Trust Co. of New York, 97 N. E. 517, 518, 204
N. Y. 200.
Where an attorney was charged with the
duty of haying a deed to his client executed
and acknowledged, "notice" to him, while en-
gaged in the transaction, that there was in
fact a mortgage on the premises, though It
did not appear of record, owing to a mistake
in the description, was "notice" to the client
Allison T. Falconer, 87 S. W. 639, 76 Ark. 343.
Verlial or writtea
Rev. St Ohio, I 3186, provides that,
within 30 days after a principal contractor
flies an affidavit for a lien, he shall notify
the owner, his agent or attorney, that he
claims a lien, and, if he fails, the lien shall
be null and void. Held, that "notice" as so
used meant information by whatever means
communicated, knowledge given or received;
and, written notice not being expressly re-
quired, oral notice was sufficient In re
Farmers' Supply Ck>., 170 Fed. 602, 606.
HOnOE AFFEOmrO OOUHTY AF-
FAIRS
The list of allowances made by the Judg-
es of the several courts, required by Acts
1890, p. 415, c. 186, to be published in one
newspaper at a cost not exceeding a fixed
sum for each allowance, are required to be
published in two newspapers in Acts 1903, p.
860, I 1, providing that, where the law re-
quires the publication of '^notices affecting
county affaj^" the same shall be published
in two newspapers. Cheney v. State ex reL
Risk, 74 N. B. 892, 893, 166 Ind. 121.
VOTICE OF APPEAI.
As process, see Process.
As writ, see Writ
If to appeal is not to institute a new pro-
eeeding, a ''notice of appeal" cannot be an
original process by which parties are brought
into court, but is a notice merely by which
the parties who are already in court are no-
tified of subsequent and further proceedings
in the cause therein pending, and hence,
where such notice was served on defendant's
attorney and purported to be a notice of ap-
peal as against all of the defendants origi-
nally sued, it was not objectionable by reason
of the fiict that all of the defendants exoeift
one were referred to hy the abbreviation *%t
8 Wn&ft P.2D Skb.— 41
aL" Instead of settiiig out their names in
folL Philadeli^bla Mortgage ft Trust Go. v.
Palmer, 73 Pac. 601, 602, 32 Wash. 466.
The words "notice of the appeal," as
used in Rev. Codes N. D. { 7221, refers to no-
tice or knowledge of a perfected appeal as
furuished by service of a copy of the under-
taking and not merely to the notice in writ-
ing provided for by section 7205. Beddow v.
Flage, 126 N. W. 97, 98, 20 N. D. 66.
NOTIOE OF APPROPRIATION
A notice of appropriation of water with-
in a United States forest reservation, which
states all the matters required by Civ. Oode,
S 1416, relating to the notioe of appropriation
of water, and which states ttie points of di-
version as located on a designated section
and township which the court Judicially
knows is within a reservation, is sufficient
within section 1422, providing that where the
place of intended diversion is within a reser-
vation, and is so shown in the notice of ap-
propriation, the claimant shall have a speci-
fied time after the grant of authority to occu-
py and use the reservation for such Intended
purpose within whi<^ to commence the con-
struction of the works, eta The form of
notice of appropriation of water of a stream
is fixed by Civ. Code, 1 1416, requiring a per-
son desiring to appropriate water to post a
notice stating enumerated facts, and section
1422, relating to diversion of water vrithin
any reservation, does not affect the form of
notice. Wishon v. Globe lilglht ft Power Go.,
110 Pac. 290, 292, 158 Cal. 187.
NOTIOE OF DISHONOR
Oral notice of dishonor of a chedk, given
to a clerk of an indorsing ^mmerdal corpo-
ration, is not notice to the corporation, with-
in Negotiable Instrument Law (Acts 1899, a
94) I 97, authorizing the giving of "notice*' to
a party or to his agent American Nat
Bank v. National Fertiliser Co., 143 S. W.
597, 699, 126 Tenn. 328.
If the holder of negotiable paper desires
to charge antecedent parties with Its pay-
ment,'it is Incumbent on him to give them
"notice of dishonor." The notice may be
either written or verbal, or it may be writ-
ten and supplemented by verbal testimony.
All that is necessary, says Byles, is to apprise
the party liable of the dishonor of the bill
in question and to intimate that he is ex-
pected to pay it It is sufficient if, under all
the circumstances, the language of the notice
imports that the indorser is looked to for pay-
ment, and it would seem not unfair to imply
such intention from the very fkct of sending
"notice of dishonor." The weight of author-
ity is that a notice of dl^onor is sufficient
to charge an indorser, if it comes from the
holder or his agent snd notifies the indorser
that the note was presented and payment
was refused. Notioe of nonpayment, how-
ever, is not sufiki^it; nor is mere knowledge
NOTICE OP INFIRMTTT
6^
NOTIFICATION
5 V^
Mil
If
at protest all that is required to charge' the
Indorser. "Notice does not mean mere
knowledge, but an actual notification. For a
man who can be dearly shown to have
known beforehand that the bill would be dis-
honored is, nevertheless, entitled to notice/*
''Notice means something more than knowl-
edge, because it is competent to the holder
to give credit to the maker. It is not enough
to say that the maker does not Intend to pay,
but that the holder does not intend to give
credit to such maker." Marshall v. Sonne-
man, 64 Atl. 874, 875, 216 Pa. 66 (citing Byles,
BiU, •27Q; 7 Cyc. p. 1109).
VOnCOE OF UNFUtMITT
Under Negotiable Instruments Law (Sess.
Laws 1899, p. 350, c. 149) | 56, providing that,
in order to constitute "notice of an infirmity"
in an instrument or defect in the title of the
person negotiating the same, the person to
whom it is negotiated must have actual
knowledge of the infirmity, or knowledge of
such f&cta that his action in taking the in-
strument amounts to bad faith, one who has
knowledge of a defect in his transferror's
title, or knowledge of such facts that his ac-
tion in t&klng the instrument amounts to bad
faithj is not a holder in due course. Keene
V. Behan, 82 Pac. 884, 886, 40 Wash. 505.
Under a statute providing that, to consti-
tute "notice of infirmity" in a negotiable in-
strument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it, the person to whom it is nego-
tiated must have had actual knowledge of the
infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such
facts that his action in taking the instrument
amounted to bad faith, evidence that the
transfer of a check for $400 by S., the payee
thereof, to plaintiff, his brother-in-law, took
place near the bank on which the check was
drawn, and of which plaintiff was vice presi-
dent, that no inquiry was made at the bank
before purchase, and that plaintiff, went to a
hotel, got a blank check, and filled it out to
the order of S. for $400, and gave it to an-
other party for delivery to S., did not show
actual knowledge on plaintiff's part of .an in-
firmity in the check. Matlock v. Scheuer-
man, 93 Pac. 823, 824, 826, 51 Or. 49, 17 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 747 (citing and adopting Belmont
Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Hoge, 35
N. Y. 65-^; Bowman v. Metzger, 39 Pac 8,
44 Pac 1090, 27 Or. 23).
HOTIOE OF NEGUGEIIOE
There is a clear distinction between a
''notice of negligence" and a claim for damag-
es. A mere notice to a telegraph company
that its employes have been negligent in the
transmission of a message, together with the
circumstances of the negligence, is not a
presentment of a claim for damages, based
on such negligence, within the contract for
the transmission of the message providing
that the company shall not be liable for
diimages i^iere the ctaini is not presen
within a sgedAed time, etc. Western Un
Telegrairti Co. v. Mozley, 96 S. W. 112, 113,
Ark. 554.
NOTIOE OF TRANSFER
Before notice of transfer, i
i Before.
NOTIOE TO THE WORUO
The "notice to the world," required
Civ. Ck)de 1895, | 2684, which dedares t
the dissolution of a partnership by the
tiring of an ostensible partner must be m
known to creditors and to the world, may
given by publication in a public gazette di
lated in the locality in which the busines!
the partnership has been conducted, if si
publication is fair and reasonable as to
terms and the number of times it is ma
Such publication is not, however, necesa
as any means of fairly publishing the f
of dissolution as widely as possible in or
to put the public on its guard, as by adi
tisement, public notice in the maimer us
In the community, the withdrawal of the
terior indications of partnership, eta,
proper to be considered on the qaestion
notice. Bush & Hattaway v. W. A. McCa
Co., 56 S. E. 430, 431, 127 Oa. 308, 9 1
Gas. 240 (quoting and adopting definitioiis
Askew V. Silman, 22 S. E. 573, 05 6a. t
Lovejoy V. Spafford, 93 U. 8. 430, 23 L.
851).
NOTIFY
See Duly Notified.
To "notify" one of a fact is to "mak<
known to him," to "inform him by notit
Huntington v. aty of Calais, 73 Aa 829, i
105 Me. 144.
Under Rev. St Ohio, | 3185, provid
that a person filing an affidavit or a medi
ic's lien d^all within 30 days thereafter di
fy the owner of the property, his agent,
attorney that he claimed such lien, verbal
tioe is sufiicient The word '"notify" as g
erally used does not imply the use of writ!
it meaning simply to convey informatJ
knowledge, or notice in whatever way. In
Boner, 189 Fed. 93, 94.
NOTIFIOATIOH
In Pub. St c. 172, S 29, relating to s
of land on execution, requiring "notificatit
thereof to be posted up in some public pi)
in the city or town where tiie land lies, i
also in two adjoining cities or towns, if th
are so many in the county," the plural *tM
fications" would be construed, apart fr
history, with reference to the several dt
or towns in which the notifications are
quired, notwithstanding the words ''and
so," and not as requiring two or more m
fications in the dty or town where the Ui
lies. In fact, however, the plural Is a s
vtval from St 1798, a 77, | 4^ wlii<di requii
NOTIFISD
643 NOTORIOUS FUPLIG INDECENOT
the posting tip of notUficationfiriB two or more
public places in the town where the land lies.
Rev. St c. 73, | 39, substituted "some public
place" for "two or more public places," and
thereby made one notiflcation sufficient
Holmes t. Jordan, 39 N. B. lOOB, 1006, 163
Mass. 147.
VOTDTBD
The word '"notified,*' as used in a certifi-
cate and protest by a notary public that he
duly notified the indorser of the note of non-
payment, there b^ng no qualification of the
word as to the mode of notice, must be re-
garded as meaning verbal notice. Ticonic
Bank v. Stackpole, 41 Me. 321, 824, 66 Am.
Dec. 246.
Where one desiring to ship goods inform-
ed the agent of the carrier that lie would
want two cars In which to transport the
goods, an allegation in a complaint founded
on a failure to furnish the cars, that the agent
"notified" the dilpper that he "would en-
deavor" to secure the cars was insufficient to
show an acceptance of the proposal according
to the terms in whldi it was made, or an
unconditional promise to comply with it It
was no more than a luromlse that the agent
"would endeavor" to comply with the order
which it was his duty to do without a con-
tract Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ander-
son, 79 N. E. 881, 383, 39 Ind. App. 112.
Bums* Ann. St 1901, | 3626a, providing
that in an action to foreclose a lien for a
municipal Improvement it must be shown
that 10 days before suit the owner, if found
or known, was "notified** of the assessment
Including the amount thereof, with interest
and where payable, means a notice either
verbal or written, and it may be given by
any one Interested in the claim, or by any
municipal officer charged with a duty in con-
nection with the making or collection of the
assessment Ross v. Van Natta, 74 N. E. 10,
U, 164 Ind. 557.
The word "notified," in the warrant of a
county clerk to the treasurer directing the
collection of taxes, reciting, 'Ton are hereby
notified to collect the taxes** enumerated in
the lists attached. Is suffidentiy defined to
warrant the treasurer to proceed to collect
tile taxes, pursuant to the statute providing
tliat the county clerk shall attach to the lists
his warrant in general terms requiring the
treasurer to collect the taxes, and no infor-
mality shall render any proceedings for the
collection of taxes Illegal. Cadman v. Smith,
85 Pac 346, 348, 15 OkL 633.
NOTORIETY
" 'Notoriety* la the state or character of
being well known, usually, and, always when
appUed to crime, in an unfavorable sense.
It is often found with words of similar im-
port such as 'open' and 'flagrant' " People
V. Salmon, 83 Paa 42, 43, 148 CaL 303, 2
L. B. A. (N. S.) 1186» 113 Am. St Bep. 268.
NOTORIET7 OF POSSESSION
See Openness, Kotorlety, and Exdusive-
ness of Possession
NOTORIOUS
See Open, Notorious, and Continuous
Change of Possession.
The word "notorious" is used in the stat-
ute relating to the recognition of a child,
with the design of emphasizing the thought
that the understanding of the father's recog-
nition should be as extensive as the Immedi-
ate community of his residence and within
the common Imowledge of the public. Mor-
gan ▼. Strand, 110 N. W. 696, 6d7, 133 Iowa,
299.
NOTORIOUS ADXJjyrEKY
See Open and Notorious Adultery.
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION
See Open and Notorious Possession.
''Notorious'* possession as an element
of titie by limitation is possession which is
generally known and talked of, and univer-
sally recognized, conspicuous, widely, or com-
monly known. Long v. Lackawanna *Coal &
Iron Co., 136 S. W. 673, 680, 681, 233 Mo. 713.
Within the rule that to constitute ad-
verse possession it is necessary that the pps^
session be "actual,** "continuous,** "notori-
ous,*' and "hostile," "actual*' means real,
visible; "continuous** means without inter-
ruption; "notorious** means open, undisguis-
ed, generally known; and "hostile'* means
opposed and antagonistic to the claims of
all others. Bradbury Marble Co. r. Laclede
Gas Light Co., 106 S. W. 594, 699, 128 Mo.
App. 96.
The elements of titie by limitation are
uninterrupted possession, actual, visible, no-
torious, adverse, and hostile under color and
claim of right for the statutory period ; the
words "adverse and hostile'* meaning practi-
cally the same thing. Long v. Lackawanna
Coal & Iron Co., 136 S. W. 673, 680, 681, 233
Mo. 713.
NOTORIOUS FUBUO INBECENOY
What is decent and indecent is determin-
ed by the sensibilities and moral standards of
the people as evolved from generation to gen-
eration along with their civilization. Whether
an act is decent or indecent depends on the
time, place, and the circumstances, including
the intention of the actor. When by general
consensus of public opinion an act tending to
debauch the morals Is understood to be of-
fensive to the common instincts of decency
if done under particular circumstances, the
act, when so done, is in contemplation of
law a "i^torious act of indecency." A public
and intentional or wanton intruding upon the
NOVATION
644
NOVATION
attention of the opportte sex of the sexual
act or other things directly soggestiye of it
is an act of public indecency, within Pen.
Code 1895, | 390, making notorious acts of
public indecency a misdemeanor; the barrier
erected by social decorum between the sexes
being a fundamental of decency. For a man
intenti<mally and wantonly to cause a bull
and cow to copulate upon a public highway,
knowing that a woman and children are so
situated that they can hardly fail to see the
act, and that they are likely to be offended
by it, constitutes criminal notorious public
indecency, within Pen. Code 1895, | 390.
Redd y. State, 07 8. Bl 709, TU* T Ga. App.
675.
NOVATION
A "novation'* is the substitution of one
obligation for another. Tilden v. Qordon A
Co., 74 Pac 1016, 1017, 34 Wash. 92.
A "novation" presupposes a previous ob-
ligation for which the new one is substituted.
Idnder Hardware Go. v. Pacific Sugar Ck>rp.,
118 Pac. 785, 17 CaL App. 81.
The doctrine of "novation** is derived
from the civil law, and a novation can neither
be founded on an original claim, which was
illegal, nor, under the civil law, be made by
one incapable of contracting. Wadsworth v.
Board of Sup'rs of Livingston County, 115 N.
y.* Supp. 8, 18 (citing Green's Brice^s Ultra
Vires, p. eoi). ,
A "novation" is in the nature of a re-
lease or discharge and is new matter which
must be specially pleaded. There can be no
"novation" and substitution in law unless
the original creditor and the new debtor all
enter into such an agreement Temple v.
Teller Lumber Co., 106 Pac. 8, 9, 46 Colo.
497.
A "novation" is the making of a new con-
tract, its elements being essentially the same
as in the first contract, which are, parties, a
meeting of the minds, and a consideration.
Daviess County Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright,
110 S. W. 361, 363, 129 Ky. 21, 17 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1122.
The necessary legal elements to establish
"novation" are: Parties capable of contract-
ing, a valid prior obligation to be displaced,
the consent of all parties to the substitution,
based on sufficient consideration, and the ex-
tinction of the old obligation and the cre-
ation of a new one. Harrington- Wiard COb
V. Blomstrom Mfg. Co.* 131 N. W. 659, 668,
166 Mich. 276.
The essential elements of a "novation"
are parties capable of contracting, a valid
prior obligation to be displaced, the consent
of all of the parties to the substitution, and
the extinction of the old obligation and the
creati<Hi of a new one. QiUett t. Ivory
(Mich.) 139 N. W. 58, 56.
''Novation" is defined to be the snbatlta-
ti<m by mutual agreement of one debtor or of
one creditor for another, whereby the old
debt is extinguished, or the substitution of a
new debt or obligation for an existing one,
which lis thereby extinguished. In re Rans-
f ord, 194 Fed. 658, 662, 115 a a A. 560.
"Novatioa" ocmsists of a bilateral agree-
ment for the substitution of one obligaticNi
for another, and may take place ^ther by
the substitution of a new for an old party, or
by the substitution of a new agreement be-
tween the parties, or by a change of parties
and agreement at the same time. Parsons
Mfg. Co. V. Hamilton Ice Mfg. Oo., 78 AtL
254, 255, 78 N. J. Law, 809.
To constitute a "novation" by substitution
of creditors or debtors, there must be a mutual
agreement between three or more persona,
whereby a debtor, in consideration of beinf
discharged from his liability to the original
creditor, contracts a new obligation in fiivor
of the new creditor, and the new creditor
must have consented to the discharge of his
original debtor, and have accepted the new
debtor. McAllister v. McDonald, 106 Pac.
882, 886, 40 Mont. 375.
The doctrine of "novation" cannot apply
to an action for use and occupation of land to
which plaintiff had no legal titie, where nei-
ther defendant nor the lessee of the land was
indebted to plaintiff, she being a stranger to
the transaction, since novatloii imiAies a
substitution of a debt<H: of a creditor and of
a new contract Pennington v. Qartiey, 88
Ati. 701, 708, 109 MSb 27a
That defendant verbally agreed with the
payee to pay others' notes, and the payee ac-
cepted the promise, and thereafter looked to
defendant for payment, and the payee's cash-
ier told a surety on the notes that defendant
had agreed to pay them, and that the surety
was released, is insufficient to show a "nova-
tion" binding defendant, for want of eonsAdet-
ation, where it does not appear that defend-
ant was indebted to the mak»s, or that they
paid, or agreed to pay, him anything for as-
suming the debt, or that the payee formally
released the makers or sureties or surr^ider^
ed any security held under the old notea.
Bank of St James v. Walker, 111 S. W. 829,
830, 132 Mo. App. 117.
A broker, acting for several customers^
whose orders for goods it had taken and
agreed to fill, contracted with a seller for tfa«
purchase of the goods in lump. The seller
knew that the merchandise was for different
customers, and for convenience agreed to ship
car load lots to customers and draw direct
on them therefor. It shipped goods to a
customer and drew against him th^efbr.
The customer sued the seller for failure to
deliver goods of a merchantable quality.
Held, that he could not maintain the action
on the theory that the seller severed the con-
NOVATIOK
645
NOVATION
tract, and bb to the castomer released the
broker and looked to him instead. H. Mid-
wood's Sons Oo. V, Alaska-Portland Packers'
Assn, 67 AtL 61, 62, 28 B. I. S03» IB Ann.
Gas. 954.
A ••novation" Is the substltntton of a
new obligation for an old one. The reqnl-
sites of a novation are a valid prior obliga-
tion to be displaced, consent of all parties to
the snbstitntlon, a sufficient consideration,
the extinction of the old obligation, and the
creation of a valid new one. The snbstltn-
tion may be in the debt or contract, in the
debtor, or in the creditor. Where one, to
whom wage claims of employte of bankrapts
are assigned, ezdianges them with the baak-
mpts for their note and dneblll, there Is a
"novation" of the wage claims, extlngnlshlng
the preference given by Bankr. Act July 1,
18d8, c. 5CU I 64b4, 80 Stat. 568, to claims
for wages. In re Fnller ft Bennett, 162 Fed.
538, 54L
A real estate agent procured the sale of
certain premises to defendant, and defend-
ant, In consideration of the agent's release
of his daim against the vendors for commis-
sions, paid him 91>000, and agreed to pay him
$8,600 more on sale of the premises. Later
the agent placed his daim In the hands of an
attorney for settlement, and negotiations
were carried on between the attorney and the
defendant Defendant offered to pay $2,500
and $250 counsel fees, for the snrrender of
the contract, and the delivery of a general
release by the agent The offer was reported
to the agent, who said he would acc^t it;
and a day was fixed as the time, and the
attorney's office as the place, for closing the
transaction, but the transaction was never
completed by the payment of the money or
surrender of the contract and delivery of the
release. At the time of the offw by defend-
ant for surrender of the contract, negotia-
tions had been completed for pur<diase of the
premises by a third person, but the agent had
no knowledge thereof. Held, that the trans-
action did not amount to a ''novation" by the
substitution of a new contract between the
parties. Bandman v. Finn, 02 N. Y. Supp.
1096, 1006, 103 App. Dlv. 822.
"Novation" is effected by the substitution
of a new obligation between the same parties
with the intention to extinguish the old one,
or by the substitution of a new debtor with
the Intention to release the old one, or by the
substitution Of a new creditor with the in-
tent to transfer the rights of the old one to
him. There must be a mutual agreement
among the parties for the substitution of the
new debt In place of the old. There must be
an extinguishment of the old debt and an
agreement tg look to the new debtor alone,
and the mere taking of a new debtor will not,
standing alone, amount to a ••novation." The
taking by a creditor of a note from one who
has assumed the debt is not a "novation,"
releasing the old debtor; there being no
agreement to this effect M. Glmbell & Sons
V. King, 85 S. W. 7, 8, 43 Tex. av. App. 188
(citliig Beach, Mod. Con. | 786; Add. Cont pw
530; Pimental v. Marquee, 42 Pac. 159, 108
Cal. 406; Jackson Iron Go. v. Negaunee Con-
centrating Ck)., 65 Fed. 298, 12 O. C. A 636;
Stowell V. Gram, 69 N. E. 342, 184 Mass. 562;
Western White Bronze Co. v. Portrey, 70 N.
W. 383, 50 Neb. 801 ; Piehl v. Plehl, 101 N.
W. 628, 138 Mich. 515).
Where by a wrltt^i contract plaintiff
sold land to defendant, with the agreement
that plaintiff should receive one-third of
profit^ a^bove that amount when the property
could be sold for as much as $19,000, and sub-
sequently defendant asserted that she would
not take lees than $21,000 for her share, and
that plaintiff might take any amount received
above that sum, and plaintiff attempted to
make a sale on such terms but failed to get
$21,000, there was a rescission of the written
agreement, and a substitution of the parol
contract, constituting a novation, defined by
Civ. Code, I 1530, as the substitution of a
new obligation for an existing one. Simmons
V. Sweeney, 109 Paa 265, 267, 18 CaL App.
288.
The owner of real estate contracted for
Its sale for a specified amount; a certain
portion of the paiehase price to be paid on
the execution and delivery of the agreement,
another on the delivery of the deed, the bal-
ance payable In three years, with interest
at 6 per cent for. the first year and 6 per
cent for the balance of the term, to be se-
cured by a purchase-money mortgage. The
purchaser paid the agreed sum at the execu-
tion of the contract, and on the passing of
the deed paid the vendor an amount much
greater than the contract required to be
paid at that time, and gave the mortgage
for the balance. Held, that the receipt by
the vendor at the delivery of the deed of an
amount in excess of the amount agreed upon,
and the acceptance of a mortgage for the bal-
ance, constituted a "novation," and that the
vendor was not entitled to interest under
the terms of the first contract on the excess
of the amount received at the delivery of the
deed over the amount agreed upon. Crim-
mins V. Carlyle Realty Co., 117 N. Y. Supp.
434, 435, 132 App. Div. 665.
Substitntioa of new delator
"Novation" is the substitution of one
debtor by mutual agreement for another,
whereby the old debt is extinguished. Cheno-
weth V. National Bldg. Ass'n, 53 S. El 659,
561, 59 W. Va. 653.
Where parties to an executory contract
for work, acting with a third person, agree
to substitute the third person, by consent of
all, in place of the original contractor, there
is a species of "novation." Security Nat
Bank v. St Croix Power Co., 04 N. W. 74,
77, 117 Wis. 211.
I i.
i
i \
I III
:
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NOVATION
646
NOVATION
Tlie essence of '"novation" is tliat all the
three parties assent to or concur in the
agreement whereby the new debtor is sub-
stituted for the old and the old debt ex-
tinguished. Elliott y. Quails, 130 S. W. 474,
470, 149 Mo. App. 482.
Where a corporation, as creditor, accepts
in payment of a debt the note of a third per-
son, together with valuable security, a "nova-
tion" is effected, and it can thereafter look
only to the substituted debtor for reimburse-
ment. Security Warehousing Co. v. Ameri-
can Bzch. Nat. Bank, 103 N. Y. Supp. 390,
402, 118 App. Div. 350.
A "novation by the substitution of a new
debtor" consists of a mutual agreement
among three parties, the creditor, his im-
mediate debtor, and the intended new debtor,
whereby the liability of the last named is
accepted in place of that of the original
debtor in discharge of the original debt
Babbitt v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co.. 130 S. W.
364, 367, 149 Mo. App. 439.
A "novation" occurs when a debtor
makes an arrangement with his debtor, for
a valuable consideration, whereby the second
debtor assumes and is to pay the first debt-
or's debt, and if, before passing of the con-
sideration, or completion of the transaction,
either of the debtors explains the proposed
transaction to the first debtor's creditor, and
the creditor consents to the substitution and
agrees to accept the new debtor and release
the old one, the novation is complete. Bank
of St James v. Walker, 111 S. W. 829, 830,
132 Mo. App. 117.
Where a divorced husband and wife en-
tered into an agreement that the wife would
pay the husband's attorneys in consideration
of his transferring certain property to her,
and the husband's attorneys agreed to look
to the wife for compensation, and the proper-
ty was transferred, and the wife drew a
check in favor of the attorneys, there was a
complete "novation." Dougherty v. Van Rip-
er, 120 Pac. 333, 334, 16 N. M. 600.
Where, after the sale of goods to an
individual, the business was Incorporated,
and the corporation requested the delivery
of the goods under the contract to it, and
made payment on account of such goods, a
"novation" was efTected, and the corporation
was substituted for the original purchaser,
as debtor of the seller. An express agree-
ment is not requisite for a "novation" or
substitution of parties to a contract, as it
may be implied. J. H. Lane & Co. v. United
Oilcloth Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 1061, 1062, 103
App. Div. 378.
EztiiiCiiial&meat of old debt
A "novation" requires the creation of
new contractual relations, as well as the ex-
tinguishment of old. There must be the con-
jsent of all the parties to the substitution, re-
sulting tn the extinction of the old obliga-
tion and the creation of a valid new one
Held V. CaldweU*Baston Co., 89 N. Y. Sopp
964, 955, 97 App. Div. 801«
To constitute a contract of ''novation,'
the original indebtedness or obligation mos
be extinguished, and a mutual agreezneni
made among the parties to the old and nev
obligations, whereby the new is sabstitatM
for the old. Inman v. F. N. Burt Co., 108 N
Y. Supp. 210, 211, 212, 124 App. Div. 73 (dt
ing Ryan v. Pistone, 35 N. Y. Supp. 81, ^
Hun, 78).
The eesentiaUi of a "noyatfon" are a nro
tual agreement to which the creditor, tbe old
debtor, and the new debtor assent, by wMcl
the. old obligation is extinguished and t nei
and valid obligation is created and takes iti
place. Hemenway v. Beecher, 121 N. W
160, 161, 139 Wis. 399.
" 'Novation' is the substitution of m
obligation for another, and takes place ei
ther by the substitution of a new for an oU
part7, or by the substitution of a new a^ree
ment between the old parties, or it may be b;
a change both of parties and of agreemeni
at the same timew" To support the claim
of a "novation," the assent of tbe partle!
that the new obligation shall be accepted la
extinguishment of an old one is an essentitl
element, but the substitution may be accom-
plished by either an express or an implied
agreement Illinois Life Ins. Oo. v. Benoer.
97 Pac. 438, 439, 78 Kan. 611.
"Novation" takes place by agreemeDt of
all the parties concerned, and, where A tis-
dertakes to pay B.'s debt, the obligation u^
sumed may be collateral to B.'s obiigatloD
rather than substituted therefor, and, if in-
tended as collateral, B.'s debt conthineB to
exist, and this distinguishes such a ca.«
from one of novation in which B.'8 debt
would be extinguished. Hargadine-McKit
trick Dry Goods Co. v. Goodman, 45 Soutt
995, 997, 55 Fla. 361.
" 'Novation* is the substitution of a new
obligation for an old one, which is thereby
extinguished." Where a mortgagee, who
had given a loan on security, falsely repre;
sented to be a first mortgage, and bac
brought an action for the deceit discontiiso
ed on the oral promise of the mortgagor's fa-
ther to pay the debt, but did not release tlu
mortgage or the debt of the mortgagee bot
only the claim for the deceit, th^e was so
such "novation" as to render the promise o^
the mortgagor's father binding under ^
statute of frauds. BicknaU v. Blcknall, 6^'
AtL 976, 977, 27 B. I. 429 (citing Bout. U'
Diet).
"Novation" is defined as the sobstitutioB
of one obligation for another, and taktf
place either by substitution of ft new for an
old party or by the substitution ott^
agreement between tiie old parties, or it otfT
be by a change both of parties and ^P^^
ment at the same time. One of the (
NOVATION
647
NOW
emeDts to a *^oyatlon'* is that there should
lYe been an extfngnlshment of the old debt,
id another is that there should have been
mutual agreement between all of the par*
es that the old debt should become the obli-
itlon of a new debtor. Miles ▼. Bowers, 90
ac. 905, 906, 49 Or. 429.
Where A. imrchases a tract of Uind from
. and gives a purchase-money note there-
»r, payable to B. '*or order," and B. trans-
^rs said note by indorsement, together with
le reserved title to the land to 0., O. be-
>me8 thereby a party both to the note and
> the contract of purchase, and if said note
Bcomes barred by the statute of limitations,
Dd A. enters into a new agreement with
., whereby A. promises to pay to C. the bal-
Dce due on said note by installments run-
Ing through several years, the consideration
smalning the same, and no new security
elng added, the fact that the holder of said
ote has been substituted as payee, and the
ime of payment definitely extended, does not
oQstltute such a "novation** between said
laker and holder as would extinguish the
riginal debt and create a new one. Ameri-
an Mortgage Co. of Scotland v. Rawlings,
6 S. E. 110, 127 Ga. 82 (citing Wofford v.
Jalnes, 53 Ga. 485; Lott v. Dysart, 45 Ga.
58; McDonnell v. Alabama Gold Life Ins.
k)., 5 South. 120, 86 Ala. 401).
A bankrupt, having purchased certain
and and executed a deed of trust thereon
0 secure a debt, conveyed the land to his
atber. who did not assume the debt, and
ater devised the land to his two children,
'ODslsting of the bankrupt and his sister.
^eld, that such transaction did not consti-
iite a novation of the debt secured by the
leed of trust, which can occur only when
here is a substitution of a valid new obliga-
JOD for an old one, necessitating the ex-
Inction of the old debt In re Straub, 158
^ed. 375, 376.
Directors of a corporation, by vote re-
'iting the inability of subscribers to stock
» take and pay for all the shares subscrib-
^ for, agreed with such subscribers that in
^nslderatton of payment of certain sums in
^sh they would be released as to one-half
>f the amount subscribed for. The payments
^ere made, the contract fully executed, the
released subscribers thereafter treated as
stockholders, the surrendered stock resold to
»ther subscribers, and the whole transaction
^aa in good faith, and was not repudiated by
»ny stockholder. Held, that the agreement
^as in effect a ••novation,'* which, under Civ.
Me, S 1531, is made by the substitution of
1 new obligation, between the same parties,
^Ith Intent to extinguish the old obligation;
*nd the fact that payment of a part of the
nwney required to be paid by the released
wbscribers was deferred did not have the
effect of continuing them in their relation
*8 stockholders, for the full amount of their
■Qbscription, until the final payment had
been made. Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel
Co.. 117 Pac. 1041, 1045, 16 CaL App. 40a
NOVEL
A complaint, in jan action for libel, which
alleges that defendfint published and circu-
lated a *'boQk or novel" in which he referred
to plaintiff in terms set out, does not nega-
tive by reason of the use of the word "nover*
the allegation that the article complained of
referred to plaintiff, though strictly speak-
ing the characters in a novel are fictitious.
Dailey v. Bobbs-Merrill Co^ 186 N. Y. Supp.
570, 571.
NOVELTY
"Novelty," as used in Its popular sense,
means something altogether new and different
from any other method and an improvement
on any other method. Imperial Bottie Cap &
Machine Co. v. Crown OcNrk & Seal Co., 139
Fed. S12, 321, 71 a O. A. 442.
The novelty of an article, which will sup-
port the issuance of a patent thereon, must
be a "novelty" in the means or mechanical
device, and not in the use to which the com-
bination Is put. O'Rourke Engineering Const.
Co. V. McMuUen, 150 Fed. 338, 349 (quoting
and adopting the definition in Woolensak v.
Sargent, 14 Sup. Ct 293, 151 U. S. 227, 88 L.
Ed. 137).
"A 'patentable novelty* may be found in
an improvement which simplifies a compli-
cated train of mechanism by eliminating
some of its elements, with the result that de-
fects due to presence of those elements are
done away with." Brown v. Huntington
Piano Co., 134 Fed. 735, 739, 67 O. C. A. 639.
NOW
The word "now," as used in a will pro-
viding that executors should carry on the
testator*s business as "now conducted by me,"
must refer to, the time of his death. Luers
V. Luers, 124 N. W. 603, 604, 143 Iowa, 600
(citing Appeal of Allen, 17 Atl. 453, 125 Pa.
544).
A devise of all that part of land which
"I now own" should be construed as if made
at testator's death. Garrison v. Garrison, 29
N. J. Law, 158, 159.
A reference in a will to the "farm on
whidi I *now' live" refers to the existing state
of thiugs at* the date of the will. Mueller v.
Buenger, 83 S. W. 458, 465, 184 Mo. 458, 67
L. R. A. 648, 105 Am. St Rep. 541 (quoting
and adopting definition in Liggat v. Hart, 23
Mo. 127 ; Gold v. Judson, 21 Conn. 616).
The word "now," in the phrase "now be-
ing on the various tracts," implied present
time, and the deed conveyed only the timber
of the specified size at the time it was execut-
ed. Crawford v. Atiantic Coast Lumber Co.,
60 S. B. 445, 447, 79 S. C. 16a
*JOW
648
NOW
Under General Con8ti:iict|on Law (ConsoL
Laws 1909, c. 22), | 34» providing t|iat tbe
term **now,*' in a provision referring to laws
in force or to t&cta as existing, relate^ to the
laws in force or to the facts existing immedi-
ately before the taking Wect of the provision,
the word "now," In th^' institutional provi-
sion referring to the Jurisdiction of courts
"now" exercised, relates to laws in force at
the adoption of the Oonstitotlon, and to the
Jurisdiction existing immediately b^ore the
taking effect of the Constitution. Leach r.
Auwell, 138 N. Y. Supp. 976, 979, 164 App.
EHv. 170.
The use of the word "now," in a statute,
often precludes the statute from being deem-
ed general, as, for example, certain things
confined to cities where a board of assessment
and revision "now" exists, or confined to
honorably discharged soldiers "now" in of-
fice, or confined to cities in which there are
"now" by law three members of common
council. P. L. 1906, p. 192, providing that
in all instances where excise conunlssioners
are "now" by law appointed by the mayor or
other governing body or any municipality
shall be appointed by the court of common
pleas in the county, is unconstitutional, be-
cause special. Bumsted v. Henry, 64 Atl. 476,
477, 74 N. J. Law, 162 (citing Richards v.
Hammer, 42 N. J. Law, 436; Pierson v.
O'Connor, 22 Ati. 1091, 64 N. J. Law, 36;
Bennett v. Common Council of City of Tren-
ton, 25 Atl. 113, 55 N. J. Law, 72).
A mortgage on a woolen mill, running
gear, tools. Implements, and working stock
" 'now upon said premises' or in any way be-
longing to the said mills, and the business
of the same," did not embrace after-acquired
material. Cunningham v. Alryan Woolen
Mills, 61 Atl. 372, 873, 69 N. J. Eq. 710.
Priv. Laws 1867, p. 219, c. 11, divides
the city of Joliet into school districts, pro-
vides for the election of school inspectors,
and gives the city council power to levy tax-
es for school purposes. Hurd*s Rev. St. 1903,
p. 1714, c. 122, increases the power of the
school inspectors, giving them authority to
employ teachers, and to fix the amount of
their compensation, and to build or purchase
buildings, etc., but provides that all moneys
necessary for school purposes shall be raised
as "now provided by law," and that they
shall be held by the treasurer subject to the
order of the school inspectors on warrants to
be countersigned by the mayor and city clerk.
Held, that the latter statute did not give the
board of school inspectors authority to levy
taxes by repealing the former statute by
implication. People ex rel. Board of School
Inspectors of Joliet v. Mottinger, 74 N. E.
160, 152, 215 111. 256.
Under Code, | 8271, providing that "prop-
erty to be subsequently acquired may be de-
vised when the intention is clear and ex-
plicit," a will giving to certain persona, "all
my real estote which is" (deseribiiig It) "i
so including all other real estate now own*
by me," devises real estate acquired by test
tor after execution of the will ; "now*' beii
referable to the time of testator's deat
Luers v. Luers, 124 N. W. 608, 604, 145 low
600, 139 Am. St. Repb 453.
Rev. St S 2166^ providing for the m
uralUation of aliens honorably dischargi
from military service on proof of one yeai
residence in the United States, requires th
the court shall, ia addition to sucdi proof
residence and good moral diaracter as "^no^
provided for by law, be satisfied by compete]
proof of the applicant having been honorab
discharged from service of the United State
Held, that the word "now" is linated to tl
laws existing at tbe enactment ol the sti
ute, and did not inelude subsequent enac
ments. In re McNabb, 176 Fed. 611, 513.
An owner of stock contracted with ce
tain partfes to turn over to them all the 8to<
in the corporation **now owned" by hii
This stock, at the time, had been assigned
one of the proposed purchasers as secori
for a note given to him. Held, that the seU<
need not deliver the stock to the purchase
unincumbered. BHiehrman v. McCord, 95 ]
T. Supp. 489, 490, 107 App. Dlv. 12.
2 Rev. St (1st Ed.) pt 2. a 6. tit 1,
6, provides that every will devising in expre
terms, or by intent, all of testator's real e
tate, shall be construed to pass all he own<
at his death. Testator's will read: **! gi^
• ♦ ♦ to my husband all my real esta
♦ • ♦ of which I am now possessed." SI
subsequently sold a farm which she then ow
ed and purchased property of which she dii
seised. Held, that the word "now" in tl
will did not extend its meaning, and und<
the statute the property subsequently a(
quired by the testator went to her husbai
under the wilL Hodgkins v. Hodgkins, 1(
N. Y. Supp. 178, 174, 123 App. Dlv. 110 (d
Ing Lent v. Lent [N. Y.] 24 Hun, 436; Schoc
V. Shook, 10 N. Y. Supp. 935; Heck v. Yo
et al., 14 N. Y. St Rep. 409, affirmed 24 N. 1
U04, 120 N. Y. 668).
Tillamook City CSiarter, art 4, | 2, snl
sec. 2 (Sess. Laws 1893, pp. 551, 552), autho
izes the city to collect road taxes from t
property of the corporation equal to tbi
"now" levied by law for road purposes, to I
expended on highways, streets, and alle}
within the corporation, under the supervisio
of the common council, and exempts dtizei
and property from the same tax for count
road purposes. Held, that the word '*now
meant "at the present time," and limited tb
city's right to levy taxes for street purpose
to the amount the county was authorised t
levy for road taxes when the charter took el
feet, and this amount was not changed o
increased by subsequent statutes* raising tb
county rate, either by the same or subsequen
Legislature. Tillamook City t. County Oooi
NOW ARS
64»
KUISANOk
Tillamook Ooooty, 107 Pac 482, 468, 66
r.112.
OW ABE
A lease provided that the premises be
irrendered at the end of the term of two
^ars "in the same condition as they now
•e." It covenanted that the '^premises are
)w in good repair." When the lease was ex-
ited the premises were In very bad con-
tion, and It was agreed that the pit)perty
lould be put In good condition before the
ssee would take possession. The necessary
aprovements cost a considerable sum, of
blch the lessee paid a small part Held, In
1 action against the lessee for not surrender-
ig the premises In the same condition they
ere at the time of the rental, that the parties
(tended the premises to be surrendered
t the end of the term in the same condition
! they were at the beginning thereof, the
ords *'now are" not referring to the condi-
on of the premises at the time of making
le lease. Chesapeake Brewing Co. v. Gold-
srg, 60 AtL 37, 89, 107 Md. 486, 16 Ann.
as. 879.
OW COKSTTTUTED
See As Now Constituted.
row DUE
The phrase "debts now due," In the act
f 1848, dividing the town of Windsor Into
i^indsor and West Windsor, Is synonymous
rith the word "UabUmeS,** whether arising
I contractu or ex delicto. Hunter t. Wind-
or, 24 Vt 827, 338.
row DUE AND PATABUB
The allegation of a counterclaim, that
laintlff's Indebtedness is '*now due and pay^
ble," even treated as a statement of fact,
oes not show that the counterclaim existed
t the time of the commencement of the ac-
ioD, as required by Code Civ. Proc | 438.
*ro?ident Mut. Building Loan Ass'n v. Da-
is, 76 Pac. 1034, 1035, 143 Cal. 253.
row FIXED &T I.AW
The effect of the act adopting the Code
t 1910 was to re-enact into one statute all
f the provisions of that Code ; and hence the
►brase •*iiow fixed by law," as used in sec-
ion 2788 of that Code, comprehends all the
aw in the Code applicable to the provisions
•' that section. The Employer's Liability
^ct. found in section 2782 et seq., is applica-
>le to a suit brought under authority of sec-
ion 2788, by an employ^ against a federal re*
»lver of a railroad operated partially wlth-
n this state. Atkinson v. Swords, 74 S. B.
003, 1096, 11 Ga. App. 167.
VOW OR HEBEAFTEB
The bond of a bank to p. county treas-
urer, though given with express reference to
I i%8olutlon of the county board authorizing
^e deposit In the bank by such treasurer of
pobUo funds in his hands, being, In tertns, to
secure repayment of all said depestts ''now or
hereafter placed in said bank or under Its
care or control by said treasurer,'* covers de-
poaiti in said bank of such funds by said
treasorer before he was so authorised, the
sureties knowing at the time of such deposits.
Sawyer v. Stilson, 125 N. W. 822, 824, 146
Iowa, 707.
HOW PROVIDED BT LAW
See As Now Provided.
NOXIOUS
"Noxious" means hurtful, harmful, in-
jurious, destructive. Johnson v. Northport
Smelting A Refining Co., 97 Paa 746, 747, 60
Wash, 567.
irOZIOUS BSTABUSHMEirr
Any other noxious establishment, see
Any Other.
HOXIOUS PORTIQH OR SUBSTANCE
"Noxious" means "hurtful, harmful
baneful, pernicious, destructive.*' "Potion"
means "draught used as a liquid, medlcinev
or dose." (Webster, Diet). "Poison" has been
defined as "a«y substanee which, when ap-
plied to the body externally, or ih any way
introduced into the system^ without acting
mechanically, but by its own Inherent quali-
ties, is capable of destroying life" (Beck,
Med. Jur.), and "as a substance having an
inherent deleterious property, which renders
It, when taken into the system, capable of
destroying life" (Wharton A Still^). The
term **noxiou8 potion or substance" is a
broader term than "poison." "Poison"
would not Include powdered glass or boiling
water, while "noxious potion or substance"
would not only embrace poisons, but the lat-
ter. As used in a statute inflicting a punish-
ment on any one mingling "any other noxious
potion or substance with any drug, food, or
medicine, with Intent to kill or Injure any
person," the word "potion" applies to some
hurtful or baneful liquid; and the words
"noxious substance" means some solid of
hurtful or baneful character. The phrase
"noxious potion or substance" means some
character of poison. Runnels v. State, 77 S.
W. 458, 460, 45 Tex. Cr. R. 446.
NUISANCE
See Abatable Nuisance; Attractive Nui-
sance; Continuing Nuisance; Indict-
able Nuisance; Mixed Nuisance; Per-
manent Nuisance; Private Nuisance;
Public or Common Nuisance.
Abatement of nuisance, see Abatement
Abatement of as within police power, see
Police Power.
Other nuisance, see Other.
See, also. Annoy— Annoyanoa
NUISANCE
650
NUISANOJD
''Anything that worketh hnrt, InconTen-
ience, or damage to another, or his property,
may constltnte a nuisance." Missouri, K. &
Tl By. Co. of Texas y. Anderson, 81 S. W.
781, 787, 86 Tex. av. App. 121 (quoting Bur-
dltt ▼. Swenson, 17 Tex. 489, 001, 67 Am. Dea
660).
A "nuisance" is an annoyance, and, ac-
cording to Blackstone, it signifies anything
that woiiceth hurt, inconvenience, or damage.
Hamm t. Briant, 124 S. W. 112, U3, 57 Tex.
CftT. App. 614.
A "nuisance" is anything which inter-
feres with the rights of a citizen, either in
person, property, the enjoyment of his prop-
erty, or his comfort Thornton ▼. Dow, 111
Pac. 899, 903, 60 Wash. 622, 82 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 968.
A *'nuisance" is anything which incom-
modes, annoys, or produces inconvenienoe or
damage. City of New Orleans v. Lenfant,
52 South. 575, 577, 126 La. 456, 29 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 642.
"At common law a 'nuisance^ was any-
thing that worked hurt or inconreni^iice or
damage." City of Chicago t. Gunning Sys-
tem, 73 N. B. 1035, 1038, 214 lU. 628, 70 h.
R. A. 230, 2 Ann. Gas. 892 (<iuotlng and adop^
ing definition in Harmon ▼. City of Chicago,
110 111. 400, 413, 51 Am. Rep. 698); Jones ▼.
F. 8. Royster Guano Co., 65 S. B. 861, 366, 6
Oa. App. 506w
A "nuisance" is defined as an unreason-
able, unwarrantable, or unlawful use of one's
own property to the annoyance^ inconven-
ience, discomfort, or damage of another.
Pritchard v. Bdison Electric Illuminating
Co., 87 N. Y. Supp. 225, 226, 92 App. Div. 178.
A 'Nuisance" is anything which works
hurt, inconvenience, or damage; anything
which essentially interferes with the enjoy-
ment of life or property. State ex reL Lyon
V. Columbia Water Power Co., 63 S. B. 884,
889, 82 S. C. 181, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 435, 129
Am. St Rep. 876, 17 Ann. Cas. 343 (citing 29
Cyc. p. 1152; Addison, Torts, 370).
The word "nuisance" designates a dass
of wrongs arising from an unreasonable or
unlawful use of property, so as to produce
such material discomfort or injury to an-
other that the law presumes damage; every
use of property, so as to materially violate
the rights of another being, as a rule, an
actionable nuisance. McNulty v. Ludwig &
Co., 138 N. y. Supp. 84, 87, 153 App. Div.
206.
"The term 'nuisance' has a well-defined
legal meaning. A thing cannot be declared
a nuisance which is in fact not a nuisance."
Boyd V. Board of Coundlmen, 77 S. W. 669,
673, 117 Ky. 199, 111 Am. St Rep. 240.
A "nuisance" consists in unlawfully do-
ing an act, or omitting to perform a duty,
which act or omission either annoys, injures.
or endangors the comfort* repose^ health, c
safety of others. Town of Colton ▼. Scut
Dakota Cent Land Co., 126 N. W. 507, 50
25 S. D. 309, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 122.
"A 'nuisance' is anything that worket
hurt, inconvenience, or damage to anothei
and the fact that the act done may otherwb
be lawful does not keep it from being a na
sanoe. The inconvenience complained of ma
not be fanciful or such as would aifect on]
one fastidious taste, but it must be sndi t
would affect an ordinary, reasonable maa
Gabbett v. aty of Atlanta, 73 S. B, 372, 3T
137 Ga. 180 (quoting and applying CIt. Cod
I 4457).
Bums' Ann. St 1901, { 290, defines "^u
sauce" as whatever Is injurious to health c
indecent or offensive to the senses or an ol
struction to the free use of property, so as t
essentially interfere with the comfortabl
enjoyment of life or property. Russell ^
State, 69 N. B. 482, 483, 32 Ind. App. 243.
"Nuisance" is anything done to the bai
or annoyance of the land or hereditameni
of another. The theory is the doing of soin
thing intrinsically lawful in a manner danut]
ing to others; it being the resulting damag
that creates the wrong. Henry v. Cherry
Webb, 73 Aa 97, 108, 30 R. L 13» 24 L. I
A. (N. S.) 991, 136 Am. St Rep. 928, 18 Am
Cas. 1006.
When the cause of annoyance and disoon
fort arising from a nuisance is oontinaoo}
equity will restrain it Boyd v. Schrdsc
(Tex.) 116 S. W. 100, 104.
The question of nuisance vel non cannc
be determined by reference to the rules of tt
common law, but each case must be consic
ered on its own fiicts. A thing may or ma
not be a nuisance according to the msDoe
in which it is used, the situation in whidi i
is placed, or the time it has been carried o
without complaint, when measured by tb
mind and taste of the average citizen. Den^
more v. Evergreen Camp No. 147, "Woodnie
of the World, 112 Pac. 255, 61 Wash. 230, 3
L. R. A. (N. S.) 608, Ann. Cas. 1912B. 1206.
To constitute a nuisance, there most b
more than a tendency to injure, and tbtf
must be something appreciable, tangible, ac
tual, or subsisting, and, in determiniu
whether an injury charged comes witbt
these general terms, regard must be had t
the notions of comfort and convenience entei
tained by persons generally of ordinar
tastes and susceptibilities, and the nuisaDC
and discomfort must affect the ordinary con
fort of existence as understood by the peopfa
Everett v. Paschall, 111 Pac. 879, 881, 6
Wash. 47, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 827, Ann. Csi
1912B, 1128.
A ''nuisance" is confined to 80<^ matter
of annoyance as the law recognizes, and fo
which it gives a remedy by way of redress o
abatement or in a proper case, by restraioi^
KT7I8ANOB
651
NUISANOD
rocess. Berger v. Smith, 75 & Bl 1008, UOO,
K) N. C. 206.
''What is a nniaanci^ Is a relative qiies-
on oftener than it la an abstract fact
lackstone was wise in not attempting an
cplidt and invariable definition, and in con-
ning himself to general terms. He said a
loisance* is 'anything that worketh hurt,
(Convenience, or damage.* " C3lty of St
ouis V. (lalt, 77 8. W. 876, 879, 179 Mo. 8,
J li. R. A. 778.
The test of nuisance is not injury and
amage simply, but injury and damage re-
citing from the violation of the legal right
r another. There is no nuisance, however
luch of injury and damage may ensue ; but,
I a right is violated, there is an actionable
nisance, even though no actual damage re-
alts therefrom. Powell v. Brookfleld Press-
a Brick & Tile Mfg. Co., 78 S. W. 646, 647,
04 Mo. App. 713 (quoting Wood, Nuls. 1015).
The word "nuisance" means that which
nnoys or gives trouble; annoys or disturbs
ne in the possession of his property, making
\s ordinary use or occupation physically un-
omfortable to him. Iverson v. Dilno, 119
^ac 719, 721, 44 Mont 270.
Under Snyder's Comp. Laws, | 4751, and
J the common law, anything which annoys
r endangers the comfort repose, or safety
f others is a nuisance. Ex parte Jones, 109
'ac. 670, 573, 4 OkL Cr. 74, 31 L. B. A. (N. S.)
48, 140 Am. St Rep. 665.
A thing is not a *'nuisance" merely be>
aase a municipal ordinance declares it to be
nch, but the state may declare what shall
»e deemed a "nuisance." Inhabitants of
loulton V. Titcomb, 66 Atl. 733, 738, 102
ie. 272, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 580, 120 Am. St
lep. 492.
Under Giy. Code 1896, | 3861, a nuisance
s not as at common law essentially an injury
0 real property, hat any nnlawfiil use of
•roperty whereby another is injured, whether
D property, business, person, or otherwise, is
in actionable nuisanoe. Towaliga Falls Pow-
r Co. V. Sims, 66 S. B. 844, 846^ 6 Ga. App.
49.
Irrespective of Its public or private na-
ore, a ^^nulsance" is 'literally an annoyance,
iDd signifies in law such a use of property
>r such a course of conduct as, irrespective of
ictual trespass against others or of malicious
>r actual criminal intent transgresses the
Qst restricttons vpon use or conduct whidi
he proximity of other persons or property
n civilized communities imposes upon what
^ould otherwise be rightful freedom." John-
son V. City of New York, 96 N. Y. Supp. 754,
r56. 109 App. Div. 821 ; Acme FertUizer Co.
^ State, 72 N. K. 1037, 34 Ind. App. 346, 107
^ St Rep. 190.
Code Civ. Proe. | 781, defines a '*nui-
Buioe" as anything which is injurious to
health, or Indecent, or offensive to the senses^
or an obstruction to the free use of property,
so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
ment of life or property, and mere deprecia-
tion in value of surrounding property has no
tendency to prove the cause of the depreci-
ation a nuisance. Meek v. De Latour, 83 Pac
300, 302, 2 Cal. App. 261.
"A 'nuisance' is literally an annoyance,
and signifies In law such a use of property or
such a course of conduct as • ♦ • trans-
gresses the Just restrictions upon use or con-
duct which the proximity of other persons or
property in civilized communities imposes up-
on what would otherwise be rightful free-
dom." The right to have a nuisance on an-
other's property restrained or abated is not
based upon an assertion of title to such prop-
erty, or of any proprietary interest therein,
or right or claim to the property itself, but is,
on the contrary, based solely upon the breach
of a personal duty which the owner of the
property owes to his neighbor In its manage-
ment and use; a breach of duty which may
be punished by indictment, where the nui-
sance is of a public character, and which ren-
ders the offender personally liable In dam-
ages to the Injured neighbor. And therefore-
the assertion by the neighbor of his right to-
have the nuisanoe restrained or abated, beinr
based on the personal wrong and breach tl
duty on the part of the owner, and seeking
merely to enforce the Just restrictions which
the law imposes upon him, in the use of
his property, and prevent misuse, cannot be
regarded in any Just sense as the assertion
on the part of the neighbor of a claim to
property within the meaning of the Judiciary
act Ladew v. Tennessee Copper Co^ 179
Fed. 246, 262.
To determine a nuisance, the criterion Is
whether the condition is so serious as to in-
terfere with the comfort of Ufe and enjoy-
ment of property, or so threatening as to con-
stitute an imp^iding danger to persons In the
enjoyment of their legitimate rights. Kilts
V. Board of Sup*rs of Kent County, 127 N.
W. 821, 823, 162 Mich. 646.
Bums' Ann. St 1908, i 291, defining a
nuisance as whatever is injurious to health,
or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an
obstruction to the free use of property so as
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property, defines in general lan-
guage a nuisance, and the court must de-
termine whether facts charged bring a partic-
ular case within the statute. Lake Shore
A M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, L. S. A 8. B. Ry.
Co., 92 N. B. 989, 990, 48 Ind. App. 684.
** 'Nuisance,' in its largest sense, sigiiilles
anything that worketh hurt, inconvenienos^
or damage. It Is ^ther public, annoying aR
the parties In the community, or It is private^
Injuriously affecting the lands, tenements, or
hereditaments of an individual" (Blackstone).
"A 'nuisance,* In the ordinary sense In which
NUISANOB
662
KUISANGB
the word Is used, is anytUng that produces
an annoyance, anything that disturbs one
or is offensive; but in legal phraseology it
is applied to that class of wrongs that arise
from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or un-
lawful use by a person of his own property,
real or personal, or from his own improper,
indecent, or unlawful personal conduct, work-
ing an obstruction of or injury to a right
of another or of the public, and producing
such material annoyance, inconvenience, dis-
comfort, or hurt that the law will presume a
consequent damage. Indeed, it may be stated
as a general proposition that every enjoy-,
ment by one of his own property, which vio-
lates the right of another in an essential de-
gree, is a nuisance, and actionable as such at
the suit of the party injured thereby. While
it is true that every person has and may exer-
cise exclusive dominion over his own prop-
erty of every description, and has a right to
enjoy it in all the ways and for all the pur-
poses in which such property is usually en-
Jpyed, yet this is subject to the qualification
that his use and enjoyment of it must be rea-
sonable, and such as will not prejudicially af-
fect the rights of others." Baker v. Mc-
Daniel, 77 S. W. 531, 637, 178 Mo. 447 (quot-
ing Wood, NuisO.
An actional "nuisance" is anything
wrongfully done or permitted which injures
or annoys another in the enjoyment of his
legal rights. To constitute a nuisance, it is
not necessary that the annoyance should be
of a character to endanger health. It is suifl^
dent if it occasions what is offensive to the
senses and which renders the enjoyment of
life and property uncomfortable. Even that
which does but cause a wellrfounded appre-
hension of danger may be a nuisance. The
unauthorized or unreasonable use of, or the
neglect of properly and reasonably using,
one's own property, to the detriment, hurt, an-
noyance, discomfort, injury, or damage of
another in his property or legal rights, or of
the public, is a nuisance. A use made by one
of his own property, which works an irrep-
arable injury to another's property, or which
deprives his neighbor of the reasonable and
comfortable enjoyment and use of his prop-
erty, or which violates the unwritten but ac-
cepted law of decency, or which endangers
or renders insecure the life and health of
his neighbor, is a nuisance. It is difficult
to define Just what degree of injurious an-
noyance must be reached in order to war-
rant the court in determining what circum-
stances constitute a nuisance. A mere tend^
ency to injury is not sufficient. There must
be something actually appreciable which of
itself arrests the attention, that rests not
merely in theory, but strikes the common
sense of the ordinary eiti^n. The determina-
tion, however, of the question rests in sound
Judgment, and depends upon common sense
ift each case. Sandet» v. Miller, 113 S. W.
996, 998, 62 Tex. Ov. App. 372 (dtlng Black.
Com.; Btirdltt y. Swenaon^ 17 T^z. 489,
Am. Dec. 666 ; Joyce, Nuisances, H 11, 19).
Crime dUtl^gnislied
"Crime" and "nuisance" are not ct
vertible terms. Hefferon v. New York Ta:
cab Co., 130 N. T. Supp. 710, 712, 146 Aj
Div. 311.
If eBliKonoe dlatingiilalied
A "nuisance" involves the dement
positive wrongdoing, as distinguished fire
mere negligence; and the mere "permlttini
of a dog to lie in a hallway of an apartme
house does not amount to a private nulsaiK
McCluskey v. Wile, 129 N. Y. Supp. 455, 45
144 App. Dlv. 470.
Injnvy to healtli
The "nuisance" contemplated by Heali
Act (2 Gen. St 1895, p. 1637) | 28, permittii
any local board of iiealth to file a bill in t]
name of the state for an injunction to pr
hlbit the continuance of a nuisance hazari
ous to public health, is a nuisance which
hazardous to public health, and hence tl
subject of indictment Board of Health <
Pompton Lakes v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemou:
Powder Co., 80 AtL 998, 1000, 79 N. J. Eq. 3
The. allegations of the petition on a d
murrer to Which the defendants elected i
stand, taken as true, showed that a Urj
number of hogs were kept adjacent to ti
city in such a manner that odors from tX
place and from garbage hauled thereto wei
offensive to the people living in the neighbo
hood and to those who passed along tl
streets, and offensive to such an extent as i
impair the health of citizens and diminis
the value of their property. Held to const
tute a nuisance, the continuance of whic
should be perpetually enjoined. Kansas Qt
V. Sihler Hog Cholera Serum Co., 125 Pai
70, 71, 87 Kan. 786 (citing 5 Words an
Phrases, pp. 4855-4866).
Pkysieal Imjmry to property
Anything which causes hurt or damag
to the lands or tenements of another, or li
terferee with the reasonable employment c
the same, is a "nuisance;" In an actio
against a railroad company, where the con
plaiot alleges that plaintiffa land was injui
ed by the negligent flow of adds from tb
tower house, and the testimony shows thi
defendant's employes constantly poared tb
contents of vessels oontaining adds on plain
tiff's land, and that such acta had been don
within six years before bringli^ suit, it i
error to enter a nonsuit Stokes v. Pennsjl
vania R. Co., 63 Atl. 1028, 1030, 214 Pa. 412
The t)laclng, by a mining company, o
slack, copperas, and other deleterious sub
stances in and near a water course on iti
land, which the ordinary rains washed orei
the lands of a lower proprietor, ttins injur
ing and rendering them unfit for agrlcoltnn
constitutes a nuisance; a nuisaaee beim
NUISANOB
iroiSANOB
anytidng done to ttae hurt or annoyance of
the lands of another. N^ GonsoL Goal &
Coking Co. ▼. Lynch, 133 8. W. 763, 79^ 141
Ky. 711.
The use of water by an upper riparian
proprietor in such a way as to carry sand,
gravel, and mining debris over the land of a
lower proprietor, rendering it valueless, con-
stitutes a "nuisance," both at common law
and under Giv. Gode, | 4550, defining a nui-
sance as anytliing injurious to health or in-
terfering with the comfortable enjoyment of
life or property or unlawfully obstructing
the customary use of a river. Chessman v.
Hale, 79 Pa& 254, 257, 81 Mont 577, 68 L. R.
A. 410, 3 Ann. Gas. 1088.
A "nuisance" is "anything that worketh
hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another"
(quoting and adopting definition by Black-
stone). The discharge of adds and waste
from an oil mill, and other ofl^ulve matter
from onttKrases used In connection there-
with, into a ditch originally oonatmcted for
dratoage of the land, and extending through
the land of an adjoining owner, by which
the latter suffers injury to his ecope and
from the offensive and unwholesome odors,
constitutes a private nuisance Bxley v.
Southern Gotten OU Go., 151 Fed. 101, 103.
Bvery person is bound to make a reason-
able use of his property, so aa to occasion
no unnecessary damage or auAoyanoe to his
neighbor. If he make an unreasonablei un-
warrantable, or unlawful use of it, so as to
produce material annoyance, inconvenience,
discomfort, or hurt to his neighbor, he will
be guilty of a "nuisance" to his neighbor.
And the law wUl hold him responsible for
the consequ^it damage. "What is a reason-
able use of one's own property cannot be de-
fined by any certain general rules, but must
depend upon the drcumstances of each case.
A use of property in one locality and under
some circumstances may be lawful and rea-
sonable, which under other circumstances
would be unlawful, unreasonable, and a nui-
sance. To constitute a 'nuisance,' the use
must be sadh as to produce a tangible and
appreciable injury to neighboring property,
or such as to render its enjoyment specially
uncomfortable or inconvenient." The opera-
tion of the works of a cement company, dur^
ing the season for harvesting ice, in such
manner as to ttirow on the ice cinders, ashes,
coal dust, and other substances which nfight
sink into the ice and render it unmerchant-
able, was a nuisance. Aiberican Ice Go. v.
Catskill Gement Co., 88 N. T. Supp. 455, 450,
43 Misc. Bep. 221 (quoting and adopting def-
inition in Gampbell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568,
577, 20 Am. Bep. 567).
TrespAM diatlasvialied
See Trespass.
▲eta ov ¥iurimesa anthoriaed fey Hmm
That cannot be a "nuisance," so as to
give a common-law right of. action, whicdi
the law authorised. Gasey v. Wrought Iron
Bridge Go., 89 S. W. 380, 384, 114 Mo. App.
47 (citing Payne v. BCansas Gity, St J. ft G. B.
By. Go., 20 8. W. 322, 112 Mo. 6, 17 L. B. A.
628; 5 Words and PhraBes, p. 4861; Trana-
portation Go. ▼. Ghicago, 99 U. S. 640, 25 Ij.
Ed. 336; Whitfi^d v. Town of GarroUton, 50
Mb. App. 98).
"Nuisances" always arise from unlawful
acts. That which Is lawful can never be a
nuisance. Therefore, where the Legislature,
by a ph>per act, authorizes that to be done
which would otherwise be a nuisance, the
act is made lawful and is not a nuisance so
far as the public is concerned, unless the
power given by the Legislature Is exceeded.
"There are two classes of nuisances, public
and private. • • • There is no differ-
ence between these two kinds of nuisances
except as they affect the public or any cer-
tain individual&" A legislative charter to a
boom corporation to do work which, without
the charter, would be a nuisance absolves it
from liability by indictment or otherwise,
but does not exempt it from action by an in-
dividual injured by its existence as a private
nuisance. Pickois v» Goal Biver Boom &
Timber Go., 65 B. B. 865, 866, 66 W. Va. 10,
24 L. B. A. (K S.) 364 <anoting and adopting
1 Wood, Nuisances, pi 2, note).
If legislative sanction is given to such
acts that otherwise would be deemed a "nui-
sance" (as, for instance, by St 1894, p. 446,
c. 399, licensing the storage of petroleum or
any of its products), tliey cease to be such
when properly exercised within the terms of
the license which authorizes and permits
them. ' Gommonwealth v. Packard, 69 N. E.
1067, 185 Mass. 64 (citing Gommonwealth v.
Gity of Boston, 97 Mass. 555 ; Badger v. Gity
of Boston, 130 Mass. 170; Aldworth v, Gity
of Lynn, 26 N. E. 229, 153 Mass. 53, 10 L.
B. A. 210, 25 Am. St. Bep. 608; Ba.con v.
aty of Boston. 28 N. El 9, 154 Mass. 100;
White V. Kenney, 31 N. E. 664, 1^7 Mass. 12,
13; Taft v. Commonwealth, 33 N. E. 1046,
158 Mass. 526^48).
An offensive trade or manufacture may
require interfer^ce In equity on the ground
that it is a nuisance for, though necessary
and lawful, it shouM be exeidsed in & re-
mote place. • McQIll v. Pintsch Gompressing
Go., U8 N. W. 786, 788, 140 Iowa, 429, 20 L.
B. A. (N, S.) 466.
A business . may belranie a nuJsanoe^
where it is not conducted with, dne regard to
the rights of surrounding property owners,
and renders the enjoyment of th^ property
Impossible. Nowak v. Baler, 77 Atl. 1062,
1063,.78N. J. Bq. 112.
That crowds of people, with their teams,
will congregate at or near a cotton gin when
erected, does. not render the gin a. nuisance,
where it Is not claimed that the crowds will
conduct themselves in:iproperiy. Bobinson
V. Dale (Tex.) 031 a W. 806^ 8ia
mrtsANGB
654
NUISANCE
The erection by a railroad company of
switch tracks and a freight depot In a resi-
dence neighborhood directly across the street
from complainant's residence and flat build-
ing, and the constmctlon of an elevated
drlTeway from the street to the tracks and
depot, but In such a manner as not to cause
the traffic to Interfere with the use of com-
plainant's property any more than any other
constant use of the street would do, cannot
be enjoined as a "nuisance" ; there being no
showing that the depot was not neoessary,
or that It could hare been as conveniently
built elsewhere. Walther ▼. Chicago & W.
I. R. Co., 74 N. B. 461-463, 216 111. 456.
One may not create a '^nuisance" and
Justlf;^ himself in a continuation thereof up-
on the ground that his establishment is a
source of benefit and profit to the community,
and, as applied to a water course, a nuisance
Is created when the use of stream by the
first user Is unreasonable In character, and
such as to produce a condition actually de-
structive of physical comfort or health, or a
tangible, visible injury to property. ▲ ripa-
rian proprietor operating a creamery, who
deposits refuse therefrom in a stream to
such an extent as to produce a condition de-
structive of physical comfort or health, or to
create a tangible, visible Injury to property
rights of the lower riparian proprietor, is
guilty of an act constituting a nuisance.
Bowman v. Humphrey, 100 N. W. 854, 855,
124 Iowa, 744 (citing Ferguson v. Flrmenlch
Mfg. Co., 42 N. W. 448, 77 Iowa, 576, 14 Am.
St Rep. 319; Weston Paper Co. v. Pope, 57
N. E. 719, 155 Ind. 394, 56 L. R. A. 899;
Gould, Waters, | 206; Wood, Nuls. | 640);
Id., 109 N. W. 714, 715, 132 Iowa, 234, 6 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1111, U Ann. Cas. 131.
Residents of cities, towns, or villages
must of necessity submit to consequences re-
sulting from occupations and pursuits car-
ried on in the immediate neighborhood which
are lawful and necessary for trade and com-
merce; and matters which, though in them-
selves annoying, are in the nature of ordi-
nary incidents of city or town life, cannot be
abated as nuisances. Locality is to be con-
sidered in determining whether a certain use
of property is a nuisance. Gose v. Coryell
(Tex.) 126 S. W. 1164. 1168.
The mere imposition of more railway
tracks, or the Increased use of the tracks
beyond what may originally have been
thought probable, resulting from the loca-
tion of defendant's depot on land acquired
by it adjoining the avenue, did not constitute
a "nuisance." Oklahoma City & T. R. Co. v.
Dunham, 88 S. W. 849, 850, 39 Tex. Civ.
App. 575.
The presumption that a telephone pole
in a street, claimed by plaintiff to be a nui-
sance, was erected with the consent of the
city council, arising from the absence of an
averment to the contrary in the complaint
to compel the removal of the pole, would i
render the complaint bad. Merchants' M
Tel. C6. V. Hlrschman, 87 N. B. 238, 241,
Ind. App. 283.
AdTertisiiic stsns
A corporation operating public sta;
through principal streets of a dty, pern
ting its vehicles to carry advertising si|
bearing colors, constituting a dlsfigarenM
rather than ornament, but not Injuring p
lie comfort, health, or safety, cannot be
strained by Injunction from exhibiting si
signs on the ground that they constitute
nuisance. Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. C
of New York, 111 N. T. Supp. 759, 761,
Misc. Rep. 401.
BlMtiiiK
Blasting, without reference to Uie p
tlcular locality in which it is carried on,
not so intrinsically dangerous as to be 1]
facto a "nuisance," so that a blaster woi
be liable for the injury caused by it, whe
er or not he was guilty of any ne^rllgence
the manner in which the blasting was do
Houghton V. Loma Prieta Lumber Ca,
Pac. 82, 84, 152 CaL 500, 14 L. R. A. (N.
913, 14 Ann. Cas. 1159.
Where defendant by blasting caused n
to fall into a stream where plaintiffs w
to erect a pier for defendant, the injury v
not a nuisance, since the term *^iiiaance"
volves the idea of continuity or recurra
of the acts causing the injury, while a *^i
constituting an invasion of personal or o
tract right, expends its force in one a
though the injurious consequences may be
long duration. McCalla v. Louisville & N.
Co., 50 South. 971, 972, 163 Ala. 107.
BowUbls alley
A person keeidng bowling alleys undei
license granted under Rev. Laws, c 102,
168, is not liable for maintaining a *^
sance," where the alleys are built in the mi
ner such alleys are usually built, with pi
and cushions to deaden the noise caused
the rolling of the balls, and where the alle:
as run, make no more noise than wonld be i
pected under similar circumstances. Levin
Goodwin, 77 N. B. 718, 191 Mass. 341, 1
Am. St R^. 616.
.In an action to enjoin a public **iii
sance" resulting from a dam, an instruct]
that before plaintiff could recover the ju
must find that the dam caused sewage, et
to accumulate above the dam so as to actoi
ly pollute the water and render the Ht
"materially" unwholesome or offensive
those residing near by, or In some "materia
respect added to such offensive condition, w.
not erroneous as tending to mislead the jui
and as imposing a greater degree of pro
than required. Royd T. Schreiner (Tex.) 1
S. W. 100, 104.
NUISANCB
965
miisAi^cs
Where defendant maintained a stairway
leading to a basement, the top of the stairs
betng over 4% feet from the sidewalk and
in a private alley, the stairway was not a
'^noisaBce," and defendant was not liable to
a person who, while walking on the sidewalk
and in attempting to avoid a runaway horse,
fell down the stairs. Sheehan v. Bailey Bldg.
Co., 85 Pac. 44, 45, 42 Wash. 535.
Pen. Gode, | 420, requiring one cutting
ice to sorronnd the openings with guards to
obstrnct the free passage of persons into the
hole, and making failure to do so a misde-
meanor, is a condition to the right to cut ice,
and the failure to do so at a place much
used for skating would constitute a nuisance
within section 385, making it a public nui-
sance to unlawfully omit to perform a duty
which endangers the safety of a considerable
number of persons. Llnzey v. American Ice
Co., 116 N. Y. Supp. 767. 768, 131 App, Div,
333.
A lease limiting the liability of the ten-
ant respecting orders of a city department
to those issued for the correction, prevention,
and abatement of "nuisances" or **other
grieyances" does not render the tenant liable
for the cost of a fire escape, as the words
are to be taken in their natural and usual
sense. The absence of a fire escape is not a
^'nuisance," as that word is commonly used,
and the more generic words "other grievanc-
es'* do not extend the plaintifT's liability so
far as to render him liable for the cost of the
fire escape. Kalman v. Ck>z, 92 N. T. Supp.
816, 46 Misc. Rep. 589.
DeMi body
A guest of a hotel, who knowingly per-
mits the body of a dead infant to be con*
cealed in the rooms occupied by him, or caus-
es it to be concealed in any other part of the
building, and in either case to remain un-
til it becomes ofTenslve to other guests, com-
mits a nuisance, and may be chargeable with
liability for damages resulting to the land-
lord's business ; but, unless he actively caus-
es or participates in the concealment in a
place not under his control, he is not charge-
able with liability unless the act was done
by one for whom he is responsible. Parkes
V. Seasongood, 152 Fed. 583, 585.
Dxmiiia
Where a drain laid by property owners in
a public street, under permission from the
dty, empties into a natural stream, and
thereafter, without express license from the
dty, is used as a sewer to discharge sewage
into the stream to the injury of a lower ri-
parian owner, the drain is a "nuisance,*' and
the dty is liable for negligence in not abating
it Schlesiqger v. Gilhooly, 81 N. E. 619, 631,
189 N. Y. 1, 12 Ann. Cas. 1138.
I^runkenness In a public place Is a nui-
sance 9^d disorderly conduct, within Klrby's
Dig. 11 5438, 5461, authorising munidpal cor-
porations by ordinance to prevent nuisances
and disorderly conduct Dewitt v. Lacotts,
88 S. W. 877, 878, 76 Ark. 250.
EzploslTes
Whether the maintenance of a powder
magazine within 1,000 feet of a dwelling
house was a "nuisance" was a question for
the Jury, In an action for injuries caused by
an explosion of the magazine. H. S. Ker-
baugh V. Caldwell, 151 Fed. 194, 196, 80 C. G.
A. 470, 10 Ann. Cas. 453.
To constitute the keeping of gunpowder
a nuisance, there must be negligence in the
fact or the manner of keeping and storing
the gunpowder; and whether the storing of
gunpowder is a nulsimce depends on the lo-
cality, quantity, and surrounding drcum-
stances. Where a powder magazine was im-
perfectly constructed and improvldently
maintained, and its location, manner of con-
struction, and maintenance was dangerous to
life and property, the magazine was a nui-
sance, and the owner thereof was liable for
an explosion thereof. Fisher v. Western
Fuse & Explosives Co., 108 Pac 659, 662, 12
CaL App. 739.
"A 'nuisance,' at common law, may con-
sist in the keeping or manufacture of gun-
powder, naphtha, or other explosive or in-
flammable substances in such quantities and
places or in such manner as to be dangerous
to the persons and property of the inhabit-
ants of the neighborhood." In a community
sparsely settled, a magazine of the capadty
of that belonging to defendants, when filled
with the quantity of gunpowder shown by the
evidence, may not imperil life or property in
the vicinity by reason of a possible explosion ;
but, if located In a more populous neighbor-
hood, it might be found to endanger both. In
such an inquiry, the proximity of dwellings
or of highways, or of the usual fftdlities for
public travel, or the density of population,
may be shown. Flynn v. Butler, 75 N. E. 730,
731, 189 Mass. 377 (quoting and adopting
definition in Commonwealth v. Kidder, 107
Mass. 188, 192).
Femoes
To constitute a fence a private nuisance,
within Rev. St 1902, c 22, | 6, making a
fence unnecessarily exceeding six feet, in
height, malidooely kept to annoy another, a
private nuisance, it is not required that an-
noyance shall be the sole purpose^ but it is
suffldent if it is the dominant one. An ad-
joining owner may erect a fence as much
higher than six feet as may be necessary to
protect himself, his family, and his property
from annoyances inflicted or threatened by
tils neighbor; but, li; the fence is built higher
than six feet for the malicious purpose of, in
turn, annoying his neighbor, it is a nuisance
within the statute. Healey y, Spauldlng, 71
AtL 472,. 47?, 104 Me, 122.
KUISANOB
666
NUISAMCB
The primary meaning of *^iilaanoe^ Is
that which Injures. If the natoral tendency
of the act complained of la to create danger
and Inflict injury upon person or property,
it may properly be found a nuisance as a
matter of fact ; but, if the act in its Inherent
nature is so hazardous as to make the danger
extreme and serious injury so probable as to
be almost a certainty* it should be held a
"nuisance" as a matter of law. The ezhibi-
tion of fireworks, allowed to be given in a
pubUc street^ where a large number of people
are assembling, is not a ''nuisance'' as a mat-
ter of law, and whether It is a nuisance in
fact Is a question for the Jury. Melker ▼. Oity
of New York, 83 N. B. 666, 667. 190 N. Y. 481,
16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 621, 18 Ann. Cas. 644.
Grade evoaalac
A grade crossing or the condition exist-
ing by reason of such an intersection of two
hi^ways is in the nature of a "nuisance,"
and can only lawfnUy^exist under state au-
thority. Cowles ▼. MaW'Xork, N. H, & H. R.
Co., 66 AtL 1020, 1022,: 80 Conn. 48« 12 L. B.
A. (N. S.) 1067« 10 Ann. Cas. 481.
Hospital
Hospitals for the treatment et patients
suffering from infectious and contagioua dl»-
easeis are nuisances when located in the resi-
dential parts of cities and towns, and the
danger differs in kind rather than degree.
Shepard v. City of Seattle, 109 Pac. 1067,
1070, 69 Wash. 863, 40 L. R. A, (N. S.) 647.
A building used as a hospital for the
treatment of contagious diseases is not a
"nuisance" per se. Where buildings used as
a hospital for contagious diseases were locat-
ed in a sparsely settled neighborhood on land
entirely surrounded by highways, and on
which there were no other buildings, and
with ordinary caution there was no proba-
bility of communication of contagious diseas-
es from the hospital unless by transmission
through the air, and the buildings were at
a greater distance from the highways than
smallpox Is transmissible In the open air,
there was no showing of a "nuisance." State
ex rel. Board of Health of Hamilton 3^» y.
Inhabitants of City of Trenton (N. J.) 68
AtL 897, 898.
JaU
Bums' Ann. St 1901, | 290, provides that
whatever Is injurious to health, or indecent,
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction
to the free use of pr(^>erty, so as essential-
ly to interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
ment of life or property, Is a nuisance, and
the subject of an action, thus following the
common law, which defines a "nuisance" as
anything which causes an injury to lands or
houses and renders them useless or even un-
comfortable for habitation, but the erection of
a Jail next to a residence is not the creation
of a nuisance. Pritchett ▼. Board of Com'ra
of Knox County, 86 N. B. 82, 85, 42 Hid. A
3 (dtlng Ha Torta [4th Ed.] p. 584).
Keepiac disorderly l&oiiaa
The keeping of a disorderly house h
nuisance, both at common law and under t
statute, and the offense is a misdemeanor, :
which the ordinary remedy is by crimi]
proceedings. Weidner v. Friedman, 151 S.
66, 67, 126 Tenn. 677, 42 U R. A. (N. &) 10
Holsea, odors» sasM» and i
Noxious gases arising from the carry!
on of lawful occupations are not ''nuisano
in all situations, but may become such
reason of the trade being carried on in 1
proper localltiea, or by reason of tbe ga
being negligently suffered to escape. Lc
V. Louisville & N. B. Co., 107 S. W. 203, 2
128 Ky. 26, 18 U R. A. (N. S.) 1063, 16 A
Cas. 673.
Any act, omission, or use of prope
which pollutes the atmosphere with offensd
gases, stenches, or vapor, so as to cause o
terlal discomfort, or annoyance, or Injury
health or property, is a ''nuisance." Wo<
stock Hardwood & Spool Bltg. Co. r. Gharl
ton light & Water Co. (S. a) 63 S. E. 5
666.
Noise alone, if it be of such a charao
as to be productive of actual physical d
comfort and annoyance to a person of or
nary sensibility, may create a "nuisance,** t
subject of a remedy at law or in equi
Longley v. McGeoch, 80 Att. 843, 846, 115 \
182.
"Under the statutes anything whi<A p
duces noxious exhalations, offensive smel
or other annoyances, injurious to the heali
comfort, or property of individuals. Is a 'n
sance.' It is not necessary that these ode
be deleterious to health. It is suffident
they offend the senses in such a manner
to produce actual disoomfioct" Bhoades
Cook, 98 K W. 122, 123, 122 Iowa, 336.
The malicious annoyance of another
loud noises, consisting of screaming ai
pounding on tin pans, fences, and iron,
consequence of which another is injured
health and business, is a "nuisance," whi
equity will abate. Shellabarger y. Morris, \
S. W. 1005, 1007, 116 Mo. App. 566.
An authorized business properly condi»
ed at an authorized place is not a "nuisance
for whatever Is lawful cannot be wrongfi
and the owner of a railroad thus authorte
and operated is not liable in damages to oi
whose residence is permeated by smoke, d
ders, and gas emitted from the engines ^
such an extent as to be injurious to tl
health and comfort of the inhabitants. A
chlson, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Armstrong, i
Pac 978, 979, 71 Kan. 366, 1 L. B. A. (K. S
113, 114 Am. St. Rep. 474.
The operation of a crematory and f»
tlllzer plant, in whldi ordinary garbage an
other waste matter are subjected to a ban
VUIAANCa
6S7
JfUIBAim
ig pxooeoi* mad tht xealdiie, In <2ie tfiape of
shes» uaed In connection with otlier elements
> make a feztiUser, In eacti a manner tbat,
nder certain conditiona of the atmoephere
nd direction of the wind, the smoke arising
rom the cremation and the odor dne to the
lethod of handling the elements of the fer-
IMzer compels those residing within a dls-
ance of from 2,000 to 2,500 feet to keep their
rindows closed, and renders their houses nn-
omfortahle for habitation, and preyents
bem from sitting out of doors, constitntes a
nuisance." Laird t. Atlantic Ooast Sani-
ary Co., 67 AtL 887, 388, 73 N. J. Bq. 49.
"While It is tme that dancing is fre-
nently an innocent amusement, and drink-
Dg may be engaged in without becoming a
auisance,' yet if the dancing and drinking
ire accompanied by swearing and being
Irunk, making lond noises and otherwise
Qlsbehaying, there can be no doubt that such
icts win constitute a 'nuisance.' " Gommon-
realth y. andnnati, N. O. & T. P. B. €k>.,
12 S. W. 618, 614, 189 Ky. 429, 18 U R. A.
N. S.) 690, Ana Gas. 1912B, 427 (citing and
idopting Jung Biewing Go. v. Gommonwealth,
^ S. W. 096, 123 Ky. 507, 124 Am. St Bep.
;76).
Noises resulting from the operation of a
nanufacturing plant, to constitute a **nui-
unce,** must be unreasonable and of such a
^haracter as to be of actual physical dls-
»mfoTt to persons of ordinary sensibilities.
HcGUl V. Plntsch Compressing Co., 118 N. W.
r86, 788, 140 Iowa, 429, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.)
166.
A creamery discharged Its waste on the
and of another, and ther^y Increased the
Sow of water on the land, and Interfered with
the proper cultivatlan thereof. Noisome odors
irose from the waste, but these were not no-
Iceahle until one got near the point of dis-
charge, and there was no evidence that any
me suffered therefrom. Held, that the waste
nras not a nuisance within Code, i 6078, de-
ling '^nuisances." Ruthven t. Farmers' Go*
;>p. Creamery Co., 118 N. W. 915, 916, 140
Iowa, 570.
Noises which are not "nuisances^ on a
nreek day may be when made on a Sunday, If
Aisturbing the quiet and rest which a dllzen
Is entitled to have for his recuperation; and
the fact that such noises are forbidden by
the Sunday laws takes away any defense for
making them, though they be but slight. Mc-
MlUan V. Kuehnle, 78 Atl. 1054, 1056, 76 N. J.
Eq. 266.
A private park in the residence part of
a dty. Inclosed by a fence and rented to
lodges and other bodies for holding enter-
tainments by day and night, is, when permit-
ted to be so conducted that it is a rendezvous
for boisterous, dissolute, drunken people, who
indulge in music, dancing, and obscenity un-
til very late boors of the night, so as to dis-
turb the sleep of neighboring residents, a
8WDsAPJnSxB.— 12
"nnlsanee.'' Palestine Bhlg. Ass^ ▼. Minor
(Ky.) 86 & W. 696, 696.
"At conmion law a 'nuisance* was any-
thing that worked hurt or damage. A public
or common nuisance was that which affected
the public or was an annoyance to the king's
subjects at large." An Illinois statute, pro-
viding that a city council in cities shall have
the power to declare what riiall be a nui-
sance, to abate the same, and to Impose fines
on parties who may create, continue, or suf-
fer a nuisance to exist, authorised the Chi-
cago city council to pass Ordinance March
23, 1903, i 10, declaring the emission of dense
smoke from the stack of any boat, locomo-
tive, or chimney anywhere within the dty,
with certain exceptions, to be a public nui-
sance. Glucose Beflning Co. v. City of Chica-
go, 188 Fed. 209, 214 (adopting the quotation
from Harmon v. Chicago, 110 JUL 400, 51 Am.
Bep. 698).
'at may be laid dovm broadly as a gen-
eral rule that any act, omission, or use of
property which results in polluting the at-
mofliphere with noxious or offensive effluvia,
gases, stenches, or vapors, thereby produdug
material physical discomfort and annoyance
to those residing in the vicinity or injury to
their health or property, is a nuisance*" The
occupant of a dwelling is entitled to an in-
junction to restrain the operation of a slaugh-
ter house adjacent thereto, where such oper-
ation causes the dwelling to be filled with
noxious smells. Wright v. Ulrich, 91 Pac. 43,
44, 40 Colo. 437.
A "nuisance" Is defined as an 'Unreason-
able, unwarrantable, or unlawful use of one's
own property, to the annoyance, inconven-
ience, discomfort, or damage of another/'
Under this definition, the jury was justified in
finding that an electric light plant, erected in
a residential neighborhood, was a nuisance,
where the evidence showed that the machin-
ery produced a vibration of an adjoining ho-
tel, that dirt and cinders came into the
rooms of the hotel, that noise and bad odors
invaded the premises, and that the income
derived from rental of rooms had decreased
since the plant was established. Pritchard
V. Bdison Electric lUuminating Co., 87 N. Y.
Supp. 225, 229, 92 App. l>iv. 178 (quoting and
adopting definition in Bly v. Edison Co., 64
N. K 745, 172 N. Y. 1, 98 In R. A. 500).
Where It was proven that the owner of
a steam mill, to obtain water, made an ex-
cavation in a hollow leading down from a
suburb of a nearby town, with the assent of
most of the inhabitants pf the nel^boriiood,
that the filth from the nearby premises cor-
rupted the water, so that it inconvenienced
the neighborhood, and that the pond was of
too recent origin to have, as yet, injuriously
affected the health of the community, in-
structions that whatever la openly injurious
to public health and comfort, is a ^'Buisaace,'*
though not all the members of the commu-
ki.
JIUiaANOB
<58
xm^ANom
nity are affected thereby, tbat a "nnisance"
must either be in a populous neighborhood,
or 80 contiguous to a highway as to affect
those passing thereon, that a "nuisance" was
not necessarily detrimental to the public
health, it being sufficient If its bad odors af-
fected the public at large, and that, if the de-
fendant maintained a * 'nuisance" by main-
taining a pond wherein was drained a part
of the filth of a nearby town, endangering
the public health, and likely, in the nature of
things, to generate disease, they should con-
vict, were applicable to the evidence. West
V. State, 71 S. W. 483, 484, 71 Ark. 144.
In determining whether the maintenance
of a planing mill, coalyard, and bins in a res-
idence district in a city are a *'nuisMice," the
effect on persons of ordinary sensibilities
only, and not on persons of very delicate and
fastidious tastes or sensibilities, should be
considered. First Avenue Coal & Lumber
Go. v. Johnston, 54 South. 508, 600, 171 Ala.
470, 82 U B. A. (N. S.) 522.
It is not essential to the existence of a
"nuisance" from offensive odors that they
should be calculated to break down or injure
health, or that health should be impaired or
even threatened by them. It is sufficient that
they may be nauseating or physically discom-
forting or annoying to persons of ordinary
sensibilities, "interfering with the ordinary
comfort physically of human existence, not
merely according to elegant and dainty modes
and habits of living, but according to plain
and sober and simple notions among the Eng-
lish people.'* The sound condition of those
employed in fish factories^ and habituated to
the smells necessarily generated In their op-
eration is not determinative of the question
whether such a factory is a nuisance. It is
well known that persons can become* accus-
tomed to foul and noisome odors and retain
their health. United States v. Luce, 141 Fed.
385,408.
Under Code, | 4302, defining a ••nui-
sance" to be whatever is injurious to health,
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an ob-
struction to the free use of property, so as
to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment
of life or property, one using hia property so
as to unwarrantably impregnate the atmos-
phere with smoke, odors, etc., which would
not exist but for his instrumentality, creates
a nuisance; but only where an unreasonable
amount of smoke or noisome fumes are emit-
ted, or they are emitted in an unreasonable
manner, resulting in tangible injury, will the
courts interfere. ffcGill v. PIntsch Com-
pressing Co., 118 N. W. 786, 787, 140 Iowa,
429, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466.
Bums' Ann. St 1908, S 291, makes whatr
ever obstructs the use of property so as to
essentially interfere with its comfortable en-
joyment a "nuisance," and the subject of an
action. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs
did a retail clothing and furnishing business I
on the first floor of a building, under a leaf
from one of the defendants, and that sue
defendant caused and permitted the uppc
story to be used by the other defendant as
roller skating rink, the noise from which pr^
vented conversation in plaintiffs* store, an
annoyed and drove away their caatomer,
thereby causing loss of profits and injury t
the business which could not be oompensai
ed for by damages, and that if smch ose 1
permitted to continue plaintiffs' buaiiieaBwi
be destroyed, and also alleged facts showln
the character and ext^it of plaintiffs* bus
ness, th^r inability to procure another rooo
and prayed an Injunction. Held, tliat tb
complaint showed that the business would t
destroyed if the rink was continued, so tha
plaintiffs were entitied to the injunction; th
injury not being susceptible of comp^isatio
in damages. Foor v. BSdwards, 00 N. EL 7S
45 Ind. App. 259.
The use of soft coal in a factory a
situated in a country district soitable fo
country homes that black smoke tberefros
great in volume and dense in qoallty, env^
ops and discolors a n^ghboring dweUioi
causing discomfort and financial loss to tb
occupants, is a •'nuisance," where the use o
soft coal is not necessary for the running o
the factory, and is not a reasonable use o
the manufacturer's property. McCarty ^
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 81 N. E. 549, 53C
189 N. Y. 40, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 465, 12 Ano
Cas. 840.
By Civ. Code 1895, | 8861, a '^nlsance'
is anything that worketh hurt, inconveo
leiice, or damage, to another; and tive fac
that the act done may otherwise be lawfo
dees not keep it from being a '•nuisance.'
The inconvenience complained of must not bi
feudful, or such as would affect only one ol
f ii&tidious taste, but it must be sach as would
affect an ordinarily reasonable man. mic
employment, by the owner of a ginnim
plant, of machinery which separates dust and
sand from cotton and expels the particles oi
dust and sand Into the air in large volumes,
causing the same to be blown into the dwell-
ing house of an adjac^it proprietor, to bis
great discomfort and injury, is an in^*asioo
of his property rights, for which an action
for damages will lie. Ponder v. Quitm&Q
Ginnery, 49 S. E. 746, 747, 122 6a. 29 (dtiag
Swift V. Broyles, 42 S. E. 277, 115 Ga. 8S5,
58 L. R. A. 390; Farley v. Gate City GasUght
Co., 31 S. E. 193, 105 Ga. 331 ; Austin v. Au-
gusta T. Ry. Co., 34 S. E. 852. 108 Ga. 671, 47
L. R. A. 755).
ObstrmotioBL of Usl&waj
An obstruction in a public highway cod-
stitutes a "nuisance." State v. Southern Id
di^na Gas Co., 81 N. B. 1149, 1150, 169 lod.
124, 18 Ann. Cas. 908 (citing Zimmerman v.
State, 31 N. E. 550, 4 Ind. App. 583).
"A permanent encroachment upon a pub-
lic street for a private purpose Is a 'purpres-
NUISANCB
659
NUISANOB
Qre.* and is In law a 'nalsanoe/ ** Lacey t.
Ity of Oskaloosa, 121 N. W. 542, 546, 143
owa, 704, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 863.
The general rule is that any unauthoriz-
d obstruction or excavation in a qublic
treet, impairing its safety, constitutes a
ublie "nuisance." Blixer v. Herrlck, 02 Atl.
019. 78 Vt 349.
An obstruction placed within the limits
f a public way is a "nuisance" at common
aw, as well as under Rev. St 1903, c 22, |
. Smith V. Preston, 71 Aa 063, 666, 104
ie. 156.
A temporary obstruction of a street or
iighway with the consent of the proper pub-
ic authorities, in the course of construction
if a building, sidewalk, or other work, is not
I "nuisance." Malkan ▼. Carlin, 93 N. Y.
>upp. 378.
A fence obstmetliig a street, which is a
rablic highway, and thereby rendering its
ise lees conveolent, would be an indictable
liuisance." State ▼. Godwin, 69 S. B. 132,
33, 145 N. G. 461, 122 Am. St Rep. 467.
A spike two inches high in a sidewalk is
L ''nuisance." Wile ▼. Los Angeles Ice ft
3old Storage Go., 83 Pac. 271, 272, 2 GaL
kpp. 19a
Civ. Gode, f 3479, defines a "nuisance"
18 anything which obstructs the free use of
property or free passage or use of any
;treet Section 3493 provides that a private
)erson may maintain an action for a public
inisance, if it is specially injurious to him.
ield, that the owner of a lot abutting on a
^reet his such an easement over it that he
nay maintain an action to abate structures
erected in the street opposite his lot Mc«
[^ean v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 83 Pac 1082,
L084, 2 GaL App. 346.
"At common law any act or obstruction
^hlch unnecessarily Incommodes or impedes
:he lawful use of a highway by the public
s a •nuisance."' Where the owner of a
)uilding negligently maintained a leader
!rom the roof of a building so as to discharge
nrater on the sidewalk, by which ice accumu-
ated thereon and the walk became danger-
)ii8, be was liable to any person injured
Jiereby, Tremblay v. Harmony Blills, 64 N.
S. 501, 171 N. Y. 696 (quoting and adopting
leflnition in Ang. Highw. | 223).
An obstruction is merely matter out of
[>lace and that which may be a stepping stone
in a position where it is needed and may be
iised as such becomes an obstruction when
Micupying a place intended for other use,
eind where it is not needed and cannot be so
Q8e<l. Where a iMivement has been laid, the
Etsphalt surface of which lays smoothly down
to the curb, a block of stone placed within
the curb is ah obstmction and becomes a
"nuisance." McGormack v. Robin, 62 Soutii.
m, 781, 126 La. 594^ 139 Am. 8t Bep. 649.
The acciimulation of water and ice in a
depression in a sidewalk, so as to obstruct
the free and safe use of the sidewalk, by wa-
ter being collected on a roof and cast on the
sidewalk by a projecting conductor, consti-
tutes a "nuisance," which it is the duty of the
city to prevent or abate, negligent failure to
perform which will make it liable to one in-
jured thereby. Gity of Muncie v. Hey, 74
N. E. 260, 251, 164 Ind. 570.
Under Ky. St | 2886, providing that it
shall be the duty of police officers in cities to
remove all nuisances in the public streets,
parks, and highways, it was the duty of a
policeman, on obtaining knowledge of a dan-
gerous cave-in in a street, to guard the same
in order to prevent injury thereby, and hence
the policeman's knowledge thereof was no-
tice to the city; the word **nuisance," as
there used, not being limited to a physical
obstruction placed in a street, but including
ahything that "worketh hurt, inconvenience,
or damage." Gity of Louisville v. Lenehan»
149 S. W. 932, 934, 149 Ky. 637.
An owner, collecting surface water inta
a definite channrt and pouring the same on
a pnblic highway where the water freeies.
creates a "nuisance," and he is liable for the
damages ensuing as a probable consequence.
Field T. Gowdy, 86 N. E. 884, 886, 199 Mass.
668, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 286.
Where a trench, dug in a city street for
the purpose of supplying heat to the city
library building, had been partly filled, but
the remainder was left open awaiting ma-
terial for making pipe connections, such ex-
cavation, having been made for a proper
purpose, was not a "nuisance" per se, and
did not become such unless it was allowed to
remain open for an unreasonable length of
time. Oametz v. Gity of GarroU, 114 N. W.
67, 136 Iowa, 669.
The trees, grass^ and fiowers growing on
park strips maintained by a municipality be-
tween the curbing jiud the sidewalk and prop-
er barriers placed around them to protect
them are not obstructions or "nuisances,"
within the meaning of the statute requiring
the city council to keep the streets of a mu-
nicipality open, in r^jwir, and free from nui-
sance. Village of BarnesviUe v. Ward, 96
N. E. 937, 938, 86 Ohio St 1, 40 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 94, Ann. Gas. 1912D, 1234.
Giv. Gode, I 8479, declares anything
which unlavrfully obstructs the free passage
or use of a public street a "nuisance." Sec-
tion 3480 defines a **public nuisance" as one
affecting an entire community or any consider-
able number of persons. Section 3493 pro-
vides that a private person may maintain an
action for a "public nuisance" only if it is
specially injurious to himself. In an action
to enjoin the construction or operation of a
railroad in the street in front of plaintUTs
premises^ the complaint alleged that the
NtnSANGB
660
NUISANOB
constitictloii and operation of the railroad
would greatly obstruct the use of plaintiff's
premises and impair the easement of access
thereto and egress therefrom, and would
greatly hamper plaintiff in carrying on his
business on the premises and lessen the yalne
thereof. Held, that the allegations were
merely statements of the plaintiff's opinion
or conclusions as to the effect of defendant's
proposed acts, and hence the complaint was
demurrable as not showing a nuisance result-
ing in some special injury, within the mean-
ing of CiY. Code, f S 3479, 3480, 3493. Brown
V. Rea, 88 Pac. 713, 714, 150 CaL 171 (citing
Aram v. Schallenberger, 41 Gal. 449; Bigley
▼. Nunan, 63 Oal. 403; Hogan v. Central
Pac. R. CJo., 11 Pac. 876, 71 Cal. 87).
Obstmotioa of wmters
A obstruction in a stream, caused by fill-
ing it, and resulting in damages to property
through water being set back, is a "nui-
sance." Hedrick v. City of St Joseph, 122
S. W. 375, 376, 138 Mo. App. 396.
Laws 1905, a 57, f 4, gives corporations
organized for clearing and improving streams
for logging purposes, power to build wing
dams and sheer booms, etc., for the purpose
of holding logs, providing that no such dam,
etc., shall be so maintained as to obstruet
the outlet of the stream, and that if such
dam, etc., is constructed so as to interfere
with the use of the stream for any other
purpose or injure adjacent land, compensa-
tion shall be first determined, and the appro-
priation of the use made by eminent domain.
Held, that the statute contemplated the ob-
struction of navigation at times by the con-
struction of dams, etc, for driving timber, the
only limitation being that the outlet of the
stream be not obstructed, so that the fact that
a boom built in a river navigable to some ex-
tent for three or four miles from its mouth
at high tide for floating logs necessarily ob-
structed navigation above the boom would
not be a "nuisance^*' as defined by Rem. A
Bal. Code, | 943 (1 Ballinger's Ann. Codes &
St fl 8085, 3093 [Pierce's Code, f| 1870,
1867]), so that the boom company could con-
demn the privilege of using the river in that
manner. State ex rel. Pealer v. Superior
Court of Chehalls County, 109^ Pac 340, 341,
58 Wash. 565.
Comp. liiws 1909, f 4751, defines a
''nuisance" to consist in unlawfully doing an
act or omitting to perform a duty, which act
or omission, among other things, ''unlawful-
ly Interferes with, obstructs or tends to ob-
struct, or renders dangerous for passage, any
lake, or navigable river, bay, stream, canal,
or basin, or any public park» square, street,
or highway." McKay v. City of Enid, 109
Pac 520, 522, 26 Okl. 275, 30 L. B. A. (^.
S.) 1021.
Pool Toom
The maintenance of a place for selling
for gain pools upon horses at an exhibition
trial of their q(ieed on a race track and ft
selling of the pools is punishable as a 'iin
sance" at common law and under B. & (
Comp. I 1930, providing for the punishmei
of any person who willfully or wrongful)
commits any act which grossly disturl
the public peace or health, or which open)
outrages the pubHc decency and is injurioi
to the public morals. State v. Ayers, J
Pac 653, 49 Or. 61. 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 99
124 Am. St Rep. 1036.
A pool room on one of the prindp;
thoroughfares in the dty, in which persoi
daily congregate to bet upon horse raa
reported to the proprietor by telegraph, is
gaming house, punishable as a "nuisance
at common law and under the statute proTii
ing for the punishment of any person wl
willfully and wrongfully commits any a<
which grossly disturbs the public peace (
health, or which openly outrages Uie publ
decency, and is injurious to the public mo
als. State v. Nease, 80 Pac 897, 898, 46 0
433.
Roller skatlns rink
"Any business, however lawtol, whic
causes annoyances that materially interfei
with the ordinary comfort, physical, of lii
man existence, is a 'nuisance' that shou
be restrained." The operation of a rolli
skating rink, so conducted as to render tl
appropriate enjoyment of adjacent chun
property impossible will be enjoined. Fir
Methodist Episcopal Church of City of Cai
May V. Cape May Grain & Coal Co., 67 A1
613» 614, 73 N. J. E^. 257 (quoting and adop
ing definition in Cleveland v. Citizens' Ga
light Co., 20 N. J. £q. 201, 205).
Saloons amd otl^or pl*ees of sale of U^
A saloon or tippling house was not
'^nuisance" at common law if properly ooi
ducted, and therefore a conviction for mal]
taining a nuisance cannot be sustained t
proof of the maintenance of i^n unlicensc
tippling house, in the absence of proof Uu
it was so conducted as to annoy, disturb, <
scandalize the people li^ a community, t
iriiowing that drunkard^ thieves, prostitute
or .other disorderly persons were permits
to resort there. State v. Ingram & Adam
94 S. W. 790, 791, 118 Ma App. 323.
Under Rev. St 1903, c 22» | 1, a pla(
of resort is a "nuisance" if used by a dn
either to sell intoxicating liquor to its mei
bers, or to distribute among them liquor owi
ed in common, or to procure and dispense i
its members liquor bought for and belongii
to them individually. State v. KaplcslK
73 Att. 830, 832, 105 Me. 127, 23 Ii. B. A C
S.) 737.
SaaitarivoB.
Under the statute (Rem. ft Bal. Code,
8809) defining a nuisance as an act or omi
sibn which either aimo}tB» injures^ or endai
NUISANCE
681
NUISANGB PBB 88
the oomforl; health, or sBtety of otbeni,
naintenanoe in a residential district of
y of a sanitarinm for tiie treatment of
rcoloeis patients is a "nnisanoe," where
fear indnced by the proximity of the
arinm distorbe the ''comfortable enjoy-
:'* of adjacent property, whether the
is founded on scientific facts or not, for
ifortable enjoyment" means mental qniet
rell as physical comfort, and the word
ifort" implies whateyer is requisite to
secnrity from want and famish reason-
physical, mental, and spiritual enjoys
u Everett v. Paschall, 111 Pac. 879,
61 Wash. 47, ai U B. A, (N. S.) 827, Ann.
1912B, 1128.
trfaee water
The action of a railroad in permitting
ice water from one side of its track to
pe to the other aide alongside of a high-
does not create an actlonaMe "nuisance."
nsend v. New York Cent & H. R. R. CJo.,
^^. Y. Supp. 381, 387, 06 Biisc Rep. 258.
SANCE PEB ra
A "nnisance per se" is a nnisanoe in it-
and which cannot be so conducted as to
awfully carried on or permitted to exist
)er ▼. Whissen, 180 & W. 903, 704, 05
545.
"A 'nuisance per se' is an act, thing, or
fsion or use of the property which in and
self is a nuisance, and hence not permis-
s or excusable under any circumstances."
I V. Columbia Theater Co.^ 94 ^ W. 847,
197 Mo. 328.
"A 'nuisance at law' or a 'nuisan^per
s an act, occupation, or structure whipb
nuisance at all times, under any cir-
Btances, regardless of looatloi^ or sur-
idlngs." Swaim v. Morris, 125 S. W. 432^
93 Ark. 362, 20 Ann. Cas. 930 (quoting
adopting the definition tn ^ Cyc. P.
).
A "nuisance per se" is an act, thing, or
sion, or use of the property, which lA
of itself is a nuisance, and hence' Is not
lisslble or excusable under any clrcum-
:?es. A lawful business is not generally
iuisance per se," but may become. so by
S located in an inappropriate plaice^ or
g kept in an improper manner. Bems-
V. Tola Portland Cement Co., 84 Pac.
549, 73 Kan. 66.
A "nuisance" is. anything wmch incom-
es, annoys, or produces inconvenience
amage. A "nuisance per se" is one which
iways a nuisance in certain localities,
nuisance in fact" is one which becomes
lisance by reason of circumstances and
oundlngs. City of New Orleans v. Len-
, 52 South. 575, 677, 126 La. 455, 29 L.
i. (N. S.) 642.
A "nuisance per se," as the tenn im-
s> is a nuisance in itself, and one ^hich
oannot therefore be so conducted' or main-
tained as to be lawfully carried on or permit-
ted to ezlat Sullivan Realty & Improve-
ment Co. V. Crockett, 188 8. W. 024, 926, 158
Mo. App. 573.
" 'Nuisances' are of tliree kinds, viz.:
Per se^ malum la w (that ia, naturally evil);
malum prohibitum, because forbidden by law ;
and those which do not fall within the two
definitions mentioned, but may be found in
fact to be nuisances." Awnings constructed of
wood, with roofB covered with metal, extend-
ing over and about 15 feet above a street, and
attached to substantial brick buildings, the
outer edge resting on posts in the sidewalk
or curb, did not constitute a public "nuis-
ance per se." Brown v. Town of CarroUton,
99 S. W. 37, 39, 122 Mo. App. 276.
OemeteiT
A public cemetery Is not a "nuisance per
se." Sherman r. Crawford (Tex.) 127 S. W.
1075, 1076.
Dead awliwals
JDead domestio animals «z« not ''nul-
sanoes per se," and cannot be made such by
legialatlTe declaration. Oity of Richmond v.
Oamthers, 50 8. B. 265, 1Q6 Va; 774, 70 U
R. A. 1006, 2 Ann. Cas. 406.
£leotrioit7
The transmission of electricity at a high
voltage over a right of way, being authorized
by law, is not a "nuisance pfer se," as It is
well settled that a lawful business or erec-
tion ib never a "nuisance per se." Mu!l v.
Indianapolis ft O. Traction Co., 81 N. B. 667,
659, 660, 169 Ind. 214.
lUFlosiTes
The arbitrary rule that the keeping of
gunpowder, nitroglyceiine, or other explosive
substances in large quantities in the vicinity
of a dwelling house or place of business is a
"nuisance per ae" has been modified, and the
present rule is that the question whether
they are a nuisance depends on the locality,
the quantity, iind. tto surrounding circum-
stances, and the method and manner of ke^^
ing and i^sing^ The owner of an airtomobilie
garage, licensed to store one barrel of gaso-
line in the building, which is a frame building
and adjacent to other frame buildings, will
be enjoined from introducing gasoline ipto
the tanks of the automobile inside of the
building, and from storing automobiles, with
gasbllne in the tanks, inside the building.
O'Hara v. Nelgon (N. J.) 63 Atl. 836. 840
(citing, in support of a general rule, Heeg v.
licht, 80 N. Y. 579, 36 Am. Rep. 654; Rudder
V. Koopman, 22 South. 601, 116 Ala. 882, 37
L. R. A. 489 ; Kinney ▼• KooiNnaa, 22 Soutb.
593, 116 Ala. 310, 37 U R. A. 497, 67 Am.
St Rep. 119; Kleebauer ▼. ^Wesitem Fuse &
Explosives Co., 71 Pac. ei7, 138 Oal. 497, GO
JU R. A. 377, 04 Am. Bt. Ue^ 62/, Collins ▼•
NUISANCE PER BE
662
NULL AND VOID
AJalMtnui a. 8. R. Go, 16 South. 140, 104 AUu
390; High, InJ. [8d Ed.] p. 503, f 776, et seq.;
1 Pom. Bquit. Remedies, S 516 et seq ; Barnes
V. Zettlemojer, 02 S. W. Ill, 26 Tex. Civ.
App. 468 ; Flymi v. Butter. 75 N. B. 780, 189
Mass. 377).
A gambling house, under the statute and
as recognized by the oaurts, is a '"nuisance,"
and even at comm<m law such a nuisance
could be enjoined «t the instance of any per*
son who was injured thereby. Ex parte Al-
lison, 90 S. W. 492, 494, 48 Tex. Cr. R. 634,
8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 622, 13 Ann. Gas. 684.
"A "nuisance per se' is any act or omis^
Bion, or use of property or thing, which is of
itself hurtful to the health, tranquility, or
morals, or outrages the decency, of the com-
munity." Keeping a common gaming house,
which is held to include pool rooms where
betting on horse races is indulged (Bollinger
V. Commonwealth, 36 S. W. 553, 98 Ky. 674 ;
Commonwealth v. Simmonds, 79 Ky. 618;
Brown v. State, 13 S. W. 236, 88 Tenn. 666;
Swigart V. People, 40 N. B. 432, 164 lU, 284),
to which there is common resort for the pur-
pose of betting, and at whidi money or other
property is bet, won, or lost, is per se a
nuisance at common law (1 Hank. P. G. p.
733; Kneffler v. Commonwealth, 22 S. W.
446, 94 Ky. 369). Ehrlick v. Commonwealth,
102 S. W. 289, 290, 11«5 Ky. 742, 10 L. R. A,
(N. S.) 996, 128 Am. St Rep. 269.
Slansl^terlioiise
Under Wilson's Rev. & Ann. 8t 1903,
c 66 (enttttcid "Nuisance") ft 1, 3, 8, 10, de-
claring that a nuisance consists in unlawfully
doing any act or omitting to perform a duty,
which act or omission annoys, injures, or
endangers the comfort, health, or safety of
others, and declaring that a public nuisance
is one which afTects at the same ttme an en-
tire community or neighborhood, or any con-
siderable number of persons, though the ex-
tent of the annoyance or damage inflicted on
the individual may be unequal, etc., a
slaughterhouse is not a "nuisance per se," un-
less it appears from thfe evidence, independ-
ent of the manner in which it Is being used
and conducted, that its location, proximity,
and relationship to the public make it so.
Weaver v. Kuchler, 87 Pac. 600, 602, 17 OW.
189.
Steam traotloBL ensiae
The use of a steam traction engine and
trailers in the streets of a city is not a public
"nuisance per se." — ^McCarter v. Ludlum Steel
& Spring Co. (N. J.) 63 AtL 761, 767.
TrmiMM
The noises of locomotives, shifting of
cars, smoke, offensive odors, loading and un-
loading of freijsht, and the like, occasioned by
and incident to the use and conduct of a rail-
road freight and passenger terminal, and re-
sulting in damages to the premises as a place
of religious worship does not constitnte i
actimiable nuisance, where the railroad con
pany conducts its operations with reasoDabl
care. Neither does the nmning of tnios aa
shifting of cars on Sunday at the thne of w
ular church services constitute a '^nuisuc
per se," since under the express provisioDsc
Revisal 1906, i 2613, a railroad company mi
operate Its trains on Sunday. But, while till
is true, It also remains true that a nilm
BO operated as to needlessly cause im
would be such a nuisance. Taylor t. §«
board Air Line Ry., 59 8. E. 129, 132, 145 !
O. 400, 122 Am. St- Rep. 456.
ITmdertakiiic estabUskaiemt
An undertaking establishment is not
"nuisance per se." The malntenaoce of i
undertaking estabUdunent In a buildiog 3 (
4 feet from the residence of one of the pUi
tiffs and 35 feet from the residence of ti
other in a resldaice district of a city, thooi
the mortician operating the same InteiMk
to occupy the upper stories of the biilldlDg<
a residence, constituted a nuisance where
was shown that noxious odors, gases, et(
were likely to permeate the hooses of t)
plaintiffs therefrom, and that there wi
danger of infection and contagion from ti
proximity of the morgue, wltii the possibDi
of flies passing from one place to the otiu
etc. Densmore v. Evergreen Gamp No. H
Woodmen of the World, 112 Pac. 255, <
Wash. 230, 31 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 608, Ann. Ci
1912B, 1206.
NUXSAHOE TAlsVB
A "nuisance value" is the value of
fftinchlse "because it may be used to hind
or defraud another enterprise, althoogb I
self conferring or securing nothing of ral*
Consolidated Gas Go. v. New YoA, 157 Fe
849,874.
NUL TIEL RECORD
"The plea of *nul tl^ record' ralsei b*
one question, and that Is whether there
such a record as that set out in the wilt
Bank of Eau Claire v. Reed, 83 N. 8. £
821, 232 IlL 238, 122 Am. St R^. 66.
NULL AND VOID
The terms "nuU" and •Void'* are iw
Interchangeably. "Void" is defined as bi
Ing no legal force, entirely null, incapable <
confirmation or ratification; and ''naU"
defined as of no legal or binding force (
validity, of no eflicacy, Invalid, void, m
tory, useless, or of no account or signiflcsiK
Forrester & MacGlnniss v. Boston & M. Co
soL Copper & Silver Min. Co., 74 Pac. lOS
1091, 29 Mont 397 (citing Standard Did)*
Though a conveyance was, as betv«
the parties, within the statute providing tin
all fraudulent conveyances shaU be '^nnU u
void," the fimudulait grantee hating ooot«
r-
!■'
luV
KULL AND VOID
663
NUNC PEO TUNO
le prcperty to a tlilrd person, who was
[oade a party to a suit bj creditors of
vendor to subject the land to their claims,
ras not bound by a decree in favor of
>lainant The words **null and void," as
in this statute, are to be given the sense
roidable," since the conveyances are good
etween the parties and also as against
grantor. As stated by Bacon in his
dgment, tlL "Void and Voidable": "A
; is void which was done against law at
rery time of the doing it, and no person
ound by such act; but a thing is only
ible which is done by a person who ought
to have done it, but who nevertheless
lot avoid it himself after it is done.
• Of a void act or deed every stran-
nay take advantage, but not of a voidable
' Tudor V. Tudor, 67 Atl. 539, 80 Vt 220,
Am. St Rep. 977 (citing Carpenter v.
lure, 39 Vt 9, 91 Am. Dec. 370; Merrill
nglesby, 28 Vt 150).
In a statute providing that all capital
t or securities of a company purchased
\ie company by a director thereof for less
i the par value thereof diall be ''null
void," the term ''null and void" should
onstrued as meaning "voidable." Toledo
L. ft K« G. R. Ck>., V. Continental Trust
96 Fed. 487, 520, 36 O. C. A 165.
The words "void," "void and of no ef-
" and "null and void," are used in stat-
and legal documents in the sense of void-
merely — that is, capable of being avoid-
-and not as meaning that the act or trans-
on is absolutely a nullity, as if it never
existed, incapable of giving rise to any
ts or obligations under any circum-
ices. Code 1896, f 1286, provides that no
iflcate of incorporation shall issue when
corporate name assumed is that of a
ion or firm, unless there be Joined thereto
e name designating the business he car-
on, followed by the word "company" or
poratlon," and if any corporation shall
to comply with this qualification its
inlzation is void. Section 1282 provides
; when any corporation falls to comply
1 the requirements of the statute in its
inlzation, the failure may be remedied by
g with the probate judge who Issued the
iflcate of Incorporation a statement set-
forth the omission end supplying the
e. Failure of a corporation to comply
1 the qualifications of section 1286, by in-
iDg the word designating the business
e carried on, did not render its incorpora-
"void," but "voidable" only; such be-
the evident import of the two sections
'ode 1896, which are pari materia. State
reL Thompson v. Colias, 43 South. 190,
192, 150 Ala. 515 (citing BweU v. Daggs,
ap. Ct 408, 108 U. S. 148, 27 L. Ed. 682;
ieep V. Lecony, 1 N. J. Law, 112; New
k & Long Island Bridge Co., 42 N. B. 1088,
N. Y. 540; Columbia ft P. S. B. Co. v.
Bralllard, 40 Pac 382, 12 Wash. 22; Van
Shaack v. Roboins, 36 Iowa, 201 ; Rhelner v.
Union Depot, etc, Co., 17 N. W. 623, 31 Minn.
289 ; Brown v. Brown, 50 N. H. 538, 552).
NULLA BONA
A return on an execution "nulla bona" Is
a return that the execution is uncollectible.
Card V. Groesbeck, 124 N. Y. Supp. 372, 373,
140 App. Div. SO.
A return on an execution issued on a
Justice's Judgment, reciting: "Executed the
within writ in the county of Stoddard, state
of Missouri, on the 2d day of May, 1893. No
property found to levy this execution" — con-
stituted a sufficient return of "nulla bona."
ScharfT v. McGaugh, 103 S. W. 650, 552, 206
Mo. 844.
NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRIT REGI
'The maxim ^nullum tempus occurrit
regi' only applies In favor of the sovereign
power, and has no application to municipal
corporations deriving their powers from the
sovereign, although their powers, in a limited
sense, are governmental. Thus the statute
runs for or against towns and dtles, and al-
so for or against counties." In an action
between a county and an individual, the stat-
ute of limitations is applicable to the same
extent as though both parties were natural
persons. State ex rel. Board of Com*rs of
Fountain County v. Stuart, 91 N. E. 613, 615,
46 Ind. App. 6U (quoting Wood, Lim. f 53).
NUMBER
See Reasonable Number; Street and
House Number ; Street Number.
Where the evidence showed that the
state's witness on "one" occasion stated that
he bought the liquor from another, and not
from defendant, the court properly refused to
instruct the Jury to acquit, if they believed
from the evidence that such witness made a
"number" of statements that he did not pur-
chase the liquor from defendant, but from
another. Faulk v. State, 59 South. 225, 226,
4 Ala. App. 177.
HirMBER OF VOTES
See Greatest Number of VotesL
NUNC PRO TUNC
An entry *'nunc pro tunc^ is something
different from an entry correcting an over-
sight or mistake. Such entry assumes that
an act was done at a particular time, which
never got of record in the proper books ; and
the entry is finally made now for then. Ho-
facre v. City of Montlcello, 103 N. W. 488,
489, 128 Iowa, 239.
*'The court may order 'nunc pro tunc'
entries, as they are called, made to supply
•
1
ir
'
■iHf
NUNC PRO TUNC
664
NUT Olli OE OIL OF inJTS
some diBisslon in the entry of what was done
at the preceding term; yet this is a power
the extent of which is limited and not easily
defined. In general, mere clerical errors may
be amended in this way." Evans v. Freeman,
140 Fed. 419, 424,
The office of a "nunc pro tone*' entry is,
not to make an order now for then, but to
enter now for then an order previously made;
and the fact that a Judge in chambers ex-
pressed a willingness to make a desired or-
der extending the time for filing a motion for
new trial, where no such order was actually
made or directed in court, does not warrant
the entry of such an order nunc pro tunc at
a succeeding term. Klein v. Southern Pac.
Co., 140 Fed. 213, 216.
A "nunc pro tunC entry can only be em-
ployed to correct a clerical mistake or mis-
prision of the derk. It can never correct a
mistake or oversight of the judge, nor be
used to correct Judicial errors, nor to render
a Judgment different from that actually ren-
dered, even though the Judgment actually
rendered, was not the Judgment the Judge
intended to render. Bumside v. Wand, 71 S.
W. 337, 389, 170 Mo. 581, 62 L. B. A. 427.
A •'nunc pro tunc" entry can only be
made upon evidence furnished by the papers
and files in the cause, or something of rec-
ord, or in the minute book or Judge's docket,
as a basis to amend by. The stenographer's
notes of proceedings in an action do not con-
stitute a paper or file in the cause, which can
be made the basis of an amendment of a
Judgment "nunc pro tunc" A memorandum
for a Judgment drawn by an attorney to be
copied by the clerk does not constitute a rec^
ord, paper, or file in the action, which can
be made the basis of an amendment of a
Judgment "nunc pro tunc.'' Becher v. Denser,
69 S. W. 363, 364, 169 Mk). 159 (citing Mis-
souri, K. & B. By. Go. v. Holschlag, 45 S. W.
1101, 144 Mo. 256, 66 Am. St. Bep. 417 ; Young
V. Young, 65 S. W. 1016^ 165 Mo. ^4, 88 Am.
St Bep. 440).
The purpose of an order "nunc pro tunc"
is to make a present record of an order
which the court made at a previous term, but
which was not then recorded; it being im-
proper to make the record show an order not
previously actually made, and hence accused,
who was sentenced on a plea of guilty, is not
entitled to an order nunc pro tunc setting
aside the sentence. People v. Wllmot, 96 N.
E. 973, 975, 254 IlL 554.
NURSE
As servant, see Servant
The mere giving of massage treatments
professionally falls within the profession of
a trained "nurse," and one who gives such
treatments is not required to be licensed.
People, to Use of State Board of Health, v.
Hettiger, 150 lU. App. 448, 45L
Merely giving manage treatment
bathing a patient falls properly within I
profession of a trained "nurse," while i
ministering osteopathic treatment does i
Witty V. State, 90 N. EL 627, 630, 173 I
404, 26 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1297 (dting Peo]
V. Gordon, 62 N. BL 858, 194 lU. 560, 88 A
St Bep. 166).
An agreement to "nurse" an adult i
plies that the object of the care is sick, a
means much more than mere watchfulBc
and contemplates such care and attenti
of the person as will conduce to the co
fort and hasten the recovery of the patie:
but the practice of medicine, within the st
ute regulating its practice, implies not oi
the knowledge of the professional nurse, t
implies much more, and includes the appli<
tion of medical knowledge of disease, and t
loss of health, and henoe an agreement
nurse a person during his lifetime in a
sideration of the devise of the patient's pn
erty is not an agreement to practice medLd
without a Ucoiae prohibited by the statu
so as to prevent spedflc pexformanoe of t
contract Oswald t. Nehla, 84 N. £. 6
622, 283 IlL 488.
HUBSZlfO
The word ''caring," in an Instruction
an action by a parent for injuries to 1
minor child authorizing a recovery for t
services of his wife in nursing, and medi(
attendance made necessary by the injury,
synonymous with "nursing," and means t
usual attendance on eldk persons, and t
use thereof does not render the instructi
misleading. Johnson v. St Paul ft W. C<
Co., Ill N. W. 722, 728, 131 Wis. 627.
NUTS
Marrons (chestnuts) preserved in syr
are not dutiable as "nuts" under paragrs]
272, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, 1 1, Sdic
ule G, 30 Stat 172. Schall ft Go. v. Unit<
States, 154 Fed. 1005, 83 C. a A. 329.
Apricot stones oome within the comnn
definition of "nuts," and aprioot kernels a
dutiable as "nuts * * * not special
provided for," under paragraph 272, Taii
Act July 24^ 1897, o. 11, | 1, Schedule G, :
Stat 172. United States v. Spenoer ft O
151 Fed. 1022, 81 a a A. 683.
NUT OIL OR OIL OF NUTS
"Nut oil" derived from the fmlt <
aleurltes vemica of China, which is simih
to the so-called Jatropha nuts, is proper
subject to classification of "nut oil or o
of nuts," not otherwise specially provide
for under the provisions of l&e Free List 1
TaHff Act July 24, 1897, c 11, S 2, par. 62
30 Stat 199. Edward mils, Sims ft Go.
United States, 127 FM. 970i
HUTOALLS
C66
KXTTRINB
TGALLS
"Extract of natgalla," an artide wblch
mde by grinding natgalls, digesting the
der In water, and filtering to remove im-
ties, a chemical being added as a pre-
atlve wldiout working any chemical
ige, Is not dutiable as tannin or tanle
i, under paragraph 1, Schedule A, { 1,
L, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, 80 Stat 151,
as a chemical compound under para-
)h 3, Schedule A, f 1, c. 11, 80 Stat 101,
either directly or by similitude as "drugs,
I as • • • nutgalla, • • • ad-
ranced in Talne or condition,** under para-
graph 20, Schedule A, | 1, c. 11, 80 Stat 152.
W. N. Proctor & Co. t. United States, 189
Fed. 586^ 088.
NUTRINE
"Nntrine,** which is made out of crushed
grain, com, and wheat sifted, mixed with
cotton seed meal and molasses, is not flour,
within article 280 of the ConsUtution of 1898,
in reference to exemption from taxation. At-
las Feed Products Co. v. City of New Or-
leans, 87 South. 081, 088, 118 La. eil.
O. F. B. A.
eee
OATH
o
0. F. B. A.
Where a writ was indorsed •'Dr. Peter
Brudgeman, O. F. B. A.," It was held clear
from the remainder of the writ that "Odd
Fellows' Building Association" was meant
Odd Fellows' Bldg. Ass'n ▼. Hogan, 28 Ark.
261, 264.
0. K.
"O. E." may have no title to be classed
as elegant English, but in the business life
of this country it has for many years been
in common use, and has acquired a meaning
which is not all obscure or uncertain. Web-
ster's International Dictionary defines It as
"all correct." The Century Dictionary gives
its meaning as "all Hccht; correct; now com-
monly used as an indorsement, as on a bill."
It is neither more nor less than a brief, but
expressive, certificate of the correctness of
the bill or clain^ on which it is indorsed.
Hence mere "O. K." indorsements on bills by
architects are a suflacient compliance with a
contract for the erection of a building requir-
ing an estimate to be given by the architect
for 85 per cent, of work and materials, and
providing that payments shall be made on
written certificates of the architects, without
designating any particular form of certifi-
cate. Getchell & Martin Lumber & Mfg.
Co. V. Petterson & Sampson, 100 N. W. 660,
554, 124 Iowa, 509.
Under Rev. St. 1908, f 3437, requiring
each water commissioner to keep an account
of the time of each assistant employed by
him, and to certify it to the board of county
commissioners, accounts of deputies contain-
ing "O. K. George Hider, Water Commission-
er, District No. 40," are sufiiciently certified
by the commissioner; the* abbreviation "O.
K." meaning "all right," "correct." Board
of Com'rs of Gunnison County v. Hider, 107
Pac. 1068, 1069, 47 Colo. 443.
A« indloatliis consent
The court, on plaintiff's motion for the
direction of a verdict, discharged the Jury,
and directed plaintiff's counsel to prepare
the findings and judgment Thereupon de-
fendant's attorney, in open court, stated,
"And we can have an exception to each and
every finding." Findings and conclusions,
with form of Judgment, were prepared and
served on defendant's counsel. In the
transcript, below the findings, conclusions,
and Judgment entry, was the abbreviation
"O. K.," followed with the signature of de-
fendant's counsel. Held, that the abbrevia-
tion "O. K." did not show that defendant's
counsel assented to the findings, conclusions,
and Judgment Humphries v. Sorenson, 74
Pac. 690, 692, 33 Wash. 563.
0 N
A bill of lading declared that. If the
word "Order," was written thereon immedi-
ately before or after the name of tlie part;
to whose order the property was eonsigDed
the surrender of the bill of lading, properly
Indorsed, should be required before d^very
of the property. An organ blower was ship-
ped by plaintiff under a bill of lading, recit-
ing: "Consigned to Organ Power Company.
P. R. M. Co. Notify Patton-Rnbush Mu^lc
Company. Via Merchants Dispatch.** The
freight bill contained the following: "Con-
signee Organ Power Company, O N Pat-
ton-Rubush M. House." Held that, as the
court would take Judicial notice that the tet-
ters "O N" signified "order notify," the car-
rier was chargeable as for a misdellTery lo
delivering the blower to the person to be
notified without surrender of the biil of lad-
ing and payment of the draft thereto attach-
ed. Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Or-
gan Power Co., 46 South. 254, 92 Miss. 781.
0. R.
"O. R.," as used in a contract of ship-
ment, indicates that the shipment Is made
on the owner's risk. Nairn v. Biissonri, K.
& T. R. Co., 106 S. W. 102, 126 Ma App. 707.
OAK
See White Oak.
OAR
In mechanics an oar is but a lever. The
oarlock is the fulcrum; so that, given a loose
oar, the distance from the fulcnun to the
power or weight is liable to shift or varr
between the oars, and result in an uneven or
unsteady stroke, and prevent, in sudi contin-
gency, true and safe rowing. Where an em-
ployer furnished a safe boat with which to
row its employes to their place of work, the
fact that the boat was provided with tight
oars did not render the employer liable for
the death of a servant, who was drowned bj
the overturning of the boat Chrismer v.
Bell Telephone Co., 92 S. W. 378, 384, 194
Mo. 189, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 492.
OATH
See Corporal Oath; General Oath; Sup-
pletory Oath.
See, also. Swear — Sworn.
An *'oath" is an outward pledge, given
by the person taking It, that his attestation
or promise is made under an immediate sense
of his responsibility to God. Pumphr^ ▼.
State, 122 N. W. 19, 20, 84 Neb. 636, 23 L
R. A (N. S.) 1023, 18 Ann. Ca& 979.
OATH
667
OBJECT
^n *oath** l8 a solemn adjtintioii to God
anlsh the affiant If he swears falsely,
its sanction is a belief that the Supreme
g ^wiU panlsh falsehood. Birmingham
rdsht & Power Ck>. y. Jung, 49 South.
4^0, 161 Ala. 461, 18 Ann. Cas. 657.
Pile word "oath" does not necessarily
y perjury, for an oath may be taken out-
of judicial proceedings, or by other
ol authority, and, although false, would
be perjury, but only false swearing.
ed States y. Howard, 132 Fed. 325, 338.
Comp. Laws 1909, f 2177, defines '*oath"
Including every mode of attesting the
1 of that which is stated which is author-
by law. Town of Checotah y. Town of
lula, 119 Pae. 1014, 1017, 31 Okl. 85.
Tbe requirement of Gly. Code 1910, f
; tbat exceptions to tiie award of arbi-
0T8 be made "on oath," is not met by af-
rit of the party filing such exception that
are true to the best of his knowledge
beUef. Winn y. BiiUer, 71 & B. 658» 669,
Ga. 38a
rs OF OFFIOB
See Neglect to Take Oatii.
rS-BOUND FRATEBNITT
"Oath-bound" and ^'secret," as used in
1909, p. 332, prohibiting '^secret, oath-
ad*' fraternities in the public schools, are
onymous. Bradford ▼. Board of fiduca-
t of City and County of San Francisco,
Pae. 929, 932, 18 OaL App. 19.
TS
See Country Run Oats; Texas Bed Rust^
Proof Oats.
As proTisions, see Proyisiona
The word "oats" is defined as ••prori-
18 laid in large for man and beast" Kan-
Clty, rt S. & M. R. Co. V. Graham, 74
r. 232, 233, 67 Kan. 791 (citing Dr. John-
's Diet, and Cent Diet).
,T FEED
Since the term *<oat f^ed" in its ordi-
7 acceptation does not mean the whole oat
in, either crushed or ground, but instead
ans that part of the grain which remains
er the miller subtracts the portions useful
human food, consisting of nubbins, mid-
ngs, hulls, and oat dust, a compound
^stance sold in packages under the name
omo Horse and Mule Feed," and describ-
OD the package as a "mixture of ground
'alfa, oats, com, alfalfa, oat and hominy
^ds," with the name of the manufacturer
d place of manufacture, followed by an
alysis of its contents, was not mlsbrand-
m violation of the food and drugs act (Act
ng. June ,30, 1906, c. 8915, 34 Stat 768),
cau8e it contained an excess of oat hulls
compound and not the whole ground oats.
United States r. One Car Load of Como
Horse and Mule Feed, 188 Fed. 4S3, 457.
OAT HUIX8
A by-product in the manufacture of oat-
meal, which consists merely of the broken
hulls of the oats, and is known as "oatmeal
feed," is dutiable as "oat hulls,*' under the
Tariff Act of July 24, 1897. United States
T. McGettrick, 139 Fed. 304.
OBITER DICTUM
See Dictum.
OBJECT
See Natural Object of His Bounty.
*'ObJect" is the end to be attained by a
given action or efFort Sawter r. Shoenthal,
80 Ati. 101, 81 N. J. Law, 197.
Of aotloBL
"The 'object' of an action is the reUef
demanded; the recovery of damages or the
land or personalty sued for; the restraint or
other relief demanded." Lassiter v. Norfolk
& C. R. Co., 48 S. E. 642, 643, 136 N. C. 89,
1 Ann. Cas. 456.
Of eonspiimejr
Under Rev. St | 5440, making criminal
a conspiracy to commit an offense against
the United States or to defraud it, where
one or more of the conspirators do some act
to effect the "object" of the conspiracy, it is
not enough that the conspiracy be directed to
the attainment of some unlawful object but
it must be directed to the attainment of such
an object as brings the conspiracy within
the class made criminal, and, when that ob-
ject is attained, "the object of the conspira-
cy" is effected, and there can be no further
overt act Lonabaugh y. United States, 179
Fed. 476, 481, 108 C. a A. 56.
Of statnte or ordinance
The "object" of a law is the aim or
purpose of the enactment State v. De Hart
33 South. 605, 606, 109 La. 570.
"The object of an act" as used in Const
art 4, f 7, par. 4, requiring that every law
shall embrace but one "object" and that
shall be expressed in its title, means the
end or aim of the subject There must not
be mixed in one and the same act such things
as have no proper relation to each other. To
except from an act one of the class which
the act would otherwise interdict is not to
intermingle subjects having no relation to
each other, but to legislate on a subject cov-
ered by the statute and germane to its pro-
visions, and to give expression in the one act
to the legislative purpose covering all the
subjects embraced within the object of the
statute. The act entitled "An act for the
protection of pigeons and other fowl and
constituting the violation of its provisions a
misdemeanor," approved April 12, . 1904 (P.
OBJBcrr
OBULaATlOK
L. p. 510) Ifl not in conflict with sndi con-
stitutional provisions. State t. Davis, 61
Atl. 2; 3, 72 N. J. Law, 346.
Under the requirement of the Constitu-
tion that the "object" of an act must be ex-
pressed in its title, the true rule is that the
object expressed must give notice of the ef-
fect of the legislation to one conversant with
the existing state of the law. The validity
of the title is not to be determined by nice
distinctions o( etymology or definition of
words, but by the facts of the case and the
history of the legislation. Sawter v. Shoen-
thai, 83 Ati. 1004, 83 N. J. Law, 499; Har-
ris V. American Casualty Co. of Reading,
Pa., 86 Atl. 194, 83 N. J. 641, 44 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 70.
OBJECTIOK
As proceeding, see Proceeding.
Exception synonymous, see Exception.
Subject to objection, see Subject To.
Cases on appeal are tried from a bill of
"exceptions," not a bill of "objections." It
is true that the word "object" in certain
connections may have the same meaning as
"except" In the course of a- trial an objec-
tion is made to the end that a ruling of the
court may be had. This mMng is not upon
what the court itself has done, but upon
what the parties are doing or offering to do.
The objection goes to the act of persons oth-
er than the court and is made to get action
from the court When the court acts, the
error is preserved by an exception to the
ruling. Thus the origin of the term "bill of
exceptions.'* Harding v. Missouri Pac Ry.
Co., 134 S. W. 641, 643, 282 Mo. 444, Ann.
Cas. 1912B, 1221.
OBJEOXIONABI.E JVBOB
An "Objectionable Juror" Is one against
whom exists some ground or cause, such as
the formation of opinion or some prejudice,
which might be ground, of challenge, and
would tend to show that the Jury was not
absolutely fair and impartiaL Carter y.
State, 76 S. W. 487, 439, 46 Tex. Or. R. 430.
OBJEGTXVB SYMPTOM
"Objective symptoms" are those which
the surgeon discovers from a physical exam-
ination of his patient, while subjective symp-
toms are those he learns from what his
patient tells him. Dean v. Wabash B, Co.,
129 S. W. 963, 967, 229 Mo. 426^^
OBLIGATE
OBUOATIOH
See CivU Obligation; Existing ObUga-
tions; General Obligation; Imperfect
Obligation; Joint Obligation; Moral
Obligation; Natural Obligation; Orig-
inal Obligation; Pecuniary Obliga-
tion; Personal Obligation; Right Aris-
Ing Out of an Obligation; Several
Obligvtion; Single Obligatkm; SUt-
ntory Obligation*
Other obligation by whidi debt is 8eea^
ed, see Other.
"The word 'obligation' • • • imports
an existing moral or physical neeessity*
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Czanch (XO U. S.) ST.
144, 3 L. Bd. 162 (Johnson, J., diaeeating).
The term "obligation,'* as used In Loniri-
ana, is in its general and most extensile
sense synonymous with "duty;" Obligations
are of three kinds, imperfect, natoral, and
dvil, or petltect, obligations. Morgan's Loo-
islana & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Stewart. 44
South. 138, 148, 119 La. 892.
The term "obligation,'' as used In Rer.
St 1896, art 1194, subd. 6, providing that
when one has contracted In wilting to per-
form an obligation in a particular conntr^
suit may be brought therein or in tbe oous^
of defendant's domicile, means such an ob-
ligation that its breach would deprive tbe
other party of some ai^redable right or
cause him some actionable damage; and
where a written contract for the sale of
lumber did not provide that the price was
to be paid in H. county, or provide where
the lumber was to be delivered, merely pro-
viding that the seller should pay ttie frei^t
to a point in that county, there was no obli-
gation to be performed in H. county which
was breached by the buyer's refusal to or-
der and receive the remainder of the lum-
ber, whether the contract of sale be consid-
ered as executed or executory; the refiBal
to pay the full contract price being tbe onl;
material obligation breached in the first is-
stance, and the seller's measure of damages
not being affected by such refusal, if the
contract ' was executory. Ogbum-Dalchaa
Lumber Co. v. Taylor (Tex.) 126 S. W. 4a,
62.
Under Bums' Ana. St 1901, f 373, pro-
viding that in pleading the performance of a
condition precedent in a contract it shall be
sufficient to allege generally that the party
performed all the conditions on his part an
allegation that plaintiff fully perfiomied all
the obligations required of hw was a suf-
ficient compliance; for, while "obligatiiHi''
and ''condition" are not synonymoua tenns,
the effect of a valid condition is to impose
upon the party to whom it applies the obliga-
tion of perf ormanoeu Security Accident &
Si^ B&L Ass'n V. Lee, 66 N. B. 745, 160 Ind.
249.
In an action on notefl» defendant inter
posed a counterclaim for damages thronsh
violation of instructions by plaintUTs f onner
firms as factors, alleging that plaintiff as-
sumed and agreed to pay the "obligatioos''
of sudi firms. Held, that while the word
"obligations" has been limited on the one
hand to sealed instruments of ascertain kind
only and extended on the other to include all
legal duties* though as commonly used it im-
OBUQATIOK
<69
OBLIGATIOK
fiUeB no mose than a cause of action «fi*
denced by a writing, and would not extend
to an unliquidated liability aounding in
tort» it would on demurrer be assumed that
the pleader used the word in its larger senses
and the remedy for indeflniteness btfng by
motion under Code CLr, Proc | 640, the coun-
terclaim would be held to state a cause of
action on contract Carroll ▼. GOiarp, 122
N. Y. Supp. 694, 097, 67 Misc. Rep. 264.
Rev. Codes, | 4966, defines a "contract
as an agreement to do or not to do a certain
thing. Section 4966 provides that to a con-
tract there should be parties capable of con-
tracting, their consult, a lawful object, and a
sufficient cause of consideration. Section
4892 defines an "obligation" as a legal duty
by which a person is bound to do or not to
do a certain thing. Section 4898 provides
that an obligation arises either from the con-
tract of the parties or by operation of law.
Section 6446 provides that an action upon a
contract, account, or promise not founded
upon an Instrument In writing must be com-
menced within five years. Section 6447 pro-
vides that an action upon an obligation or
liability not founded upon an instrument in
writing other than a contract, account, or
promise must be commenced within three
years. Defendant, acting as agent to sell real
property to plalntifF, received $6,000 on the
purdmse price. Hie sale was not completed,
and but $4,000 was returned to plaintiff.
Held, in an action for the balance ttiat the
terms ^contract" and "obligation,** as used
in sections 6446 and 6447, were defined by
sections 4966, 4966, 4892, and 4893, and as
tbexe was no contract between the parties for
the return of the money an action to enforce
its return was not an action upon a contract
as defined by the Code% or as used in the
statute of limitations, but the duty to return
the money was an "obligation" or legal duty,
and the action being upon an obligation, not
founded upon an instrument in writing with-
in the statute of UmitatioDs, and not being
brought within three years, was barred.
Schaeffer r. MlUer, 109 Paa 970, 973» 41
Mont. 417, 137 Am. St B» 746.
The words "obligation executed,** as used
in P. U 1902, p. 459, prohibiting any eoipora-
tion from pleading usury on any obligation
executed by it refers to corporate obligations
such as bonds, mortgages, and the like^ and
does not apply to an agreement to pay a usn-
rloua eommission to an agent Mazarin v.
Hudson County Real Estate & Building Co.,
76 Aa 822, 823, SON. J. Law, 35.
Okeek
A bank dieck Is not an "obligation for
tiw payment of money," wttiUn the legal
meaning of audi term as used In B«r. 8t S
5461, providing for the punishment of bHb-
Cfy of United States eBkcetn, Tbe dcflni-
tlons of tlie woKd "cbe^" as given In 1 Boor.
Law Diet 226^1 Abb. Law met 214, 2 Daniel,
Neg. Inst (4th Bd.) | 1666, Bish. St Crimes
(2d Ed.) p. 299, f 328, and People v. Howell
<N. X.) 4 Johns. 301, do not support the
proposition that a "check" is an ''obligation
for the payment of money," within the mean-
ing of the statute. The definitions of the
word "obligation" as found In 2 Bouv. Law
Diet 254, Whart Law Diet, 2 Abb. Law
Diet 198» Strong t. Wheaton (N. Y.) 38
Barb. 616, Crandall v. Bryan (N. T.) 16 How.
Prac. 48, Hippon's Bx'rs v. Townsend's Bx'rs
(S. C.) 1 Bay, 446, and Basehore v. Rhodes,
86 Pa. 44, are not sufficiently broad to cover
the case of a "check." A "check" is a rep-
resentation by the drawer that he has money
on deposit with the drawee subject to his
order. The law implies a consideration for
the check, and a promise on the part of the
drawer to pay the amount of the check in
case it is not paid or accepted by the bank
or banker on which it is drawn. The giving
of a check is not the creation of an obliga-
tion, but is merely the admission by the draw-
er of the existence of an obligation to pay a
certain sum of money. If payable to bearer,
or to the order of the payee, it is negotiable
and passes by delivery or Indorsement; but
the check imposes no obligation on the drawee
to pay the same, at least as between the
drawee and payee; but if the bank refuses to
pay the che<^, having funds with which to
pay the same, the payee cannot maintain an
action in law or in equity against the bank
unless the bank has accepted the check. A
check is neither a draft or bill of exchange,
although it has many of the features of a bill
of exchange and some of the features of a
draft It is not a bond or a promissory note. '
It is not a contract, for it contains no prom-
ise by the drawer to any person. United
States V. Green, 136 Fed. 618, 646. 660 (cit-
ing Bull V. First Mat Bank, 8 Sup. Ct 62,
123 U. S. 110, 111, SI L. Bd. 97; Merchants'
Nat Bank v. State Nat Bank, 10 Wall. [T7
n. 8.1 604, 19 L. Ed. 1008; CJhapman v.
People, 89 Mich. 867, 869; In re Ricfater, 100
Fed. 296, 297; U. S. v. Boyall, 3 (branch, C.
C. 618, 27 Fed. Cas. 906; Elsasser v. Haines,
18 Ati. 1006, 62 N. J. Law, 10; Slnton v. Car-
ter County, 23 Fed. 636, 637, 638; Regina v.
Beed, 8 Carrlngton & Payne, 623; MerchantB'
Nat Bank v. SUte Bank, 10 Wall. [77 U. 8.]
604, 19 Ll Bd. 1008; Bull v. First Nat Bank,
8 Sup. Ct 62, 123 U. 8. 110, 111, 31 Ll
Ed. 97; People v. Howell [N. T.] 4 Johns.
296, 301).
DoM OT UftUUty
Obligation aa debt see Debt
Bev. St Ohio 1892, 18300, authorlaeaany
railroad company to purchase a railroad con-
structed by another company, and de<Hares
that after such purchase the purchasing
company shall be vested of all the rights and
powers in respeet to the location, eonstruc-
tlon, completion, and operation of sodi rail-
road, and tfiall be snltfect to an the duties.
OBUGATIOK
670
OBLiaATIOH
''obllgatioiiB*'' and restrictioiiB of the former
oompany. Held, tbat a claim for.bteach of
a contract to transport plalntifTs stone for
a specified rate, existing against a railroad
company whose line was pnrchased by de-
fendant» was not an ^'obligation" which de-
fendant was bound to perform under such
section; defendant never having agreed to
assume such liability. Rice v. Norfolk ft W.
Ry. Go., 153 Fed. 497, 498, 82 G. C. A. 447.
Where testator paid the secured debt of
his insane nephew In order to preserve the
security for the nephew In case he regained
his reason, the nephew's liability to reim-
burse testator was an "obligation" within
Rev. St 1909, f 1889, declaring that actions
on contracts, obligations, or liabilities, ex-
press or implied, shall be barred in five years,
and hence an action to enforce testator's
right to subrogation must be brought within
that time. Petty v. Tucker, 148 S. W. 142,
144, 166 Mo. App. 98.
Rev. Godes 1899, f 5047, relating to at-
tachment, defines "debtor" as one who by rea-
son of an existing obligation has or may be-
come liable to pay money to another,*whether
such liability is certain or contingent, and,
so defined, the term "debtor" has its usual
signification; that is, one from whom a debt
is due, using the word according to its com-
mon meaning. Section 3762 defines an "ob-
ligation" as a legal duty by which a person
is bound to do or not to do a certain thing.
The several sections quoted make it plain
that the Legislature has broadened the com-
mon meaning of the words "debtor" and
"creditor," so as to include all persons from
-whom or to whom obligations are due^ wheth-
er arising from contract or imposed by law;
but none of these provisions define the term
"debt," or furnish ground for the contention
that "debt" and "obligation" are synonymous.
It will be conceded that the common and
ordinary meaning of the term "debt," in
legal acceptation of the term, is an obligation
resting upon contract, either express or im-
plied. Under the statutory definitions of a
debtor, it is not necessary to owe a debt It
is sufficient if one owes an oUlgatlon imposed
by law. Every debt, however, is an obliga-
tion; but every obligation Is not a debt
"Obligation" is the broader term; "debt"
the narrower. The term "obligation" in-
cludes all debts. The term "debt" does not
include all obligations, but only that particu-
lar kind of obligations known as debts. The
statement, therefore, that the Legislature has
specifically defined the term "debt," and that
the term "debt" is synonymous with the
word "obligation," is not sustained by the
statute. Sonnesyn v. Akin, 97 N. W. 657,
560-663, 12 N. D. 227.
Deed or sealed instnunent
Under Rev. Gode 1852, amended to 1893,
p. 745, c. 99, § 12, providing that to an ob-
ligation for the. payment of any sum not
exceeding $200 there may be an extzt lu-
rant, duly executed, authorizing any Josttoe
of the peace to alter Judgment tbeie<m by
confession, the word "obligation" Imports ai
instrument under seal, as does the wamot;
and hence a note and warrant attacbel
neither of which were under seal, do not
give a Justice authority to enter Judgmeot
by confession. Slaughter v. Provident Sar.
Bank of Preston, Md. (DeL) 80 AtL 243, 24i
2 Boyce, 333.
IHity as oblisAtioB
See Duty.
Enforceable oliUsatioa
A promise founded upon a good ooDsid-
eratlon rendered at the time is obligatory and
enforceable. A loan of money and simple con-
tract debts are familiar instances of the
kind. The promise to repay the money or to
discharge the debt becomes binding and ob-
ligatory by reason of the promisor baving re-
ceived a consideration for making it WLen,
however, a promise, by whatsoever reason.
has become binding, it ia more aptly termed
an "obligation." But a promise of material
import will support a counter promise, and
vice versa. When mutually entered into,
they operate one as a consideration for tlw
other; thus constituting an agreement bind-
ing and obligatory upon both parties. Wbeie
the agreement is wholly executory, it is es-
sential that the obligation be mutual; else
there is no consideration for its support, and
it is but a mere nudum pactum. Llvesley ▼•
Johnston, 76 Pac. 946, 948, 45 Or. 30, 65 L
R, A. 783, 106 Am. St Rep. 647.
IdaMUtT enforoeaUa agalast hoB<-
stead
The meaning of the word "obligations.''
as used in Const. 1885, art. 10, f 1, provldin?
that an exemption of a homestead shall not
apply to obligations contracted for the pur-
chase of the property or for improvemeots
thereon, means a debt contracted to be V^
or a duty to be performed by the purdiaser
as a consideration of the purchase. Piatt t.
Piatt, 39 South. 536, 537, 50 Ma. 594 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in Whitaktf ^
ElUott, 73 N. G. 186k and dtlag Fox r. Bnoks.
88 N. C. 234).
A loan to the owner of a homestead, to
pay a note due for the purchase mosey of tbe
homestead, the lender taking the owner's
note, with an Indorsement of a third peisoo
thereon to whom he looks for payment is
not an "obligation," within a constltntionil
exception rendering a homestead liable for ^
obligation contracted for the purchase there-
of. Wilhelm T. Locklar, 35 South. 6, 46 Fit
575, 110 Am. St. R^. 111.
Should implying
Should implying, see Should.
Tax
In reference to the payment of t*^*
the terms "obligation" and "duty" are osed
n
OBLIGATION
671
OBLIGATION OP CONTRACT
^o senses ; the first being in reference to
vidnals, and the second being in reference
be sovereign imposing the tax. The mat-
of obligation to indiyidnals arises from
legal or equitable relation of the [>artie8;
matter of duty to the sovereign is fixed
the legislative enactments imposing the
In neither case is the measure of obli-
on fixed by the mere fact of an interest
in estate in the land. It is settled by the
tiorities that the party under obligation
)ay taxes cannot acquire a title at a tax
K Shrigley v. Black, 71 Pac. 301, 303,
Kan. 213 (dissenting opinion, quoting
att V. Price. 18 Fla. 289).
ort
An order of the federal court directing
receiver of a railroad ^o restore to the
road its property in his hands on the
eement of the railroad to assume "all law-
liabilities and obligations of the receiver
itlng on a designated date and save the
dver harmless against the payment of
' liabilities incurred by him, Imposes on
railroad the payment of liabilities ind-
tal to the receiver's operation of the road,
luding the liability for injuries to a pas-
ger through tire negligence of the receiv-
i servants; the word "obligations'* mean-
duties arising out of a contract or from
acUonable tort, and the word "liabilities"
luding any form of legal obligation meas-
d by money valuation, whether arising
m contract, express or implied, from duty
Josod by law or judgment of court, or in
sequence of a tort Vandalia R. Co. v.
^8, 91 N. E. 173, 175, 46 Ind. App. 363
f)tlng 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4878).
LIGATIOH BT WKIOH DBBT IS SE-
GUBED
Const art 13, f 1, permits provision, ex-
t in case of credits secured, for a deduc-
1 from credits of debts due to bona fide
Idents. Pol. Code, § 3617, subd. 8, pro-
es that a mortgage, or other ''obligation"
which a debt is secured, when land is
dged, shall, for the purposes of taxation,
deemed as interest In the land so pledged,
1 by subdivision 6 the term "credits"
ans those solvent debts not secured owing
the person assessed, and the term "debt"
ans those unsecured liabilities owing by
' person assessed to bona fide residents
1 section 3628, provides that, in assessing
rent credits not secured, a reduction shall
made of debts due bona fide residents, and
tioD 3650, snbd. 15, provides that in enter-
assessments containing solvent credits,
>ject to deduction, the assessor must enter
the proper column the value of debts and
luct them therefrom. Const art. 13, |
provides that a mortgage, or other obllga-
Q by which a debt is sechired, shall, for
purpose of taxation, be deemed an In-
est in the property affected. Pol. Code, S
^, contains the same provision. Held«
that a collateral security of credits by a loan
on personalty was not a mortgage, etc., or
"other obligation by which a debt is secured,"
within Const art 13, f 4, that section apply-
ing only to liens on land; nor was it a "mort-
gage or trust deed," within section 1, so that
the person assessed on such credits was en-
titled to have his debts deducted therefrom;
and Pol. Code, f 8629, subd. 6, directing the
asaessor to require each person assessed to
show separately all solvent credits unsecured,
is not applicable, not referring to the asses-
sor's du^ in making the assessment, but only
prescribing the ft>rm of the taxpayer's return
for the assessor's Information. Bank of Wil-
lows T. Glenn County, 101 Pac. 18, 155 Cal.
352.
OBUOATIOH FBAUBUUSlfTIiT ZX-
CUBMED
A debtor, who by fraudulent representa-
tions procures an extension of time within
which to pay a debt, fraudulently incurs an
"oUigation," within Rev. St f 2781, subd.
4, and renders his property subject to at-
tachment First Nat. Bank of Stevens Point
V. Rosenfeld, 28 N. W. 370, 371, 66 Wis. 292.
OBUOATIOH OF OOHTRACT
See Impairing Obligation of Contract.
"The 'obligation of a contract,' within
the meaning of the Constitution ia a valid
subsisting obligation, not a contingent or
speculative one." Ochiltree v. Iowa Railroad
Contracting Co., 21 WaU. (88 U. S.) 249, 252,
22 L. Ed. 546.
The "obligation of a contract" is Its en-
gaging quality, the attribute of binding force
upon the parties to it State ex rel. Coleman
V. PuUman Co., 90 Pac 319, 321, 75 Kan. 664.
The "obligation of a contract" consists
of the binding force of its stipulations upon
those who make them, and depends upon the
continued existence of the means of enforc-
ing its stipulations; otherwise a contract
would be without obligation, and would have
only such effect as the parties should choose
to give it, and a state law which unreason-
ably restricts the time to sue in its own
courts to enforce the judgment of a sistier
state on an existing contract impairs the ob-
ligation of the contract and is invalid. Lamb
V. Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 Fed.
434, 439, 65 C. O. A. 570, 67 L. R. A. 558.
"The 'obligation of a contract' consists
in its binding force on the party who makes
it This depends on tht laws in existence
when it is made. These are necessarily re-
ferred to in all contracts, and form a part of
them as the measure of the obligation to per-
form them by the one party and the right
acquired by the other. There can be no other
standard by which to ascertain the exteut of
either than that which the terms of the con-
tract indicate, according to their settled legal
meaning. When it becomes consummated, the
I
#'4i<:t|
II
*PI
OBLIOATION OP CONTRACT
672
OBSOENS— OBSOENITT
law defines the duty and the right, compete
one party to perform the thing oontracted
for, and gives the other a right to enforce
the performance by the remedies then in force.
If any subsequent law affect to diminish the
duty or to impair the right, it necessarily
bears on the obligation of the contract in
inYOT of one party, to the injury of the other;
hence any law which in its operation amounts
to a denial or obstruction of the rights ac-
cruing by a contract, though professing to
act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious
to the prohibition of the Constitution." **The
obligation of a contract in the constitutional
sense is the means provided by law by which
it can be enforced — by which the parties can
be obliged to perform it Whatever legisla-
tion lessens the efficacy of these means im-
pairs the obligation. If it tend to postpone
or retard the enforcement of the contract,
the obligation of the latter is to that extent
weakened." Harrison v. Remington Paper
Co., 140 Fed. 385, 391, 392, 72 C. O. A. 405,
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 954, 5 Ann. Cas. 314 (quot-
ing and adopting the definitions in McCrack«
en V. Hayward, 2 How. [43 U. S.] 008, 611,
612, 11 L. Ed. 397, and Louisiana ex rei
Ranger v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203, 206,
26 L. Ed. 132); Myers ▼. Knickerbocker
Trust Co., 139 Fed. Ill, 115, 71 C. C. A. 199, 1
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1171 (adopting definition in
McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. [43 U. S.]
608, 611, 11 L. Ed. 897).
Remedy as part of
The remedy, where it affects substantial
rights, is included in the terms "obligation of
a contract," and the remedy cannot be alter-
ed so as to materially impair such obligation.
Welsh V. Cross, 81 Pac. 229, 280, 146 CaL
621, 106 Am. St Rep. 63, 2 Ann. Cas. 796 (cit-
ing Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 600, 24 L.
Ed. 793).
"The 'obligation of a contract' includes
everything within its obligatory scope.
Among these elements nothing is more im-
portant than the means of enforcem^it ; that
is the breath of its vital existence. Without
it a contract, in the view of the law, ceases
to be, and falls into the class of those Imper-
fect obligations,' as they are termed, which
depend for their fulfillment upon the will
and conscience of those upon whom they rest
The ideas of right and remedy are insepara-
ble. * • • The laws which subsist at the
time and place of making a contract enter in-
to and form a part of it, as if they were
expressly referred 4o or incorporated in its
terms. This rule embraces alike those which
affect its validity, construction, discharge^
and enforcement" Blakemore v. (}ooper, 106
N. W. 566, 569, 15 N. D. 5, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1074, 125 Am. St Rep. 574 (quoting and
adopting definitions in Edwards v. Kearzey,
96 U. S. 595, 24 L. Ed. 793).
"The 'obligation of a contract' in the
constitutional s^se. Is the means provided by
law by whicb it can be enforced, b^ which
the parties can be obliged to perform it*
Bx parte Folsom, 181 Fed. 496^ 503 ; HoiDan
& Grace v. Boajrd of caiosen Fieeliolders of
Essex County, 64 AtL 742, 745, 71 N. J. Bq.
541 (quoting Louisiana «c r^ Ranker ▼. New
Orieans, 102 U. & 203, 206, 26 L. fid. 132).
Thus a constltutioaal amendment intended
to impair the means provided by law for the
payment of municipal bonds Is obnoxloDS to
the federal (Constitution. Ex parte Folsom.
131 Fed. 496, 503 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in Louisiana ex reL Ranger v. New Or-
leans 102 U. 8. 206^ 26 L. Ed. 182).
OBLIGATION OF UNlTlgD STATES
United States treasury checks, or orden
issued for interest accrued upon registered
bonds of the United States, where Intended
for immediate payment, may be taxed by a
state, in the bands of the owner, witbont vio-
lating Rev. St U. 8. f 8701, tfcempting ''ob-
ligations of the United States" from state
taxation. Hibemia Savings & Loan Society
V. aty and Oounty of San Francisco, 26 Supi
€%. 266, 266, 200 U. 8. 810, 50 L. Bd. ^5, 4
Ann. Oas. 934.
OBUOATOBT WJUTUIQ
See Writing Obligatory.
What constitutes a writing,
—Writings.
WritiDC
OBUOSB
As creditor, i
Creditor.
OBLITERATE-OBLITERATION
OBIiITEBATEB OOBNEB
Section 2 of a circular of the United
States General Land Office relative to tbe res-
toration of lost or obliterated comers defines
an "obliterated oomer" as one where no via-
ble evidoice remains of the work of tbe orig-
inal surveyor in establishing it; and defines
a "lost corneal as one, the po0iti<m of wfaidi
cannot be determined beyond reasonable
doubt, either from original or reliable marfca
or reliable external evidence. Oaven v.
Lesh, 126 Pac 774, 775, 22 Idaho, 4fi3L
OBSCENE— OBSCENITY
The word ''obscene," when used, as tai
the statute, to describe the characttt* of a
book, pamphlet, or paper, means containing
immodest and indecent matter, the reading
whereof would have a tendency to d^rare
and corrupt the minds of those into whose
hands the publication might fall, whose
minds are open to such immoral influeneea
United States v. Moore, 129 Fed. 159, 161
(citing United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed. 732).
The word "obscene^ means ''(riSeosAve to
senses; repulsive; disgusting; fool; filthy:
offensive to modesty or deomcj; impore; as-
chaste; indecent; lewd." Holeombe t. Stat^
62 8. a ^7» 648, 5 Qa* AffP^ 47.
OBSO£NE-OBSO£NITT
673
OBSERVE
In ReT. St I 3893, as amended in 1888,
making it a misdemeanor to mail any ob-
8ce&e writing, the word "obscene** should be
given fully as broad a significance as it had
at common law. Knowles v. United States,
170 Fed. 409, 412, 95 O. C. A. 579.
A letter held not to contain matter which
was "obscene, lewd or lascivious,'* within the
meaning of Rev. St I 3693, so as to render its
mailing an indictable offense thereunder.
United Stotes v. O'Donnell, 165 Fed. 218, 220.
The word *'vulgar." as used in the act of
May e, 1893 (Gen. Laws, p. 177, c. 121), as
amended by the act of April 27, 1901 (Oen.
Laws, p. 314, c. 13^, requiring a bond by liq-
uor dealers to keep an orderly house, and
providing that it must not contain any vul-
gar or obscene pictures, conveys such mean-
ing as, with its companion word "obscene,"
will accomplish the purpose of the statute,
whidi was to prevent the exhibitions in sa-
loons of immoral and indecent pictures.
The word "obscene" in the statute is not lim-
ited to pictures suggestive of lewdness or
lasdviousness. An instruction defining "ob-
scene'* as "offensive to chastity and decency,
impure^ expressing or presenting to the mind
or view something which delicacy, purity,
and decency forbid to be exposed," is errone-
ous. Raley v. State, 105 8. W. 342, 344,
47 Tex. Qv. App. 426.
InsvltiBC iMMg^migB
A remark to a married woman; "Look
me in the eye. Are you satisfied with the
man you married?' — will not sustain a con-
viction for using "obscene and vulgar lan-
guage" in the presence of a female, where
there is nothing in the evidence to indicate
that the remark was intended to convey an
obscene and vulgar meaning. Roberts v.
State, 47 S. B. 511, 512, 120 Ga. 177.
The phrase "obscene and vulgar lan-
guage," as used In Pen. Code 1895, § 396,
making a person who shall use obscene and
vulgar language in the presence of a female
guilty of a misdemeanor, includes any foul
words which would reasonably offend the
sense of modesty and decency of a woma^ in
whose presence the words are spoken, under
all the circumstances of the case. Holcombe
V. State, 62 S. E. 647, 648, 5 Ga. App. 47.
"Language" is a generic term, and in-
cludes any words or speech by which thought
may be conveyed, and language may be "ob-
scene and vulgar" when used in the presence
of a female without the use of a single word
which could be intrinsically classified as be-
ing obscene and vulgar. Morris v. State, 65
S. B. 58, 59, 6 Ga. App. 896.
Beziial impurity
As used in Rev. St f 3893, declaring
every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book,
pamphlet, print or ottier publication of an
Indecent character, or notices giving infor-
mation for obtaining such publicatlonB, to be
8 WDB.& P.2D SBB.-43
nonmailable matter, and prescribes a punish-
ment for the use of the mails to transmit or
circulate the same, the word "obscene" sig-
nifies that form of immorality which has re-
lation to sexual impurity, having the same
meaning as is given them at common law
in prosecutions for obscene libel. Hanson v.
United States, 157 Ffed. 749, 750, 85 C. O. A.
326.
OBSCURE
"Obscure", means not dear, fuH, or dis-
tinct; clouded; imperfect "Obscurement of
reason" is not synonymous with "dethrone-
ment of reason" as a definition of "heat of
passion." Dillon t. State, 119 N. W. 352,
356, 137 Wis. 655, 16 Ann. Gas. 913.
OBSCITREMENT OF BISASOH
Dethronement of reason distinguished,
see Dethronement of Reason.
OBSERVE
The word "observe" is defined to mean
"to notice with care; to be on the watch re-
specting." An employ^ has the right to as-
sume that a machine is safe, and is charge-
able with notice of dangers or defects that
are plain and obvious to view, but is not
bound to make an Inspectioii to ascertain if
the machine is free from defects ; tiiat is, he
is not required "to take notice with care"
and "to be on the watdi" for defects or im-
perfections, which would be implied from
the use of the word "observe" in an instruc-
tion that the law required him to be observ-
ing, and that his failure to observe what he
should have observed would defeat a re-
covery. Rock Island Sash ft Door Works v.
Pohlman, 71 N. B. 428, 480, 210 111. 133.
Where, by defendant's constitution, ben-
efits were restricted to members in good
standing who had paid all dues, and who
faithfully observed the laws, rules, com-
mands, and regulations then in force, or
which might thereafter be added to the con-
stitution, by-laws, and rules, and in taking
his obligation of membership, without which
admittance was impossible, decedent agreed
in writing to abide by the constitution as
it then was, or might thereaft^ be amended,
the words "to observe" and "to abide by"
meant to obey and to accept the consequence
es of, and, so far as amendments were con-
cerned, were not restricted to amendments
of those laws and rules as related entirely
to disciplinary and social regulations, but
extended as well to amendments affecting
decedent's right to benefits. Order of United
Commercial Travelers of America v. Smith,
192 Fed. 102, 104, 112 G. O. A. 442.
Snnday
Unless an individual ceases from labor
on Sunday, he does not "observe" the day,
within the meaning of Or. Code, § 241, and
if he does on every Sunday, or the seventh
OBSTAOLK
674
OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCnON
•:^i
1?
M
i-i fr'
day of the week, refrain from labor, he ob-
serves that day. Ex parte CaldweU, 118 N.
W. 133, 135, 82 Neb. 6ii.
OBSTACLE
As obstrmstloa •! Idsbwaj
The word "obstacle," as used In a stat-
ute making it a misdemeanor to cat or place
a tree, brush, or other obstacle across a pub-
lic road, so as to impede travel, and not
remove the same within six hours, should
be construed as referring to obstructions of
a temporary dtiaracter, which, if not willful,
do not become criminal unless they remain
for as long as six hours. Goitral of Georgia
Ry. Co. V. State, 40 South. Ml, 982, 146
Ala. 99.
OBSTETRICS
Am practice of medicine, see Practioe of
Medicine.
OBSTINATE DESERTION
See^ also. Desertion.
"'Obstinate* means determined, fixed,
persistent'* "E3ven if a wife deserts without
cause, and afterwards realizes that she has
acted hastily or foolishly, and would return
if the way was opened for her, but the hus-
band refrains from doing anything to induce
her to return, for the purpose of making her
absence a ground for divorce, her desertion
is not 'obstinate,* and not, therefore, a
ground for divoroa" A husband is not
bound to attempt to induce his wife to re-
turn, when it is dear any effort in that di-
rection would be unavailing. Hudson v.
Hudson, 61 South. 867, 868, 869, 69 Fla.
629, 29 L. B. A. (N. S.) 614, 138 Am. St Hep.
141, 21 Ann. Cas. 278 (quoting and adopting
definition in TraU v. Trail, 32 N. J. Bq. 231).
A desertion can only be adjudged "ob-
stinate** within the statute relating to di-
vorce when it has resisted such efforts or
concessions as the party alleging desertion
ought, under the particular circumstances,
to have made to prevent it or to bring it to
an end, though the conduct of the deserting
party may be of such a nature that the de-
sertion will be deemed obstinate without
any effort on the part of the deserted party
to prevent or terminate it Kipp v. Kipp, 78
Att. 682, 77 N. X Eq. 686.
OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION
See Lawful Obstructions; Temporary Ob-
struction; Wrongful Obstruction.
See, also, Obstacle.
Of due admlnistratUa of Jvstioe
Since the United States commissioner,
after having held a person accused to an-
swer to the federal courts^ has no further
duty to perform in the matter, a subsequent
assault committed by such accused od tb(
commissioner, induced by tlie latter's us,
does not constitute an "obetructioo of \q&
ttce,** within Rev. St i 6399, providmg tM
the punishment of every person "who cor
ruptly, or by threats or force, obstructs ci
impedes, or endeavors to obstmct or is
pede, the due administration of Justice" li
any court of the United Statni Unite
States T. McLeod, 119 Fed. 418, 41S.
A bare attempt, without success, to i:
duce a third person to do what he ooold t
influence jurors in a pending case in a fe^
oral court, did not obstruct or impede tt
administration of justice, 'so as to constitct
a contempt, punishable under Rev. St f TS;
under the rule that, to constitute socb m
tempt, the act done by the aocnaed no;
naturally and directly tend to sodi otetrvt
tion. As stated in United States v. Met
27 Fed. Gas. 1010, no 'obstruct,* ind^
ent of the acceptation the word has obttiM
in the criminal law, would seem to sttod e
vi termini a direct and positive interpos
tion, which prevented or tended to prefa
the action of the oflicer or court in rem
to a matter then to be proceeded in. 'In
pede^ must necessarily bear a similar in
port and, if there be any discriminfltioB Ix
tween the two terms, it can only be tlu
the same direct and positive interfereDC
may, without amounting to a compiete ol
struction, become an impediment to the a<
Uon intended to be interested. The Inta
tion of the Legislature to give tbese tem
an application only to direct acts of nolecc
or menace is inferable from the constrc
tion that the endeavor is made equL)
criminal with the entire completion of U
purpose. An endeavor to obstruct or ii
pede, etc, by threats or force, woold nece
sarily imply the effort to put fortb sod
act which in its natural, if not necessar:
consequence must be attended with as ol
struction, and with a forced and compelle
interruption of further progress in tbe a(
ministration of Justice.** United States
Carroll, 147 Fed. 947, 963 (citing Unite
States V. Bittinger, 24 Fed. Caa 1149; E
parte McRae, 77 S. W. 211, 46 Tei. Cr. I
26Q).
Of Uslaway
As injury to property, see InJ^ ^
Property.
As public nuisance, see Public Nnisaoc
The term "obstruction," used with rei
erence to a street or hii^way, meaos tb
placing of obstacles or impediments in tb
way, so as to prevent free passage alonf i
and render it difficult for travel. People^
Eckerson, 117 N. Y. Supp. 419, 422, 133 Ap{
Div. 220.
A street railway company's act in P^
mitting its cars to stand upon its trads f«
a reasonable length of time does not coi
stttute an ''obstruction of a highway." ^
:i
OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION
675
OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION
ind ▼. United Traction Co., 05 N. T. Supp.
98, 500, 107 App. DlT. 50L
An *'ob8traction" Is a blo<ddng np; fill-
ig with obstacles or Impediments; imped-
ig; embarrassing or opposing tbe passage
long and oyer a street Meservey ▼. Oulll-
ord, 03 Pac 780, 786, 14 Idaho, 133 (citing
:base y. City of Oshkosh, 51 N. W. 560, 81
^Is. 313, 15 L. R. A. 563, 20 Am. St Rep.
dS; 6 Words and Phrases, p^ 4801).
An "obstraction'' Is an obstacle In the
ray, or an impediment or hindrance which
mpedes, embarrasses^ opposes^ or Interferes
nth the free passage along tbe highway. A
petition In an action for damages for the
emoyal of a cattleway across a public high-
ly, which alleges that the cattleway was
lot a direct obstruction, does not negatlye
he Inference that It was %n obstruction
^thin Code Supp. 1007, i 1560, requiring
he road superylsor to remoye all obstruc-
ions In the road. Davis v. Pldserell, 117 N.
V. 276, 277, 130 Iowa, 186.
A "street" Is a public way, from side to
dde and end to end, so that any private use
jFbldi In any degree hinders or prevents Its
:ree use as a public way to Its full extent Is
m "obstruction" or 'Incumbrance" within the
JDeanlng of the law. Lacey v. City of Oska-
oosa, 121 N. W. 642, 644, 143 Iowa, 704, 31
U R. A. (N. S.) 853.
An '^obstruction'* is merely matter out of
Mce, and that which may be a stepping stone
in a position where It Is needed and may be
ased as such becomes an obstruction when
occupying a place Intended for other use,
and where it la not needed and cannot be so
Qsed. Where a pavement has been laid, the
asphalt surface of which lays smoothly down
to the curb, a block of stone placed within the
corb is an ''obstruction," and becomes a nui-
sance. McCormack v. Robin, 52 South. 770,
781, 126 La. 504, 180 Am. St Rep. 540.
An embankment In a street dedicated to
public travel and traveled as a public street,
is an "obstruction," and under the Vrooman
Act (St 1885, p. 160, c 158) the superlnt^d-
ent of streets Is liable for failing to take
steps to protect against the danger to public
travel caused thereby. Merrltt v. McFar-
land, 88 Pac 860, 870, 4 Cal. App. 800.
The placing of a fence across a public
road constitutes an ''obstruction," within Rev.
Code 1852, as amended 1803, p. 501, c. 60, |
31t declaring that. If any person shall ob-
struct a public road, he shall be deemed
polity of a misdemeanor. State v. Southard
(Del.) 66 Aa 872, 873, 6 Pennewlll, 247. But
s fence permitted by a dty to remain across
an unopened street after the land had been
acquired for street purposes Is not an Illegal
"obstmctlon," so as to entitle one to recover
damages caused by surface flood water turned
back over his land by the fence; sadx per-
Qdsslon being expressly authorized by the
city's charter. Parsons Bros. v. City of New
York, 05 N. T. Supp. 181, 133, 107 App. Dlv.
324.
A barbed-wire fence Intentionally placed
nearly lengthwise the traveled portion of a
public highway; Bartlett v. Beardmore, 46
N. W. 404, 407, 77 Wis. 35; or a structure
within the limits of the highway which Im-
pedes or seriously Inconveniences travel there-
on, constitutes an "obstruction" within the
meaning of St 1808, f 1326, imposing a pen-
alty therefor, Jones v. Tobln, 115 N. W. 807,
808, 135 Wis. 286; and a post set between
two large stones already In a highway may be
an "obstruction" within this statute. Neale
V. State, 120 N. W. 345, 346, 138 Wis. 484.
Any object unlawfully placed within the
limits of a highway Is an "obstruction," If it
Impedes or seriously inconveniences public
travel or renders It dangerous, and It Is un-
necessary that such object should stop travel
In order to be an obstruction. Jennings v.
Johonnott, 135 N. W. 170, 171, 140 Wis. 660.
The trees, grass, and flowers growing on
park strips maintained by a municipality be-
tween the curbing and the sidewalk and prop-
er barriers placed around them to protect
them are not "obstructions" or nuisances
within the meaning of the statute requiring
the dty council to keep the streets of a munic-
ipality open, In repair, and free from nui-
sance. Village of Bamesville v. Ward, 06 N.
B. 087, 088, 86 Ohio St 1, 40 L. R. A. (N. &)
04, Ann. Gas. 1012D, 1284.
A step 4% Inches high and 10^ inches
wide, dose up to a building in front of which
It is placed, and used as a means of access to
it from the street, does not constitute an un-
lawful "obstruction," and does not Interfere
to an appreciable or unreasonable extent with
the use of the sidewalk, so as to sustain an
action by a pedestrian Injured by stumbling
over It City of Richmond v. Lambert, 68
5. B. 276, lU Va. 174, 277, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.)
880.
The lawful change of the grade of a
street Is not a "use or obstruction of the
street,'* within the meaning of Laws 1880, a
256, making munldpal and other corpora-
tions liable for the use or obstruction of
streets, so as to materially interfere with
their usefulness as such, etc Smith v. Ban
Glalre, 47 N. W. 880, 831, 78 Wis. 467.
Of navisatliMa
A barge negligently moored to the bank
of a canal, which* because of such negligence
floats out Into the diannd of the canal caus-
ing a collision with a passing vessel, Is clear-
ly within the meaning of the term "obstruc-
tion." Gilllkln & Gaskell v. liSke Drummond
Canal ft Water Co., 60 S. B. 654, 147 N. C. 30.
Act Cong. Mardi 8, 1800, c. 425, f 0, 80
Stat 1151 reUtlng to the "obstruction" of
navigable streams, dedares that It shall not
be lawful to construct or commence the con-
OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTIOK
676
OBSTRUCT— OBSTRUCTION
•tmctton of any bridge, dam, dike, or cause-
way over or in any port, roadstead, haTon,
harbor, canal, navigable rlTW, or other na?!-
gable water of the United States, onless the
consent of Congress to sach stractares shall
have been obtained, and until the plans for
the same diall have been approved by the
chief of engineers and the Secretary of War,
with certain provisos. Section 10 prohibits
the creation of any obetrnctlon, not affirma-
tively authorised by Congress, to the navl*
gable capacity of any of the waters of the
United States. Held, that section 10 not only
Includes the kind of structures specifically
referred to In section 9, but all others that
may be an obstruction to the navigable capac-
ity of the waters of the United States, with-
out reference to whether the obstruction Is
but slight, and only temporary. Hubbard ▼.
Fort, 188 Fed. 087, 907.
Of ofleM
Pen. Code 1895, f 906, making it a misde-
meanor to "obstruct," resist, or oppose an
officer serving or attempting to execute any
lawful process, implies force as a necessary
element of the resistance. Moses v. State,
64 S. E. 099, 6 Ga. App. 261.
An officer was sent into a saloon to ar-
rest one S., who was in a fight The def^d-
ant, a one-armed man, who had known the
officer for some 30 years and was a friend of
the belligerent, put his arm on the officer's
shoulder, and told him to let S. go, and he
would take him home and take care of him.
The officer struck the defendant, who then
desisted from any further act An informa-
tion was filed, alleging that the defendant
had unlawfully obstructed an officer in the
discharge of his duty. Penal Code, under
which this Information was based, provides
that any one who wUlfully delays or ob-
structs an officer in the discharge of his
duty is guilty of a misdemeanor. Held, that
acts of the defendant did not constitute an
obstruction of the officer, as "obstruction"
usually means "to impede, hinder, or stop.*'
State V. Knudson, 131 N. W. 400, 401, 27 S. D.
400.
Of yreseomtiaa of aetloa
The term "obstruct or hinder" In the
statute of limitations importo resistance and
obstruction of righta, and unless acta com-
plained of by a creditor are in point of Ssict
such as would hinder or prevent him bring-
ing suit, notwithstanding his desire to do so,
they cannot properly be said to obstruct or
hinder him. Ky. St 1903, i 2552, provides
that if judgment be rendered for plaintiff in
any case provided in the four preceding sec-
tions (which refer only to syretiea), and the
same be afterward reversed or arrested, or if
the ^dgment be obstructed by appeal, super-
sedeas, or injunction, the time of such ob-
struction shifll also be disallowed, does not
apply where an appeal is made in an action
against the principal, and so does not suspend
the statute of Umitatlona In fiiTor of tht
sureties. McGovem ▼. Bectanus (Ky.) 145
S. W. 965, 967, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 380 (dtlLs
Reld ▼. Hamilton, 18 S. W. 770, 92 Ky. 61&:
Coleman ▼. Walker, 8 Mete [00 Ky.] 68. 77
Am. Dec. 163; Kennedy ▼. Foster's Execator
14 Bush [77 Ky.] 479).
Of milroAd timek sr tralm
A statute which requires warnings to be
given by a looomotf ve when an "obatrncdoD"
appears on a railroad track extends to per-
sons appearing on the traek, or 00 near there-
to as to be within striking dlstanoeu One
does not pass '^yond striking dlstanoe," sou
to absolve the railroad from the duty of stop-
ping the train, so long as he waa stilll so dow
to the track that, having doe regard for the
instinct of self-preservation and tlie InvoIUD-
tary movementa of the body, tbeie was stfll
a reasonable probability or likdlliood that be
might fall or be thrown against the side of the
engine or train as It passed him. Southern
By. Co. ▼. Sutton. 179 Fed. 471. 474. 103 C. C
A. 61.
The word ''obstruction,*' in Code 1997,
f 6473, requiring a railroad engineer, on per-
ceiving any "obstruction'* on the trade to
stop the train, la not to be construed in tbe
sense of "object,'* and the statute does wi
require the stoppage of a train on the ema-
neer perceiving any object on the track, as 1
chicken, turkey, or buzzard. Smith v. Centnl
of (^rgla By. Ck)., 61 South. 792, 793. 1^
Ala. 407.
The oondition of the atmosphere and tte
hour of the day do not oonstltiite '*obeti«>
tlons," such as will excuse a tsaveler fron
exercising his sense of sight and hearlES
in crossing a railroad track. On the oob-
trary, the darker it la, the more carefol be
should be. Morrow ▼. North QaioUna B.
Ck>., 69 S. H 168, 169, 146 N. a 14.
An object does not appear on the "rosd."
within Shannon's (3ode, U 1674, 1675. reqIil^
Ing railroads to maintain a lookout on tlw
locomotive, and when any person or other
"obstruction appears on the road" to soasd
the alarm whistle, etc, until the object ^
near enough to be struck by a pawing traiB.
Bogers V. Cincinnati, N. O. 4 T. P. Ry. Co..
136 Fed. 573, 674, 69 G 0. A. 321 (dtii«
Louisville, N. & 6. S. B. Go. v. Reidmond, U
Veti [79 Tenn.] 205).
Of wUewmSk,
Plalntifr was injured by flailing over t
plank left by a dty contractor across a side-
walk. The court charged that plaintUT U
the complaint alleged that defendante had
notice of the obstruction in time to have pre-
vented the injury to plaintiff, that notice of
the condition might be either actual or ci)s-
structive, and might be inferred from the
length of time the obstruction existed, togeth-
er with all the other facts and drcnmstanc^i
concerning the aame» and in determining
OBTAIN
677
OBVIOUS
whether defendants knew of the obstruction
the jury should take into account when it
was placed, the length of time it existed,
the condition of the street and sidewalk as
to whether there was much or little travel,
or otherwise, and from all the facts deter-
mine whether defendants knew it. Held,
that the court did not err in referiing to
the plank as an "obstruction," since anything
which to any extent obstructs the free use of
a street or sidewalk is an "obstruction"
though every obstruction is not of sudi a
character as to render the street or sidewalk
unsafe for use, and that the instruction was
not misleading as either assuming or intimat-
ing that the obstruction was dangerous or of
sudi a charader as to Indicate that defend-
ants were negligent in placing it there or
permitting it to remain. Gtty of DvansvlUe
y. Pifer (Ind.) 100 N. S. UO, 112.
OBTAIN
''Obtain" is defined as follows: "I. trans.
1. To get; procure; secure; acquire; gain;
as to obtain a month's leave of absence; to
obtain riches. • ♦ ♦ II. Intrans. 1. To
secure what one desires or strives for; pre-
vail; succeed." An indictment under the
federal statute for mailing a letter giving
information where and how and of whom
and by what meami articles and things de-
signed and Intended for the procnjriiig- of an
abortion might be "obtained" states an of-
fense, where it sets out a letter written to
defendant inquiring for some medicine or
other means for accomplishing such result,
and a letter, alleged to have been mailed by
defendant in reply, which, when read in
connection with the letter of inquiry, in ef-
fect offers for ft stated consideration to ef-
fect the desired result by some treatment or
operation, although the particular means
is not specified; the word "thing," as used
in tbe statute, being a comt^rehenslve term,
which includes any kind of treatment or op-
eration. United States v. Somers, 164 Fed.
259, 202 (quoting and adopting definition in
Cent Diet).
As acquire possession of
"Obtain" means "to get hold of by ef-
fort" "to get possession of," or "to have In
possession." On an indictment for obtaiiring
money under false pretenses, it appeared
that defendant in Pennsylvania, to establish
a financial credit jmAe written statements
to a company in New York, which relied on
tbe same, fURd accepted his order for goods,
and delivered them to a carrier, and they
were received in Pennsylvania by the periton
making the order. Held.that^ such state-.
ments being false and fraudulent defendant
'^as guilty of "obtaining" goods in Penftsyl-.
^anla under false pretepses. Gommonwj^th
V. Schmunk, 66 Atl. 1088, 1089, 207 Pa. 64^,
w Am. St Eep. 801.
OBTAIH VALIDITY
As used In Rev. St 1909, § 1275, provid-
ing that before any school bond "shall obtain
validity or be negotiated, such bond shall first
be presented to the state auditor, who shall
register the same," the term "obtain validi-
ty" means to become clothed with validity
as a present and subsisting obligation, and
the term "negotiated" means sold and put
In circulation by delivery In consummation
of the sale ; and ofiBcers of a school district
after bonds have been voted, may advertise
for bids and accept a bid for bonds before
they have been registered by the state audi-
tor; and hence such acts of the oflOcers fur-
nish no reason for refusing registration.
State ex rel. Carrollton School Dlst v. Gor-
don, 133 S. W. 44, 47, 231 Mo. 547.
6BTAnrABi:.£
The word "obtainable," in a contract pro-
viding that scrip exchangeable for tickets
will not be honored for passage on trains
except from stations where tickets are not
obtainable, cannot be given its full natural
meaning, but must be restricted to mean
that scrip cannot be used for fare on trains,
except from stations where tickets are not
kept on sale or for exchange for scrip. Koz-
minsky v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 104
Pac 670, 572, 86 Utah, 454, 24 L. R. A. (N.
a) 758.
OBTAZKnre obebit on faiiSe
STATBMBJfT
A financial statement made by a bank-
rupt to a mercantile agency in response to
a request therefor stating that "this infor-
mation la asked for and received in strict
confidence for Qommeifdal use only," is not
within Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c 541, § 14b
(8), as added by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, f
4, making it a ground for refusal of a dis-
charge if a bankrupt has "obtained prop-
erty on credit from any person upon a ma-
terially false statement in writing made to
such person for the purpose of obtaining such
property on credit" as respects a creditor who
sold goods to the bankrupt more than a year
after such statement was made, and such
creditor has no standing to oppose a dis-
charge under such provision. Novick v. B.
P. Reed A Co., 192 ted. 20, 112 C. C. A. 408.
OBTAPmrO FBOPBBTY BT TALMB
FRsmBura
See False Pretense.
OBVIOUS
The word "obvious" means easily dis-
covered, plain, manifest evident. The Sikh,
175 Fed. 869, 871; State v. Kauffman, 108
N. W. 246, 20 S. D. 620 (Quoting Webster's
Diet.).
A^ charge that the rules of a railway
company are to be strictly construed against
the company, and will not be h^ld to en-
OBYIOUB
678
OBVIOU8 B3SKM
Join upon an employ^ a particular duty with
res(«ct to a particular subject, unleas such
du^ be comprehended within the dear and
"obyloua" meaning of the rule Itself, and
that the violation of a rule by an employ^
will not forfeit his rlg^t to recover unless
there has been a negligent violation of the
rule, according to Its plain and ''obvious^
meaning, nor unless such violation of the
rules has been a contributing cause for his
Injury, is not erroneous because of the use
of the word ''obvious,** which Is a pretty
strong sounding word. Its chief Jurldlc em*
ployment is by Judges of courts of review,
who generally pronounce obvious those prop-
ositions which they are able to support with
but sparse array of precedent and whldi
they are unwilling to put forth as an original
dictum without the supporting influence of
some strong, Impressive, faith-bearing word;
for a proposition weak In substance is oft
aided In appearance by the strength of ao-
nancy, and "obvious** is a sonant word. How-
ever, this word is not absolutely Interdicted
to the trial Judges; and in proper cases
they may use it cautiously, if the facts are
sufficient to Justify it Georgia, T. ft A« Ry.
Co. V. Sasser, 61 & £. 505, 506, 4 Ga. App.
27«.
The word ''obviously,*' as used In the
rule that the employed will not discharge
his duty by furnishing the ordinary place or
appliance, if such ordinary place or
appliance be obviously dangerous, does not
apply to any person, no matter how unskill-
ed or ignorant, but to the ordinarily careful
employer who is charged with the duty of
furnishing the place or appliance, or to a
person possessing equal skill and Judgment
and opportunity for examination as sudti an
employer. Tazdzewskl v. Barker, 111 N. W.
689, 690, 691, 131 Wis. 494, 120 Am. St Rep.
1059.
The word "obviously," before the word
dangerous, in an instruction that, where an
employ^ has two ways of performing a duty,
one of which is dangerous and the other
safe, and he knowingly and voluntarily, or
through negligent ignorance, seeks the dan-
gerous one, thereby bringing on himself an
Injury which probably would not have be-
fallen him if he had selected the other one,
merely emphasizes the notion that, to Im-
pute contributory negligence to the employ^
as a matter of law, the danger of the means
or methods must have been known to him,
or the circumstances must have been such
that it ought to have been known to him,
and the use of the word does not render the
Instruction erroneous. Johnson ▼. Maletta,
87 Prc. 447, 460, 34 Mbnt 477.
OBVIOUS DAirOEB
Exposure to, see Bxposure.
Obvious risk of danger, see Obrloiis
Riska.
OBVIOUS DSFEOT
See Open and Obvious Defsetr
OBVIOUS BBBOB
The act of the board in maktaif
increase In the aggregate valuation was aa
"obvious error" within Kirk's Dig. f 7903,
providing that, where there has beea an ob-
vious error discovered In the ■fisMsim nr ef
pecaonal property, the owner may have it ad-
Juated upon proper showing to the county
conrt Boardof Bqvaliaatiim of Saline GovD'
ty ▼. Hughes, 106 a W. 077, 84 Ark. M7.
OBVIOUS BISKS
An ^'dbvious danger," with referenee t»
the diaracter of an employmeat, la one that
is discoverable in the eierdse of tbat rea-
sonable care which penons d ordinary in-
telligence may be expected to take for their
own safety. Hardy v. Chicago, B. I. 4 P.
Ry. Ck>^ 116 N. W. 8» U, 139 Iowa, 814b id
L. R. A. (N. 8.) 997 (dtlng Newbury v. Getch-
el 4 Kartln l4iniber ft Mlig. Oo^ 69 X. w.
748, 100 Iowa, 461, 62 Am. 8t Rep. 682;
Hanson v. Hammell, 77 N. W. 839, 107 Iowa,
171).
'^Obvious danger," as applied to aasomp-
tlon of risk by a servant, is that danger
which would have bea seen and observed by
reasonably prudent moi. James Ramage
Paper Co. v. Ruldusai, 147 Fed. ISl, 154, 71
a a A.
Stepping from a moving train, Irrecpec-
tlve of the speed at which it was moving, is
not, as a matter of law, an "obvious danger,"
within an accident Insurance company's poli-
cy relieving the company from liability for
death resulting from exposure to an obvious
risk. National life St Accident Ina. Co. ▼.
Lokey, 62 South, 46, 47. 166 Ala. 174.
The term "obviously dangopous" means
plainly dangerous. If a carrier's station plat-
f om is obviously dangerous, the carrier is
guilty of the grossest negligence. Randolph
V. Chicago, M. 4 St P. Ry. Co., 79 S. W.
U70, U71, 106 Mo. App. 6i6.
A flagstone in a sidewalk 6 feet wUe.
which projected at the highest point 2^
inches above the other stones, and graduallj
decreased till it was levd with the other
stones at the outside of the walk, was uoC
an "obviously dangerous" defect, rendering t
city liable for Injuries to one tillering and
falling over it Davidson v. City of New
Tork, 117 N. Y. Supp. 186. 186, 183 Appw DiT.
862.
A clause In an accident policy llmitittg re
covery, in case of death "due to unnecessary
exposure, to obvious risk of injury or ohvious
danger," must be deemed to Include all cases
of exposure to unnecessary danger attributa-
ble to negligence on the imrt of the Insured:
and It is proper to charge the word **obri-
ous," as used In the policy, meana '^ppu^
OBVIOUS RISKS
679
OCCASION
ent," "perceivable," or whether or not a thing
can be seen. Price ▼. Standard Life & Aca
Ins. Co., 99 N. W. S87, 888, 92 Minn. 23S.
An "obvioiis risk'! is such as would in-
stantly appeal to tl\,e senses ot an intelligent
person familiar with the business, and about
which there can be no difference of opinion
in the minds of intelligent persons ; and it is
not required that the servant make close
scrutiny into all the details of the instru-
mentalities with which he deals to determine
the risk inrolyed. MiUen ▼.. Pacific Bridge
Co., 95 Pac. 196, 199, 51 Or. 538 ; Gentzkow
V. Portland Ry. Co., 102 Pac. 614, 619, 54
Or. 114, 135 Am. St Rep. 821 (Quoting and
adopting definition in Johnston ▼. Oregon S.
L. 4 U. N. Co., 31 Pac. 283, 286, 23 Or. 94,
105, and citing and adopting St»v«n» t. Unit-
ed Gas & ElecMc Oo^ 60 AtL 848, 850, 73
N. H. 159, 163, 70 L. R. A. 119; Bergin ▼.
Southern New England Tel. Co., 38 AtL 888,
70 Conn. 64, S9 L. R. A. 192; Law ▼. Central
Dist Printing 4 Telegraph 06., 140 Fed. 558;
Anderson v. Inland Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 58 Pac. 657, 19 W«flb. 575, 41 L. a A.
410; Wood, Master 4 Berraat, 763).
Risks which are incident to the business
must not be confounded with such as are
denominated ''obyious." The former sort
comprises those which accompany or arise
from the natural or usual method of conduct-
hig the particular business, and has more
special relation to perils which attend the
business generally, while the latter include
such as are manifest as to the sense of ob-
serration, open, and readily discernible^
whether they arise from the nature of the
business, the particular manner in which it
Is conducted, or the use of defective and un-
safe appliances. New Omaha Thomson Hous-
ton Elec. L. Co. ▼. Rombold, 106 N. W. 218,
216, 73 Neb. 259*
Laws 1902, p. 1750, c. 600, § 3, providing
that an employ^, by entering on or continu-
ing in the employer's service, shall be pre-
sumed to have assented to the necessary risks
of the employment, such risks including those
inherent in the nature of the business, after
the employer has exercised due care for the
safety of employes, and complied with laws
regulating such business, distinguishes be-
tween ^'necessary risk" and "obvious risk,"
which latter may be due to the master's fail-
ure to perform his duty. Hurley v. Olcott,
119 N. T. Supp. 430, 435, 134 App. Olv. 631.
In a dissenting opinion in Logerto v. Cen-
tral Bldg. Co., 108 N. T. Supp. 604, 123 App.
Dlv. 840, the term "obvious risk" is defined as
roch a risk "as is apparent, and it must be
apparent to the person who is claimed to
luive assumed the risk." Ward v. Edison
Electric Illuminating Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 608,
«10. 124 App. Dlv. 22.
An instmction that a servant, in enter-
ing on his employment, "assumed all the ob- 1
vious and ordinary risks or dangers incident
to the employment, and that, if the injury
arose out of such obvious risks and dangers,
defendant was not liable," was not improper
for failure to separate "obvious and ordinary
risks" from "the obvious and the ordinary
risks" ; the case having been tried on the the-
ory that the risk was an ordinary one.
Thomas v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper &
Silver Min. Co., 87 Pac. 972, 973, 84 Mont
370.
OCCASION
See Privileged Occasion; Special Occa-
sion.
The word "occasion," as used in an aver-
ment in a pleading of estoppel that S. had
full time, occasion, and opportunity in which
to notify the plaintiff of a forgery, held to
mean, not only time and opportunity, but
such conditions and circumstances as requir-
ed him to speak, or otherwise be forever es-
topped from denying his signature. Shinew
V. First Nat Bank, 95 N. B. 881, 883, 84 Ohio
St 297, 36 L. B« A. (N. S.) 1006, Ann. Ca&
1912C, 587.
The statute providing that any telegraph
company within the state shall be liable for
all damages "occasioned" by the negligence
of their operators in receiving, copying,
transmitting, or delivering messages, does not
render telegraph companies liable for dam-
ages other than the proximate result of its
negligence. The word ^'occasioned" is used
with reference to settled rules of legal re-
sponsibility for breach of duty constituting
actionable negligence. Fisher v. Western Un-
ion Telegraph Co., 96 N. W. 545, 547, 119
Wis. 146.
"Webster defines 'occasion' as follows:
'To cause or to bring about by furnishing the
condition or occasion needed for the action of
a principal cause ; to cause accidentally or in-
cidentally, or simply to cause or bring about' "
A fire insurance policy provided that the com-
pany should "not be liable for loss caused,
directly or indirectly, by invasion, • ♦ ♦
or by order of any dvil authority, or for
loss or damage occasioned 'by or through
• ♦ • earthquake.' " Held, that the words
"directly or indirectly" did not apply to the
provision respecting earthquake; that, con-
struing such provision most strongly against
the insurer, in accordance with the establish-
ed rule, the word "occasioned" was equiva-
lent to "caused," and related to the origin of
the fire, and the provision exempted the com-
pany from liability for loss only where an
earthquake was the immediate, direct, and
proximate cause of the fire which destroyed
the property. Baker ft Hamilton v. Wil-
liamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 157 Fed. 280,
283. See, also, Williamsburg^ City Fire Ins.
Co. of Brooklyn v. Willard, 164 Fed. 404, 406,
90 a 0. A. 392, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 103.
OCCASION
680
OCCUPANCY-OCCUPATION
Under a fire Insurance policy which ex-
empted the Insurer from liability for any loss
"occasioned by or through earthquake," there
can be no recovery If it Is shown by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that if there had
been no earthquake, and, but for the earth-
quake, the Ore which destroyed the insured
property would not have started, and a fire
thus started by an earthquake in another
building, which spread to and destroyed the
insured property, is one occasioned "by or
through earthquake'* within the meaning of
such provision. Henry Hilp Tailoring Co. ▼.
Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Go. of Brook-
lyn, 157 red. 285, 286.
OOOA8IONAX. DRUfX
A life policy was issued oo an applica-
tion wherein insured stated that he bad no
daily habit as to the use of liquor, but took
an occasional drink of whisky, and that he
had always been in the habit of so doing.
Insured drank more or less frequently for
weeks at a time, or not at all. His intervals
for drinking were not regular. He was never
so intoxicated as to be incapable of doing
business. Held, that insuredM statements
were not willfully and intentionally false,
and he could recover on fbe policy; the word
''occasional*' meaning occarrlng more or lesa
frequently, but not at fixed or regular inter-
vals. Aria T. Mutual Life Ina. Co. of New
York, 103 Pac. 60, 52, 64 Wash. 269.
An "occasional" glass of beer may mean
anything from a glass once a month to one
every 15 minutes, according to the capacity
of the individual, or, perhaps, according to
the "liberality" of his views. A statement in
an application for life insurance that the
applicant drinks a "glass of beer occasional-
ly" is suflScient to suggest to a discreet per-
son the advisability of further inquiry. Bler-
mann v. Guaranty Mutual life las. Co^ 120
N. W. 963, 965, 142 Iowa, 84L
OCCUPANCY
See During Occupancy of Building.
In relation to building insured, see Un-
occupied ; Vacancy— Vacant — Vacate.
"Occupancy" does not necessarily include
residence. Webster defines "occupancy" as
"the act of taking or holding possession," and
an "occupant" as "one who occupies or takes
possession; one who has the actual use or
possession, or is in possession of a thing."
Twiggs V. State Board of Land Com'ra, 75
Pac. 729, 731, 27 Utah, 241.
OOOUPAHOT — 00017PATION — OOCIT.
FT (Of Laaa)
See Action for Use and Occupation;
Actual Occupant; Physical Occupancy.
Ready for occupancy, see Ready.
"Occupation" is to hold or keep for use,
to possess, to cover or fill. So to say that
one occupies or has occupied land contina-
ously is tantamount to saying that he has or
has had actual possession of the same. Hall
V. Roberts (Ky.) 74 B. W. 190. 200 (dtiiis
Webst Diet).
The phrase ''occupy and use," in a lease
which binds the lessee to ezprad a certain
sum for improvements on the premises, and
which stipulates that in default of the pay
ment of the rent the lessor may re-enter vA
"occupy and use" for its benefit all Improre
ments thereon, shows that it was not in
tended that the improvements should be re-
moved, or that they were in any nmnuer
severable from the land, and the imprort-
ments made by the lessee are part of the real
estate. In re Long Beach Land Co., 91 N. I.
Supp. 508, 60^ 101 App. Div. 109.
'K>ccupied" inpUea actual posseBsion
not oonatructive poamooion. A testttor sare
to hia housekeepte f «r life the use of cer-
tain premiaea oeeispied by hin. A portiai
of the premlaee waa at the time of his deatfa
occupied by hUn aa a residenoe, and a por-
tion by a bank paying a monthly rental
The housekeeper aoqaired the me of the por-
tion of the premiaea occupied as a restdeoce
only. In re Handley'a Batate, 57 Aa 755,
757, 208 Pa. 388.
A tract of 200 actea of timber land was
''occupied," witbia l^ax Law (Laws 1896, p
801, c. 908) f 9, aUowing land to be assessed
aa nonresident land only where there la not
an owner <Hr occupant of it residing in tlie
tax district, and section 134, providing tbat
the term "occupant** shall be construed to
mean a person who has lawfully eiter«d
upon the land so occupied, and is hi posses^
sion of the same to the exdusion of everr
other person, and that the term "occnpaocf
shall mean the actual, lawful and ezdnslTe
use and possession of such lands and premis-
es by such an occupant, where the owners
had marked its exterior lines by blazins
away part of them, and left a larger quantity
on the skids, and, at the time the assessois
were on their annual rounds, were erectiuf
on it a substantial shanty large enongb u
house them and theJr bark peelers. Clarl:
V. Kirkland, 118 N. Y. Supp. 315, 319, 133
App. Div. 820.
The relator owned lota bordering «
Lake Pladd, on which it had built an Ibil
and also owned the greater parte of two lots
situated in part on Moose Island in the lab
and in part under the water of the lake, tbe
parts of which nearest to the inn were tm
2% miles to 2% mUes distant, and wbict
made, with the other lota, a fairly comp»«
tract owned and cared for by the relator.
The lots sold were connected with the iut
and with relator's boathouae by the watei^
of the lake, and were used in oonnectioD witB
the tract of land for picnics and campiB?'
and for tiie purposes of enjoyment by tbe
OCCUPANCY— OCCUPATION
681
OCCUPANCY— OCCUPATION
members of the Lake Placid Boat Club, and
there were boat landings on the two lots, and
relator had expended money in repairing and
improving the approaches to the lots and had
put up signs forbidding shooting, etc. Held,
that "occupancy/' as defined by Tax Law
(Consol. Laws 1909, c. 60) | 134, did not rift-
quire that the o.wuer should build a house
and reside upon the particular part of the
lands sold for taxes, and that relator, upon
the occupancy shown, was entitled to redeem
the lots from a tax sale. People ex rel.
Lake Placid Co. v. Williams, 129 N. Y. Supp.
767, 770, 145 App. Div. 34.
An owner of a preserve irardiaaed addi-
tional land to litnlghiten the boundary Une
thereof. The adcUtiooal land was fmbaeqnent-
ly used in conneefcion with Hie preserve. The
owner's snperintendent actually I'es&dBd on
the preserve, and cootrolled the same, includ-
ing the additional land which was not inclotih
ed, coltivated, or loftfiroved. The owner ex-
pended large sams io improving the other
portion of the preserre, and also continnons-
ly kept domestic animals thereon. He also
maintained on the premises metal notices
warning persona against trespassing. The
notices were placed along tbe botoidary of
the preserve, including the additional land.
Held, to sAiow an actual occupancy and pos-
session by the owner of tbe entire promisee,
Including the additional land within Tax
Law (Consol. Laws, c. 60) f 184, defining an
"occupant" as one who has lawfully entered
on land and is in possession thereof to the
exclusion of others, and "occupancy" as
the actual, lawful, and exclusive use and pos-
session of land by the occupant, and the own-
er was entitled to notice to redeem the prem-
ises from a tax sale. People ex rel. Moyne-
han V. Gaus, U8. N. Y. Supp. 750^ 757, 134
App. Div. 80.
Under the Constitution, requiring occu-
pancy as well as intention to create a home-
stead, intention without occupancy is insuf-
ficient to create a homestead, and there must
be some acts which, coupled with intention,
constitute the necessary occupancy Where
a widow purchased a vacant lot, which for
three years she used onl^ f or the raising of
vegetables, being without sufilcient means to
erect a house, there was no ^'occupancy" suf-
flclent to entitle her to daim the lot as* a
homestead. Ware v. Hall, 101 N. W. 47. 138
Mich. 70, 67 L. B. A. '313, 110 Am. St Rep.'
301.
"To 'occupy' means to hold in possession;
to hold or keep for use; as to occupy an
apartment" Act Cong. Aug. 14, 1848 (es-
tablishing the territorial government of Ore-
Son) f 1, contains the proviso that the title to
the land, "not exceeding 640 acres, now oc-
^Pied as hiissionary stations" among the
Indian tribes in said territory, together with
the Improvements thereon, be confirmed and
established In the several religious societies
to which said missionary stations respective-
ly belong. Held, that such statute was not a
grant certain of 640 acres to each religious
society having a missionary station on pub-
lic lands within such territory, but was a
grant only of so much land as was actually
occupied by such station, not exceeding 640
acres. Bishop of Neequally v. Gibbon, 15
Rup. Ot. 779, 784, 158 U. S. 1B5, 168, 39 L.
Ed. 931.
Operatlofla of mi|M
"In the primary and most familiar sense
of the word, 'occupy' la the equivalent of the
word 'possess.' It implies the oonception of
permanent tenure for a period of greater or
less duration." As used in a deed relating to
the occupation of a coal bed, the word "occu-
py" is synonymous with "work" or "operate."
Hoysradt v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 151
Fed. 321, 330 (citing Lacy v. Green, 84 Pa.
520).
PoMeasioM
As commonly used and undeiatood, the
word "occupation" is synonymous with "pos-
session." . Xost y. Anchor Fire Ins. Co., 38
Pa. Super. Ct 594, 599.
"PosseasUMi" does not iJEOply "occupa-
tion." United States v. De la Maza Arredon-
do, 6 Pet (31 U. 8.) 691, 74a, 8 L. £d. 547.
T0Bse8si<m" means actual control of
property by physical occupation. Collar v.
Ulster & D. R. Co., 181 N. T. Supp. 56, 60,
72 Misc. Rep. 274.
The word "possession," in Wilson's Rev.
& Ann. St. 1903, § 4787, providing that an ac-
tion may be brought by any person in "pos-
session," by himself or tenant, of real prop-
erty, against any person who claims an estate
or interest therein adverse to him, for the
purpose of determining such adverse estate
or interest, is not equivalent to the word
"occupancy," and one who temporarily va-
cates a homestead owned In fee simple; for
the purpose of giving educational advantages
to minor children, does not so abandon the
possession as to forfeit his right to maintain
an action to remove a cloud from the title.
Womble V. Pike, 87 Pac. 427, 429, 17 Ckl. 122.
The ordinary meaning of the word **pos-
session" is the same as "occupancy." It is
defined as the act of possessing; a having
and holding or retaining of property in one's
power or control. Nathan v. Dierssen, 79
Pac. 739, 740, 146 Cal. 63; Her v. MUler, 111
N. W. 689, 590, 78 Neb. 675, 14 L. R. A.
(N, S.) 289 (citing Cent. Diet.).
Mere occupancy or personal presence of
complainant on the ground does not consti-
tute sHch possession as to sustain an action
of forcible entry, and a mei:e trecq^asser can-
not by the very act of trespass immediately
and without excuse give himself what the
law, understands by possession against the
person wliom he ejects. Schwinn y. Perkins,
OOCUFANCY— OOCUPATIOH
982
OCCUPAKT-OCOUFIER
I J
' i
78 AU. 19, 21, 79 N. J. Law, 515, 32 L. B. A
(N. S.) 51, 21 Ann. Oaa. 1228.
Tba words "oGcnpaUon*' and **!»•■«-
a&on" are frequentljF uaed syiioiiyinoualy, ea-
pecUOly in laaoaa and like inatromenta. Thna
where a gnarantj for tbe payment of rant
recited that the landlord had exacted from
the leeaeea a guaranty that they would pay
the rent that might become due nnder the
lease while they were ''in the occupation'* of
the premises, and stipulated that the guar-
antor would, on default f6r sudi months as
the lessees were 'in occupation** of the prem-
ises pay the rent, it was held that, to make
the instrument efleetiye, the words "in occu-
pation" will be construed to mean 'in posses-
sion.** Woods y. Broder, 118 N. T. Snpp.
885, 886, 129 App. Dir. 122.
Where an indictment for burglary
charged an entry without the consent of the
occupant of a house, "occupancy** la equiva-
lent to "possession,*' and embraced a chicken
house on the premises of proseeuter. Moore
▼. State, 88 & W. 280, 4B Tex. Or. a. 400.
Blclit of way
An owner of land adjoining a railroad
location may acquire by prescription during
20 years an easement of travel longitudinal-
ly over a part of the location, notwithstand-
ing St 1801, c 100, now St 1008, e. 468, pt
2, I 80, providing that no length of occupan-
cy of land of a railroad corporation by an
occupier of adjoining land shall create in
him a right to such land, which, when con-
sidered in connection with St 1892, a 275,
prohibiting the acquisition by prescription
of a right of way across any railroad loca-
tion, refers only to titles in fee and not to an
easement; the word "occupancy" meaning a
permanence and continuity of possession
greater than that required in tbe establish-
ment of a right of way. Hall v. Boston 4
M. B. B., 97 N. E. 914, 915, 211 Mass. 174.
The word "occtqiation,'* aa used in a
statute providing that every contract or
agreement for the leasing, rent, and occupa-
tion of buildings, not in writing, shall be a
tenancy from month to month, terminable
only by a month's written notice, does not
mean a mere possession of premises by any
one who happens to be in them or get in
them, but means an occupation pursuant to
an agreement between the owner and the oc-
cupier, sufficient to create the relation of
landlord and tenant Permission of a land-
lord to a tenant, on moving out, to leave
boxes in the building for a few days, on the
understanding that the tenant would turn
the premises over dean and in good condi-
tion, is not such an occupation. Sterling v.
Heimann, 82 S. W. 539, 540, 106 Ma App. 40.
Use
The occupancy contemplated by Pub. St
a 11, I 5, cL 8, as amended by St 1899, a
466, exemptiag from taxation property
literary, benevolent diaritable, and scientL
institutions, "occupied by them or tbeir ol
cere for the purposes for whidi tbey we
incofporated,** must tend direcUy to promo
the purposes for which the inatltatlon w
incorporated. The occupation of prsDii
belonging to a college by the president »
the professors, and the otBottB of tbe ins
tution and their families, is not Deeesaaii
inconsistent with the intent of the statni
Phillips Academy v. Inliabitants of AndoT<
65 N. B. 841-^848, 175 Mass. 118, 48 U B.
560.
Dormitories furnished by a coOege wit
out rent or lease, for the use of Its atedeni
who club together for the purpoBe of c
taining board at*cost, are "occupied** f
the purposes for whldi tiie college was 1
eorporated, within the meaning of this sti
ute; and so Is a boose built witb pnU
funds on the college grounds for Its pre
dent, and occupied 1^ him and bis fiantiily i
a dwelling, and also used as a place fcr coi
mencisment and holding otber leo^itioiis 1
ddent to his fnnctlODa, faculty and comml
tee msetlngs, etc. ; and so are hoiises b^on
ing to, and kept in repair by, the college, ai
used partly for its convenience and part
for uses incident to the duties of professoi
who occupied them for dwelling porposc
without rent or lease, exo^ that tbe vaii
of their use as dwellings was takoi into s
count when the professors' salaries we
voted. Harvard College v. Assessors <
Cambridge^ 55 N. SL 844, 846» ITC Man. 14
48 L. B. A 547.
OCOUPAKT-OCCUPISa
See Actual Occupant; Bona Fide Oeo
pant
In a prosecution for breaking and ente
ing a storage room in the custody of C, i
tnstruction that, if 0. had the key and e
dusive right and means of entry, then he ^
law would be the "occupant,** was corre
and was not objectionable as charging tbi
C. was in fact the occupant of the rooi
burglarised. Kinney v. State (l?exO 148 !
W. 783, 786.
The words "the occupant thereof," i
used In a statute providing that, if tbe pro]
erty is actually occupied, the ocoapant ttier
of must be made defendant, may be read i
meaning "an occupanlf* and not "all the o
cupants.'* Glos v. Patterson, 68 N. R 44
445, 204 IlL 540 (quoting Hennessey ▼. Pas
sen, 41 N. B. 516, 147 N. Y. 255).
Of laad
Ordinarily the "occupant** or "actual a
cupant" of land is one in actual possessloi
"Occupant** is defined in* the Century Di<
tionary as: "One who occupies; an inhab
tant; especially one in actual possession, a
a tenant, who has actual possession, in dif
tinction from the landlord, who has legal o
OCWUPANT— OOOOPIEB
683
OCCUPANT— OCJCUPIER
constmctiye possession.'* The Standard def-
inition is: ''One who oocnpies; especially a
tenant in possession of property, as distin-
guished from the actaal owner. • • *••
Parsons v. Pmdential Real Estate Co., 125
N. W. 621, 623, 86 Neb. 271, 44 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 666.
The word "oocapant," as ^yrdinarily used
In statQtee, means one in actual posseflslon
ot land, as distiingiiifibed from constnictlTe
possession thereof; that is, one who holds
possession and exerdses dominion over it
There may be occupancy of land, without
actual residence thereon. Thus the owner of
a farm, of which he is in actual possession,
though he resides in a village near by, is an
'occupant" within Rev. Laws 1906, i U72
requiring notice of hearing on a petition for
a highway to be served on the occupants of
the land. McCauley v. Town of McOauley-
vllle, 127 N. W. 190, 191. Ill Minn. 428, 20
Ana. Cas. 828.
Under Oomp^ Laws 1907, | 20, providing
that if any cattle shall. treqpass or do dam-
age upon the premises of another, the ag-
grieved party, whether he be the owner or
occupant, may recover against the owner of
the cattle, plaintUf, who purchased luoeme
seed from the owner of land[ and left it in
an inclosed field to dry, was an "occupant**
trithin the purview of the statute, and might
Bupport an action against the owner of cat-
tle which trespassed upon the field, and ate
and ruined the seed, without pleading or
proving negligence; the statute apparently
warranting a recovery for injury to person*
alty, as well as to real estate. Peterson v.
Petterson, U7 Paa 70, 71, 39 Utah, 354.
A tract of 260 acres of timber land was
occupied, within Tax Law (Laws 1896, p.
BOl, c. 908) i 9, allowing land to be assessed
as nonresident only where there is not an
owner or "occupant" of it residing in the tax
district, where the owners had marked Its
axterior lines by blazing trees, had made
roads, cut and skidded a large quantity of
logs, drawn away part of them, and left a
larger quantity on the skids, and, at the time
the assessors were on their annual rounds,
were erecting on it a substantial shanty
large enough to house them and their bark'
peelers. Clark v. BUrkland, 118 N. T. Supp.
^15, 819, 188 App. Div. 826.
An owner of a preserve purchased addi-
tional land to straighten the boundary line
thereof. The additional land was subse-
quently used in connection with the pre-
serve. The owner's superintendent actually
resided on the preserve, and controlled the
same, including the additional land which
p^as not Inclosed, cultivated, or improved,
rhe owner expended large sums in improv-
ing the other portion of the preserve, and
ilso continuously kept domestic animals
thereon. He also maintained on the pieok-
ises metal notices warning persons against
trespassing. The notices were placed along
the boundary of the preserve, including the
additional land. Held, to show aa actual oc-
cupancy and possession by the owner of the
entire premises, including the additional land
within Tax Law (Consol. Laws, c. 60) | 134,
defining an "occupant" as one who has law-
fully entered on land and is In possession
thereof to the exclusion of others, and "oc-
cupancy" as the actual, lawful, and exclu-
sive use and possession of land by the occu-
panty and the owner was entitled to notice
to redeem the premises from a tax sale.
People ex reL Moyneham v. Oaus, 118 N. T.
Supp. 766^ 767, 134 App. Div. 80.
Laws 1900, p. 02, c. 20, f 220, gives to
the commission of the fbrest preserve the
care and control of the forest preserve, and
by its wardens, foresters, and protectors it
actually occupies the preserve, so that it is
an "occupant," within the meaning of Laws
1896, p. 842, e 906, f 184, requiring that,
where land shall be sold for taxes, notice
shall be given to the occupant to redeem
before a deed is given. People ex rel.
Turner ▼. Kelsey, 72 N. E. 624, 626, 180 N. T.
24.
Same— Iiandlord
"An 'occupant* is defined by Webster as
'one who occupies or takes possession; one
who has the actual use or possession, or is
in possession of a thing.* Bouvier defines
'occupant* as 'one who has actual use or pos-
session of a thing.* Shumaker & Longsdorf
in their Law Dictionary, in defining 'occu-
pant,' say: 'One who has the actual posses-
sion or use of a thing; occupancy implies
the exclusion of every one else from enjoy-
ment Tenant in possession.*" Under the
statute providing that forcible detainer in-
volves eaatrj during the absence of the "oc-
cupant," an owner of land in actual posses-
sion of a tenant cannot maintain forcible
detainer against one dispossessing the ten-
ant Chesum v. Campbell, 86 Pac. 48, 49,
42 Wash. 660, 7 Ann. Cas. 921.
flamep-^reaMit
Lessees in possession are "occupants" of
land, BO that they may object to the granting
of a liquor license. American Woolen Co. v.
Town Council of North Smithfield, 69 AtL
293, 294, 29 R. I. 98, 16 Ann. Cas. 1227 (cit-
ing Lonsdale Co. v. Board of License Com'rs,
of Town of Cumberland, 26 Atl. 066, 18 R
1. 7).
As used in St 1898, | 1391, providing
that respective "occupants" of adjoining
lands used for farming shall maintain parti-
tion fences, and that "owners** of land who
do not maintain lawful partition fences can-
not recover fbr trespass by animals, the
term "owners" includes a tenant as the oc-
cupant of the land, so that his failure to
maintain the partition fence precludes him
OOCUP ANT— OCCUPIER
684
OCCUPATION
from recovering for trespass, Peterson ▼.
Johnson, 111 N. W. 659. 132 Wis. 280 (citing
6 Words and Phrases, pp. 490i, 6134).
Of p«bU« UmA
Bey. St U. B. | 2887, provides that the
judge of tlie oonnty coart may enter at the
proper land office land occupied as a town
site of an unincorporated town, In trust for
the ''occupants*' ; the execution of the trust
to be under regulations prescribed by the
Legislature of the state or territory. Rev.
St Arts. 1901, pars. 4075-4077, 40T9. 4080.
4085, 4093, 4094. providing the method of
executing the trust, require the payment by
the "claimant" to the trustee of the pur-
chase price of 15 per lot before he Is entitled
to a deed. Held, that this requirement ap-
plies to actual occupants, and not only to
those who merely daim the right to posse*-
sion, and an occupant, to be entiUed to his
deed, must be a claimant, file his statement,
and pay to the trustee the purchase price.
Robertson v. Martin, 76 Pac ei4, 615, 8 Arts.
422.
Rev. St U. 8. f 2387. provides that,
whenever any portion of the public lands
have been occuiAed as a town site, it Is law-
ful for the Judge of the county court in case
the town is unincorporated, to enter the lands
80 occupied in trust for the benefit of the oc-
cupants thereof, the execution of which trust
shall be regulated by the legislative authori-
ty of the territory, etc. Held, that the "occu-
pants'* for whom the trustees took the legal
title under the act were those who were such
at the time the town site was entered. City
of Globe V. Slack, 95 Pac. 126, 11 Ariz. 408.
"An 'occupant' within the meaning of
the town-site law, la one who is a settler or
resident of the town and in bona fide actual
possession of the lot at the time the entry
was made. * ♦ • xhe 'occupancy' must
be actual, and cannot be begun by an agent.
It must be for residence, or for business, or
for use, and the residence, business, or use
must be by the claimant There must be a
subjection of the land to his will and con-
trol. ♦ ♦ ♦ It follows • • • that there
can be no such thing as constructive occu-
pancy under the town-site law, but there
must be an actual bodily presence of the
claimant or some one for him, on the lot or
lots for which he seeks to acquire title, or
a purpose to enjoy, united with or manifest-
ed by such visible acts. Improvements, or in-
closures as wjLU give to the claimant the ab-
solute exclusive enjoyment of It" Where
plainUtr staked out a lot in a mining camp in
Alaska and built a log cabin thereon, in
which he resided for some three years and
then left, leaving some tools, a stove, etc.,
in the cabin, and asking two different per-
sons to look after the property for him, nei-
ther of whom took possession of or occupied
it, and did not return for three years, and
about a year after leaving other persons lo-
cated the lot, and went Into continoous pos-
session, and made valuable improvements os
the property, and conveyed it plaintiff, al
though his title was recorded in tbe book
kept for the benefit of settlers, there Um^
been no steps taken to locate a town site, vta
not an occupant or In possession, and had
no right therein which would ripm into a
tttlt under the town-site law (Bev. St {
2867; Act March 8, 1891 [26 SUt 10Q5. t
061, I 11)) at the time of Its location by tbe
grantor, or which would support an acdon
to recover the property from the grantee&
Gordon ▼. Ross-filgglns Co., 162 Fed. 637.
610, 80 O. C. A. 429 (quoting and adopting
language In Bender ▼. Sfaimer, 19 L D. 363,
867).
Of Hcbt of way
The grantee of a railway right of way
is not the owner or "occupant" of the esuie
over which it is granted. The mere running
of trains over a road does not make the cod>
pany running them an "occupanf* of tbe
land. Kansas 4 C. P. R. Go. v. Bums, (9
Pac 288, 239, 70 Kan. 627 (dlssenthig diiB
ion) (guoting Cook County ▼. Chicago, a & (^
B. Co., 36 IlL 460.
OCOUPATIOH
Of land, see Occupancy— Occupati<»-
Occupy (Of Land).
OfdweUlaclaoiiM
In rdation to building Insured, see I'c-
oocupied; Vacancy— Vacant— Vacate.
Under White's Ann. Pen. Code, art 845c
providing that the term ''private residence"
shall be construed to mean any bailing or
room "occupied and actually used" at tbe
time of the offense as a residence, it is not
necessary, to constitute the offense of bar-
glary of a private residence, that the family
be personally present at the time of the bur
glary, but it is sufficient if the house Is ac
tually used at the time as a private residence,
though the family are temporarily alttf*Jflt
Handy v. State, 80 S. W. 526, 46 Tei. Cr
R. 406.
•The word *occm>ation,* as applied to i
dwelling house, means living in it; and hence.
to become vacated or unoccupied, it must l^
Without an occupant— without any person li^
ing in if Baggerly v. Lee, 73 N. E- 9-^
923, 37 Ind. App. 139 (citing Home Ins. Co
of New YorK v. Boyd, 49 N. E. 285, 19 Ini
App. 173 ; Paine v. Agricultural Ins. Co. [>
Y.] 5 Thomp. ft C. 619 ; American Ins. Co. v.
Padfleld, 78 111. 169).
OCCITPATION (Voeation)
See Dangerous Occupation
As property, see Property.
As trade; see Trade.
Change of occupation, see Chanire.
Following occupation, see Follow-Fol-
lowing
OCCUPATION
686
OCCUPATION
Other occupation, see Other.
Some other occupation, see Some Other.
The term "occupation" is synonymous
tb calling, trade, business, or profession.
ty of Topelta v. Jones, 86 Pac. 162, 168, 74
m. 164.
The word "occupation" is a generic term,
d Is that to which one's time and attention
i habitually devoted, vocation, calling,
ide, business, and a **Tocation" is an em-
•yment, occupation, calling, trade, Including
)fes8ions as well as medianical occupa-
Ds. Village of Dodge ▼. Guidinger, 127 N.
122, 87 Neb. 349, 188 Am. St Rep. 494.
"Occupation,*' as commonly understood,
nlfies vocation, calling, trade, the business
ilch one principally engages in to secure a
ing or obtain wealth. Joliff v. State, 109
W. 176, 177, 178, 53 Tex. Or. B. 61 (citing
indford v. State, 16 Tex. App. 831); Cohen
State, 110 S. W. 66, 67, 53 Tex. Or. R. 422,
) (quoting and adopting the definitions in
indford V. State, 16 Tex. App. 881; Love
State. 20 S. W. 978, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 469;
enlg V. State, 26 S. W. 835, 33 Tex. Cr. R.
r, 47 Am. St Rep. 36; State v. Austin
lb, 33 S. W. 113, 89 Tex. 20, 30 L. R. A.
)); Dossier v. State, 137 S. W. 679, 681, 62
X. Cr. R. 258.
"Occupation" is a term of broad signifl-
ice, and includes the trade, calling, pro-
sion, office, employment, or business by
ich one generally gets his living; and it is
: incidental, recreatory, or even necessary
^pension of th€» performance of regular
tj which constitutes a "change of occupa-
Q" by one insured against accident Bver-
I V. General Fire & Life Assur. Corp., Lim-
i, of Perth, Scotland, 88 N. R 658, 661,
t Mass. 169. Thus, where an accident
icy insured plaintiff as the manager of a
1 and contained a rider that the insurance
>ald not l>e forfeited by a temporary
mge of occupation, it was not material
t bis injury sued for occurred while he
s operating a mower as a mere temporary
ersion. Kenny v. Bankers' Accident Ins.
of Des Moines, 113 N. W. 566, 569, 136
ra, 140.
The term "occupation," as used in an ac-
ent policy, ImpUes simply that which at
^ time of the accident constitutes the as-
ed*8 principal business or pursuit; that
ich engages his attention and time, as
tinguished from that which is incidentally
inected with the life of men in any or all
upations. Thus, where a party obtains
K>Ucy of insurance- against injury by acd-
It, specifying the occupation of the assured
be that of a druggist, deemed to be a se-
t risk, and that of a farmer or supervising
mer only is specified as a more haeardotm
It, calling for a, larger premium, and there-
er the drug store of the assured was d^
Dyed by fire, whereupon the assuied mov-
ed upon a tract of land entered as a home-
stead, into a house built by him thereon,
which he thereafter occupied with his family
as his home, and superintended the construc-
tion of a bam thereon, and caused to be
fenced and broken and cultivated 40 acres
of the land thereof, under his supervision,
for a period of six months, and was prepar-
ing for further cultivation of the land at the
time of his injury, and for eight months
prior to such injury had no connection with
the business of a druggist, his occupation
was that of a supervising, farmer, and not
that of a druggist wltbin the meaning of
the policy. JBitna, Life Ins. Co. v. Dunn, 188
Fed. 630, 633, 71 O. 0. A. 79. And so,
where the application for a life policy stated
that assured's occupation was "dealer in
pumps and well supplies," and the policy
stipulated that enumerated occupations, such
as "blasting, mining, and handling or trans-
porting of inflammable or explosive substanc-
es" were risks not assumed by the insurer
during the first year, and the assured died
within the year by reason of an explosion
during an attempt to blow out a well casing
with dynamite in the course of his designated
business, it was held that the risk of using
the dynamite did not constitute a risk not as-
sumed by the insurer; the stipulation in the
policy relating to an occupation different
from that named in the application as as-
sured's occupation. Hortensen v. Central
Life Assur. Ass'n, 99 N. W. 1059, 124 Iowa,
277.
A by-law of a fraternal benefit order
which bars from admission to the order per-
sons "engaged" in blasting, coal mining, man-
ufacturing e3Q>lo6lve8, etc., or who are en-
gaged in any other occupation deemed extra-
hazardous, or who are engaged either as prin-
cipal, agent, or servant in the sale of liquor
as a beverage, and which provides that any
member who shall engage in any of the pro-
hibited occupations shall thereby render his
certificate void, is violated by a member who
with his son opened a saloon as copartners,
the license therefor being issued in their Joint
names, and the member being pecuniarily in-
terested therein, though he performed no la-
bor in or about the saloon and took no active
part in the business, the word "engaged" be-
ing the equivalent of the words "carry on,"
and the word "occupation" meaning "busi-
ness." Graves v. Knights of the Maccabees
of the World, 92 N. B. 792-794, 199 N. Y. 397.
139 Am. St Rep. 912.
A by-law of the defendant a fraternal
insurance company^ provided tliat If a mem-
ber should enter into the business or occupa-
tion of selling at retail intoxicating liquors
as a beverage liis member^bdp should cease,
and the Insurance cectificate and all rights
thereunder should become fpirMted.. Plain-
tiff's liusband,. a .common laboiter, - while a
member, accepted work in> a village saloon
as a temporary substitute lor the bartender
CHXJUPATIOK
686
OCCUPATION RENTAL
'Ml j^n
for fire or bIx weeks, during wklcb time bo
paid an aaoessment that came due on the
membership certificate. This asseasmoit was
accepted and retained by the officers of the
local lodge. Three dajs after the Insared
quit the said temporary employment he died.
After his death, and with knowledge of his
said employment, defendant's grand record-
er reqnested farther proofk, not only as to
his '*occapatlon,** but as to bnriaL Assamlng
that the temporary employment forfeited the
Insurance, It is hdd that the trial court's
finding that there was a waiyer of the for^
felture Is sustained by the eridenoe. Hen-
drlckson v. Grand Lodge A. O. U. W., 188 N.
W. 946, 060, 120 Minn. 86.
^'Occupation'' is correctly defined. In an
action on a benefit certificate, in which the
defense is a wrong statement in the applica-
tion as to insured's occupation, by an Instruc-
tion stating that it means that whidi prac-
tically takes up one's time and energies, es-
pecially one's regular business or employ-
ment, and that the word does not necessarily
mean the present occupation, but it means
that which principally takes up one's time,
thought,' and energy, especially one's regular
business or employment, so that one might
have a regular occupation, such as that of a
painter, and be out of employment, and might
temporarily engage in other business, yet, if
he was questioned as to what was his occu-
pation, he would give it as a painter, that be-
ing his general occupation. Supreme Lodge
Knights and Ladles of Honor ▼. Baker, GO
South. 058, 060, 163 Ala. 6ia
An acddent policy provided that, if the
insured was injured while engaged in any
^'occupation or exposure" more hazardous
than that against which he was insured, his
insurance shall be so much as the premiums
paid will purchase at the rates fixed for such
increased hazard. "Occupations" were classi-
fied, with an explanation that merely ridltfg
a bicycle for pleasure is not an "occupation,"
and that one insured as a proprietor of a
manufacturing industry does not change his
status by incidentally riding a bicycle. Held,
that the fact that an insured is injured while
incidentally riding a bicycle does not place
him in a different class as to hazards from
the "occupation" named in the policy. Com-
stock y. Fraternal Accident Ass'n, 03 N. W.
22, 26, 116 Wia 382.
Where defendant, a ftirmer, had proyid-
ed himself with the necessary equipment to
operate a flying jenny, an occupation taxed
by law, and to operate the same for profit, he
was guilty of pursuing an occupation without
paying the occupation tax provided therefor;
the word "occupation," as uaed in the statute,
meaning vocation, calling, trade^ or the busi-
ness which one engages in to procure a liv-
ing or obtain wealth. Robblns v. States 123
S. W. 605, 606, 67 Tex. Or. B. 462.
In a iwosecutlon under Acta 29th ]
(Gen. Laws 1006, p. 01) c 64, providinf
the punishment of any one, or the agen
employ^ of any one, engaged in the "busL
or occupation'' of keeping or storing int
canta for others in any county, etc^ in w]
the tale of intoxicants had been prohiU
who pemdts anothw to drink intoxia
within such place of huabiess, an instmc
defining "buMneas or occupatimi'' to be 1
whidi oigagee one's time and aLtbeotUm oi
bor, or that about which one la engage
employed, was misleading, where aca
claimed that the Intoxicants shown to I
been drunk on the premises were not k^
hire or profit, nor as a business or call
but that such keeping was csBoal and 1
dental; the terms "business" and *^occn
tion," as used in the statute, meaning a <
log, trade, or vocation In whldi one e&gi
to make a living or obtain wealth. Gobe
State, 110 S. W. 66, 67, 68 Tex. Cr. R. 42
Under Act AprU 16, 1000 (Acts 31st ]
c. 16), making it a felony to pursue the o
pation of selling intoxicating liquor in 1
option territory, the word "occupation" <
not necessarily mean principal business,
may mean a business carried on by the
fendant as a aide line, and hence a chargi
a prosecution under that law, that in oi
to constitute and engage in or iHursue the
cupation of selling intoxicating liquor 1
necessary for the state to prove beyon
reasonable doubt that the defendant nnl
fully followed that business, places a gns
burden on the state than the law reqoi
and was not prejudicial to defendant. Cl
V. State, 186 8. W. 200, 264, 61 Tex. O
507.
An instruction that it was not neoesa
that a party should make a profit in his b
ness in order to be guilty of pursuing the
cupation of selling intoxicating liquors '
not an Improper limitation on the meanini
the words, '^occupation" or ''business,**
used in the statute, and was proper wl
the evid^ice showed that accused would
der whisky fbr his store customers, i
charge it in their store account at cost tc
paid when the rest of the account was p
since each of these transactions oonstitii
a sale. And a further charge that the si
was not required to show that such **&
ness" or "occupation" was accused's prind
"business" or ''occupation," or that he s
the whole or the greats part of his time
such business, but that lA althons^ engaj
in his usual occupation, he secretly sold
toxicating liquors when the opportunity I
sented, he would be guilty, was not objecti
able on the grounds that it did not prope
define "business" or "occupation.** Dkb
V. State (Tex.) 146 S. W. 014, 018.
OCOUPATIOV BEITTAI.
One occupying real pn^^erty under
lease which is subsequent and subject u
OCCUPATION TAX
687
OCCUPIED BY ITS TRACKS
mortgage under foreclosure, in an action
irhereln a recover has been appointed, must
tnswer to such recover for rent which may
be due or which may accrue after such re-
ceiver's appointment; or, if the occupant
claims to have a defense to the landlord's
claim for rent as such, then the occupant
must pay to the receiver as custodian of
property which is security for a mortgage —
uid to safeguard such security — a reasonable
amount for the use and occupation of such
mortgaged premises, called "occupation rent-
al," during the pendency of the action. Der-
by V. Brandt, 00 N. X. Supp. 980, 081, 00 App.
Dlv. 257.
OCCITPATIOV TAX
License or occupation tax, see license
Tax.
Laws 1003, c 176, I 10, requiring itiner-
ant physidans to pay an annual sum for a
license to practice as such. Imposes an occu-
pation tax within Const art 6, | 17, requir-
ing that taxation shall be equal and uniform.
State V. Doran, 134 N. W. 53, 56, 28 S. D. 486.
A specific tax upon agents and represen-
tatives of packing houses and of dealers in
packing house goods and products having a
place of business or stock of merchandise in
a dty and selling to customers therein is a
vocation or occupation tax. City of Savan-
nah V. Oo(«er, 68 S. S. 188, 189, 140, 131 Ga.
670.
The fees imposed by a dty to pay the
cost of necessary Inspection of the installa-
tion of electrical appliances, inside and out-
side of buildings in the dty are not taxes
within Const art 8, | 1, providing that per-
sons engaged in mechanical and agricultural
pursuits shall not be required to pay an oc-
cupation tax. License and Inspection fees
levied under the police power of a dty are
not an ''occupation tax'* within this constitu-
tional provision. Ex parte Cramer, 136 S.
W. 61, 62, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 11, 36 L. E. A. (N.
S.) 78, Ann. Caa. 1013C, 588.
A tax levied on a corporation for the ex-
ercise of the privilege of carrying on its busi-
ness is an occupation tax within Const art 8,
1 1, authorissliig the Leglalature to impose oc-
cupation taxes on persons and corporations
doing business in the state. State v. Galves-
ton. H. ft S. A. By. Co*. 07 S. W. 71, 77, 100
Tex. 153.
Laws 1007, c 65, imposing cm erery in-
surance company doing business in the state,
except domestic mutual insurance companies,
an annual tax of 2% per cent of the gross
amount of premiums received in the state
during the preceding year, etc., when con-
strued in the light of the history of the 1^-
islatlon on the subject imirases an '*occupa-
tion tax** and not an "ordinary tax" within j
the Constitution relating to taxation. Queen
City Plre Ins. Co. ▼. Basford, 130 N. W. 44, .
46, 27 S. D. 164. 1
OOOUPIED AS DWfilXIKO HOUSE
A landlord who rents the second story of
a store buflding, to be used by the lessee for
printing and publishing a newspaper therein,
in the absence of an agreement in the lease,
1b not bound to put the building in a 'condi-
tion fit- for such occupation, and repair fu-
ture dilapidations thereof, as the property
leased is not intended '*for occupation of hu-
man beings*' within the meaning of Wilson's
Bev. ft Ann. St 1003, H 863, 864. Tucker v.
Bennett, 81 Pac. 423, 424, 15 OkL 187.
OCCUPIED AS rACTO&T
Defendant insured an ice manufacturing
plant after Its operation had been abandoned,
the policy describing the property as a build-
ing ''occupied as an ice factory,** and de-
scribed the personal property as appurte-
nances and appliances necessary to be used
in plaintiff's business, all while contained in
such building. The policy also declared that
if the subject of insurance was a manufac-
turing establishment and it should cease to be
operated for more than 10 consecutive days
without the Insurer's consent, the policy
should be forfeited. Held, that the policy
being construed most strictly against the in-
surer did not insure an ice manufacturing
plant in operation, but merely a building and
appliances therein that had been used for
that purpose, and that the policy was there-
fore not forfeited by a continued failure to
operate the plant without insurer's consent.
Home Ins. Co. v. North Little Rock Ice &
Electric Co., Ill S. W. 004, 006, 86 Ark. 538,
23 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1201.
OCCUPIED AS SAI.OOK
In a fire Insurance policy, the words, "oc-
cupied as a saloon," are words of description
only, and do not mean that the building in-
sured shall be at all times conducted as a
saloon. Silver v. London Assur. Corporation,
112 Pac. 666» 668, 61 Wash. 503.
OCCUPIED AS A STEAM LAUNDBT
The phrase "occupied as a steam laun-
dry" In a Are policy on property described as
a two-story basement and bride building, and
additions adjoining and communicating, in-
cluding foundations, "occupied as a steam
laundry," renders a boiler house connected
with the building: within the policy. Guthrie
Laundry Co. v. Northern Assur. Co. of Loo-
don, 87 Pac. 640, 651, 17 Okl. 571, 10 Ann.
Cas. 036.
OCCUPIED BT ITS TRACKS
The phrase "occupied by its tracks," in
Pub. St 1882, c lis, II 82, 88, requiring ev-
ery street railway company to ke^ in repair
the paving of the portion of the street oc-
cupied by its trades, refers to the rails and
the space between them oTer which theocars
pass. City of Boston y. Boston Elevated B.
Co., 71 N. E. 205, 186 Mass. 274.
OCCUPIED BY ITS TRACKS
688
OOCURRENCX
Under a dty ordinance, requiring a atreet
railway company operating a line wittiin tbe
corporate limiti to keep in good repair all
that part of the atreet occupied by it, when-
ever the street car company took poeaession
ot that portion of the street for the. purpose
of laying a track, it was '^occupied by iV
Montgomery St By. Co. ▼. Smith, 39 South.
757, 761, 146 AU. 316.
OOOVPIED EZ0I.ir8XVELT AS A
DWXSXIK0
The owner of a two-stoiy buUdliig liaT-
ing two show windows with an entrance be-
tween them conducted- a laundry therein
from July until September, when the sign
was taken down and not replaced until the
following June or July, when the business
was resumed. Held that, though the owner
lived in a part of the building, it was not
'^occupied exclusively for a dwelling** within
Liquor Tax Law requiring consents to the
granting of liquor licenses, and therefore
could not be counted in ascertaining assent
of the owners of the surrounding homes to
the proposed application for a liquor tax cer-
tificate, though on the date of the applica-
tion the sign was down and the laundry had
been suspended for the season. In re Ben-
nett, 136 N. Y. Supp. 910, 911, 76 Misc. Rep.
310.
OCCUPIED FO& 8CHOOI. PURPOSSS
In a Legal and technical sense, a public
achooL building In which a public school is
b^ng conducted is "occupied for common
school purposes" from the beginning to the
ending of the term, iadudijig sdiool days,
Saturdays, Sundays, and nights. The term
"unoccupied for common ecbool purposes," as
used in Burns* Ann. St 1901, tl 5920a-5981,
relating to tbe duration of school terms in
school townships; and section 5999, granting
the right to use a public school building for
other than school purposes when "unoccupied
for common school purposes," has refer-
ence only to the time intervening between
terms of school, and the statute does not au-
.thorlze a religious organization to use a
schoolhouse on Sundays and evenings during
a school term, when the school was not ac-
tually in session. Baggerly v. Lee, 73 N. E.
921, 923, 37 Ind. App. 139.
OCCUPT
See Cease to Occupy; Occupancy — Oc-
cupation— Occupy (Of Land).
In relation to insurance, see Unoccupied;
Vacancy — ^Vacant — Vacate.
"To occupy" is generally defined to be
to take and hold possession of, .have in pos-
session and use^ to take posseselon of, to keep
in possession, to possess, to h(M and use, as
to joccopy a house or a farm. Thieme v. Ni-
agara Fire Ins. Co., 91 N. Y. Supp. 499, 501,
100 App. Dlv. 278 (quoting in support of def-
initions, Stand. Diet; Imperial Diet).
An ordinance which makes U nnlawfal t
"oocopy** or allow to be occupied any portic
of a house to he used as a house of HI fan
or disorderly house in the dtj of Atlani
means that occupancy whidi oontiihutes i
some manner to the unlawful ctiaxacter (
the house, and does not preclude an innoc^
and lawful oooupancy of a room or a portk
of a house which may in other paFts there
be used for disorderly and immoral purpose
Dannie v. City of Atlanta, 73 8. B. 6S4, 66
10 Oa. App. 471.
"Occupy," within Rev. St e 9, f IS, so
sec. 1, providing that personalty employed
trade shall be taxed in the town where it
employed April 1st, if the owner occupies
landing place, etc.., means having control
whole or a part, having a special right
use. Inhabitants of Georgetown r. WHlia
E. Hanscome ft Co., 79 AtL 379, 380, 106 U
131.
Appntpriate as syaoaymoas
See Appropriate— AppropriatLon.
OCCUR
If a political party at its inimazy mak
no nomination of a candidate for election
an ofllce, a vacancy has '"occurred," wiUi
the meaning of the statute (Gobbey'a Ann. :
1011, 1 S888); and the proper party eonunitt
may fill that vacancy. State ex reL Cur;^
V. Wells, 138 N. W. 166, 107, 92 Neb. 337.
U B. A. <N. S.) 1068.
Acts 1909, a 103, 1 3, am^ding Acts 19(
c. 435, provides that all vacancies in tJ
State Board of Elections shall be filled 1
Joint vote of the General Assembly, exce
vacancies occurring when it is not in sessio
when, If the office of only one member is v
cant, the remaining members of the boai
shall fill the vacancy, and if they f^il to do j
it shall be flUed by the Secretary of Stat
Comptroller, and Treasurer, and that if the
be more than one vacancy it shall be fill<
by appointment by sudi oflioexa. f eid. 1
view of the meaning of ^'vacant,** whk
meant ^'without an incumbent," regardless i
when or how it became vacant, and of tl
words "occur" and "iiappen," whicb wa
synonymous and meant ''existing" or **to I
found," that the Comptroller, Secretary i
State, and Treasurer were authorised to fi
two or more vacancies in the board of ele
tions during recess of the LegLslatuxe, whet)
er such vacancies occurred during recess <
while the Legislature was in aeeaion. Rid
ardson v. Young, 125 S. W. 604, 6S4, U
Tenn. 471.
OCCURRENCE
See Exceptional Occurrence; Extraord
. nary Occurrence.
The word ''transaction" is not synoDj
mouil with "occurrence.** Bxcelalor Cla
OOBAK
OV
Works ▼. Pe Camp, 80 N. E. 981, 983, 40 Ind.
App. 26 (dttng Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Go.
V. Van Auken, 27 N. B. 119, 1 Ind. App. 492).
OCEAN
OCBAHraONV
P. L. 1894, p. 146, an act to enable cities
located near the ocean and exnbrat:ing within
their limits any bea(^ or ocean front to open
and lay out a public park, defines in its title
"ocean front" as meaning as icnach of such
front as is within the territorial Iknits of
such dty. Grossan v. Ventnor City, 78 Atl.
12, 80 N. J. Law, 511.
OCTOROON
As negro, see Negro.
OCTROI TAX
The ''droit de ville" and an ••octroi tax"
are internal revenue imposes of France which
are not general in their application, but vary
with the locality and are not collected if the
merchandise is exported. United States y.
R F. Downing ft Go., 131 Fed. 658, 664.
ODD WITNESSES
The term "odd witnesses," used in a re-
cital that 60^d witnesses were Introduced
in an eminent domain proceeding, referred to
number rather than to singularity. St
Louis, M. k S. E3, R. Go. y. Aubuchon, 97 S.
W. 867, 860, 199 Mo. 852, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.)
426, 116 Am. St Rep. 499, 8 Ann. Gas. 822.
OF
The pre|K>sitton "of* as used in an act
establtBhing a dty police court with Jurisdic-
tion to enforce any penalty for the yiohitlon
of any regulation of such city "or any board
thereof," should be construed to denote
source, creation, or . autbonhip, as distin-
guished from mer& existence or possesstoo.
Board of Health of Glty of AiA>ury Pack y.
New York & L. B. R. Co., 71 Atl. 259, 77 N.
J. Law, 15.
Rem. k Bal. Gode, § 6119, requiring the
publication of annual statements of infiuraAce
companies in "two dally papers of the larg-
est general circulation to be designated by
the Insurance Commissioner," requires the
publication in any two papers belonging to
the class haying the largest circulation, which
class may consist of more than two papers,
and the commissioner has discretion to desig-
nate any one of the papers belonging to the
class, and to determine what papers belong to
the class haying the largest circulation,
though the 4lff6rence in the circulation
may be considerable ; the worA "of Indicat-
ing the aggregate or whole of which the lim-
ited word denotes a part, or of which a part
8 WDS.ftP.2n SEB.-44
is referred to, etc. State ex reL Cowles y.
Schlvely, 114 Pac. 901, 903, 63 Wash. 103.
Under a statute authorizing a town to
take "of* the waters of a certain pond and
so much as may be necessary for certain spec-
ified purposes, such town did not haye the
excluslye right to the water as against a rail-
road company that had been authorised by
statute to use the water of the pond. Fram-
ingham Water Co. y. Old Colony R. Co., 57
N. E. 680, 681, 176 Mass. 404.
As belonsli&s to
The words "of the United States," in Act
Cong. August 1, 1892 (27 Stat 340, c. 352), re-
lating to hours of labor of laborers or me-
chanics employed upon any of the public
works of the United States, means belonging
to the United States. Dredging a channel in
Boston Harbor Is not a public work of the
United States, within the meaning of the
act forbidding a contractor under penalty of
fine or imprisonment to permit or require
employ^ on public work to work moxe than
eight hours each day. Ellis y. United States,
27 Sup. Ct. 600, 602, 206 U. S. 246, 51 L.
Ed. 1047, 11 Ann. Gas. 589.
The yalidlty of an indictment for lar-
ceny Is not affected by the omission of the
preposition "of between the' Words "goods
and chattels*' and the name of the prosecu-
tor. Bennett y. State, 84 S. W. 483, 73 Ark.
386.
The word "of," where it precedes the
words "all existing steam railroads" in an
elevated railroad franchise regulating the
height of the superstructure over the "tracks
of all existing steam railroads," was not in-
tended to denote ownership or possession,
and that the right of way and tracks refer-
red to therefore are only those owned by "ex-
isting steam railroads," but was evidently
Intended only to identify the right of way
and tracks mentioned in the ordinance by In-
dicating the character of the road of which
they formed a. part Peabody Coal Co. v.
Northwestern Elevated R. Co., 82 N. R 578,
575, 230 m. 214.
As ift
The preposition "of," as used In Code
Pub. Oen. Laws 1904, art. 23, | 366, relating
to the "streets or highways of Baltimore
city," and the granting of franchises for their
use to electric light and power companies, is
not descriptive of or relating to title or own-
ership, but refers to location and municipal
jurisdiction ; and the expression quoted em-
braces streets or roads within the dty limits
which are currently traversed without objec-
tion by Its citizens, whether the municipality
has or has not acquired the legal title to the
land lying under them. Patapsco Electric
Co. V. City of Baltimore, 72 Atl. 1039, 1041,
110 Md. 306.
Lands "of the state, as used in the title
of an act to promote public health, etc., by
09
690
OF RECORD
m^-
•fi.
draining the Unds "of the etate, means
lands "within** the state. Sisson ▼. Board of
Supers of Buena Vista County, 104 N. W. 454,
458, 128 Iowa, 442, 70 L. R. A. 44a
As portiim or yart pf
A marine policy insured "in port and at
sea, ^ ^ * at all times, in ail places and
on all occasions, • • • npon the hull,
spars, sails, materials fittings, boats (includ-
ing launches, steam or otherwise, if any), for-
niture, provisions, stores, * * \ boilers,
etc., of and in the schooner yacht Rosemary,'*
against all manner of marine perils, and the
furniture and boats against fire when laid up
on shore. Held, that a naphtha launch, part
of the equipment of the yacht, carried on
davits when she was under way, and used as
a means of communication with the shore
when in port, while being so used in the usual
way between the yacht and shore was "of
and in*' the yacht, and covered by the policy.
Dennis v. Home Ins. Co., 136 Fed. 481, 482.
See Or.
As to
Defendant employed plaintiff as a travel-
ing salesman, agreeing to pay a salary of
$1,800 per year, to allow $1,200 for traveling
expenses, and to pay a commission of 5 per
cent in excess 'to $40,000** sales made by
plaintiff and shipped by defendant Held,
that the use of the word "to** was a mere
grammatical error, the Intention of the par-
ties being that plaintiff was only to receive
commissions on sales made by him in excess
of $40,000, and that the preposition "to"
should give place to "of with which it was
synonymous. Ettenson v. Mendelson, 133 N.
Y. Supp. 283, 284, 75 Misc. Rep. 307.
OF COUNSEL
Where the judge before whom deftedant
was brought for trial on an indictment for
suborning a witness at a hearing in bank-
ruptcy to commit perjury while conducting a
hearing in a bankruptcy case to discover as-
sets, appeared to be angry and said in the
presence of accused: "This is a nasty piece
of business. This estate has been looted by
some one" — and then turned to an officer of
the court and directed that he use what was
left of the estate, even to the last penny, to
investigate the matter, and if any one, who-
ever he might be, had committed any act that
could be reached and punished under the law,
to institute proceedings against him, the
Judge merely performed his duty to direct an
official inquiry of what appeared to be a crim-
inal offense, and did not thereby become dis-
qualified to try accused therefor, as being ei-
ther "concerned in interest" or "of counsel'*
for the prosecution, within the meaning of
the statute. Epstein v. United States, 106
Fed. 354, 355, 116 C. 0. A. 174.
or OOUBSB
See Ck>ntinued of Course; Costs as
Course.
The term "of course," as emidoyed
Code av. Proc || 1229, 1774, providing th
in an action for divorce. Judgment cannot
taken "of course'* upon the dertsJan or
port, etc^ and declaring that after the ex
ration of three months final Judgment sfa
be entered as "of course** upon the dedsi
etc., means, without special direction or p
vision or pursuant to settled role tor whJ
there need be no further direction or auth
ity. Petit V. Petri, 91 N. Y. Supp. 979. 9
45 Misc. Rep. 15&
OF OBAOE
A chancellor is said to act "of grac
That grace sometimes becomes a matter
right to the suitor, and, when it is clear tl
the law cannot give protection and relief
which the complainant in equity is admitt
ly entitled, the chancellor cannot withlM
his grace any more than the law can de
protection and relief, if able to give the
This is often overlooked when it Is said tl
in equity a decree is of grace and not
right The phrase "of grace** had Its orij
in an age when kings dispensed their roj
favors at the hands of chanceUora, but li
no rightful place In the Jurisprudence of
commonwealth. Sullivan v. Jones St Lam
lin Sted Co., 67 AtL 1065, 1071, 206 Pa. &
66 L. R. A. 712. See, also, American Sum
Ing ft Refining Co. v. Godfr^, 158 Fed. Z
237, 89 C. C. A. 139, 14 Ann. Gas. 8 (fn
the opinion of Marshall, District Judge,
the Circuit Court, quoting from Walters
McElroy, 25 AtL 125, 151 Pa. 549).
OF KO EFFECT
The phrase "of no effect,** as used in n
40 of the Supreme Court, i»x>vidingr that i
rules, whether granted by the court or by
Justice, sliall be entered in the minates wit
in ten days and in default thereof shall
"of no effect,** is synonymous with '*Told" si
not with "voidablei" Jersey City t. Davi
76 Aa 969, 80 N. J. Law, 600.
OF OB GOKGEBHINO
See Concern.
OF RECORD
The rule that unsurveyed land within ti
bounds of a railroad grant, which was occ
pied by a bona fide settler intending i
homestead the land, acquires a superior rifl
founded on the terms of the statute grantii
certain alternate sections, provided they wei
free from pre-emption or other claims <
rights, was not altered by an opinion of U
Supreme Court referring to such dalm by
homesteader as "of record,'* as the court di
not Intend to require that all such claims (
rights must be of record, but intended to di
scribe only one class of claims which w&
OFF
691
07FRKSB
xcepted from the granting act Northern
»ac Ry. Co. v. Trodlck, 81 Sup. Ct. 607, 609,
21 U. S. 208, 55 Lu Ed. 704 (dtlng United
Itates V. Chicago, M. & St P. B. Co., 31 Sup.
^. 7, 218 U. S. 233, 54 li. Ed. 1016).
>FF
See Cut Oflf; Marked Off; Paid Off:
Put Off; Sign Off.
On a contract not to become interested
a the buainess of catching certain kinds of
sh, other than the business to be conducted
y the other party, or the business of manu-
acturlng fish into oil or guano, "upon, along;
r *off* the Atlantic seaboard" the word "off"
dds to and enlarges the meaning of the
rords **upon'* and "along," and carries the
rohlbltlon out into the deep water more dls-
ant from the coast, and Includes all the wa-
ers adjacent to the eastern coast of the
Fnlted States, and does not exclude bays or
ther indentations along the coast American
Isberies Co. T. linnen, 118 Fed. 869, 874.
IFFAL
"Offal" is defined in Cent Diet as "that
hich is suffered to fall off as of little value
r use; waste meat; waste or refuse of any
ind." Under a city ordinance providing
lat "no person shall go about collecting any
ouse 'offar consisting of animal and vege-
ible substances, or carry the same through
oy of the streets, lanes or courts of the
ity," except the person appointed for that
arpose by the sanitary committee, the term
tiouse offal" is held to Include refuse food
*om the tables discarded victuals, and swill
>nsiBting of refuse from the table, though
[>ne of it be in a decayed condition. State
Robb, 60 AU. 874, 875, KK) Me. 180, 4 Ann.
as. 275.
A libel for condemnation of catsup, al-
ging that it was mlsbranded, in that it was
ade in part from tomato pulp screened from
clings and cores, as the "offal" of tomato
inning factories, and not from choice ripe
matoes, etc., as stated in the labels, did not
large a violation of the provision of the
ire food law (Act Cong. June 30, 1906, c.
>15, I 7, par. 6) relating to preparations con-
sting in whole or in part of a filthy, decom-
>sed, or putrid animal or vegetable sub-
ance; the words "as the offal of tomato
inning factories" being of no exact slgnlfl-
Ltion, and the word "offal" not the equiva-
nt of a charge that the tomato pulp was a
thy, decomposed, or putrid vegetable sub-
ance. United States v. Six Hundred and
Lfty Cases of Tomato Catsup, 166 Fed. 773,
A.
FFENDER
See First Offender; Pursuit of Offender.
OFFENSE
See Body of the Offense ; Continuing Of*
fense; Criminal Offense; Different
Off^ises; Each Offense; Lesser Of-
fense; Minor Offense; Petty Offense;
Public Off ense ; Same Offense; Second
Offense; Separate Offense; Specific
Criminal Offense; State Prison Of-
fense.
Merger of offenses, see Merger.
"An 'offense,* in its legal signification,
means the transgression of a law." Town of
Neola V. Reichart 109 N. W. 5, 7, 131 Iowa,
492 (quoting and adopting definition in Moore
V. State of Illinois, 14 How. [55 U. S.] 19,
14 Li Ed. 806; Grafton v. United States, 27
Sup. Ct 749, 754, 206 U. S. 383, 358, 51 L.
Ed. 1084, 11 Ann. Cas. 640).
" 'Offense* signifies a public wrong which
subjects the perpetrator to legal punishment"
An attempt to commit suicide Is not an in-
dictable offense in the state of Maine. May
v. Pennell, 64 Ati. 885, 887, 101 Me. 516, 7 L,
R. A. (N. S.) 286, 115 Am. St Rep. 334» 8 Ann.
Cas. 851.
In Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 114, providing
that whenever a magistrate is informed on
oath that an offense is about to be commitr
ted against the person or property of the in-
formant or of another, "or if any person has
threatened to commit an offense,** he must
issue a warrant for the arrest of accused, the
word "offense,** as used in the clause "or if
any person has threatened to commit an of-
fense,** has the same meaning and is uped in
the same sense as the word "offense** in the
preceding part of the same article, and should
be limited in its meaning to offenses against
person or property. Ex parte Muckenfuss,
107 S. W. 1131, 1132, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 467.
An "offense** is a breach of the laws es-
tablished for the protection of the public, as
distinguished from an Infringement of mere
private rights. The word is used as a genus,
comprehending every crime and misdemeanor,
or as a species, signifying a crime not indict-
able but punishable summarily or by the for-
feiture of a penalty. Laws Okl. T. 1903, p.
168, c. 15, I 4, providing that it shaU be un-
lawful for any carrier to receive any of the
game mentioned in section 1 of the act for
the purpose of carrying It to any of the
places within or beyond the territory, and
that any carrier so doing shall forfeit a cer-
tain sum with costs, creates an offense within
the meaning of Organic Act (Act Cong. May
2, 1890, c. 182, 26 Stat 87) | 10, and a civil
action brought for the recovery of the penalty
must be tried within the county where the
violation is alleged to have occurred. Chica-
go, R. I. k P. Ry. Co. V. Territory of Oklaho-
ma, 105 Pac. 677, 679, 25 Okl. 238.
"Offense" is used synonymously with
"misconduct** which is defined as "wrong con-
duct; bad behavior; mismanagement*' Bail-
OFFENSE
692
OFFENSE
fll
i>i
,:! i-;
!' )
K \ :
■q
ey T. Examining and Trial Board of Police
Department of City of Helena^ 122 Pa& 572,
674, 45 Mont. 197.
"Offense" Is now used synonymously with
"crime.*' United SUtes ▼. Zarafonitis, ISO
Fed. 97, 101, 80 a O. A. 61, 10 Ann« Gas. 290
(quoting and adopting Burr. Law Diet yerbo
"Offense"). And while the words "offense"
and "crime** are in certain cases considered
synonymous, the "offenses" specified by New
Tork Military Code, I 96, for the most seri-
ous of which the punishment is dismissal
from the servioe with a small fine, and no one
of which is designated as a "crime," are not
"crimes." People v. Wendel, 112 N. Y. Supp.
301, 302, 69 Misc. Bep. 354.
The word "offense" implies a violation of
a law by which alone it can be denounced.
Thomas y. United States, 156 Fed. 897, 900,
84 C. a A. 477, 17 Li B. A. (N. S.) 720.
An "offense** which is pursued at the dis-
cretion of the injured party or his repre-
sentatiye is a dyll injury, while an offense
which Is pursued by the soyereign or the sub-
ordinate of the soyereign is a crime. Jeml-
gan y. Gommonweath, 52 S. E. 861, 362, 104
Va.860.
"An 'offense^ which may be the subject
of criminal procedure is an act committed or
omitted in yiolation of a public law, either
forbidding or commanding it" Dent y. Unit-
ed States, 71 Pae 920, 922, 8 Ariz. 138 (quot-
ing and adopting definition In United States
y. Eaton, 12 Sup. Ct 764, 144 U. 8. 677, 36
L. Ed. 691).
An action by the state for penalties im-
posed by the anti-trust act of Texas, declar-
ing that corporations yiolatlng the act shall
be guilty, and when conyicted, shall be sub-
ject to penalties recoyerable by "suit** where
the "offense" is committed, is not a crimi-
nal prosecution, within the statute prescrib-
ing the time for the institution of criminal
prosecutions, but is a clyil suit; the word
"offense" haying reference to violations of
the acts, and not being equivalent to the
words "felony** or "misdemeanor." Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. V. State, 106 S. W. 918, 48 Tex.
Civ. App. 162.
The word "offense,** as used in Const
art 5, S 13, giving the Governor power to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
after convictions for all offenses, Is equiva-
lent to "crimes,** and the Governor cannot
pardon an offense until after conviction by
the judgment of the court Ex parte Cam-
pion, 112 N. W. 585, 588, 79 Neb. 364, 11 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 865, 126 Am. St Rep. 667. 16 Ann.
Cas. 319.
The term "offense,** as used In Rev. St.
85 4364r-20a, 4364-20b, which provide for an
election in any n^unldpallty to determine
whether or not the sale of intoxicating liq-
uors as a beverage shall be permitted, and
which declare that whoever shall sell where
sales are prohibited shall be guilty of a mli
demeanor, and which ivescribe the punist
ment for the first offense and for a secon
offense^ embraces the entire charge, thoo^
there may be a number of counts, and znean
a conviction. Hence an affidavit diargin
three separate sales to differoit persons o
the same day, without alleging a previous coi
viction, is in legal effect a charge of a fin
offense only. Carey y. State, 70 N. B. 9S
966, 70 Ohio St 121.
Driving an automobile at a prohiblte
rate not being an offense against the police c
towns, fines imposed by a justice of the pesc
for violations of the speed limit, in the al
sence of special provision to the eontnuy, bi
long to the county under Pub. St 1901, c 29(
I 2, providing that, unless otiherwiae spedaU
provided, all fines and forfeitures imposed b
a justice of the peace for "offenses agaliu
the police of towns,** and yiolations of b:
laws of towns, and fines and fbrf^tnies in
posed by a police court, shall be for the m
of the town, and all other fines and forfe
tures shall be fOr the use of the comity. Tt
phrase "offenses against the police of towx^
refers to the offenses enumerated under Uu
title in Pub. St 1901, c. 264. Bodkingluu
County y. Chase^ 71 AtL 634, 635, 75 N. I
127.
VIolatioa of eity ordlnaaoe
A violation of a city ordinance is an "o
fense*' against the city. The violatioD
termed a petty offense and constitute
crime in the broad sense of that word. Pea
son V. Wimblflh, 52 S. E. 751, 755, 124 Ga. 70
4 Ann. Cas. 501 (citing McRae v. Mayor, et<
of City of Amerlcus, 59 Ga. 170, 27 Am. Re
390).
A grand Jnior is not rendered incomii
tent because charged with a violation of
municipal sanitary ordinance; which is m
a "crime or offense*' within the intendment <
section 1, Act No. 135, p. 216, of 1896. Stal
V. Calhoun, 41 South. 360, 361, 117 La. S
(citing State v. Thlbodeaux, 19 South. 6S0. ^
La. Ann. 600; State v. Nicholas. 33 Soatl
92, 109 La. 84).
Kvisanee
B. & C. Comp. I 1930, punishing any pe
son committing any act which grossly Injun
the person of another, or which grossly di
turbs the public peace or health, or openl
outrages the public decency and is injuriov
to public morals, not otherwise made punisl
able, covers offenses against the public peact
health, and morals not otherwise made poz
Ishable, and known at common law as Indld
able nuisances; and at common law wluil
ever tends to corrupt society is an "offens
against good morals,** and is punishable a
a nuisance, and such act need not be a coo
tlnuous one, but may consist of a single ad
and it may not affect the public at large, ta
only such as come in contact with it St&ti
ENSE AGAINST UNITED STATES
aymlre, 97 Pac. 46, 47, 48, 52 Or. 281, 21
. A. (N. S.) 56, 132 Am. St. Rep. 699.
"EMSE AOAIHST THE UNITED
STATES
iL conspiracy to violate the ''bucket shop"
of the District of Columbia is an "of-
3 against the United States," within the
ite, providing for the removal of offend-
Lgainst the United States and the statute
log to conspiracies to commit offenses
[ist the United States. United States v.
pbell, 179 Fed. 762, 764.
In Rev. St S 4540, relating to conspira-
the words "offenses against the United
&s'' have the same meaning as the words
inses against the laws of the United
es" in the original act of March 2, 1867
Stat. 484, c. 169) the change being mere-
Qe of phraseology made by the revision
nission, and such section denounces con*
icies to commit offenses created by any
e statutes of the United States. Thomas
nited States, 156 Fed. 897, 901, 84 O. a
r7, 17 !#. R. A. (N. S.) 720.
Assisting the importation of alien con-
: laborers Is an "offense against the
ed States," within the meaning of Rev;
U. S. S 5440, providing for the criminal
Bhment of persons conspiring to commit
offenses, since Congress, In making it a
lemeanor, by Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, |
[ Stat. 900, to assist the immigration of
persons, has made such action a crime,
stable as such, although, by section 5 of
act, it has provided a remedy ih the
re of a civil action for the recovery of a
Ity for a violation of the act United
es V. Stevenson, 80 S. Ct 87, 88, 215 U.
K), 54 L. Ed. 157.
'ENSE INVOLVING MOBAI. TUR-
PiTUDE
See Moral Turpitude.
"ENSIVE
Wliere a restriction in a deed forbade
erection on the land of "any tavern,
king saloon, slaughterhouse, skin-dressing
t>lishment, or any other building for of*
Ive purpose or occupation," it includes a
ic garage for hire, storage, and repair of
mobiles and the furnishing of needed
>lies. Hibberd v. Edwards, 84 Atl. 437,
235 Pa. 454.
The owner of land divided it into build-
lots, and in each deed inserted a restric*
that the property should not be used for
business "offensive to the neighborhood
Iwelling houses." in a suit by one of the
itees to restrain the erection of an au*
)bile garage, it appeared that the build-
was designed to accommodate about 125
e automobiles, a part of one story being
?ned for a repair shop, ^nd it being in-
ed to place in the building a portable
e; that demonstration cars were to be
OFFER
kept, with demonstrators to run them; and
that about 75 or 100 customers were expect-
ed to store automobiles there, such machines
to go in and out on an average of once a
day. Held, that a finding that the mainte-
nance of such building would constitute a vio-
lation of the restriction was warranted.
Evans v. Foss, 80 N. E. 587, 589, 194 Mass.
513, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1039, 11 Ann. Cas. 17L
OFFENSIVE BSTABIiISHMENT
Any other offensive establishment, see
Any Other.
OFFER
See, also, Proposal.
Const art 5, | 7, provides that one who
shall offer or promise to pay to another any
money as an inducement for the giving or
withholding of such other's vote at an elec-
tion shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Held,
that the words, "If you will vote the Repub-
lican ticket, I will pay yon |20 after the
polls have closed," constitute an offer to pay
within the Constitution, and render the per-
son making the offer guilty of a misdemean-
or ; no acceptance of the offer being re-
quired, and no tender being needed to make
an offer. State v. Barr (Del.) 79 Atl. 730,
733, 7 PennewiU, 340.
In an action for resdseion and cai^cella-
tlon of a deed fraudulently obtained, an alle-
gation that plaintiffs are ready and willing
to execute a deed to the land traded for to
defendants is a sufficient offer to restore
within Wilson's Rev. & Ann. St 1903, S 827.
Clark V. O'Toole, 94 Pac 647. 552, 20 OkL 319.
The word "offered," in a charge against
a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers that he had "offered" his advice
and service to railroad officials in their pro-
posed plan to run engineers through from
one city to another, means that he had vol-
unteered his advice and service.' Fritz v.
Knaub, 103 N. Y. Supp. 1003, 1008, 57 Misc.
Rep. 405.
As attempt
As respects an attempt or offer to cast a
ballot and vote, the terms "offer" and * 'at-
tempt" are practically the same in meaning.
One of the definitions given by Mr. Webster
of the word '^offer** is '•♦attempt" State v.
Fielder, 109 S. W. 580, 888, 210 Mo. 18a
To support a conviction for a violation
of a statute punishing every person who shall
corrupt or attempt to corrupt a Juror, by of-
fering to give any gift with intent to bias
the Juror, it is not necessary to prove an ac-
tual tender of the gift offered as a bribe, so
as to enable the Juror to at once accept or
reject the same. Evl<Jence showing a pro-
posal or a willingness to give a, bribe to bias
the Juror's verdict is sufficient. State v.
Woodard. 81 S. W.'857, 861, 182 Mo. 391, 103
Am. St Rep. 646.
n\
OFPEB
694
OFFER FOR SAIjB
'^^
^l'J.V
Hi
In 2 Boayler's Law Dictlonaiy, p. 827»
the definition of "offer** is "a proposal to do
a thing." To prove the commission of the
offense created by Rev. St. 1899, | 2043, pun-
ishing every person who shall oornipt or at-
tempt to corrupt a Juror by "offering to give
any gift * • * with intent** to bias the
Juror, it is not necessary to show an actual
tender of the bribe, but evidence showing a
proposal and declaration of a willingness to
give a bribe or gratuity to bias the Juror's
verdict is sufficient State t. Miller, 81 S.
W. 867, 872, 182 Mo. 870.
Where a yerdict found defendant guUty
of an "attempt" to bribe, it sufficiently show-
ed a violation of the statute prohibiting "an
offer" to bribe an officer; the words "offer"
and "attempt" in «uch connection being
synonymoua Johnson t. State, 02 & W. 257,
49 Tex. Or. R. 26a
As eoatMMt
See Contract
As temder
The word "offer" is frequently used by
courts and text-writers as synonymous with
"tender,** and it may be properly so used
with reference to articles capable of manual
delivery and actually produced. But with
respect to heavy articles of merchandise,
situated at a distance from the place to
which they must be transported, if restored
to the vendor, the phrase "offer to return"
is more commonly and aptly applied to ex-
press a willingness, or to make a proposal
to rescind the contract and return the goods.
In order to work a rescission, it is not suffi-
cient for the purchaser, who has taken de-
livery of the goods at the vendor's place of
business, to give notice to the vendor that
he holds the goods subject to his order, or
that the goods are at a designated place sub>
Ject to his die^sal. The goods must be re-
turned to the place where acc^ted, unless,
upon an "offer to return,*' such offer is re-
fused by the vendor. Mundt v. Simpkins, 116
N. W. 325, 326, 81 Neb. 1, 129 Am. St Rep.
670 (quoting and adopting definition in Mil-
Uken V. SkilUngs, 89 Me. 180, 36 Ati. 77).
Under Rev. St | 3627, providing that,
at the Joining of issue in an action for in-
voluntary trespass before a Justice, defend-
ant may "offer in wilting" to permit plaintiff
to take Judgment against him for damages
and costs, and section 3628, providing that if
plaintiff fails to recover a more favorable
Judgment he shall not recover costs made
after such offer, the oral answer of de-
fendant entered by the Justice in his docket,
that "defendant tenders Judgment for six
cents and costs up to day," is sufficient to
satisfy the statute. It bound defendant Just
as effectually as though he had himself
written and subscribed it and then served
it on the plaintiff. Williams v. Ready, 39 N.
W. 779, 72 Wis. 40a
Medical treatmemt
A will devising and bequeathing p
erty to trustees to convert into secaiit
and pay spedfled sums and tbe balance
some hospital "offering" to treat tnberci
patients, makes a gift to a hoepital best
ing free treatment to tubereolar patie
and hence is a public charity, as distlngi
ed from a private enterprise for profit;
word ^'offering" without any oondition
nexed and connected with a hospital in
ing bestowing free treatment to those so
ing from disease. French t. Calkina, 9(
B. 877, 881, 202 IlL 24S.
OFFBB AJTO BEFU8AL
A statement by a seller contracdoi
repurchase at the expiration of one yeai
the buyer desiring it, made before the en
tion of the year in response to the bo]
demand to repurchase that he could no<
it is the legal equiyalent of an **offer
refusal" within Civ. Code, | 1515, proTi<
that a refusal to accept perfomuuiee n
before an offer thereof is equivaJent to
offer and refusal, unless before perfomu
is actually due he gives notice of his y
ingness to accept it, and the seller desi
to hold plaintiff to performance most s
that prior to the eijkiration of the yeaj
expressed a willingness to reporcfaaae, i
unless tbe statement is withdrawn be
the expiration of the year, the buyer i
not make demand and offer at the exact
piration of the year. Howard ▼• Galbn
109 Pac. 889, 890, 13 Cat App. 873.
OFFEB FOB 8AI<E
Announcement that property will be
at auction to the highest bidder is a i
declaration of intent to hold an auction,
not an offer to sell becoming binding, <
conditionally, on the owner when a bi<
made. Anderson v. Wisconsin Gent. By.
120 N. W. 39, 46, 107 Minn. 296, 20 L. B
(N. S.) 1133, 131 Am. St Rep. 462, 16 I
Cas. 379.
A merchant has "offered or exposed
sale" an adulterated or ndsbranded arti<d
food, in violation of Agricultural (Law, H
166, added to Laws 1893, a 838, hy L
1903, c 524, by having the adulterated or i
branded article in stock for the purpose
sale, without actually making a sale. 1
pie v. Lewis, 122 N. T. Supp. 1(^5, 1026,
Appi Div. 673.
The uncontradicted testimony of
state agents that defendant deUyered a
of adulterated milk at a lunchroom, takin
receipt therefor from the person in chai
is sufficient evidence of ''sale," or ''offer
sale," in violation of Ckmsol. Laws, a 1, f
making it unlawful to sell or offer f6r s
adulterated milk. People v. HcDenii
Dairy Co., 122 N. T. Supp. 294, 296.
OFFER TO^ SALE
0FFIC5B
Under a contract with recovers by which
roker was authorized to "offer and sell"
stock of salmon of a canning company,
h a provision that the sales were to be
ject to the receivers* Instructions and con-
nation, he was not required to procure an
r but a purchaser, aUd was entitled to the
tulated commission if he was the efficient
ins of procuring a purchaser whose offer,
le directly to the receivers, was accepted,
[ to whom a sale was made. Colonial
ist Go. V. Padflc Packing ft Navigation
. 158 F-ed. 277, 279, 86 G. O. A. 539.
FEB'OF OOMFBOMI8E
Admission distinguished, see Admission.
FEB OF BEWABD
See Reward.
FER OF SETTIiEMEIlT
Admission distinguished, see Admission.
FEB TO ours
Lfl conTey
A bill foV specific performance of a con-
Tt for the conveyance of land, which al-
is that defendant ''offered to give" plain-
certain land, provided plaintiff would not
::t a building in a certain place and man-
, and that plaintiff accepted tlia offer,
nged the plan of the building, took pos-
iion of the land, and erected the building
accordance with the agreement, states a
se of action as against a demurrer; the
gation of an agreement "to give" being
strued as an agreement "to convey."
pley V. nnk, 62 Aa 860, S61, 102 Md.
, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1002.
FICE
See Business Office; Maintenance (Of
Office); Post Office; Usual Business
Office.
As public place, see Public Place.
Student in office of attorney, see Student
To have an "office," in ordinary or tedii-
il parlance, implies to hate that control
Em office which an owner or lessee, or at
St a licensee, would exercise. Althause v.
iranty Trust Co. of New York, 137 N. Y.
>p. 945, 947, 78 Misc. Rep. 181.
The word "office," as used in Code Civ.
>c { 3160, providing that a plaintiff in an
ion brought in the City Court of New
•k, who has an office for the regular trans-
Ion of business in person within the dty
New York, is deemed a "resident" of that
r, within the meaning of sections 3268 and
9, which provide that a defendant may re-
re securi^ for costs where plaintiff is not
resident, means a place where service is
idered or business is done. Brassack v.
erborough Rapid Transit Co., 121 N. Y.
sp. 215, 216, 66 Misc. Rep. 190.
An "office" in Missouri, within Rev. St
1899, 1 3862, authorizing service on a fondgn
corporation having no office or place of busi-
ness in Missouri, by service on any agent or
employ^ in any county or state where such
service may be obtained, means an ordinari-
ly established office, and not a mere casual
place of meeting, and hence a return of serv-
ice on such a corporation was not objectiona-
ble in that It recited that the corporation had
no "regular office" or place of business with-
in the state. Stegall v. American Pigment ft
Chemical Co., 130 S. W. 144, 158, 150 Mo.
App. 261.
Where a majority of the board of direc-
tors of a corporation met pursuant to a reg-
ular call for a special meeting of the board,
and were unable to obtain access to the office
of the corporation, and convened as a board
in the hallway of the building Just outside
of the office, and then adjourned the naeeting
to a designated date, the meeting of the
board was valid as against the objection tliat
the board did not meet at the office, within
Civ. Code, § 319, requiring the holding of
meetings of boards of directors at the corpo-
ration's office. Seal of Ck>ld Mining Go. v.
Slater, 120 Pac. 15, 17, 161 Gal. 621.
The word "office" as used In Civil Code
1910, I 2259, is synonymous with "place of
business." An action upon a contract with a
mining corporation, which was made or was
to be performed in a county where the corpo-
ration maintained a plant, together with a
superintendent who was in control of its busi-
ness and a large force of laborers, and a
place for the transaction of such business as
was necessary to the operation of the plant,
may be brought in the county where the
plant is located, notwithstanding the princi-
pal office of the corporation was by Its char-
ter located in another ' county, where its
board of directors met and its financial opera-
tions were carried on. General Reduction
Co. V. Tharpe, 75 S. E. 339, 340, 11 Ga. App.
334 (citing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4921).
Under a petition alleging that plaintiff
was lawfully occupying a room or "office" in
the northwest part of the courthouse, when
defendants assaulted, struck, and wounded
him and forcibly ejected him from the room
to his damage, but containing no allegation
that plaintiff was entitled tp maintain posses-
sion of such room as clerk of the county court
or of the records thereof, whether he was the
lawful county clerk and as such official en-
titled to possession of the room and records
was not in issue; the word "office" in the
connection In which used signifying a room
or apartment Morgan v. Owen, 91 S. W.
1055, 1056, 193 Mo. 587.
An ordinance directing the corporation
counsel to bring an action to collect and re-
coyer on the bond of a dty official such mon-
ey paid to hixn and belonging to the city **as
may be i^own to have been stolen from or
OFFICE
696
OFFICE
nlMpproprlated in the ofiloe of the dty treas-
urer and not duly accounted for/' did not
contemplate that the moneys for which a re-
covery was sought should be shown to have
been actually stolen from the room in which
the treasurer held his office, or misappropri-
ated in that particular room, but included
moneys of the city stolen or misappropriated
by the treasurer or his subordinates in such a
way that the treasurer was liable therefor.
City of Syracuse ▼. Rosooe, 123 N. Y. Supp.
406, 411, 66 Misc. Rep. 817.
A foreign stock corporation, leaving its
blank stock certificates and its stockbook
with a trust company in this state, which act-
ed as a transfer agent, cannot be said to have
an "offlce for the transaction of business" in
this state, within Stock CJorporation Law
(Consol. Laws 1900, c. 50) | 33, providing that
every foreign corporation having an office for
the transacCioB of business in this state shall
keep therein a stockbook, and that, if any
such foreign stock corporation has in this
state a transfer agent such stockbook may
be deposited in the office of such agent, for
Inspection of stockholders. Althause v. Guar-
anty Trust Co. of New York, 187 JN. Y. Supp.
045, 046, 78 Misc. Rep. ISL
OFFICE
See Civil Office; Color of Office; Con-
tinuance in Office; Corruption in Of-
fice ; De Facto Office ; Elective Office ;
Go Out of Office; In Office; In Virtue
of His Office; Lucrative Office; Mis-
behavior in Office; Misconduct in Of-
fice; Misdemeanor in Office; Munici-
pal Office; Out of Office; Possession of
Office; Principal Administrative Office;
Principal Office; Quasi Office; State
Office; Successor in Office; Term of
Office; Township Office.
Any office, See Any.
Belonging to office, see Belong — Belong-
ing.
His term of office, see His.
Particular positions held to be offices, see
Officer.
Vacancy in office, see Vacancy — Vacant—
Vacate (Of Office).
An "office," as the term is used in the
Constitution, means something to be held, not
something to be done. Ross v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Essex County, 65 AtL
310, 313, 60 N. J, Law. 201.
Jl The term "public office" Implies perma-
^ nence and duties of a public nature. Reed v.
Schon, 83 Pac. 77, 70, 2 CaL App. 55.
An "office" is a public charge or employ-
ment, and the term comprehends every
charge or employment in which the public is
interested. Michael v. State ex rel. Welch,
50 South. 020, 031, 1G3 Ala. 425.
An "office" is a position or station in
which a person is employed to perform cer-
tain duties, or by virtue of which he becomes
charged with the performance of certab d
ties, public or private, or a place of tnu
and emolument is a usual, but not a De<%
sary, element of office. Wells v. State, \
N. B. 321, 322, 175 Ind. 380, Ann. Gas. 19i:i
"Office** implies much more than tl
right to physically occupy a ^)ecifled rot:
to exercise certain powers, and to recehe
prescribed emolument People t. Abearm i;
N. Y. Supp. 664, 131 App. Div. 30; Id., 89 :
E. a30, 033, 106 N. Y. 221, 26 U R. A. ■:
S.) 1153.
A '*public -effloe," while net property.
a position held by right of Section or a
pointment, and courts wil protect <xie in tl
enjoyment of these Hgbts as quickly and i
fully as though it were property. Christy
Kingfisher, 76 Pac 135, 137, 13 OkL 5S5.
An ''office" is a trust conferred by pc
lie avthority for a public purpose and i
a definite time. It is "a public station <
employment conferred by the appobtnoent <
the government The term embraces tl
ideas of tenure, duration, emoluments, u
duUes.** State v. Rose, 86 Pac 296. 29S.
Kan. 262, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 843, 10 Am Ca
027 (quoting United States v. HartwelL
WaU. [73 U. S.] 385, 303, 18 L. Ed. 83Cm
"An 'office,' as defined by BUtdutoDe.
a ri^t to ezerdse a public or private ei
ployment and to taka the fees and emol
ments thereunto bekmging, whether pobii
as those of a magistrate, or private, as tai
iffs, recovers, and tbe like." In re Opim^
of the Justices, 62 AtL 960, 970, 73 N. i
621, 6 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 415, 6 Ann. Gas. 2:
(quoting and adopting definition in Sbelbr
Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 72 Am. Dec 169, ir.
"The term 'office' is defined as "a i^l
to exercise a public or private employiuei
and to take the fees and emoluments ther
imto belonging.' It embraces the Ideas *
tenure, duration, emoluments, and duti^
and these ideas or elements cannot be se^
rated and each conslda?ed abstracfiy. ^'
taken together, constitute the office." Tu
ner v. Edward, 86 Pac. 765. 766, 31 Ttah.^
120 Am. St Rep. 010, 10 Ann. Cas. 1«
(quoting Kendall v. Raybould, i4 Pac lo:^
13 Utah, 226; 2 HI. Comm. 36).
'*An 'office' is defined to be tbe rl^bt i
exercise a public or private employment u
to take the fees or emoluments tbereoBt
belonging." 2 Bla. Com. 36. (State t. ^^^
10 Paa 885, 13 Or. 385). The office of jar
commissioner, created by Sesa Acts l^- '
28, embodied in Rev. SL 1800. S! 6539. ^
(Ann. St 1006, p. 3272), relating to the «
pointment of Jury commissioner in cities li»'
ing a specified population, is not an "offlff
within Const art 9, § 14, limiting the ten
of office of county, township, and munJcip*
officers to four years. State ex Inf. ^^'
V. Corcoran, 103 S. W. 1044, lOlfl^ ^ *
1, 12 Ann. Cas. 565.
OFFICE
697
OFFICE
An "ofllce" Is a public charge or employ-
it, and he who performs the duties of an
?e is an "officer." Blackstone sdys: "An
ce' is the right to exercise a private or
lie employment and to take the fees and
)lnments thereunto belonging. An office
ilies an authority to exercise some portion
the sovereign power of the state, either
Daakiiig, administrating, or executing the
8." The power and jurisdiction of an
% constitute t^e "office*' and are insep-
ble from It The true test of a public of-
seems to be that it is a part of the ad-
ilstratlon of government, civil ox military,
surper is not an "officer'* at all, or for any
pose; for there cannot be a de facto of-
r when a de Jure officer already fills the
:e. Commonwealth v. Bush, 115 S. W.
, 251, 252, 131 Ky. 384 (quoting and adopt-
definltion in United States v. Maurice, 2
ck. 103, 26 Fed. Gas. 1211; Olmstead v.
7 of New York, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct 481;
nlon of the Judges, 3 Me. 481; Common-
ilth V. Gamble, 62 Pa. 343, 1 Am. Rep.
: Eliason v. Coleman, 86 N. C. 235; cit-
Eubank v. Commonwealth, 103 S. W.
, 126 Ky. 348; United States v. Alexan-
, 46 Fed. 728; McCahon v. Leavenworth
8 Kan. 437; Matter of Ounn, 32 Pac.
, 048, 50 Kan. 155, 10 L. R. A. 510).
"Office'* is an Incorporeal right and con-
8 in the right to execute a public trust
to take the emoluments belonging to it,
i an injury to the right is an injury to
rlvate right for which there ought to be a
ledy. Maloney v. Collier, 88 S. W. 667,
, 112 Tenn. 78 (citing Dodd v. Weaver, 2
ed [34 Tenn.] 670).
"An office l8 an Incorporeal right, and
sists in the right to execute a public trust
to take the emoluments belonging to it"
March 27, 1007, art. 8, ft 8, declares that
offices existing under the charter of the
of Memphis and acts in amendment
reof are thereby vacated and abolished,
ler the charter there was a city tax asses-
city attorney, and assistant attorney,
ge, and clerk of the city court, mayor, and
) mayor; and Act March 27, 1007, provides
a city assessor, dty counselor, president,
vice president, whose duties are respec-
ily substantially the same as those of the
responding officers under the city char-
Held, that the act could not have the
ct to remove the officers holding un-
the city charter and create a vacancy
be filled by appointment, since, though
porting to abolish the offices, it restored
n under other names, and the rule be-
that, while an office may be abolished,
' the (^cer cannot be legislated out of
re without an abolishment thereof. Ma-
5 V. Williams, 103 S. W. 708, 818, 118
n. 300, 121 Am. St Rep. 1002 (quoting
adopting the definition in Dodd v. Weav-
2 Sneed [34 Tenn.] 670).
That a board of revision of a city is not
a quasi corporation, as some boards are, and
that there is attached to the duty no emolu-
ment has no effect as to such board consti-
tuting an office. Neither of such character-
istics is an essential element. The most es-
sential characteristic of an office id that the
incumbent in his independent capacity is
clothed with some part of the sovereignty of
the state to be exercised in the interest of
the public and required by law, and that the
duties are of a continuous character as op-
posed to a mere temporary employment
Barker v. State, 68 N. B. 575, 576, 60 Ohio
St. 68 (citing State ▼. Brennan, 20 N. B. 593,
40 Ohio St 33; State ex rel. Armstrong v.
HalUday, 55 N. B. 175, 61 Ohio St 171).
"Public office," as used in tbe Constitu-
tion, has respect to a permanent trust to be
exercised in behalf of the government or of
all citizens who may need the Intervention of
a public functionary or officer and in all mat-
ters within the range of the duties pertain-
ing to the character of the trust It means a
right to exercise generally, and in all proper
cases, the functions of a public trust or em-
ployment, and to receive the fees and emolu-
ments belonging to it, and to hold the place
and perform the duty for the term and by
the tenure prescribed by law. People v.
Aheam, 80 N. E. 030, 037, 938, 106 N. Y.
221, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1153 (concurring
opinion of Edw. T. Bartlett X; quoting Mat-
ter of Hathaway, 71 N. Y. 238, 244).
"A 'public office' la the right, authority,
and duty created and conferred by law by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is vested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the
government to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public'' (quoting and adopting
definition in Mechem on Public Officers, as
approved in Kimb rough v. Bamett, 55 S. W.
120, 03 Tex. 301). "As said by Chief
Justice Marshall, 'although an office is an
employment, It does not follow that every
employment is an office.' Mr. Mechem, in his
work on Public Officers, says: 'The most Im-
portant characteristic which diBtinguishes an
office from an employment or contract is
that the creation and conferring of an office
involves a delegation to the individual of
some of the sovereign functions or govern-
ment, to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public; that some portion of the sov-
ereignty of the country, either legislative, ex-
ecutive, or Judicial, attaches for tbe time be-
ing, to be exercised for the public benefit
Unless the powers conferred are of this na-
ture, the individual is not a public officer.'
Now, while the faet that the position of ste-
nographer is designated in tiie act provid-
ing for its creation as an office, and that it
declares that the person who may be called to
perform its duties ^all be a sworn officer of
the court,* affords some reason for deter-
'
\&
• ?
if if
K.
S^
mm
1 r»
■t :■
'^1 ■ •;
OFFICE
698
OFFICB
mining It to be such, still it is believed tbe
place possesses none of those sovereign func-
tions of the Judicial department of the gov-
ernment to which it relates* to distinguish it
from a mere enployment to perform a spe-
cies of service, under public authority, for
the assistance and convenience of the court
and parties litigant therein, in which no Ju*
didal discretion or judgment ' is involved.
The creation of the position, as shown by the
very terms of the act, was designed for no
other purpose than to provide some one by
whom the oral evid^ice offered, and other
proceedings involving objections made to the
admissibility of testimony, the ruling of the
court, and exceptions thereto, might be tak-
en in shorthand as a method of preserving
those matters as they occurred, without de-
laying trials, to be afterwards transcribed
and furnished the court and parties to the
suit, to aid them in an accurate and prompt
preparation of the record. The report or
transcript of the proceedings by the ste-
nographer is not binding, however, upon the
court, and may be adopted or rejected at his
discretion. No act which he is authorized
to do is independent of the control of oth-
ers, or vested in him as a supreme power to
be exercised as a right or prerogative of a
judicial office. We conclude that while the
position of a stenographer, under the statute
in this state, may be, in a sense, an office,
and the term thereof may continue for a
longer period than two years, yet there is no
sudi sovereign function of government em-
braced in the powers conferred upon the
individual performing its duties as brings it
within the meaning of the word 'office' as
used in the section of the Constitution quot-
ed." Robertson v. Ellis County, 84 8. W.
1007, 1098, low, 88 Tex. Civ. App. 146.
Aceaoy, duty, or trast
A public office is an agency of the stata
State ex rel. Le Blanc & Bailey v. Michel, 36
South. 869, 870, 113 La. 4.
"The words 'office of public trust* are
equivalent to 'public office.* *' State v. Mona-
han, 84 Pac. 130, 183, 72 Kan. 492, 116 Am.
St Rep. 224, 7 Ann. Cas. 661.
An "office** is a public agency, and an
"officer" is a mere agent of the public, en-
titled to exercise the functions and perform
the duties of the office for the public bene-
fit, and not for his own. Goodrich v. Mitch-
ell, 75 Pac. 1034, 1035, 68 Kan. 765, 64 L. R.
A. 945, 104 Am. St. Rep. 429, 1 Ann. Caa 288.
An "office" has been defined as "a spe-
cial trust or charge created by competent
authority"; more tersely still "a public office
is a public trust" The general doctrine is
that the idea of office clearly embraces the
ideas of tenure, duration, fees or emolu-
ments, rights and powers^ as well as that ot
duty. The true test of public office is "that
it is a parcel of the administration of gov-
ernment Gracey v. City of St Louis (Mo.)
HI 8. W. 1059, 1163 (citing State ex i^
Walker v. Bus, 36 S. W. 636, 135 Mo. 331
33 L. R. A. 616; 6 Words and Phrases,!
4923; 2 Bouv. L. Diet tit "Officer*').
A "public office" la a personal poba
trust created for the benefit of tbe 8tat
without any element of property. Scbeoio
V. State (Ala.) 69 Sooth. 169, 16L
"A 'public office' la an agency for tb
state, and the person whose duty it is to pei
form this agency is a public officer. The e>
seuce of it is the duty of performing tn agei
cy; that is, of doing some act or acts, o
a series of acts, for the state." Mslone \
Williams, 103 S. W. 7»8, 820, 118 Teno. 39(
121 Am. St Rep. 1002 (quoting and sdopdA
the definition in Clark ▼. Stanley, 66 N. C6S
8 Am. Rep. 488; tLOapteA in Wood t. Belkin]
27 S. B. 115, 116. 120 N. a 212); Martini
United States, 104 & W. 678^ 684, 7 Isd. 1
451.
"Though the word 'office' may be nw
in varying senses, the term in any pnpe
sense implies, as indicated by its etymolog
a duty or duties to be performed. Other ek
ments, such as the public nature of the dot
and its permanence, may be necessary to coi
stitute a public office; but this element— ths
is, duty or aervloe to he performed— is «
essential part of the definition.'' Though tit
word may, like other terms, be used is ai
improper sense, it will be presumed, unles
the contrary appears, that the proper sen>
was intended. "The term 'officer' and 'office
are^ indeed, paronymous, and in their orig
Inal and proper sense are to be regarded a
strictly correlative. But both terms, iii
most other terms, are used in varloas senses
nor do the variations of the one always coi
reiqwnd with the other." Reed v. Schon, S
Pac. 77, 79, 2 C3aL App. 65.
An "office or place of trust," within t
constitutional provision prohibiting person
holding any office or place of trust under Uv
United States or under the state from bold
Ing or exercising any other office or place oi
trust under the authority of the state, me«B
a public position involving a delegation t(
the individual of some part of the sovereigz
functions of the government to be exerd^
for the public benefit The most Importani
characteristic which distinguishes an offi«
from a public agency is that the conferring
of the office carries with it a delegation tc
the individual of some of the sovereign fonc^
tions of the government In this respect tbe
terms "office" and "place of trust" as vseH
in such constitutional provisions are synony-
mous. The position of a public admini^n-
tor is not an office within such constitntionil
provisions, but is a mere administrative
agency. Wooton r. Smith, 69 S. B. 6«, ^'
145 N. a 476.
A "pnbllc office" la a personal po^^^
trust created for the benefit of the state u^
not for the benefit of the individual dtla^
OFFIOB
OFFICE
eof, and It has in It no element of prop-
. Therefore a statute providing for pref-
ce of honorably discharged soldiers of
Civil War in appointment, employment,
promotion in public service over others
gtual qualiflcation does not violate Const
1, 1 6, declaring that the General Assem-
shall not grant to any citizen or class of
ens priyileges or Immunities not equally
Dgittg to all; the right to hold a public
& or to be employed by the state in any
idty not being a privilege. Shaw v. City
adl of Marshalltown, 104 N. W. 1121,
, 131 Iowa, 128, 10 L. R. A. (N. SO 825,
UL Ca& 1089.
''A 'public elective office* is a public
icy, which barring any constitutional in-
tlon, express or implied, may be aholish-
curtailed, or regulated by legislative en-
lent** State ex reL Henson v. Sheppard,
L W. 477. 481, 102 Mo. 407.
A public office embraces more than the
t to physically o<)cupy a q;)ecifled room,
cise certain powers, and receive a pre-
)ed emolument It means the right to
else generally and in all proper cases the
tions of a public trust or employment, to
Ive the fees and emoluments belonging to
nd to hold the place and perform the du-
3r the term and by the tenure prescribed
aw. People v. Aheam, 115 N. Y. S. 664,
131 App. Div. 30.
A public office is a mere public agency
ted by the people for the purpose of the
inistration of the necessary functions of
nlzed society, and the agency may at
time be terminated by the power which
ted it As between the office holder and
^duals in their private capacity, and
aps as against any authority except the
reign power itself acting in pursuance
power Of removal expressly reserved or
ssarily implied from the nature of office,
officer is entitled to the full, protection
he law in his right to hold the office,
tically to the same extent as if it were
ate property. In re Carter, 74 Pac. 997,
CaL 816.
In the most general and comprehensive
8, a "public office" is an agency for the
J, and a person whose duty it Is to per-
\ this agency Is a "public officer." Stat-
more definitely, a ''public office** is a
ge or trust conferred by public authority
El public purpose, the duties of which in-
B, in th^r performance, the exercise of
i portion of sovereign power, whether
t or small. A public officer is an indi-
al who has been elected or appointed in
manner prescribed by law, who has a
^nation or title given to him by law, and
exercises the functions concerning the
i assigned to him by law. A parish su-
atendent is an officer. State ex rel. Smith
tieus, 38 South. 870, 872, 114 La. 1007«
Oompensatioa
An "office** may be only one of honor
without perquisites or profits. Some employ-
ments of a private nature are considered pub-
lic offices, if connected with the public, as a
bank or railroad president, secretary, treas-
urer, or director. Bouse v. Thompson, 81 N.
E. 1109, 1120, 228 lU. 522 (dissenting opin-
ion by Carter, J. ; citing People ex reL Koer-
ner v. Bidgley, 21 111. 65; Dickson .v. People
ex leL Brown, 17 IlL 191).
The position of city surveyor of the city
of New York is not perhaps strictly iB{>eaking
an "office,** for it does not carry a salary,
yet inasmuch as the surveyor is appointed
and is required to take an oath of office, and
because by virtue of his appointment under
the authority of law and the taking of such
oath eligible to certain employment in the
nature of public service for which he Is en-
titled to receive compensation which com-
pensation in turn is to be assessed upon the
property, the amount thereof depends upon
the law at the time the service is rendered.
Pepole ex rel. Crane v. Ahearn, 110 N, Y.
Supp. 306, 310, 125 App Div. 795.
OoiitlniiMce resardlMMi •£ laom]mb«a«y
An office is a legal entity, and may ex-
ist, though it be Without an incumbent
Chflds V. State, 118 Pac. 546, 548, 4 Okl. Cr.
474, 38 li. B. A. (N. S.) 568.
OreAt«d #iid duUes yresezibed by l*w
An office i» a place in a governmental
system created or recognized by the law of
the state which either directly or by delegat-
ed authority assigns to the incumbent there-
of the contiiiuous performance of certain per-
manent public duties. Fredericks v. Board
of Health of Town of West Hoboken, 82 Atl.
628, 82 N. J. Law, 200.
Election or appointment
"An 'office* is a public station of emolu-
ment conferred by the appointment of gov-
ernment The term embraces the idea of
tenure, duration, emoluments, and duties.**
State ex rel. Mosconi t. Maroney, 90 S. W.
141, 146, 191 Mo. 531.
XUnployment distlngnished
Apart from the statute, the distinction
between a public officer and an employ^ is
that the former is charged with duties in-
volving an exercise of some part of the sov-
ereign power in the performance of which
the public is concerned, and which are con-
tinuing and not occasional, while one merely
performing duties required of him by per-
sons employing him under an express con-
tract or otherwise, though the employer is a
public officer and the employment be a public
work or business, is a mere employ^ San-
ders T. Belue, 58 S. B. 762, 763, 78 S. C. 171.
An employment differs from both an of-
fice and a position, in that its duties, which
are nongovernmental, are neither certain nor
OFFICB
700
OFFICB
permanent Fredericks t. Board of Health
of Town of West Hobokeo, 82 Atl. 528, 629,
82 N. J. Law, 200.
Wblle generally speaking an ''officer" Is
one employed on behalf of a goyemment In a
strict legal sense, the term implies employ-
ment in some fixed and permanent capacity:
those engaged in mere transient or occasion-
al employment being more properly employ^
than officers. Bilger y. State, 116 Pac. 19,
24, 63 Wash. 457.
In Const art 7, f 8, iMroviding for the
appointment of officers whose offices shall be
created by law, the word ''office" difters in
its legal signlflcatioii from "employ^," an em-
ploye being a mere agent Bine t. Tetrick,
72 S. B. 1038, 1085^ 69 W. Va. 742.
An "office" is a public station or employ-
ment conferred by the appointment of gov-
ernment The term embraces the idea of
tenure, duration, emolument, and duties. A
government "office" Is dlfFerent from a gov-
ernment contract The latter is necessarily
limited in its duration and specific in its ob-
ject An act of the council of the Muskogee
Nation, empowering the diief thereof to em-
ploy an attorney nntil the dissolution of the
tribal relations and until a specified date,
with prescribed duties, at an annual salary,
payable from the general funds of the na-
tion, does not create an "office"; but the at-
torney is an employ^ under contract Por-
ter y. Murphy, 104 8. W. 658, 669, 7 Ind. T.
395.
"The distinction is plainly taken between
a person acting as a 'senranf or 'employ^
who does not discharge independent duties
but acts by the direction of others, and an
'officer* empowered to act In the discharge of
a duty or legal authority in official life."
Padden v/Clty of New Yorit, 92 N. Y. Supp.
926, 928, 45 Misc. Rep. 517 (quoting and
adopting definition in Olmstead v. City of
New York, 42 N. Y. Super. Ct 481; citing
People ex rel. Gilchrist v. Murray, 78 N. Y.
535).
"Although an office is an 'employment,'
it does not follow that every employment is
an 'office.' A man may certainly be employ-
ed under a contract express or implied to do
an act or perform a service without becom-
ing an o^cer." An "office" is defined as "an
employment on behalf of the government in
any station of public trust not merely tran-
sient, occasional, or incidental." It is a "spe-
cial trust or charge created by competent au-
thority. The officer is distinguished from
the employ^ in the greater importance, dig-
nity, and independence of his position, in be-
ing required to take an official oath, and per-
haps to give an official bond, in the liability
of being called to account as a public of-
fender f6r misfeasance or nonfeasance in
office and usually, though not necessarily, in
the tenure of his position. United States v.
Schllerholz, 137 Fed. 616, 622 (quoting and
adopting definition in United States r. }b;
rice, 26 Fed. Ota. 1211, 2 Brock. 96; In i
Attorneys' Oaths [N. Y.] 20 Johns. 492; P«
pie ex reL Throop v. Langdon, 40 Mich. ^
The use of the word "employed' in se
tlon 1, a 114, Laws 1891 (secdcm 4613, G«
8t 1909), providing that eight hours sha
constitute a day's work for all Ubom
workmen, mednanics, or othtt penom en
X^oyed on behalf of any dty of the state, e
dudes officers; an office being dlstingQislu
from an employment, in that it Implies m
are, duration, emolument, and duty. Stii
V. City of Ottawa, 113 Pac. 391, 394. 84 Ku
100.
laVestaM&t witk f «aetl«BS ef gorai
*" 'Ofllce^ ia ceoficaUy defined as a pobt
dbargB or employment, through which tt
incumbent discharges a part of the fooctioi
of government for the benefit of the public
State V. Peake, 120 N. W. 47, 55, 18 K. I
101 (dissenting opinion of Morgan, I),
A "public office" is a rightj author!^
and duty created and conferred by lav, t
which an individual is invested with son
portion of the sovereign functions of the go
ernment to be exercised by him for the be:<
fit of the public. It implies a delesatioo <
a portion of the sovereign power to and 1*3
session of it by the person filling the ofSo
State T. Mackie, 74 AtL 750, 761, 82 Goo:
"A 'poblic office' is one whose dotJ^
are in their nature public— that is, IdtoItIs
in their performance the exerdse of m
portion of the sovereign power, whether ^
or 8mail--and in whose propor perfonniiK
all citiMns; Irrespective of party, are icte
ested, eitiier as members of the entiie bo^
politic or of some duly established dlTisioB<
it" Qreenough ▼. Luoey, 06 Atl. 300, 28 1
1.230.
"The term 'office* implies a delegation <
a portion of the sovereign power to, and pc
session of It by, the person filling the c^«
and the exercise of such power within \fp
limits constitutes the correct discharge i
the duties of such office. The power the
delegated and possessed may he a portio
belonging to one of the three great depar
ments, and sometimes to another; still iti
a legal power which may be rightfally ^
erdsed, and in its effects will bind the ri^-
of others, and be subject to revision and coi
xection only according to the standing U^
of the stete." In re Opinion of the Justin*
62 AtL 969, 970, 73 N. H. 621, 6 L. a A. \>
S.) 415, 6 Amu Cas. 283 (quoting and adopto
definition in Re Opinion of the Justices [Me
3 Greenl. 481, 482).
A "pubUc (^Bce" is the right, aathoritj
and duty created and conferred by laVi ^'
whtdi, for a given period, either fixed k
law or enduring at the pleasure of the cr^j
ing power, an individual is invested viQ
OFFICE
701
OFFICE
le portion of the sovereign functiODS of
government, either executive, legislative,
judicial, to be exercised for the benefit of
public; and unless the powers conferred
of this nature the Individual is not a
»lic officer. Chithrie Daily Leader v. Cam-
n, 41 Pac. 635, 630, 3 Okl. 677.
The true test of •'public office" is in itself
arcel of the administration of government,
"office" has been defined as a special trust
charge granted by competent authority,
'public office" is a public trust The gen-
1 definition is that the idea of office clear-
jmbraces the Idea of tenure, duration, fees,
emoluments, rights and powers, as well as
t of duty. Gracey ▼. City of St Louis.
S. W. 1159, 1163, 213 Mo. 384 (citing 6
irds and Phrases, p. 4923; 2 Bouv. Law
t tit. "Officer"; People ex rel. Throop v.
agdon, 40 Mich. 682; State ex rel. Cannon
tfay, 17 S. W. 660, 106 Mo. 488).
The individual invested with the ''right,
hority, and duty created and conferred by
r, by which for a given period, either fix-
by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
atlng power, or invested with some portion
the sovereign functions of the government
be exercised by him for the benefit of the
)lic," is a ••public officer." State ex pel.
sooni V. Maroney, 90 S. W. 141, 146, 191
. 531 (quoting and adopting the definition
Mechem, Pub. Off. | 1).
As used in Const art. 14, | 7,' providing
Lt no person, who shall hold any office or
ce of trust or profit, under the United
Ltes, or any department thereof, or under
state, etc, shall hold or exercise any oth-
office or place of trust or profit under the
hority of the state, provided, etc., the
ma "office" and "place of trust" are syn-
rmous, and have reference to a public posi-
a, involving a delegation to the individual
some part of the sovereign functions of
government, to be exercised for the public
lefit. Wooten v. Smith, 59 S. B. 649, 650,
I N. C. 476.
An administrator belongs to that class
Dfflcers represented by curators, guardians,
elvers, referees, and the like, whose duties
5 private, and whose acts concern private
her than public interests. An adminlstra-
is vested with no portion of the sovereign
ictions of the state to be exercised by him
the benefit of the public, and he is there*-
e not a •'state officer" Within the meaning
Const, art. 8, | 12, providing that ••no per-
i shall be elected or appointed to any 'of-
^ in this state, dvil or military, who Is not
dtizen of the United States, and who shall
ve resided in this state one year next pre-
ling his election or appointment" A ••pub-
office" is a light and authority created
law by which an individual is invested
bh some portion of the functions of govern-
nt to be exercised by him for the benefit
of the public for a given period of time, ei-
ther fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power. The word "office," as
here used, is to be disUnguished from its
application to such positions as are at most
quasi public only, as the charge of an ex-
ecutor, administrator, or guardian, and from
the offices of a private corporation. Stevens
V. Larwill, 84 S. W. 113, 118, 110 Mo. App.
140 (citing Mechem, Pub. Off. i 1; In re
Hathaway, 71 N. Y. 238).
As license
A license to keep a dramshop is not an
••office," which can be tested or vacated by
quo warranto. Hargett v. Bell, 46 S. B. 749,
760, 184 N, C. 394.
Position distinsnislied
A position is analogous to an ••office,"
in that the duties that pertain to it are
permanent and qertaln, and it differs from
aa office in that its duUes^may he nongovern-
mental and not assigned to it by public law.
Fredericks v. Board of •Health of Town of
West Hoboken, 82 AtL 628, 529, 82 N. J. Law,
200.
A '*public office" is a place crated, or at
least recognized, by the law of the state, and
to which certain permanent duties are as-
signed either by the law itself or by regula-
tions adopted under authority of law. A
•'position," within the purview of the veteran
act of 1895 (8 Oen. St 189^ p. 3702), is a
places the duties of which are continuous and
permanent, analpgous to. those of an office,
and which pertain to the position as such.
Hart V. City of Newark, 77 AU. 1086, 1087,
80 N. J. Law, 600.
As property
Bee Private Property; Property,
As priTilese •£ eitiaen
See Privileges and Inmaunltiea.
As public office
The word ••offices," as used in the gen-
eral tax law of 1903 (P. L. 1903, p. 396, | 3,
par. 8), cannot be deemed to refer to other
than public ••offices." North Jersey St Ry.
Co. V. Jersey aty. 67 AU. 33, 35, 74 N. J.
Law, 761.
The word •'office," in Mansf. Dig. Ark. c.
151, II 6464, 6466, providing that in Ueu of
the writs of scire facias and quo warranto
actions by proceedings at law may be brought
to vacate or repeal charters and prevent the
usurpation, of an office or franchise, and de-
claring that when a person usurps an office
or franchise to which he is not entitled by
law an action by proceedings, at law may be
instituted against him either by the state
or the party aititled to the office or fran-
chise, to prevent the usurper from exercising
the office or franchise, means a public office,
and does not include the offices of a private
corporation. Le Bosquet v. Myers, 103 S. W.
770, 771, 7 Ind. T. 75.
OFFICE COPY
702
OFFICE FURKITUBX
I
I
•
OFFICE COPT
Ad "office copy^ of a record is ''a copy
authenticated by an officer Intnuted for
tliat purpose, and It is admitted in erldence
upon the credit of the officer*' (quoting and
adopting definition in 1 Greenleaf on Evi-
dence, I 507). Under Rev. St 1800, | 8008,
providing that records kept in any public
office of a sister state, not appertaining to a
court, shall be evidence in this state, if at-
tested by the keeper of said records and the
seal of his office, it is necessary to show, as
a basis for tlie introduction of an alleged cer-
tified copy of articles of incorporation grant-
ed by a sister state, that the laws of that
state required the articles to be kept or re-
corded by the officer certifying the copy.
Florsheim & Co. v. Fry, 84 S. W. 1023, 1024,
100 Mo. App. 487 (citing 6 Thomp. Priv. Corp.
i 7712).
OFFICE FOB TKB BBOULAB TRAITS-
Acnoir OF BUsiESM m peb-
SOH
The expression "office fbr the regular
transaction of business in person,*' as used
in Code C:1y. Proc f 3100, does not neces-
sarily mean one who carries on some busi-
ness at some particular place of which he
is proprietor; hence the place where one is
regularly employed to render services, where
he attends every business day, Is a place or
office for the regular transaction of business,
regardless of the character of the business
transacted. Brassack v. Interborough Rapid
Transit Oo., 121 N. T. Supp. 215, 210, 66
Misc. Rep. 100.
OFFICE FOnHD
A legislative act directing the posses-
sion and appropriation of public land which
had been granted 'Is equivalent to 'office
found,* *' and "before a forfeiture or reunion
with the public domain could take place a
judicial inquiry should be instituted, or, in
the technical language of the common law,
'office found* or its equivalent" Spokane &
B. O. R. Co. V. Washington & Q. N. R. CJo.,
95 Pac. 64, 67, 49 Wash. 280 (quoUng United
States V. De Repentigny, 5 Wall. [72 U. S.]
211, 267, 268, 18 L. Ed. 627).
An alien purchasing lands or taking
them by devise may not be divested of his
estate even by the state until after a formal
proceeding called "office found,*' and until
that is done he may sell and convey or de-
vise the lands, and pass a good title to the
same. Though during the life of an alien
the state, by proper proceedings, could have
declared an escheat of land held by her in
contravention of Const art 2, | 33, on her
death it lost that right; the land descend-
ing to her heirs. Abrams v. State, 88 Paa
327, 329, 45 Wash. 327, 9 Ia R. A. (N. S.) 188,
122 Am. St Rep. 914, 13 Ann. C^s. 527.
"Inquisition** or '"office found,** as relat-
ing to a trial for or declaration of forfei-
ture, etc., have no relation to the ordimi
eomtton-law trial by jury, and the ja
there summoned was not the commoD-li
Jury before whom a dtisen has a i\gbi
demand a trial where his peace or his rlgl]
were In question. Blackstone defines 1
qulsltion*' or "office found" to be "an inqnt
made by the king's officer, his sheriff, a
oner, or eacheater, virtute officii, or by ir
to them sent for that purpose, or by co
missioners specially appointed, concernl
any matter that entitled the king to t
possession of lands or tenements, goods
chattels. This is done by a jury of do (
terminate number, being either twelve,
less, or more. • • • These inquests
office were devised by law, as an aotben
means to give the king his right by solei
matter of record ; without which he, in gi
eral, can neither take nor part from ti
thing.** For *1t is a part of the Ubert
of England, and greatly for the safety
the subject, that the king may not eni
upon or seise any man*s possessions ui
bare surmises without the Intervention
a jury.** It was a procedure pecolia:
adapted for the king's use, and the imp
tant thing about it was that a record mi^
be made and altered whereon the king coi
base his right to possess himself of tbeUit
goods, and chattels of his subject: and,
it respects lands, the office found put h
into Immediate possessloii, without the i
cessity of a formal re-entry. Althougli
frequent use was for the determinatioD
attainder, esdieats, and breaches of cod
Uons aimexed to grants, and the like, t
record was not conclusive, and the snb>
was yet entitled to a trial suitable at co
mon law for the final determination of 1
rights. A good Illustration is found in
cheats. "The usual form of proceeding 1
this purpose was by an inquisition or
quest of office before a jury, which was b
upon a commission out of the Court of Cbi
eery, but was really proceeding at oomm
law ; and. If it resulted in favor of tbe Idi
then, by virtue of ancient statutes, any o
claiming title in the lands might, by \»
of that court, file a traverse, in the nato
of a plea or defense to the king's dii
and not in the nature of an original so
• • • The Inquest of office was a ppoc«
ing in rem ; when there was a proper off
found for the king, that was notice to i
persons who had claims to come in and i
sert them ; and, until so traversed, it ^
conclusive in the king's favor.*' Unit
States V. Oregon & a B. Oa^ 186 Fed. ^
926 (quoting 8 BL ComuL 258, 259; Hsm
ton V. Brown, 16 Sup. Ot 586, 687» 161 D.
256, 263, 40 L. Bd. 601).
OFFICE FURHITUBB
By a mortgage bin of nie of all tl
desks, chairs, trunks, and ''office fnrnitQi^
in a certain ofBce^ the mortgagor intendi
OFFICE HOURS
703
OFFICER
be articles of use in the office at the
should pass; and an iron safe, which
then used there, would be embraced as
rticle of office furniture. Skowhegan
T. Farrar, 46 Me. 2d3, 29a
ICE HOURS
^ee Business Hours*
Jnder Rev. St 1895, art 1222, authoriz-
he service of citation upon a corpora-
by leaving a copy of the same at the
Ipal office of the company during "of-
hours, a return showing service during
ness" hours is sufficient El Paso & S.
y. Ck). V. Kelly (Tex.) 83 S. W. 855, 860.
ICE or HONOR OR PROFIT
Service as a grand Juror is not an "office
nor or profit," within Const ait. 2, | 2,
ding that no person shall hold two of-
of honor or profit at the same time.
> V. Graham, 60 S. Bl 431, 432» 79 S. G.
ICE OF TRUST
Dhe chairman of the executive commit-
f a political party does not hold an of-
»f trust, etc., within Terrell election law
e*s Ann. Civ. St Supp. 1906, p. 183),
ding that no holder of an office of prof-
trust, etc., shall be a judge of election.
:er v. Mobley (Tex.) 105 S. W. 61, 62.
rhe office of a commissioner of the Unlt-
tates Centennial Commission is an "of-
►f trust" under Const U. S. art 2, | 1,
lalifying the holder of an office of trust
r the United States for the office of
)r of president and vice president of
Jnited States. In re Corliss, 11 R. I.
640, 23 Am. Rep. 53a
ICE UNDER THE STATE
:;ivll office under the state, see Civil Offi-
cer.
[?he provision of. the Constitution that
Senator or Representative shall hold an
i under the state' • • • the emolu-
B of which have been increased during
lession of the Legislature of which he
a member, until one year after the ex-
ton of his term of office in the Legisla-
' does not prohibit a member of a Leg-
ire that has increased the emoluments
embers of the Legislature from being
;mber of the next Legislature, as an
e under the state" does not include the
ative office. State ex rel. Olson v. Scott,
;r. W. 1044, 1046, 105 Minn. 513.
[CEHOUIIHG
Offlceholding" is a political privilege
the matter of appointment to office is
ffected by the fourteenth amendment or
provision of the federal Constitution,
as has been said, the power of the Leg-
ire is supreme in respect to appoint-
ments, save as the Constitution has limited
it Goodrich V. Mitchell, 75 Pac. 1034, 1036,
68 Kan. 765, 64 L. R. A. 945, 104 Am. St
Rep. 429, 1 Ann. Cas. 288.
OFFICER
See Army Officer; Chief Officer; Ci-
Devant Officer ; City Officer ; Civil Of-
ficer; Collecting Officer; Competent
Officer; Constitutional Officer; Con-
sular Officer ; County Officer ; De Fac-
to Officer; De Jure Officer; District
Officer; Election Officer; Executive
Officer; Ex-Officer; Financial Officer;
Fiscal Officer; General Officer; Ju-
dicial Officer; Legislative Officer ; Lo-
cal Officer L Ministerial Office— Offi-
cer; Municipal Officer; Peace Officer;
Police Officer; Precinct Officer ; Prop-
er Officer: Retired Officers: Revenue
Officer; Salaried Officer; State Offi-
cer; Subordinate Officer; Tftken by
Public Officers; Town Officer; Town-
ship Officer; United States Officer.
All other officers, see All Other.
Any judicial officer, see Any.
Any one aMK>inted as meaning ofllcer, see
Any.
Discharge of officer, see Discharge.
Of corporation as employ^ see Eknploy^.
Other officers, see Other.
Other taxing officer, see Other.
Proceedings to remove as civil action, see
Civil Action— Case— Suit— etc
Removal, see Remove — RemovaL
Service of officer, see Service.
An "officer" Is defined to be "one who la
lawfully invested with an office." State v.
Kelly, 77 S. W. 996, 997, 103 Mo. App. 7U
(quoting Bouvier, Law Diet).
'Tlie terms 'officer* and 'office' are, in-
deed, paronymoufi, and in their original and
proper sense are to be regarded as strictly
correlative. But both terms, like most other
terms, are used in various senses; nor do the
variations of the one always correspond with
the other." Thus it sometimes happens that
the word "officer" is used without reference
to the original and proper sense. Reed v.
Schon, 83 Pac 77, 79, 2 Cal. App. 55.
"A 'public officer* is one who is appointed
to discharge a public duty and receive com-
pensation for the same." People v. Warner,
104 N. Y. Supp. 279, 282 (quoting and adopt-
ing Conner v. City of New York [N. Y.l 2
Sandf. 355).
"A *public officer* is an individual who
has been appointed or elected in the manner
prescribed by law, who has a designation
or title given to him by law, and who ex-
ercises the functions concerning the public
assigned to him by law.'* State ex rel. Mos^
coni y. Maroney, 90 S. W. 141, 146^ 191 Mo.
53L
"To be an 'officer' one must be chosen
or appointed or otherwise invested with the
OITFICEB
704
OFFICER
position. It is not a thing tbat a person gets
merely by fitting bimself therefor. It takes
the act of some other person or body of per-
sons." Danforth v. Egan, 119 N, W. 1021,
1024, 23 S. D. 43, 139 Am. St Rep. 1030, 20
Ann. Gas. 418.
Where either the people or the Legisla-
ture create an office or designate a person
to perform some function of government, the
head of such an office would be a public of-
ficer. People ez r^. O'Toole y. Hamilton, 90
N. Y. Supp. 547, 649, 98 App. DIy. 59.
An officer who exercises Important public
duties and has delegated to him some of the
functions of government, and whose office is
for a fixed term, and whose powers and du-
ties and emoluments become vested in a suc-
cessor when the office becomes vacant, is a
''pubUc officer." Richie v. City of Philadel-
phia, 74 AU. 430, 431, 225 Pa. 511, 26 L. R. A.
<N. S.) 289.
When public functions are conferred by
law on certain persons elected by the people
or appointed by the Legislature, and such
functions concern the general interests of the
state, and are not merely local or temporary,
such persons are public officers, especially if
they be paid a salary for their services out
of the public treasury, but not so if their
duties are merely transient, occasional, or
incidental. In re Appointment of Reviser,
124 N. W. 670, 676, 141 Wi& 592, 18 Ann. Cas.
1176 (citing 6 Words and Phrases* pp. 4925-
4927).
" 'Officers,' with regard to the public body
for which they act, are officers of the general
government, state officers, county officers, and
municipal officers." State ex rel. Long ▼.
Rexford, :09 N. W. 216, 217, 21 S. D. 86.
An "officer" is a mere agent of the
public, entitled to exercise the functions and
perform the duties of the office for the pub-
lic benefit, and not for his own. Goodridi v.
Mitchell, 75 Pac. 1034, 1035, 68 Kan. 765, 64
L. R. A. 945, 104 Am. St. Rep. 429, 1 Ann.
Cas. 288.
"A 'public office' is an agency tpr the
state, and the person whose duty it is to
perform this agency is a 'public officer.* The
essence of it is the duty of performing an
agency; that is, of doing some act or acts,
or a series of acts, for the state." Malone v.
WUliams, 103 S. W. 798, 820, 118 Tenn. 390,
121 Am. St Rep. 1002 (quoting and adopting
the definition in Clark v. Stanley, 66 N. a 63,
8 Am. Rep. 488 ; adopted in Wood v. Bellamy,
27 8. B. 116, 116, 120 N. C. 212).
An ''officer' la simply an agent of the pub-
lic, whose power of attorney is the law,
which prescribes his duties and limits his
authority to such acts only as are necessary
and incidental to a proper discharge of such
duties as it imposes. As the agent of the
public, he can no more transcend the power
given by his principal than can the agent of
the humblest IndivlduaL While this power
is sometimes exceeded, an act in excess of it
can never be legaL Callaghan ▼. McGown
(Tex.) 90 S. W. 319, 327.
Every one who is appointed to discharge
a public duty, and receives compensation, in
whatever shape, is a ^'puhlic officer," and tt
a duty be a continuing one, which is defined
by rules prescribed by the government, and
not by contract* it is v^ry difficult to dis-
tinguish such a charge or employment from
an office, or the person who holds it from an
"officer." Michael v. State ex reL Wel<dv
50 South. 929, 931, 163 Ala. 425 (quoting and
adopting definition in Bac. Abr. and in Unit-
ed States V. Mau0ee, 2 Brock. 102, 26 Fed.
Cas. 1211).
An "office" Is a public charge or employ-
ment, and he who performs the duties of
an office is an "officer." Blackstone says:
"An 'office' is the right to exercise a private
or public employment and to take the fees
and emoluments thereunto belonging. An
office implies an authority to exercise some
portion of the sovereign power of the state,
either in making, administrating, or execut-
ing the laws." The power and Jurisdiction
of an office constitute the "office" and are
inseparable from it. The true test of a pub-
lic office seems to be that it is a part of the
administration of government, dvil or mili-
tary. A usurper is not an "offioer** at all,
or for any purpose; for there cannot be a
de facto officer when a de jure officer already
fills the office. Commonwealth v. Bush, 115
S. W. 249, 251, 252, 131 Ky. 384 (quoting and
adopting definition in United States v. Maur-
ice, 2 Brock. 103, 26 Fed. Cas. 12U; Olm-
stead V. caty of New York, 42 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 481 ; Opinion of the Judges, 3 Me. 481 ;
Commonwealth v. Gamble, 62 Pa. 343, 1 Am.
Rep. 422; Eliason v. Oleman, 86 N. C. 235;
citing Eubank v. Commonwealth, 103 S. W.
368, 126 Ky. 348; United States v. Alexander,
46 Fed. 728; McOahon v. Leavenworth Co., 8
Kan. 437; Matter of Gunn, 32 Pa& 470, 948,
50 Kan. 155, 19 L. R. A. 519).
Rev. Codes Mont I 262, authorizing a
board of examiners to employ clerical help
for any state officer or board, and prohibit-
ing such "officers" or "boards" from employ-
ing clerks without the authority of the board
of exandners, does not apply to the employ^
of the Supreme Court; it not being an "of-
ficer" or "board" within the terms of the act
State ex ret Schneider v. Cunningham, 101
Paa 962, 965, 39 Mont 166.
A coroner's physician appointed by him,
as authorized by Laws 1882, p. 429, C 410,
I 1769, Is a subordinate of the coroner and
is not a public officer, exercising as he does
no part of the sovereign power. In re Flynn,
119 N. Y. Supp. 1079, 1088, 66 Misa B^
233.
OFFIOBI^
705
OKFICEB
tmste*
juialcBuee* veaelTerf ov {
An administrator belongs -to that class of
cOiceis represented by curators, guardians,
reoelTers, referees, and the like, whose duties
axe private and whose acts concern priyate
rather than public interests. An administra-
tor Is vested with no portion 'Ot the soyereign
fonctlons of the state to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public, and he is there-
fore not a "state officer" within the meaning
of Const art 8, f 12, providing that "no
person shall be elected or appointed to any
office in this state, civil or military, who ia
not a citizen of the United States, and who
shall not have resided in this state one year
next preceding bis election or appointment"
A "public office" is a right and authority
created by law by which an individual is in-
vested with sonie portion of the functions of
government to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public for a given period of
time, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power. The word
"office," as here used, is to be distinguish-
ed from its application to such positions as
are at most quasi public only, as the charge
of an executor, administrator, or guardian,
and from the offices of a private corporation.
Stevens v. Larwill, 84 S. W. 118, 118, 110 Mo.
App. 140 (citing Mechem, Pub. Off. 1 1; In re
Hathaway, 71 N. Y. 238).
Though Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541,
I 1, subd. 18, 30 Stat 544, defines the term
"officer" as used in the act as including trus-
tees, a trustee in bankruptcy does not occupy
an "office" in the sense in which that term
is used in the law which prohibits an alien
from being a public officer, since his duties
are not general or permanent, and therefore
an alien is not disqualified from acting as a
trustee in bankruptcy. Section 46 of this act
PKOvides that individuals who are competent
to perform the duties of a trustee and who
reside or have an "office" in the Judicial dis-
trict within which they are appointed may
act as trustees. "Individual" Is a very broad
term and is sufficient to Include an alien.
In re Ck)^ 154 Fed. 162, 163 (citing In re
Hathaway, 71 N. Y. 238; United States v.
Germalne, 99 U. S. 508, 26 L. fild. 482 ; Auff*
mordt V. Hedden, 11 Sup. Ct 108, 137 IT. S.
310, 34 L. Ed. 674).
An action by a receiver of a national
bank to recover assets is one by an officer of
the United States suing under authority of
an act of Ck)ngress, within Bev. St § 620,
cL 3, of which a Circuit Court of the United
States has Jurisdiction without regard to the
amount involved or the citizenship of the par-
ties. ' Murray v. Chambers, 151 Fed. 142, 143.
Prlv. Laws 1851, p. 5, provided for the
Section of trustees to administer the Kaskas-
kia commons, and provided for the division
and lease of the lands and for the use of the
same for school purposes. Section 7 also aa-
8 WnB.& P.2d Sbb.— 46
I thorised trustees to appropriate a portion of
the proceeds to religious purposes, when
asked for by a majority of the voters of the
town of Kaskaskia, etc. Held, that the trus-
tees were not "public officers," but trustees
of an educational and religious trust, the ad-
ministration of which was within the juris-
diction of the court of chancery. Stead v.
President, etc., of Commons of Kaskaskia, 90
N. E. 654, 663, 243 HI. 239.
AttoTmej at law
An attorney at law is not a "public of-
ficer." McKannay v. Horton, 91 Pac. 598,
602, 151 Cal. 711, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 661, 121
Am. St Rep. 146.
An attorney and counselor at law is a
public officer appointed by the court to per-
form duties of a public character, and vested
with certain power and authority incidental
to the office. In re Spencer, 122 N. Y. Supp.
190, 192, 137 App. Div. 330.
A prosecuting attorney is a public officer,
becauso he represents the sovereign power of
the people of the state by whose authority
and in whose name, under Const art 6, |
20, all prosecutions must be conducted, and
not because of his relation to the court
Fleming v. Hance, 94 Pac. 620, 622, 153 CaL
162.
In order to constitute an attorney em-
ployed to assist the Attorney General an of-
ficer of the state, the term of his appointment
and continuance in office must be coterminous
with the term of office of the Attorney Gen-
eral who appointed him, and of the Govern-
or approving the appointment Terrell v.
Sparks, 135 S. W. 519, 521, 104 Tex. 191.
Candidate for offlee
A candidate nominated at a primary elec-
tion for a public office is not an *'officer"
within the statute allowing officers to resign.
State ex rel. Donnelley v. Hamilton, 111 Pac.
1026, 1029, 33 Nev. 418.
The provision of Code Pub. Gen. Laws
1904, art 33, f 128, that cases of contested
elections of any of the officers not otherwise
provided for shall be decided by the Judges
of the courts therein named, does not apply
to primary flection contests; the nominee
of a political party not being an "officer."
Foxwell V. Beck, 82 Atl. 657, 658, 117 Md. 1.
Corporate offioer
Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, |
17a (4), 30 Stat 550, excepting from a dis-
charge in bankruptcy debts created by the
bankrupts fraud, embezzlement, misappropri-
ation, or defalcation while acting as an offi-
cer, or in any fiduciary capacity, an indebted-
ness of an officer of a private corporation,
created by his misappropriation of the fund
of such corporation, is not dischargeable in
bankruptcy. Tatum v. Leigh, 72 S. SL 286,
238, 136 Ga. 791, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 216L
OFFICER
706
OFFICER
A director of a trust comiMiny la not •
"public officer^ within Penal Law (ConaoL
Laws 1900, c. 40) i 1867, punishing omlasion
of public duty by a public officer, and a di-
rector guilty of neglect of dut^ as such is
not punishable under the section* People ▼.
Knapp, 90 N. S. 841, 844, 206 N. Y. 878.
The bankruptcy acts of 1841 and 1867
excepted from the operation of a discharge
debts contracted in consequence of a defalca-
tion as a '*public officer.*' The act of July 1,
1898, c. 641, 1 17, el. 4, 80 Stat 660, proYldes
that the di«charge shall raleaae a t>anknipC
from all provable debts, except such as were
created by fraud, embeszlement, or defalca-
tion, while acting as an *'offlcer." Htid, that
it must be presumed that the change was in-
tentional, and, by omitting the word "public,"
officers of private corporations are Included
within the term "officer." In re Harper, 133
Fed. 970, 973.
Officers of a corporation, where they get
control, with an attendant fiduciary obliga-
tion, of property of the corporation, are "of-
floers,'* within Bankruptcy Act, exempting
from discharge debts created by misappropri-
ation or defalcation while acting as an "offi-
cer," so that a continuance of a suit in a
state court against corporate officers for the
value of corporate property mlsai^ropriated
by them will not be stayed on the applica-
tion of the officers who had been adjudicated
bankrupt In re Qulick, 186 Fed. 360, 361.
Covaty or parisli oAeer or employ^
Tlie superintendent of public education
in a parish Is a pubUc officer.' State ez ret
Smith y. Theus, 88 South. 870, 872, 114 l4L
1097.
The superintendent of a county infirma-
ry, who resides in some apartment of the in-
firmary or building contiguous thereto, per-
forms such duties as the directors may im-
pose, and is governed in all respects by their
rules and regulations, and is not removed ex-
cept for good and sufficient cause, Is not the
holder of a '*public office'* within Rev. St f
6760, so as to authorize quo warranto to oust
him from the same, but is a mere employ^
The most general distinction of a "public
office*' is that it embraces the performance
by the incumbent of a public function dele-
gated to him as a part of the sovereignty of
the state, and it is essential that certain in-
dependent public duties, a part of the sov-
ereignty of the state, should be appointed to
It by law to be exercised by the incumbent in
virtue of his election or appointment to the
office thus created and defined, and not as a
mere employe, subject to the direction and
control of some one else. To the incumbent
of a "public office" are delegated some of the
sovereign functions of government, to be exer-
cised by him for the benefit of the public,
and some portion of the sovereignty of the
country, either legislative or executive or Ju-
dicial, attaches for the time being, to be ex-
ercised for the public benefit The office
county warden is a public office, as tfa« j
combent has power to avpoiat assistants
mmAat in policing certain reservoirs of t
state aBd territory pertaining thereto in tbi
respectiTe oovnties, and to arrest all vioUitc
of the laws for Ite protection of flsh t
game. Palmer y. Zeigler, 81 N. El 231 2
287, 76 Ohio St 210; Id., 81 N. B. 238.
Ohio St 229 (citing State ex rsL Atton
General y. Kennon, 7 Ohio St 547, 557, 55
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Jennioi
49 N. B. 404, 405, 57 Ohio St 415, 421
Am. St Rep. 728; State ex reL Leiand r. II
son, 66 N. B. 468, 61 Ohio St 513; Stite
rel. Attorney General v. Halllday, 56 N.
118, 61 Ohio St 852, 49 L. R. A. 427).
An "officer'* In the constitutloiua sen
being one who is elected or appointed to
office, and who takes the oath of office u
is responsible for the official acts of him
and subordinates, his clerks are not "oi
cers," and the provision in Oonst art 2, | '.
that the General Assembly shall fix tbe co
pensatlon of all officers, is not infringed
Act March 22, 1906 (96 Ohio Laws. p. S9), i
thorizing the county commissioners to fix t
compensation of clerks of county office
Theobald v. State, 30 Ohio Or. Gt R. 4]
415.
A janitor is not a county officer, witi
the constitutional definition of an '^offio
so that the salary of a Janitor cannot be cv
sidered in determining whether a oertj
amount was properly levied for the salary
county officers. People v. Cincinnati, L. k
Ry. CJo.. 93 N. E. 421, 247 IlL 506.
Within Veteran Act March H 1895
GoL St p. 8702), protecting only those pc
sons who hold an "office** or a *lK)sLtioii,''
person employed by a board of choaen fn
holders to work as a carpenter at daily «
ges, about the county courthouse, under tl
direction of the county superintendent, do
not hold an "ofilce." Kreigh v. Board
Chosen Freeholders of Hudson Comitj, '
Atl. 625, 62 N. J. Lew, 178 (citing and adof
ing LewU v. Jersey City, 17 Aa.112, 51 :
J. Law, 240; Stewart y. Board of Cbos
Freeholders of Hudson County, 38 Atl SI
61 N. J. Law, 117).
A comparison clerk in the county derk
office of the county of New York is a pob^
officer in the dvU service of the state. F«
pie ex rel. OToole v. Hamilton, 90 K. ^
Supp. 97, 44 Misc. Rep. 577.
Members of a building committee i]
pointed by a co^nty court to contrad for ti
erection of a courthouse are "public officer
within Acts 1899, p. 358, c. 182, making it
misdemeanor for any "public officer** <
award a Contract for any public work witl
out requiring the bond provided for in i^
act W. T. Hardison & Co. ▼, Teaman, 91 '
W. 1111, 1115, 115 Tenn. 639.
OFFICER
707
OJSTIOER
Bums* Ann. St 1901, { 6633b, proyldes
county boards of education shall consti-
boards of truancy, who shall appoint
truant officer in each county, and also
the duties and compensation of such
T. Held, that such truant officer was a
lie officer," and therefore bound to quali-
efore entering on the duties of his office,
aking the oath prescribed by section
. Feathemgill v. State ex peL Wright,
f. B. 181, 182, 33 Ind. App. 683.
The term "public officers,*' as used in
It art 12, I 3, providing that the com-
ation of any public officer shall not be
iased or diminished during his term of
i, when construed in connection with the
isions that no money shall be paid out of
:reasury except on appropriation by law,
on warrant drawn by tiie proper offi-
and that the general appropriation bill
I embrace only appropriations for ordi-
expenses of the executive, legislative,
judicial departments, etc., and with ar-
5, I 10, article 30, f| 8, 15, and article
I 2, providing for the terms and salaries
ounty judges, and supreme and county
es, applies only to state officers who
7 their salaries from the stat^ treasury,
does not include the county judges,
ser V. Seeley, 100 N. W. 437, 438, 18 &
08.
A "public officer," as defined by Act 1901
St at Large, p. 754), declaring that the
I '^public officer" shall include all officers
he state previously commissioned, the
tees of the various colleges of the state,
libers of the various state boards, dispen-
constables, and other persons whose du-
are defined by law, includes a poorhouse
lintendent appointed by a county board
ommissioners, under the authority con-
;d by Civ. Ck>de 1002, |§ 786, 786. San-
V. Belue, 58 S. E. 762-764, 78 S. G. 171.
Under Const art 3, | 28, prohibiting the
iting of any extra compensation to any
ic officer, and Code Civ. Proc. | 3280,
Iding that each public officer on w.hom a
is expressly imposed by law, must exe-
the same without fee, except where a
s expressly allowed, an agreement to pay
unty clerk, a **publlc officer" under Pub-
)fficers Law, | 2, for services imposed by
is invalid on the ground of public policy.
Isworth V. Board of Sup'rs of Livingston
aty, 115 N. Y. Supp. 8, 15.
The provisions of section 6 of "an act to
ice the number of members of boards of
en fre^olders," etc. (the Strong Act [P.
902, p. 67]), concerning the terms of of-
of certain officers, do not apply to a mere
^ship in a county institution. Walker v.
rd of Chosen Freeholders of Essex Coun-
i5 AtL 166, 83 N. J. Law, 695.
"Mr. Freeman says that a ^better deflnl-
of an office is that it is a right to exercise
a public function or employment and take the
fees belonging to It' Applying the rule or
definition thus indicated, we think that, if
the person who has been duly selected and
authorized to do the official county printing
is not to be considered an officer, hU position
is so analogous to that of an officer that the
rules whicfh have been approved wih refer-
ence to the conflicting claims of officers de
facto and officers de jure and their respective
claims against the state, county, or other
municipality may be held applicable." Smith
V. Van Buren County, 101 N. W. 186, 188, 125
Iowa, 454.
Oomrt officer or employ^
Judges are not public officers within
Const art 3, 1 13, providing that no law shall
extend the term of a public officer, or change
his salary, after his election or appointment
Commonwealth y. Ifathues, 59 Atl. 961, 980,
210 Pa. 372.
A county judge is a "public officer" with-
in Const art 5, | 30, providing that, except
as otherwise provided in the Constitution, no
law shall extend the term of any public offi-
cer or diminish or increase his salary or
emoluments after his election or appoint^
ment Henderson v. Boulder County, 117
Pac. 997, 998, 51 Colo. 364.
Judges of the superior court of West
Florida were "public officers acting under au-
thority of Congress" within the meaning of
the proviso in Act June 22, 1860, ft 3, prohib-
iting commissioners from embracing among
the Florida land claims which ought to be
confirmed "any claim which has been hereto-
fore presented for oonflrmation before any
board of commissioners or other public offi-
cers acting under authority of Congress, and
rejected as being fraudulent, or procured or
maintained by fraudulent or improper
means." United States v. Dalcour, 27 Sup,
Ct 58, 59, 62, 203 U. S. 408, 51 L. Ed. 248.
One appointed court stenographer, though
for a single case only, by the judge, under
Sess. Laws 1899, pp. Ill, 112, c. 72, is in the
discharge of his duties a "public officer," so
that the contract of the parties to pay him
more than provided by the statute for tran-
scribing the testimony is void, as iigainst
public policy. Dull v. Mammoth Mih. Co., 79
Paa 1050, 1051, 28 Utah, 467.
"A *public office' is the right, authority,
and duty created and conferred by law by
which, for a given period either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is vested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the gov-
ernment to be exercised by him for the bene-
fit of the public" (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in Mechem on Public Officers, as ap-
proved in Kimbrough v. Bamett, 55 S. W.
120, 93 Tex. 301). "As said by Chief Justice
Marshall, 'although an office is an employ-
ment, it does not follow that every employ-
OFFICER
T08
OFFICSB
ment Is an offloa* Mr. liecbem* In bU work on
Public Offlcez% lays: The most Important
characteristic which dlstingaishes an office
from an employment or contract is that the
creation and conferring of an office inTolres
a delegation to the indlTldual of some of the
sovereign functions of government, to be ex-
ercised by him for the benefit of the public;
that some portion of the sovereignty of the
country, either legislative, executive, or Ju-
dicial attaches for the time being, to be exer-
cised for the benefit of the public. Unless
the powers conferred are of this nature the
individual is not a public officer.' Now,
while the fact that the position of stenogra-
pher is designated in the act providing for
its creation as an office, and that it declares
that the person who may be called to per-
form its duties 'shall be a sworn officer of
the court,' affords some reason for determin-
ing it to be such, still it is believed the place
possesses none of those sovereign functions
of the judicial department of the government
to which it relates, to distinguish It from a
mere employment to perform a species of
service, under public authority, for the as-
sistance and convenience of the court and
parties litigant therein, in which no Judicial
discretion or Judgment is involved. The cre-
ation of the position, as shown by the very
terms of the act, .was designed for no other
purpose than to provide some one by whom
the oral evidence offered, and other proceed-
ings involving objections made to the admis-
sibility of tsetimony, the ruling of the court,
and exceptions thereto, might be taken in
shorthand as a method of preserving those
matters as they occurred, without deiaytng
trials, to be afterwards transcribed and fur-
nished the court and parties to the suit;;* to
aid them in an accurate and prompt prepara-
tion of the record. The report or transcript
of the proceedings by the stenographer is not
blading, however, upon the court, and may
be adopted or rejected at his discretion. No
act which he is authorized to do is independ-
ent of the control of others, or vested in him
as a power to be exercised as a right or pre-
rogative of a Judicial office. We conclude
that while the position of a stenographer,
under the statute in this state, may be, in a
sense, an office, and the term thereof may
continue for a longer period than two years,
yet there is no such sovereign function of
government embraced in the powers confer-
red upon the individual performing its duties
as brings it within the meaning of the word
'office* as used in the section of the Constitu-
tion quoted." Robertson v. Ellis County,
84 S. W. 1097, 1098, 1009, 88 Tex, Cij. App.
146.
Deputy
Persons who are appointed deputies un-
der a statute are "public officers." Wells y.
State, 94 N. E. 321, 822, 175 Ind. 880» Ann.
Cas. 19130, 86.
A dspttty sheriff, appointed onder tlie ti
thority of Shannon's Code, { 448, to sen
process in the portion of the county In whic
he residesk being required by sections 107
1080, to take the constitutiODal oath of oic
is an officer, within Const art 2i i 28, dedi
ing that no person shall hold moze Oud oi
office at the same time. Stats v. Sla^e, i
S. W. 826, 115 Tenn. 886L
A statute making It a ndsdemeanor fi
any officer reanired to keep a conrt docb
Or to keep an account of fees or fines ai
to pay over the same, to fklsify sach dod
or account, Is not restricted to public officei
and applies not only to the deik of a di
trict court but to the deputy derk. State
Hanlln, 110 N. W. 162, 164, 134 Iowa, 483.
Under CoBst art 2; f 2, providing t
the appointment of officers by the Preskif
or heads of departments, a 6eBfaty Uniti
States surveyor, appointment of whum by
Surveyor General is provided tor bj ^
St f 2223, is not an ^'officer of the Unit
States" within Act March 8, 1887, c. 359,
2, 24 Stat 605, as amended by Act June '
1808, c. 608, 80 Stat 495, wlthdrnwlng fn
the Jurisdiction of the Circuit and Distii
Courts suits for fees, salary, or compem
tion for official services of officers cS. i
United States. ScuUy ▼. United Statei, 1
Fed. 186, 186L
Deputy inspectors of boilers and elei
tors, provided for by the <diarter of tbe d
of St Louis, perform public functions. Tb
have a fixed tenure of office of four yea
and are required to give bond. Tb<dr sa
ries are fixed at a certain sum per j»
Their qualifications are prescribed by la
Their public position is expressly daiomt
ed as an office, and their duties as offidal c
ties. Tte diarter defines '"officers" as tk
holding situations under the dty goTenuoe
or its departments with an annual salary
for a fixed definite term of office, and t
forms of official oath and bond prescrib
refer to their positions as officers. In ^
of this, it was held that they are ''officer
although McQuUlin's Municipal Code of !
Louis, I 2107, authorizes the inspectors
boilers and elevators to "employ" depatfa
the word "employ" conveying the idea of i
lecting and intrusting with a duty. Grac
V. City of St Louis, 111 S. W. 1159, 11<
U61, 1163, 213 Mo. 884 (citing 6 Words aJ
Phrases, p. 4923).
An "officer" in the constitational v^
being one who Is elected or ai^inted to i
office, and who takes the oath of office, ai
is responsible for the official acts of ^
and subordinates, his deputies are sot ^
ficers," and the provision in Const art 2.
20, that the General Assembly shaU fix tl
compensation of all i^cers, is not infrio?
by Act March 22, 1006 98 Ohio Laws, p.^
authorizing the county commissioners to i
the compensation of d^;nities of coonty c
OFFICEB
709
OFFICER
8. Theobald ▼. 8Ute» 80 Olilo Olr. Ot R.
415.
Since the Legislature has not provided
the office of deputy town marshal or dele-
d to towns the power to create such of-
the deputy town marshal of an unincor-
Lted town was not a **publlc officer" wlth-
en. Code 1901, 1 143, making it a criminal
ise to resist a public officer. Findley v.
e (Aria.) 127 Pac. 716.
Rev. St 1899, i 8863, as amended, pro-
8 that every justice issuing any process
lorized by chapter 48, art 3, including
mons, on being satisfied that process will
be executed for want ot an officer to be
in time to execute it, or in all cases
re the constable is a party to the pending
, or is otherwise interested in the result
eof, may empower any suitable person
a party to the suit to execute the same
ndorsement thereon, and that the party
mpowered shall possess all the authority
be constable in relation to its execution,
ion 3864 (page 2143) declares that every
table or "other person" serving any pro-
authorized by the article shall return
eon in writing the time and manner of
ice, and shall sign his name to such re-
I. Held, that a private person specially
itized to serve a Justice's summons is in
lense an "officer," but is in law and fact
agent of the party at whose instance and
^hose risk he has been named, and hence,
igh required to make return of the time
manner of service, sneh return Is subject
mpeachment in the action by motion co
ih, or plea in abatement, and is not with-
he rule thai the return of an officer is
lusive on the parties, and can be im-
^ed only in a direct action on the officer's
i for a false return. Stegall v. American
nent & Chemical Co., 180 S. W. 144, 160,
Mo. App. 261.
rainage dlstriot direotov
The director of a drainage district is in
^Dse a public officer ; but, as his office is
one provided for by the Constitution, nor
1 one of the same general character, as
that are referred to in that instrument,
iust be deemed not to be within the scope
le prohibition; the Kansas Bill of Rights,
prohibiting any religious test or property
llfication as a requirment for any office
ublic trust or for any vote at any election,
ie V. Monahan, 84 Pac. 130, 133, 72 Kan.
115 Am. St Rep. 224, 7 Ann. Cas. 661.
leotittB J«dc«s or olerks
The Judges and cl«-ks of election, ap-
ited under the authority of Act March 28,
J (Laws 1908, p. 170), creating a board of
tion commissioners in cities having a
Illation of over 800,000, requiring the
fd to appoint, 90 days prior to the first
tion after the adoption of the act and
^ two years thereafter, Judges and clerks
of election for each precinct in the dty, pro-
viding for the removal of the Judges and
clerks from "office" for grounds specified,
prescribing their duties, and fixing their
emoluments, are *t>ublic officers" holding of-
fice for a fixed period. State ex rel. Mosconi
V. Maroney, 90 S. W. 141, 145, 191 Mo. 531.
A Judge of election is a public officer un-
der "An act to regulate elections" (Revision
of 1898 ; C. S. p. 2073), upon whom a duty is
imposed, and the depositing by him of a bal-
lot, in the ballot box, of a voter who has been
challenged, before the board had by a major-
ity vote decided to receive such ballot, makes
him guilty of a misdemeanor under section
197 (C. S. p. 2187). State v. Lockman, 83
Ati. 689, 690, 83 N. J. Law, 168; Same v.
Stockwell, 134 N. W. 767, 770, 23 N. D. 7a
Employ^, laborer, or serrant
See Employ 6 ; Laborer; Servant
Distinction between officer and employ^
generally, see Office.
Insuranoo asent
An insurance agent, as such, Is not a
"public officer," nor is his character a matter
of public interest; except as the public has
an indirect interest in the private character
and conduct of every member of society ; but
this interest is not sufficient to invoke the
privilege in libel, granted in case where one
holds or is a candidate for some position of
public trust Morse v. Times-Republican
Printing Co., 100 N. W. 867, 873, 124 Iowa.
707.
Jailer or otker prlsom keeper
The office of keeper of a county Jail is an
"office or franchise" within Revision, p. 005,
providing that in case any person shall usurp
or intrude into any office or franchise the
Attorney G^ieral on leave of the Supreme
Court may bring information. State ex rel.
Bownes v. Meehan, 45 N. J. Law, 189, 196.
One employed as an assistant matron of
a workhouse is not an officer but a mere em-
ploy6, although under contract for one year,
and on sufficient proof of misconduct or neg-
lect may be summarily removed by the board
in control. Jameson v. City of Cincinnati, 28
Ohio Cir. Ct R. 41, 43.
Within the definition of an office as a
place in a governmental system created, or
recognized, by the law of the state which, ei-
ther directiy or by delegated authority, as-
signs to the incumbent thereof the continuous
performance of certain permanent public
duties, the wardenshlp of the Essex county
penitentiary, in view of Act March 22, 1900
(P. L. p. 168) i 6, and the duties imposed on
the warden by the board of freeholders of
the county, is an office, and not a mere em-
ployment, so that quo warranto, and not
certiorari, is the proper remedy to determine
which of the parties is the lawful incumbent
thereof. Hosp v. Martin, 84 AtL 1059, 1060,
88 N. J. Law, 299.
I I'
OFFIOBR
710
QFFICBB
Jwor or iwr
The qualiflcatloiis and competent of
grand Jurors, except as prescribed by Oode
1907, I 7239t providing that grand jnrors
most be male residents of the oounty, orer 21
and under 60 years of age, are f6r the judg-
ment of the Jury commissioners, and a Juror
need not be a qualified elector, and section
1467, fixing the eligibility to office, has no
application to Jurors. Wilson y. State, 54
South. 572, 574, 171 Ala. 25.
A Jury commissioner is an "ofllcer" with-
in Oonst art 160, proYiding that all oAoers
shall take the oath of office and, unless he
takes the oath pritecribed by that article, he
cannot enter on the discharge of the duties,
though he may have sworn to discharge those
duties according to acts 1808, p. 216, No. 185,
or some other statute. State r. McClendon,
43 South. 417, 418, 118 La. 702 (citing State
y. Newhouse, 29 La. Ann. 824; State ▼. Arata,
32 La. Ann. 193; State v. Dellwood, 33 La.
Ann. 1229; State y. Nockum, 6 South. 729,
41 La. Ann. 689 ; State y. Fuselier, 26 Soutii.
264, 51 La. Ann. 1317; State y. Scott, 84
South. 479, 110 La. 371).
Under Bums' Ann. St 1901, f 1449, re-
quiring Jury commissioners to take an official
oath to honestly perform their duties "during
their term of office," and section 1456, declar-
ing that any person appointed a Jury commis-
sioner who shall "fail to take upon himself
said office,** etc., shall be guilty of contempt
of court, a person appointed a Jury commis-
sioner is an "officer" whose acta axe protect-
ed by the de facto doctrine. State y. Suther-
lin, 75 N. B. 642, 645, 166 Ind. 339.
The office of Jury commissioner, created
by Sees. Acta 1879, p. 28, relating to the ap-
pointment of Jury commissioner in cities
haying a specified population. Is not an "of-
fice" within Const art 9, I 14, limiting the
term of office of county, township and munic-
ipal officers to four years. State ex inf.
Hadley y. Corcoran, 103 S. W. 1044, 1045,
206 Mo. 1, 12 Ann. Gas. 565.
A grand Juror is not a "public officer*'
to be commisMoned by the Goyernor, within
the statute construing the term "public of-
ficers" to mean all officers of the state that
haye heretotore been commissioned by the
Qoyemor, etc. State y. Graham, 60 S. B.
481, 432, 79 S. C. 116.
Miuilcipal offloer ov employ^
Persons employed in a city hall in man-
aging and conducting the affairs of the mu-
nlcipaUty are public officers, charged with
the performance of public duties; and the
doctrine of respondeat superior does not ap-
ply to such employments. Schwalk^s Adm*r
y. City of Louisville, 122 8. W. 860, 862, 135
Ky. 570, 25 L. E, A. (N. SO 8a
An assistant dty auditor, whose duty it
is to assist the dty auditor and to act in his
absence, is a *1[>ublic officer," defined as one
the performanoe of whose dattes toroWed
the exercise of some portion of the aorerep
power, and in whose proper performance all
citizens are interested, either as members d
the entire body politic or of some snbditlsion
of it Attorney General y. Tlllin^iast, S9
K. B. 1058» 1060, 203 Mass. 539, 17 Ami. Ca&
449.
The superintendent of streets In Oldton
in 1904-05 was not an employ^ or agent o(
the dty entitled to damages for breacb oi
contract for employment, but was a *1ral]lc
officer^ possessing official powers and chaif
ed with public duties, and hence can recorer
only the salary or emolumentB established
by law for that offios to be paid by the dtj.
St^bens y. dty of Oldtown, 66 Atl 115,
U7, 102 Me. 21.
A teacher In the public schools Is not &d
"officer" of the city within the provisions oi
original Greater New Tork Charter, $ 1117
relating to the transfer to the service of tbf
consolidated city of those holding office foi
definite terms. Bogert y. Board of Ednca
tlon of City of New York, 94 N. T. Supp.
180, 183, 106 App. Dly. 56.
A ''public officer" being one who renden
a public servioe, or senrlce in which the gen-
eral public is interested* a municipal fire
man is a public officer, as he is cbarged witb
the public duty of protecting the property in
the municipality from fire. Schmltt t. DooI
ing, 140 S. W. 197, 198, 145 Ky. 240. 38 I
B. A. (N. S.) 881, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 107&
Since Bums' Ana. St 1908, ff i
proylding for the crsation of boards of beftitt
recognises and treate them as one of tbe ei-
ecutiye d^iartmente of the dty, memben iA
such board are dty offloeis, and not me.**
employ69. Watts y. City of Princeton^ 96 N.
BL 658, 659, 49 Ind. App. 86.
The word 'Offloer," as used in Greater
New Yortt Charter, Laws 1901, p. 109, c 4(»
I 255, proylding that the oorpocation coubs^
shall be the attorney for the dty and eidi
and every officer, and shall conduct all i^
law business In which the dty Is Interested.
and shall be the legal adviser of tbe nia^-
and dty boards and officers, and shall to:-
nish them such advice and legal assistaoce
as may be required, clearly related to thf«
officers who were on the same general M-
ing as the mayor, dty boards, and offices
ete., and not to the subordinate officers. ^^
ahue y. Keeshan, 87 N. Y. Supp. 144. 147,91
App. Div. 602.
A derk appointed under Greater N^^
York Charter, 1 1571, authorising the cok^k^
to appoint a clerk« etc, who performs roo*
tine duties in strict subordination to a v^^
lie officer, and with no authority nnder tM
stetute to do anything exo^ where it |^
authorised and directed by such officer, i-^
not a "public officer/' an^ hence wben ^
missed in violation of Civil Service Law, i ^
(lAWS 1899, p. 809, c ^70, as amended ^
OFFICER
711
OFFICER
vs 1004, p. 1604, c 607), mandamus la
remedy. People ex reL Hoefle ▼. Cahlll,
S, E. 453, 454, 188 N. Y. 480.
Under Rev. St 1880, | 5777, declaring
term **offlcers" to include any person
ling any situation under the city govem-
it or any of its departments, with an an-
1 salary or for a definite term of office,
erson appointed to perform certain engl-
ring duties with regard to sewers in a
' of the third class, for no definite term,
I to receive a per diem wage, is not an
icer," entitled to perform such work un-
section 5848, requiring the same to be
formed by a dty engineer or other offi-
Weesner v. Central Nat Bank, 80 S. W.
, 320, 106 Mo. App. 66&
A clerk of the street department la one
the subordinate officers whose appoint-
it by the council la authorized by the
rter of the dty of Trenton, but his term
)ffice is for one year unless sooner remov-
and an appointment for three years is
ond the power of the coundl. Where the
ordinate office of clerk of the street de-
tment la created by ordinance »under a
rter provision authorizing the common
ndl to appoint such subordinate officers
^all be necessary, the incumbent must be
icted and appointed by the common coun-
and the duty cannot be delegated to one
the clt^ officials appointed by the council,
i clerk of the street department having
duty to perform other than those directed
the street commissioner, his appointment
3 not to a public office, but was in the na-
e of a contract of employment McAvoy
Inhabitants of City of Trenton, 80 AtL
. 051, 82 N. J. Law, lOL
A councilman of an incorporated dty is
"officer or agent of a corporation" within
tatute prohibiting any "officer or agent of
' corporation" or public Institution to be
jrested in any contract to sell or furnish
' supplies, etc., to the corporation, etc.
Dmonwealth v. Witman, 66 Atl. 086, 088,
Pa. 41L
A dty councilman, like a dty marshal, is
1)ubllc official." His duties are defined
law. He is not the general or private
nt of the dty, and the coundlmen could
y bind the city by such construction as
J are by law authorized to make, and,
5e the right of any public officer can ex-
only by law, the dty coundl Is power-
i to bind the dty in any manner to pay
ompensatlon to the marshal not fixed by
alld ordinance. G'Dwyer v. City of Mon-
100 S. W. 670, 671, 123 Mo. App. 184.
A diarter provision for a board of ap-
isement composed of two aldermen and
citizen, to which should be referred all
tters pertaining to taxation, does not cre-
a new "office," but confers upon the al-
men, when selected, a power which might
e been given to thB entlie eoundl, and
does not violate Const art 16, | 40, provid-
ing that no pej^son shall hold at the same
time more than one dvil "office" or emolu-
ment City of Houston v. Stpwart, 87 S. W.
663,. 665. 00 Tex. 67.
The word "officers," .as used in a dty
charter providing that the mayor shall ap-
point all officers of a dty whose election or
appointment is not otherwise provided for in
the charter or by-laws, does not cover em-
ploy^ but only includes such officers whose
appointment is not otherwise provided for
at the time of the appointment. MacDonald
V. Lane^ 00 Paa 181, 182, 48 Or. 530.
The secretary of a dty board of health
is an "officer" within the act for the incorpo-
ration of cities, approved March 14, 1867,
declaring that no dty "officer" shall be In
any manner interested in any contract with
the dty, and a contract made in violation
thereof to be void, and hence a contract, be-
tween a dty and the secretary of the board,
whereby the secretary is to care for small-
pox patients, is void unless such an emer-
gency exists that it would be manifestly un-
just to delay action in order to comply with
the strict requirements of the statute. . City
of Greenfield v. Black, 82 N. B. 707, 708, 42
Ind. App. 645.
Under Rev. St 1800, i 5848, relating to
the duties to be performed by a dty engineer
or other officer and providing that on the
completion of any sewer district the dty en-
gineer or other officer having charge of the
work shall compute the cost thereof, and
shall apportion the same against the lots,
an officer other than the dty engineer may
perform the duties in regard to sewers, but
an inspector appointed by the dty engineer
to have oversight of a sewer construction, as
agent of the engineer during his temporary
absence from the work, is not such an officer.
Ernst V. aty of Springfield. 130 S. W. 410,
423, 145 Mo. App. 80.
The word "officer," in Pen. Code, § 672,
punishing one who with intent to defraud
presents for allowance or payment to any
officer of any city, authorized to audit, al-
low, or pay bills, fraudulent claims, includes
the comptroller of the city of New York, au-
thorized by Greater New York Charter, Laws
1001, p. 50, c. 466, § 140, to adjust claims
against the dty. People v. Miles, 108 N. Y.
Supp. 510, 123 App. Div. 862.
The use of the word "officer" in a dty
charter authorizing the common council to
make rules and regulations for the govem-
mpnt of all "officers," and to fix the fees and
charges for all offldal services, and to fix
salaries and wages not otherwise provided
by general laws, or by the charter, aad a fur-
ther provision stating the amount of the an-
nual salaries of the officers of the dty, and
empowering the coundl to fix the salaries of
aill other officers, does not indude a chai'ter
officer, and the oommon couadl was not au-
OFEicrat
712
onriGUi
thorlsed to create aalAcles for its members.
Woods ▼. Potter, 96 Paa 1125, 1127, 8 OaL
App. 41.
Village Law (Oonsol. Laws 1909, c 64) |
832, providing that an "officer" shall not be
interested in a contact which he or a board
of which he is a member makes on behalf of
the village nor in furnishing work or materi-
als, held not to apply to the street superin-
tendent of the Tillage of Saratoga Springs,
as the act creating snch offioe omitted as to
him the restriction applicable generally to
Tillage officers, so that he may recoTer for
the use of a horse and wagon furnished by
him to couToy the sewer, water, and street
commissioner about the Tillage in the dis-
charge of his duties. Morrissey t. Sewer,
Water h Street Commission of Saratoga
Springs, 133 N. Y. Supp. 366, 866, 73 Misc.
Rep. 432.
The office of a city treasurer, appointed
by the mayor pursuant to Municipal Code
Act (Acte 1907. pp. 799, 811) || 17, 83 (Code
1907, fl 1067, 1171), proTidlng for the deter-
mination by ordinance of the officers of a
city, their salary, manner of election, and
terms of office, and an ordinance thereunder
fixing the office of treasurer, defining his du-
ties, requiring him to make bond, etc., is a
'^public dTil office," the title to which may be
tried by quo warranto proceedings under
Code 1907, | 6453. Michael t. Stete ex rel.
Welch, 50 South. 929, 961, 163 Ala. 426.
The treasurer of a village is not an ''of-
ficer" within Village Law, Laws 1897, p.
451, c. 414, i 313, providing that an officer
shall not be interested in a contract which he
or a board of which be is a member is au-
thorized to make on behalf of the village,
since under section 81 (page 388) the village
treasurer is not a member of the board of
trustees, and is not authorized to make con-
tracte on behalf of the village, so that a con-
tract for public work entered into between
a village and a corporation of which the vil-
lage treasurer is president is not void. In
re Village of Kenmore, 110 N. Y. Supp. 1008,
1013, 59 Misc. Rep. 388.
Under Spokane Charter, which esteblish-
ed a commission form of government and
classified civil service, one entitled to the
position of foreman in the water construction
department is an "officer," and not a mere
subordinate, as affecting his right to maintein
quo warranto on wrongful discharge. State
ex rel. Powell v. Fassett, 125 Pac. 963, 964,
69 Wash. 555.
St. 1S65, c 163, being an act for supply-
ing the dty of Cambridge with water, pro-
vides, in* section 6, that the powers therein
granted shall be exercised by such agents as
the "city council" shall direct A water
board is not provided for by any subsequent
act, but subsequent ordinances of the city, tn
designating Ite agents^ use the phrase '*water
board*** flt 1891, c 864, amendbg tbe dt
charter, recognizes the existence of the wite
board, but makes no provisioa for the elecdo
of Ite members, except in section 9, irbic
provides that all "ofDcer^* not elected b
voters shall be appointed by the mayor, sol
ject to confirmation by the board of aldei
men. Held, that members of the water boar
are "officers,** within the meaning of the la
ter section, and therefore an ordinance pn
viding for their appointment In such vavan
is valid. O'Brien v. Thorogood, 39 N. E. 2S:
288, 162 Mass. 598.
The foreman of the yard of health d
partment of a dty being one of those engasc
in the labor service of the dty holda an "ei
ployment*' rather than an "office.*' G&ni
V. City of LoweU, 85 N. B. 182, 185, 199 Mas
47, 127 Am. St Eep. 468.
8t Louis aty Charter, art 4, | 43, d
fines the term "ofllcers** to indude "all pe
sons holding any dtnation under the ei
govemment or ite dotartmaitB, with an a
nnal salary or for a definite term." An i
specter to assist the commissioner of pob]
bnildingB In the inspection of private boil
Ings in the course of erection is an offici
Magner v. City of 8t Lonis, 78 8. W. TS
784, 179 Ho. 495.
An ez^npt flrenan holding the positi'
of assistant building Inspector holds a *1kk
tion** and not an "office.** Hence certlon
and not qno warranto was the proper reme
to test the legality of his removal. McGra
V. aty of Bayonne, 83 Aa 780, 83 N. J. La
224.
Where a fireman wrongfully dischar^
from the fire department of the dty of X<
York pending reinstetement accepted a pa
tion as sergeant at arms to the conndl of ti
munldpal assembly, he was a mere ''e
ploy6** of the dty and not an "officer," witfi
New York City Charter (Laws 1S97, p. ^
c 378, I 1549), prohibiting **munldpal office
from holding two offices.** Padden v. City
New York, 92 N. Y. Supp. 926, 927, 45 Mi
R^. 517.
Firem^i are not ofllcers within Con
art 15, I 1, providing that stete and coos
officers shall subscribe to an oath not to i
ceive or use any free pass or free transpoit
tion during thdr term of office. Oklahos
City y. Oklahoma Ry. Co., 93 Pac iS, !
20 OkL 1, 16 L. B. A. (N. S.) 65L
New Haven dty diarter provides for fi
appointment of a director of public worl
who shall have necessary derlcal assIstM
to perform the cl«ical work of the board ti
examine all transfers of real estate wltli
the dty, and presei^e such abstracts of Hi
as may fadlltete the departmental voi
The charter also createa a dvil serrlce bo&
to prescribe dvU service rules for positio
in the dty government, Indudlng all derl
€Qpyist% JanitoC8» atMOgraites^ ctft ^<
OFPICEK
tl3
OFFiOBB
nee provided that the cleflf of the deport-
t of public works shall keep a record of
proceedings of the department and per-
1 other prescribed dntleo. The director of
Ic works appointed relator to examine the
rds of transfers of real estate and make
preserve abstracts of title for us0 of the
irtment, but prescribed no other dutiee.
position was known as '^examiner of rec*
*' with an annual salaiy assigned to it,
the dty yearbook contained relator's
e, followed by that title. Upon adoption
le civil service roles, relator took the civil
ice examination, was appointed and con-
ed in the same duties until his removal.
I, that relator's position was not a **public
»" to try title to wtilcAi quo warranto will
relator not being invested with part of
sovereign functioi^ of government State
el. Neal v. Brethauer, .75 Att. 705, 706, 83
a. 143.
Btary pvblio
**The position or place of *notary public'
early a public office." (Since, under the
non law, women are disabled from hold-
)ffice, they are disqualified from appoint-
t as notaries public. In re Opinion at
Justices, 62 Atl. 069, 970, 971, 78 N. H.
5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 415, 6 Ann. Gas: 288
3g People V. Hathbone, 40 N. E. 895, 896,
N. Y. 484, 437, 28 L. R. A. 884).
"A notary public, who receives his ap-
tment and commission from the Gov-
r of the state upon the recommendation
le county court, must be regarded as a
Ic 'officer* of the county." Governor v.
Ion, 15 Ala. 7^75.
A notary public is a *^blic officer,'*
In the meaning of Const N. Y. art 13,
prohibiting the use of free transportation
i public official. People v. Wadhams,
i. B. 65, 176 1^. Y. 9 (citing People v.
ibone, 40 N. B. 395, 145 N. Y. 434, 28 Li B,
54).
A "public officer", is one who has somei
to perform concerning the public; and
i not lesr so when his duty is confined
arrow limfts, because it is the duty and
oature of that duty which makes him a
Ic officer, and not the extent of his au-
Ity; and, wh«re an employment or duty
continuing one which is defined by rules
rescribed by law and not by contract,
a charge oi* employment is an office, and
person who performs it is an office!*.
[>tary public is a public officer. In re
ion of the Justices, 62 Atl. 969, 970, 73
[. 621. 5 L. R, A. (N. S.) 415, 6 Ann. Cas.
[quoting and adopting definition in Shel-
. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 72 Am. Dec 169,
One who has been commissioned as no-
and has taken the oath of office, and has
acting as notary fbr many years, and
the reputation of being such in the com-
ity in which he lives, but who has failed
to file his oath df officb in tl!te offices of the
Secretary df State and of the eferfc of court,
and has also failed to 'renew \A^ bond every
five years, as required by law, is a notary de
facto; and acts passed before hiib have the
same validity as acts passed before ft rfbtary
de Jure. The position of a notary puWic ifi^
an "office,? and where a pecsoui holds a/com-
mission aa a notary^ aad acts^ > as one, . and
has the r^utation of' being a notary public,
he is a ^'notary pubUfl die facsto*" Davenport
V. Davenport, 41 South. 240, 241» U6 I4L
1009, 114 Am. St R^Pw 575.
OMoev of poUtiesl pa^7
The office of Demoi^ratlc ward committee^;
man of a city is not a '^public , office." Green-
ough V. Lucey, 66 AU. SOO, 301', 218 ft. I. 230.
The local executive committee of a polit-
ical party, though required to perform cer-
tain duties by Laws 1905, p. 510; t, 93, and
required to conduct political campaigns, ate
not **publlc officer^." Attorney Geheral v.
Barry, 68 Atl. 192, 74 N. H. 353.
ftrshal, or otHer peao«
Police ofioevy'
oflloer
A city marshal elected by the people is
a "t)ublic officer," within Const 1890, 1175,
providing that such officer shall not be re-
moved from office for Willful neglect of duty
or misdemeanor in office, except on an in-
dictment and conviction. Lleano y. City of
Pass Christian, 50 ^lith. 981, 982, 96 Miss.
640.
A dty mairshfil, holding^ otice under
Greater New York Charter, § 1424, is a "pub-
lic officer," within Municipal Court Act, |
338, authorizing increased costs .where, the
successful defendant is a public ; officer ap-
pointed or ^ected under the authority of the
state. Scherl v.Blam^ 121 N. Yi Supp. 522,
528, 136 Apj^.Dlv. 753.
"A 'public officer' Is one wlio has some
duty to perform concerning the public; and
he is not the less a public officer when his
duty is confined to narrow limits, because It
is the duty, and the nature of that duty,
which makes him a public officer, and not
the extent of hie authority." Policemen are
"officers," wlthiil Const. | 20, requiring ofi^i
cers to be appointed' for a definite time, s6
that ^n oi^inance authorizing appointment
of policemen during good behavi<or is void.
Monette v. State, 44 South. 989, 91 Miss. 662,
124 Am. 6t Rep. 715 (quoting and adc^ting
definition in Shelby t. Alcorn, S6 Miss. 273,
72 Am. Dec. 169).
A special policeman appointed by the
Governor at t^le "instance of a railroad com-
pany pursuant to Code 1899, c. 145, f 31 (Code
1906, I 4281), and paid by such company for
his services, is prima fade a public officer,
for whose acts the company is not liable.
McKaln v. Baltimore & O. It. Co., 64 S. B.
18, 19, 65 W. Va. 233, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 289,
131 Am. St. Rep. 964, 17 Ann. Cas. 634.
A
OFFIGfiB
714
OFFICEB
PoUoeiBen are not oflKoera within Const
art 16, I 1, proTldlng tluit itate and coanty
officers sball subscribe to an oath not to rs-
oeiye or use any free pass or free transporta*
tlon daring their term of office. Oklahoma
aty ▼. Oklahoma By. Co., 93 Paa 48, 61, 20
OkL 1, 16 L. B. A. (N. B.) 66L
A Janitor of a police station Is not a
"^pobUc officer." Sims t. O'Meara, 7» N. B.
824, 826, 196 Mas& 647 (distlngnlshlnf Ham
Y. Boston Board oC Police^ T N. B^ 640, 142
11888.90).
A Janitor of a police station, appointed
for a year, is not a public officer, bat a mere
employ^, whose contract gives him no estate
for years In the station house, and no right
of entry beyond a revocable license. Wlggln
y. City of Manchester, 68 Att. 622, 623, 72
N. H. 678.
For the purpose of determining his right
to compensation during a period of suspension
on written charges which on Investigation are
found untrue, a policeman appointed subject
to the civil service rules as required by the
charter of the dty of Portland (section 179),
who is required to take an oath of office and
give a bond for the faithful , discharge of his
duties, who is made a peace officer by B. & G.
Comp. 1 1693, and a large part of whose du-
ties are such that he must have authority
to act, not as agent for the state or city,
but by virtue of the office. Is an officer, audi,
when legally appointed, has title to the office,
which can only be terminated in the manner
provided by law. Beising y. City of Port^
land, Ul Pac 877, 378^ 67 Or. 296, Ann. Gas.
1912D, 896.
Section 11 of the diarter of the dty
of Portland provides that there shall be elect-
ed a mayor, treasurer, municipal Judge, dty
attorney, auditor, and 16 coundlmen, who
shall be officers of the city. Section 18 pre-
scribes the terms of such officers. Municipal
officers embraced In a department; wliJch In-
cludes detectives, are subject to the civil
service rule found at section 808. Const art
8, I 7, provides that such other dty officers
as may be necessary shall be elected or ap-
pointed in such manner as may be prescribed
by law. Article 16, | Z, provides that when
the duration of any office is not provided by
the Constitution, it may be declared by law,
and, if not so declared, the office shall be
held doring the pleasure of the authority
making the appolntmoit but the legislative
assembly shall not create any office, the ten-
ure of which shall exceed four years. Held,
that a detective is not an oflicer within Const
art 16, S 2. Beising v. City of Portland, 111
Pac 377, 378, 57 Or. 295, Ann. Cas. 1912D,
895.
A duly appointed patrolman of the police
department of a dty is an "officer," within
the meaning of the laws of Ohio. State v.
City of Palnesville, 32 Ohio Clr. Ct B. 123,
129.
eoMilssI— sgf
vlser
A anpervlBor of public roads it t poba
officer. Mlal v. EUington, 46 S. £. 9ei,9£
184 N. a 181, 86 L^ B. A. 697.
''A road overseer le a public oflBoer, ui
obstructing him in the performance of bl
duties as sudi public officer coosUtota
public offense." BldiardMm t. QTbedaHS
N. W. 184, 168^ 17 & D. 829.
•ckeU mr sekoel dietriet effiMr
The office of sdiool director is tn'offlee
within Const art 8, 1 12, oonf enlos exdosn
appellate Jurisdiction on Uie Supiene Covi
In cases involving the title to an oflke wk
this sUte. State ez inf. Sutton v. Vusat^i
8. W. 1, 189 Mo. 682.
A school trustee is an "officer,** wltiii
the meaning of the word as used in a ea
stitutional provision that all officers sbi
take a prescribed oath before entering <
the duties of their oAoe. Budianan r. Gr
ham, 81 S. W. 1237, 1239, 86 Tex. CiT. Ap
46&
Powers In the directors of a school di
trict wiil be implied when the exercise the
of is necessary to enable them to perform ti
duties Imposed upon them ; school dlrecto
being «^ubUc offlctts," and subject to t
same rules as other public officers in respe
to their Implied powers. A. H. Andrews C
V. Delight Special School Dist, 128 S. W.St
363, 95 Ark. 28.
Under Bev. Laws, a 42, | 27, prori
ing that the school oonmittee of a town 'slu
have the general charge and saperioteodeii
ef all the public s<^ools," the school cofflm
tee act not as "agents" of the town, bat
"public officers," intrusted with powers i
charged with duties concerning the maia
nance of the schools. Horse v. Asbley, Td
a 481, 4S2, 193 Mass. 294.
A "public officer" Is a person appoint
by the government and not by contract
perform a continuing duty defined by lav
governmental rules. The superintendeot
the Arkansas SUte School for tbe BUj
elected by the state board of trustees of cbi
itable institutions under a statute authorizi
such election, whose comp^isation is fii
by the statute, and whose duties of a poi)
nature are prescribed by law, are continoo
and not affected by change of the persooi
of the Incumbent and who Is required
give a bond for the faithful performaiKe
his duties connected with the instituUc
is a public officer and not an employ^ ^^^
V. FutraU, 106 & W. 6«7, 609, 670, 84 ii
540.
Bev. St I 3899-«, provides that on t
third Monday in April, 1896. and biannui-
thereafter, the school councils shall el«ct
clerk, who shall not be a member of tl
council, and who shall be derk of the W
of education. School Code April 25, ^
OFFICSB
715
OFFICSB
»Ykles that all existing offleora <tf boavds of
icatlon and school councils shall hold their
ces until boards of educaticm are elected
1 organized under the proviaiona of this
. On the third Monday in April, 1904, the
incU neglected to elect a clerk, but ^ected
i on April 25, 1904, after the provisions of
new School Code went into effect Under
tain statutory provisions the clerk of the
ird of education, outside of his mere cleri-
duties, which he has to perform for the
ird and as directed by it, has many statu-
y duties, for the faithful performance of
ich he must answer to the people. Held,
it the Incumbent of the office was a public
cer, occupying the office of clerk of the
ird of education at the time the new Code
k effect, and hence there ^as no vacancy
the office at the time the school council
lertook to elect the defendant clerk, and
pretended election was void. State ex rel.
yers v. Coon, 26 Ohio ar. Ct B. 241, 242.
Bev. St 1890, | 4274 (Bev. St 1889, I
6), provides the period within which civil
ions shaU be commenced, after the cause
action has accrued, as follows: "Within
ee years: First i^n action against a sher-
coroner, or other o^cer, upon i^;lial)iUty
urred by the doing of an act in his official
ttcity, and in virtue of his office, or by the
ission of an official duty, including tiie
ipayment of money collected upon an exe-
lon or otherwise," ^tc. Section 9864 te-
res the board of a school district to or-
lize by electing a president and a treasure
Section 9868 requires the treasurer to
e a bond conditioned "that he will render
althful and just account of aU money that
y come into his hands as such treasurer,
1 otherwise perform tike duties of hiq office
ording to law." Section 9869 provides
t the treasurer "shall be responsible on
'official' bond," etc. Section 9871 re-
res the treasurer to make annual aettle-
Qts, and prescribes that "at the expiration
his term of office" he shall deliver over
his successor in office • • ♦ all mon-
or other property In his hands," etc.
Id, that a treasurer of a school district Is
}ubllc officer within the meaning of seo-
a 4274. State ex rel. School Dist of Se-
U V. Barter, 87 S. W. 941, 943, 188 Mo.
Itate oAeev or employ^
The state secretary of mine industries
vided for in the act creating the State
K>ciation of Bfinera (Oen. St. 1901, | 4178)
*x officio state mine inspector, and a public
cer. Titus v. Sherwood, 106 Pac. 1070, 81
D. 870.
The words '^blic officer^ may be syn-
mouB with officer and broad enough to
Lude any person authorized to perform
r public du^, but "public officer" is a term
used in the Connecticat Oonatitntion «z*
cept In aMcle 24, prdviding^ that ndther
the General Assembly, nor any coumty, city,
etc., shall pay ot grant any extra compensa-
tion to any public officer, etc. It la rarely
used in legislation unless limited by its con-
text In article 10, providing a form of oath
for members of the General Assembly, execu-
tive and Judicial officers, the generic word
"officer" is dealt with in its broadest mean-
ing, and the classes to which it may apply
are defined as members of the General As-
sembly, executive officers, civil officers. Judi-
cial officers, and military officers. Such
term, as used in article 24, cannot Include
members of the General Assembly or legis-
lative officers, the €k)vemor or Lieutenant
Governor. McOovem y. Mitchell, 68 Atl. 433,
489, 78 Genu. 636.
Laws 1911, p. 18, f 68, in so far as it ap-
propriated $7,000 for salary and expenses of
N. as special agent and expert to the Missouri
Waterway Commission he not being an offi-
cer of the state, and there being no law creat-
ing an office, tenure, or duties which he was
required to fill, is unoonatitutlonal as a gift
of money to an individual, tn violation of
Const art 4, § 46, and as granting to him a
special and exclusive right or privilege, in vio-
lation of article 4, t 53, par. 26; but the in-
validity of such provision did not invalidate
the balance of the law, appropriating $10,000
to the Commission. Kavai^uii^ v. Gordon,
149 S. W. 587, 592, 244 Mo. 695.
Ky. St 1908, I 4258, authoH^sea the audi-
tor of public accounts to appoint revenue
agents, whose term of office shall be four
years. Section 4259 requires revenue agents
to take the oath required of other officers,
and to execute a bond to the commonwealth.
The duties of such agents are prescribed by
law, and in many matters they may act in-
dependently of the auditor, as in assessing
omitted property under section 4241. Held,
that a revenue agent though an appointee of
the auditor, is an "officer of the common-
wealth" holding for a fixed term, and is not
subject to removal by the auditor under sec-
tion 140 of the statutes, authorizing the au-
ditor to remove the assistant auditor and aur
ditor's clerk. Hager v. Lucas, 86 S. W. 552,
553, 120 Ky. 307.
The commissioners of incorporated ports
appointed under Laws Or. 1909, c. 39, § 8, who
are vested with the power and authority
given to corporations organized under the
act, are mere agents for the performance of
certain duties defined by the act, and are not
"officers," within the meaning of Const art
15, I 2, limiting the tenure of officers appoint-
ed by the Legislature to four years. Bennett
Trust Co. V. SengStacken, 113 Pac. 863, 868,
58 Or. 388 (citing DIavfd t. Portland Water
Co., 12 Pac. 174, 14 Or. 96; State v. George,
29 Pac. 356, 22 Or. 142, 16 L. B. A. 737. 29
Am. St Bep. 568; White Y. Mears, 7^4 Pac.
931, 44 Or. 215).
<l
liil!
ta^A.
OFFICER
718
OFFICER
OFITCEB (Of Oorporfttioa)
As officer in general, see Officer,
Misconduct of, see Misconduct
"Offlcen" are ttie means, tbe bands, the
head by which corporations normally act
The word "officer" has this precise meaning.
Webster gives its etymology as "ops,** help,
and **facere/' to do or make. A corporation,
in common, with a natural person, may act
either in chief or by an agent In the for-
mer case, being an artificial person, it can
act only through the office of some natural
person, who is on this account called its
officer, and who, being thus inherent in such
artificial person, is not, as regards it an
alius or other person, and hence Is not an
agent, within tbe meaning of the maxim
"Qui facit per alium fadt per sa" Ameri-
can Soda Fountain Go. r. Stolaenbach, 68
AtL 1078, 1080, 75 N. J. Law. 721, 16 Ll B.
A. (N. S.) 708, 127 Am. St R^. 822.
Rev. St i 5102, provides that when a
corporation is the party, the verification of
the pleading may be made by an ^'officer
thereof its agent or attorney." The word
"officer" is not used in this statute tautologi-
cally, but is used in contradisttnctioQ to the
word "agent" and an officer of a corpora-
tion may verify a pleading when an agent
can or cannot do so. Bullock Beresford Mfg.
Co. V. Hedges* 81 N. B. 171, 172, 76 Ohio
St 91.
A councilman of an incorporated city is
an ^'officer or agent of a corporati<Hi," with-
in a statute prohibiting any "officer or agent
of any corporation*' or public institution to
be interested in any contract to sell or fur-
nish any supplies, etc., to the corporation,
etc. €k>mmonwealth v. Witman, 66 AtL 086,
988, 217 Pa. 411.
A^nU distfa&gvlshed
One distinction between officers and
agents of a corporation lies in ttie manner
of their creation. An "officer" is created
by the charter of the corporation, and the
officer Is elected by the directors or the
stockholders. An agency is usually created
by the ofllcers, or one or more of them^ and
the agent is appointed by the same authority.
It is clear that the two terms "officers" and
"agents" are by no means interchangeable.
One deriving its existence from the other,
and being dependent upon that other for Its
continuation. Is necessarily restricted in its
powers and duties, and such powers and
duties are not necessarily the same as those
nertainlBg to tbe authority creating it The
officers, as such, are the oorporatton. An
i^ent is an employ^. A mere employment
however liberally compensated, does not
rise to the dignity of an office. The term
''general agent" as applied to one repre-
senting a corporation, does not necessarily
import tha.t the person designated is an offi-
cer of the corporation. Vardeman v. Penn.
Mut Life Ins. Co., 54 S. E. 66, 67. 123 (
117, 5 Ann. Oas. 221.
Bookkeeper
One employed as bo<^Lkeeper for t d
Inlte period Is not an officer or agent of s;
corporation within Code 1006, § 22S1, bll
bis place during tbe pleasure of the directc
and removable by them without cause vi
oat liability on tbe corporation for bnftcfa
tbe contract of employment Munn t. We
burg Banking 4b Trust Co., 66 S. E. 290,2
66 W. Va. 204, 135 Am. St Bep. 1024.
Mreotor
A director of a corporation is an "offia
within General Corporation Act I 57, gif
employ^ of an insoivoit ooiporatioa prioi
for wages, but declaring that the word "i
ploy6" shall not in<dnde any officer, and
is not entitled to priority as an emploj^
wages as a foreman. In re PeninsnlA i
Stone Co., 82 AtL 688, 9 Dd. Gb. 348.
A foreman acting under the directioG
the superintendent of a corporation is
an '"officer" of the corporation, and is nc
person on whom service of summons on
corporation can be made. Simmons t.
fiance Box Co., 62 S. E. 435, 436» 14S N
•A A
049.
Gemevml ace&t
A mere employment however liber
compensated, does not rise to the dignit]
an office, and the term "general agent," as
plied to (me representing a coiporatioa <i
not necessarily import that he is an "oSc
of the corporation. One distinction bet«
an "officer" of a corporation and an "aee
thereof is that an officer may by mand^i
compel the corporation to reinstate him. ^
an agent may be dismissed without ca
and bis only remedy would be compensai
in damages. Vardeman v. Penn. Mut I
Ins. Co., 64 S. a 66, 67, 68, 125 Ga. U:
Ann. Cas. 221 (citing Wheeler & Wilson I
Co. V. Lawson, 15 N. W. 3d8, 57 Wis. ^
Farmers* Loan ft Trust Co. v. Wanln?.
Wis. 305; Thomas F. Meton ft Sons r. Isl
Wagon Co., 4 N. Y. Supp. 215 ; Raleigh i
R. Co. V. Pullmann Co., 50 S. B. 1008, 122
704; Commonwealth y. Christian [Pa-!
Phila. 558).
Manager
The manager of a corporation is
"officer of the corporation," so that the r
flcatlon of a complaint by him is the ^^
flcation by an "officer." Stockton Lob
Co. V. Blodgett, 84 Paa 441, 8 OaL Apfi
See Person.
SoUdltor
A ''solicitor of business^ is not «1t
the clause "and other officers," in Tier.
U. S. i 5136, giving a national bank poire:
appoint a president* vice president, asL
OFFICER
T19
OFFICIAL BALLOT
other officers, and dismlas guch officers
easure ; but tinder subdivisions 3 and 7
lid section, empowering sucli a bank to
i contracts and to ezerdse, bj duly au-
ized "officers^ or agoits, all such in-
ital powers as shall be necessary to car-
1 the banking business, it may employ a
Itor of business for a year. Case ▼. First
Bank of City of Brooklyn, 109 N. T.
K 1119, 1120, 09 Misc. B^p. 269.
I "woTkauaL
See Workman.
TGEB DE FAOTO
See De Facto.
TGEB EIiEOT
The term "officer elect** implies a person
ble to hold office, and though a person
chosen at a general election, where he is
gible to hold office, he is not an "officer
/' within Code 1906, f 3436, which pro-
3 for the holding of an election to fill a
ncy created by the failure of an officer
; to qualify. State ▼. Hays, 46 South.
730, 91 Miss. 756.
TGEB HA VINO OEKEBAL SUPEB*
INTENDENCE
A treasurer of a corporatibn Is not an
%r having a general superintendence of
concerns," within General Corporation
(ConsoL Laws 1909, c. 23) ft 90, 91, au-
Izing a creditor, trustee, director, man-
, or other officer of a corporation having
neral superintendence of its concerns, to
to compel officers to account for their of-
I conduct Loughlln T. Wocker, 137 N.
^upp. 257, 152 App. DiT. 466.
^CEB OF OOUBT
See Court Officer.
Assignee for benefit of creditors as, see
Officer.
Attorney at law as, see Attorney at
Law.
Clerk of court a^, see Okttk. of Court
Beceiver as, see Beceiver.
•*ICEB OF THE BEVENDE
See Bevenue Officer.
nCEB FBO TEM.
An "officer pro texn.'* is one who pro
>ore (for the time being) is such officer,
r, complete, and he is, as Bevisal 1900,
i33, provides, authorized "to execute the
es" of such office. State t. ThomJEis, 53
L 522, 523, 141 N. a 79L
fTCIAX.
See Defaulting OffidaL
f*ICIAI. ACT
All acts of officials are not "official acts,"
only such as are done under some au-
ity derived from the law, or in pursuance
of prescribed duties. Chase y. Cochnu^ 67
AtL 320, 322, 102 Me. 43L
A statute authorizing county supervisors
to declare a charge against a county, the ex-
penses of a county officer in defending an ac-
tion against him for an "official act*' applies
only to official acts in which the public has
concern, and does not apply to the act of
the sheriff in returning an execution. Wey
Y. O'Hara, 95 N. Y. 8ui^ 81, 84, 48 Misc.
Bep. 82.
"By an 'official act* is not meant a lawful
act of the officer in the service of process;
if so, the sureties would never be responsi-
ble. It means any act done by the officer in
his official capacity, under color and by vir-
tue of his office.'* Where a conltable; in levy-
ing an execution, committed an assault on
the Judgment debtor's wife, who was attempt-
ing to assist the debtor in making a 'sdiedule
of his property claimed to be exempt, he was
acting under color and by virtde of his office;
so as to render his bondsmen liable, under
Hurd's Bev. St 1906, p. 1272, c 79. § 9. pro-
viding that the bonds of constables eAiall be
held for the security and benefit of all per^
sons who may be injured by their official acts
or misconduct Greenb^rg v. People, 80 N. B.
100, 102, 225 111. 174, 8 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1223,
116 Am. St Bep. 127 (quoting and adopting
the definition in Turner y. Sisson, 137 Mass.
191).
Where, when deputy sheriflii were with-
in 250 yards of certain men at night and ^aw
flashes of pistols and heard pistol shots fired
in the public street of a town, such acts con-
stituted the commission of an offttise al^ahniit
the public peace, so that the officers' acts in
attempting to arrest the persons supposed i»
be guilty of such offense were '^official mtitM,^
within Bev. St 1895, art 4897, making sher-
iffs responsible for the official acts of their
deputies. King v. Brown, 94 S. W. 328, 329,
100 Tex. 109.
The rendition of a Judgment is tlie "offi-
cial actf' of the court, as distinguished from
the ministerial act of spreading it on the
records. Simmons v. Hanne, 39 South. 77,
78, 50 Fla. 267, 7 Ann. Cas. 322 (quoting and
adopting definition in 1 Black, Judg. 1 106).
OFFICIAX. BAIXOT
The "official election ballot,'* and "official
ballot" in ComiK St 1903, c. 26, | 32, pro-
viding that in no case shall the candidate
of any political party be entitled to he desig-
nated on the official election ballot as the
candidate of more than one political party,
and shall be designated on the "official bal-
lot" as the nominee of the party In whose
nomination his name appears as the political
party with which he affiliates, refer to the
general election ballot and not to the primary
election ballots. State ex rel. Adair v. Drex-
el, 105 N. W. 174, 177. 74 Neb. 770.
OFFICIAL BALLOT
7^
OFFICIAL 8£AL
ReT. 8t 190i8, I 5919, requfrlnff pemimi
deBirlng to be candidates for scbool director
to file a written nottce of lntentloii» and re-
qniilng the secretary of tbe ediool district to
prepare iMdlots oontalnlng tlie names of cai^
dldates wbe have certified soch Intention,
and proTldlBf tbat no other person shall be
Toted for, cannot be enstalned as prescrlUnff
an "official ballot," which Is a ballot prepared
for election by. public authority at public ex-
pense, and ballots other than those prepared
by the secretary cast at the election by duly
qualified electors must be counted In the ab-
sence of any fraud. littlejohn y. People, 121
Pac 159, 102. 62 Colo. 217, Ann. Cas. 191SD,
610 (quoting 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4952).
8t 1900, pi 91, c. 188^ extending tbe.pro-
visions of the dyil sendee law to the police
force of the town of Natlck, and providing in
section 4 that the act shall take effect on its
acceptance by a majority of the legal voters
at an annual town meeting or at any meeting
called tor the purpose, and if the vote thei^e-
on la taken at the annual town meeting it
shall be by official ballot, etc., could not be
accepted by the precinct voting, the provision
that the vote shall be by official ballot not
warranting the inference that the vote could
be taken by precincts ; the term "official bal-
lot,'' as defined by St 1907, p. 633, c 560, i
1, meaning "a ballot prepared for any elec>
tlon, caucus, or primary by public authority
and at public expense." Sweeney v. Bigelow,
88 N. B. 917, 918, 202 Mass. 539 (citing Stat
1896, p. 541, c. 548, f 1 ; Rev. Laws, c U, |
1 ; Stat 1907, p. 683, c. 560, I 1).
OFFICIAXi BOXD
Under Gode 1906, f 3463, relating to "offi-
cial bonds," the bond of the treasurer of a
levee board lis an "official bond." Adams ▼.
Williams, 52 South. 865, 869, 97 Miss. 118, 30
L. B. A. (N. S.) 866, Ann. Cas. 19120, 1129.
A bond given by a couiity contractor un-
der Bums' Ann. St 1908, { 7723, is an "offi-
cial bond" within sectibn 1278, which pro-
vides that defects in official bonds shall not
vitiate them. Holthonse v. State^ 97 N. E.
130, 132, 49 Ind. App. 178.
OFnOIAL pOOTTMENT.
See JB'orelgn Official Document
OFFIOIAIi DUTY
See While In Discharge of Official Duty.
Discharge of official duty, see Discharge.
Proceedings instituted by a drain com-
missioner to enforce payment of his salary
were not "official duty" imposed on him by
law, but were rather for enforcement of a
private right, and hence fees for services of
an attorney employed by him in such pro-
ceedings were not necessary expenses in-
curred by him as drain commissioner in the
discharge of the duties of his office, to be
paid by the county as required by Pub. Laws
1909, c 9, No. 118, i 5. Hatch v. Board of
Sup'rs of Chlhoun County, 136 N. W. 31
351, 170 Mich. 322.
A county tnasnrsr's fallura to mecen
to the oountyaad the states and pay oi
the revenue In his hands, wan an omUskm
"oflklal duty," within the meaning of Ci
1861, 1 1659, providing that actions agalnsl
public officer, growlng^ out of an omission
an official duty, must be conunenced wit)
three years after it accrues. State v. Dj
17 Iowa, 223, 227 (citing and adopting defi
tlon in State, to Use of Mount I^eass
Bank, v. Conway, 18 Ohio. 234; State, to C
of Knox County Com*rs, v. Blake^ 2 Ohio i
147).
OFFICIAX. BLSCnOH BAXXOT
See Official Ballot
OFFICIAX* JOVRNAI.
Tbe "ofllcua joumar of mOt of i
honses of the Legislature Is the journal fi
In th» office of the Secretary of State In
cordance with law/ and It controls In case
any discrepancy between It and the prim
Journal. State ex rel. McKinley v. Man
48 South. 846» 847, 160 Ala. 181.
OmCIAX. MUOOMDVOT
His own official misconduct see ffis.
Willful official misconduct, see Will
Misconduct
See, also. Misconduct In Office.
Antedating by a clerk of a court of i
filing of a paper, filed out of tlme^ ao as
show filing Mthin time, is ''official misc(
duct" warranting his removal under Ri
St 1895, art 3531. Howard v. Gulf, C.
S. F. Ry. Co. (Tex.) 135 S. W. 707, 769 it
lug Harris v. Hopson, 5 Tex. 529).
Where the mayor of a dtj by Intoxk
tlon voluntarily Incapacitated himself t
the performance of his dutiee, but witbo
undertaking official' business daring 6i»
time, and in the case in aueetlon owed i
official duty to tide men firom whom he pi
cured the Intoxicating liquors unlawfuHj.
was guilty not only of private, but "offiei
misconduct" warranting his removal frc
ofik*e for Intoxication pursuant to Acts 31
Gen. Assem. c. 78, f 1. State v. Hendtfso
124 N. W. 767, 769, 145 Iowa, 65T.
OFFICIAI. PROCiaSBIirCHI
See Public Official Proceedinga.
OFFICIAI. 8BAI.
Nothing short of an Impression on tl
paper vrill constitute an "official seal.'* Tl
requirement of Rev. St | 182, that a coi:
mlssioner of deeds for Wisconsin in anotb
state shall have a seal of office, by whi<
his offlcial acts shall be authenticated, Ls m
complied with by the use of a seal whk
does not contain the name of the state, bi
OFFIGIAL Bl'EQIroaRAPHER
721
OLBBKASS
whicli the space for such name is left
nk, and in the impreoiion the word "WiGk
isin" is written in sach space with a pen.
[bermann v. Ide, 68 N. W. 3M 885) 98
8. 669, 57 Am. St Rep. 941
TICIAIi STElfOORAPHEB
Where two stenographers took the testi-
ny at the trial, acting at different times,
ler of them was the "official stenogra-
^r," within Laws 1910, c. Ill, requiring
nand for a transcript for purposes of ap-
il to be serred on the "official stenogra-
ir" within 30 days after adjournment of
rt ; and, such demand having been served,
transcript furnished will not be stricken,
ess shown to be incorrect in some material
tlcular. Lumber Mineral Oo. yl King, 54
ith. 250, 251, 98 Miss. 7S8.
TIOIAIi 0UBTET
An "official survey," under St. l890i H
14, 1735, must ishow distinctly of what
ce of land it is a stkrvey, at whose requeet
ivas made, what owners were notified and
«ent at the date of the isurvey, and the
ne of the chainman ; and if such essen-
Is are omitted it cannot be treated as an
cial survey. WatMns v. Havigfaorat, 74
!. 318, 319, 13 OkL 128.
TIOIAIXT
See Only and Officially
FSET
See Set-Off.
FSPRING
See Natural Offspring.
In the absence of proof to tl^e contrary,
nay be inferred thajt^ a child described in
ition to a named man as his child is not
rely a child committed to his custody, but
the "offspring" of h\^ body and lawfully
otten. Rimes v. States 67 & B. 223, 7
App. 55a
The electrical unit of resistance, called
"ohm," is 1,000,000,000 units of the cen-
eter-gram-second, usually ca^ed .the ,G.
S. system. Peoria Waterworks - Oo. v.
>rla R. Ck>., 181 Fed. 990, 1001.
"Old" is defined in the Century Die-
tary as having the form or resemblance of
thing indicated, like, as, in anthropoid,
B man; crystalloid, like crystal; hydroid,
i water. It is much used as an English
matlve, chiefly in scientific Words. Rub^
oid, therefore, is a de8<^rlptive word,
aning like rubber. Standard Patiit Go. t.
3 WDS.& PJ2d Seb.— 46
TrinidUd Asphalt Mfg. Go., 81 Sup. Of 456,
457, 220 U. S. 446, 55 U Ed. 536.
OIL
See Gocoanut Oil; Dead Oil; Linseed
Oil; Olive Oil; Salad OU; Sesame
Oil; Wood-Nut OIL
As land, see Land.
As materials, see Materials.
As mineral, see Mineral.
As real property, see Real Property.
Dealer in oil, see Dealer.
Manufacture of, see Manufactures —
Manufactured Articles.
OEL <XrailIOiin»Y VftED IN SOAP MAK^
no
Niger-seed oil, wMch, while used in soap
making, can be used tor other purposes,
though without the proper qualities for sucfh
purposes, is within the provision ih Tariff
Act July 24, 1807, c. 11^ | 2, Free List, par.
568, 86 Stat. 151, for oils' "commonly used
in soap making, • ♦ ♦ fit only for such
use." United States v. Golby & Go., 153 F%d.
883, 82 0. 0. A. 629.
Tariff Act July 24, 1807,' a 11, f 2, Free
List, par. 568, 80 Stat. 198, reUting to "oils
oommonly used in soap making" and "fit
only ft>r' such usee," does not include so*
called '\>lelc acid," of red oil, which is fit
for other uses, although commonly used as
soap st6ck. Edward HiU*8 Sons & Go. v.
ITnited States^ 151 Fed. 475, 81 a O. A. 18.
on G01fP4^HT
' As merchant, see Mertdiant.
OIL DEPOT
Any warehouse or t>lftce ^'^^n oils are
stored in large quanttties is a depot within
the meaning of a statutes Unpiosihg a tax on
"oil depots," wherein petroleum or other oils
ate stored in bulk or tank. Standard Oil
Co: v: OommoiiwellUh, 62 B. W. 1020, 1022,
119 Ky. 75. r .
OIL MUX
1^ Gotten Seed OU liUk
OIL W£IX ,, V ,*" ..' , ':/"' V V ,
' . As mine^ see Mina <,, .
OLD
OI<D BRASS
"Gomposition metar is a comiherelal
designation for all cdmposite metMOs of cop-
per, tin, lead, and spelter contmMiing 70 per
cent, or more of copper, and articles made of
that metal are not **old brass," within the
commercial meaning of that term. "Gompo-
sition scrap" is the commercial designation
which includes old cannon and various oth-
er articles made of composition metal, which
are dealt in by the old-metal trade. Do^;vn^
OliD-FIELD PJKB
7»
dilVJB OIL XN TINS
lag T. United Stoied, 122 IM. 446» 440, 68
G. a A. 427.
oxi]>-Fizx]> pnra
A timber deed, which oooT^yed all the
pine timber 10 inches and up, indndee every
kind of pine on the land, regardless whether
it is worth sawing, and so includes "old-
fleld pine," which is i^e that grows on land
that has been once farmed. Hearin t. Union
SawmiU Co, 151 a W. 1007, 1006, 106 Arte
406.
OLB UHE FOXJOT
A contract of life insurance whicb does
not unalterably fix the payments to be made
by the insured, and which makes the benefit
to be paid dependent upon the ooUectlen of
such assessments as may be neoessaiy, is an
assessment policy, an old-line policy being
one in which the premiums and the liability
incurred by the insurer are fixed and unal-
terable. Knott ▼. Seeurity Mut Life Ins.
Go., 144 8. W. 178, 188, 181 Mo. App. 679.
•
Where a policy provided that the price
of the insurance was calculated on the Amer-
ican Tables of Mortality, and that a certain
sum should be laid aside from the premiums
for the first two yean to make an emergen-
cy fund required by Rev. St 1809, | 7906,
and that, if the death rate should exceed
that estimated in the American Tables, an
assessment might be made to meet the emer-
gency, it was an *'old line life insurance poli-
cy,'* and not an assessment policy, defined by
section 7901 as one where the amount is de-
pendent on the collection of an itosessment on
persons holding similar contracts, and hence
the policy in question was within section
7890, declaring that no misv^Nresentation
should avoid a policy unless the matter rep-
resented should have actually contributed
to the contiligency or event on which the
policy was to become payable. Williams v.
at Louis Ut^ Ins. Go., 87 8. W. 499, 603,
189 Mo. 70.
OXiB WATER
Where benefits of an Irrigation system
were classified under two heads, one of "old
water,'* and the other of "new water," and
the term "old water^ referred to existing
water rights at the time of the purchase of
the canal, and "new water'* referred to rights
yet to be acquired by the enlargement of the
canal, and no benefits under the head of "old
water" were apportioned to plaintHTs land,
and the oanal had not been enlarged so as
to acquire any "new water," until such en-
largement occurred, or it was made to ap-
pear that the canal company had sufficient
water to suiH^ly plaintiiTs demand without
interfering with prior users, he could not ac-
quire a perpetual water right by the tem-
porary use of water from the canal when pri-
or users were not demanding their full rights. '
Gerber v. Nampa ft Meridian Ixr* Dist, U
Pae. 80, 84, 16 Idaho^ 1.
OLEOMARGARINE
Dealer in oleomargarine, see Dealer.
"Oleomargarine is a manufactured pnx
net made of oleo oil, neutral lard, milk id
cream, and pure butter, although pure botti
is not used in all grades, and butter and mS
and cream and other coloring matter is e^
dently used for the purpose of giving it tl
semblance of the true dairy product** Stai
V. Armour Packing Ckx, 100 N. W. 09, 80, 12
Iowa, 823, 2 Ann. Cas. 448.
Agricultural Law, Laws 1893, pi 6G0,
388, art 2, 1 20, defiines oleomargarine as si
article or substance in the semblance of bo
ter not the usual product of the dairy, an
not made ezdusiv^ at pue aad madnlte
ated milk or cream, or (2) any article or tn^
stance into which any oil, lard, or Cat n
produced from milk or cream enters ss
component part Section 26 (page 663), i
amended by Laws 1894, pi 870, c 426^ I^i
1807, p. 810, c. 768, and Laws 1902, p. 96
c. 385, provides that any person manufa
turing, selling, etc., any substance in imit
don or semblance of butter, shall be deesM
guilty of a violation of the agricultural U^
whether he sells such substance aa bnttx
oleomargarine, or under any oth^ name
designation whatsoever. Depositions i
which a warrant diarging a violation of ss
section 26 was issued showed that relat
sold an article called "Oleomargarine,'' ce
sisting of a small brick of white substan
wrai^ied in paper, and labeled "Oleoou
garine.*' There was no statement that tl
article imitated or was in semblance of m
ural butter. The chemist who analyzed i
substance deposed that it was not natar
butter, nor of the color of natural butt
produced from pure milk or cream, etc, b
was What Is commonly known aa oleoms
garine. Held, that the depositions negatiT<
the fact that the substance was an Imitatlc
or in semblance of natural butter, and di
proved the essential fiicts necessary to ooi
stitute the crime. People ex rel. McAulef
Wahle, 109 N. T. Supp. 629, 631, 124 Ap]
Div. 762.
OLIVE OIL
OLIVE OIL nr xjLRB
Construing Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c V
f 1, Schedule A, par. 40, 30 Stat 153, pn
viding (1) for oUve oU "in botUes. jars, diii
or similar packages," and (2) for *'oUve oi
not specially provided for," held, that oil 1
5-gallon tins, in which form it is not soli
to the ^nsumer but to hotels and retti
dealers, is not subject to the first provisioi
but to the latter. United States v. La U^
na, Aaema 4 iTaman, 154 Fed. 927.
OLIVES
728
ON— UPON
LIVES
LIVES nr JABS
Tariflf Act July 24. 1897. a 11. | 1,
hedule G. par. 264. 80 Stat 171. relating to
ives "In bottles. Jars or similar packages.*'
id '*in casks or otherwise than in bottles,
rs. or similar packages." does not import
I intention to make a division between
ives in retail packages and those in whole-
le packages, and that "olives in Jars" hold-
? 10 gallons are therefore within the first
these provisions. United States v. Shing
ion ft Ck>.. 173 Fed. 844, 846^
LIVES PREPARED
Ab f ndt. see Froit
LOGRAPHIC WILL
See Holographic WilL
MISSION
See WiUfol Omission.
"Omission" denotes a negative and in-
tion. Bandle v. Birmingham By... Light
Power Co., 53 South. 918, 921. 169 Ala. 314.
"Omission" is a correlative of duty. New
)rk Cent ft H. B. B. Ck>. v. United States.
6 Fed. 2Q7, 269. 92 0. 0. A. 831.
The act of a railroad company in closing
obstructing a drain so as to damage lands
id crops was an act of "commission'* and
t of "omission." Brown v. Liouisiana &
W. B. Co.. 42 South. 666. 118 La. 87.
Under St 1894. c. 889. requiring in case
omission to state the place of the injury,
e term "omission" means something more
an a failure to state the precise spot of
e accident with sufficient clearness. The
llure must be an omission patent on the
ce of the document Hence a notice of ac-
lent on a highway, stating that it occurred
bile driving along the F. road, leading
>m W.. about three or four miles from W.,
a point thereon on the F. side of the five
idges. is not within the statute. Tobln v.
habitants of Biimfleld. 65 N. B. 28. 182
EiSS. 117.
The violation by a corporation of the
ty imposed by the Employers* L4ability Act,
quiring all railroads to equip their cars
ed in interstate commerce with automatic
uplers. constituted an "omission," within
c meaning of Code 1896. § 27. giving a
jht of action to the personal representative
r the wrongful act. omission, or negligence
any person or corporation causing the
ath of intestate. Mobile. J. & K. O. R. C6.
Bromberg. 37 South. 395. 400» 141 Ala. 258.
ResUot dlstl»OTlibfwi
Set Neglect
OMUunoNS, HRouscrra, ard re^
FAUIiTS
An alderman, clothed with original crim-
inal jurisdiction by the town charter, who
failed to charge a person brought before
him with any offense under the charter, and
who tried him for an offense not embraced
within the charter, and who fined and im-
prisoned him for an offense of which he was
not tried in an orderly manner, and to which
he had not pleaded guilty, and who failed to
keep a record of his Judicial proceedings
was guilty of "omissions, neglects, and de-
faults." within Bev. Code 1852. as amended
to 1893. p. 697. c. 92. | 2, authorizing the
Judges of the superior court to punish the
contempt, omissions, neglects, and defaults of
enumerated offloera. In re TuU (DeL) 78 AtL
299. 300, 2 Boycc^ 126.
OMIT
See Neglect
Under Code Supp. 19to7. I 1386b. autJior-
izing the auditor to correct etrors in the as-
sessment list, and to assess for taxation any
omitted property on noticing the owner, etc..
taxable property is omitted from the assess-
nient roll where the assessor erroneously de-
cides that property subject to taxation is not
taxable and leaves it off the roll oh that ac-
count, as well as where through oversight or
ignorance of the existence of the property It
is omitted; the word "omit" meaning to let
fail, to leave out, not to insert or name, to
neglect to mention or to^peak of, as to "omU*'
an item from a list, etc. Talley v. Bi\Qwn. 125
N. W. 248. 253* 146 Iowa, 360. 140 Am. St
Bep^ 282.
ON— UPON
See As Upon the Trial; In or Upon; In.
Upon, or About; Lived Upon; Long
Oh; Squatted Ujion;' Standing or
Erected Upon.
The word "upon" is ordinarily synony-
mous with "on*' in all of its meanings; the
prefix "up" being almost eliminated. State
ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S. W. 40, 51,
241 Mow 433.
Where a note is payable on a fixed day,
and not "on or about" a fixed date, and the
debt6r makes payment before the maturity of
the note, he is not entitled, in the absence of
an agreement to the contrary, to Interest on
the payments from the time they are made
to the date on which the note is due. Black-
shear Mfg. Co. V. Stone. 7a S. B. 29, 30, 8 Oa.
App. 661.
While Jurisdiction of the courts of a
state extends only to things "on" a river, and
not to permanent structures attached to the
river bed within another state, it includes a
suit relating to floating structures used in
connection with fish nets in the river, al-
though anchored by means of weights. Co-
ON--UPOK
7544
o»r*-UPON
lumbia Biver FAcksn' Assli v. McGowan, 172
Fed. ©91, ©97.
In calling for the Oblo riTer as tlie north-
ern boundary of a magisterial district which
bordered on it, the designation of the begin-
ning point as "on the Ohio river" means that
the district line begins in the line of the
county on its northern shore. Commonwealth
T. Louisville & E). Packet Oo., 80 S. W. 154,
155, 117 Ky. 986.
In a conveyance the words "to," "on,"
"by," "at," "along," a nontidal stream pre-
sumptively carry title as far into the stream
as the grantor possesses. Leary v. Jersey
City, 189 Fed. 419, 428.
A conveyance of land bounding "on" a
way, where, as a matter of construction, the
granted premises do not stop at the side Hue,
goes to the line of the ownership of the
grantor. An owner laid out a passageway
along the easterly line of his tract. He sub-
sequently conveyed the tract by mortgage,
which described the land as "on a" way and
gave courses and distances. He subsequently
conveyed the way to a third person. Held,
that the mortgages operated to convey to the
center of the way, with a right of way over
the other half, and that the third person
had a half of the way, with a corresponding
right of way over the other half. Gould v.
Wagner, 82 N. E. 10, 11, 13, 196 Mass. 270.
In an action against a street railroad
company for personal injuries, an allegation
in the declaration that plaintiff was "on"
one of defendant's cars renders the count de-
murrable^ as plaintiff might have be^i on the
car as a trespasser; the action being based
on his legal presence on the car. Breese v.
Trenton Horse B. Co., 19 AU. 204, 206, 5^ N.
J. Law, 250.
"There iS' a long lin^ of uniform author-
ities that the words 'on,* 'when,' 'after,* 'from
and after,* and like expressions, used in a
devise of a remainder following a life estate,
do not afford sufficient ground in themselves
for adjudging that a remainder is contingent
and not vested, and that such words, unle^
their meaning is enlarged by the context,
are to be construed as relating merely to the
time of the enjoym^itof the estate, and not
to the time of its vesting aa int^est W)iere
nothing appears in the context of the will
whicii enlarges theae words, they do not of
themselves effect a postponement of the vest-
ing of the lemalnder until the death of the
life tenant" Davidson v. Jones, 98 N. T.
Supp. 265, 266, 112 Appu Div. 264 (citing Con-
nelly V. O'Brien, 60 N. B. 20, 166 N. Y. 406;
Hersee v. Simpson, 48 N. E. 890, 154 N. T.
496; Nelson v. Bussell, 31 N. B. 1008. 135
N. T. 137, Moore v. Lyons [N. Y.] 25 Wend.
119).
Adverbs of time, such as "upon," '*then,"
"from and after," etc., in tlie devise or be-
quest of a ririBlndgr limited x^ifoik life estate^
are construed to relate merely to the time of
enjoyment of the estate, and not to the time
of its vesting in interest Btapta v. Mead,
137 N. Y. Supp. 847, 850, 152 App. Div. 745.
The location of a depot at a point within
300 feet of the northern boundary of a town,
100 feet of its eastern boundary, and 1,450
feet from its sputhern boundary at the near-
est point, is not a location "on" the southern
limits of the town within the terms of a deed
delivered in escrow and conveying land in
consideration of such location. Bridgers t.
Beaman, 75 S. B. 798, 799, 159 N. a 521.
As used in Code dv. Proc. | 847, as It
stood prior to 1897, requiring that Judgment
be rendered upon the coming in of the re-
port of sale, the word "upon" does not mean
"immediately upon." Hence a defld^acy
Judgment in a foreclosure suit, under such
statute, was not erroneous because not ren-
dered immediately upon the coming in of the
report of sale, where entered at the term at
which confirmation was had. Crary t. Buck,
95 N. W. 839, 840, 1 Neb. (Unof .) 596.
As after
As used in a will directing the payment
of certain indebtednesses "upon" the death
of testator's wife, the word "upon" meant
immediately after. Brown v. Ferren, 68 Atl.
870, 73.N.H. 6.
In section 2330, Rev. Codes 1906» relat-
ing to the division of counties, the word
"upon** means afiw, or following, and the
section makes the qualli^lng of the commis-
sioners a cpndition precedent to clothing the
new county with legal existence. The word
"fornM^" mesAs and relates only to the area
of the county and has no reference to a
county equipped with means of government,
and therefore the voters are legal voters at
a primary held before tile appointment of
the commissioners. Murray v. Davis, 128
N. W. 305, 306, 21 N. D. 64.
Where a lease recited that the lessee had
hired a store in the course of erection "on"
a lot described, it was held that the word
"on" could not be read as "and," and that
the building only was demised. Klie v. Yon
Broock, 37 Atl. 469, 472, 56 N. J. Bq. 18.
As at the tiiite of
A claiise in a will devising property to
testator's grandchildren "upon the death" of
their mother does not Indicate an Intention
to postpone the vesting of the remainder to
the date of the mother's death, ins^d of
from the date of testator's death, but merely
refers to the time when the remaindermen
shall come into the ^Joyment of the est'^te.
Archer v. Ja^iobs, 101 N. W.. 195, 199, J25
Iowa, 467.
A remainder is notf to be considered con-
tingent where it may be vested consistently
with the intent oft^dtalor, and the words
"after" and "upon the death ot" and like
ON— UPON
726
ON AND AJFTKB,
words, do not make a conttDgency, but merely
indicate when the remainder ehall take effect
In poBBesBlon. Clark v. Peters, 124 N. Y.
Supp. 961» 962» 68 Misc. Bep. 252.
A win gave part of testator's estate in
trust for his brother, providing that "upon
his death" the property should be conTeyed
to another. Held, that the use of the word
"upon," followed by directions to conrey,
Indicates that, until the contingency named
should happen, there was to be no vesting.
In re Keogh, 85 N. Y. Supp. 191, 196, 47 Misc.
B^. 37.
The word ''upon," as used in a bond in
which the condition is that if within one
year, upon request and payment of a certain
sum, the obligor shall make and execute a
valid deed of a piece of land, is eguivalent in
meaning to the words "at the time of," and
requires the obligor to execute his deed withr
in a reasonable time after request made and
money piald or tendered, if done, within a
year. Brown v. Glough, 39 Me. 566, 568.
Omiditlon . pveoedent
The words ''on payment," in a contract
of sale providing that, ''on payment" of the
contract price and interest, the vendor would
execute and deliver a warranty deed of the
said premises, make the conditions of the
contract concurrent as to time and dependent,
so that the payment ot the money is a
condition precedent to the delivery of the
deed which is Intended by the parties to take
place at the same time.. ?unt v. Lake, 97
N. Y. Supp. 298, 299, 48 Misc. Eep. 570.
As oontiffBonSy near to» or fit
When used as indicating relative situa-
tion, "on" means at, near, or adjacent to,
without Implying contact or support O'Mata
v. Jensma, 121 N. W. 518, 519, 143 Iowa, 297.
The word "on" in Laws 1905, p. Il4,
making it unlawful for a' person to be in an
intoxicated condition on any public street or
highway. Is not synonymous with "near,"
and one could not be convicted under the act
for being Intoxicated on a porch or shed of a
store, within 15 to 30 feet of a pubHc road.
Hutchinson v. State, 70 d. E>. 63, 65, 8 Oa.
App. 684.
Where a deed described the land as lot
10, of block V of the Mott tract, "the same
being the lot on the corner of First street on
the east side of F. street, being 65 feet front
by 165 feet deep," and a map of the Mott
tract showed lot 10 of block V, as a lot front-
ing 60 feet on F. street with a depth of 165
feet, and as located 60 feet from First street,
and lot 9 of the same dimensions lying be-
tween it and First street, and fronting on
F. street, the quoted words did not render
the description uncertain as inconsistent with
the other description, for the word "on" In
the quoted . description might be construed
as equivalent to "near to" or "at," as simply
denoting proximity. Hall v. Bartlett, 112
Pac. 176, 178, 158 CaL 638.
Aslm or diuriay
The word "on" is often given the mean-
ing of "in" or "during," and this meaning is
well recognised when used to designate a
date or calendar division of time, and is al-
ways its meaning when used with reference
to a named day. Henry v. Lovenberg (Tex.)
128 S. W. 675, 676.
As oa svrfftoo of
Under Rev. St 1899, | 6116^ providing
that before granting any franchise for con-
structing and operating an elevated, under-
ground, or other street railroad "on," "over,"
or under any street or alley, etii., the word
Vover" means "over," and can only apply
to elevated roads; and "under" means be-
neath," and can refer only to underground
roads; and "on" means "on," and can only
ref 6r to a surface road on the street Ruck-
ert V. Grand Ave. Ry. Oo., 68 .8. W. 8U» 818,
163 Mo. 260.
As over
An indictment; alleging that accused
practicing medicine without a license treat-
ed a patient, and that the . treat^ient con-
sisted in physical, manipulations with ac-
cused's hands "over" the patient, is sustained
by proof that accused placed his hands "up-
on" the patient and rubbed and nianlpulated
his hands "upon" his body; the words "up-
on" and "over" being synonymous. Milling
V. Statte (Tex.) 150 S. W. 484. 436.
Wlieoa syaoiijmows
The wMdci "on or upon," wben affecting
the -qualitr of an estate in nsference to the
time of its vesting or enjoyment, are synony-
mous with "when." In bequests tfC personal
property^ these words usnaUy import a condi-
tion, and, unless explained nr Controlled Isy
ao^e expressiens ot other pifovtsloiis ofthte
will, they are annexed as conditions prece-
dents to the gift and render thelntedrest con-
tingent While several modem text-writers
and many dedsions seem to give these words
the same significance in reference to de^ses
of real, and bequests of personal, property,
the older authorities hold that in respect to
realty tbey import usuaUy a condition subse-
quent determinative . of the estate according
to the terms of the conditioBO, and that la the
meantime the estat^d would vest. But all of
the authorities are agreed that both, as to
real and personal property they may be so
explained and controlled by other expressions
ajQd. provisions of the will that tbey do not
Import a condition at all, but simply refer
to the time of enjoyment, and that the in-
terest conferred will vest at the testator's
death to be possessed and enjoyed at the
time Indicated. Hooker v. Bry^n, 53 S. E.
130, 131, 140 N. C. 402,
Olf AKD AFI^R
The provision' in section 33, Tariff Act
July 27, 1897, c. 11, 30 Stat 213,' that "on
and after" that date merchandise previously
ON AKD AFTER
726
OK OR ABOUT
iDPorted Bhould be subjeeted to the duties
Imposed by said act, is not limited to mer-
chandise imported prior to tbat date^ but ap-
plies also to that imported on that day. John
B. BUlBon & Sons ▼. United States, 186 Fed.
960, 972, 978.
Where certain guaranties ot payment ex-
pressly applied to all goods sold on credit
*'on and after" their dates from time to time,
and for any balance or balances of account
of such goods, induding interest thereon "af-
tmr maturity," and which were made to con-
tinue until notice of their discontinuance of
further liability thereon, given by the sub-
scribers in writing to the seller, the guaj^-
anties were continuing, notwithstanding the
amount of the liability was limited, and were
applicable to all future sales made prior to
notice of discontinuance. Bond r. John V.
FarweU Cio., 172 Fed. fi8, 66, 96 a a A. 546.
ON OB ABOUT
An admission that a notice was served
"on or about" June 16, 1906, cannot be con-
strued as an admission that the notice was
served June 15th or prior thereto. Hope v.
Scranton & Lehigh Goal Co., 106 N. T. Supp.
372, 378, 120 App. Div. 506.
A contract for the sale of calendars, con-
taining the name of the buyer and matter
advertising his business as insurance agent,
stipulated that the calendars should be ship-
ped by freight and delivered f. o. b. cars "on
or about" November 1st On December 8th,
following, the seller shipped the goods by
express, and the buyer received them 6 days
later. It would take a package from 8 to 22
days to be earried by freight field, that
time was of the essence, and the seller failed
to deliver in time. Brown & Bigelow v.
Bard, 118 N. Y. Supp. 871, 874, 64 Misc. Rep.
249.
Where a note is payable on a fixed day,
and not "on or about" a fixed date, and the
debtor makes paymoit before the matuitty
of the note, he is not entitled, in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary, to interest
on the payments from the time th^ are
made to the date on which the note Is due.
Blackshear Mfg. Oo. y. Stone, 70 8. B. 29,
80, 8 Ga. App. 6ftl.
"Among the meanings of the word
'about,' as given in Webster's Dictionary, are
'concerning;* *wlth regard to;* *on account
of;' 'touching.' " Acts 1898, p. 1169, c 602,
subjecting eveir building to a lien for the
payment of debts contracted for work done
"on or about" the same, eliminates the right
of a lien for materials furnished for a build-
ing, and gives a lien for labor only. A sub-
contractor agreed with the principal contrac-
tor to "carve, furnish the models, and ^ • •
erect in place and finish all the exterior
marble work" for a building. The material
was taken to the subcohtractor's yard, where
stonecutters put the stones into proper shape.
The stones were then loaded on cars and
transported to tte side ef the boUdl
where they were unloaded, and then bm
from the sidewalk and placed hi the bm
in proper place. Held, that the scbcoDtnt
fnmlahed work "on or abour the Iraildi
within the act Svans Marble Go. t. Im
national Trust Co., 60 Aa 667, 672, 101 ]
210, 109 Am. St Rep. 568^ 4 Ann. Ga&hSL
Comp. Laws, f 10,714, require the im
of a dalm of mechanic's lien within 60 di
of tbe time of furnishing the hut m&teil
A claim was filed on April dOth, 8tatin?il
the last materials were furnished on or abi
March 3d. Held, that as the phnae '^
about" is a relative term, not showing d
nitely when the materials were foniM
and as the claim showed on its face that i
last materials were furnished tt least
days before lioi filed, it was not a comi
ance with the statute Godfrey Lamber
y. Kline, IBS N. W. 528, 529, 167 Mia \
(quoting 6 Words and Phrases, pu 4m.
Im etvU pUadiasTS
There is no fatal variance between
allegation that a contract was made **m
about September, 1905," and proof tbat
was entered into on October the same yf
Kerr v. Blair. 105 8. W. 548, 561, 47 7
Civ. App. 406.
There is no variance between a a
plaint in trover alleging that the conrers
occurred on or about October 18th aod
proof that it occurred on October 21st Bl
V. Riddle, 57 South. 382, 383, 3 Ala. A
292 (citing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 490^
Im imdiotmenta or iiaformmtioiu
Charging that the offense was commit
"on or about" a certain day is indefinite t
uncertain, and is fatal upon motion in
rest of judgment Morgan v. State, 40 Sot
828, 829, 51 Fla. 70^ 7 Ann. Caa 773.
The words "on or about," in an ind
ment alleging that defendant "did, o^
about the 1st day of April, 190V' cocu
the offense charged, do not render the ido:
and the year* as well as the day, unceru
The meaning of the language to tlie geoe
understanding is that the time of tbe ai
was near the 1st day of April in tlie y<
1901. There is no uncertainty as to i
year. The words "April, 1901," mean Af
in the year 1901, and no resource of Ingeo
ty can make them mean anything else.
averment in this language is of a time wltl
the year, and if any day within the year n:
be proved the allegation is sufficient
averment of time in an indictment Is a n^
ter of form, not generally material, and.
view of Rev. St f 1025, which provides tt
no indictment shall be deemed Insuffideot
reason of any defect in matter of form oc
as well as under the Oregon statute, adopt
by rule in the f^eral courts in tbat sU
which provides that the precise time dJ
not be stated, an indictment alleging c
time of commission of the offense as on
OK OR ABOUT
727
ON OR BSFORE
it a day named is suffldent, except in
9 where the time is an ingredient of the
use. United States v. McKinley, 127 Fed.
171.
The common understanding of the words
or about," when used in connection with
^finite point of time, is tliat they do not
the time at large, but indicate that it is
gd with approximate accuracy. An indict-
t under Rer. St { 3883, as amended by
Sept 26, 1888, c 1089, i 2, 25 Stat 486,
depositing an obscene, lewd, and lascivi-
letter in the malls, is not bad because
lleged that the offense was committed "on
Lbout" a given date^ where it shows that
a short tim» elapsed between the writing
he letter and the finding of the indict-
it ; the defect being one of form only, by
ch the defendant was not prejudiced, and
t>e disregarded under Rev. St i 1025.
ker V. United States, 151 Fed. 755, 757. 81
:. A 379.
OB ABOUT THE PREMISES
The Alabama statute provides that it
11 be unlawful for any person without a
use to sell vinous or spirituous liquors
ny quantity, if the same is drunk ''on or
ut the premises." This statutory prohl-
on embraces places over which the seller
no legal right to exercise authority or
trol, but which are so near his premises,
so situated In relation thereto, that they
within the mischief intended to be rem^
1; but where the liquor is taken by the
crhaser, in the quart measure of the seller,
I place OA the opposite side of the street,
of view of the seller's house, about fifty
; distant therefrom, and in front of an-
er store, and is there drunk, the court
not assome, as a legal conclusion, that
ti place is within the statute. Basterling
ttate^ 80 Ala. 46» 4&
ORBBFOBE
See, also, Before.
A written contract for the exchange of
perty, which provides that property is tp
conveyed subject to an, incumbrance, due
or before" two years, means that tb» in-
ibrance will mature in two years, but may
paid at any time on or before maturity,
enck V. Ballon, 97 N. B. 704, 705, 253 111.
, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 251 (citing 6 Words
i Phrases, p. 4967).
In an admission that a note sued on was
drsed by the several defendants '*on or be-
i negotiation," the words "on or before"
luded **after," and the word "negotiation"
lified delivery, that term being generally
criptive of all those acts by which a note
}ill is put into circulation or passed in its
Illation, including delivery in issue, trans-
by delivery, or transfer by Indorsement
n^ard Knapp & €k>. v. Tidewater Ooal Ck>.,
^tL 1063, 1066^ 85 Conn. 147.
An indictment alleging that the theft
occurred "on or before" the 21st day of July
was not fiitally defective because not show-
ing that the offense was committed within
the period of limitation; the state being re-
quired to prove that the offense was commit-
ted within the period of the limitation count-
ing from the time the indictment was re-
turned by the grand Jury. Presley v. State,
131 S. W. 332, 333, 60 Tex. Cr. B. 102.
A negotiable note on which the maker in-
dorsed after it was barred by limitations "on
or before the year 1904 I promise to pay
within note" became due and payable not
later than January 1, 1904; the words "on or
before" as used in notes meaning immediate-
ly at or any time in advance of the date
named. Lovenberg v. Henry, 140 S. W. 1079,
1080, 104 Tex. 560; Henry y. Lovenberg,
(Tex.) 128S. W.675.
Under a contract to sell potatoes to be
delivered on or before November 1st under
which the buyer was to furnish cars and was
entitled to determine when the potatoes
should be delivered, giving the natural and
ordinary interpretation to the phrase "on or
before," the seller was entitled to such sea-
sonable notice of the arrival of the cars as
would enable him, by the use of reasonable
diligence, to complete the transportation and
delivery on November 1st and was not re-
quli^, wheh notified on November 1st that
the cars were ready to Commence hauling
and continue hauling and loading on that
and succeeding days, where it would have
been impossible for him to complete the de-
livery on November 1st Pinkham v. Haynes,
68 Atl. 642, 644, 168 Me. 112 (Leader v.
Plants, 60 Atl. 54, 95 Me. 841, 85 Am. St Rep.
415; In re Public Road in Middlesex and
Monmouth Counties, 4 N. J. Law. 290).
As renderins note aonneBeiialile .
A note payable "on or before" a certain
date is valid as a negotiable Instrument
Lovenberg v. Henry, 140 S. W. 1079, 1081,
104 Tex. 550; Cunnln^am V. McDonald, 83
S. W. 372, 374, 98 Tex. 316.
A note payable "on or before" a certain
date is negotiable. The maker of such note
has the right to pay before the date named,
but the holder cannot demand payment be-
fore that day. National Bank of Commerce
V. Kenney, 83 S. W. 368, 371, 98 Tex. 293.
As sivins option ma to ;^yment of note
or otKer obUgatipn
The words "pn or before," in an instru-
ment payable on or before a certain date,
gives the obligor the right to pay at his op-
tion any time before the date. Henry v.
Lane, 128 Fed. 243, 252, 62 0. 0. A 625 (cit-
ing KlktDdal V. MltcheU, 14 Fed. Cas. 468, 2
McLean, 402).
Where the owner of lots wrote reel es-
tate agents that he would sell the lots for
a given price, so much cash and the balance
ON^ Oil NEAR
728
ON ANY MILIiSITJE, ETC.
on long ilm^ the agentd were not alithorlzed
to sell on terms whereby notes mnning from
one to tiv^ years, given by the purchaser fbi'
the t)alance, were payable *\mi or before*' cer-
tain dates, nie quoted words placed in each
of the notes gave the maker the privilege of
paying them at any time he^ might choose,
and they did not comply with the terms of
the authority, because they were not long-
time notes. Colvin v. Blandiard, 106 S. W.
323, 325, 101 Tex. 23L
ONOBNEAB
Bee Property On or Near Premisea
QV ACCEPTING THIS OPTION
The .first clause of an <H)tlon contract for
the sale of bonds provided that, in case "this
option is nccepted" by. defendant, plaintiff
would endeavor to procure the sale and de-
livery of $50,000 more of the same kind of
bonds or such part thereof as he could obtain
control of at the same price. The second
clause declared, 'In case this option is takeo^
up as hereinafter provided," plaintiff agreed
to sell at a certain price stock of the com-
pany that issued the. bonds. The third qlause
contained an agreement of plaintiff to sell
certain other bonds of the same kind at the
same price **in case this option is accepted"
by defendant; . and the seventh clause de-
clared that it was expressly understood .that
defendant was to purchase^ "on accepting
this option," $20,000 of said bonds, the pro-
ceeds to be applied to a particular purpose.
Held, that the Words ''on. accepting this op-
tion," in the seventh clause, did not mean
tliat defendant was bound to purchase such
bonds on the delivery and acceptance of the
paper containing the option, but only on his
election to purchase the bonds specified in
the first clause. Martyn v. Hitchings, 78 N.
E. 380; 381, 192 Massi'Tt
ON ACCOUNT OF
"A 'payment on account of the accident*
means a payment because of accident, and
may be either on account or tn full settle-
ment" Wallner v. Chicago Consol. Traction
Co.. 01 N. E. 1053, 1055. 245 111. 148.
In an assignment of all claims or causes
of action for or "on account of," in trespass
upon certain real estate, the words "on ac-
count or* doubtless mean by reason of. A
cause of action in trover f6r the conversion
of logs previously crat by a trespasser certain-
ly seems to be a cause of action resulting "by
reason ef the initial trespass. The conver-
sion is a natural and legitimate result of the
trespass. Dulibar v. Montreal River Lumber
Co., 106 N. W. 88d, 390, 127 Wis. 130.
Plaintiff having sued two corporations
Jointly for injuries alleged to have occurred
in a collision between a street car of defend-
ant traction company and a train belonging
to defendant railroad company, received from
the railroad company, $1,000 "on account of^
his injury, and dismissed the suit as to it.
testifying that he had no further clalma
against the railroad company. Held, that the
W0T6a ''on account of" tHnoxM be coMtrued
to mean "because of the accident," and* ^d
not indicate a partial payment rather than a
full settlement, and th&t the proofs- tMeretom,
showed a full payment and release of one of
two Joint tort-feasors. Wallner v. Qhioago
ConsoL Traction Co., 91 N. B. 1058» 106%
245 IlL 14&
ON AND HUNO
Provision in a building contract that the
third payment thereon should be made "when
trim is on and dbora hung" in practice refer
to a stage of the work and are given a liber-
al construction. It is not necessary for com-
pliance therewith that all the trim be on and
doors hung, because in practice son)^ of the
doors are left unhung, although prepared to
be hung for convenience in the work. Yeitch
V. Clark, 57 Atl. 272, 273, 67 N. J. Bq. 67.
ON ANT CONSIDERATION
Under Rev. Pen. Code, I 618, making it
ail offense tp buy or receive in any manner,
"upon any consideration," property, knowing
that it has been stolen, the gist of the offense
is the buying or receiving with such knowl-
edge, and an information is not bad for omit-
ting to allege that the property was bought
or received "upon ainy consideration"; that
phrase being synonymous with "any motive"
or "for any cause." State v. Plrkey, 118 N.
W. 1042, 1044, 22 S, D. 550, 13 Ann. Ca& 192.
ON ANT UELIAtn, ETC.
B« A O. Comp. I 5668, as amended by
Laws 1907, p. 294, ikrovides that, when two or
more mines are claimed by the same person
or persons and worked through a common
shaft or tunnel or at one mill, or Miet red«e-
tlon works, then all the ipines, and all roads,
tramways, trails* flumes, dltch^es, or pipe
lines, buildings, irtructures, or superilruc-
tnres used or owned in connection therei^^th,
shall be deemed one mine. Held, that the
words "roads, tramways, trails, flumes, ditch-
es or pipe lines." include sudi appurtenances
when not situated upon the mine, and that the
term **upon any millsite or mill used, owned,
or operated in connection with such mine,**
in such section, prior to its amendment, had
reference to ttie millsite or mill not situated
on the mine; the section as amended neces-
sarily including the millsite or mlllB connect*
ed with the mine, without being specifically
mentioned, so that a miner's lien notice need
not state nor the proofs show that the labor
for which the lien is claimed has been done
on the mill or buikling on the mine to sub-
ject them to the lien. Washburn v. Inter-
Mountain Mining Co., 109 Pac 882, 886^ 56.
Or. 578, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 857.
OK ANT UNDSBSTAKDING .
729
ON THE CUBB
OH Ainr UHDEBSTAHBZHO OB
AOBEEMENT
Under Pen. Code, i 118 (Penal Law, f
2440; Consol. Laws, c. 40), making it a felony
to give or offer to' a witness, or one abont to
be called as a witness, any bribe upon any
understanding or agreement that his testi-
mony shall be thereby influenced, or to at-
tempt by any other means fraudulently to in-
duce any witness to give false testimony, the
essence of the crime is the understanding un-
der which the money was given to a prospec-
tive witness and not the giving of the money;
the words "upon any understanding or agree-
ment;;" and "attempts fraudulently to in-
duce," being equivalent to **wlth the intent"
People ▼. Kathan, 120 N. T. Supp. 1090, 1099,
136 App. Div. 303.
OK APFROVAI.
In a receipt given by a dealer in dia-
monds to S. & Co. for a pair of diamond ear
knobs, "on approval to show to my cus-
tomers, said knobs to be returned to said S.
A Co. on demand/' the expression "on ap*
proval," as ordinarily interpreted, was not
Inconsistent with a mere authority '"to show"
nor with an obligation *'to return on de-
mand," and parol evidence was admissible to
show that, in the diamond trade, such words
took a recognized meaning and were under-
stood, not to confer a power to sell, but au-
thority merely to show diamonds to a cus-
tomer and report to the owner. Smith v.
Clews, 21 N. £. 160, 162, 114 N. Y. 190, 4 K
B. A 392, U Am. St Rep. 627.
ON ABBIVAIi
Under the federal pure food act of 1906
(Act June 80, 1906, c. 3810, 34 Stat 768), for-
bidding the introduction of misbranded or
adulterated liquors into one state from anoth-
er, such liquors are removed from the opera-
ti<m of the commerce clause of the federal
Constitution, and become subject to the laws
of the state upon arrival within its territory
and before delivery to the consignee. State
T. Intoxicating Liquois, 76 AtL 268, 269, 106
Ma 136.
The expression "upon arrival In such
state," as used in Act Cong. Aug. 8, 1890, c
728, 26 Stat. 313, providing that Uquors
transported into any state shall, "upon ar-
rival in such state," be subject to the opera-
tion of the laws of such state to the same
extent as though they had been produced in
such state, means neither on entrance within
the state borders, nor on delivery to the con-
signee but on reaching Its destination. Hud-
son V. State, 101 Pac. 276, 279, 2 OkL Or. 176.
IjawB 1900, c 20, fl 4« 8^ as amended by
lisws 1906» c. 478, and Laws 1907, c 666, pro-
hibit.the possession of deer between certain
dates, eta, and provide that, such possession
by a common canier unaccompanied by the
owner shall constitate violatioA of .ttae law.
Section 141, added by Laws 1902, c 194,, pro*
vides that, whenever in this act the posses-
sion of game is prohibited, reference is had
equally to such game coming from without
the state as to that taken within the state.
Lacey Act May 26, 1091, c. 663, t 6, 31 Stat
188, provides that game transported into any
state shall, upon arrival therein, be subject
to the laws of such state, to the same extent
as though it had been there produced. Held
that, in view of the latter statute, the provi-
sions of the state statute do not attach to a
shipment of foreign game while in transit,
in possession of a common carrier, and until
its arrival at the point of destination and de-
livery there to the consignee. People v.
Fargo, 122 N. Y. Supp. 663, 666, 137 App.
Div. 727.
ON BOARD
A marine policy, insuring "freight on
board, or not on board," valued at £2,062, or
actual freight, if more, "full interest admit-
ted, the policy being deemed sufficient proof
of interest," should be construed to cover
the freight at risk at the valuation spedfled^
though the freight actually at risk was much
less in value. Where a marine policy in-
sured "freight on boa^rd, or not on board,"
valued at a specified sum, or actual freight
if more, full interest admitted, and of the ac-
tual freight insured lost the whole, except a
small salvage, there having been no abandon-
ment, the percentage of actual freight lost
should have been applied to the value in the
policy. New York 4b Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v.
Boyal Bzch. Assur., 164 Fed. 316, 318, 83 C.
C. A 236 (citing Am. In& f 339; Adams v.
Pennsylvania Ins. Co. [Pa.l 1 Rawle, 97; De
Longuemere v. Phoenix Ins. Co. [N. Y.] 10
Johns, 127; Same v. New York Fire Ins.
Co. [N. Y.l 10 Johna 201; Minturn v. War-
ren Ins. Co., 2 Allen [84 Mass.] 86).
OK CASH 8AIJS
See Cash Sale.
OK A OOKTIKOEKOT
See Contingency.
OK OONVIOTXOK
The words "upon conviction,*' In P. L.
1906, p. 199, providing that, wh^« the holder
of a liquor license shall sell liquor contrary
to the act, his license shall thereby **upon con-
viction" become forfeited and void, refer
to the fbrfelture, and it i^ not necessary that
a petition for the revocation of a license
should. state that the person complained of
had been convicted of the offenses charged.
Davis V. Kepp, 76 Aa 169, 170, 79 N. J. Law,
394.
OK THE OUBB
• A sale of stock *V>n the curb" is a sale
in tbe roadway neiM^ the sidewalk in Broad
street in the dty of New York,. where brokers
gather and dsj^l in seQUxltied which are not
ON DEMAND
730 ON THE EXPRESS AGBEEMENT
listed at the New Tork Stock Exchange.
Content v. Banner, 76 N. Sk 918, 184 N. Y.
121, 6 Ann. Ga& lOe.
OK DEMAKD
Ia bills* aotei, or bonds
In a note payable "on demand," the word
"demand" Is not a part of the contract, but
is used to show that the debt is due. Van
VUet T. Kanter, 119 N, Y. Supp. 187, 188,
es Misc. Rep. 48.
The term ''payable on demand" in a bill
imports that the debt is already due, so that
limitation begins to run from the date.
Ck)ok V. Carpenter, 61 Ati. 799, 803, 212 Pa.
165, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 900, 108 Am. St Rep.
854, 4 Ann. Cas. 723.
An instrument which acknowledges an
indebtedness from the maker to a person
named and which promises to pay a specified
sum to such person, "and in the event of my
(maker*s) death, I hereby authorize and di-
rect the payment of the same out of the funds
of my estate," is a promissory note payable
on demand, within Negotiable Instruments
Law (Consol. Laws 1909, c. 38) H 26, 29. de-
claring that an instrument is payable on
demand when no time for payment is ex-
pressed, etc.; the quoted clause being sur-
plusage. Gilbert y. Adams, 131 N. Y. Supp.
787, 788, 146 App. Div. 864.
ON DEMAND AFTER DATE
A note payable to the order of the maker
"on demand after date** at a bank designated
is a note payable on demand, within Nego-
tiable Instrument Law (Laws 1897, p. 728, c
612, § 26), declaring that a note is payable
on demand where it is expressed to be pay-
able on demand, or in which no time for pay-
ment is expressed, and is not a note payable
at a determinable future time, within sec-
tion 23 (page 722), providing that a note is
payable at a determinable future time which
is expressed to be payable at a fixed period
after date^ etc., and it must be presented foe
payment within a reasonable time after its
issue, as expressly required by section 131
(page 736). Schlesinger r. Schultz, 96 N. Y.
Supp. 383, 386, UO App. Diy. 356.
ON DEPOSIT
The words "on deposit," in the writing
as follows: "Received of L. $1,600 on de-
posit in national currency" — have a well-
known meaning and imply a promise to pay
upon presentation, where no other date of
payment is fixed. Lewis v. Norris, 103 Pac.
134, 135, 80 Kan. 620 (quoting Long v. Straus,
6 N. E. 123, 7 N. E. 763, 107 Ind. 94. 67 Am.
Rep. 87.
ON DUTY
An employe is "on duty** within the
statute making it unlawful for any inter*
state carrier to require or permit any em-
ploy 6 to be or remalib on duty for a longes
time than 16 consecutive hours, where he Is
at his post in obedience to rules or require-
ments of his superior and ready and willing
to work, whether actually at work or await-
ing orders, or the removal of hindrances from
any cause, and the limitation of time of con-
tinuous servioe when applied to trainmen
includes the time of duty preceding and
subsequent to the time of service in actual
operation of trains, as required by the rules
of the employment United States v. Chi-
cago, M. & P. S. R. Go., 195 Fed. 783, 786.
The exprecBion "on duty," as used In
the Hours of Service Law, othecwise known
as the Sixteen-Hour Law, of March 4, 1907
(chapter 2989, 34 Stat 1415, 1416), means «to
be actually engaged in work or to be charg-
ed with present responsibility for such should
the occasion for it arise." United States
V. Denver & R. Q. R. CJo., 197 Fed. 629, 631.
Act March 4, 1907, c. 2939, | 2, 34 Stat
1415, provides that it shall be unlawful for
any common carrier subject to the act to re-
quire or permit any employ^ subject thereto
to be or remain on duty for a longer period
than 16 consecutive hours, and whenever
such employ^ has been continually on duty
for 16 hours he shall be relieved, and not re-
quired or permitted again to go on duty until
he has had at least 10 consecutive hours off
duty; and no such employe who has been on
duty 16 hours in the aggregate in any 24-hour
period shall be required or permitted to con-
tinue or again go on duty without having
had at least 8 consecutive hours off duty.
The act further provides in section 1 that
the term "employes" as used in the act,
shall be held to mean persons actually en-
gaged in or connected with the movement
of any train. Held, that where an interstate
carrier had a rule requiring engineers to re-
port 30 minutes before leaving time, duiin?
which they were required to overlook their
engines in preparation for the trip, to see
that they were properly oiled and the brakes
O. K., and to connect the englnees with their
trains, the time so occupied constitutes a
part of their time of duty; and this though
it was the custom of the carrier not to strict-
ly enforce the rule. United States v. IUinol»
Cent R. Ck>., 180 Fed. 630, 631.
ON EITHER SIDE
See Run Upon Bither Side.
ON THE EXFBES8 AGREEMENT
Where a deed provided that it was "upon
the express agreement** of the grantee to
build or cause to be built on the premises,
within six months, a dwelling house to cost
not less than $1,500, which agreement was
considered as a part of the consideration
for the conveyance, sndi' provision constitat-
ed a mere personal covenant on the part of
the grantee, and was not a oonditton subse-
quent, authorizing a forfeiture for nonper-
formanoe. Hawley v. Kaflt% 8S Pac. 248^
ON THB FARM
781
ON HAND
249» 148 CaL 3d3, 3 L. a. A. (N. S.) 741, 113
Am. St Sep. 282.
OXr THE FABM
Where the judgment debtor aBA his
fSamily lived on land belonging to his wife
and her coheirs in IndlviBlon, and his sons
cnltlyated the land under an agreement by
^hlch they receired the surplus of the cotton
after the sappUes were paid for, and plain-
tiff received the other products for the sup-
port of the fftmily, corn, hay, and cane raised
on the land belonged to the debtor atnd were
"on the farm" within the law, so as to ex-
empt from sehBure upon execution; the law
not requiring that the farm belong to the
person claiming the exemption. Hlnton t.
Roane, 60 South. 798, 799, 124 La. 027, 134
Am. St Bep. 62a
onfujb
The withdrawal of the deposition of a
party from the flies of the state circuit
court where the action was begun for use on
the trial of the action in the federal court
after removal to the federal court does not
prevent the use of the deposition on a subse-
quent trial within Bums' Ann. St 1908, { 456,
permitting the use of depositions provided
they remain "on file" from the time the for-
mer action was dismissed until the time at
which it was proposed to use them in a sub-
sequent action. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v.
Huffman, 97 N. E. 434, 437, 177 Ind. 126.
ON Fllf AI. BISTBIBimOK
Testator bequeathed to a daughter a cer-
tain sum "to be paid out of my residuary es-
tate upon final distribution." In a subse-
quent section of the will he left the residue
of his estate in trust, and provided that the
income should be paid to his wife during her
natural life or while she remained unmarried
for her maintenance ahd the education and
maintenance of two daughters, and that
when said daughters arrived at lawful age,
the trustees were requested to convey to each
of them a moiety of the property in their
handa Held, that the phrase, "upon final
distribution," did not mean upon final dis-
tribution of the personal estate made pur-
flfuant to order of the probate court, but
referred to the final distribution on the com-
ing of age of the two daughters who were
to take the property left in trui^t. McDevltt
T. Hibben, 123 111. App. 438, 441; Id., 77 N.
B. 586, 221 lU. 234.
-ON nB£
A marine policy contained a clause,
••Warranted free from particular average,
unless the vessel or craft or the interest
insured be stranded, sunk, or on fire." The
libel alleged that on November 18th, while
the ship was lying In port and before dis-
charge, a fire broke out in the after 'tween-
decks of the ship and burned the bulkhead
forward of the lazarette, the door thereof,
and a considerable portion of dunnage, and
other parts of the ship. An exhibit, quoting
from the ship's, psotest, recited that the mas-
ter, on the alarm being given, went below
through the lazarette and saw the reflection
of the flre over the top of the bulkhead be-
tween the after 'tween-decks and the laza-
rette, which were then full of cargo, and
that after considerable trouble the flre was
extinguished with considerable damage. It
was held that the words "on flre," as used in
the particular average clause, were not
synonymous with the word "burnt," contain-
ed in former policies, but were indicative
of a happening Whereby the ship was en-
dangered by actual flre burning some part
of it, necessitating extraordinary efforts to
prevent serious damage, and that under such
definition, the libel was not subject to ex-
ception as stating a loss from which the in-
surer was exempted by the particular aver-
age clause as matter of law. Pacific Creosot-
ing Co. V. Thames & Mersey Mfarine Ins.
Co., 184 red. 947, 949.
on THE OBOUND
Under a contract to conduct a dremi
for four days, entitling the amusement com-
pany to draw on funds derived from advance
sales of tickets when the show was "on the
ground,** the show was "on the ground" when
the * paraphernalia arrived at the* show
grounds and the actors at their lodgings, and
the equitable title to part of funds then vest-
ed in the company*is assignee, so as to pre-
clude the other party, who had knowledge
of the assignment, from defeating the as-
signee's rights by paying, with the company's
consent, money due the actors, who refused
to perform unless paid in advance. Brindze
V. Atlantic City Policemen's Beneficial Ass*n,
72 Atl. 435, 437, 76 N. J. Eq. 406.
ON HAND
See Cash On Hand; Stock en Hand;
Then on Hand.
A bequest by a manufacturer of a prod-
uct "on hand" Inclades that in the hands of
a selling agent in another city, as well as
that at the factory. Brown v. Olothey, 79
N. BL 269, 270, 193 Mass. 271.
Where a shipper, demanding stock cars,
has his stock within five miles of the station
ready to be loaded within a few hours after
receiving notice of the arrival of the cars,
he has his stock "on hand," within Rev.
St. 1895, art. 4502, relating to furnishing
shippers with cars on demand, a^d providing
that it shall be necessary for the party bring-
ing suit against any railroad company under
the provisions of this law, to show by evi-
dence that he had "on hand," at the time
demand was made, the freight necessary to
load the cars. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Taylor,
126 S. W. 1117, 1119, 103 Tex. 367 (citing
Crouch V. Parker, 56 N. Y. 597). ,
The phrase "on hand," as used in Rev.
St 1895, ai:t 4502, docis not require that the
OK HAND
T8S
OK THB PART OT
dripper shall hare the property at the imaiedl-
ate point of ehipment at the time of demaad,
bat, as the statnte gives tlie railroad oom-
panj six days from demand within which to
famish cars, and the shipper 48 hours there*
after to load, the words mean that he has
or owns the property so circumstanced as
may be shipped within the time named. Tex*
as & P. Ry. Oo. t. Taylor, 118 a W. 109T,
1100. 54 Tfex. ClT. App. 419.
The requirement of Rev. St 1895, art
4502, that the shipper prove that he had on
hand, at the time of the order, the neces-
sary freight for loading the cars forbade any
character of speculation and precluded re-
covery by a shipper, where such freight in
form and condition to be shipped is not there
on hand, though he is able to show that he
could have had it ready if the cars had been
furnished, and a shipper of crushed ston4,
who intended to load from the crusher and
save expense in handling the crushed prod-
uct did not have such fMght "on hand,"
and he was not entitled to a penalty for
failure to furnish the cars demanded. Chi-
cago, R. I. A Q. Ry. Go. v. Risley Bros. A
Co., 119 S. W. 897, 898, 55 Tex. Giv. Ai^. eO.
OH HCABDro nr sauTrr
An order of a Circuit Court granting a
preliminary injunctioii made after the filing
of a bill and on notice to the defendants, pur-
suant to which their counsel appeared spe-
cially to object to the jurisdiction, but were
heard upon the merits a« amid curin, was
made "upon a hearing in equity" within the
meaning of section 7 of the act (Act March
8, 1891, c 517, 26 Stat 82®, creating the Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals, as am^ded by Act
April 14, 1906, c. 1627, 84 Stat 116» and is
appealable thereunder. Northern Pac. R. Co.
V. Pacific Coast Lumber Mfrs.' Ass'n, 165
Fed. 1, 5, 91 C. C. A. 39; Union Pac. R.
Co. V. Oregon A Washington Lumber Mfrs.'
Ass'n, 165 Fed. 13, 91 C. C. A 61.
OH ITS UHS
Where a railroad company operates its
trains engaged in interstate commerce with
its own engines and crews over the tracks
of another company, under a contract be-
tween them, such tracks are a part of its
line, within the meaning of Safety Appliance
Act March 2, 1893, c 196, i 6, 27 Stat 532,
as amended by Act April 1, 1896, c. 87, 29
Stat 85, imposing a penalty on any rail-
road company hauling or using "on its line"
any car in violation of its provisions, and it
is immaterial that its trains, while on such
tracks, are run subject to rules and regula-
tions prescribed by the owner of the tracks ;
nor is it any defense to an action to recover
the penalty for hauling a car not equipped
as required by the act in one of its' inter-
state trains on such tracks that the inspec-
tion of sudi cars is made by a servant of
the company owning the tracks, who, in per-
forming such duty, acts as Its own inspect
tor. Phlladdphla A B. R. Co. v. I^
States, 191 Fed. 1, 2, Ul a C A (MO.
OH THB JOB
Whan pUdiitiir oontimcted with defei
ant city to repair a brid^s^ the coDtncc pi
Tiding that plaintUTs compensstioD sbm
be a oertala sum per thousand feet for t
lumber osed, and that no work riumld be I
gua untU material for at least wtia]l
the repairs should be ^'on the job," ud
compliance with this requlreiDeDt plaisi
distributed lumber along the bridge, and h
used a part of it In making repain, wheel
bridge and all the lumber was destroyed
fire, he was entitled to reeow for the In
her which had been used, but not for t!
which had not Yoang v. Qlty of Ghioiv
72 N. B. 63, 186 Mass. 6ia
OH A JOUBHET
See Journey.
OH THB UKB FBOOV
"Upon the like proof,** as used In B
St 1898, I 2891, authorizing the entry of
fault Judgments on the applicant iSliag
proof of default with the derk before
plying for a judgment and authorlzlBg pis
tiff to apply to the court for judgment wl
the defendant has made default '^ipon
like proof,** means proof of default made
the court; and hence, where the applicat
is made to the court it is not necessarr ti
proof of service should be filed before
rendition of judgment Schmidt t. B
mann, 105 N. W, 44, 46, 126 Wis. 65.
OH ntB MKKI'n
See Merits.
OH THB OPIHIOH BBLOW
Where a Oiiyniit Court of Appeals alBi
a decision "^on the opinion briow/' It
proves the reasoning, adopts the fl&dii
and concurs in the conclusions of tbe co
below; but where the decision below te b<
ly "affirmed,** such approval and concnrre
are not to be inferred, but <ni the coatn
it is to be understood that for some reai
the appellate court prefers not to adcvt
opinion below. Victor Talking Ma(*. Co.
Hoschke, 188 Fed. 826, 828, UO G. C
304.
OH THE PART OF
The words "on the part of the mothj
as used in Tex. Rev. St 1895, art 1"
making bastards capable of inheriting '^
and through" their mother and of "tran^
ting estates," and giving them the riglit
distributive shares of the personal esta
of any of their kindred "on the part of tl)
mother," mean of the mother's side of <
genealogical tree, and the artide gires i
bastard kincOilp in law on the iDOtl»
side, but does not change his status as to i
father. Berry v. Powell, 106 & W. 845, 3
47 Tex. Otv. App. 08iL
OK THB PUEMISEd
783
OK STOPICIOK
THE PlkEMIBES
A brewery company owned lots 8 to 10,
islve; the brewery proper covering lots
10. The second story of the building
ots 3 and 4 was occupied by the piesi-
; of the brewery as a residence, that part
he first story on lot 4 was used as his
e, and that part on lot 3 was. occupied as
loon. There weip^ partitions between the
on and office and the office and brewery
ler, with entrances jthrough them, and
public entrance to the saloon was on the
er of lot 3, through which brewery em-
6s, who were givei> free beer, entered.
1, that the brewery was selling beer "up-
:he premises" within Code, { 2460, pro-
Dg that one operating any brewery per-
Ing any drinking, or sale at retail, of
;)roduct upon the pfiemises, shall forfeit
exemption thereby granted, so that it
not exempted under section 2456, ex-
tlng manufacturers of liquor from the
titles provided by law for manufacturing
Drs. Orke v. McManus, 121 N. W. 177,
142 Iowa, 654 (citing 6 Words and
ases, p. 5512).
PROPER CAUSE SHOWH
Corporation Act (P. L. 1896, p. 202) i 44,
rides that the books of a corporation, ex-
; the stock and transfer books, may be
t outside of the state, If the by-laws or
iflcate of incorporation so provides, and
t the Court of Chancery or the Supreme
rt or any Justice thereof, may, upon prop-
lause shown, summarily order any or all
he books of the corporation to be fottk-
1 brought witMn the sttite and kept there-
t such place and for such time as may be
gnated in such order. Held, that the
Else ''ui>on proper cause shown" means a
96, the propriety of which is made to ap-
r to the judicial officer nominated in the
ion, and the propriety of the "cause
wn** must be submitted to the determina-
of such officer, and for such determina-
i the conclusion reached by applicant for
order from undisclosed facts is not a val-
rabstitute, and a petition for such order
setting . forth fact» from which the oBL-
can make such determination U insuffl-
it National Packing Co. v. Qarven, 78
703, 706, 70 N. J. Law, 266.
REASOHABLE TERMS
The phrase "on reasonable terms" in
mon parlance means the charges for serv-
I rendered or the price of goods sold and
vered. State v. Central Vermont By. Co.,
^tL 104, 196, 81 Yt 463, 130 Am. St Bep.
5.
SALE (In Patent Law)
See, also, Public Use (In Patent Law).
Proof of a meve oontraet to construct
n plans, and to*' deliver in ttie futsre, a
::hine or ttanufaetan not dlown to luive
be^ previously built, is insufficient to estab-
lish that the machine or manufacture was
''on sale" within the meaning of Rev. St. $
48^, so as to defeat a patent therefor not
applied for uhtil more than two years after
such contract was made, in the absence of
any evidence that the invention had beeii
reduced to practice at the time the executory
contract was made. McCreery Engineering
Co. V. Massachusetts Fan Co., 195 Fed. 498,
501. 115 C. O. A. 408.
A single unrestricted sale by the inventor
of his Invention is a public sale, or puts it
"on sale," within the meaning and Intent of
Rev. St U. S. f 4886, but a single sale of an
invention by the inventor for experimental
purposes, where he is Unable otherwise to
make proper tests, does not put the invention
"on sale." In re Mills, 25 App. D. C. 377,
383.
A machine put out for trial, under a "sale
or return" contract, does not constitute a be-
ing on sale two yea!rs before the patent ap-
plication, uiiless the trial period expired, or
unless there was actual acceptance more than
two years befote the application. William
B. Miershoo ft Go. v. Bay City Box ft Lumber
Co., 180 Fed. 741, 748.
Where the inventor of a cigar pocket for
more than two years before applying for a
patent therefor made and sold such pockets
in the regular course of his business, such
articles were in **publlc use" and "on sale,"
and defeated his right to a patent under Rev.
St I 4886, although they were not kept by
him in stock, but were made up only on or-
ders received; it being the custom of the
trade to take such orders by sample. A de-
vice will be "on sale" and in "public use" if
it is offered for sale, whether any specimen
of it is actually sold or not Dittgen v. Ra-
dne Paper Goods Co., 181 Fed. 394, 398 (cit-
ing Walk. Pat [11th Ed.] p. 96).
OH STOCK
No obligation to honor any draft except
one for the price of stock shipped to the
drawee is assumed by a live stock commis-
sion firm in writing to a bank, "We will hon-
or P.*8 draft for one thousand dollars on
hogs or cattle." There is a manifest differ-
ence between the expressions "for stock" and
"on stock." The one merely relates to the
use the drawer is to make of the money he
obtains for the draft, and the other is equiv-
alent to "against stock," and clearly Implies
that the draft is to be drawn on the strength
of the stock; that the stock is to be made
in a way security for the draft Stough v.
E. J. Healy, 89 Pac. 898. 899, 75 Kan. 526,
10 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 9ia
OK suspicion
Where the consignee refused to accept
oertaln cigars, and the consignor directed
them to be deUvvrad to a< thirds person, such
ON THB TABLB
784
OVErBjaJt aALLOK
conduct Indicatee tbat the dsaxs
oat "on suspicion'* (that ifl» in expectation
that they would be accepted), and not that
they had been bought or ordered by the
consignee or by such third person. New
Tork ft N. J. Steamboat Go. ▼. New Jersey
Produce Co., 68 Aa 200, 210, 70 N. J. Law,
20a
OH THE TABLE
See Continued on the Table.
ONCE
SeeAtOnca
ONCE A WEEK
Proof that a summons was published for
"six sncoesslve weeks'* in a weekly newsiMi-
per sufficiently shows a publication "once a
week" for six successive weeks. McHenry ▼.
Bracken, 101 N. W. 900, 061« 063, 93 Minn.
510 (citing Iowa State Sav. Bank ?. Jacob-
son, 66 N. W. 453, 8 S. D. 292).
Const 1001, 1 106, provides that no local
law shall be passed, unless notloe of the Inr
tention to apply therefor shall have be«i pub-
lished at least oncea week fbr tonr oongMcutive
weeks in some newspaper published in sudi
county or counties, or, if there is no newspa-
per so published, th^i by posting a notice
for four consecutive weeks at fve different
places in the county or counties, prior to the
introduction of the bill. Held, that the post-
ing clause requires that the notice must be
posted during a period of 4 weeks, or 28
days, before the introduction of the bill, but
that the word "a" in the clause "once a week
for four consecutive weeks," in the publica-
tion clause, was used in the sense of "in
each," so that, where the notice was publish-
ed in a newspaper once a week in each of four
consecutive weeks prior to the introduction
of the bUl, the constitutional requirement
was complied with, though 28 days did not
intervene between the first publication and
the introduction of the bilL Lower v. State
(Ala.) 59 South. 611« 612.
As vequirims: fttU Mvmber of weeks
A tax sale notice published once in each
week for four consecutive weeks prior to the
day of sale complies with the requirements
of section 7639, Gen. St 1901, providing that
notice shall be published "once in each week
for four consecutive weeks prior to the day
of sale," though the first publication was
made 2S days only before the sale. Tidd v.
Grimes, 71 Pac 844, 845, 66 Kan. 401.
ONCE A TEAR
Where a policy of fire Insurance provides
that "the insured shall take an 'inventory'
of the stock hereby covered, at least *once a
year,' during the life of this policy," the as-
sured has a year from the date of the policy
in which to make an Inventory, although the
policy runs for one year only* Tucker ▼•
Colonial Fire Ins. Coug 61. & IL 8(1^ 88^ J
w. va. aa
ONE
See Some One.
CUE BVTEJMMik
Under liquor Tax Law, taws 1897, ]
220, e. 812, 1 17, subd. 8, requiring tbe cocses
of the owners of two-thirds of tbe Dumbe
of buildings used ezduslvely as dwelling
and situate within IMK) Aset of premises to t<
used for the liquor trafllc to the carrying o
of such traflic, an ordinary frame baOdinj
in a country village, Intended and used to
two families, is one building. In re Clenern
103 N. T. Supp. 157, 158, 118 App. DIt. 575.
The words "one dwelling house," as use
in a conveyance of land declaring tlutt tfa
grantee shall not occupy the premises, a
cept tot one dwelling house to each lot, ai
used in the sense in which the words ax
ordinarily used. A building planned asd di
signed for two or more dweHings caimc
properly be described aa one dw^ling honsi
A building designed and planned for tw
families, one to occupy the ground floor an
one the second fioor, each to have a separat
entrance, violates the restriction in the c(h
veyance. Harris v. Roraback, 100 N. V
391, 392, 137 Mich. 292; 109 Am. St Rep. ^
A double two^tery building, comprisii
four flats under a single roof, with a div
sion wall running through it on the centi
line of the lot from front to rear and fioi
cellar to roof, on either side of which wi
a bay front, intended for the occupation (
several families, was not ''one dwelling
within a restrictive building covenant pr
viding that not moro than "one dwelUnj
should be erected on each lot Sanders
Dixon, 89 S. W. 577, 582, 585, 114 Mo. Ap
229.
OHE-HAJLF
See Eastern One-Half.
OHE-HAZ.F OAIXOH
Gm. Ulwb 1909, c 123, i 52, Imposing
penalty for the sale or keeping for sale by r
tail druggists, without first obtaining a !
cense, of enumerated Uqnors, and dedarli
that the finding of any liquors ennmerau
on the premises of any retail druggist i
quantities exceeding one-half gallon shall I
considered evidence that the same is kept f«
sale, when construed in the light of chap^*
32, i 3, providing that every word importm
the singular number only may be constroe
to include the plural, and every word imvo^
Ing the plural number only may be constra*
to embrace the singular, prohibits the ie«I
ing of intoxicating liquor in quantities ci
ceeding oofrhalf gallon, whether it con^
of one kind only, or ia tiie aggzegate of «fv
0S1& HOUSE
78S
OKLT
kinds. 8tate ▼. Almy, 79 Aa 902, 968,
. I. 415.
3 HOUSE
The erection of a house or flat two sto-
hlgh under a single roof, planned for
rate occupancy by two families, one on
floor, with separate entrances, did not
titute a breach of a building restriction
deed providing that not more than '*one
e" should be erected on each 40-foot
tage Pank t. Eaton, 89 S. W. 686, 587,
tfo. App. 171.
S I.OT
The words '*one town or city lot/* in Act
8, 1852, iimitinr the extent of the home-
1, mean the lot or piece of ground on
h the head of a family has a house, with
ippurtenances which he uses as a home,
gh it contains more than one lot, accord-
to the plat and survey of the town or
Owens ▼. Jabine^ 115 S. W. 883, 384,
rk. 468.
3 PUkCB
On a trial for keeping a liquor nuisance,
proof showed that defendant conducted
tel and in the rear of it about three feet
ilTom is a small building, and that, to
entrance to it, it is necessary to pass
ugh the hotel. The evidence showed
defendant sold liquor in the basement
ie hotel and in this building. Held that,
in Rev. Codes 1905, | 9373, the building
tituted "one place" for the maintenance
liquor nuisance, and it was not error to
defendant's motion to require the prose-
in to elect which place they would rely
s the place of sale. State v. Ildvedsen,
^. W. 489, 490, 20 N. D. 62.
S RAIIAOAB
Circular No. 325 of the railroad commls-
declaring that continuous mileage rates
apply to the Central Railroad and the
ley Southern Railway Company for
sportation of passengers and freight
Ing between those railroads or over any
on of either, such: rates to be governed
le freight and passeiiger tariffs prescrih-
y the Qeorgia railroad commission for
Central of Georgia Railway Company, is
iAT and complete fixlpg of a. continuous
ige rate between the two roads, without
ssity of resorting, to ascertain its mean-
to rule No. 1 of the commission, declar-
;hat, when two or mpre con^iecting lines
lilroad are operated by one maoagement*
here the majority of the.stock of. each
introlled by one od sulrh companies^ the
of railroads of all shall be considered as
tituting but one railroad, and the rates
be computed on a cont^uoM mileage
L Hill V. Wadley Southdin'By; 06., 57
796, 800, 128 «a. 7%.' I
OITB 8TATB TO AJTOTRBR
Engaged in transportation from one state
to another, see Engaged.
ONE SUBJECT
See Subject (Of Statute).
ONEROUS
"Onerous" means burdensome or oppres-
sive. Meador v. Adams, 76 S. W. 238, 239,
33 Tex. Civ. App. 167.
ONEROUS DONATION
An "onerous donation" is a gift burdened
with charges imposed by the donor. A man<
ual gift may be free, onerous, or remunera-
tive, and when the donor makes such a gift,
omnium bonorum, on condition that the do-
nee shall maintain him for the rest of his
life. It will be dealt with as an onerous dona-
tion, and not as a commutative contract
Ackerman v. Lamer, 40 South. 581, 587, 116
La. lOL
ONLY
See Fit Only.
The word "only," in PoL Code Mont |
4350, providing ttiat the county treasure!
must disburse the county moneys only on
county warrants issued by the county clerk,
based on orders of the board of county com-
missioners, or as otherwise provided by law,
limits the power of the treasurer to pay out
the money of the coimty, both as to the
amount and the precedent conditions of pay-
ment Ex parte Farrell, 92 Pac. 7S5, 786, 36
Mont 254.
Seattle City Charter, art 16, | 12, de-
clares that every employ^ in the classified
civil service shall hold office until removed
or retired; that any employ^ may be re-
moved by the appointing power "only" on the
filing with the Civil Service Commission of
a statement of the reasons therefor; that
an employ^ removed may demand an Investi-
gation, which the Commission shall make,
and certify its decision to the appointing
oflScer, and If the removal is not sustained
the employ^ shall be reinstated. The Com-
mission is given power to require the at-
tendance of witnesses. Section 4 provides
that the Commission "shall make rules for
examinations, appointments, and removals. **
Article 24, | 8, provides that every officer,
board, or department authorized to appoint
any employ^ shall have the right to remove
the person so appointed. Article 16, § 20,
provides that any officer who has been con-
victed after trial before the Commission shall
be dismissed from the service. Held, that
the Commission has no power to dismiss a
clerk in the police department who has been
appointed by the chief of police; such pow-
er of removal being in the a^iet of police
"only^** and the action of the OomnUssion au«
tiiori£ed by ttie chaiter being a mere basis
ONIiT
Tse
OPAQOX
for action by Um nmoTtnt powttr. Baismi T.
City of SeatUe, 78 Pac 496, 406» 82 Waih.
406.
In a written warranty that "It la under-
stood that the goods are warranted only
against breakage cansed by manifest defects
in material," the word "only** necessarily ex-
cludes all other warranties. Giving the
word its ordinary meaning, and applying it
in its restrictive sense, as qualifying the
word to which it naturally belongs, the con-
clusion cannot be escaped that it restricts
the meaning to be given to the v^b warrantr
ed. Dowaglac Mfg. Co. v. Mahon, 101 N. W.
903, 13 N. D. 616.
Im UaUtatioA la deed or Imam
A conveyance, **ft>r railroad imrposes
only^ entitles the company to the use and
possession of ttie entire strip so long as any
part of it is used for such purposes. Ritter
V. Thompson, 144 8. W. 910, 911, 102 Ark.
442.
Where grantors of a shore front at a
summer resort reserved the right to build a
pier, covenanting not to permit the sale of
commodities thereon, and to charge '*only an
entrance fee," their covenant is not broken
by charging for the use of roller skates at
a rink on the pier, where all who pay the
entrance fee may go to every part of the pier,
including the rink. Atlantic City t. Asso-
ciated Realties Corp., 67 AtL 987, 938, 72
N. J. Eq. 684.
Im Umitatloa of Jvrisdietloa
Using Webster's definition of **only" as
"utterly, entirely, wholly" (WebsL Diet p.
913), Jurisdiction cannot be founded only on
one ground, when another and equally im-
portant constitutional ground is presented in
the same suit Cound v. Atchison, T. ft 8.
F. R. Co., 173 Fed. 527. 533.
The word "only" in the judiciary act
(Act March 3, 1887, c 373, i 1, 24 Stat 552,
as amended by Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, { 1,
25 Stat 43^, providing that, where Jurisdic-
tion is founded "only" on the fact of diver-
sity of citizenship, suit may be brought in
the district of the residence of either the
plaintiff or the defendant, is equivalent to
"solely" ; and a suit within the general Juris-
diction of the federal courts, both on the
ground of diversity of citizenship and be-
cause founded upon a law of the United
States, can be brought only in the district
where defendant resides. Whittaker ▼. Illi-
nois Cent R. Co., 176 Fed. 130, 181 (citing
(3ound V. Atchison, T. ft 8. F. R. Ck)^ 173 Fed.
627; McCormick Harvesting Hach. Co. y.
Walthers, 10 Sw. Ct 485» 134 U. & 41, 83
L. Ed. 888).
OTOrr ADVISOB.T
The phrase "only advisory,** within the
rule holding tliat a nuister's findings are only
advisory to the court, simply mean ttiat such
findings are. not «enelvaLT» npMk the coozt,
but^ on the eoatrary, his condasloiii boQ
law and ftict may be reviewed by tbe d
cellor. In other words, the master's cod
slons do not bind the court on any quest]
of law or fact Guarantee Gold Bond, L
ft Savings 0>. v. Edwards, 104 & W. i
633, 7 Ind. T. 207.
onT owTfiiminr
A complaint on a note, whldi avei
that tiie payee died intestate lesTliig
widow and that he left plaintiSs as his <
dren and only children and **0Dly bein
law,** that all claims against him and bit
tate had been paid, and that no letters of
ministration had been granted on the es<
was suffldeat to show the plsiptiiW r
to sue as owners of the note, tboogb
quoted words be taken to stste a mere
elusion, the words *'only cUldRO,** itin
unqualified, including deceased as well
living children. Barrett ▼. Sipp, 06 N
310, 811, 50 Ind. App. 804.
ONYX
So-called Mexican onyx is dotiibU
"onyx" rather than as "marble," ud
Tariff Act July 24. 1807, c 11, | 1, Sche
B, par. 114, 30 Stat 158. Blochman Bi
ing Co. ▼. Blake» 168 Fed. 572.
OONTZ
It was held in Oonunonwealth v. B
merer (Ky.) 18 S. W. 108, under a statute
vidlng that "Whoever • • • shall
up, carry on or conduct • • ♦ a 1
bank, faro bank, or other machine or
trlvance used in betting," etc., "shall be
ed," eta, that "oontz,** which is played y
dice on a table or other surface was
within the meaning of "oth» machioe
contrivance.*' White t. States 76 N. E.
555, 87 Ind. Appi 05.
OPAL
As preoloua stooe^ see Predons Stn
OPAQUE
The term ''opaque^'* as employed la
scribing a patent for a current control
device for telephone circuits, and hi de&
a circuit In its r^atkm to the enensizbi?'
rent, is a circuit containing a condoisef
equivalent device which prevents tbe pt
ing through the dreuit of an appreciable
substantial amount of current-— tbat i&
vnfllclent amonnt to affieet the operatic
the system to an eb^eetlonable degree^
by the term ^'ofpaque^" when refeiring to i
taUdng conent, is contemplated that (^
aeftnlatio of the dicott wb&di vrltt v^
the passage of the talking cunento tb^
through 4a sofflcient wnount to materia
affect the tynnsmlsalon of the talking a
rents through the 91^. oontalniag tlte te
OPEN
737
OP£N
» receiver. EjeUogg Switchboard A Sup-
k>. v. Dean Electric Ck>., 168 Fed. 549,
adopting definition given in description
tents in Oongress).
N
See Holding Open; Unopened; Way
Opened and Dedicated to Public Use.
Seep open, see Keep.
defendant owned a tract lying between
tiflTs land and a certain creek, and the
es made a contract by which plaintiff
d to furnish labor "to clean off right of
and dig ditch through G. pond and to
out and open the old ditch" on defend-
land; plaintiff agreeing "to dig this
not less than six or eight feet wide and
)roper depth necessary and not to ex-
three feet in the new ditch." The con-
further provided that defendant should
plaintiff's water right of way through
itch, through the pond to the creek, for
purpose of keeping the ditch clean and
The new ditcdi referred to was to con-
with the old ditch, which was to furnish
utlet to the creek ; the purpose being to
\ one drainage ditch by digging the new
to meet the old. Held that, under the
sion "to clean out and open the old
," plaintiff was required not merely to
ve the rubbish therefrom, but to widen
> as to make it an unobstructed outlet
be water; the word "open" meaning to
by cutting, cleaning, removing, or push-
aside whatever impedes or hinders,
mder v. Smith, 67 South. 104, 107, 8
App. 001.
looa
I saloon is "open" on Sunday, in viola-
of MiUs' Ann. St (Rev. Supp.) i 184ed,
^h not kept open in the same manner as
eek days; it being enough that it is so
that access may be had thereto by per-
not employed about it, and that, though
ofr is not kept open, it is opened on ap-
tion for admission. Birmingham v. Peo-
K) Pac. 1121, 40 Colo. 302.
Jnder a statute forbidding the keeping
of a tippling-house on the Sabbath, the
loes not concern itself with the length
me during which it was open, but does
r some circumstances justify the open-
if a house used as a saloon on secular
even on the Sabbath day, and a charge
1 failed to present the distinction be-
a the lawful and unlawful opening of
a house, but charged that the offense
complete whenever it appeared that the
i in question was a tippling-house and
it was open on the Sabbath day and
the law did not concern itself with the
3S€ for which it was open, too greatly
Icted the pui'poses for which a saloon
be open on the Sabbath day. Bicfaard-
3 Wo8.ft P.2D SxB.— 47
son V. State, 59 S. D. 916^ 917, 8 Ga. App.
318.
Street or road
The expression "to open," as applied to
a street or road, is used almost indifferently
to express two very different processes— the
act of establishing or creating a highway,
and that of actually putting in shape for
travel one already having a legal existence.
Board of Com'rs of Cowley CJounty v. John-
son, 90 Pac. 805, 807, 76 Kan. 65.
In an ordinance, which proposes to va-
cate a part of a street and open It on other
lines, the words "open on other lines" are
only applicable to an already existing high-
way. Brie By. Co. v. City of Pasaic, 74 Atl.
838. 79 ^. J. Law, 19.
Where an ordinance, entitled "An ordi-
nance to open, grade, macadamize and other-
wise improve" a new street designated in
such title, contained provisions for the tak-
ing of the lands required for such street, by
condemnation, and the paym^it of proper
damages for such taking, it was held, that
the word "open" implies the acquisition by
condemnation, if such acquisition be neces-
sary, of the lands required for such opening,
and that the title sufficiently indicates an
intent to condemn. Beechwood Park Land
Co. V. City of Summit, 78 AtL 57, 58, 78 N.
J. Law, 182.
A charter giving a city authority to
"open, alter, widen, establish, abolish," etc,
streets, does not give it authority to alienate
streets. Krause v. City of El Paso CTex.)
101 S. W. 828, 833.
The method of opening a street in Jer-
sey City is prescribed in its charter, which
declares that a street must be opened in that
manner and not otherwise. Every street
"opened" in the dty involves: (1) The ac-
quisition of the necessary lands; (2) the ob-
ligation of the dty to improve, maintain,
and keep in repair the streets of the city;
and (3) the assessment for benefits. City of
Jersey City v. National Docks B. Co^ 26
AtL 145, 148, 55 N. J. Law, 194.
The word "opened," as used with refer-
ence to streets and public places, refers to
the time when the city becomes vested with
the title to the land on which the street or
avenue is to run. But it was not used in
that sense In Laws 1895, p. 2037, c. 1006, | 2,
relating to the discontinuing and closing of
streets, and providing that the contiguous
street bounding the plot or square wherein
is situated the land sought to be closed and
occupied has been opened; but the puii>ose
of the act was to substitute one system of
the public highways for another by opening
new streets and closing old ones, and it was
not intended to physically close the streets
of one system without providing something
to take their places. Johnson ft Co. v. Cox,
86 N. Y. Supp. 601, 608, 42 Misc. Bep. 301.
OPEN
738
OPEN AOOOUNT
Where J. avenue was opened under
Laws 1867» p. 953, c 400, under which act the
dty acquired only an easement for street
purposes, and thereafter proceedings were
instituted to acquire land to widen the ave-
nue, when a part of it then in use was aban-
doned under Laws 18d5, p. 2037, c 1006, { 2,
providing that, when the public easement in
a street was legally abandoned, the owner
regained complete possession thereof, and,
after the new street was opened, could oc-
cupy the abandoned part, and the cemetery
association owned the fee in land which was
Included within the abandoned portion of J.
avenue» th^ new street was not "opened,"
within the statute, until there had been an
actual physical opening, and hence the aban-
doned part of the avenue was not exempted
from assessment as ''land actually used for
cemetery," by Laws 1879, c. 801, | 1. In re
Jerome Ave. in City of New York, 85 N. E.
755, 756, 192 N. Y. 459.
Laws 1895, p. 2037, c. 1006, relating to
the discontinuing and closing of streets and
other thoroughfares in New Yoirk city, pro-
vides (section 2) that on the filing of a map
showing the intention of the public authori-
ties to close or discontinue any street, road,
or other thoroughfare which has been in
actual and physical use, the owner of the
fee thereof shall be permitted to close and
use and occupy the same as fully as if the
same had not been laid out, dedicated, es-
tablished, or used, provided the contiguous
street bounding the plot or square wherein
the land sought to be closed and occupied has
been "opened." Held, that the term "open-
ed" as used therein meant actually op^ied so
that a road could be used, and that till a
road, intended to take the place of a discon-
tinued thoroughfare, was "physically opened
and capable of public use" owners of prem-
ises abutting the old road are properly pro-
hibited from closing or fencing the roadbed
In front thereof. Isaac G. Johnson ft Co. v.
Cox, 89 N. E. 454, 457, 196 N. Y. 110.
OPEN AOCOUNT
Money advanced under a contract or at
the instance and request of another is not an
"open account" within Rev. St 1895, art.
3102, providing that on all open accounts,
when no interest is agreed on by the parties,
interest shall be allowed from the first day
of January after the same are mada Cou-
turie V. Roensch, 134 S. W. 413, 416.
Items for unliquidated damages set forth
in a petition do not constitute an "open ac-
count," within Rev. St. 1909, § 1799, provid-
ing that in actions on an open account where
the items are set forth in the petition, de-
fendant, who makes default, shall be deemed
to admit the account to he due as set forth
in the petition, and a petition in an action
by a subcontractor against the principal con-
tractor for damages for failure to procure
for the subcontractor access to the grounds
on which the work ia to be done, is not
larged by items of unliquidated damagec
corporated In the petition. W. W. Br
Const Co. V. MacArthur Bros. Ca, 139 &
104, 106, 236 Mo. 41.
Civ. Code 1895, { 4130, whidi prov
the mode of proof and defense in a sui
a Justice's court on an '^open account,''
not apply to an action for the loss of or (
age to personal property by a conmioo
rler, even though the cause of action ii
out in detail in a statement attached to
sununons and verified by the affidavit ol
plaintiir. £1. E. Lowe Co. v. Cencm
Georgia Ry. Co., 51 S. E. 653, 123 Ga. 7
"'An account current' is an *opei
running account' between two or more
ties, or an account which contains item
tween the parties from which the bal
due to one of them is or can be ascotaj
from which it follows that such an ace
comes under the terms of an 'open ac»
in so far as it is running, unsettled, or
closed." Where supplies of coal for a
sel were ordered and delivered at diffe
times, a bill being rendered after each d
ery, the several charges do not constitn
running account, but each constitutes a
arate and distinct cause of action, and U
title the seller to a lien for any item oi
the New York statute notice thereof i
have been filed within 30 days after i
item was furnished or suit to enforce
lien must have been instituted within
time. The Golden Rod, 153 Fed. in,
82 C. C. A. 345 (quoting and adopting df
tion in 1 Cyc. p. 363).
Where petition alleged that plaintiff
and delivered certain goods to defenc
the amounts and prices of which were i
ized in an exhibit, and paid certain fn
charges for defendant, and that correct
and invoices were made out at the tim
the shipments, and received by defent]
who agreed to pay the sums set forth
Itemized, an affidavit as to the correctne
the items was no proof thereof, und^
St 1895, art 2323, providing that in ai
tion on an open account an affidavit o]
correctness shall be prima facie evid
thereof, as the petition showed an ae»^
stated so far as the sales were concer
and the freight charges were evidently fe
on a special contract, which formed no
of the account for goods sold. An "open
count" is one in respect to which nothing
occurred to bind either party by its st
ments; an accojint which is yet fnlly c
to be disputed. An account consisting
many items based on agreements as to e
item as to price and time of payment is
an open account any more than one in wl
the price and time of payment has been &
by an agreement made after all the items
the account have been consummated hj s
and delivery. The word "open" indies
that there is something undetermined
OPEN AND APPARENT
739
OPEN CONCUBINAGE
ict of the parties, or by the application
:tled rules of law, and an account can-
e said to be "open*' when there remains
rm of contract to be settled bj agree-
"Open account'* la used in opposition
tated account/' wherein the account is
I by the assent to its correctness by the
charged. An "account stated" is an
ment between two persons who have
previous transactions fixing the amount
1 respect to such transactions and prom-
to pay them. In other words, an "ac-
stated" is one consisting of many items
on agreements as to each item as to
)rice and time of payment Wroten
1 & Lumber Co. 7. Mineola Box Mfg.
rex.) 95 S. W. 744, 745 (citing McCam-
. Batsell, 69 Tex. 363; Abb. Law Diet.;
Llesey v. SpoCford, 47 Tex. 13).
(f AND APPARENT
L hazard is open and apparent which
e discovered by the exercise of ordinary
by the party charged with the duty of
Lsing such care. Indianapolis Traction
rminal Co. v. Holtsclaw, 82 N. £. 986,
LI Ind. App. 620.
f AND NOTORIOUS ADULTERY
L married man was not guilty of "open
lotorious adultery** because he lived in
ery with his brother*s wife, under such
ustances that the community in which
ed believed that they were married and
i their adulterous relation was kept se-
People v. Salmon, 83 Pac. 42, 43, 148
303, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1186, 113 Am.
ep. 268.
H AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION
in instruction that the sale of goods or
rty by one who is involved deeply in
and unable to meet his obligations in
to be valid against the creditors of the
or must be accompanied by open and
lous change of possession, and that by
and notorious possession** I mean the
2 change of possession, which is to con-
and to be manifested continually by the
ird and visible signs, such as render it
Qt that possession of the judgment
r has ceased, is correct Swartzburg
ckerson, 78 Pac. 282, 12 Okl. 666.
ff AND OBVIOUS DEFECT
lu open and obvious defect is one mani-
;o the sense of observation, whether It
\ from the nature of the business, the
er in which it is conducted, or the use
(fective and unsafe appliances. New
La Thomson^Houston Electric Light Co.
mbold. 106 N. W. 213, 216, 73 Neb. 259.
Ef BIDDING
Iurd*s Rev. St 1899, p. 453, c. 32, { 85,
der» that the board of directors of a
iDg and loan association shall hold such
1 meetings, not less frequently than
once a month, as may be provided by the by-
laws, at which the money in the treasury
shall be offered tot loan ih open meeting, and
that th& stockholders who shall bid the
highest premium for the preference or priori-
ty of loan shall be entitled to receive a loan
of a certain amount for each share of stock.
Held, that where at a regular meeting "mon-
ey was offered for sale,** and there were
several bids therefor, among which was th&
bid in question, the requirement of the stat-
ute with reference to "open bidding" was
complied with as to the bid in question,
though it was made by way of written appli-
cation for the money, submitted without the
presence of the bidder. Savage v. Evanston
Savings ft Loan Ass*n, 81 N. E. 1062, 1063,
228 111. 431 (citing Farmers* Savings & Build-
ing ft Loan Ass'n v. Kent, 30 South. 874, 131
Ala. 246; Ruppel v. Missouri Guarantee Sav-
ings ft Building Ass*n, 69 S. W. 1000, 158
Mo. 613; SUte v. Stockton, 86 Mo. App. 477;
Miller v. Missouri Guarantee Sav. & Build-
ing A8s*n of Hannibal, 83 Mo. App. 669;
Edinger v. Same, 83 Mo. App. 616).
OPEN CAR
An "oi)en car** on a trolley line is one
with a running board on each side along
which the conductor passes collecting the
fares and discharging his general duties.
Drake v. Auburn City Ry. Co., 66 N. B. i21,
122, 178 N. Y. 466.
A policy, issued to a railroad company,
which covered in general terms all cotton on
or in depots, platforms, qr grounds adjacent
thereto, and in transit, but which provided
that cotton in open cars was not covered, in-
sured cotton on a stationary flat car placed
on a spur track adjacent to a depot to re-
main there about 12 hours, though the cot-
ton was subsequently to be transported on the
car, since the ''open cars** referred to meant
cars of that description commonly used for
transportation, as the company sought to re-
lieve itself from the increased hazard inci-
dent to the transportation of cotton on open
cars due to sparks from locomotives in ac-
tual transportation, and since the words "in
transit" meant in course of passing from
point to point Royal Ins. Co. v. Texas ft
G. Ry. Co., 116 S. W. 117, 120, 63 Tex. Civ.
App. 164.
OPEN GONCUBINAOE
The word "open,** in Civ. Code, art. 1481,
providing that those living in open concubin-
age are respectively incapable of making to
each other any donation of immovables,
means "not secret, without concealment or
disguise**; so that, where the living is under
the cloak of an innocent reliation and sought
to be kept secret, it d6es not give rise to the
Incapacity pronounced by that article. Suc-
cession of Jahraus, 38 South. 417, 418, 114
La. 45a
OPEN OOUBT
T40
OPEN HOUSE
OOUBT
See Conf eseioii in Open Court
An "open coortf* contemplates the piee-
euoe of the Judge and the ^erk of the conrt,
or a duly qualified deputy, the legular open-
ing and (Aodng of the court, and the pree-
ence of the derk'a docket, upon which should
be entered, under the eye of the court, the
succeeslTe steps taken In open court in each
case. Hays ▼. Philadelphia, W. ft B. B. Co.,
68 Aa 439, 441, W Md. 418.
Written application filed with the clerk,
end not brought to the court's attention, is
not made In "open court,** within Rev. St
1!S95, art 8188, providing that no Jury trial
fllaall be had, unless application therefor be
omde in open court Gibson v. Singer Sewing
llach. Co. (Tex.) 147 8. W. 285, 286.
In the provision of Bankr. Act July 1,
1808, c. Ml, I 12, 80 Stat 649, that a bank-
rupt may offer terms of composition to bis
creditors after he has been examined In open
court or at a meeting of his creditors, etc.,
the term 'in open court" refers to proceed-
Ings before the referee. In re Bloodworth-
Stembridge Co., 178 Fed. 372, 373.
Pub. Laws 1911, c. 702, | 2, provides
that theaters afterwards erected should have
an open court or space on sides not border-
ing on streets or alleys which should be at
least six feet wide, etc This act took the
place of Pub. Laws 1909, c 472, | 27, pro-
viding for similar courts from the prosceni-
um line to the line of the street in front
parallel with the adjoining street which de-
dared that such courts should be "opoi to
the sky opposite the whole length of the au-
ditorium.*' Held, that "open court" as used
in the act of 1911 was one complet^y uncov-
ered and open to the sky, and that a covered
passageway was not in compliance there-
with. Greenough v. Allen Theater ft Bealty
Co., 80 Aa 200, 281, 83 B. L 120.
Coatlmvoaui session dIsttnsiniAed
The term "open court" as used in Acts
1898, No. 108, p. 156, providing that appeals
in criminal cases shall be taken by motion,
either verbal or in writing, in open court
within three days after sentence shall have
been pronounced, means the actual session
of the court while the judge is on the bench,
as contradistinguished from the continuous
session of ten months provided for by arti-
cle 117 of the Constltutton. SUte v. Yick-
uair, 43 South. 635, 637, 118 La. 963.
H€»ld court synoaymons
Acts 1888-89, p. 64, is not violative of
Const 1875, art 4, | 19, providing that no
bill shall be so altered or amended on its
passage through either house as to change its
original purpose; the change having been
only from a bill to fix the time of "opening"
courts to one to fix the time of "holding"
courts, and the terms as used in the connec-
tion being synonymous. Letcher v. State, 49
South. 805, 806, 109 Ala. 09, 17 AmLGa&m
The expression "open crosBbg," lAo
apidied to railroads, has a weU-endentood
mesntng, and the use to be made of It ihc»
sarily depends somewhat upon the dianeter
of the land on eadi side of the tuck and
the purposes to which the owner pot it, and
where a railroad company sgreed to jive
the owner an ''open croestaig," wbere tbe
road intenected a 220-acre pa^ure, tbe pir*
ties contemplated an "open croseiiis" for tbe
passage of stock between the sepaitte puts
of tiie farm. Hartshorn v. Ghieego Grat
Western By. Co., 113 N. W. 810, 841, IT
Iowa, 824.
OFEH FOB BirSIirESS
Where an insurance policy wimstF^.
that insured should keep an inventory vA
his books of account in a flreiNroof safe dr
ing the hours when his drug store "was y:
open for business,** and insured was In the
habit of keeping his store open for bosbe"
until 11 or 12 o'clock at night, the policy <£'
not require that such books shooki be plaa<:
in his safe during his temporary absence fro:
the store at about 9 o'docfc on the eTenins ^
the fire, answering a professioDSl call, as >
physician, about a blodc distant from tb; i
store. Major ▼. Insurance Co. of NVJ!|
America, 86 S. W. 883, 884, 112 Mo. Ar^
280.
Where a store containing insiired's ii '
tures and stock was locked for a half lioor i: i
noon while the persons in charge weret:
lunch, and during that tJmp ^^e property ^
destroyed by flre^ the store was not ^ I
"open for business,** within a provisioD of tb |
iron-safe clause in the policy, requirlv ^
assured shall ke^ his books and inTeob)? I
locked in a fireproof safe when tbe Nldisf |
is not actually open for busLneBS, or In sose i
place not exposed to a fire which would d^
stroy the building. Joffe ft Mankowiti ^ I
Niagara ITire Ins. Co., 81 AtL 281, 283,lli
Md. 166, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1217.
OPEN HOU8B
Under Acts 81st Leg. c 17, 1 15i deflnisf
an "open house" as one in whldi no scnesi
obstructing the view throned the place of »
trance into such house are used, a salooD<^
ducted in a wing of the entrance lobby <kS
hotel in plain Tlew of the aitranoe ti>e^
is conducted in an "open house." Doyle«(
Scott (Tex.) 184 S. W. 829, 83a
Acts 30th Leg. c. 138, • 15, leqniritf Pf^
sons engaged in the sale of intoxicatiits ^t
uors to be drunk upon the premises to P^
bond conditioned that ttiey will keep an oi^
house, and defining an "open house" « J*
in which no screen or other derioes areoaj
inside or outside such house tbat will f>>
struct tbe view throng the open door ^
OPEN MARKBT
741
OPEN SHOP
i of entrance where the liquors are sold,
not require that ordinary doors used at
entrances shall be constructed of trans-
nt material, and a failure to so construct
I is not a breach of the bond, where there
) other screen or deyioe to obstruct the
through the open door. State ▼. W. C
d & Sons (Tex.) 136 S. W. 182, 183.
!N MABKET
In an action against a carrier for dam-
to a shipment of cattle, in a requested
'uctlon for defendant that there was no
mce to show that the cattle in certain
were not sold in "open market" on a
lin date, the words "open market" unez- i
led would necessaHly have confused and |
ed the Jury, and, if by "open market" i
meant that the sale was made before'
close of the regular market as held that
the request should have been so framed
) express that meaning. Baltimore & O.
;o. y. WhitehUl, 04 AU. 1083, 1039, 104
295.
m MORTGAOB CLAUSE
The indorsem^t on a fire policy that
if any, shall be payable to the mortgagee
is mortgage interest may appear, desig-
s the payee of any loss which, for the
K)se8 of distinction, has been called "open
:gage clause," but does not bring insurer
mortgagee into contractual relations with
other, either directly or through an as-
ment of the policy, and neither does the
^gagee thereby become a person whose
erty or property interests are insured
iv the policy, and the contract for indem-
remains one exclusively between insurer
the owner of the property. ColUnsvllle
Soc. V. Boston Ins. Co., 60 Atl. 047, 048,
;onn. 076, 00 L. B. A 924.
:h, notorious, and continu-
ous change of possession
The words "open, notorious, and continu-
change of possession," used to describe
of the requisites of a valid sale of prop-
as against the seller's creditors, means
the possession taken must be actual, and
t be of such a character as to apprise the
nunity, or those who are accustomed to
with the seller, that the goods have
iged hands, and that the title has passed
of the seller and into the buyer. Wil-
s V. Youtsey, 131 S. W. 706, 706, 151 Mo.
09.
:n policy
An open or unvalued policy is one in
^b the value of the interest at risk is not
I in the policy, but is estimated by a cer-
standard, and in case of loss is made out
)roof. Peninsular A O. S. S. CJo. v. At-
Ic Mut Ins. Co., 185 Fed. 172, 174.
An "open policy of insurance" is one
re the value of the property insured is not
agreed on or liquidated. On an open policy
of marine insurance on a cargo, the recovery
in case of a total loss is the value of the car-
go, at the place of shipment, and does not in-
clude a loss of profits. Leonard v. Bosch, 08
AtL 60, 73 N. J. Eq. 438.
Under a marine insurance policy cover-
ing an importation valuing the property at
the invoice, an invoice, not stating the actual
cost or actual market value, as required by
Act Cong. June 10, 1890, c. 407, 20 Stat 131,
to be stated in the "invoice"* accompanying
importations, was not such an invoice as the
contract contemplated ; and hence the policy
was an open and not a valued one, and, the
insured, having paid in reliance on the valua-
tions given in such invoice, might recover
back the excess over the actual value. Insur-
ance Co. of North America v. Willey, 98 N. B.
077, 079, 212 Mass. 76.
Civ. Code, { 1793, defines insurance as a
contract whereby one undertakes to indem-
nify another against loss. Section 1846 pro-
vides that a policy is either open or valued.
Section 1840 defines an open policy as one in
which the value of the thing insured is not
agreed upon, but left to be ascertained in
case of loss. Section 1847 defines a valued
policy as one which provides that the thing
insured shall be valued at a specified sum.
Section 1877 provides that double insurance
exists where the same person is insured by
several insurers in respect to the same sub-
ject. Section 1878 provides that in case of
double insurance each insurer shall contrib-
ute ratably toward the loss. Sess. Laws 1905
c 120, prescribes a standard form of fire pol-
icy which provides that the amount of in-
surance written therein on real property shall
be taken conclusively to be the true value.
Held that, under the standard policy, the
value of real property on total loss is conclu-
sively fixed by the total of all the insurance
written therein which is the amount of the
policy and concurrent insurance, and the total
amount of loss Is the sum total of insurance,
and, the value of the property being condu-
sivedy fixed at a sum equal to the loss, the
several policies cannot be prorated. Lawver
V. Globe Mut Ins. Co., 127 N. W. 016, 019,
26 S. D. 649.
Valued polloy distinKiiislied
See Valued Policy.
OPEN SHOP
An employer who does not discriminate
between union and nonunion labor, but leaves
the matter to the voluntary choice of his em-
ployes, maintains an "open shop." Shine v.
Fox Bros. Mfg. Co., 150 Fed. 357, 80 C. C.
A 811.
The term "open shop" has a distinctive
trade meaning, and in reference to trade mat-
ters means that in selecting employes there
should be no discrimination against union or
nonunion men. The term excludes the idea
OPI^ STORE
742
OPENlfESS, NOTORIETY
of dlscriminatioii against men because of
tbelr membership in a union. The moment
men are discriminated against with refer^ice
to their employment because they are union
men, the shop pursuing this policy becomes a
"closed shop." The principle of an "open
shop** is that in it men are employed regard-
less of whether they are union or nonunion.
This is the sense in which the term '*open
shop*' is invariably used. Sackett ft Wil-
helms L. & P. Go. v. National Ass'n of Em-
ploying Lithographers, 113 N. Y. Supp. 110,
114, 61 Misc. Rep. 160.
OPEH STORE
The Iceeping of a fruit stand open on
Sunday for the sale of fruit is the keeping of
an "open store" within Code Miss. 1906, |
1367, providing that a person shall not keep
open his store on Sunday for the purpose
of disposing of any wares or merchandise,
etc. City of Oulfport v. Stratakos, 43 South.
812, 90 Miss. 489, 18 Ann. Cas. 855.
OPEH TO USE
The words "open to use,'* as used in an
act providing that every railroad company
or corporation whose lines or road, or any
part thereof, is "open to use,*' shall within
six months after the passage of the act main-
tain fences on the sides of their roads, or
the part thereof "open to use,*' where the
same passes through, along, or adjoining in-
closed or cultivated fields or uninclosed lands,
and that any such railroad company failing
to maintain such fences shall be liable to the
owners of Uve stock killed, injured, or dam-
aged by their agents, employes, engines, or
cars, do not include a railroad which the evi-
dence shows was built in 1872, and further,
that an owner of stock had done business
with the "Rio Grande** for 25 years. Denver
& R. G. R. Go. V. Kelso, 90 Paa 05, '66, 40
Colo. 84.
OPEH VISIBLE RISK
An "open visible risk" is such a one as
would instantly appeal to the senses of an in-
telligent person familiar with the business,
and about which there can be no difference of
opinion in the minds of intelligent persons;
and it is not required that the servant make
close scrutiny into all the details of the in-
strumentalities with which he deals to de-
termine the risk involved. Millen v. Pacific
Bridge Co., 95 Pac. 196, 199, 51 Or. 58a
OPEHED AHB DEDICATES TO PUB-
UO USE
See Way Opened and Dedicated to Public
Use.
OPEHIHG OF THE OOUBT
Code 1882, | 4926, providing that defend-
ant shall file his answer in writing on or
before the "opening of the court" at the re-
turn term of the suit, is mandatory, and a
rule of court providing that new cases shall
be called for assignment on the seoond Moa-
day of the ttf m, and that defendants sboold
have until *fuch call to file answer in all ose
where an appearance has been entered dar-
ing the first day of the term, is void. It \m
an unwarranted construction to extend tbe
meaning of the words "opening of the court"
to include any other day except tbe first dar
of the term. If the plea could be filed after
the first day of the term, it could be filed oo
the last day, as well as on any Intermediitf
day. To give any other oonstmction to tliii
statute would be to deprive it of t definite
meaning in this regard. Lippman v. ftu
Ins. Co., 47 8. E. 093. 594, 120 Ga. 247.
OPEHIHO STATEXEHT
As pleading, see Pleading.
OPEHLT
An answer setting up that a waste ditdi
was used continuously, openly, peaceablj.
etc., flufllciently shows that tbe use was cot
clandestine, as the word "openly" sufficieDtij
shows that f^ct Abbott t. Pond, 76 Ptc
60, 142 Oal. 898.
OPEHI.Y OUTRAGE PUBLIC DECEKCY
The statute (St. 1893, $ 2552; Wilsons
Rev. & Ann. St 1903, | 2650) making it la
offense to commit any act which "openly oai-
rages public decency" and is Injurious to
public morals is directed against acts wbi- i:
are committed openly and affect the public.
A doctor's private office is not siich a phut
as will give an act committed therein tte
character of an open act, especially when c?
one was present except the one against wboit
the act was committed. Gunn v. Territory, SI
Pac 861, 862, 190 OkL 240.
OPEHI.Y POSSESS
Where a petition alleges that the plfli^
tiffs own and "openly possess*' land, tbe pet
tion is not drawn under Act No. 38 of l^-
authorizing suits to establish title to rea^
estat^ where neither of the claimants are i£
actual possession, since the quoted phras
cannot be construed as an averment sinpjJ
of title to the land, but means to possess i:
an open manner; publicly; not In prlTate
without secrecy ; by some word or act vhic:
is an open declaration to those Ui the neirii
borhood that they are exercising the rlgbts
of ownership. McHugh v. Albert Haiis?a
Lumber Co., 56 South. 636, 637, 129 La. 6S)
OPEHHESS, HOTORIETT, AHD BXOX-
SIVEHESS OF PO8SE88I0K
An instruction that "openness, notoriety,
and excluslveness of possession" are sh-^'^
by such acts In respect of the land in its coe
ditlon at the time as comport with owwr
ship, such acts as would ordinarily ^ I^
formed by the true owner in appropriatit?
the lands or its avails to his own nse, or pre-
venting others ftrom the use of it as ftr ^
reasonably practicable, was correct Alaba^
OPENWOHK ARTICLES
743
OFERATB
ma State Land Ck>. t. Matthews, 03 South.
174, 175. 168 Ala. 200.
DPENWOBX ABTIOI.es
As exnbioiderles, see Bmbroidery*
Not dutiable as articles in iinltation of
lace, see Articles Within Tariff Act
OPERA
The word "opera** is different in mean-
ing from the words "opera house," in that
the former may have no relation to the build-
ing in which it may be rendered, and so a
"theater" may mean a place where plays are
produced, whereas a "theater building" may
be such whether plays are produced therein
or not Neher v. Vlviani, 110 Pac. 095, 098,
15 N. M. 460.
OPERA HOUSE
Opera distinguished, see Opera.
The word "opera" is different in mean-
ing from the words "opera house," in that
the former may have no relation to the
building in which it may be rendered, and
so a "theater" may mean a place where
plays are produced, whereas a 'theater
building" may be such whether plays are
produced therein or not Neher ?• Vivia^i,
110 Pac 695, 698, 16 N. M. 460. ,
OPERATE
See Cease to be Operated; Constructed,
Run, and Operated; Continuously Op-
erated; In Operation; Physical Op-
eration of Switch ; Properly Operated;
Under the Control, Management, or
Operation.
The word "operate" is defined as "to
put in action and supervise the working of,
as to operate a machine," or as "to put into
or to continue in operation; to work, as to
operate a machine." Thus, by a strict def-
inition, the meaning of the phrase "operat-
ing a machine," as used in Labor Law, § 81,
providing that children under 16 years of
age shall not be permitted to operate, or as-
sist in operating, dahgerous machinery of
any kind, would be to work the machine, or,
in other words, to regulate and control its
management and operation. Gallenkamp v.
Garvin Mach. Co., 86 N. Y. Supp. 378, 384,
91 App. Div. 141 (dissenting opinion by In-
graham, J., adopted in 72 N. E. 1142, 179 N.
Y. 688. Citing Stand. Diet ; Imp. Diet).
In an action against an abutting owner
for injuries from defects in the cover of a
coal hole, where the complaint predicates
negligence of the defendant in the manage-
ment, operation, and control of the sidewalk,
and in keeping the coal hole in defective or-
der, and in failing to provide proper warning
as to the defective state of the coal hole
cover, there is no l^al differentiation be-
tween the terms "management" "operation,"
and "control," and any one of them would
be suQcient to justify the admission of tes-
timony to sustalA a delinquency intended to
be charged. Maldosky y, Germania Bank,
127 N. Y. Supp. 292, 293.
Under Code Va. Supp. 1898, 9 2486, pro-
viding that "all persons furnishing supplies
to a mining or manufacturing company nec-
essary to the operation of the same shall
have a prior lien upon the personal property
of such company other than that forming
part of its plant," etc., supplies necessary to
the "operation of a manufacturing establish-
ment" are such as pertain to its output, and
do not include material or machinery nec-
essary to the construction, equipment, and
completion of its plant, and for the latter
the statute gives no lien. American Wood-
working Machinery Co. v. Agelasto, 136 Fed.
899, 400, 69 O. O. A. 248.
The phrase "purchasing or construct-
ing," as used in Const, art. 10, § 12a, and
Laws 1903, p. 93, authorizing certain cities
with the assent of two-thirds of the voters
thereof, voting at an election for the purpose,
to become indebted In a larger amount than
specified in Const, art. 10, 9 12, not exceed-
ing an additional 5 per cent of the value of
the taxable property for the purpose of pur-
chasing or constructing waterworks or elec-
tric light plants to be owned exclusively by
the dty so purchasing or constructing the
same, do not give cities the power to issue
bonds for the purpose of maintaining and op-
erating waterworks or electric light plants, for
the power to maintain and operate water-
works and electric light plants is not necessa-
rily incident to or implied in the power to
purchase or construct waterworks or electric
light plants, for the word "maintain" does
not mean to provide or construct, but to keep
up and preserve, and the word "operate"
means to put into or continue in operation
or activity. State ex rel. City of Chillicothe
V. Wilder, 98 S. W. 465, 467, 200 Mo. 97.
The expression "operate as a grant,"
used by the Supreme Court of the United
States in construing the confirmatory act of
June 13, 1812 (2 Stat 748, c. 99), to operate
as a grant of the fee from the United States
to the claimant of land, is in no case used
by that court in any different sense. It is
simply a judicial construction to the effect
that Congress intends by an act of confirma-
tion, where there is a confirmee or class of
confirmees to take thereunder, that the same
shall operate to vest in the confirmer any
legal title which may be in the United States.
Catron v. Laughlin, 72 Pac 26, 31, 11 N. M.
604.
Operatliic ear
EiUgaged in operation of car, see En-
gaged.
Operating encina
Engaged in operating engine, see En-
gaged.
OFXKATB
744
OP£RATB
09«r«tlac k««M eff pvMtltstioA
Since a eontlcUon of a Tlolatioii 4if Act
April 26, 1900, pnnlflhlng one who aball en-
gage or asslet in operating or managing any
house of proetltntion, cannot be had nnlees
it is shown tliat accused tiad control of and
conducted or assisted in the management and
operation of the affairs of the bouse In some
manner, or that be was abU to brine about
or assist in bringing about prostitution, a
charge that if accused in any manner aided
or abetted a third person in the management
of the house he is guilty is erroneous; the
word "management" meaning the act of man-
aging; the manner of treating, directing,
carrying on, or using for a purpose; and
the word "operate" meaning to put into or to
continue in operation or actiTity ; the word
"manager" meaning one who baa the conduct
or direction of anything; and the phraee "to
carry on," when applied to business, mean-
ing to prosecute, to help forward, to oon<
tinue, etc. Trozso ▼. Peoplei 117 Pac. 160,
154, 51 Oolo. 323.
Operatlac yllfoadl
Engaged in operation of railroad, see
Engaged.
Code, i 2071, makes every railroad com-
pany liable for damages to employte by the
mismanagement of the engineers or other
employte, when such wrongs are in any man-
ner connected with the "use and operation'*
of any railway about which they shall be
employed. PlaintUf was a machinist's helper
in the machine shop of defendant railroad
company where engines were brought for
repairs; his duty being to block, the wheels
of an engine when placed over the draw pit
in the shop and to remove such blocks when
the engine was to be moved. After one set
of wheels had been put on an engine and it
was about to be moved by another engine,
in order to put on the second pair of drivers,
plaintiff attempted to brush a chock from
under the wheel of the dead engine, when
the other engine started without warning
and crushed his hand. The operating de-
partment of the railroad had no control over
the machine shops, which were used only for
repairing disabled equipment which had been
withdrawn from service, and not merely for
temporary repairs and cleaning, as were the
roundhouses. Held, that the statute refer-
red to the physical "use and operation" of
the railroad in transportation, and the rails
on the shop floor did not constitute a ''rail-
way," nor was the movement of the repair-
ed engine by the other engine done in the
"use and operation" of the railway, within
the meaning of the statute, so that tne com-
pany was not liable for the negligence of
the engineer in starting the live engine.
Slaats V. Chicago, M. ft St. P. Ry. Co., 129
N. W. 63, 64, 149 Iowa, 735, Ann. Gas. 1912D,
642.
The risk of Injury attending the removal
from the track of a hand car used fbr the
tiaiisportatJoii of a section oew tiid »•
terials is peculiar to the "operation of nfl-
roads," within Bev. 8t 1886, | 1818, ii
amended by Laws 1908, p. 741, c 448, prorU-
ing that every raihroad Bball be Uable for
damages to its employte, provided tbe wot
shall arise from a risk peculiar to tbe "oper
ation of railroads." Hardt v. Chictgo, IL t
St P. Ry. Co., 110 N. W. 427, 481, 130 ^
612.
Where a section hand, engaged with otb-
ers in trucking rails, was injured by a nil
which he was standing astride being snddfs-
ly dropped to the ground, in view of the
necessity of haste caused by frequently ps5<^
ing trains and the embarrassment of standics
ground between rails and ties, tbe Injnrr
was one arising from a risk peculiar to tbe
operation of railroads within 8t 1898, | ISii
as amended by Laws 1908, p. 741, e. 418.
making the company liable for socb injories,
though caused by the negligence of a Mot
servant Meo v. Chicago ft N. W. By. Co,
120 N. W. 344, 138 Wis. 340.
The complete control and manigemat
of the track is the very easoioe of "operat-
ing" a railroad. Bedford*Bowllng Greei
Stone Oa ▼. Oman, 184 Fed. 441, 450i
. Hie word •^operate,'' In St 1808, | M
requiring railroads to be fenced and pn^
ed with cattle guards within three nootls
from the time of commencing to "operate the
same,'* refers to the transportation of goods
and passengers, and not to tbe numing of
construction trains. Nordean v. MlnDeapoli&
St P. ft a 8. M. By. Co., 185 N. W. 150. U
148 Wis. 027.
A joint traffic arrangement undtf whidi
one line hauls the cars of another within
the state does not constitute the "operatioc
of a railroad." Slaughter v. CanadUn Pie
Ry. Co., 119 N. W. 398, 400. 106 Minn. 26i
A blacksmith engaged in constractioii of
a railroad bridge, and injured by tbe act of «
feUow servant in letting a coll of rope tiH
whUe they were both at camp, Ib not injarefi
in the ^'operation of a raUroad," witbls tbe
meaning of the railway fellow-serrast att
(Revlsal 1906, i 2646). O'Neal v. Soatb k W
B. Co., 67 S. SL 1022, 1023, 1S2 N. G 4W
A cause of action against a railroad opff*
atlng a road in front of premises tocnxs
when every part of the road is adjusted l<^
cording to its final construction and It bcgiffl
to carry passengers, for until tiiat time K i^
not in "operatton," defined as actlTeexerdse
of some specific function of office^ or power ex
erdsed in producing an effect tfaoa^ P^^^
to that time construction and ^perlineou
trains had been operated. Rothman t Inter
borough Rapid Transit Co., 121 N. T. Si#
200, 201, 66 Misc. B^i. 37&
An employ^ of a railroad company, en-
gaged in trucking freight from a wardwo*
to a freight car. la within the protectl«
OBERATB
746:
OPSiRATB'
of Rev. St 1899^ { 2878, makliig orery rail-
road corporation liable for all injuries %o a
servant while engaged In the work of operat-
ing the railroad by reason of the negligence
of any other servant Orendorff v. Terminal
R. Ass'n of St Louis, 92 S. W. 148, 149, 116
Mo. App. 34&
The fellow servant act <PriT. Laws 1897,
p. 83, c. 66, I 1), giving a servant of any
railroad company "operating" in the state a
right of action against the company for in-
juries sustained through the negligence of
a fellow servant, is not applicable to an in-
jury sustained by a servant assisting in tha
construction of a railroad at a point five or
six milea from the completed track, and still
further from the track on which trains were
being operated. The word "operatiag," as
applied to a railroad, means operation in the
course of its business in any of Its depart-
ments but not in the course of its construc-
tion. Nicholson V. Transylvania R. Oo.» 51
8. E. 40, 41, 138 N. O. 616.
While the mere repair of a roadbed or
track is not operation of a rivllroad, yet the
risk of injury attending the removal from the
track of a hand car used for the transporta-
tion of a section crew and materials is pe-
culiar to the ''operation of railroads*' within
a statute providing that every railroad shall
be liable for damages to its employes from
risks peculiar to the **operatlon of railroads?'
Hardt V. Chicago. M. & St P. Ry. C!o., 110 N.
V* 427, 431, 130 Wis. 512.
Doder the statute providing that every
railroad corporation owning or operating a
railroad shall be Uable for all damages sus-
tained by any servant, "while engaged in the
work of operating such railroad, by the neg-
ligence of any other agent or servant there-
of," a fireman who, after attending to the
headlight of his engine, stood in front of the
pUot a short time, and, while returning to the
cab, was struck by lumber projecting from
the door of one of the passing cars, was
engaged in the "operation of a railroad."
St Louis & S. F. R. Co. V. Bussong, 90 S. W
72, 73, 40 Tex. av. App. 476.
A contractor to furnish logs to a saw-
mill over a logging railroad, to which spurs
were connected and on which a log skidder
was operated solely to haul logs to a point
where they could be loaded on cars and traos-
ported to the mill, was a person "operating
a railroad" within Sayles* Ann. Civ. St 1897,
art. 4560h, providing that all persons engaged
In the common service of a person operating
a railroad in the same grade of employment
and together doing the same character of
work at the same time and place are 'fellow
servants," and that employes who do not
come within such provisions are not ftellow
servants. Hampton ▼. Woolsey (Tex.) 139 S.
W. 88S, 890.
Asm* at ISMs I 2873,' makes every rafl-
road liable for damages sustained by a serv-
ant while engaged in operating the railroad
by reason of the negligence of another serv-
ant Section 1192 requires railroads to carry
a limited amount of baggage for each pas-
senger, and section 1100 requires them to give
XiheckB i&erefor. Plaintiff was Injured while
engaged with another employ^ in transferring
baggage from and to passenger trains to the
baggage rooms of defendant railroad termi-
nal company. H^d, that plaintiff was en-
gaged in "operating the railroad," within
section 2873. Turner v. Terminal R. Ass'n
of St Louis, lU S. W. 841, 842, 132 Ma App.
38.
Rev. St 1899, i 2873, provides that ev-
ery railroad corporation owning or operating
a raUroad in this state shaU be liable for any
damages sustained by any agent or servant
thereof while engaged in the work of operat-
ing such railroad by reason of the negligence
of any other agent or servant thereof. Held,
that the work of repairing or reconstructing
a bridge over which a railroad company's
track was laid is work performed in "operat-
ing such railroad," within the meaning of
the statute. Huston v. Quincy, O. & K. C.
R. Co., 107 S. W. 1045, 1048, 129 Mo. App.
576.
Rev. St Mo. 1899, i 2873, providing that
every railroad corporation shall be liable for
all damages sustained by any servant while
engaged in the work of ''operating such rail-
road," by reason of the negligence of any
other agent or servant thereof, is not limited
in its application to the servants of the rail-
road company actually engaged In the oper*
ation of trains thereon, but Includes all serv-
ants whose work is directly necessary for
the running of trains, and therefore includes
section hands engaged in z^)alring the road.
Callahan v. St Louis Merchants' Bridge
Terminal Ry. Co., 71 S. W. 208, 170 Mo. 478,
60 L. R. A. 249, 94 Am. St Rep. 746.
Under Railroad Law (Laws 1890, p. 1113,
c. 565, t 101) as amended by Laws 1897, p.
776, c. 688, relating to street surface rail-"
roads, and providing that no corporation con-
structing and operating a railroad under the
provisions of this article, etc., shall charge any
passenger more than five cents for one continu-
ous ride from any point on its road, "or on
any road, line or branch operated by U, or
under its control," to any other point thereof,
etc., and Railroad Law (Laws 1890, p. 1096, c.
565, { 39) imposing a penalty on any railroad
corporation receiving more than the lawful
rate of fare, etc., the operation or control
of a road within the meaning of such sections
means a control of the operation of the road,
and not merely a control of the corporation
or individuals operating it by reason of the
ownership of a majority of the road's capi-
tal stock. Judgment Senior T.'Nefw York
OPJSRATB
746
OPKBATE
a^ R. Co., 97 N. T. Snpp. 646, lU App. DIt.
89.
Where a railway company for a fixed
rental furnished to a brewina company a
locomotive for the ezclnaiTe nee of the brew-
ing company in a yard containing tracks and
switches, the ties and rails for which were
owned by the railway company and the real
estate by the brewing company, and the engi-
neer and fireman operating the locomotiTO
were selected by the railway company and
paid by the brewing company, the mainte-
nance and operation of such yard was the
operation of a railway, within Rev. Laws
1905, I 2042, p^viding that every company
owning or operating a railroad shall be liable
for all damages sustained within the state
by any agent or servant thereof, without
contributory negligence on his part, by rea-
son of the negligence of any other servant
thereof, so that neither the railway company
nor the brewing company conld escape lia-
bility to an injured person upon the ground
that the injury resulted from the negligence
of a fellow servant, if the injured employ^
was exposed to a railroad hasant School v.
Chicago. St P., M. ft O. Ry. Co., 127 N. W.
433, 434. 112 Minn. 38, 45 U R. A. (N. a) 84L
In Gen. Laws 1899, p. 214, c. 125, | 1,
providing that whenever freight, baggage, or
other property has been transported over two
or more railroads operating any part of their
roads in this state and having an agent in
this state, or operated by any assignee, trus-
tee, or receiver of such railways, suit for loss
or damages thereto may be brought against
any one or all of such railroad corporations,
the term "operating any part of their roads
in this state" means that such corporations
are engaged in the transportation of freight,
baggage, or other property within the state.
Where the undisputed evidence showed that
a raUway track did not extend into the state,
and that the company was not engaged in the
transportation of any freight, baggage, or
other property within the limits of the state,
but, in the course of business between it and
another railroad company as connecting lines,
the engines and cars of each road recipro-
cally passed over the boundary line of the
states of Texas and Arkansas, in no sense
could It be said that such interchange of
bu&lness is within the term "operating any
part of their roads within this state." St
Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. V. J. H. White & Co.,
80 S. W. 77, 79, 97 Tex. 493.
Operatlas sAwaiill
An employ^ engaged in cutting and deliv-
ering logs to his employer's sawmill Is not
entitled to a lien, under Ballinger's Ann.
Codes & St I 5919, giving a lien for labor in
the operation of a sawmill, etc., but he may
assert a lien on the logs cut and delivered
under section 5390 et seq., giving to a person
performing labor on logs a lien thereon, etc
Oraham t. Gardner* 89 Pae. 171, 172, •&
Wash. 648.
Overmtiac stve«t vallway
Authority to an electric company to
''operate" its railway on a certain street does
not authorize it to exclude the public traa
the street nor to operate the railway so u
to render the street unnecessarily dAngeroos.
MciOm ▼. aty of Philadelphia, W AtL 3iQ,
342, 217 Pa. 243, 19 L. R. A. (N. &) 506l
It has been held thst a street railroad
company running its cars over portions of tbe
lines of another company by virtue of a lease
is not "operating" a railroad, as that tens
is employed in the Constitution and in Rail-
road Law, §§ 91, 102, requiring the consent of
abutting owners to the construction or cfpen-
tk<m of a street railroad. Topham ▼. Interor*
ban St R. Co., 86 N. Y. Supp. 295, 299. 42
Misc. Rep. 503 (citing IngersoU ▼. Nasao
Electric R. Co., 52 N. BL 545, 157 N. Y. 453.
48 L. R. A. 236).
Operatlaic tralas, locomotives, or con
Where plaintiif was Injured while blodc-
ing up a turntable so as to turn a push car
by the car being derailed and a timber there-
on falling on plaintiff, he was "operating «
car," within Sayles' Ann. Qv. St 1897. ait.
4560f, making railroads Uable for injuries to
employ^ while operating cars, etc^ by neidi-
genoe of other employ^ Missouri, K. ft I.
R9- Co. of Texas v. Bailey, 115 8. W. 601, 605.
53 Tex. Civ. ApQ. 295.
Injury to a railway sectionman, caused
by his foreman suddenly stopping a hand
car on which they were riding, did not arise
in the operation of railroad trains, within tbe
employer's liability act (Bums' Ann. St. 190S.
S 8017), making railroad companies liable for
injuries to employ^ in oiumerated cases.
Richey v. Qeveland, C, C. ft St. U R. Co., 96
N. E. 694, 697, 176 Ind. 542.
Where sectionmen in building a tempora-
ry track used a push car to bring the rails.
and plaintiff was injured by the falling of
a rail while being removed from the car to
the trade, the injury did not occur while ei^
gaged in the work of "operating a car,'* witli-
in the fellow servant rule of Batts' Ann. Qt.
St art 4560ea. Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co.
V. Anderson, 118 S. W. 127, 102 Tex. 402.
"Operate: • • • <2) To effect any re-
sult; exert agency; act (3) To bring about
a specified result (4) To produce the proper
or intended effect" Under Rev. St art 4560t
providing that every corporation operating
a railroad shall be liable for damages sos-
tained by any servant while engaged in oper-
ating its cars by reason of the negligence of
any other servant, though a fellow servaLL
an employ^ In a quarry was engaged in oper
ating a car, where he and another employ^
loaded It with rock, started it, and moimtfl
it when loaded, and by the use of brak^
regulated its speed down the track to Uie
OPKRATB
747
OPERATB
crusher, and after unloadUag it puabed It
back. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Webb, 72 S. W.
1044, 1046, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 4d8 (quoting
and adopdJig Office Stand. Diet.).
In a complaint, in an action by a servant
for injuries, ascribing the injury to the negli-
gent operation of a train by an engineer, the
word "operation" means management or con-
duct, and presupposes the existence of the
subject of operation, and does not extend to
negligence in the composition of the train,
and evidence tending to show negligence in
the composition of the train does not support
the averment. Reeves v. Henderson-Boyd
Lumber Co., 55 South. 191, 192, 172 Ala. 526
(citing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4992).
The term "operation," In an instruction
in an action for injuries to a passenger caus-
ed by the negligent handling and running of
the train, in which the court declared the
prima facie liability of the carrier for the
negligent "operation" and running of the
train, is synonymous with the term "run-
ning," and the instruction is not objection-
able as not confining the negligence to the
running of the train. Louisville, & N. R. Co.
V. Willis, 51 South. 134, 136, 58 Fla. 307.
"Operation" means how cars shall be run,
and what shall be done in that respect by a
street railway company, and does not relate
to fare. A provision in a contract between
a city and a street railway company that the
dty should not reduce fares below five cents
was not abrogated by a subsequent contract
providing that in the construction, mainte-
nance, and "operation" of its lines the com-
pany should be subject to all present or fu-
ture ordinances of the dty. Minneapolis St
R. Co. Y. City of Minneapolis, 155 Fed. 989,
1000.
Where a "fire knocker," for the purpose
of moving blocked cars of wood, to unload
which was a part of his duty, was attempting
to remove the block so as to move the cars
a short distance, and another "fire knocker"
was on top of the cars signaling the engineer
for the same purpose, they were engaged in
operating cars under Rev. St. 1895, art 4560f,
exempting persons engaged in "operating the
cars" from the fellow-servant rule. Texas
& P. Ry. Co. V. Johnson, 118 S. W. 1117, 1118,
55 Tex. Civ. App. 495.
One employed as night hostler in a rail-
road yard charged with the duty, pursuant to
the orders of his superior, of turning engines
when they come in the yard, seeing that they
get fuel, sand, and water, and are oiled,
wiped, and dispatched on the road, is not,
while inspecting a switch engine to deter-
mine whether it has been properly wiped,
engaged In the operation of a locomotive,
within the statute relating. to employes en-
gaged in the work of operating locomotives.
Galveston, H. & N. Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 109
S. W. 261, 263, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 591.
Where a railroad section foreman was In-
jured while assisting his colaborers in load-
ing rails onto a flat car composing part of a
train, while the train was at rest, he having
no duty to perform with reference to the
movement of the train, he was not engaged
in operating a car, locomotive, or train vrith-
in Sayles* Ann. Civ. St 1897, art. 4560f, pro-
viding that every person, receiver, or corpora-
tion operating a railroad shall be liable for
damages sustained by any servant or em-
ploy^ while engaged in operating cars, loco-
motives, or trains, by reason of the negligence
of any fellow servant St Louis Southwest-
ern Ry. Co. of Texas v. McGee (Tex.) 141
S. W. 1054, 1055.
An allegation in a petition that injury
occurring upon the derailment of a train was
caused from the manner in which the engine
and cars were being "operated," refers to that
which was being done by the employes on the
engine and cars at the time of the accident,
and not to the manner in which the train
was ordered to be run by the officials of the
road. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas v.
Poole, 133 S. W. 239, 240, 104 Tex. 36.
A freight handler negligently run into
by an engine while he was pushing a car to a
freighthouse by direction of his superior is
within Laws 1893, c. 220, making railroad
companies liable for injuries to any employ 6
through the negligence of another employ^,
without contributory negligence on his part,
while engaged in "operating cars." Ban v.
Chicago, etc., R. Qo., 69 N. W. 997, 998, 95
Wis. 69.
Plaintiff was engaged with others in dis-
tributlDg ties along a railway track. The ties
were placed on a car which was pushed along
the track by plaintiff and the other workmen
and the ties pulled or thrown off where need-
ed without stopping the car, if possible. It
was the duty of plaintiff to assist in starting,
stopping, and moving the car as well as
throwing off the ties. While he was moving
a tie thrown off, a co-employ6 caused another
to slide off, which Injured him. Held, that
plaintiff was injured while engaged In operat-
ing a car within the meaning of the statute,
declaring that the fact that injury in such
cases is due to the act of a fellow ser^^ant
does not defeat recovery. Freeman v. Shaw
(Tex.) 126 S. W. 53, 55.
Where railroad employes were transport-
ing ballast on a push car for repair of a
track, and had to remove the car from the
track between trips and replace it on the
track, they were "operating the car" within
a statute providing that a railroad company
shall be liable for injuries to a servant, in
operating a car, through the negligent act of
any other servant Seery v. Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 77 S. W. 950, 951, 84 Tex. Civ. App.
89.
Under Rev. St Mo. 1899, § 2864, as amend-
I ed by Laws Mo. 1906, pp. 185-137, providing
OPBRATB
748
OPEBATINa SXPEN8E8
tbat whenerer any person, Indudlng an em-
plo74 of the corporation or Indirldnal here-
inafter referred to, whoee death la eaiiaed by
the negligence of a coemployd thereof, shall
die from an Injury resulting from or occa-
sioned by the negligence, unsklUfulnesa, or
criminal Intent of any officer, agent, serrant,
or whilst running, conducting, or managing
any locomotive, car, or train of ears, or any
street car, or of any master, pilot, engineer,
agent, or employ^ whilst running, conducting,
or managing any steamboat, or of any driver
of any stage, automobile, or other public con-
veyance whilst in diaige of the same as a
driver, and when any passenger shall die
from an injury resulting from any defect or
insufficiency in any railroad, or in any loco-
motive, car, street car, steamboat, stage, au-
tomobile, or other public conveyance, the cor-
poration, or individual in whose employ any
such officer, agent, servant, master, pilot, en-
gineer, or driver shall be when such injury
is committed, or who owns, operates, or con-
ducts any such railroad, locomotlvei car,
street car, automobile, coach, or other public
conveyance when any injury is received re-
sulting from or occasioned by any defect or
Insufficiency, unsklllfulness, negligence, or
criminal intent above declared, shall forfeit
and pay as a penalty tor every such person,
employ^, or passenger so dying not less than
$2,000, nor more than $10,000 in the discre-
tion of the jury, which may be sued for and
recovered by persons bearing specified rela-
tions to deceased, the words "operates or con-
ducts" do not include a tnere servant of a
railroad company or other, public carrier,
but has reference to the railroad company or
Individual, using the locomotive, cars, or oth-
er conveyances of another railroad company
or individual, as lessee or bailee for the par-
ticular purpose. Chicago, R. I. 4 P. B. Co. v.
Stepp, 151 Fed. 908, 918.
The term "operation," as used in Sayles*
Ann. Civ. St. 1897, art. 4560f, providing that
every person or corporation operating a rail-
road shall be liable for all damages sustain-
ed by any servant thereof while engaged in
the work of operating cars of such railroad
by reason of the negligence of a fellow serv-
ant, comprehends something more than the
mere running of cars, locomotives, and trains
of a railroad company. It Includes within
its meaning every employ^ who when injured
was performing some work In the line of his
duty directly connected with or Incident to
the movement and operation of a car, loco-
motive, or train. A servant of a railroad
company injured while unloading ties from
a box car in a train used for distributing the
ties along the trade by the negligence of a
fellow servant was engaged in work proxi-
mately and neoessaiily connected with the
operation of the cars at the time of his in-
jury and was oititied to the protection of
the statute. St Louia Southwestern Ry. Co.
of Itaaa ▼. Thornton^ 103 8. 'W. 437, 438^ 4fi
Tex. Civ. APP. 649.
OpeMtftac mmdMt pmUmt
A license to "operate under a pateof
does not authorise the licensee to tray op io-
fringing arttdes made by others, wbo hare
been adjudged infringers, and resell tbea
under its own name. Victor Talking Mad
Go. ▼. American Oraph^^hone Co., 178 Fed.
577, 578.
Where defendant, which had been eDjoio-
ed from infringing a patent owned by cosi-
plainant, covering a sound-producing apiian-
tus for talking machines, including the 9mA
record, under a subsequent contract wltb
complainant was given the right to "operate"
under such patent, in return for the giantlDg
of a like right under a patent of its own, it
had the right to sell records made by another,
as well as those of its own make, and wu
not chargeable with violation of the injnoe-
tion because It sold records made by aootber,
who had been held as a contributoiy infrios-
er of complainant's patent; snch reGordi
however, not being a direct Infringemest
American Oraphophone Co. v. Victor Talkiog
Mach. Co., 188 Fed. 580, 581, 106 C. GL A m
OPERATE SUBSTAETIAUiT AS BE-
80BIBED
The words *^ operate substantiaUy i->
deecribed,** at the end of a dalm hi an ap-
plication for a patent, do not import into the
dalm elements described in the spedflcatioa
but not mentioned in the dalm for tbe pur-
pose of either extending or limiting it G€fi^
eral Blectric Co. v. International Spedaltj
Co., 126 Fed. 755, 768, 61 O. C. A 329; ft
Long Hook & Eye Co. ▼• Francis Hook & Eje
& Fastener Co., 150 Fed. 601, nota
OPERATED WITHOUT LI0EH8E
See License (Governmental Begulatioo).
OPERATIHG EXPEK8E8
The "operating expenses" of a raflraad
Include the value of the use of property tbat
is used but not consumed in rendering tbe
service, as well as the value of labor aai
management used, and of property used and
consumed, in rendering the service. State c
rel. Railroad Com'rs v. LoulsvUle & >•• ^
Co., 57 South. 673, 676, 63 Fla. 274.
It has been held that taxes, rents ac^
cost of construction are ^'operating expenses
of a railroad. There are some kinds of (^
struction, some kinds of rents, and ^(^
kinds of taxes, that ought not to be ebars^d
as "operating expenses" ; but whether or B'^
rents, taxes, and cost of construction are ''it-
erating expenses'* depends on the circuis-
stances of each particular case, to be det^
mined by the evidence. Schmidt t. l^
vUle, C. & L. By. Co., 84 a W, 81i 31S, ^
Ky. 287.
Liabilities incurred by the recetreroi^
railroad for car rentals^ for cars destrop^
OPKRATION
7i9
OPERATOB
by fire, for rolling stock, equipment and traf-
fic balances doe other roads, and for dam-
ages for injuries to persons or property caus-
ed by torts of the servants of tbe receiver
are legally classed as items of "operating ex-
penses.'* St Louis Union Trust Co. v. Texas
Southern By. Go. (Tex.) 126 & W. 286^ SOO.
OPEBATION
See Mining Operation ; Negligent Opera-
tion.
A policy indemnifying an employer
against liability for claims for personal in-
juries to its employes while engaged in "oper-
ations connected with the business of iron
and steel works»" covers injuries received by
an employ^ by reason of the construction ol
a building by the employer for use in his
business. Hoven v. Smployers' Ldab. Ass'n
Oorp., 67 N. W. 46, 48, 83 Wis. 201, 32 L. B.
A38&
The word "thing" is defined as *that
which is or may become the object of
thought; that which has existence or is con-
ceived or imagined as having existence ; any
object, substance, attribute, idea, fact, cir-
cumstance^ event, etc. A thing may be mate-
rial or ideal, animate or Inanimate, actual,
possible, or imaginary." And the word "op-
eration" is defined as "the course of action or
series of acts by which some result is accom-
plished ; procesa (a) In surg., the act or se-
ries of acts and manipulations performed up-
on a patients body, as in setting a bone, am-
putating a limb, extracting a tooth, etc" An
indictment under the federal statute for mail-
ing a letter giving information where and
how and of whom and by what means arti-
cles and things designed and intended for the
procuring of an abortion might be obtained
states an offense, where it sets out a letter
written to defendant inquiring for some medi-
cine or other means for accomplishing such
result, and a letter, alleged to have been
mailed by defendant In reply, which, when
read in connection with the letter of inquiry,
in effect offers for a stated consideration to
effect the desired result by some treatment or
operation, although the particular means is
not specified; the word "thing," as used in
the statute, being a comprehensive term,
which Includes any kind of treatment or op-
eration. United States v. Somers, 164 Fed.
259, 261, 262 (quoting and adopting definition
in Cent Diet).
The term "operation," in an accident in-
surance policy issued to a physician which
covered "that class of injuries known as sep-
tic wounds, caused by accident while per-
formiiig any 'operation' pertaining to the
business of the insured," means treatment
pertaining to tlie business of insured, and the
company was liable where death was caused
by septicsemia resulting from a wound from
a broken bottle which he broke while prepar-
ing medicine for a patJaiit, Central Acddent
Ins. Ck>. ▼. Bembe, 77 N. B. 128, 126, 220 IlL
151, 6 Ii. B. A. (N. 8^ 833, 110 Am. St Bep.
285, 5 Ann* Oaa. 155.
A surgical ** 'operation' begins when the
opening is made Into the body and ends when
this opening has been closed in a proper
way after all appliances necessary to the
successful operation have been removed from
the body." Harris v, Fall, 177 Fed. 78, 84,
100 0. a A 487, 27 Lu B. A (N. S.) 1174
(quoting and adopting definition in Akridge v.
Noble, 41 S. B. 78, 114 Ga. 848).
OPERATIOK AXB BEPAIB
Labor performed in mowing grass, weeds,
and bushes off a railway right of way is
work done in the "operation and repair of a
railroad," within Sayles' Ann. Civ. St 1897,
art 3312. Idlssouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas
V. Bryan (Tex.) 107 S. W. 572, 576 (citing
Pittsburg & B. Pass. By. Co. v. City of Pitts-
burg, 80 Pa. 72, 74; Arthur v. City of
Charleston, 41 S. B. 171, 51 W. Va. 132).
OPERATIOK OF UkW
See Domicile by Operation of Law.
The suing out of an injunction to re-
strain a performance of a contract for street
improvements is not a prevention of perform-
ance by the "operation of law" within the
meaning of that phrase as used in Civ. Code,
§ 1511, providing that the want of perform-
ance of an obligation is excused when such
performance is prevented or delayed by the
"operation of law." Union Contracting ft
Paving Co. V. Campbell, 84 Pac 806, 806^ 2
Cal. App. 584.
OPERATIVE
See Practical Ballroad Operatives
Oivll eiiglneer
A civil engineer is not entitled to a lien
for wages earned by him in the construction
of a railroad under Bev. St. art 3312, be-
ing neither a "mechanic," "laborer," nor
"operative." Gulf & B. V. B Co. v. Berry,
72 S. W. 1048, 1050, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 3.
Operator distinguished
See Operator.
Workmam fHsttngwIshed
See Workmen.
OPERATOR
See Confidence Operator; Telegraph
Operator.
In an arbitration proceeding between
a railroad company, and the Order of Rail-
road Telegraphers, in which the question was
submitted whether members of the Order of
Railroad Telegraphers in the employ of the
railroad company should legislate for train
dispatchers relative to rates of pay, hours
of service, or otherwise, expert or opinion
evidence tending to show tlmt a train dis-
patcher was an entirejly different functionary
from a telegrapher oc "operator," that while
OPERATOR
750
OPINION
the dispatcher might be an operator he was
not necessarily such, his duties being very
dissimilar in character, largely administra-
tive, and of much greater importance not only
to his employer in carrying on the service but
to the safety and convenience of the public,
that he stood in a different relation to his
employer, as well in fact as in law, and rep-
resenting him in the discharge of his duties
as an alter ego or vice principal In his re-
lations with other employes, was competent
In re Southern Pac. Co., 155 Fed. 1001, 1004.
Operative dlstlBC^lshed
An ''operator" is one who operates or
produces an effect, while an "operative** is a
skilled workman, an artisan, or mechanic.
Seaboard Air Line By. v. Continental Trust
Co., 166 Fed. 587, 600.
OPHTHALMOLOGY
Practice of science as practice of medi-
cine, see Practice of Medicine.
OPINION
See Fixed Opinion; Intimation of Opin-
ion; Matter of Impression or Opinion.
An "opinion" is "a notion of conviction
founded on probable evidence; belief stronger
than an impression, less strong than positive
knowledge." In re Clark, 103 S. W. 1105,
1108, 126 Mo. App. 391 (quoting Webst. Diet).
"Opinion" arises when the assent of the
understanding is so far gained by the evi-
dence of probability that it rather inclines to
one persuasion than to another, yet not with-
out a mixture of uncertainty or doubt Bil-
ton V. Teerltory^ 09 Pac 163, 167, 1 OkL Cr.
566.
While the word "opinion," in a close and
strict sense, means a court's decision upon
pleadings and facts duly presented in a
cause, yet in a broader sense It means one's
'^notion," **idea," "view," or even one's "senti-
ments." Ex parte Clark, 106 S. W. 990, 998,
208 Mo. 121, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389.
In an action for injuries to a passenger,
testimony of plaintiff that she slipped on
material on the platform of the oar which
"looked like old ice" is not an "opinion" in its
ordinary sense, which is an inference as to
what will follow from a given state of facts,
"but is the observation of an existing condi-
tion." Murphy v. North Jersey St Ry. Co.,
80 Atl. 331, 334, 81 N. J. L. 706, 35 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 592.
As disqualifying a Jw«r
As applied to the opinion of a Juror when
challenged for bias, an "impression" of the
juror is correctly defined as an opinion, re-
membrance, or belief, especially when that is
somewhat indistinct or vague. Under St. I
7278, providing that if a Juror has formed
an "opinion" the court may examine him
and permit him to serre if satisfied Chat th6
Juror will render an impartial verdict on the
evidence, **oplnion" is a conclusion or a
judgment held with confidence but falling
short of positive knowledge, facts h^d to
show that the court did not abuse its dis-
certaln in overruling a diallenge for bias
after an examination on voir dire. Lindsey
V. State, 69 N. B. 126, 131, 69 Ohio. St 215.
False vepvesentatioa distlBcaiAed
See False Representation.
Impression or nnderstaadiag
There is "a marked distinction between
a matter of 'opinion' and a matter of 'impres-
sion* or 'understanding.* The former is predi-
cated upon the existence or nonexistence of
a fact. The latter is only a deduction drawn
from the assumption of that fact, so that,
while the one may rise to the standard of
evidence, the other is universally rejected as
such." Cross v. Aby, 45 South. 820, 822, 66
Fla. 311 (quoting and adopting definition in
Chalres v. Brady, 10 Fla. 133, 140).
An "opinion," within the meaning of
Bates* Ann. St | 7278, providing that if a
Juror has formed an opinion the court shall
thereupon proceed to examine him on the
grounds of such, opinion, etc., is well defined
as being a conclusion or Judgment held with
confidence but falling short of positive knowl-
edge, and while an "opinion** and an *im-
presslon" are alike In mind, there is an es-
sential difference between the two in degree,
an impression as applied to this subject-mat-
ter being correctly defined as, a notion, re-
membrance, or belief especially one that is
somewhat indistinct or vague. lindsey t.
State, 69 N. E. 126, 131, 69 Ohio St 215.
Within Gen. St 853, | 205, providing that
it shall be good cause of challenge to a Juror
that he has formed or expressed an opinion
on the issue or any material fact to be tried,
an impression depending only on the news-
paper account of the truth of which he had
no knowledge Is not an opinion. State v.
Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257. 279.
Jvdcmaat distliigoished
See Judgment (Of Court).
Statemeat of fact distincvislied
"To distinguish 'opinions' from 'state-
ment of facts,* the general rule is if the
vendor, knowing them to be untrue, makes
statements with the intention of misleading
the vendee, and if the latter, relying upon
them, is misled to his injury, or If he induces
the vendee not to make inquiries with re-
spect to value, or any extrinsic facts affect-
ing values, or makes statements In 8a<^ a
manner that the vendee. Instead of being put
on inquiry, is put off his guard, it has been
held that a substantial right to recover dam-
ages Is created, or the vendee may, at his
opinion, avoid the contract To effect this,
however, the representations must, as a
rule, be coupled with other olreumstances,
as where they «re><vaiidnteBtfy made of par-
OPINION
T51
OP.^ORT UNITY
ticulars in rdatton to the estate whititi the
vendee has not equal means of knowing* and
wliere he is Induced by the vendor's artifice
to forbear inquiries which he would other-
wise have made; but whether a representa-
tion as to value is merely an expression of
'opinion' or belief, or an affirmation of fact
to^be relied on, is a question for the Jury, and
should properly be left to their decision.
Again, while the purchaser must rely upon
his own judgment in questions of value, yet,
in regard to any extrinsic facts affecting the
quality or value of the subject of the con-
tract, he may rely upon the assurances of
the vendor ; and, if he does so rely, and those
assurances are fraudulently made to induce
him to enter into the contract, he may main-
tain an action for the injury sustained.**
Oneal v. Weisman, 88 S. W. 290, 292, 39 Tex.
Civ. App. 692 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion 2 Warv. Vendors, | 946).
A statement of a salesman of a seller of
an automobile that the tires of the machine
were as good as new was merely an expres-
sion of "opinion** as to their condition, and
not a statement of a present existing fact,
necessary to constitute a warranty. Warren
v. Walter Automobile Co., 99 N. Y. Supp. 396,
398, 50 Misc. Rep. 605.
OPIKION (Of Court)
See On the Opinion Below.
An "opinion" is a written statement by
the court of its reasons for the conclusion
reached from an examination of the law and
of the facts in controversy, but forms no part
of the Judgment, though it may with proprie-
ty be consulted tq explain an ambiguity
ther^b:u State v. Gray, 71 Pac. 978, 979, 42
Or. 261 (adopting definition in Houston v.
WlUlams, 13 CaL 24, 73 Am. Dec. 565 ; Keane
V. Fisher, 10 La. Ann. 261).
Hie "opinion** of a court giving the rea-
sons on which its Judgment is based is never
called a "report" In appellate tribunals,
when in a given case the court has reached
its conclusion, and is ready to pronounce Its
Judgment, some member of the court is usual-
ly designated to prepare the opinion, but
he Is never said to report it The opinion is
delivered, not reported, by him. Gillette v.
Peabody, 75 Pac. 18, 20, 19 Colo. App. 356.
In Pennsylvania practice, the docket en-
try, •*rule absolute for new trial," implies all
that Is meant by the words "Judgment vaoat-
ed, verdict set aside, and new trial granted,"
and following that practice in the United
States Circuit Court of the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, the words "opinion granting
a new trial filed,** entered in the appearance
docket of the Lnited States court, have the
effect of disposing of any doclcet entries
which stand In the way of the order, and Im-
ply all that is meant by the words "Judgment
vacated, verdict set aside, and new trial
granted/* Bv«ns v. Freeman, 140 Fed. 419^
428 (dtlng Fisher v. Hestonvllle^ M. & F.
Pass. Ry. Co., 40 Atl* 97, 185 Pa. 602).
Beeislon distimsvlslied
Under Rev. Civ. St. 1911, art. 1955, pro^
viding that a plaintiff may take a nonsuit be*
fore the Jury retires, and, on trial by the
Judge, before declsdon is announced, the term
"decision" Is not equivalent to "opinion,"
and, though the court in a case tried without
a Jury expressed an opinion indicating that
he intended to render a decision in favor of
the defendants, the plaintiffs would not be
precluded thereby from having a nonsuit (cit-
ing 2 Words and Phrases, p. 1901). Kidd v. .
McCracken, 150 S. W. 885, 887, 105 Tex. 383.
As Judgment
See Judgment (Of Court).
OPHnOIf EVIDEKOE
"Opinion evidence*' is that which Is giv-
en by a person of ordinary capacity who has
by opportunity for practice acquired a special
knowledge outside of the limits of common
observation and which may be of value In
elucidating a matter under consideration.
The experiential qualifications of the witness,
including his opportunity to observe the very
thing under inquiry, being first shown, his
special knowledge may be imparted in aid of
the Jurors at the trial under questions in
ordinary form. Crosby v. Wells, 67 Atl. 295,
298, 73 N. J. Law, 790.
All matters of physical facts are not
"opinion evidence*' In the legal sense of that
term. They are not theoretical, nor conclu-
sions drawn by inference, but a statement of
facts from personal observation, and hence
also they are not "expert evidence.** The
exceptions to the rule that witnesses cannot
give opinions is not confined to the evideuce
of experts testifying on subjects requiring
special knowledge, skill, or learning, but it
includes the evidence of common observers
testifying the result of their observations
made at the time in regard to common ap-
pearances, facts, and conditions which can-
not be reproduced and made palpable to a
Jury. Britt v, Carolina Northern R. Co., 61
S. E. bOl, 603, 148 N. C. 37.
OPIUM
See Crude Opium.
Manufacture of, see Manufactures — Man-
ufactured Articles.
Unmanufactured <:9itum» Bee Unmanu*
factured.
OPPORTUNITY
See Clear Opportunity.
By "opportunity" Is meant "fit or con-
venient time; suitable occasion; time or
place favorable for executing th» purpose
or doing the thing in question.*' Under 9
provision in a. policy of insurance that a de-
oppoBTUNrrr
7ia
OPPRESSION
Unqnent should bave thie ^^oppoitnnity for
reliiBtatemeiit on similar oonditloDs,'' tbe
context showing tliat tbo term '^slmUar oen-
dltlons" liad reference to tlie payment of
pastrdne premiums, assessments, and other
indebtedness, a d^inquent was entitled to
relnstatonent, and, if tbe company refused
to reinstate him, to recover the premiums
paid In the absence of anything in the policy
which required the approval of the company,
or any of its officers as a condition precedent
to reinstatement Lane t. Fidelity Mut
Ufa Ins. Ck>., 64 & B. 864, 855, 142 N. 0. 66,
116 Am. St Bep. 728.
The rule that opportunity to know the
truth will prevent recovery means merely
that one may not blindly act on statement in
disregard of knowledge of their falsity or
with such opportunity that by the exercise
of ordinary observation, not necessarily by
search, he would have known thereof.
Jacobsen y. Whitely, 120 N. W. 286, 280, 138
Wis. 434.
OPPOSITE
The term "opposite," in a stipulation in
a contract between a railroad company and
landowners, providing that the former
should have certain rights respecting land in
consideration of the construction of its
railroad, and that the company would cause
its railroad to be constructed within one
year and in operation "opposite" lands of the
parties by a time fixed, must be liberally and
reasonably construed so as to carry into
effect the general intent expressed in the
contract, and means a place or places from
which the land can be reached for develop-
ment of its resources, it being underlaid with
coal, economically and conveniently, consid-
ering the topography of the land and all ma-
terial circumstances, and completion of the
road to a point 10 miles distant from the
place from which this can be done, is not a
compliance with the stipulation, though it is
possible to build a branch road to the land
from that point Adams v. Guyandotte Val-
ley Ry. CJo., 61 S. E3. 341, 343, 64 W. Va. 181.
Advevee syiumyaioiis
"Opposite" is a synonym of "adverse.*'
Prunty v. Consolidated Fuel, etc., Co., 108
Pac. 802, 803, 82 Kan. 641 (dtlug Webst Uni-
versal Diet).
OPPOSITE PABTT
The term "opposite party," as used in a
statute providing for the reversal of a decree
entered on a bill taken for confessed, and
requiring reasonable notice to the opposite
party of the motion to reverse, does not mean
only the plaintiff, but any party to the. suit,
who has an interest in upholding the decree
sought to be reversed, whose pecuniary or
profiting interest would be prejudiced by re-
versal. It means opposite la interest Mor-
rison A Ottr T. Lea<di« 47 & & 287, 288, 55 W.
▼a.lML
Hie phrase "opposite party,** in tfaeetit
ute providing that when a suit is proseeoied
or defended by heirs, assigns, deriseea, lep
tees, or personal repres^tatlves of i d^
ceased person, the "opposite party" M
not be admitted to testify to matters eqnall;
within the knowledge of decedent, lefen ts
the real party in interest who must be coodiil-
ed by the determination of the suit Wbm
on appeal by heirs from an order allowinftbe
final account of the administrator, the isste
was whether certificates of deposit Id favorof
decedent and which had be^i in tbe bi&d»
of the administrator were a part of tbe es-
tate, the testimony of a witness od bebalf sf
the administrator that the property bdm
ed to her by gift causa mortis from deceda:
was not incompetent ; the witness sot beiii
the real party in interest Beed v. Whippie.
108 N. W. 648, 663, 140 MidL 7.
OPPOSITE TO
Laws 1816, c. 199, { 1, supplemeatiiii
Bev. Laws 1813, c. 74, | 4, allowed tbe co=
missioners of the land office to grant to ' i'^
jacent" owners land under the water sci
rounding Staten Island, which grant was d3:
to extend more than 600 feet from low-wit^r
mark. A riparian landowner applied for i
grant of land opposite to and "adjoining
his, and extending to a point 600 feet fni
low-watei' mark, and an aflMaTlt npps^
to his application described his land u b^
ing bound by the low-water mark. 1%e At
tomey General recommended that applies:
be granted the land "opposite to" tbat nci?
held by him, and the commissioiiers passed!
resolution that letters patent be issued t
him for the land under water applied for. A
patent was issued, describing tbe land pe&'
ed as beginning at low-water mark and ei
tending to a point 600 feet out Held, tb:
the words "adjoining" and "opposite u'
must be understood to be equlTalent to t^-
Jacent" as used in the statute, and the i?
plication must l>e taken to apply to l£i^
immediate contiguous to that of the ap^
cant, and as declaring that he owned the Us-
to low-water mark, and hence was ^v^
enough to Include any land lying between lu>
actual boundary and low-water maA »
that the patent must be construed as ff^-
ing to applicant all the land lying bettree:
his land and a line 600 feet out froio lov-
water mark, as any other construction wot*.
not be in accord with the commissioners' rer
olutlon, and would render the patent Toi
under the statute. Bardes v, Herman, i^
N. Y. Supp. 723, 720, 144 App. DlT. T^-
Warth V. Same, 129 N. T. Supp. 730. 144 m
Div. 943.
OPPRESSION
A poUce officer la guUty of "oppresaea"
mnder Pen. Code^ i 608, where he tf^ten'
OPaPBBSfiOEOK
758
OPTION
nloon, and, witfaont any JuetUlcatlon, point*
a pistol at a woman who la tbne^ and de-
tains her against her will, and oommlts acts
whereby she is Injured. People ez reL
Reardon t. Flynn, HI N. Y. Snpp. 1067, 58
Misc. Rep. 624.
Where a person goes to a billiard room
to collect a bill, and while there the place is
raided by the police on information that
gambling was going on theee^ and an officer,
tbongh told by soch person of the reason for
his presence, stmck him and t04^ him before
a magistrate for disorderly conduct, od
which charge the magistrate discharged him,
and such person was neither gambling nor
In the conunission of any overt act authorijE-
Ing his arrest, the polioe oflElcer was guilty of
"oppression" under Pen. Code, | 066. People
ex rel. Beardon ▼. Flynn, 111 N. X. Supp.
1065, 1066, 58 Bilsc Bep. 621.
"Oppression'* is defined by the Standard
Dictionary as "the act of subjecting to crueL
and unjust hardships." The mere omission
to repair a damage unintentionally, though
negligently done, cannot be said to be sub-
jection to cruel and unjust hardship. Civ.
Code, I 3294, authorizing an award of puni-
tive damages in an action not arising from
contract, where defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice, express or
implied, does not apply to a case of simple
negligence. That defendant constructed a
bulkhead adjoining plalntUTs property for
the purpose of retaining dirt, gravel, sand,
etc., so negligently that it gave way, and pre-
cipitated gravel, dirt, etc., onto plalntiiTs
premises, destroying a portion of his fence
and chicken house, was insufficient to show
such gross negligence, wantonness, or oppres-
sion aa to justify an award of punitive dam-
ages. Spencer v. San Francisco Brick CJo.,
89 Pac. 851, 852, 5 Oal. App. 126.
0PPBS88IVE ACT
There is no ftital inconsistency between
a general verdict against a sheriff on the
theory that he was a trespasser in making
an execution levy and special findings show-
ing that he acted "oppressively," though the
jury do not afflrmativrty find that the writ
was in his hands more than 60 days before
the levy so as to make him liable on the the-
ory that the writ was functus officio; an
'^oppressive*' act in its ordinary sense being
an act of cruelty, severity, unlawful ex-
action, domination, or excessive use of au-
thority. Gallegos v. Sandoval, 106 Paa 873,
376, 15 N. M. 216.
OPTIC
OPTICAIi IVSTBUlfiarX
Certain small slightly made magic lan-
terns not saffldently substantial to be used
by mature persons, but rather by ehildren as
toys, are not dutiable as "oi^al Instru-
3 WDS.& P.2D SEB.-48
meats,'* under Tariff Act 1894, 1 1, Schedule
B, par. 98. Borgfttdt t« United States, 224
Fed. 457, 45a
OPTIGIAN
Itinerant optician, as merchant, see Mer-
chant.
An "optician** is a maker of optical fu*
struments, and applies to a man who fits
glasses to the eyes. One who diagnosed
his patient's diseases by a microscopic exam*
inatlon of a drop of blood, and treated them
by placing them under the rays of electric
arc lights, is not an "optician" within Acts
U901, p. 115, c 78^ excepting opticians from
its provisions as to licensing persons practic-
ing medicine. O'NeU v. State, 90 S. W. 627,
628, 115 Tenn. 427, 3 L. B. A. (N. S.) 762.
OPTICS
The* term "optics," as defined by the
Standard Dictionary, is "the science that
treats of light and vision, the organs of
sight, chromatics, and all that is connected
with the phenomena of sight. It includes:
(1) Geometrical optics. (2) Physical optics,
embracing (a) the undulatory theory, and
the effect explained by it, as polarhsation,
refraction, and interference; and (b) elec-
trooptics, treating of such phenomena as de-
pends on bodily function or brain action."
O'NeU V. State, 90 S. W. 627, 629, 115 Tenn.
427, 3 L. B. A. (N. S.) 762.
OPTION
See At the Option of Either Party;
Buyer's Option; Local Option Law;
On Accepting this Option.
Agency distinguished, see Agency.
As property, see Property.
As sale, see Sale.
See, also, Attempt to Purchase.
An "option'* is an exclusive privilege to
buy; and a contract for an option is the
agreement by whiclL the privilege is created.
Benedict v. Pincus, 84 N. B. 284, 286, 191
N. X. 377.
An "option** is a right acquired by con-
tract to accept or reject an offer to purchase
property at a fixed price within a specified
time. Wlnslow v. Dundom, 125 Pac. 136, 138,
46 Mont 71.
An "option** is a continuing offer which
the offerer may not withdraw until the expi-
ration of the time limited. Adams y. Pea-
bOdy Coal Co., 82 N. E. 645, 646, 230 m. 469.
An "option" is simply a contract,' by
which the owner of property agrees that an-
other shall have a right to buy it at a fixed
price within a certain time. The owner does
not sell the property, but sells the privilege
to boy at the option of the other person.
McGregor ▼. Irdand, 121 Pac. 358, 86 Kan.
426 (cittQg 6 Words and Phrases, p. 5001).
OPTION
754
OPTION
""An option conveyB no tjitl* to the tlilnt
■old, bnt creates rights In personun, whidl
may be again sold or assigned by the Tsn-
dee." Womaek t. Coleman, 100 N. W. 9, 11,
92 Minn. 32a
An ^'option** has been defined to be "an
unaccepted offer to sell." It transfers no
title or right in rem, but areates a ri^t in
personam, and that right is to accept or re-
ject a present offer within a limited or rea-
sonable time In the future. It is a continu-
ing offer until the expiration of the time
limited. Btandiford t. Thompson, 135 Fed.
991, 996, 68 G. G. A. 425.
** 'An option contract to purchase' is but
a continuing offer to sell, and conveys no
interest in the property. • • • Although
based upon a consideration, it is but an of-
fer, a privilege extended, differing from an
ordinary offer only In this: That It Is not
rerocable, because based upon a valuable
consideration. An assignment of it therefore
passes no Interest in the property to which It
relates.'* Rease y. KitUe^ 49 S. B. 150, 154,
66 W. Va. 269 (citing CaldweU t. Frailer, 68
Pac. 1076, 65 Kan. 24; Gilbert t. Port, 28
Ohio 8t 276).
An "option" is "a right of choice or elec-
tion; sometimes applied to contracts whereby
one purchases the right for a certain time,
at his election, to demand and receive or to
deliver property at a stated price." Mont-
gomery V. Hundley, 108 S. W. 527, 531, 205
Mo. 138, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 122 (quoting and
adopting the definition in Cyc Law Diet p.
645).
The obligation by which one binds him-
self to sell, and leaves it discretionary with
the other party to buy, is what is termed in
law an '^option," which is simply a contract
by which the owner of property agrees with
another person that he shall have the right
to buy the property at a fixed price within a
certain time. Montgomery v. Waldeck, 2
Alaska, 581, 585; Montgomery v. Hundley,
103 S. W. 527, 531, 205 Mo. 138, 11 L. R. A.
<N. S.) 122 (quoting and adopting the deflni-
Uon in Black v. Maddox, 30 S. E. 723, 104 Ga.
157) ; Womaek v. Goleman, 100 N. W. 9, 11, 02
Minn. 328 (quoting and adopting definition In
Black V. Maddox, 30 8. E. 723, 104 Ga. 157).
An "option" is "the obligation by which
one binds himself to sell and makes it dis-
cretionary with the other party to buy, which
is simply a contract by which the owner of
property agrees with another person that he
shall have a right to buy the property at a
fixed price within a certain time." Indiana
& A. Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Pharr, 102 S. W.
686, 689, 82 Ark. 573 (quoting and adopting
the definition in Black v. Maddox, 30 S. E.
723, 104 Ga. 157).
An "option" is a continuing offer or con-
tract by which the owner stipulates with an-
other that the latter shall have the right to
buy the property at a fixed price witUn t
certain time, and, unless the option is foniMt
ed on a coosideraUoii, It may be withdnn
at any time before acceptance. Ganat t. j
M. Guffey Petroleum Go., 110 N. Y. Snpp. R
177, 125 App. Dlv. 760.
"An 'option* Is an unaccepted offer. It
states the terms and conditions on wMcb tbe
owner Is willing to sell or lease his land U
the holder elects to accept within the tiae
limited. If the holder does so riect, be mast
give notice to the other party, and the ac
cepted offer thereupon becomes a tdndios
contract If an acceptance is not made mtb-
In the time fixed, the owner is no \Qm
bound by his offer, and the option is at »
end." John v. Elkins, 69 S. £. 961, 963. Si
W. Va. 15a
An ''option" is a rli^t acquired bj co^
tract to accept or reject a preset offer wltb
In a limited or reasonable time In the fatare.
In such contract two elements exist: Fii^L
the offer to sell, which does not becomes
contract until accepted. Second, the com-
pleted contract to leave the offer open fortiK
specified time. Bates v. Woods, 80 K. E. Si
85, 225 111. 126 (citing Black v. Maddox. m
Ga. 157, 80 8. £. 723 ; Ide v. Ldser, 10 Moql
5, 24 Pac. 695, 24 Am. St Rep. 17).
"An 'option* is a right aeqiiired by cot
tract to accept or reject a present offer.
within a limited or reasonable time is ^
future." It is "the obligation by which oae
binds himself to sell, and leaves it discreCioih
ary with the other party to boy, which is
simply a contract by which the owner of
property agrees with another person that bf
shall have the right to buy the property it >
fixed price within a certain time.'* Trogdn
V. Williams, 56 S. B. 865, 868, 144 N. C. l^
10 L. U. A. (N. S.) 867 (quoting and h^&m
definition in Black v. Maddox, 30 S. E. 7^
104 Ga. 157, and citing Sitterding v. Orinnl
19 S. E. 02, 114 N. C. 108; Hopwood t. M.^
Causland. 04 N. W. 469, 120 Iowa. 218; Uc
v. Goosliug, 19 S. W. 527, 93 Ky. 185. 21 L
R. A. 127 ; Cozart v. Herndon, 19 S, E 1»^
114 N. C. 252 ; Clark. Cont 369; Cya p. 265».
An "option" is a continuing offer npos
the part of the optioner to sell, and vbo
limited to a certain time ft Ib essential tbtt
it should be accepted within 8U<di time by s
compliance with Its terms upon the l«rt of
the optionee, and if not accepted within sod
time, the right to do so is lost An '*opti<»'
is not an executory contract, but is ao eI^
cuted one, giving a' right to the optionee, br
complying with the provisions of the optica
to convert it into a valid and binding eiecih
tory contract Fulton v. Messenger, 56 S. E
830, 831, 61 W, Va. 477 (citing Pollock ^
Brookover, 53 S. B. 795, 60 W. Va. 7^ ^
li. R. A. [N. S.] 403: Rease v. Kittle, 49 J^
B. 150, 56 W. Va. 269; Weaver v. Borr. >
S. B. 743, 31 W. Va. 736^ a li. & A 91; Bafr
OPTION
765
OPTION
I7 y. WattersDn;10 fl. B. 63^ 89 W. Ya. 214;
DonnaUy v. Parker, 6 W. Va, 801).
**An 'option* is in a sense a continuing
offer of a contract, and if the oflPeree decides
to exercise his right to demand the conrey-
ance or other act contemplated he must sig-
nify that fact to the offerer/' Hence a les-
see's acceptance of an option to purchase
creates a contract for purchase. Sizer v.
Clark, 93 N. W. 539, 541, 116 Wis. 534.
In a sense all options are contingent be-
cause they may or may not be exercised with-
in the time or upon the conditions stipulated;
and such contingency does not render the
options invalid. An option is a unilateral
agreement binding upon the party who exe-
cutes It from the date of its execution, and
becomes a contract inter partes when exer-
cised according to Its terms. Boyer v. Nes-
bitt, 76 AtL 103, 106, 227 Pa. 898, 136 Am. St
Rep. 890.
The phrase "option of either party," in
an agreement between a dealer in electric
lamps and a manufacturer, whereby the
dealer agreed to carry the manufacturer's
lamps in stock at ail times, with prlrllege
"to settle by return of lamps at any time
at option of either party and by a sixty-day
notice by either party," must receive a con-
struction in harmony with the entire agree-
ment, and the manufacturer did not have the
right to elect to take lamps in payment, but
the election related to the time of payment
Union Trust Ck>. v. Michigan Electric Co..
103 N. W. 656, 657, 140 Mich. 131.
An "option to purchase'* is merely an
agreement whereby the buyer may upon com-
pliance with certain terms and conditions be-
come the owner of the property, the seller
giving him that option, and an "option to
purchase" differs from an "option to re-
turn," In that in the former the property
does not pass, while it does pass In the lat-
ter, subject to the right to rescind. In re
Allen, 183 Fed. 172, 174.
An "option" to purchase If one likes is
essentially different from an option to re-
turn a purchase if one should not like it,
and in the one case title will not pass until
the option is determined, while in the other
the property passes at once, subject to the
right to rescind and return. State v. Betz,
106 S. W. 64, 66, 207 Mo. 589 (quoting and
adopting definition in Hunt v. Wyman, 100
Mass. 198, 200).
"An *option to purchase' If he liked is
essentially different from an option to re-
turn a purchase if he should not like. In
one case, the titie will not pass until the
option is determined; in the other, the prop-
erty passes at once, subject to the right to
rescind and return." The option given by an
agreement for a transfer of corporate stock,
together with th« owner's vtqw as director,
in consideration of a .tflnedlled eum "to be
considered an option," running until a given
date, when an addltioaal sum is to be paid,
or, in lieu thereof, all the property delivered
HndejT the agreement is to be returned, Is not
an option to purchase, but one to return;
^nd, if not exercised at the time named, the
sale is complete, and the promise to pay the
purchase price becomes absolute. Guss v.
Nelson, 26 Sup. Ct 260, 261, 200 U. S. 298,
50 L. Ed. 489 (quoting and adopting defini-
tion in Hunt v. Wyman, 100 Mass. 198, 200,
quoted approvingly in Sturm v. Boker, 14
Sup. Ct 99, 104, 150 U. S. 312, 329, 37 L. Ed.
1093, 1100).
An "option" being a mere right to pur-
chase, the consideration of the contract Is
the consideration given for the right to pur-
chase, and not the value of the subject-mat-
ter of the contract; therefore the recording
fee for recording an option contract to pur-
chase land will under Act March 17. 1910
(Acts 1910, c. 315), which graduates the fees
for recording such contracts according to the
consideration, be based upon the considera-
tion given for the contract and not upon
the land in question. Stearnes v. Goad, 69
S. B. 1101, 111 Va. 834.
Where a contract for the division of cor-
porate stock between promoters provided
that plaintiff should have one-half of a cer-
tain block of the stock on his selling or pay-
ing for a specified portion of the corpora-
tion's bonds, it was not error for the court
to refer to the contract as an "option," de-
fined to be a right to choose between one of
two or more alternatives. Malloy v. Drum-
heller, 122 Pac. 1005, 1009, 68 Wash. 106.
An instrument reciting that plaintiff ha&
an "option" to purchase land with all grow-
ing crops for $10,200, to be paid $250 cash
and the balance on or before August 15,
1903, otherwise the cash payment was to be
forfeited, and declaring that the $250 was a
part payment on the land, etc., constituted
a mere option to purchase; there being no
mutuality of obligation on the part of plain-
tiff. White V. Bank of Hanford, 83 Pae. 698,
699, 148 Cal. 552.
Where an offer of sale was based on a
valuable consideration, it amounted to an
''option" binding the promisor to make the
proposed sale if accepted by the promisee,
and waa irrevocable until the expiration
of the time agreed upon by the parties, dur-
ing which the offer was to remain open, and,
if acceptance was made within such time, it
would complete the contract Simpson &
Harper v. Sanders & Jenkins, 60 S. £. 541,
543, 130 Ga. 265.
A vendor, contracting to sell for a sped-
fled sum described real estate, providing that
the contract shall be void after a designated
date, gives to the puridiaser only an "option"
to puflChasQ.on payment of tbepilce, and the
purchaser cannot, befofe ticercifSns hgls.'OP-
OK
758
OB
be read "and." Manson ▼. DaytoOr 163 Fed.
258, 269, 82 C. C. A. 588 (citing End. Interp.
St. S 3a3 ; Thomas v. City of Grand Junction,
56 Pac. 666. 667, 18 Colo. App. 80, 84, 86;
Kitchen v. Southern Ry., 48 S. E. 4^ 6, 68 S.
a 664, 1 Ann. Cas. 747).
An instruction is not erroneous for au-
thorizing the conviction of one who "advised
or* encouraged" another in the commission
of a crime instead of "advised 'and* encour-
aged," in accordance with the definition of a
principal In Pen. Code, | 41. State v. Allen,
87 Pac. 177, 182, 34 Mont 403.
A warrant of attorney contained in a
Joint and several note signed by eight makers
authorizijDig the holder to have Judgment
against "us, or any or either of us," is not
exhausted by the entry of Judgment against
one or more but not all of the makers, but
is the equivalent of eight separate warrants,
signed by one of the makers, and the holder
may at his election enter a several Judgment
against each maker. It cannot be doubted
that in this case "or" includes ''and." Oth-
erwise the power would be exhausted if the
Judgment was entered against only one of the
signers — a result that is so absurd as hardly
to need refutation. George D. Barter Bank
V. Straus, 170 Fed. 489, 492.
Same— In deeds and eonveyaiioes
Where, in an oil and gas lease, it is stip-
ulated that the lessee shall complete one well
within one year, ''or" pay at the rate of $4
quarterly, in advance, for each additional
three months such completion is delayed, and
it is expressly declared that the contract is
made "for the sole and exclusive purpose of
mining and operating for oil and gas," and it
is otherwise manifest from the instrument as
a whole that the intention of the parties was
not that the lessee should have the right to
simply hold the land during the term of the
lease — not exploring it himself for oil and
gas, and not allowing any one else to do so —
but that he should be bound to complete a
well within one year, the obligation to pay $4
quarterly will be held to be a mere penal
clause, and not an alternative obligation, and
the making of said payments will be held not
to be a fulfillment of the principal contract,
in whole or in part, but merely the payment
of liquidated damages. Murray v. Bamhart,
42 South. 489, 492, 117 La. 1023.
A trust deed, stating in the granting
clause, "has and hereby does grant, bargain,
sell and convey unto said party of the second
part or his successors in trust," is not void
for uncertainty as to the grantee by reason
of the use of the word "or" ; it being the in-
tention of the grantor to vest the legal title
of the property in the trustee, with power, on
conditions named, to substitute a trustee.
Empire Ranch & Cattle Co. v. Stratton, 126
Pac. 1094, 22 Colo. App. 577 (citing 6 Words
and Phraaes, p. 50Q2).
eiva atot«te»
««Or" and *%nd" may be read conTertiblT
in construing a statute, to effect legi^tiTt
intent Ransom v. Rutherford Conotj, m
S. W. 1057, 1063, 128 Tenn. 1, Ann. Ca?
1912B, 1366; In re Stelnruck's InsokeiKy. :4
Aa 360, 226 Pa. 461; People ex rel CobaT
Butler. 109 N. Y. Supp. 900, 903, 125 A?f
Div. 384.
The word "and** may be substitiited foi
the word "or" when necessary to mik i
statute express the true legisladTe intent a
gathered from the context and the drcoiir
stances attending its enactment James r.
United States FideUty & Guarantee Co^ u:
S. W. 406, 409, 133 Ky. 299; State y. Hooka;.
98 Pac 964, 972, 22 OkL 712; James t. Udt
ed States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 117 S. W
406, 409, 133 Ky. 299.
As uaed in the proviso limitiDg die goe-
al right of a wife to inherit the real estited
her husband, as given In sectlOD 8 of le
concerning descents and distributtons isr.
tion 2510, Gen. St 1901), which dedans tbi:
the wife shall not be entitled to any latere^
under the provisions of tliis section* in uj
land to which the husband has made a oc&
veyance, when the vrlf e at the time of tke
conveyance is not "or" never has been a re<-
dent of this state, the word "or" should tc
read '*and," with the effect that a wife ^?
had ever been a resident of this state is »
titled to the benefits of the act Kenned? t
Haskell, 73 Pac. 913, 914, 67 Kan. 612.
As used in Rev. St 1887, § 4842. pro#
ing that an appeal from a Justice's coort l|
not effectual unless an undertaking be £i^^
for $100 for the payment of the costs od H^
peal, or if a stay of proceedings be ciaisMil^^
a sum equal to twice the judgment, the witI
"or" means "and," and the statute reqoins
that an undertaicing be given for the sam ^'
1100 for the payment of costs, and if & ^^
of proceedings be claimed, then In an adi
tional sum equal to twice the judgment 13-
by V. Spokane Valley Land & Water C«. ?*
Pac 715, 717, 15 Idalio, 467.
Where a landlord had entered for tbe
tenaut*s breach of the lease and claimed po^
session, it was entitled to answer In sumiMi?
proceedings by the tenant's agent to rwc^r
possession of a part of the premises froin i
subtenant under Code Civ. Proc i 2244. pr^
viding that the person to wh<Hn the prertJ^
is directed or his landlord or any peRon t
possession "or" claiming possession of tt«
premises or a part thereof, may answer; ^
word "or" being used in such section Id ^^
copulative and not in its disjunctive «s»
Cohen v. Carpenter, 113 N. Y. Supp. 168. T-
128 App. Div. 862.
Labor Law (Laws ISOT, p. 468, c. 41&
I 20, as amended by Laws 1899, p. ^^ f
102), providing that, if hoisting appa»tfl«**
in a building in the course oC ooost^
OB
759
OB
tion, the *V:ontmetovB'Or ownen'* shall cause
the openings in each floor to be inclosed,
places such duty on the owner of a bulldlnf
as to an employ^ of an independent contrac-
tor, as well as on the contractor, though
all the work on the building is being done by
independent eontractom and the hoisting ma-
chine is installed by a hoisting machine com-
pany, paid by the contractors for the use
thereof. Rooney v. Brogan Const Co., 95 N.
Y. Supp. 1, 5, 107 App. Dlv. 258.
In Act N. J. April 18, 1884, | 4, proTiding
"that this act shall not apply to railway,
canal, 'or* banking corporations, ♦ ♦ ♦
'or' manufacturing companies 'or' mining
companies carrying on business in this state,"
the word "or" is used in its copulative, and
not in its disjunctiye, sense, and the qualify-
ing words ''carrying on business in this state"
relate to all the corporations designated in
the act, and not merely to mining companies.
Standard Underground Cable Co. y. Attorney
General, 19 AU. 733, 735, 46 N. J. Eq. 270, 19
Am. 8t Rep. 394.
Laws 1905, p. 163, c. 103, § 6, providing
that one who has not purchased "one comple-
ment" of school land **under this act or
former law" may buy not to exceed eight
sections in designated counties, or such part
thereof as will complete "his complement,"
under this act, including the purchase under
the act of 1901, when taken in connection
with section 5, authorizing a lessee of school
land or an assignee of an entire lease to pur-
chase land included in the lease, provided the
applicant has not purchased one complement,
as provided by this act or other law, which
announces a general rule applicable to all
lands except those mentioned in section 6,
and defines the rights of lessees and as-
signees, authorizes one who has purchased
four sections in one of the designated coun-
ties the full amount allowed by the act
of 1901 to purchase four sections additional
in such county; the word "complement" in
section 6 meaning eight sections, and the
phrase therein, "under this act or former
law," meaning "under this act and former
law." Ross V. Terrell, 90 S. W. 1098, 1095,
99 Tex. 602.
Same— In pesial statutes
When necessary to give eflPect to any
part of a statute of the intention of the
Legislature, the word ''and" may be substi-
tuted for "or," and vice versa. Williams v.
State. 137 S. W. 927, 928, 99 Ark. 149, Ann.
Caa 1913A, 1056; State v. Hooker, 98 Pac.
964, 972, 22 Okl. 712.
Kirby*s Dig. | 5242, which is part of an
act regulating the practice of medicine, pro-
vides that any itinerant vendor of drugs in-
tended for the treatment of disease "or" who
may, by writing, print, or otber methods, pro-
fess to cure diseases by any drug, shall, un-
less he has a certificate^ be in violation of
this law. Other parts of the act provide for
an examining board to issue certificates, and
section 5241 makes it an offense to practioe
medleiiie without a license, and section 6243
defines what constitutes the practice of medi-
cine. Held, that in view of the general scope
of the act, and that, if construed otherwise,
the clause "who may by writing, print or oth-
er methods profess to cure disease," etc.,
would be rendered ineffective, this section
must be taken to require only those itinerant
vendors of drugs who profess to cure disease
to secure a license; the word "or" being con-
strued as "and." Williams v. State, 137 S.
W. 927, 99 Ark. 149, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1056.
Acts 1901, c. 78, entiUed "An act to reg-
ulate the practioe of medicine and surgery,"
as amended by Acts 1907, c. 543, provides in
section 4 that it shall be unlawful for any
itinerant physician, or vendor of any drug,
nostrum, or application, to sell "or" apply the
same. Held that, in view of Const art. 2, |
17, prohibiting a bill from embracing more
than one subject, which shall be expressed in
its title, the disjunctive "or," used between
"sell" and "apply," must be construed as
"and," to bring the act within the title, so
that the statute, thus being a regulation of
the practice of medicine, is not open to the
objection that it prohibits the sale of proper-
ty, and works a deprivation of the same, con-
trary to Const, art 1, § 8, and Const U. S.
Amend. 14. Kirk v. State, 150 S. W. 83, 84,
126 Tenn. 7, Ann. Cas. 1913D, ^239.
Enforcing Act (Laws 1907-08, p. 606, C
69) art 3, § 8, providing that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by
oath describing, as particularly as may be,
the place to be searched "or" the person or
thing to be seized, was evidently intended by
the Legislature to follow Const art 2, | 30
(Bunn*s Ed. i 39), providing that no search
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by oath describing the place to be
searched "and" the person or thing to be
seized, and, the word "or" being inserted by
inadvertence, and to carry out the evident
legislative intent, the same will be construed
by substituting the conjunctive particle "and"
in place of the disjunctive "or." State v.
Hooker, 98 Pac. 964, 972, 22 Okl. 712.
Rev. St. 1889, I 3486, provided that any
person who should, "under promise of mar-
riage, seduce and debauch any unmarried fe-
male of good repute should be punished."
This section was amended by Acts 1897, p.
106, entitled "An act to amend section 3486,
chapter 47, article 2, of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri of 1889, relating to the seduction
of unmarried females under 18 years of age,"
an<l changed the section^ so as to provide that
any person who should, under promise of
marriage, seduce or debauch any unmarried
female, etc., should be punished. Held, that
the words "seduce" and "debauch," though
ordinarily not BynonymQus« were used in such
rat
Teo
OB
Mctldn nyamymimBlj, and that tba word ^'or^
miut be constrned to maan ''and," In order to
bring the offenae dedned within the tlile» ae
that an instroction that the jnry could oon*
Vict, If they beUered proeecntrlx waa either
eeduced "or" debauched by defendant under
promise of marriage, waa erroneous. State
T. Long, 141 S. W. 109Q, UOl, 288 Mo. 883.
flame— Xb pleadlmg
In Rev. Codes 1006, I 0088, subd. 4, au-
thorizing an attachment where defendant has
sold, assigned, transferred, secreted, or oth-
erwise disposed of, "or" is about to sell, as-
sign, eta, with Intent to cheat or defraud his
creditors or hinder or delay them, the dis-
junctive conjunction ''or" does not connect
two grounds for an attachment, but the
whole subdivision states only one ground con-
sisting of different phases of facta or condi-
tions intimately related, pertaining to that
one ground, and an affidavit for an attach-
ment stating such ground disjunctively in
the language of the statute is sufficient
McCarthy Bros. Co. v. McLean County Farm-
ers' Blevator Co., U8 N. W. 1040, lOCM), 18
N. D. 178, 188 Am. St Rep. 767. 20 Ann. Cas.
674 (citing Shlnn, AtUdi. ft Gam., R 146,
146; Waples, Attache & Oam., i 186; Wood
V. Wells, 2 Bush [66 Ky.] 197; Klenk ▼.
Schwalm, 19 Wis. 111).
An Indictment for forgery of a writing
"or" paper did not describe the Instrument in
the alternative^ since the words "writing"
and "paper" when connected disjunctively
clearly amount to the same thing, a written
Instrument Blala v. SUte, 126 & W. 1064,
1066, 94 Ark. 827.
An indictment Is subject to demurrer If
the descriptive terms relating to any material
allegation are set forth in an alternate form.
The word "or" is generally used as a dis-
junctive, and to express the notion that the
two clauses which it connects are alternative ;
but this is not always so. It may properly
be used to introduce a statement which is
an amplification or expIaDation of a preced-
ing statement The use of the word in the
present indictment was of the latter nature.
Whltaker v. State, 76 S. B. 258, 11 Ga. App.
208.
A pleader should use the word "and"
in an indictment when the word "or" Is used
in the statute, whenever the word "or" would
leave the averment uncertain as to which of
two or more things is meant, but not so
where the complaint <^arges inaction as the
violation of a statute commanding action, and
the use of the conjunctive "and," Instead of
the disjunctive "or," would not make the al-
legation more certain. In a prosecution un-
der Pub. Laws 1908, p. 287, c. 1592, | 12, re-
quiring every chauffeur, after knowingly caus-
ing an accident by collision or otherwise,
or knowingly injuring any person, horse, or
vehicle, to forthwith bring his motor vehicle to
a full stop, return to the scene of the accident,
and give to any proper panon, ikmuOit
the aaiM, the number of hla driver's Uoaa,
tiia regtatratioB number of the motor Tebide.
and the names and reddsDoes otm±wk
occupant It was held tiiat, under the ni«
ttiat the word "or" la a proper oonoectiTsia
pleading negative averments, a oompUist
charging that accused, while driving & sifitdr
▼ehlde, did not, after knowingly cuim u
accident by a collision with a horse, etc.
bring such vehicle to a full stop "or'* letnn
to the scene of the accident bat drore tbe
vehicle away therefrom with great speei
against the statute, eta, was not objection-
able for duplicity. State v. SmiUi, 72 At:
710, 711, 715, 29 K, I. 513.
8am»-lB wUla
To effectuate the intention of fiie tesa
tor, the word "or" may be read as 'W cr
vice versa, when necessary to avoid defeitiai
his intention. Shropshire ▼. Gaalt (Ky.) S?^
S. W. 690 (citing Hunt t. Johnson, 10 B
Mon. [49 Ky.] 342; Robb ▼. Belt, 12 B. Mot
151 Ky.] 647; Aulick v. Wallace^ 12 Bosfe
[76 Ky.] 631) ; In re Allison, 102 N. I. %Wr
887, 891, 68 fiflsc. Bep. 222; Shaver's Adal
▼. Bwald's Ex*r, 134 S. W. 906, 907, 142 Kr.
472.
Where, from the language of the wilL it
la apparent that the testator used the vord
"or" as the equivalent of "and," it will be
so Gonatrued. Olcott v. Tope, 115 ni App.
121; Id., 72 N. B. 761, 753, 213 lU. U
Thus where testatrix made specific beqae^«
to some of the diildren and all of the gnsd^
children of her toother who had four If
ing children, two of whom had children ^'^
four deceased children, two of whom le^
issue surviving, and further proTided M
the house In which she lived was to be dl^
posed of and the proceeds equally dinde^
between the "children and heirs'* of her brott
er, the clause disposing of the remaloder d
her estate to the "living children or heirs of
her brother. Including the widow of a de-
ceased child and the son of another deceased
child," should be construed as if ''or" was
"and." McClench ▼. Waldron, 91 N. B. 12&
128, 204 Mas& 664.
In a will by which testatrix gave h«
entire estate to her daughter, providing tiiit
if she should not be living "at the time oi
my decease or die without lawful Issne" tb?
estate should be divided between her t^
sons, the word "or" will be constrned tf
mean "and," and the daughter, snrrlTlnir t!ie
mother, wiU take the whole estate absolnt^^
In re Edwards* Estate, 76 Aa 28, 29, 22T Pi
299, 19 Ann. Oas. 921.
Under the provision for the establl^
ment of an asylum with the money ^
queathed to the adopted daughters, or i^
of them, upon the deatii of either before tt^
should become of age or be married,
amount bequeathed to B. was notawfla^
for such charitable use where ahe becan«
OB
761
OB
age before her deatb unmarried, it being ao
available only in case sbe died before either
event happened; it being p^rmlaaible to oon^
fltme the word "or" to mean "and,'* when it
seems necessary to give effect to the meaning
of testator. Clarke v. Inhabitants of An-
dover, d2 N. B. 1018, 1016, 207 Mass. 91.
A testator devised his whole estate to his
wife to manage and control in every particn*
lar, "that is to say, to seU a part or any part,
or the whole, shonld it be necessary or ad-
visable in her best Judgment" Held, that
she took the property absolutely, and that
her title was not cut down by the subsequent
provlrion '*or I further wish and desire my
said wife to make a last will and testament
wherein such division of our estate shall be
made among our children as in her best ludg-
ment will be just, reasonable and proper";
"or^ apparently meaning in the event of her
not selling the property, and, even if read as
"and," merely expressing a wish as to the
disposition she should make of the property.
Snyder v. Snyder, 83 AtL 246, 247, 116 Md.
e09.
A will, after giving a life use of testa-
tor's residuary estate, consisting of land, to
his wife, provided that after her death, sub-
ject to her life use thereof, testator gave to
his daughter A. for her life the use of the
T. block, and then proceeded: "On the death
of both my said wife and daughter, I give
♦ ♦ • said T. block to my son H. abso-
lutely, or in case he should die before that
time, to his legal helrs-at-law, to be distrib-
uted among them as if it were his intestate
property." Held, that reading the devise
to the son, as it must be read in view of the
rule that the law favors vested estates, as
though phrased "subject to the life estates
above created in favor of my wife and daugh-
ter, I give," etc., and treating the word "or,"
in said devise, as used as the equivalent of
"and," which use is plainly shown from the
employment of the latter word for a Uke pur-
pose in a subsequent devise of a remainder to
the daughter, the son was given a vested re-
mainder in fea Cody v. Staples, 07 Atl. 1, 80
Conn. 82.
Testatrix gave all her realty to her hus-
band for life, after his death such realty to
revert to testatrix's two daughters, and pro-
vided that, if either daughter should die
without leaving legal issue, the property
should go to the other daughter, if living,
and, if both should die without leaving legal
issue, the property should go to testatrix's
husband "or his heirs." Held, that the in-
tent was that, if both daughters died without
leaving legal issue during their father's life-
time, the daughters' interests should go to
him in fee, the daughters taking remainders
which vested in them immediately upon tes-
tatrix's death; the word "or" in the> phrase
"or his heirs" being construed as "and," the
general rule that, where the context of the
will is flQent, woida rafsfxlng to the death of
the prior legatee In oonnection with some
collateral event apply where the contingency
happens after as well as before death of tes-
tator, not applying where the context shows
the intent to be otherwise. Smith v. Dellitt,
94 N. £. lis, 116, 249 IlL 118 (citing 6 Words
and Phrases, p. 0008).
Hot eoastraed as and
The conjunction "or" may be used as a
disjunctive or as an equivalent. As stated
in Webster's International Dictionary, "or"
may be used to join as alternatives terms ex-
pressing unlike things or ideas, or different
terms expressing the same thing or idea.
Amet V. Texas & P. By. Co., 41 South. 721,
722, 117 La. 464.
The use of the disjunctive "or" in "where
goods, wares or merchandise are manufac-
tured or offered for sale," means either
where they are manufactured, or where they
are offered for sale. Baltimore & O. S. W.
R. Co. V. Cavanaugh, 71 N. B. 239, 242, 35
Ind. App. 82.
The meaning of the term "proper party,'*
as used in the phrase 'Is not a proper or nec-
essary party," is not so clear as the mean^
of the term "not a necessary party." The
word ''or" may be used in two forms. In one
it corresponds to "either," and in that sense
the term "proper or necessary" would mean
either proper or necessary; that is, one or
the other. In the other form it means to ex-
press the same thing alternatively in differ-
ent words. In that sense, the term "not
proper or necessary," would imply that it was
not proper; that is, not necessary. Jones v.
Kansas City, Ft S. & M. R. Co., 77 S. W.
890, 893, 178 Mo. 628, 101 Am. St Rep. 434.
Provisions in the charter of a college
that the trustees should hold inviolate all
furniture, stock, assets, lands, buildings,
moneys, or endowment funds, professorships,
scholarships, or other funds, did not forbid
the trustees from using for current expenses
money donated without any direction as to
the purpose for which it was to be used;
the word "or" not being used as equivalent to
"either," and as presenting the choice of ei-
ther. The word "or" has two significations.
It may be used to convey the idea of an al-
ternative, or may be used to join different
terms expressing the same thing or idea, and
in this sense it was here used. Board of
Trustees of Park College v. Attorney Gener-
al, 129 S. W. 27, 81, 228 Mo. 614.
In an action under Civil Damage Act
(Code 1906, c. 32) | 26, by a wife injured in
her means of support, against a saloon keep-
er alleged to have unlawfully sold her hus-
band intoxicants, it was error to instruct
that a sale of intoxicants to a person "at a
time when he was intoxicated or when the
defendant, or his bartender, or cleric, or any
of them, knew or had reason to believe" he
was intoxicated, was an unlawful sale, since
an actual sale to an intoxicated person, and
OR
702
OB
knowledstt, actual or oonstnictlve, by the
seller of sach Intoxlcatlou, are two eaaentlal
elements of one offense, and the word ^^or**
instead of "and" conveys the idea that either
element of the offense, without the other, is
sufficient to constitnte an unlawful sale.
Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 60 S. E. 850, 854, 68
W. Va. 197.
A city ordinance providing that the dty
treasurer shall receive a monthly salaiy And
a specified *'per cent of all moneys received
and paid out by him as treasurer," which
shall be payable monthly, is unambiguous,
and comprehends both a receipt and disburse-
ment of funds before any commisision is pay-
able; and under Code Civ. Proc. { 1858, re-
quiring the court, in the construction of a
statute, to declare its terms, and not insert
what has been omitted, the court may not
construe the ordinance so as to allow the per-
centage on all moneys received, and on all
moneys paid out, by construing the word
"and" in the quoted phrase to mean "or."
City of Corona v. Merriam, 128 Pac 769, 770,
20 Cal. App. 231.
It is error to define a principal as one
who "aids or abets" in the commission of a
crime instead of "aids and abets" in accord-
ance with the definition of I'en. Code, § 41.
State V. Allen, 87 Pac. 177, 178, 34 Mout. 403
(dttng People t. Dole [Cal.] 51 Pac. 945; Id.,
55 Pac. 581, 122 Cal. 486, 68 Am. St Rep. 50).
An instruction that accused, on trial for
homicide, cannot be guilty as an aider or
abettor in the kiUing of decedent if he gave
no "assistance or uttered no word to the per-
son doing the killing," etc., is misleading for
using the word "or," instead of "and," be-
tween the words "assistance" and "uttered."
Morris ▼. State, 41 South. 274, 284, 146 Ala.
66.
Where, in a prosecution for keeping a
bawdy house, the court charged that a bawdy-
house was a house of ill fame kept for the
resort and commerce of lewd people of both
sexes, an instruction that if the jury believ-
ed that accused kept a common bawdyhouse
and "did willfully and knowingly keep or
suffer to remain in and about her house lewd
women, or men, for the purpose of prostitu-
tion, or permit them to come together and
meet or remain there for the purpose of hav-
ing illicit sexual intercourse," etc., she was
guilty, was not prejudicially erroneous in
that the use of the disjunctive, "or," author-
ized a conviction in case accused suffered ei-
ther lewd women or men to remain in her
house without requiring that the house was
permitted to be used for immoral purposes.
State V. Price, 92 S. W. 174, 175, 115 Mo.
App. 656.
In a docket entry of a justice of the
peace, relating to the preliminary examina-
tion of a person charged with crime, which
recites that the offense of "pocket picking
'or* larceny from the person" had been commit-
ted, tlie word "or" la not used disjunctively,
bat liidlcateB the synonym of the tenns pie.
ceding and following it State v. Duid, 7:
Pac 811, 812, 66 Kan. 483.
Where, in an action for injuries to u
employ^, the grounds of negligence were the
failure of the engineer to warn the emplojl
of the backing of the train and the failure to
keep a brakeman stationed near the re&r od
of the train to warn the employ^ and dim
was nothing in the evidence to sngsest vlj
other grounds of recovery, an iiutnKtu>a
that if the person in charge of the en^oeat
the time of the injniy was guilty of &e$3-
genoe in operating the engine, followed by i
distinct disjunctive statement of the tic
grounds of negligence alleged, is not mta^r
ing, though connected by the word 'a:
which must have been used in the sense of
"that is." Choctaw, O. & T. Ry. Ca t. iic
Laughlin, 96 8. W. 1091, 1093, 43 TeL Qr
App. 523.
Same— In eivil statmtes
Const { 201, prohibiting consolidatioo of
"parallel or competing" railroads, sbooid n^
be read "parallel and competing." Commoir
wealth ex rel. Breathitt v. LouisviUe k \ ^
Co., 138 S. W. 291, 293, 144 Ky. 324, Am
Caa 1913A, 633.
The word "or" may be osed to jot
as alternatives, terms expressing diflereit
things, as well as to join different terms ei
pressing the same thing, and, in a sutine
giving an action for damages caused bj m*
son of the insufficiency of any bridge or a-
vert, it is used In the former sense, so tlui
it does not co-ordinate "bridge" and 'col
vert," and make each in turn the eqoiraitii
of the other, but specialises one to one oh^
ing and the other to another meanlDg, tbif
making the statute mean as though it kaI
"either a bridge or a culvert" Clevelwd t.
Town of Washington, 65 AU. 684, 585. T^ Vi
498.
**The conjunction 'or* may be osed mi
disjunctive or as an equivalent*' As uaed ii>
a statute providing that all claims for l«»fc
or damages to the owner caused by its ta)^^
ing "or" expropriaUon for pubUc works shi'l
be barred by two years* prescription, tbt
word "or" makes the terms taking and o
propriation equivalent Amet v. Texas & P
Ry. Co., 41 South. 721, 722, 117 La. 454 (dt
ing and adopting Webst Int Diet).
The word "or," in Acts 1889, p. 117. <-
81, providing that a conditional seller, on i^
gaining possession on the buyer's de&Q>^
shall advertise the property for sale *^y
printed hand bills or written or printed »'
Uces/* etc, is used in its ordinary meanio^
to indicate an altemaUve. J. I. Case Thresl^
ing Mach. Co. v. Watson, 122 S. W. 974. 9-*
122 Tenn. 156.
As used in Code, | 3106, providing tbat
every laborer or miner who shall perftnn 1*
bor in opening, developing, or operating ttj
coal mfae shall have a Ucn an aU property
OR
763
OR
of the person, firm or corporation owning or
peratlng soch mine," etc, the word **or/'
etween the words "owning" and "operate
Qg/' cannot be ooastrued to mean "and,"
nd henoe the statute does not give a lien on
aiDing property of an owner in favor of the
mployte of an operating lessee. Caster t.
fcOleUan, 109 N. W. 1020, 1021, 132 Iowa,
02 (citing G Words and Phrases, p. 6009).
The statute making adultery ground for
lirorce, but imposing on the complaining
tfirty the burden of proving that the adultery
ras without his or her "consent, connivance,
(rivity, or procurement," by the use of the
iisjunctlve conjunction "or" makes the Inhibi-
lon apply to each of the quoted words sep-
irately, and the existence of either condition
s therefore suflkdent to bar a favorable de-
!ree. Richardson v. Richardson, 114 N. T.
}app. 912, 910.
Webster says the colijunctlon "or" Is
>ften placed between different terms express-
ng the same thing or idea; as this is a
iphere or globe. The word "assessments"
ind the word "dues," in Rev. St 1899, § 1408
Ann. St 1906, p. 1111), declaring that a fra-
ernal beneliciary association might make
)royision for the payment of benefits from a
und to be derived from "assessments or
lues" collected from Its members, are used
here without definition, and seemingly as
ueaning the same thing. State ex rel. Su-
)Teme Lodge K. P. v. Vandiver, 111 S. W.
)11. 916, 213 Mo. 187, 16 Ann. Cas. 283.
In Act May .11, 1874, imposing a double
iability on "all stockholders in banks, bank-
Dg companies, saving fund institutions, trust
companies and all other incorporated compa-
nies doing the business of banks or loaning
ind discouDting moneys as such in this com-
monwealth," the word "or** is used to mark
!in equivalent and has the same effect as If
it were "that is." De Haven v. Pratt, 72
ai. 1068, 1073, 223 Pa. 633.
In Acts 1906, p. 679, c. 167, § 123 (Bums*
dm, St 1908, § 7793), provides that any per-
son aggrieved b^ decision of the county com-
missioners in proceeding relating to hlgh-
n^ays may appeal, and that such appeal shall
t)e tried de novo, and may be had as to any is-
sue tried, "or that might have been tried, be-
fore the county board," the last clause only
authorizes the trial of such Issues as might
tiave been tried under issues before the board,
and does not authorize the trial of issues not
presented. JGtna Life Ins. Go. v. Jones, 89
N. E. 871, 872, 173 Ind. 149.
Under Mills' Ann. St Colo. § 1508, giv-
ing a right of action for death negligently
claused by a carrier to be sued for aud re-
LX)vered, first, by the husband or wife, If
there is no husband or wife, by the children,
and, if the deceased be a minor or unmar-
ried, by the father and mother, the words
"minor or unmarried*' cannot be construed
to mean "minor and unmarried," thus giving
no riglit of action for the death of an adult
leaving no husband, wife, or children, but
should be construed as. giving the father and
mother a right of action whenever the de-
ceased leaves no husband, wife, or children.
Hopper V. Denver & R. G. B. Co., 155 Fed.
273, 275, 84 0. C. A. 21.
Under Levee Act, i 58, providing that the
owner of land outside a ' drainage district
who shall make a connection with a drain-
age ditch or whose land will be benefited by
such ditch shall be deemed to have made
voluntary application to be Included in the
district, it is not necessary that there should
be both connection and benefit, but either
in itself Is sufficient, since this Is the plain
and unambiguous meaning of the language
of the act, and there is no room for construc-
tion where there Is no ambiguity, and, while
"or'* may sometimes be construed In statutes,
contracts, or wills as "and" to effectuate the
intention of the parties, this will be done
only where the intention Is clearly manifest,
and a construction of the word according to
its real meaning would Involve an absurdity,
or produce an unreasonable result Qar
Creek Drainage Dist. v. Wagner, 100 N. E.
190, 196, 266 III. 888.
Baiae Tn penal atatntea
Penal statutes are to be construed In fa-
vor of the accused, and the word "or" will
not in general be construed "and" or vice
versa, where the effect would be to aggravate
the offense or would be to the disadvantage
of the accused. Williams v. United States,
87 Pac. 647, 648, 17 Okl. 28 (citing United
States V. Ten Cases of Shawls, 28 Fed. Cas.
35; Rice v. United States, 53 Fed. 910, 4
C. C. A. 104 ; United States v. Fisk, 3 WalL
[70 U. S.] 445, 18 L. Ed. 243).
Rev. St 1870, | 910, making it an offense
to retail intoxicating liquors "without pre-
viously obtaining a license therefor from the
police jury of said parish or from the author*
itles of any town or dty," is to be construed
literally, and the word "and" cannot be sub-
stituted for the word "or." State v. Lewis,
41 South. 63, 110 La. 762;
In a statute which punishes "every per-
son who holds, arrests, returns or causes to
be held, arrested or returned," three distinct
acts are mentioned, that of holding, arrest-
ing, and returning, and the disjunctive "or**
indicates the separation between them and
shows that either one may be the subject of
indictment and punishment Clyatt v. Unit-
ed States, 25 Sup. Ct 429, 431, 197 U. S.
207, 49 L. Ed. 726.
As used in Rev. St § 792, making it
criminal to assault another by willfully
shooting at him, "or" with intent to commit
murder, rape "or" robbery, the word "or'* is
to be taken as written ; and "shooting at" is
a complete crime In Itself. State v. Fnlr-
banks, 89 South. 448, 444, 115 La. 457 (citing
0&
7M
OK
Bute T. Bradj. 2 Sonftli, 0D6» 89 Lk. Abd.
687).
The word *'or,*' m VMd in BftUinger't
Ann. Codes ft 81 | 7104, prorldlnc tor tbe
punlahment of persons who sbaU ^'wUlfnlly
or maUdouBly" commit certain acts, cannot
be construed as ''and." State ▼. Tiffany, 87
Pac. 032, d38, 44 Wash. 802 (citing Bonntree
▼. State, 10 Tex. App. 110; Weiner t. 8tat%
87 K. W. 417, 96 Wis. 268).
to— Im pUmMmM
The diflJnnctiTe "or,** in an allegation
that the death of a servant was canaed by
the negligence of the officials or some one of
the employes of defendant, and especially by
the negligence of the employ^ of defendant
or its officers, Indicates that the words ''offi-
cers," ''officials,'* and "employ^** meant the
same thing— coemployte or fellow serrants
of deceased. State, to Use of Zier ▼. Chesa-
peake Beach By. Co^ 56 AtL 886, 888, 08 Md.
85.
will*
The word ''and" will not be snbstitnted
for "or" in tU^ danse in a will pvovidillg f6r
the disposition of the testator's estate in
case any of his sons shonld die "without
leaving a wife or child," nnless the whol4
context of the will plaiiUy and beyond qnes-
tton requires such sabstitation in order to
give effect to the intention of the testator.
Travers ▼. Beinhardt, 27 Sup. Ot 583, 565,
205 U. S. 423, 51 L. Ed. 865.
In construing the expression in a wHI,
"without leaving a wife, or a child, or chil-
dren," the word "and" will not be substituted
for the disjunctive "or," where the dominant
intention of the testator in the disposal of
his estate as appears from his will, does not
require su<di substitution, and especially
where the repetition of the same expression
in another part of the will shows delibera-
tion and care by the testator in the selection
of words. Under such circumstances, the
words used, being plain and unambiguous,
must be given their ordinary and usual
meaning, and cannot be controlled by con-
jecture. Traverse v. B^nhardt, 25 App. D.
0. 567, 576.
The word "or," as used in devises to
one's children "or" other lineal descendantSi
etc., indicates alternate devises to children,
if any, and, if none, then to other lineal de-
scendants. BeiUy V. Bristow, 66 AtL 262,
264, 105 Md. 826.
Where testatrix bequeathed to her infant
daughter all her residuary estate, with a pro-
vision that if she should die before arriving
at the age of 21 years or without disposing
of the same, or without having made a last
will, then over, in construing the proviso,
"and" could not be substituted for "or," as
it would express a saise contrary to the
plain intent of the testatrix. In re Polley's
Estate, 62 Aa 558, 554, 70 N. J. Bq. 658.
A will ta whidi tHlator fltatsd hh
intention to tmvel and that knowing tbe hd-
oerCainty of a jontney h& beqaeatiied Mi
real estate and pemonal piopeftr ta Ui
wife and also all Judgments owned fay hia
and notes due, and should anytblog beftl
him while away, "or" that he should die.
all his estate and property was set orer tc
his wife for her sole benefit, waa not nmelj
contingent on testator's death during tbe
Journey, but continued operative after 1^
safe return and his death thereafter. In re
Forquers' Estate, 66 AtL 82, 95, 216 Pa. SI,
8 Ann. Cas. U46.
Testator's wiU gave hla wife a life »
tate, and provided tiiat on her death tbe
property should be divided between his'^dill^
dren or their heirs as the Uw directs." H^
that, inasmneh as under Code, § 2913, maUag
technical words unnecessary to create a Ut
a construction of '''or" aa "and" would render
the clause meaningless, and as there appeu^
ed no reason to believe "or" was intended tas
"and," the will meant that the heirs of &
child dying before the life tenant took oi^ff
the will, and not by descent, and hence xi&
remainder was contingent Conrts of jasti.>
will transpose the clauses of a will and ccih
strue "or" to be "and" and "and" to be "or-
only in sudi cases when it is absolutely seo
essary so to do to support the evident js^vt
ing of the testator. But th^ cannot aitr.-
trarily expunge or alter words without ssd
apparent necessity. Taylor v. Taylor, 92 X.
W. 71, 72, 118 Iowa, 407 (citing Griffithf
Lessee v. Woodward [Pa.] 1 Yeatea, 318).
Testator, having when he wrote his win
but one sister and one half-sister and ose
half-brother living, and having had brotiiei?
and sisters who died previously, leaving is-
sue, the heirs of such deceased brothers &ad
sisters are Included in the provision of tbe
will for division of property between his '^
ters and brothers or their heirs.** The word
"or," as thus used, probably has no signif-
cance, if used alone, but, when used in cf^
nectlon with a gift to "hia brothers or tbeir
heirs," would seon to indicate an IntentioB
that, where the brothers w«:e not living so
they could not take, their heirs shonld take
for them. In re Edwarda, 117 N. T. S\m
8, 5, 132 App. Div. 644.
"Or" ia usually disjunctive, occastosa}-
ly is construed as a conjunction to avoid aN
surdity, and is sometimes used In the so^
of "aliaa," as, "violin or fiddle." ^^Or," witb^
in the provision of St 1888, 1 17T7, for tol]
or boom charges" by a boom company, is osed
in the sense of "alias." Menominee Ri^K
Boom Go. V. Augustus Spies Lumber & Cedar
Ck)., 132 N. W. 1118, 1122, 147 Wis. 559.
As oomf errlas dlseretioiuurj poorer
As used in a municipal ordinance wlric^
provided that whoever should be found g^-
ty of being a vagrant shonld be fined not M
OPERATE
746
OPBRATB'
of Rev. St 1899, | 2878, maklDg every rail-
road corporatioii liable for all injuries to a
senrant while engaged In the work of operat-
ing the railroad by reason of the negligence
of any other servant OrendorfT v. Terminal
R. Ass'n of St Louis» 92 S. W. 148, 149, 116
Mo. App. 34a
The fellow servant act (Prlv. Laws 1897,
p. 83, c. 56, f 1), giving a servant of any
railroad company "operating" in the state a
right of action against the company for in-
Jnries sustained through the negligence of
a fellow servant, is not applicable to an in
jury sustained by a servant assisting in the
construction of a railroad at a point five or
six miles from the completed track, and stlU
further from the track on which trains were
being operated. The word "operating," as
an>Ued to a railroad, means operation in the
course of its business in any of its depart-
ments but not in the course of its construc-
tion. Nicholson V. Transylvania R. Go., 51
S. E. 40, 41, 138 N. 0. 516.
While the mere repair of a roadbed or
track is not operation of a r^lroad, yet the
risk of injury attending the removal from the
track of a hand car used for the transporta-
tion of a sectioq crew and materials is pe-
culiar to the "^operation of railroads" within
a statute providing that every railroad shall
be liable for damages to its employes from
risks peculiar to the "operation of railroads?'
Hardt v. Chicago, M. & St P. Ry. Co., 110 N.
V. 427, 431, 130 Wis. 512.
Under the statute providing that every
railroad corporation owning or operating a
railroad shall be liable for all damages sus-
tained by any servant "while engaged in the
work of operating such railroad, by the neg-
llg^ce of any other agent or servant there-
of," a fireman who, after attending to the
headlight of his engine, stood in front of the
pUot a short ttme, and, while returning to the
cab, was struck by lumber projecting from
the door of one of the passing cars, Was
engaged in the "operation of a railroad."
St Louis & S. P. R. Co. V. Bussong, 90 S. W.
72, 73, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 476.
A contractor to furnish logs to a saw-
mill over a logging railroad, to which spurs
were connected and on which a log skidder
was operated solely to haul logs to a point
where they could be loaded on cars and trans-
ported to the mill, was a person "operating
a railroad" within Sayles* Ann. Civ. St. 1897,
art. 4560h, providing that all persons engaged
in the common service of a person operating
a railroad in the same grade of employment
and together doing the same character of
work at the same time and place are "fellow
servants," and that employes who do not
come within such provisions are not ffeUow
servants. Hampton v. Woolso^ (Tex.) 139 S.
W. 88% 89a
Aitu. St Ifloe, I 28T3, makes every rail-
road liable for damages sustained by a serv-
lint while engaged in operating the railroad
by reason of tlie negligence of another serv-
ant Section 1192 requires railroads to carry
a limited amount of baggage for each pas-
senger, and section llOO requires them to give
checks Hierefor. Plaintiff was injured while
engaged with another employ^ in transferring
baggage from and to passenger trains to the
baggage rooms of defendant railroad termi-
nal company. Held, that plaintiff was en-
gaged in "operating the railroad," within
section 2873. Turner v. Terminal R. Ass'n
of St Louis, 111 a W. 841, 842, 132 Ma App.
38.
Rev. St 1899, f 2873, provides that ev-
ery railroad corporation owning or operating
a railroad in this state shall be liable for any
damages sustained by any agent or servant
thereof while engaged in the work of operat-
ing such railroad by reason of the negligence
of any other agent or servant thereof. Held,
that the work of repairing or reconstructing
a bridge over which a railroad company's
track was laid is work performed In "operat-
ing such railroad," vrtthin the meaning of
the statute. Huston v. Quincy, O. & K. C.
R. Co., 107 S. W. 1045, 1048. 129 Mo. App.
576.
Rev. St Mo. 1899, f 2873, providing that
every railroad corporation shall be liable for
all damages sustained by any servant while
engaged in the work of "operating such rail-
road," by reason of the negligence of any
other agent or servant thereof, is not limited
In its application to the servants of the rail-
road company actually engaged in the oper*
ation of trains thereon, but includes all serv-
ants whose work is directly necessary for
the running of trains, and therefore includes
section hands engaged in repairing the road.
Callahan v. St Louis Merchants* Bridge
Terminal Ry. Co., 71 a W. 208, 170 Mo. 478,
60 L. R. A. 249, 94 Am. St Rep. 746.
Under RaUroad Law (Laws 1800, p. 1113,
c. 565, S 101) as amended by Laws 1897, p.
776, c. 688, relating to street surface rail-
roads, and providing that no corporation con-
structing and operating a railroad under the
provisions of this article, etc., shall charge any
passenger more than five cents for one contlnu-
ous ride from any point on its road, "or on
any road, line or branch operated by it, or
under its control," to any other point thereof,
etc., and Railroad Law (Laws 1890, p. 1096, c.
565, § 39) imposing a penalty on any railroad
corporation receiving more than the lawful
rate of fare, etc., the operation or control
of a road within the meaning of such sections
means a control of the operation of the road,
and not merely a control of the corporation
or individuals operating it by reason of the
ownership of a majority of the road's capi-
tal stock. Judgment Senior t. New York
OFJSBATE
746
OPERATE
aty R. Co., ©7 N. Y. Supp. 645, 111 App. DIt.
39.
Where a railway company for a fixed
rental furnished to a brewing company a
locomotive for the exclusive use of the brew-
ing coinpany in a yard containing tracks and
switches, the ties and rails for which were
owned by the railway company and the real
estate by the brewing company, and the engi-
neer and fireman operating the locomotive
were selected by the railway company and
paid by the brewing company, the mainte-
nance and operation of such yard was the
operation of a railway, within Rev. Laws
1905, I 2042, pi^viding that every company
owning or operating a railroad shall be liable
for all damages sustained within the state
by any agent or servant thereof, without
contributory negligence on his part; by rea-
son of the negligence of any other servant
thereof, so that neither the railway company
nor the brewing company could escape lia-
bility to an injured person upon the ground
that the injury resulted from the negligence
of a fellow servant, if the injured employ^
was exposed to a railroad hazard. Schoen v.
Chicago, St P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 127 N. W.
433, 434, 112 Minn. 38, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 841.
In Gen. Laws 1899, p. 214, c. 125, I 1,
providing that whenever freight, baggage, or
other property has been transported over two
or more railroads operating any part of their
roads in this state and having an agent in
this state, or operated by any assignee, trus-
tee, or receiver of such railways, suit for loss
or damages thereto may be brought against
any one or all of such railroad corporations,
the term "operating any part of their roads
in this state" means that such corporations
are engaged in the transportation of freight,
baggage, or other property within the state.
Where the undisputed evidence showed that
a railway track did not extend into the state,
and that the company was not engaged in the
transportation of any freight, baggage, or
other property within the limits of the state,
but, in the course of business between it and
another railroad company as connecting lines,
the engines and cars of each road recipro-
cally passed over the boundary line of the
states of Texas and Arkansas, in no sense
could it be said that such interchange of
buMness is within the term "operating any
part of their roads within this state." St.
Louis, I. M. & S. R Co. v. J. H. White & Co.,
80 8. W. 77, 79, 97 Tex. 493.
Opevfttins SAwaiill
An employ^ engaged in cutting and deliv-
ering logs to his employer's sawmill is not
entitled to a lien, under Ballinger*s Ann.
Codes & St i 5919, giving a lien for labor in
the operation of a sawmill, eta, but he may
assert a lien on the logs cut and delivered
under section 5390 et seq., giving to a person
performing labor on logs a lien thereon, etc.
Qraham t. Gardner, 89 Pac 171, 172, 4S
Wash. 648.
Opsrmtins street rallwmy
Authority to an electric company to
"operate" its railway on a certain street does
not authorize it to exclude the public trom
the street nor to operate the railway so as
to render the street unnecessarily dangerous.
McKim ▼. City of Philadelphia, 06 AtL 340,
342, 217 Pa. 243, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 506.
It has been held that a street railroad
company running its cars over portions of the
lines of another company by virtue of a lease
is not "operating" a railroad, as that term
is employed in the Constitution and in Rail-
road Law, fifi 91, 102, requiring the consent of
abutting owners to the construction or opera-
tion of a street railroad. Topham v. Internr-
ban St R. Co., 86 N. T. Supp. 295, 299, 42
Misc. Rep. 503 (citing Ingersoll v. Nassau
Electric R. Co., 52 N. E. 645, 167 N. Y. 468,
43 L. R. A. 236).
OperAtins trains, looomotlTes, or ears
Where plaintiff was injured while block-
ing up a turntable so as to tnm a push car
by the car being derailed and a timber there-
on falling on plaintiff, he was "operating a
car," within Sayles' Ann. Civ. St 1897, art
4560f, making railroads liable for injuries to
employ^ while operating cars, etc., by negli-
gence of other employte. Missouri, K. ft T.
R^. Co. of Texas v. Bailey, 115 S. W. 601, 606,
53 Tex. Civ. App. 295.
Injury to a railway sectionman, caused
by his foreman suddenly stopping a hand
car on which they were riding, did not arise
In the operation of railroad trains, within the
employer's liability act (Bums' Ann. St. 1906,
§ 8017), making railroad companies liable for
injuries to employes in enumerated cases.
Rlchey v. Cleveland, C, C. ft St L. R. Co., 96
N. E. 694, 697, 176 Ind. 542.
Where sectionmen in building a tempora-
ry track used a push car to bring the rails,
and plaintiff was injured by the falling of
a rail while being removed from the ear to
the track, the injury did not occur while en-
gaged in the work of "operating a car," with-
in the fellow servant rule of Batts' Ann. Civ.
St art 4560ea. Texarkana ft Ft S. Ry. Co.
V. Anderson, 118 S. W. 127, 102 Tex. 402.
"Operate: • • • (2) To effect any re-
sult; exert agency; act (3) To bring about
a specified result (4) To produce the proper
or intended effect" Under Rev. St art 4560f,
providing that every corporation operating
a railroad shall be liable for damages sus-
tained by any servant while engaged in oper- .
ating its cars by reason of the negligence of
any other servant, though a fellow servant,
an employ^ in a quarry was engaged in oper-
ating a car, where he and another employ^
loaded it with rock, started it, and mounted
it when loaded, and by the use of brakes
regulated its speed down the track to the
OPERATB
747
0F5RATK
crusher, and After anloading It pushed It
back. Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Webb, 72 S. W.
1044, 1046, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 408 (quoting
and adopting Office Stand. Diet.).
In a complaint, in an action by a servant
for injuries, ascribing the injury to the negli-
gent operation of a train by an engineer, the
word "operation" means management or con-
duct, and presupposes the existence of the
subject of operation, and does not extend to
negligence in the composition of the train,
and evidence tending to show negligence in
the composition of the train does not support
the averment Reeves v. Henderson-Boyd
Lumber Co., 55 South. 191, 192, 172 Ala. 526
(citing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 4992).
The term "operation," in an instruction
in an action for injuries to a passenger caus-
ed by the negligent handling and running of
the train, in which the court declared the
prima fade liability of the carrier for the
negligent "operation" and running of the
train, is synonymous with the term "run-
ning," and the instruction is not objection-
able as not confining the negligence to the
running of the train. Louisville, & N. R. Co.
V. Willis. 51 South. 134, 136, 58 Fla. 807.
"Operation" means how cars shall be run,
and what shall be done in that respect by a
street railway company, and does not relate
to fare. A provision in a contract between
a city and a street railway company that the
dty should not reduce fares below five cents
was not abrogated by a subsequent contract
providing that in the construction, mainte-
nance, and "operation" of its lines the com-
pany should be subject to all present or fu-
ture ordinances of the city. Minneapolis St
R. Co. V. City of Minneapolis, 155 Fed. 989,
1000.
Where a "fire knocker," for the purpose
of moving blocked cars of wood, to unload
which was a part of his duty, was attempting
to remove the block so as to move the cars
a short distance, and another "fire knocker"
was on top of the cars signaling the engineer
for the same purpose, they were engaged in
operating cars under Rev. St 1895, art 4560f,
exempting persons engaged in "operating the
cars" from the fellow-servant rule. Texas
& P. Ry. Co, V. Johnson, 118 S. W. U17, 1118,
55 Tex. Civ. App. 495.
One employed as night hostler In a rail-
road yard charged with the duty, pursuant to
the orders of his superior, of turning engines
when they come in the yard, seeing that they
get fuel, sand, and water, and are oiled,
wiped, and dispatched on the road, is not,
while inspecting a switch engine to deter-
mine whether it has been properly wiped,
engaged in the operation of a locomotive,
within the statute relating to employes en-
gaged in the work of operating locomotivea
Galveston, H. ft N. Ry. Go. v. Cochran, 100
8. W. 261, 263, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 891.
Where a railroad se.tion foreman was in-
jured while assisting his colaborers in load-
ing rails onto a fiat car composing part of a
train, while the train was at rest, he having
no duty to perform with reference to the
movement of the train, he was not engaged
in operating a car, locomotive, or train with-
in Sayles' Ann. Civ. St 1897, art. 4560f, pro-
viding that every person, receiver, or corpora-
tion operating a railroad shall be liable for
damages sustained by any servant or em-
ploy^ while engaged in operating cars, loco-
motives, or trains, by reason of the negligence
of any fellow servant St Louis Southwest-
ern Ry. Co. of Texas v. McGee (Tex.) 141
S. W. 1054, 1055.
An allegation in a petition that injury
occurring upon the derailment of a train was
caused from the manner in which the engine
and cars were being "operated," refers to tbat
which was being done by the employes on the
engine and cars at the time of the accident,
and not to the manner in which the train
was ordered to be run by the oifldals of the
road. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of Texas ▼.
Poole, 133 S. W. 239. 240, 104 Tex. 36.
A freight handler negligently run into
by an engine while he was pushing a car to a
freighthouse by direction of his superior is
within Laws 1893, c. 220, making railroad
companies liable for injuries to any employ 6
through the negligence of another employ 6,
without contributory negligence on his part,
while engaged in "operating cars." Ean v.
Chicago, etc., R. (;;o., 69 N. W. 997, 998, 95
Wis. 69.
Plaintitf was engaged with others in dis-
tributing ties along a railway track. The ties
were placed on a car which was pushed along
the track by plaintiff and the other workm&a
and the ties pulled or thrown off where need-
ed without stopping the car, if possible. It
was the duty of plaintiff to assist in starting,
stopping, and moving the car as well as
throwing off the ties. While he was moving
a tie thrown off, a co-employ6 caused another
to slide off, which injured him. Held, that
plaintiff was injured while engaged in operat-
ing a car within the meaning of the statute,
declaring that the fact that injury in such
cases is due to the act of a fellow servant
does not defeat recovery. Freeman v. Shaw
(Tex.) 126 S. W. 53, 56.
Where railroad employ^ were transport-
ing ballast on a push car for repair of a
track, and had to remove the car from the
track between trips and replace it on the
track, they were "operating the car" within
a statute providing that a railroad company
shall be liable for injuries to a servant, in
operating a car, through the negligent act of
any other servant Seery v. Gulf, C. & S. F.
Ry. Co., 77 S. W. 950, 951, 84 Tex. Civ. App.
89.
Undtt Rev. St Mo. 1899, S 2864, as amend-
ed by Laws Mo. 1905, pp. 185-137, pro^^ding
OKDER
708
OBDEB
eml orders, and tlie protectton of tbe stat-
nte does not extend to an employ^ Injured
from the negligence of the foreman while
working under general directions. Indian-
apolis St Ry. Go. ▼. Kane, 80 N. B. 841, 843,
169 Ind. 25.
Of yailroAd eemadssiom
The expression *'order of the commia-
slon," as used in Act Aug. 23, 1907 (Laws
1907, p. 78) f 9, relating to the Jurisdiction of
the railroad commission, and providing that
if any corporation within its jurisdiction
shall do any act declared unlawful, or omit
to do any act required to be done either by
any law of Georgia, or by an order of the
commission, it shall be liable to persons in-
jured thereby, has reference to special or-
ders of the commission, and not to its gen-
eral rules. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. T. Beach, 70 S. B. 137, 139, 8 Ga.
App. 720.
Ordinamoe dlstinsiiislied
See Ordinance.
Wmmu&t
Under Sand, ft H. Dig. Ark. | 5273, which
provides that each dty council shall cause
to be provided for its clerk's office a seal,
which seal shall be affixed to all transcripts,
orders, or certificates which it may be neces-
aary or proper to authenticate under the pro-
visions of this act, a dty warrant is not an
''order.** Condon v. City of Eureka Springs,
135 Fed. 566, 571.
OBDEB (la Ooameretal 1iaw>
See Attested Order; Mail Order; Money
Order; Money Order Funds.
Warrant synonymous, see Warrant
''An 'order' is in its principal elements
the same whether it is for the payment of
money or for the delivery of goods." United
States V. Green, 136 Fed. 618, 649 (citing
Bish. St Crimes, p. 298, § 327).
The indorsement of a check payable to a
real or fictitious person, other than accused,
is equivalent to an "order for the payment
of money," within Penal Code, f 470, enumer-
ating the subjects of forgery. People v.
Jones, 106 Paa 724, 725, 12 CaL App. 129.
As rendering instmmeAt mesotiaMe
The words "or order" are not essential to
make a bill of lading quasi negotiable.
Forbes v. Boston & L. B. Co., 133 Mas& 154,
157.
Partievlar laatruBieats
A written instrument in the following
language: "Mr. Alex. Sapp Please let Jim
have $1.00 in trade and oblige, 0. H. Bogers.
$1.00 P. S. Will pay Thursday"— is "an or-
der for money or other property,'* within the
meaning of the forgery statute. Johnson v.
SUte, 86 South. 166, 47 Fla. 35.
Bala dlatiaciUaliea
A sale of personal property is a trans-
mutatioB ol property from one man to an-
other in consideration of soma priee or rec-
ompense in value^ and ao one having an
agency to sell wine^ which he was expected
to deliver, is not entitled to a commission on
the mere procuring of orders, the title of the
wine not passing until an actual delivery ; an
"order" being only an executory agreement
which cannot even be deemed a "sale** for
the purpose of determining the number of
sales made by the agent in a given time^
Hall V. French-American Wine Co., 134 N. T.
Supp. 158, 161, 149 App. Div. 609.
OBDEB dn Praotiee)
See Final Order; Interlocutory Order;
Lawful Order.
See, also, Final Decree or Judgmoit
As expressly defined by Gen. Code Ohio,
1 11582, an "order" is a direction of the court
or judge made or rendered in writing^ and
not included in a Judgment Mannington t.
Hocking Val. By. Co., 183 Fed. 133, 141.
Under Bev. St 1887, § 4880, an "order^
ia defined to be every direction of a court or
judge made and entered in writing and not
included in a judgment Dahlstrom v. Port-
land Biin. Co., 85 Pac. 916, 917, 12 Idaho, 87.
Under Bev. St 1899, | 4402, providing
that, on the dismissal of an aM>eal from
Justice court for irregularity, the district
court clerk shall certify the "order" of dis-
missal to the justice^ under section 4247 de-
fining a final order to be an order affecting
a subatantlai right when it determines the
action and prevents a judgment, and section
4249 providing that a final ordar of the dis-
trict court may be reversed, etc, an order
dismissing an appeal from a justice court
must be made by the district court, and most
appear upon its record, and no individual act
of appelant, such aa an entry on the docket*
can operate as a dismissal of the appeaL
Mayott V. Knott, 92 Pac 240^ 16 Wyo. 108.
The provision in Chicago Municipal
Court Act (Hurd*s Bev. St 1909, c 87) I 264.
authorizing the chief Justice to prescribe ab-
breviated forms of entries of "orders" by the
court, extends to all orders, whether inter-
locutory or final, dty of Chicago t. Oole-
man, 98 N. B. 621, 522, 254 IlL 88a.
The term "rule" or "order," whi(A are
synonymous, includes commands to lower
courts or court officials to do ministerial
acts. Garter v. Louisiana Purchase Expo-
sition Ca, 102 S. W. 6, 9, 124 Mo. App. 530.
The error of a trial court in directing or
refusing to direct a verdict is one of law
reviewable by the Supreme Court on appeal
as coming within "orders, rulings, or deci-
sions," made in the action within Oomp.
Laws 1907, | 8804, authorizing the court on
appeal from a Judipnent to review orders, rul-
ings, and decisions in the action. Ism ▼•
Smith, 98 Pac 800, 80i S4 Utah. 894.
ORDSR
799
OJR0XR
An indorsenitfit by a Jnsttce of the city
ooort npon an "order" fbr tine examination
of a judgment debtor, xedting, "Proceedings
dismissed npon objection made by jndgment
debtor/'^ is itseif an order witbin Oode Civ.
Proc f 767, defining a written direction of a
court or jndge, not contained in a Judgment,
to be an order. McAlpln ▼. Stoddard, 105
N. Y. Snpp. d, 12, 64 Misc. Rep. 647.
Code 1896, f 1372, allows SO cents for Al-
tering any "order" of court, and an item of
a cost bill stated upon an execution was **or^
ders of court, dO^." Held, tbat it was ob-
TiouB tbat the word "order" was intended,
and tbe execution was not invalid on the
ground that the bill of costs was not itemised
as required by section 1888. Simmons ▼.
Sharpe, 42 South. 441, 442, 148 Ala. 217.
The words "judgment" and "order," in
Obde, 9 542, subhead 8, which provides that
the Supreme Ck>urt may reverse, vacate, and
modify a judgment of a district court for
errors appearing on the record, and in revers-
ing su^ judgment or "order" may reverse,
vacate, or modi^ any immediate "order" in-
volving the merits of the action or any part
thereof, are used somewhat indiserindnately,
80 much so as to suggest that any specific in-
dependent part of a judgment is appealable.
Kremer v. Kremer, 90 Pa& 996, 999, 76 Kan.
1S4.
Where a justice of the pence was derk as
well, an execution issued by him was "order-
ed by the court," within Qen. St a 88, art 1,
i 4, providing that, unless so ordered, no ex-
ecution shall issue till 10 days after judgment
roidered. Guelot v. Pearce (Ky.) 88 S. W..
882, 893.
A record stating "that the said indict-
ment and proceedings are handed down to the
quarter sessions, there to be proceeded with
according to law," etc, is svidDcient to give
the quarter sessions jurisdiction ; the words
"handed down" and "ordered to be delivered"
being convertible terms. Engeman v. State,
28 Atl. 676, 678, 54 N. J. Law, 247.
An order of approval of an account and
discharge of a guardian is "an order or Judg-
ment," within Rev. St 1895, art 2799, provid-
ing that any person interested in a guardian-
ship may by a bill of review have any order
or judgment corrected on showing error
ther^n. Nicholson v. Nicholson Cl^ex.) 125
S. W. 965. 967.
As JndgaieBt or deeree
See Decree; Judgment
As Botiee
See NoUce.
Order after iudgment
An order of the trial court quashing an
execution is an "order on a summary appli-
cation in an action after judgment," and ia
appealable. Bamett v. Bohannen, ua Pae.
967, 98a, 27 OkL 36&
8 Wnaft P.2D Ssb.— 49
An order setting aside a default before
entry of Judgment thereon is not appealable ;
it not being an "order after judgment" or an
"interlocutory order," within Code Civ. Proc.
I 963, making appealable interlocutory orders
entered in actloas to redeem mortgaged prop-
erty or in partition suits, etc. Savage v.
Smith, 97 Pac. 821, 822, 154 Cal. 325.
Order against sale or oo&veyanoe
An order of the superior court, annulling
and setting aside a former order confirming
the sale of realty belonging to a decedent's
estate, is an order "against directing a sale
or conveyance" within Code Civ. Proc. i 963,
subd. 3, so as to be appealable to the Supreme
Court In re West's Estate, 122 Pac 953,
954, 162 Cal. 352.
An order of the probate court discharg-
ing an order upon the executrix to show
cause why the homestead devised by the will
of the testate should not be sold to pay debts
of the estate is an "order refusing to direct
the sale of real estate," within the meaning
of subdivision 8, | 4665, Gen. St 1894, and
such order can be reviewed by appeal only,
and not upon certiorari. In re Wilson's Es-
tate, 97 N. W. 647, 648, 91 Minn. 116.
Aa proooedinsp
See Proceeding.
RiiUjic on deaaarror
A decision overruling a demurrer to an
amended complaint, with leave to defendants
to answer, was not a judgment of ttfielf, but
an "order" which was subject to vacation for
cause under Code Civ. Proc. | 473, providing
that the court may relieve a party from a
mistake in an ord^r made during the prog-
ress of the proceedings during the term in
the furtherance of justice. Dent v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 95 Pac. 672,
673, 7 Cal. App. 683. ,
Under Pen. Code, I 1008, providing that,
if a demurrer Is allowed, the judgment is
final on the indictment or information, and
Is a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, unless the court, being of the opinion
that the objection may be avoided in a new
indictment or information, directs the case
to be resubmitted or directs a new informa-
tion to be filed, provided that, after such or-
der, the defendant may be examined before
a magistrate, and discharged or committed
by him as in other cases, and section 1009
providing that if the court does not permit
the information to be amended, nor direct
that a new information be filed, the defend-
ant must be discharged, the court's minutes
reciting tbat, the demurrer to the informa-
tion having been argued and submitted, the
court expvBBsed the opinion that Ihe demur-
rer should be sustained, but that the defect
in ttie information might be corrected by a
new information, did not constitute an order
within section 1098, authorising proceedings
4e novo and a new information agfUnst the
ORDER
770
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
accused. Ez parte Hayter, 110 Flc. 870,
S72, 10 GaL App. 211.
Aa written iaatnimeat
See Written Inatrument
ORDER AFFEOmrO SUBSTAJfTIAL
RIGHT
See Substantial Right
ORDER ORAKTnrO OR OOETUIUIJIO
IKJUKOnOH
An order overruling a motion to dissolre
or modify an injunction previously granted
is not one continuing the injunction within
the meaning of the statute, and is not ap-
pealable. Lewis T. Hitchman Goal A Goke
Co., 170 Fed. 549, 550, 100 C. O. A. 137.
A preliminary restraining order requir-
ing the defendants to show cause why it
should not be made permanent, is an "order
granting an injunction" within the statute.
Taylor v. Breese, 103 Fed. 078. 088, 90 C. C.
A. 558. And so is an interlocutory decree in
a suit for infringement of a patent which ad-
Judges the patent valid and infringed, awards
an injunction, and directs an accounting.
Highland Glass Co. v. Schmertz Wire Glass
Co., 178 Fed. 944, 970, 102 G. C. A. 310.
ORDER GRANTIHO OR REFUSING
ALIMOmr
An order adjudging or refusing to ad-
Judge a share of the husband's property to
the wife, where a divorce is granted to the
husband by reason of the aggression of the
wife, under Rev. St. f 5700, is an ''order
granting or refusing alimony," within Rev.
St 1908, 1 6700, and either party may appeaL
Fiesler v. Fiesler, 93 N. B. 899, 000, 83 Ohio
St 200.
ORDER OF OOURT
See By Order of Court
As law, see Law.
See, also, Judgment; Order (In Practice).
The expression "orders of court** has
been treated as covering not only orders of
the courts In session, but orders of the ab-
sent Judges. United States v. McCabe, 129
Fed. 708, 711, 04 C. a A. 230.
ORDER OF DEPORTATIOir
The requirement of Chinese Exclusion
Act May 5, 1892, c. 00, 27 SUt 25, as amend-
ed by Act Nov. 8, 1893, c. 14, 28 Stat 7,
that an order of deportation be executed
by the marshal, and that the person to be
deported shall not be admitted to ball, refers
to the final order of deportation, and does not
prohibit ball pending an appeal. United
States V. Yee Yet, 192 Fed. 577, 579.
ORDER OF nrXERSTATE OOXMEROE
COMMISSION
The Commerce Court has Jurisdiction of
a suit to annul an "order** of the Interstate
Commerce Commission which either awards
or denies reparation to a complainant under
Interstate Commerce Act Feb. 4, 1887, e. lOi
I 10, 24 Stat 884, as amended by Act Juihe
29, 1900, c. 3591, | 5, 84 Stat 590. A petitun
by a carrier to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission for leave to refund to a slflpper a
portion of a freight diarge paid which it
admits to have been excessive Is not the
equivalent of a complaint for reparatiaii b?
the shipper under Interstate Commerce Act
Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, | 13, 24 Stat 383, and i
denial of the petition by the Commission for
want of Jurisdiction, because under its cod-
structicm of the statute the daim of the ship-
per was barred by limitation, does doc co&
stitute an order adverse to the shipper whidi
can be made the basis of a suit by him for
relief in the Conunerce Court AriEaasu
Fertiliser Co. v. United States, 103 Fed. Gb*T.
009 0;>er Archbald, Judge, solus).
Act Cong. June 18, 1910, a 300, 36 Stat
539, confers on the Commerce Coort Jnils^
diction previously possessed by the Cinniii
Courts of the United States of cases hrou^
to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any
^'order*' of the Interstate Coouneroe Commls-
slon, also authorising the Commeroe Court
to exercise any and all powers of the Circ^
Court of the United States so far as may l<
appropriate to the effective exercise of tbe
Jurisdiction conftered, and that nothing con-
tained in the act shall be construed as enlai^-
ing the Jurisdiction previously possessed b?
the courts thereby transferred to and vested
in the Commerce Court ; the Jurisdiction so
tAT as conferred, however, being exclusiTe.
and so far as not conferred being reserved.
Held, that since capacity to sue in the Coid-
merce Court depends on the general equltr
practice in force in the Circuit Courts, aod
prior to the creation o< the Commerce Coon
a shipper claiming to be injured by a ruling
of the Interstate Commerce Commission re-
fusing to annul a private car demurrage rule
could have sued in the Circuit Court to sec
aside the commission's ruling, such rulii^
though granting no affirmative relief, shouid
be construed as an "order" of the commlssioa
which the Commerce Court had Jorisdictioa
to review on petition of the person .conceiTiBs
himself injured thereby. Procter & Gamble
Co. V. United States, 188 Fed. 221, 224.
ORDEB OF PUBUCATIOH
As process, see Process.
ORDEB TO SHOW CAUSE
An "order to show cause" Is Imt a metis
prescribed by law in the nature of a process
to bring a defendant into court to answer
plamtiff's demands Morehouse v. PaciSc
Hardware & Steel Co., 177 Fed. 337, 339. lU'
a C. A. W7*
An "order to show cause*' is an order
requiring a party to appear and show cause
why a certain thing should not be done or
permitted. Spaeth v. SeUs^ 176 F^d. 797, 79SL
OKDXaiiT H0U8B
771
OKDINANOB
OBDSBLT Houaa
See, also« Disorderly Housa
An ''orderly house/' or place for tiie sale
of Uqnors, within the condition of a bond pro-
viding that a liquor dealer shall maintain
such a place, is one in which no music, loud
or boisterous talking, yelling, or indecent, vul-
gar language is allowed, used, or practiced,
or any other noise calculated to disturb or.
annoy any person residing or doing business
in that vicinity. Adams t. State (Tex.) 14e
8. W. 1086, 108a
ORDINANCE
See Criminal Ordlnanee; Fixed by Ordi-
nance; Necessary Police Ordinances;
Permanent Ordinance; Prescribed by
Law or Ordinance; Prior Ordinance.
Any proposed ordinance, see Any.
Vacation ordinance, see Vacation.
The term ''ordinance," as used in speak-
ing of the legislation of the constitutional
convention, means a law which is essential
to carry into effect the objects for which the
convention was created, and, when oncie
adopted by the convention, such ordinance
has the force and effect of law. Smith v.
State ex rel. Hepburn, 118 Pac. 932, 935, 28
Okl. 235 (quoting and adopting the definition
in FrantB v. Autry, 91 Pac. 193, 18 OkL 561);
Frantz v. Autry, 91 Paa 193, 218, 18 Okl.
56L
"An 'ordinance* of a municipal corpora-
tion is a local law, and binds persons within
the jurisdiction of the corporation." Pitts-
burgh, 0., a & St L. Ry. Co. V. Lighthelser,
71 N. B. 218, 221, les Ind. 247 (citing Balti-
more & O. S. W. R. Co. V. Peterson, 59 N. E.
1044, 156 Ind. 364; Pennsylvania Co. v. Stege-
meier, 20 N. B. 848i, 118 Ind. 806, 10 Am. St
Rep. 136).
•'Ordinance" as a term of municipal law,
is the equivalent of legislative action, and in
a statute carries with It by implication the
usual incidents of such action. Stemmler
V. Borough of Madison, 88 AtL 85, 82 N. J.
Law, 696, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 767.
An "ordinance" is a local law prescrib-
ing a general and permanent rule. "A city
council is a miniature general assembly, and
their authorized ordinances have the force
of laws passed by the Legislature." Kersey
V. CJity of Terre Haute, 68 N. E. 1027, 1029,
161 Ind. 471 (citing atlzens' Gas & Mln. Co.
V- Town of Elwood, 114 Ind. 332, 16 N. B.
624, and quoting Taylor v. City of Carondel-
et, 22 Mo. 105),
A municipal ordinance is a local law, af-
fecting the property, rights, and Uberty of
citizens^ who are entitied to know at what
time and under what drcnmstances it ac-
quires that status. Mayor and Board of
Trustees of Town of New Iberia v. Moss
Hotel Co^ 86 South. 662, 668, 112 La. 526.
I A "mniildpal ordiimncer* Is a law of lo-
cal application, and a violation of the ordi-
nance is an offense against the city enacting
the ordinance. The ordinance is penal in
its nature; otherwise the offender oould not
be arrested and taken in custody for its
violation. An infraction of the ordinance
is termed a petty pffense and constitutes a
crime, in the broad meaning of that word.
Pearson v. Wimbish, 52 S. E. 751, 755, 124
Ga. 701, 4 Ann. Ois. 501 (citing McHae v.
Mayor, etc., of City of Amerlcus, 59 Ga. 170,
27 Am. Rep. 390).
"An 'ordinance regulating a street* is a
legislative act entirely beyond the judicial
power of the state." Indiana R. Co. v. Cal-
vert, 80 N. B. 961, 964, 168 Ind. 321, 10 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 780, 11 Ann. Cas. 635 (quoting and
adopting the definition in Wood v. Mears,
12 Ind. 515, 74 Am. Dec. 222; Indianapolis
& C. R. Co. V. State ex rel. City of Lawrence-
burg, 37 Ind. 489).
" 'FoUce ordinances' are at once family
rules on a large sci^e and state laws on a
small scale. • • • In a city, we think,
a man may fis^t in a way to violate an or-
dinance without being, guilty of an assault
and battery." Porter v. State, 52 S. £. 283,
288, 124 Ga. 297, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 730 (quot-
ing and adopting definition in McRae v. May-
or, etc, of City of Amerlcus, 59 Ga. 168, 27
Am. Rep. 390).
"Wrltins oss«Btljd
Since an ordinance must be reduced to
writing before it can be acted on by the city
council, it means something more than a ver-
bal motion subsequentiy reduced to writing
by the clerk or secretary of the council, and
hence a recital in the minutes of a city coun-
cil that a certain councilman presented a
petition from P. asking permission to erect
a fence around a portion of the property on
which a new building was to be erected, includ-
ing a poison of a street and alley with a
recommendation of the board of fire com-
missioners that the request be granted, and
that on motion the request was granted, did
not constitute an ordinance and was insuffi-
cient to grant the authority prayed; especial-
ly under Austin City Charter (Sp. Laws
1909, c. 2, art 11) I 15. providing that an
ordinance shall be complete in the form in
which it is finally passed, and be filed with
the clerk of the city council before action
shall be taken tiiereon. American Const
Co. V. Seellg, 133 S. W. 429, 431, 104 Tex. 16.
"Ordinance/* as used in Indiana Act
1899, p. 343, c. 164, S 25, providing that no
board of county commissioners, officers,
agent, or employ^ of any county shall have
power to bind the county by any contract or
agreement or in any other way to any ex-
tent beyond the aiitount of money at the
time already appropriated by ordinance for
the purpose of the occupation, etc.» means
OBDIKAMUB
772
OBDINAKCB
in Instnunent in wflttny, toiMtlilnff more
and addltloiial to a verbal motloii sabMiiueiit-
ly reduced to writing by a dark or eabotdl-
nate of the local board, ao tliat audi acta
required to be done by ordlnanoe cannot be
validly done by order, reaolotloa, or notiee.
State ez rel. DaTia t. Board o( Comibiafllon-
era of Newton County, T4 N. B. IWU 1006,
165 Ind. 202, 6 Ann. Caa. 40a
Bee Contract
An ordinance amending an ordinance
pasaed by an incorporated town of the In-
dian Territory granting to a corporation a
franchiae to furnish said town with light
and heat by meana of natural gaa, and ex-
tending the time aet in the ordinance amend-
ed for fumiahing the aame, la an "ordinance
of general and permanent nature*' within
Mansf. Dig. Ark. | 924 (Ind. T. Ann. St 1889,
I dB4), proTiding that, when an ordinance
of auch a nature ia advanced from the first
to the third reading on the aame day, two-
thirda of the members of the council must
vote in favor thereof. Town of Sapulpa v.
Sapulpa OU & Qaa Co, 07 Pac lOOT, 1010,
22 Okl. 847.
By-lawa, mleat mmd vegvlationa symoa*
yaioitfl
The words "ordlnanceai** ••mlea,*' ••regu-
lations/' and "by-laws'* are synonymous
terms. State ez reL Kreba v. Hector, 120
N. W. 190, 200, 83 Neb. 090 (citing 6 Words
and Phrases, p. 6026).
Within a city charter authorizing tiie
board of commissionera by ••ordinance" to
levy an additional taz, a mere order or res-
olution of ratification and affirmanoe, modify-
ing in imrt a prior ordinance levying an ad-
ditional taz and in all other reqiiects confirm-
ing it, waa a valid ezerdse of the powers of
the commissionera. Johnston v. City of
Huntington, 76 8. B. 142, 144, 71 W. Va. 106.
Law diatingnlslied
Law as including ordinance, see Law.
As law of the state, see Law of the
State.
A "municipal ordinance'* ia not regarded
in the light of a public law of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Stott
V. aty of Chicago, 68 N. £. 736, 739, 206 IlL
281.
•'A city ordinance" ia not a law of the
same character aa a statute. It ia merely a
regulation; a rule of conduct passed by the
common council for the direction and super-
vision of Its dtiaens. People v. (Gardner, 106
N. W. 641, 646, 148 MidL 104.
Aa liaUUty
See Liability.
Ovdev
Though the words ••regulatloB or order*'
and •'ordinance and reaolutlon," aa found
in the California atatuftas, may oflm be ved
to ezpresa tlie aame meaning, it doci act
neceaaarUy follow tliat in all eases tbe word
•'order" ia synonymous with "ordinaoce.^
and, under the ConaoUdatlon Act April 2l
1868 (St Cat 1868, pi 640, c: 352), whicii
authorisea the board of anpervison of tbe
dty and county of San Frandsoo to pro-
ceed under the police power by "regulatloD
or order," a contract for the dlspositioc
of garbage may be made by •'order*" and \k
mayor's signature la not essential to its n
lidity. California Bednction 0>. t. Sanittrr
Reduction Work% 126 JML 20, 40^ a a C
A. 91.
Aa vvtvate aat
See Private Act
Heaelmtiea 1n«l»dad
The term •\>rdinanoe** or "Ksolotioia'
aa need la Nev. Codea 1906, | 2668» glTiogtbe
mayor of the dty power to sign or veto taj
ordinance or resolution, was intended to is^
elude, not only ordinancea as sadi, but alft
resolutions of a legislative character, wbi:^
therefore are similar to ordlnaDces in this
respect State v. Duis, 116 N. W. 75L 7Ji
17 N. D. 319.
An •Vtfdinanoe^* la also a resoliitloii asd
the two are equivalent. Henos aa ordiniKe
authorising a street ImiiroventaDt pmed obIt
19 daya after the reaolutlon of intentkn bad
been paaaed is premature and void under tk
Vrooman Aet (St 1886, pi 147, c. laS).
though not aigned by the mayor imtil tfv
daya after tta enactment Mnlbeny ^
G'Dea, 88 Pac 867, 868, 4 CaL App. 385 idt
ing City of Loa Angtiea v. WaUroo, 3 Pit
890, 66 CaL 283; HeUman v. 8hostten,41
Pac 916, 46 Pac 1067, U4 CaL 1S7).
Under Barre City Charter (Acts ISU
Ko. 166) H S> 68. 66, veatiiig the adminiitn
tion of municipal alEaira in the mtyor ml
board of aldermen, and empowering tbp
council to make ••ordinances," regnlttksi
and by-lawa to provide a supply <tf w*^
etc, a grant of a privilege to an indiTldBii
to instaU a ayatem of pipes tfaroogli the
streets of the city, to convey water to tbe
inhabitants thereof, may be by resolntioD (tf
the board of aldermen, approved by ^
mayor, and need not be by ordlnanoe wbicii
strictly speaking, ia an expression of ^
municipal will affecting the condnct of tbe
inhabitants generally or of a number of tbes
under some general deslgnatloB. Citx -^
Barre v. Perry ft Scrlbner, 73 Atl. 574, 82 Tt
801.
There is a plain distinction between tbe
functions of an •^ordinance'* and a ^^^
••reeolution" not adopted aa an ordlitfact
An •'ordinance" la a mode of expiesiins ^
legialative sets of a municipal corpoittkA
and a resolnttoB ia an ordur of tmv^
character and of a mlnislwial natnie. P^
aacoU V. Southern BeU a>BlephdM<^^
ORDIKANOB
778
OBPINABT BAGG A0B
South. 820, 8^4, 48 Fla. 161 (citing aty of
Jacksonyille v. Ledwltli, 7 South. 885, 26 Fla.
163. 9 L. B. A. 69, 23 Am. St Bep. 65Q,
As statmte
See Statute.
Eleotion of city ofHeer
Election of a city solicitor by the Gam-
bridge board of aldermen, aa required by
Rev. Laws, c. 26, | 7, is not an "ordinance"
or ''order," within general rules and orders
of the city council, providing that every ordi-
nance and order requiring concurrent action
shall remain with the clerk fbr 86 hours after
passing one board. Pevey v. Aylward, 91 N.
E. 315, 816, 205 Mass. 102.
Oraat of liuad
The word "ordinance," in its usnal. pri-
mary sense, means a local law, a rule of con-
duct prospective in its operation, and apply-
ing generally to the persons and things sub-
ject to the local jurisdiction. It does not, in
its ordinary use or signification, include a
grant of landa Southern Pac. Go. v. Western
Pac. it Go., 144 Fed. 160, 181.
Warrant
Under Sand, ft H. Dig. Ark. | 6273,
which provides that "each city council shall
cause to be provided fbr its clerk's office a
seal, whldi seal shall be affixed to all tran-
scripts, orders, or oertiflcates which it may be
necessary or proper to authenticate under
the provisions of this act or of any by-law
or ordinance of the dty," a city warrant is
not an "ordinance." Gondon v. Gity of Eu-
reka Springs, 135 Fed. 566, 571.
ORDINARY (ADJ.)
"Ordinary" means methodical, regular,
according to established order, common, usu-
al, often recurring. Gity of Long Beach v.
Boynton, 119 Pac. 677, 679, 17 GaL App. 290.
See, also, Frits v. Western Union TeL Go., 71
Paa 209, 218, 25 Utah, 268.
In prosecutions for homicide, in charging
u to the presumption that persons Intend the
ordinary results of their acts, the words
"necessary," **prx)bable,*' "usual,'* and "ordi-
nary" are sabstantlally synonymous. Beau*
regard v. State, 131 N. W, 347, 361, 146 Wis.
280.
Where a reservation in a timber deed
provided that the vendors should have the
right to use such timber from the land as
inight be necessary for ordinary plantation
purposes connected with the land, not includ-
ing the right to clear any of the land, the
srantors or those claiming under them were
entitled to use the timber for every other
ordinary plantation purpose, than clearing
any part of the land, etc, construing the
word "ordinary" in Its usual acceptation as
"common,"" "usual," "common occurrence^"
"usual practice," and the word "plantation"
u a cultivated estate^ a large farm for rais-
ing the different products of agriculture.
Midland Timber Go. v. Peguee, 76 S. B. 82,
34, 93 8. G. 82.
ORDINABT AGTXOH
Rev. St 1874, c. 68, | 11, providing that
notice of proceedings by an abandoned spouse
to sell the property of the delinquent spouse
for family support shall be given "as in ordi-
nary actions," and that anything done under
"the order or decree of the court" shall be
valid, as if done by the party owning the
property, authorisses service by publication as
in chancery, notwithstanding the use of the
word "action"; that word in a comprehensive
sense being synonymous with ''suit," and
being used Interchangeably therewith to
mean any legal proceeding in a court for the
Mifbroement of a right, so that the words
"ordinary actions" did not contemplate per-
sonal service as in a strictly legal action.
Brand v. Brand, 96 N. B. 918, 920, 252 111.
IM.
OBDIKABT APPLIAHOBS
An instruction that, if the Jury believe
from the evidence that defendant's locomo-
tive was running at such rapid rate of speed
that It would have been impossible, by the
use of ordinary' means and appliances, to
stop the locomotive and prevent the Injury
to the stock within the distance in which
stock upon the tracks could be seen by the
aid of the headlight, then the defendant was
guilty of negligence is not erroneous for the
reason that, if the locomotive in question was
equipped with some extraordinary appliance
by which it could be stopped within the dis-
tance to which the headlight throws the
light, it would not be within the rule, since
the expression ^'ordinary means and appli-
ances" refers to the ordinary or customary
means and appliances at the command of
that particular train or locomotive. Louis-
ville & N. B. Go. v. Ghrlstian Moerlein Brew-
ing Go., 48 Sonat 723, 726^ 160 Ala. 890.
ORDINARY BAGGAGE
See, also, Ordinary Luggage.
The word "baggage" has been well de-
fined to mean such articles of necessity, or
personal convenience, as are usually carried
by passengers for their personal use, and not
merchandise or other valuables, though car-
ried in the trunks of passengers, not destined
for such use, but for other purposes, as for
sale, and the like. The addition of the word
ordinary," In the statute regulating the
carrier's charges for transporting passengers
with "ordinary baggage," does not limit the
word "baggage" to wearing apparel and other
articles ordinarily carried by a common trav-
eler, but is used merely to recognize the well-
established meaning of the word "baggage"
as distinguished from "merchandise." Doer-
ner v. St Louis A S. F. B. Go., 180 S. W. 62,
63, 149 Mo. App. 170.
OaDINART BAaOAQB
774
ORDIKABT CARK
*^rdlDary twggage" Is, In general, sncb
articles of necessity and convenience as are
usually carried by passengers for personal
use and comfort, or protection. The property
must have the characteristics of personal ef-
fects, and be carried for the passenger's use.
Manifestly this excludes merchandise, and,
by weight of authority, it excludes all prop-
erty carried for trade purposes, or designed
and Intended to be used in connection with
such purposes. Thus, samples carried by a
passenger in his trunk to be used in malcing
sales of goods are not baggage, and it is im-
material that they are necessary to the ob-
ject of the passmger's Journey. And Uiere
is no principle on which to distinguish be-
tween a case involTlng samples of the goods
to be sold and one involving models or photo-
graphs Intended to represent the goods to be
sold. So under Code, | 2077, requiring a car-
rier to accept and carry the ordinary baggage
of a passenger, a carrier is not liable for
delay In the delivery of a sample case check-
ed by a passenger as baggage and containing
photographs of articles of furniture which
the passenger was engaged in selling as a com-
mercial traveler. McElroy v. Iowa Cent Ry.
Co., 110 N. W. 915, 916, 133 Iowa, 544.
OBDIHAJIT BUSIHBSS
By the "ordinary business of a municipal
corporation," which under Code, | 4850, can-
not be stopped by temporary injunction. Is
meant simply those mattera which come
within the exercise of those powera and func-
tions conferred upon it by law wlilch ara
beneficially incident to its existence and op-
eration as a corporation. It does not extend
to those mattera where the dty acts merely by
appointment from the state, and in respect
of which the beneficial Interest la in the pub-
lic at large. Wingert v. Snouffer A Ford, 108
N. W. 1036, 1087, 134 Iowa, 97.
ORDIHAJIT OAS^Laa
Things repeated dally or weekly in tlie
course of trade or business are parts of the
"ordinary calling" of a man exercising such
trade or business. Ellis ▼. State, 68 8. £.
688, 589, 5 6a. App. 615.
ORDIHABT OABE
See Reasonable and Ordinary Care; Usu-
al and Ordinary Care; Want of Ordi-
nary Care.
See, also, Ordinary Diligence; Ordinary
Negligence.
"Ordinary cara" is that kind of care, in
the particulara specified, as other persons
similarly situated exerdae under like circum-
stances, and nothing more. City of Mankato
V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 142 Fed. 829,
346, 73 C. C. A. 439.
"Ordinary care" is that measure of pru-
dence universally exacted in all the lawful
relations of life, except where, from other
considerations, a higher degree of caution, is
enjoined. Sullivan-Sanford Lamber Go. ▼.
Watson (Tex.) 186 S. W. 686, 638.
The mere exercise of one's best Jndgmes
Is not necessarily <nrdinary care. Men of
average prudence sometimes airlTe at erro-
neous concluaions from a heedless or can-
less consideration of the subject before theai.
or from want of ordinary care in other n-
spects. Carney v. Concord St. Ry., 67 AtL
218, 222, 72 N. H. 864.
Instructions defining "ordinary care* ts
such care as a prudent man of tbe reqnisitt
skill will take under the circumstances of the
particular case, or such as ordinarily pnh
dent men exercise in mattera affecting thdr
own Interests, erroneously fix tbe stand&rd
of such care. Reffke v. Patten Paper Col.
117 N. W. 1004, 1006, 136 Wis. 536.
An instruction which, in attempting to
define "ordinary care," makes the Jorora tlie
standard of what la a prud^it person is er-
roneous. Mayor, etc., of City of Ameiins
V. Johnson, 68 S. B. 618-620, 2 Ga. App. 3Ta
As eare exercised Iby •&• iiinj— I— ■
ed or skilled
''Ordinary care," as apidied to railwajr
employes and agenti^ is that degree of care
which railway employ^ and agents of ordi-
nary skill and prudence obserre under simi-
lar circumstances. Loolsville, H. & St L.
B. Co. ▼. Kessee (Ky.) 103 S. W. 261, 261.
'^Ordinary care" and skill on tlie part of
a physician and surgeon is that degree of
care and skill usually exercised and possess-
ed by physicians and surgeons of ordin&rj
care and skill in similar communities. Dor
rU V. Warford, 100 S. W. 812, 313, 124 Ky.
768, 0 L. B. A. (N. S.) 1090, 14 Ann. Caa OOl
As used in an Instmctioii defatns "ordi-
nary care" as that degree of care wlii<di ordi-
narily prudent and skillful men usoally exer-
cise under the circumstances in oocapattoos
similar to those proven In tbe particultr
case, the word **8klllfal" does not add t
new, distinct, or different standard, bat only
requires what should be required of ordinary
men in the business in which they are ec-
gaged. It is better to give the ordinary defi-
nition. The instruction is only technicaUy
erroneous, if at alL Southern R. Co. in Eeo-
tucky V. Otis' Adm'r (Ky.) 78 S. W. 480, 4S1.
As eare ezerelsed la person's o^m af-
fairs
"Ordinary care" Is that degree of cire
which a person of ordinary prudence woiil<l
take of the property under the same cirenm-
stances if it were his own. Bigger t. Acree,
112 S. W. 879, 87 Ark. 318, 23 L. R. A, (N. S.)
187.
"Ordinary care" is that care which m**!!
of common prudence generally exercise abcat
their own affairs in the age and country in
which they liv^. Lyman v. Soutbern R. Cf^^
44 S. B. 550, 551, 182 N. C. 721 (quoting aa4
ORDINARY GARB
775
ORDINARY CAKB^
adopting deflnltlon In Neal ▼. Wilmington k
W. R. Co., 53 N. O. 482).
"Ordinary care*' is such care as it is
to be assumed that an ordinarily prudent
man would exercise in the circumstances
were the risk his own. Lake Erie & W. Ry.
Ck>. V. Ford, 78 N. B. 969, 972, 167 Ind. 205.
The words "ordinary care," as nsed in an
instruction In an action for the wrongful
death of an employ^, mean such care as an
ordinarily prudent man would use in matters
luYolvlng his own interest under circumstanc-
es similar to those under investigation. Illi-
nois Cent. R. Ca t. Cane's Adm'z (Ey.) 90
S. W. 1061, 1064.
"Ordinary care" is such care as ordinari-
ly prudent meta, as a class, would exercise in
caring for their own property under the like
circumstances. Fraam ▼. Grand Rapids A I.
Ry. Co., 126 N. W. 861, 863, 161 Mich. 666,
29 L. R. A (N. 8.) 834, 21 Ann. Gas. 96.
I
"Ordinary care" is such care as an
ordinarily prudent person would use for his
own safety under like conditions and similar
circumstances. Louisville & N. R. Co. T.
Ueltschi's Ex'rs (Ky.) 97 S. W. 14, 16.
The term "ordinary care" contemplates
that degree of care that an ordinarily pru-
dent person would use in the transaction of
his own business under like or similar dr-
cumst&nces. Guitar v. Randel (Tex.) 147 S.
W. 642, 647.
"Ordinary care" is such care as ordinari-
ly careful and prudent persons are accustom-
ed to use in their own affairs. Nashville, O. &
St L. R. Co. V. RusseU, 110 S. W. 317, 819,
129 Ky. 14.
Rev. Codes 1905, i 6694, defines "ordinary
care" as such care as persons of ordinary
prudence usually exercise about their own
affairs of ordinary Importance. Relnke v.
Minneapolis, St P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 186 N.
W. 779, 782, 28 N. D. 182; McBride v. Wal-
lace, 117 N. W. 867, 858, 17 N. D. 495 (citing
Rev. Codes 1905, H 5472, 6694; 8 Current
Law, 162, note 69*
Aa oAre of seneralitj or majority of
peopio
"Ordinary care" is such care as the great
mass of mankind would ordinarily use in the
same or similar circumstances. Palmer v.
Schulz, 120 N. W. 349, 352, 138 Wis. 455 (cit-
ing Nass V. Schulz, 81 N. W. 133, 105 Wis.
146, 150; Duthle v. Town of Washburn, 58
N, W. 380, 87 Wis. 231, 233; Hennessy v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 74 N, W. 554, 99
Wis. 110; Ward v. Milwaukee & St P. Ry.
Co., 29 Wis. 144; Stafford v. CJhippewa Val-
ley Electric R. Co., 86 N. W. 1086, 110 Wis.
^1, 354; Dehsoy ▼. Milwaukee Electric Ry.
* Light Co., 85 N. W. 973, 110 Wla 412;
Schrunk t. 0t Joseph, 97 N. W. 946, 120 Wis.
"Ordinary care," in the abstract, is sudi
care as the great mass of mankind ordinarily
exercise, and, as applied to any particular
case, it is such care as the great mass of man-
kind ordinarily exercise under the same or
similar circumstances. Sufferling v. Heyl S^
Patterson, 121 N. W. 252, 254, 139 Wis. 510.
" 'Ordinary care' • • • is such de-
gree of care and prudence as ordinarily care-
ful and prudent persons, or as the great mass
of mankind (that is, the majority of persons),
would exercise under the same circumstanc-
es." Banderob v. Wisconsin Cent Ry. Co.,
113 N. W. 738, 743, 133 Wis. 249.
"Ordinary care" is that degree of care
"whidti the great mass of mankind, or the
type of that mass, the ordinarily prudent
man, exercises under like circumstances."
Pumorlo V. City of Merrill, 103 N. W. 464,
466, 126 Wis. 102 (quoting and adopting defi-
nition in Dehsoy v. Milwaukee Electric Ry.
& light Co., 85 N. W. 978, 110 Wis. 412).
In an action tor injuries to an employ^,
an instruction that "ordinary care" in such
a case is such care as the great mass of man-
kind would have exercised under the same
circumstances was held sufficient, without
the addition of the words "engaged in a sim-
ilar employment." Johnson v. St Paul & W.
Coal Ca, 105 N. W. 1048. 1052, 126 Wis. 492.
An Instruction that "ordinary care" was
su^ care as the great majority of mankind
would and do exercise in the transactions
of human life under like conditions and
circumstances was not erroneous because of
the use of the expression "under like circum-
stances" ; this being the equivalent of "under
the same or similar circumstances," which
is the proper standard. Warden ▼. Miller, 87
N. W. 828, 830, 112 Wis. 67.
"Ordinary care" is the care ordinarily
exercised by the great mass of mankind or
the ordinarily prudent person under the same
or similar circumstances, and an instruction
defining this term, which omits the qualifica-
tion **under the same or similar circumstanc-
es" or "under like circumstances," is errone-
ous. Yerkes v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 88 N.
W. 34, 36, 112 Wis. 184, 88 Am. St Rep. 961;
Boelter V. Ross Lumber Co., 79 N. W. 243,
245, 103 Wis. 324 (citing Duthle v. Town of
Washburn, 58 N. W. 380, 87 Wis. 233 ; Hen-
nesey v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 74 N. W.
554, 99 Wis. 110, 118).
An Instruction that the Jury might find
"proximate causation" between the negli-
gence of a street car conductor and plaintUTs
injury if the injury might reasonably have
been expected by the conductor in the exer-
cise of "ordinary care" as a man of intelli-
gence having the knowledge that might he
reasonably expected and ought to have been
had in doing each work, if not actually er-
roneous, would have been more nearly accu-
rate If it had been limited to what might
ORDIXABT CARS
776
OBPIKART CARE
k8T« been expected by a man of "ordinary
IntelUgenoe**; the standard of oonparlaon be-
ing the conduct or foresight of ordinarily,
prudent, careful, and Intelligent persons, and
the omission of the qualifying expression
oonyeylng the idea of sometldng higher than
the ordinary. Dehsoy ▼. Milwaukee BtoctHc
Ry. A Light Co., 86 N. W. 978, 974, UO Wis.
412.
"Actionable negligence" is the absence
of ordinary care, and ''ordinary care** is that
care which Is exercised by the great mass of
mankind. If the defendant's conduct does
not measure up to this standard, it is negli-
gent, whether it falls much or little below
the standard. Sonsmith t. Pere Martfuette
R. Co., 188 N. W. 847, 861, 178 Mich. 67.
As ears olMerred Iby yersoa of eo:
"Ordinary care,** required of a boarding
house keeper in caring for the property of
guests, Is the average common prudence, or
such care as a prudent person would ordi-
narily exercise in caring for his own proper-
ty. Herter v. Dwyer, 129 N. T. Supp. 606,
607.
The "ordinary care** required of travel-
ers upon highways is such care as persons
of common prudence generally exercise.
Farrar v. Inhabitants of Qreene, 82 Me^ 674.
As ears af ordlaaiily prtademt yg>an
"Ordinary care" is such care as an ordi-
narily careful and prudent person would ex-
ercise under the same or similar circum-
stances. Everett v. St Louis A 8. F. R. Co.,
112 S. W. 486, 497, 214 Mo. 64; Skonieczny
V. Churchman (Del.) 78 AU. 634, 636, 7
Pennewill, 226; Felver v. Central Electric
R. Co., 116 8. W. 960, 988, 216 Mo. 196; Ben-
son ▼. City of Spokane, 80 Pac 1106, 1107,
39 Wash. 101 ; Galveston, H. A N. R. Co. v.
Olds (Tex.) 112 S. W. 787, 792; Gulf, C. A 8.
F. R. Co. V. Hays, 89 S. W. 29, 32, 40 Tex.
Civ. App. 162; Nephler v. Woodward, 98 8.
W. 488, 490, 200 Mo. 179; International A
G. N. R. Co. V. Tasby, 100 S. W. 1030, 1081,
45 Tex. Civ. App. 416; Jackson v. Sumpter
Valley Ry. Co., 93 Pac. 356, 360, 60 Or. 466;
Chrlsmer v. Bell Tel. Co., 92 S. W. 378, 383,
194 Mo. 189, 6 L. R. A (N. S.) 492; Louis-
ville, H. A St L. R. Co. V. Stillwell, 134 8. W.
202, 204, 142 Ky. 330; Reynolds v. Galves-
ton, H. A S. A R..CO. (Tex.) 99 8. W. 669,
570; Rapid Transit R. Co. v. Miller (Tex.)
85 S. W. 439; Chesapeake A O. R. Co. ▼.
Wilson's Adm'r (Ky.) 102 8. W. 810, 812;
Wellmeyer v. St Louis Transit Co., 96 8. W.
925, 928, 198 Mo. 627; Heberling v. City of
Warrensburg, 103 S. W. 36, 89, 204 Mo. 604
(quoting and adopting definition in Cohn v.
aty of Kansas, 18 S. W. 973, 108 Mo. 392) ;
Adkisson*s Adm'r v« Louisville, H. A St L.
R. Co. (Ky.) 110 8. W. 284, 286; Cross v.
lUlnbis Cent R. Co. (Ky.) 110 8. W. 290,
292 ; Gilliam v. Texas A P. R. Co., 38 South.
166, 168, 114 La. 272 (citing Little Rock A
M. Ry. Co. V. Wilson, 16 8. W. 613, 90 Tm
271, 13 L. R. A 364, 26 Am. 8t Bepi e83<:
Reybum ▼. Missouri Paa R. Co., 86 8. w.
174, 176, 187 Mo. 666; Murray v. St Um
Transit Co., 76 8. W. 6U, 612, 176 Mo. 1S3:
Moore V. Lindell Ry. Co., 75 S. W. 672, 97i
176 Mo. 628; Houston A T. 0. B. Co. r.
J<dinson, 127 8. W. 689, 641, 103 Tex. 320:
Kolh ▼. St Loots Transit Co., 76 & W. 1060.
1062, 102 Mo. App. 148; Miswari, K. ft T.
R. Co. of Texas v. Parrott, 92 & W. 19d, lOO
Tex. 9; Southern Pac Co. v. Heteer. 135
Fed. 273, 288, j6S C. a A. 26, 1 L. R. i. <N.
&.) 288; Dallas ConsoL Electric St By. Co.
V. Conn (Tex.) 100 S. W. 1019, 1020; Peter
son ▼. Westmann, 77 & W. 1016, 1016, 103
Mo. App. 672.
** 'Ordinary cars^ to auch care as t po"
son of ordinary prudence would exerdse on-
der the same or like drcumstsnoea" Gal-
Teston, H. A 8. A. R. Co. ▼. Hubbard, 76 &
W. 764, 33 Tex. Civ. Appi 343; Athertoar.
Tacoina Ry. A Power Co., 71 Pac. 39. 41 30
Wash. 396.
"Ordinary care" is deflned as audi care
as a reasonably prudent person would bare
exercised under the same drcumatances, or
such care as is usually exodsed by men of
ordinary prudence under the same or atntiar
circumstances. Copeland y. Wabash B. Co,
75 8. W. 106, 106, 109, 176 Ma 66a
"Ordinary care" is such care as to ordi-
narily prudent man, mindful of himself aod
of the rights of others, would exercise uiMler
the same circumstances. Amoican loe C&
V. South Qardiner Lumber Co., 79 AtL & «.
107 Me. 494, 32 L. R. A (N. 8.) lOOa.
"Ordinary care" la such care as a persn
of ordinary prudence and caution woald ba^«
exercised in the circumstances sunoondiag
the plaintiif or in like drcumstanoea Cbi»
go Union Traction Co.. t. Hansen, 125 III
App. 163, 16a
'X)rdinary care" is that degree (A off
usually exercised by persons of ordinaiy can
and prudence "engaged in the same or aist
lar business under the same or similar df
cumstances," and a charge substitatinfr is
place of the quoted phrase, the phrase, '^
der the facts and circumstances surrooDdiH
them at the time," is erroneous. Willie
▼. North Wisconsin Lumber Co., 102 N. ^
689-691, 124 Wis. 828.
"Ordinary care" may be defined as tint
degree of care which a person of ordiD&|^
prudence,' in the same occupatloor ^^^'
use under the same or similar drcamsUiK^
Theobald v. St Louis Transit Co., 90 S. »
364, 366» 191 Mo. 396.
" 'Ordinary care^ by a person to ^^
f ormance of daily taaks is that degi«e ^
care which men of ordinary prudence ex^'
else under the ordinary aftd usosl dr^
stances of their occupationa." CbicagOi ^'
OftDINAHT CAtlB
'777
ORDIKAR-r CAKE
Q. R. Co* V. UUey, 99 H. W. UK12,> 1616, 4
Neb. (Unof.) 286.
An Instmction that "ordinary care" as
nsed in instructions given meant snch care
as ordinarily prudent persons would exercise
under circumstances similar to ttiose proven
in the case, and that negligence was the
failure to exercise ordinary care, was correct.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Lucas' Adm'r (Ky.)
98 S. W. 308, 312.
A charge defining "ordinary care'* as
"that degree of care which men of ordinary
caution and prudence would use under the
same or similar circumstances, a fSailupe to
use ordinary care is negligence," while not
in the usual form, is suhstantially correct,
and not subject to the criticism that it im-
poses on the person charged a hlgiher degree
of care than that required by law. 8t Louis
8. W. R. Co. of Texas ▼. ConnaUy <1>bz.) d3
S. W. 206, 207.
"Ordinary care'' implies the exercise of
reasonable diligence, and it is the care which
persons of ordinary prudence, not careless
persons, would take under all the dream-
stances. Wilson T. New York, N. H. ft H. R.
R. Co., 69 AtL 864, 372, 29 R. I. 146 (quoting
Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels, 2 Sup. Ct 932,
107 U. 8. 454, 24 L. £ki. 605; Biayhew v. Sul-
Uvan Min. Co., 76 Me. 100, 112).
^'Ordinary care" is such as an ordinarily
reasonable and prudent person would exer-
cise under the same surroundings. Lawson
V. Seattle ft R. Ry. Co., 76 Pac 71, 72, 84
Wash. 500.
^'Ordinary and reasonable care" is such
care as an ordinarily careful person would
use in given circumstances. Colsch v. Chi-
cago, M. ft St P. Ry. Co., 127 N. W. 198, 200,
149 Iowa, 176, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1018, Ann.
Cas. 1912C, 915.
The legal duty which one owes to anoth-
er in respect to caie f6r the safety of the
person or property of that other is "ordinary
care" under the circumstances, whititi is that
degree of care which a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances, and sudi duty may be assumed
by contract or may arise from the circum-
stances or the relation of the parties. Shar-
key V. Skilton, 77 AtL 950, 052, 88 Com>. 503.
"Ordinary care" means such care as per-
sons of ordinary prudence and caution would
exercise in the same situation and under like
circumstances. Linder v. St. IjOuIs Transit
Co., 77 S. W. 907, 999, 103 Mo. App. 574.
An instruction that '*by the term 'ordi-
nary care' Is meant such care as a person of
ordinary care and prudence ordinarily 'would'
have exercised under circumstances the same
as or similar to those disclosed by the testi-
mony" was not objectionable becahse of the
use of the word ''would." Roedler v. Chica-
go, M. ft St P. Ry. Co., 109 N. W. 88, 91, 129
Wis. 2Ta
. la SB action for personal injuries, "or-
dinary care" was defined as care which a
person of ordlnaiy oaiUion, prudence,, and
Judgment would be expected to exercise in
any given case, and counsel took an excep-
tion thereto, claiming that '^ordinary care Is
such care as ordinarily careful and prudent
persons usually exercise or are accustomed to
exercise under similar circumstances." Held
that, while possibly the latter definition was
couched in better chosen language, the dis-
tinction between "person" and "persons" and
between the "given case" and "similar cir-
cumstances" was not so marked or so vital
as to raise a presumption that the Jury were
misled to defendant's prejudice. Crandall
V. City of Dubuque, 112 N. W. 656, 556, 136
Iowa, 663.
There is a want of ordinary care on the
part of the i^intlfr only when, under all of
the circumstances and surroundings of the
case, he has done, or omitted to do, some-
thing which "an ordinarily careful and pru-
dent person," in a like situation as the plain-
tiff, would not have done, or omitted to do,
and which was the efficient and proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. Hone v. Mam-
moth Min. Co.. 75 Pac. 381, 383, 27 Utah,
168.
"What a. person of ordinary care and
prudence would do in a given case furnishes
a fair and reasonably test of 'ordinary care/
and the omission pf anything which an or-
dinarily prudent person would do is a failure
to do that which ordinary prudence sug-
gests." Uttle V. McGuire, 43 Iowa, 447, 44a
Warehousemen must use "ordinary care"
to protect iHToperty Intrusted to them, which
is such care as ordinarily prudent persons in
that bysiness are accustomed to exercise.
Muskogee Crystal Ice Co. ▼. Riley Bros., 106
Paa 629, 630, 24 Okl. 114.
The "ordinary care" required of a bailee
for hire is that degree of care which ordina-
rily prudent persons would use in similar
circumstances. Michigan Stove Co. v. Puebld
Hardware Co., 116 Pac. 340, 842, 51 Colo. 160.
As eare ordinarily or usually msed
"Ordinary care" is such care as an ordi-
narily prudent person usually exercises under
the same or similar circumstances. Louls-
vlUe k N. R. Co. V. Berry (Ky.) Ill S. W.
370, 372; Louisville R. Co. v. Bsselman^ 03
S. W. 50, 52; Cross v. Illinois Cent R. Co.
(Ky.) 110 S. W. 290, 292; PosUl TeL Cable
Co. V. Terrell, 100 S. W. 292, 293, 124 Ky.
822, 14 L. R. A- (N. S.) 927; D. H. Ewing &
Sons V. Callahan (Ky.) 105 S. W. 387, 388.
"Ordinary care" is such care as ordinari-
ly careful and prudent persons ordinarily
exeircise under the same or similar circuqar
stances, in the same or similar business.
City of Covington v. Whitney (Ky.) 99 8. W.
337, 338; Toebbe v. City of Covington,. 141
OBDINABY OARB
T78
OBDIHABTGLiBB
S. W. 421, 423, 140 Ky. 768; Lovi^vUto k N.
B. Oa ▼. Outer (Ky.) 112 8. W. 904, 908.
"Ordinary care^ is that degree of care
and diligence which an ordinarily carefol
and pmdent person wonld ordinarily nee un-
der like or siniilar dreomstancee. Logan t.
Metropolitan 8t B. Go., 82 8. W. 120, 128,
183 Mo. 682; Creamer ▼. Lonisyllle By. Oo.,
184 S. W. 193, 196, 142 Ky. 840.
The controlling standard or test of rea-
sonable or "ordinary care*' la what a reasona-
bly pmdent person would ordinarily hare
done in the like circumstances, rather than
the prevailing practice of others engaged in
the same business. The practice of others,
even though not a general or prevailing one,
is some evidence of what could have been
done, and so has a material bearing upon
whether the requisite cars was exercised in
what was actually done; and an instruction
which treats what a reasonably prudent per-
son would ordinarily have done in the like
circumstances as the controlling standard or
test of reasonable or "ordinary care," and
also evidence only of ttiat standard, and
directs that such practice be considered with
ail the other evidence bearing upon the sub-
ject in fixing upon that standard, is not ob-
jectionable as permitting the jury to find that
the conduct in question was negligent, even
though it conformed to the prevailing prac-
tice of others, because that practice was not
in itself the legal standard, but, as indicated
in the instruction, was evidence only thereof.
Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. McDonough, 161
Fed. 667, 606^ 88 O. a A. 617.
"Ordinary cars^ is sudi care as ordinari-
ly careful and prudont persons ordinarily
exercise under the same or similar circum-
stances. Cornelius v. 8outh Covington ft C.
St B. Co. (Ky.) 96 8. W. 648, 644.
"Ordinary care" means the degree of
cars usually exercised by ordinarily careful
and prudent persons under the same or simi-
lar circumstances. Hauler v. Ft Dodge
Light ft Power Co., 107 N. W. 693, 694, 133
Iowa, 326 (quoting and adopting the defini-
tion in Gorman's Adm'r v. Louisville B. Co.
(Ky.l 72 8. W. 760).
"Ordinary care" means such care as a
person of ordinary prudence would usually
exercise in the same situation and drcum-
stances. Dean v. Kansas City, St L. ft C. B.
Go., 97 8. W. 910, 912, 199 Mo. 386.
"Ordinary care" is such care as persons
of ordinary prudence usually exerdse under
similar drcumstances. Dorrls v. Warford,
100 S. W. 312, 313, 124 Ky. 768, 9 L. B. A.
(N. S.) 1090, 14 Ann. Caa 602.
"Ordinary care" is that care which is
usually exercised under like drcumstances
by persons of ordinary prudence. Weber v.
Union Development ft Construction Co., 42
South. 652, 663, 118 La. 77* 12 Ann. Gaa
1012.
A rsqasst to Insfemct that, if pUtatif
was injured by attempting to Jump trom Ur
buggy, she cannot recover unless a peraoo tct-
Ing with due care would have beliered it
necessary to so Jump, and she used onUnur
care in doUig so, should have beea snnted:
the "ordinary care" referred to bdos oidi
care as an ordinarily prudent person vooU
exercise in view of the existing drcnisstiiK
ea. Warth v. JaduK>n County CDoit, 76 &
B. 420, 423, 71 W. Va. 184.
An iBStnicti<m that "ordinazy or' is
such care as is usually exercised by penoa
of ordinary care and prud^ce in tlie aseud
country, and under the same or similar or-
cnmstanoes, as a party charged with lib
neglig^ice is suffidoit Arkansas CItj t.
Payne, 102 Pac. 781« 782, 80 Kan. 353, IS
Ann. Css. 82.
"Ordinary care^is such as a person of
ordinary prudence and caution, aocordiDg ta
the usual and general experience of mtnlM
would exerdse in the same situation anddr
cumstances as those of the defendant, vbose
conduct in that regard is in questioD. Carr
V. Ifissoufi Paa B. Co., 92 fi. W. 87i S7&
195 Mo. 214; Feddeck v. St Loois Oar Co.
102 S. W. 675, 679, 125 Ho. App. 24.
«^rdinary care" is that care wfaicb u
intelligent prudent person engaged in tlia:
kind of business ordinarily exercises with r^
spect to it Shandrew ▼. Chicago, St P^ H.
ft O. By. Co., 142 Fed. 820, 324, 73 a C i
430.
"Ordinary care** is such care as one cu
ordinary prudence usually exerdsea oDde:
given circumstances. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T.
P. By. Oo. V. Evans' Adm'r, 110 S. W. 8ti
848, 129 Ky. 162.
An instruction that "ordinary care" ^
that degree of care and caution that a pei^
of ordinary prudence is accustomed to i£<?
under like or similar drcumstances is ^
incorrect, as there can be no practical differ
ence between what a person of ordinary pn>;
dence would "ordinarily do or usnallj do'
and what such person is accustomed to ^
under similar circumstances. St Louis S
W. By. Coi of O^xas v. Brown, 68 S. W. 101ft
1012, 30 Tex. av. App. 57.
An instruction that "ordinary ca«* ^
such care as persons of ordinary pnidefic^
and intelligence exercise under tlie saioe ^
similar circumstances was not fatally ^
fective for failure to use the word "ordluri^
ly/» 'iiguaUy," or "customarily," or a v^^*
of like import after the word 'intelUgeuc^
Coppins V. Town of Jefferson, 105 X. W. lt>'-
1080, 126 Wis. 578.
An Instruction defining "ordinary ctft
as that degree of care which a person of onli^
na^y prudence would usually exerdse nd^^
the same drcumstances, and the failure ^
use such care is negligence, is not enooeos^
because of a qualification of the word "ex^
OBBINAHY GABX
779
OBDINABY GABB
ctee- by the word "usually." International ft
a. N. B. Oo. T. Ford (Tttr.) 118 S. W. 1137,
1138.
Aa eare of ordiiuury maa
In an action for damages from a collision
wltb a street car, an instmction tbat ^ordina-
ry care is snch oare as an ordinary person
would usually observe under the same or
similar drcumstaoces as those under investi-
gation'* is erroneous; ordinary care being
such care as an ordinarily prudent person
would usually exercise under circumstances
similar to those proven in the case. Hender-
son aty R, Oo. V. Lockett (Ky.) 9S S. W. 303,
304.
"Ordinary care" is that degree of care
which an ordinary person would use under
like or similar circumstances. Missouri, K.
& T. R. Co. of Texas y. O'Connor (Tex.) 78 S.
W. 374, 876.
A livery man is liable for injuries to
horses in his care only when caused by his
lack of "ordinary care," which is that care
an ordinary man would exercise over his own
similar property under like conditions. Cald-
well y. Ni<diol, 184 S. W. 622, 623, 07 Ark.
42a
As eare of pmdeaty earef ul, or eantlons
"Ordinary care^' is such care as would be
ordinarily used by a prudent person perform-
ing a like service under similar circumstanc-
e& Holden v. Missouri B. Co., 76 S. W.
073, 078, 177 Mo. 466.
"'Ordinary care' is that care which a
prudent person ordinarily uses under like cir-
cumstances, which is another and different
thing from such care as persons ordinarily
use under like circumstances." Heberling v.
City of Warrensburg, 103 6. W. 36, 30, 204
Mo. 604 (quoting Cohn v. City of Kansas, 18
S. W. 073, 108 Mo. 302).
A charge defining "ordinary care" as
"such care as a prudent man would exercise
under the same or similar circumstances" is
erroneous, since it makes the test the care
that a prudent man would exercise, while
the true test is the care that an ordinarily
prudent person would have exercised. City
of Paris y. Tucker (Tex.) 03 S. W. 283, 235.
An instruction deflniug "ordinary care"
in an action for injuries on a toll bridge as
such care as a prudent operator of a toll
bridge would exercise under the same or sim-
ilar circumstances is not misleading or con-
fusing in using the words "such care as a
prudent operator of a toll bridge would exer-
cise" instead of "such care as a person of
ordinary prudence would exercise " as both
expressions mean practically the same thing.
Gibler v. Terminal B. Ass'n of St Louis, 101
S. W. 37, 40, 203 Mo. 208, 11 Ann. Cas. 1104.
"'Ordinary cars and caution' is such
care and caution as a prudent man would
exercise under similar circumstances." In^
temational A G. N. B. Co. v. Trump, 94 S. W.
903, 906, 42 Tex. Ctv. App. 536 (Quoting and
adopting definition in Houston A T. By. Ca
V. Oram, 49 Tex. 346; Texas A N. O. B. Co.
v. Black [Tex.] 44 S. W. 673).
A charge that "ordinary care" is "that
care that a prudent man would exercise un-
der like or similar circumstances" is not mis-'
leading because the word "a," instead of the
word "every" is used. Ooodwyn v. Central
of Georgia B. Ck>., 58 S. El 688, 2 Ga. App.
470.
"Ordinary ca^" means that care that a
prudent person would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances. This definir
tion is in substantial accOTd with that given
of ordinary diligence in av. Code 1895,. |
2808. aty of Atlanta y. Harper, 50 S. £3.
230, 129 Ga. 415.
As care of reasoMiblo and inteUisent
maa
" 'Ordinary care' means simply that de-
gree of vigilance which a reasonable and
prudent person would exercise under like
circumstances." Lake Shore A M. S. By. Co.
V. Mcintosh, 38 N. B. 476, 479» 140 Ind. 261.
"Ordinary care" is such care as a per-
son of reasonable and ordinary prudenoe and
skill would reasonably exercise under the
same or similar circumstances. Oousineau
V. Afuskeg<Hi Traction A lighting Co., 108 N.
W. 720, 722, 145 Mich. 314.
It is inaccurate, but not reversible error,
to instruct that "ordinary care" is such care
as a person of ordinary prudence and intelli-
gence would use under the same or similar
circumstances. Houston A T. C. B. Co. v.
Gray, 85 S. W. 838, 830, 38 Tex. Civ. App.
249 (citing Houston A T. 0. B Co. v. Brown,
85 S. W. 44, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 595; Same v.
Kothmann, 84 S. W. 1089, 37 Tex. Civ. App.
548).
"'Ordinary care' is defined as the care
that would be exercised by a reasonably pru-
dent person under the same or similar cir-
cumstance&" Comovski v. St Louia Tran-
sit Co., 106 S. W. 51, 56, 207 Mo. 263; Denver
A B. Q. B. Co. V. Norgate, 141 Fed. 247, 250,
72 0. C. A. 865^ 6 U B A. (N. S.) 081, 5 Ann.
Cas. 448.
"Ordinary care" Is such care as a rea-
sonable and prudent man would use under
the same or similar circumstancea Antonlan
y. South. Pac. Co., 100 Pac. 877, 880, 9 CaL
App. 71&
"Ordinary care^' Is such care as a rea-
sonable, prudent, and careful person would
exercise under similar circumstancea Camp-
bell y. Walker (DeL) 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce,
41.
"Ordinary care" is sndi as a man of rea-
aonable prudence and caution would exerdae
under the drcumatancea. Hot Springs 8L
OSDINABX OABB
T80
OBDINABT GABS
a Co. T. Hndrtth, 82 8. W. 246^ MT, 72 Ark.
672.
I&stnictliig thmt ordinary care o( Om
driver would bo '^acb a degreo of care and
caution, all things considered, that a reason*
ably prudent man would have ezerdsed,**
without adding at the end the words "un-
der the same or similar circumstances," if
error, was technical, and not injurious.
Kwalm y. Northern Pac. By. Co, 128 N. W.
82, 88, 148 WlSL 4i2.
" 'Ordinary care' is that care which the
Ideal prudent man would ha?e exercised un-
der the existing conditions.** Hence, in an
action for injuries to a conductor by falling
down the steps of a depot platform at night,
in the absence of a light, an instruction that,
though plaintiff's lantern was blown out, he
was entitled to proceed to Us train, "if he
thought he could safely make the Journey by
exercising ordinary care," was erroneous;
the standard of plaintiff's duty being, not
what he thought he could safely do, but what
a reasonably prudent man under the circum-
stances would do. Beard ▼. Southern By.
Co., 56 S. a 005, 608, 143 N. C. 13a
As eare reaaottably to be esyeeted
By ''ordinary card" Is meant such care
and caution as a person of ordinary prudence
might reasonably be expected to exercise un-
der like circumstances. Louisville A N. B.
Co. T. Joshlin (Ky.) 110 S. W. 882, 886. .
"Ordinary care" is such care as ought
reasonably to be expected of an ordinarily
prudent person in the same situation as the
person whose conduct is in question. Booker
V. Southwest Missouri B. Co., 128 a W. 1012,
1017, 144 Mo. App. 278.
'* 'Ordinary care' is that degree of care,
precaution, or diligence, which may properly
be expected or required, having regard to the
nature of the action and the circumstances
surrounding the transaction." Missouri, K.
A T. B. Co. of Texas v. Moss (Tex.) 135 S.
W. 6:66, 627.
"Ordinary care, foresight, and diligence"
mean such foresight and diligence as a per-
son of ordinary sense or prudence, engaged
in the same or similar business, might, be
reasonably expected to use under the same or
similar circumstances. Laurence L. Prince
A Co, V. St Louis Cotton Compress Co., 86
S. W. 873, 877, 112 Mo. App. 49.
"Ordinary care" is that degree of care
which may have been reasonably expected
from a sensible person in the situation of the
plaintiff and defendant at the time. Whit-
field v. Atlantic Coast Line B. Co., 60 S. E.
1126, 1128, 147 N. C. 236.
An instruction defining "ordinary care"
to be that degree of care, precaution, or dili-
gence which may i^ropwly be expected or re-
quired, having regard to the nature of the
act or duty and to the attending oircumstanc-
ea, Is not arroneoua. Hooston A T. C R. Ok
y. Boberta, 100 & W. 982. 983, 00 Tto. Or.
App. 00.
As dme eare
The expression "due careT Is sot tbe
equivalent of "ordinary care." City of Su
Antonio T. TUerico (Tex.) 78 8. W. 28, 31
"Due care," "due diUgence," and "onfr
nary care" are convertible terms, and liMtc
the same thing. Western Union TeL C^. t
Smith (Tex.) 133 8. W. 1062, 1064; Cornov^k:
V. St Louis Transit Co., 106 S. W. 51, 56, 207
Mo. 263 (citing 3 Words and Phrases, pi 2222:
6 Words and Phrases, p. 503$). But see Qtj
of San Antonio r. Talerico (Tex.) 78 & W.
28, 82.
The rule of law now generally reoogidied
Is that the legal measure of duty except tbat
made absolute by law, is better expressed
by the phrases "due care," "reasonable care,"
or ^'ordinary care,** used Intercfaangeablj.
Baymond v. Portland B. (>)., 62 AtL 602, 60i
100 Me. 029. 3 L. B. A. (N. &) 94.
** 'Due care' is 'ordinary care'; and *or-
dinary care' is the care that would be exer
deed by a reasonably prudent person aiider
the same or similar circumstancea" Cors^
ovski V. St Louis Transit Co., 106 S. W. 51
56, 207 Mo. 263.
A traveler crossing a railroad track ii
bound only to use ''due care,*' whicb is not
the highest degree of care possible, bat U
only "ordinary care" under the clrcalD8UB^
es. Colorado A S. By. Ck). v. ChUes, 114 Pat
661, 664, 60 O>lo. 19L
The care to be exercised by a gas cofi>-
pany to prevent escape of gas from its maio&
to the injury of trees along the street, is d^
"ordinary care," as distinguished from "€i-
traordinary care," but due care or caie com-
mensurate with the danger. <3ould r. ni
nona Gas C5o.. Ill N. W. 254, 258, 100 Minn
258. 10 L. B. A. (N. S.) 889.
"Ordinary care" means reasonable car*
Hanley v. Ft Dodge Light A Power Co.. K'-
N. W. 593, 594, 133 Iowa, 326.
To use "reasonable care" is eaulTaltfflt
to the expression to use or exercise "ordin&i?
care." International A 6. N. R. Ca t.
Trump, 94 S. W. 903, 906, 42 Tex. a?. App
536.
The phrase "reasonable care" bts b«s
declared by the courts of England to be ?P
onymous with "ordinary care." (^aren ^
Bodwell Granite Co., 69 Ati. 285, 287, 99 M?
278.
The words "ordinary care" embody tu?
same degree of diligence as the words "or*
nary and reasonable care and diligence,"' aod
have substantially the same signifl<*D**
The words "ordinary" and ^'reasonable" ^
acrlptive of diligenoe, aia synonymoos, ts^
ORDINABY CABB
781
0RDINAB7 CABB
:e used Interchangeably in gtatates and by
le courts. Goodwyn v. Central of Georgia
. Co., 58 8. B. 688, 2 Ga. App. 470.
The terms "ordinary care" and "rea-
»nable care" are In law, practically synony-
ous. In their ordinary use in connection
ith the subject in hand, they are also sub-
antially synonymous, and may be used
terchangeably in instructions in an action
r injuries. Louisville & N. R. CJo. v.
ointer's Adm'r, 69 S. W, 1108, 1112, 118
y. 952. See, also, Gaven v. Bodwell Gran-
e Co., 69 Atl. 286, 287, 99 Me. 278.
The use of the words "reasonable care^"
stead of "ordinary care,'' in an instruction
1 an action for injuries, is not such a defect
i will inyaUdate a Judgment for plaintiff,
paulding v. Metropolitan St B. Co., 107 S.
' . 1049, 1061, 129 Mo. App. 607.
"Ordinary care" and "reasonable care,"
3 applied to the duty of a master to provide
lies for the regulation of his actlvitieB, are,
rdinarily, convertible terms. Texas & N.
. R. Co. V. Walker (Tex.) 126 S. W. 99, 106.
An instruction that a telegraph company
lust use "reasonable care*' in transmitting
Qd delivering messages imposes no higher
egree of care on the company than "or^l-
ary care," as the two ternui are synony-
I0U8. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gulnn
rex.) 130 S. W. 616, 618.
Where the court in its diarge used the
iTTOB "ordinary care," "reasonable diligence,"
Qd "reasonable care," it should, in an in-
tructlon defining ordinary care, have also
)ld the Jury that reasonable diligence or
^sonable care is ordinary care. Greene v.
ouisville R. Co., 84 S. W. 1154, 1166, 119 Ky.
62, 7 Ann. Cas. 1126.
An instruction, in an action for negli-
ent delay in transmission and delivery, on
be measure of the telegraph company's duty
1 delivering, was not erroneous for requiring
: to transmit in "due time (that is, such time
s it would have been delivered by the exer-
ise of reasonable care and diligence in getr
ing it through and delivered)," on the ground
bat it was only required to use "ordinary
are," in absence of a request for a more
pedflc charge ; the terms '^reasonable care"
Qd "ordinary care" haying substantially
le same meaning. Western Union Telegraph
Jo. V. Vance CTex.) 161 S. W. 904, 907 (citing
Words and Phrases, p. 6955).
At relative tevat
"Ordinary care" is a relative term, and
spends on the circumstances and conditions
^ the particular case. Norfolk & W. Ry.
'0. V. Frltts, 49 S. B. 971; 973, 108 Va. 687,
8 Ta R. a. 864, 106 Am. St. Rep. 911 ; Oou-
ineau v. Muskegon Traction & Lighting Co.,
08 N. W. 720, 722, 145 Mich. 814; Anderson
• Great Northern Ry. Co., 99 Pac. 91, 96, 16
^ho, 618; Liberty T. Haines^ 66 Atl. 738,
741, 106 Me. 182; Feddeck v. St Louis Car
Co., 102 S. W. 676, 679, 126 Mo. App. 24;
Lynch v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 106 S. W. 68,
76, 208 Mo. 1; Woods t. Wabash R. Co., 86
S. W. 1082, 1086, 188 Mou 229 (dting 1 Thomp.
Neg. 1 26).
The term "<M*dlnary cave", is of a flexible
nature, and adapts itself to the particular cir-
cumstances under which it is to be applied,
depending upon the relation betwe^i the par-
ties in interest, and the business in which
they are engaged, and varying with the pecu-
liar phase of every situation. Palace Hotel
Co. V. Medart, 100 N. A 317, 320, 87 Ohio St
130, Ann. Cas. 1913E; 860 (citing 6 Words
and Phrases, p. 5035).
"The terms 'ordinary care,' 'reasonable
prudence,' and such like terms, as applied to
the conduct and afCairs of men, have a rela-
tive significance and cannot be arbitrarily de-
fined. What may be deemed ordinary care in
one case may, under different surroundings
and circumstances, be gross negligence. The
policy of the law has relegated the determina-
tion of such questions to the Jury under prop-
er instructions." Palmer v. Portland Ry.,
Ught d; Power Co., 108 Pac 211, 214, 66 Or.
262 (quoting Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 12
Sup. Ct 679, 682, 688, 144 U. S. 406, 417, 36
L. Ed. 486) ; Hainlin v. Budge, 47 South. 825,
832, 66 Fla. 342 (quothig and adopting defini-
tions in 7 Words and Phrases, p. 6976) ; Bir-
mingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Williams,
48 South. 93, 96, 158 Ala. 381 (citing Grand
Trunk R. CJo. v. Ives, 12 Sup. Ct 679, 144 U.
S. 408, 36 L. Ed. 486); Johnson v. Union
Pac Coal Co., 76 Pac 1089, 1090, 28 Utah.
46, 67 L. R. A. 506 (citing Cayzer t. Taylor,
10 Gray (76 Mass.] 274, 69 Am. Dec 317 ; Ni-
tro-Glycerine Case, 15 WaU. 624, 688» 21 L.
Ed. 206; Boyle v. Union Pac Ry., 71 Pac 988,
991, 26 Utah, 422, 480; Shearman ft Redfield,
Neg. i 196; BaUey, Mast liab. p. 101; Titus
V. Bradford, B. dc K. R. Co., 20 AtL 617, 618,
136 Pa. 618, 626, 20 Am. St Rep. 944 ; Dickert
V. Salt Lake City Ry, Co., 69 Pac 96, 20 Utah,
394) ; Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. Lukert
84 Pac 1076, 1084, 16 OkL 897 (quoting and
adopting definition in Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Ives, 12 Sup. Ct 679, 682, 144 U. S. 408, 417,
36 L. Ed. 485); Southern Ry. Ck>. v. McGowan,
43 South. 878, 382, 149 Ala. 440; Lynch v.
Klneth, 78 Pac 923, 924, 36 Wash. 368, 104
Am. St Rep. 958 ; Meng v. St. Louis & S. R.
Co., 84 S. W. 213, 215, 108 Mo. App. 553 (cit-
ing Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Ives, 12 Sup. Ct.
679, 144 U. S. loc cit 417, 36 L. Ed. 485;
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Griffith, 16 Sup. Ct
105, 159 U. S. 603, 40 L. Ed. 274 ; Texas & P.
Ry. V. Gentry. 16 Sup. Ct 1104, 163 U. S. 353,
41 L. Ed. 186; Warner v: Baltimore & O. R.
Co., 18 Sup. Ct 68, 168 U. S. 349, '42 L. m.
491; Washington &'G. R. v. McDade, 10 Sup.
Ct 1044, 135 U. S. 554, 34 L. Ed. 235); Sans
Bois Coal CJo. V. Janeway, 99 Pac 153, 156.
22 OkL 425 (quoting and adopting a definition
in Worth BrosL Qo« v«SaRaa, U2 Fed. 306^ 89
ORDINARY CABB
782
ORDINARY GARB
G. 0. A. 186); Enox^ille TractlMi Go. t.
Brown, 89 8. W. 819, 820, 115 T^nn. 323 (cit-
ing Grand Trunk R. Co. y. It«8, 12 Snp. Gt
679. 144 U. S. 417, 86 L. Ed. 485); Worth
Bros. Go. ▼. Kallas, 162 Fed. 806, 308, 89 C
C. A. 186 (quoting with approyal from Grand
Trunk R. Go. y. lyea, 12 Sap. Gt 679, 682,
144 U. 8. 406, 417, 86 L. Ed. 485); Klutt y.
PhUadelphia & R. R. Go., 142 Fed. 894, 896,
73 G. G. A. 494 ; Swift & Co. y. Sandy, 165
Fed. 622, 623, 92 G. G. A. 56; Kobe y. St
JjOViXb Transit Co., 78 8. W. 55, 59, 103 Mo.
App. 582 (quoting Frick y. St Louia, K. G.
& N. Ry. Co., 76 Mo. 596).
" 'Ordinary care,' or the care the common
law requires one to exerdae in and about his
business, has a rdatlye signiflcatioQ. It
means such care as a man of ordinary pru-
dence and foresight would be expected to ex-
ercise in like circumstances; the cart com-
mensurate with the risk and danger of the
business to others." Mortens y. St Louis
Transit Co., 99 S. W. 612, 614, 122 Ma App.
304.
"Ordinary can^ Is a relatlye term, and
diligence amounting to ordinary care yaries
with the circumstances of each case. Oenson
y. Georgia Ry. dt Electric Co., 68 S. BL 1113,
136 Ga. 182.
The term "ordinary care" does not ex-
press distinctly any certain degree of care;
what is ordinary care depends upon the cir-
cumstances of each particular case, so that
ordinary care under one set of circumstances
might be positiye negligence under other cir-
cumstancea Illinois Cent R. Co. y. Keegan,
112 IlL App. 28. 36.
Gniere is no fixed standard In the law by
which a court can arbitrarily say in all cas-
es what conduct shall be considered reasona-
ble and prudent or what shall constitute "or^
dinary care," and the Jury are free to fix the
standard for reasonable, prudent and careful
men under the circumstances of the case as
they find them according to their judgment
and experience of what that class of men do
under sudi circumstances, and to test the
conduct inyolyed in the issues by that stand-
ard. Southern R. Co. y. Stntts, 144 Fed. 948,
949, 75 G. C. A. 588.
The care imposed by law is ordinary
care; that is, such care as persons of ordi-
nary prudence would use under similar cir-
cumstances. "Ordinary care" would require
the exercise of a yery great degree of yigi-
lance under some circumstances, and the
amount of yigilance and caution to be used
will yary according to the situation of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances.
But the standard by which the acts are to be
judged does not change ; it remains the same.
Dallas ConsoL Electric St R. Co. y. Cham-
bers, 118 S. W. 851, 852, 55 Tex. Ciy. App. 331.
Care or the want of it is not to be meas-
ured arbttraxily aoeordlng to fixed definitions
as "slight care," "ordinary caie.** or "ex
traordlnary care," or "ali^t negU«eDoe,* «
''gross negligence," although all tbeae pbrav
es are used somewhat loosely by courts ni
law-writers, but it is to be measared by res
sonableness, under all the drcniDsUDces cf
the particular inquiry. The only tne mas-
ure is "reasonable care." And that expi*^
sion has been declared by the courts in Eo?
land and elsewhere to be synonymous vith
^'ordinary care." ''Reasonable care" is t reis
tiye term, and what is reasonable care ia &
giyen case depends upon many oanslderaddnv
What would be reasonable caie under ti^
conditions would clearly be tae^Hgeaot t
others. Reasonable care and TigUance rtiy
according to the exigencies wbidi requift
yigilance and attention. They relate to ^
work to be done, to the Instromentalities ti
be used, to the dangers that may result tx.
tbieir use, to the yarying duties owed by tb<s^
who supply or use them. And in an cts^
reasonable care means such care ss raso3s
ble and prudent men use under like drcos
stances. Gayen y. Bodwell Granite Co, 3
AU. 286, 287, 99 Me. 278 (citing FletderT
Boston ft M. R., 1 Allen [83 Mass.] 9. 79 A::
Dec. 695; Bigelow y. Reed, 61 Me. 325; I^
er y. Penobscot Lumbering Ass'n. 38 At
108, 90 Me. 198; Sawyer y. J. M. Arnold Sa?^
Co., 38 AtL 333, 90 Me. 309; Cayier t. ft:
lor, 10 Gray (76 Mass.] 274, 69 Am. Dec. s:
Cunningham y. Hall, 4 Allen [86 M&s&] ^
Holly y. Boston Gaslight Co., 8 Gny H^
Mass.] 128, 69 Am. Dec. 233).
"Ordinary care" as applied to a nttstcrt-
such care as reasonable and prudent meo t^
under similar circumstances in providing a^-
and suitable appliances and instnuoeiitali:!-^
for the work to be done, and in proTidlnJE-
erally for the safety of the eerrant In '^
course of his employment, regard being h
to the work and difficulties and dangers i:
tending it The term has a relative sigi^
cance and its definition must depend on tt^
surrounding circumstances of the particoi^
case, the determination of whidi, wben t p-
en state of facts Is sndi that reasoaableBS
may fairly differ upon the question of fif
ligence, is for the Jury. FLBher*8 Admr*
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 62 8. B. 373. ^
104 Va. 635, 2 L. R. A. (N. 0.) 9M (dc<
Bertha Zinc Go. y. Martin's Adm'r, 22 Sj
869, 93 Va. 804, 70 L. R A. 990; BichlM*
Iron Co. y. Blkins, 17 a B. 890, 90 Va-Sl
In an action against a railroad cm^
for damages for suffering endured by ?^
tifTs intestate, killed while crossing <le/e£>
ant's tracks, an instruction that wliUe ^
fact that there was a freight train staoi^ |
on the side track, the engine of wbicbj^^
tially obstructed the crossing and was
ing a loud noise, would impose upon de^
ed a greater degree of care for his o^^
ty, yet If these conditions existed, m^
f endant was rw^onaible for them, tbis ^^^
OBDINABY CAKB
T83
OBDINABY GABB
mpo6e upoA defendant a cocrespondiniTly
leater degree of care, was not erroneous in
mposlng upon defendant a greater degree of
are than "ordinary care"; "ordinary care"
elng but reasonable care which varies ac-
ording to the circumstances, and requires
nusual caution where the circumstances are
nusually hazardous. St Louis, I. M. & S.
L Go. y. Ghamberlain, 150 8. W. 157, 161,
05 Ark. 180.
The terms "ordinaiy cave" and "ordinary
iligence" must be understood to import all
be care, prudence, and diligence which the
eculiar circumstances of the case, the condi-
Lons and Instruments employed, reasonably
equire, and such as a reasonably prudent
Bd careful man would exercise under like
ircumstances. Neal y. Wilmington & N. G.
:iectric By. Ga, 58 Aa 338, 339, 8 Penne-
FlU, 467.
Same— As applied to ehildlren or in-
fants
The term "ordinary or reasonable care,"
pplied to the conduct of a child, means such
are as may reasonably be expected of chil-
ren of similar age, judgment, and experi-
nce under similar circumstances. Bohloff
. Fair Hayen & W. B. Go., 58 Ati. 6, 7. 76
k)nn. 689; Galyeston, H. A N. B. GO. y. Olds
rex.) 112 S. W. 787, 792.
"Ordinary care," as applied to a child,
3 the kind of care which children of its age
nd intelligence are accustomed to exercise
mder the same or similar circumstances;
nd this though he had arriyed at the age
rhen he should be chargeable with the care
equlred of an adult as a matter of law. Erie
i. Co. y. Weinsteln, 166 Fed. 271, 273, 92 a
). A. 189.
The rule that ordinaiy care is such care
IS an ordinarily prudent person would use
mder similar circumstances does not apply
0 a child of tender years, and the care re-
luired of a child is according to his maturity
nd capacity only, wbich must be determined
•y the circumstances of each case. Texas
1 P. B. Co. y. Crump (Tex.) 110 S. W. 1013,
014.
An instruction defining "ordinary care,"
D an action for injuries recelyed by a boy
6 years of age, while employed in feeding
beets of brass to a rolling machine, as such
are as boys of the age^ intelligence, and ex-
erience of plaintiff usually exercise under
Imilar circumstances, contains the idea that
he care used must be the care ordinarily
ised by the great mass of boys or by the dass
f ordinary careful boys, and is correct An-
lerson y. Chicago Brass Co., 106 N. W. 1077,
080, 127 Wis. 273.
The "ordinary care" of an infant is that
legree of care which children of the same
ge, of ordinary care and prudence^ are ae-
ustomed to exexdse under like circumstanc-
es. Qoldstein y. PeoiHe's B. Go. (DeL) 60
AU. 975, 976, 5 PennewiU, 806.
In determining the question of negligence,
the conduct of children is not Judged by the
same rules which goyern that of adults, and
"ordinary care" for them is that degree of
care which children of the same age, of or-
dinary care and prudence, are accustomed to
exercise under like circumstances. Geccbi y.
Lindsay (Del.) 75 AtL 376» 878, 1 Boyce, 185.
"Ordinary care" depends on the facts
of each particular case, and with reference
to an injured infant means such care as a
child of his age, intelligence, capacity, and
experience, as shown by the eyidence, would
ordinarily exercise in the same situation and
circumstances in which the infant was plac-
ed at the time he was injured. Morgan y.
G. Hager A Sons Hinge Mfg. (^., 97 S. W.
638» 642, 120 Mo. App. 590.
Whether or not an infant exercised "or^
dinary cHre" depends upon whether he used
that care that a person of his own age, edu-
cation, and mental and physical capacity
would ordinarily use under like circumstance
es. Marius y. Motor Dellyery Co., 181 N. X.
Supp. 857, 360, 146 App. Diy. 608.
"Ordinary care" is a relatiye term, and
the same standard is not expected of an inr
fant as of a mature man, and what will be
regarded as carelessness in the latter will
not necessarily be so in the case of the for-
mer. United Bys. ft Electric Go. of Balti-
more y. Carneal, 72 AtL 771, 774, 110 Md.
211.
The standard of "ordinary care" to be
required of a boy of 16 years is "such care as
boys of his age, intelligence, and experience
usually use and exercise under similar cir-
cumstances." Kucera y. Merrill Lumber Co.,
65 N. W. 374, 375, 91 Wis. 637.
"Ordinary care," as applied to a boy 14
years of age, is that degree of care which
may reasonably be looked for in a boy of
his age, experience, and intelligence. Chess
& Wymond Co. y. Ctohagan's Guardian (Ky.)
105 S. W. 890.
Where employes of a railroad see a child
of tender years upon the track, "ordinary
care" is the greatest care that can be exer-
cised to ayoid injury. Anderson y. Great
Northern By, Co., 99 Pac. 91, 96, 15 Idaho,
513.
Same--Ckavaeter of Imsiness affeetins
"Ordinary care exercised by those who
make a business of using electricity for prof-
it to preyent injury to others therefrom re-
quires much greater precaution in its use
than where the element used is of a less dan-
gerous character. A9 there is greater dan-
g^ and ha^rd in the use of electricity, there
must be a corresponding exercise of skill and
attention in ayoiding injury to another to
constitute what the law terms 'ordinary
ORDINARY GARB
784
ORDINARY CARl
cara."* Gommonwealtli Bleetxle O0. t. Mil-
vUle, 70 N. B. 1052, lOOS, 210 IlL 70.
A power eompany, fnniflhlng electrtdty
to patrons, with respect to employes of the
latter rightfully on the premises and UkMy
to come in contact with wires carryinf the
current, Is bound to use ordinary eare, whidi
demands such diligence as is commensurate
with the danger inrolved in the use <tf the
electricity. Denson y. Georgia Ry. 4 Blectric
Go., 68 & ID. 1113, ld5 Qa. 182.
By ''ordinary and reasonable oare^ Is
meant such care as an ordinarily prudent and
careful person, hSTlng in mind the dangers
to be apprehended, would exercise under the
same circumstances. The precautions neces-
sary to be taken in the ezerdse of reasonable
and ordinary care vary with the circum-
stances of each particular case and the de-
gree of hazard connected therewith; greater
precautions being necessary in the case of
great hazard, and less in cases where there
is Jittle danger. "Electric companies are
bound to use reasonable care in the construc-
tion and maintenance of their lines and ap-
paratus. This care varies with the danger
which would be incurred by negligence. In
cases where the wires carry strong and dan-
gerous currents of electricity, and the result
of negligence might be exposure to death or
serious accident, the highest degree of care
is required." Under such circumstances, rea-
sonable care requires the exercise of a high
degree of diligence, and the terms "reason-
able care" and "high degree of diligence*'
may be deemed to be synonymous. Gilbert
T. Duluth General Blectric Go., 100 N. W. 653,
665, 03 Minn. 09, 106 Am. St Rep. 430.
"Ordinary care," under the circum-
stances, Is the legal standard In all cases.
The significance of the term "ordinary care"
varies with the attendant and surrounding
drcumstanoes. This care is to be exercised
by the carrier of passengers at all times
when, and at all places where, the parties
are in the relation of passenger and carrier,
whether during transit, at the stations, and
upon platforms, or in waiting rooms; and it
applies to all matters which pertain to the
business of the carrier of passengers. Pom-
roy V. Bangor & A. R. Co., 67 Atl. 561, 562,
102 Me. 497 (citing Dodge v. Boston & B. S.
S. Co., 19 N. B. 373, 148 Mass. 207, 2 L. R.
A. 83, 12 Am. St. Rep. 541; Jordan v. New
York, N. H. & H. R. Co.. 43 N. B. Ill, 165
Mass. 346, 82 L. R. A. 101, 52 Am. St Rep.
522; Shafinon y. Boston & A. R. Co., 2 Atl.
678, 78 Me. 52).
Railroads owe the duty to exerdse "or-
dinary care," which iln the case of passen-
gers is the highest degree of care that a per-
son of ordinary prudence can exercise con-
sistent with the mode of conveyance and the
:>roper conduct and management of the bui^
ness to see that their passengers are furnish-
ed safe and comfortable transportatioiL 49t
Lonls, I. M. de 8. R. Oa t. Pttcock, 101 1%
725» 727, 82 Ark. 44U 118 Am. 8t Bep. ^
12 Ana. Gas. 688.
^e term ^'ordinary care,** when t^i
to an engineer conducting a train In an ax:-
gency, means the "ordinary care** of com;«^
tent men in that position and cannot be re^
garded as anything less than gntt cv^
Rowe T. Southern Gallfomia Ry. Co, S7 h(
220, 222, 4 Gal. App. 1 (citing Henderson -
Los Angeles Traetkm Go., 89 Pac 976, 1%
Gal. 660; Ekrey r. Soutliein Pac. COn37FK
600, 106 GaL 644, 645; Bverett ▼. Los Angeles
GonsoL Blectric Ry. Go^ 43 Pac 207, 46 Pit
888, 116 GaL 114, 34 L. R. A. 3S0).
The term "ordinary care," when ipp8*d
to the management of railroad engines ic'
cars in motion, imports all care whidi t*
peculiar circumstances of the place or occs
sion reasonably require, and this will be iir
creased or diminished according as ordlni:;
liability to danger and accident and to do i-
Jury to others is increased or diminished i:
the movement and management of sncb et
gines and cars. MacFeat v. Philadelphia ^
& B. R. Co. (DeL) 62 Aa 898, 906, 5 Penae
wUl, 52.
"Ordinary care and diligence,** vbeni>
plied to <he managanent of xailwaja, mt<
be understood to import all the care, drccL
q;>ection, prudence, and discretion wMcfa *^^
peculiar circumstances of the place or occi
sion reasonably require of the aerrants 1
the company; and this will be Incretse^I -
diminished according as the ordinary lit^
ty to danger and accident, and to do Inj:?
to others, is increased or diminished in ^
movement and operation of the cars. Bosi
win V. Wlhnington City R. Go. (Del) eOAt:
865, 866, 4 Pennewill, 381.
"Ordinary care," which is the caie tla:
an ordinarily prudent person would orshocK
exercise under similar circumstances, b 1
comparative thing, and what would be (^
nary care under one condition might be ^
negligence under another. The s^ |^
which a street car Is running may be nerJ^
gent speed, although ordinance speed or less
depending on the care required under ^
circumstances. Beier y. St. Louia T»^
Co., 04 S. W. 876, 880, 107 Mo. 215.
The term "ordinary care and dfllgwcp.
applied to the management of electric «fi 2
motion, means all the care, prudence, •»
discretion which the circumstancei ^ *
place and occasion require. Goldstein t. ^
pie's R. Co. (Del.) 60 Att. 975, 978, 5 Pe»^
will, 306.
The "ordinary care" required in the ^
eratlon of electric street cars imports i^ ^
care and discretion which the place of t^
danger and the occaskm requires, and ^
care Increases, or diminishes as the dmi^
of accident increases or dlmJiri^hw ^^
operation of the <:ars. LanlMwIei ▼* ^^niBi"^
OBDINA&Y OABB
780
OltDlNART OA^US
ton ats B. Oo. (D«L) 74. AtL U, 18, 7 Peime-
will, 64.
The ezerdse of ''ordinary eare*' la the
operation of a street railway ImpUee au^
care as the drcnmstances of the place or oc-
casion reasonably require, to be increased or
diminished as the danger of accident or in-
Jury Increases or diminighea. Eaton y. Wil-
mington City B. Oo. (DeL) 75 AtL 369, 871,
1 Boyce, 436.
A street railroad company is bound to
operate its property with "ordinary care and
caution" ; such term being understood to im-
port all the care and caution which the par-
ticular circumstances of the case reasonably
require, and such aa a reasonably careful
man would exercise under like circumstances,
the amount of care varying with the ordi-
nary liability to danger and accident and to
do injury to others in the operation and use
of the railroad. Gismondl y. People's B.
Co. (DelO 83 AtL 186, 138, 2 Boyce, 677.
"Ordinary care," as applied to the motor-
man of an electric street car, means the de-
gree of care which men of average prudence
and skill, engaged in operating street cars
by electric power in the city in question and
on the street on which the accident occurred
usually exercise under similar circumstances.
Louisville By. Ck>. v. BouteUler (Ky.) 110 S.
W. 357, 3e0.
"The term 'ordinary care and diligence,'
when applied to the management of electric
railway cars in motion, must be understood
to import all the care, circumspection^ pru-
dence, and discretion which the particular
circumstances of the place or occasion re-
quire of the servants of the ♦ ♦ ♦ com-
pany, and this will be Increased or dimin-
ished as the ordinary liability to danger and
accident and to do injury to others Is in-
creased or diminished in the movement and
operation of such cars." Dl Frisco v. Wil-
mington City B. Ck>. (Del,) 67 Aa 906, 009, 4
Pennewlll, 627 (citing Tully v. Philadelphia,
W. & B. B. Co. [Del.] 3 PennewUl, 456, 50
AtL 95).
"Ordinary care'' is not great care, and,
where an elevator la used as a means of
personal transportation, a higher degree of
care than ordinary care is required in its
operation. Belvidere Bldg. Co. of Baltimore
V. Bryan, 64 Aa 44, 60, 103 Md. 514.
"Ordinary care" in the selection and re-
tention of servants and agents requires that
degree of diligence and precaution which the
exigencies of the particular service reason-
ably require, and la such care as, in view of
the consequences that may result from negli-
gence on the part of employes, is fairly com-
mensurate with the perils or dangers likely
to be encountered. Emery v. City of Ta-
coma, 127 Pac. 851, 853, 71 Wash. 132.
The "ordinary care" exacted in employ-
ing servants is that: degree .of care that a
8 Wns.& P.2o Seb.— 60
of ordinary prudence would use in view
of the nature of the employment ajod the con-
aequttices of ems^ylng an incompetent per-
son. Worley v. SpreclLolB Bros. Commercial
Co., 124 Pac. 697, 701, 163 Cal. 60.
The term "ordinary care," as used in the
rule requiring an employer to use ordinary
care In the selection of an employ^, means
that degree of care that a man of ordinary
prudence would use in view of the nature of
the employment and the consequence of the
employment of an Incompetent persoa Still
V. San Francisco & N. W. By. Co., 98 Pac.
672, 675, 164 Cal. 659, 20 L. B. A. (N. S.)
822; 129 Am. St. Bep. 177.
The test of "ordinary care" on the part
of an employer toward his servants is not
whether he may apprehend that an injury
might result to some one of them, but wheth-
er an ordinarily prudent person, under the
same or similar circumstances, in the exer-
cise of ordinary care, would have apprehend-
ed such injury. Quae v. Power & Mining Ma-
chinery Co., 139 N. W. 195, 198, 161 Wis. 400.
"Ordinary care" by a master in giving
notice to his servants of all perils to which
they will be exposed, other than such as aey
should, in the exercise of "ordinary care,"
have foreseen, as necessarily Incidental to
the business, requires that he should actually
give the notice and not merely try to give it.
"If therefore, he falls to give such notice in
terms sufficiently clear to call the attention
of his servants to the peril of which he is
aware, he is liable to them for any Injury
which they may suffer thereby in ignorance
of that peril and without contributory neg-
ligence." Crapo V. City of Syracuse, 76 N.
B. 465, 468, 183 N. Y. 3d5 (citing Mather v.
Billston, 15 Sup. Ct. 464. 156 U. S. 891, 39
L. Ed. 464; Gates v. State, 28 N. B. 373, 128
N. y. 226: Simone v. Kirk, 65 N. B. 739, 173
N. Y. 13; Pantzar v. Tilly Foster I. M. Co., 2
N. B. 24, 99 N. Y. 368; BeuKlng v. Stelnway
& Sons, 6 N. D. 449, 101 N. Y.'647; Finn v.
Cassidy, 69 N. B. 311, 165 N. Y. 684, 63 L.
B. A. 877).
The "ordinary care" required of a drug-
gist in compounding medicines and filling
prescriptions requires a degree of vigilance #
and prudence commensurate with the dan-
gers Involved, and the highest practicable de-
gree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilance,
and the most exact and reliable safeguards
consistent with reasonable conduct of the
business that human life may not be exposed
to the danger resulting from substitution of
deadly poisons for harmless medicine. Trem-
blay V. Kimball, 77 AtL 406, 408, 107 Me.
63, 29 L. B. A. (N. S.) 900, Ann. Caa. 1012C,
1215.
Same— la. oroaaing; railroads
"Ordinary care" on the part of a motor-
man approachlAg a street crossing where a
t^yeler is atte^tpting to cross in front of
OBDINABT GARB
7M
OBDINA&T OABB
tbe car meaiu that decree of care whkh
men of ordinary pmdence and skill, engaged
in like work, would ezerdae under similar
drcamatancee; while ordinary care on the
part of the driyer means that degree of care
which a man of ordinary pnidence, drlTing
a wagon, engaged in like work and under
the same or similar circumstances^ usually
exercises for his own safety. Keefe ▼. Seat-
tle Electric Co., 104 Pac. 774, 770, 56 Wash.
44a
"Ordinary care'* Is that care which oi^
dinarlly prudent persons use in their busi-
ness, or such care as the great mass of man-
kind observe in the transactions of human
life. One crossing a street car track in ad-
vance of an approaching car must, in the
exercise of ordinary care, take the speed of
the car into consideration, where the car is
approaching at an unlawful rate of speed,
and it is observable. Grimm v. Milwaukee
Electric B. & L. (3o., 119 N. W. 833, 835, 138
Wis. 44 (citing Dreher v. Fitchburg, 22 Wis.
675, 99 Am. Dec. 91; Duthie v. Town of
Washburn, 58 N. W. 380, 87 Wis. 231, 233;
Kass V. Schuls, 81 N. W. 133, 106 Wis. 146;
Hayes v. Railway Co., Ill N. W. 471, 181
Wis. 399).
"Ordinary care,*' as applied to cases
where the public has by acquiescence acquir-
ed license to use or travel over railroad
grounds, is that degree of care which is rea-
sonably adequate to meet and avoid the
dangers which ought to be anticipated under
all the circumstances, including the fact of
the licensed use. Rowley v. Chicago, M. &
St P. B. Co., 116 N. W. 866, 869, 136 Wis.
208.
Within the rule requiring a person ap-
proaching a railroad crossing to exercise "or-
dinary care under the circumstances," the
quoted phrase is precisely defined by law,
and makes it the duty of such person, in
attempting to cross, to listen for signals, no-
tice signs put up as warnings, and look at-
tentively up and down the track. Wilkin-
son V. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 99 Pac.
466, 468, 35 Utah, 110 (quoting with approv-
al from Mann v. Belt Ry. & Stockyard Co.,
26 N. B. 820, 128 Ind. 142).
In an action for the death of a person at
a station, the court instructed that, though
he was negligent, defendant was liable if the
train employ^ saw decedent who was una-
ware of his peril, and failed to give a prop-
er warning by a signal which he would be
likely to bear, and, such signal being unheed-
ed, failed to stop. The court further instruct-
ed that if he was struck between the street
crossing and the depot at which defendant's
trains made regular stops, and the track was
so a pedestrian could have been seen for a
long distance with ordinary care and dili-
gence, and was frequently used at such point
by pedestrians, and deceased, while walking
thereon, became in imminent peril, and the
tralnmeo haeame aware tteceof hi ttoie, bj
ordinary care, to have stxipped the tnln and
averted the lojuzy, and they fdted to m
such care and stop the train, and he wu
struck and killed, the Jury must find (or
plaintiff, though they found that decedeo:
was negligent, and that by ordinaiy care ins
meant such as an ordinary careful and pn-
dent person would exerdae under the suuor
similar circumstances. Hdd, not to conflict
with an instruction that it was decedent's do
ty to look both ways and listen for the ip^
proach of trains, and if at any time before be
was injured he could, either by looking cr
listening, have known of the train's approad
in time to get off and avoid the accident
plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Potte;
V. 8t Louis & 8. F. R. Co., 117 8. W. SI
601, 136 Mo. App. 125.
In an action for injuries to a trareler oa
a highway by a collision with a street or.
the court defined "ordinary care" to meu
such a degree of care under the drcoiostio:
es in which plaintiff was placed "at the time'
as an ordinarily prudent person would exer
else under like circumstances. A subseqnei
instruction declared that, in going acroas or
near defendant's track at the time asA place
in question, it was plaintiff's dnty to exer
dse ordinary care to avoid tojuiy from the
approaching car, and, if he failed to do ff.
he could not recover. Held, that the first k
struction was not objectionable as limltlBl
the time at which plaintiff was reqoired d
exercise care to the momoit of the coUisoc.
Chicago aty Ry. Go. v. Ryan, 8D N. £. 11&
118, 225 lU. 287.
One driving onto a railroad at a crossing
where the gates have negligently been left o?
though a train is approaching, has do right to
rely exclusively on the operatives of the gatf^
or of the train in looking out for his nfety
and giving him notice, but he must use "or
dinary care,*' such care as an ordinarilT pn>
dent person would use under the same o:
similar circumstances, to discover the H'-
proach of the train and for his own aif^
and, if he does so rely on the others, vitt
out using such care, he is guilty of coDt^ib1^
tory negligence. Louisville A N. R. Oa t.
Roth, 114 8. W. 264, 268, 190 Ky. 730.
"Ordinary care" is a relative term, de-
pending upon many things, and differiiu'
greatly in specific cases. "What woold te*'-
dinary care in approaching an oskno^
place of danger, such as a railroad cros^
with nothing to disdose its presence, and tbe
inabiUty to see it from darkness, wonid 1)^
an entirely different thing from approacfais^
a known or visible crossing.** Chicago & ^
R. Co. V. Frets, 90 N. B. 76, TO, 173 lni5lS
"Ordhiary care" is that care whicb »
careful and prudent person ordinarily e«f
cises under like circumstances and condltioi^
To entiUe a pedestrian to proceed on his ffs?
and cross the tracks of a street railway <xh^
OSDINAB7 CABB
787
OBDINART OABB
pany, he is not bound to wait for conditions
that exclude all doubts of safety, but it is his
priyUege to take such a chance as a person
of "ordinary care*' and prudence would take
in the exercise thereof under the circum«
stances; and therefore, in an action against a
street railway company for injuries to a trav-
eler in a collision with a car, an instruction
that, if the traveler took a doubtful chance
of being able to cross in front of the car, it
would be a negligence precluding a recovery
was properly refused. Doherty y. Metropoli-
tan St Ry. Ck)., 91 N. Y. Supp. 19, 20.
Same— Baaser as affeotinff
"Ordinary care" is a relative term, and
means a degree of care commensurate with
the danger involved. Tackett v. Henderson
Bros. Ck>., 108 Paa 151, 165, 12 Gal. App. 658.
What is "ordinary care" must be gauged
and determined by the danger which its ex-
ercise requires to be overcome, for what
would be "ordinary care" under certain condi-
tions might under different conditions be
gross negligence. Galveston, H. A S. A. B.
Co. V. Thompson (Tex.) 116 S. W. 106, 108.
''Ordinary care" is such care as men or-
dinarily exercise under the same or similar
circumstances. The amount of care which
will satisfy this requirement is necessarily
adjusted to, and varies with, the danger to
be guarded against As the danger or the
probability of injury therefrom increases, so
do men ordinarily increase the care which
they exercise for their own protection. Chi-
cago & N. W. R. Co. V. Andrews, 130 Fed.
65, 73, 64 C. 0. A. 899.
"Ordinary care" is that degree of care
which prudent, intelligent, and experienced
men usually employ under like circumstances
to guard against dangers which are obvi-
ous or reasonably to be anticipated. An in-
struction, in an action against a railroad com-
pany to recover for an injury to a brakeman
by falling through an open culvert, which
stated that the degree of care required from
defendant in the construction of the culvert
was such as a master would ordinarily use
if the danger to be guarded against was a
personal danger to the master himself, is er-
roneous, as stating an incorrect measure of
care, as well as misleading, in that there
could be no evidence to make it ai^Ucable to
a railroad company. Southern Pac. Co. v.
Gloyd, 138 Fed. 388, 391, 70 C. C. A. 628.
What Is "ordinary care" depends on the
circumstances of the particular case, and,
when the circumstances are such that an or-
dinarily careful and prudent person would
take greater precautions for his own safety
than under less threatening drcumstancefl,
the greater degree of caution is "ordinary
care." One injured by another's negligence
may recover if he has observed ordinary care
for his safety. Dickson v. Geo. B. Swift &
Go... 87 N. IB. 69, 61, 238 IlL 62 (citing West
Chicago St B. Co. v, Manning, 48 N; IL 958
170 111. 417).
"Negligence" is defined to be the want of
"ordinary care" ; that is, such care as an or-
dinary prudent person would exercise under
like circumstances. There is no precise defi-
nition of "ordinary care " but it may be said
that it is such care as an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise under like circumstanc-
es, and should be proportioned to the danger
and peril reasonably to be apprehended from
a lack of proper prudence. Hill v. Glen-
wood, 100 N. W. 522. 523, 124 Iowa, 479.
"Ordinary care" Is defined to be "that
degree of care which a person of ordinary
prudence, under the particular circumstances,
is presumed to exercise to avoid injury. Such
care is required to be in proportion to the
danger to be avoided and the fatal conse-
quences that might result from the neglect"
Indianapolis St Ry. Co. v. Seerley, 72 N. E.
169, 170, 1034, 35 Ind. App. 467 (adopting defi-
nition in Toledo & W. R. Co. v. Goddard, 25
Ind. 185, 197; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co.
V. Schmidt, 46 N. B. 34^, 147 Ind. 638-640;
Illinois Cent R, Co. v. Cheek, 53 N. E. 641,
152 Ind. 663).
What Is proper care in a given situation
is gauged by the danger to be reasonably ap-
prehended under the circumstances existing
at the time, and not by looking back after the
accident; and "ordinary care," where the
danger is great, may call for unremitting at-
tention; but the mere probability of injury
arising from want of "ordinary care" is an
Important element in determining the degree
of care required. Parry Mfg. Co. v. Eaton,
83 N. E. 510, 513, 41 Ind. App. 81.
The term "ordinary care," as applied to
one's duty to provide reasonably safe appli-
ances furnished a third person for the use
of his employes, is a relative term*, diligence
commensurate with the danger being requir-
ed. Trask v, HalloWell Granite Works, 76
Ati. 919, 921, 106 Me. 458.
"Ordinary care," when applied to the du-
ty of a master, means such care as a person
of ordinary prudence would exercise, taking
into consideration all the circumstances of
the case; and as a danger, increases that
which would be "ordinary care" and prudence
must Increase. When applied to an employ^
with regard to the condition of the machinery
furnished by the master, it means such care
as a person situated as the employ 6 is situ-
ated will ordinarily use. Atoka Coal & Min-
ing Co. V. Miller, 104 S. W. 555, 560, 7 Ind.
T. 104.
Where a locomotive engineer knew that
a fireman was at work under an attached
engine, "ordinary care" on the part of the
engineer would be the use of every precau-
tion to prevent the engine from moving. At-
chison, T. & S. F. Ry. CO. V. Seeger, 98 & W.
892, 896, 44 Tex. Qv. App. 634.
ORDINABT CABB
788 ORDINARY OIRCUMBPfiOTION
"Ordinary caref* la the degree of care
tbat a person of ordinary prudence would
commonly exercise under like drcumatances.
*The degree of care does not vary with the
Increase or diminution of danger. It con-
tinues to be ordinary In degree, hut the quan-
tum of diligence to be used differs under
different conditions." "'Ordinary care' wUl
require the exercise of a very great degree of
vigilance under some circumstances, and the
amount of vigilance and caution to be used
will vary according to the situation of the
parties and the surrounding circumstances,
but the standard by which the acts are to
be judged does not change.*' International
& G. N. R. Co. V. Hall (Tex.) 92 S. W. 996,
998 (quoting and adopting definition in Gal-
veston, H. & S. A. Ry. Oo. v. Gormley, 48
S. W. 878. 91 Tex. 899. 86 Am. St. Rep. 894;
Gulf, 0. & S. P. Ry. Co. t. Smith, 28 S. W.
522, 87 Tex. 854).
"Ordinary care" Is that care which per-
sons of ordinary prudence would exercise un-
der the circumstances. "Ordinary care'* In
some circumstances Is nothing short of the
highest degree of cftre, while In some cir-
cumstances much less and sometimes very
little care would satisfy the requirement of
ordinary eare. Whlttadcer v. Brooklyn, Q.
C. & S. R. CO., 97 N. Y. Supp. 414, 415, 110
App. Dlv. 767.
In case of an impending collision be-
tween a street car and a wagon, "ordinary
care*' on the part of the street car company
Implies that the machinery and appliances
should be in proper condition, and also that
the servants of the company shall do all that
men of reasonable care, prudence, and alert-
ness in the same situation and with the
same appliances could do to stop the car and
prevent the collision. Memphis St R. Co. t.
Haynes, 81 S. W. 374, 376, 112 Tenn. 712.
tein^— Knowledge as affeetlns
The term " 'ordinary or reasonable care
to prevent injury* means all ordinary care in
the light of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances, so that the care required to
prevent the Infliction of injury is always
proportioned to the probability that exists
that an injury will be done under circum-
stances which are known to exist or from
past experience may be reasonably expected
to exist in a particular case." Chesapeake
& O. Ry. Co. T. Farrow's Adm'x, 55 S. B.
569, 571, 106 Va. 137, 10 Ann. Cas. 12.
There is no precise definition of "ordi-
nary care," but It may be said that it is such
care as an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under like circumstances, and
should be proportioned to the danger and
peril reasonably to be apprehended from a
lack of proper prudence. A blind person,
while crossing a public street, is not bound
to exercise any higher degree of care to
avoid accident from a defective condition
of the street than a person having the full
sense of sight. Hill y. Ckty of Glenwopd,
100 N. W. 522, 528, 124 Iowa, 479.
When a traveler perceives that a way Is
under repair and much incumbered for that
purpose, and that but a narrow and difficult
passage is open for him, the exercise of '*or-
dlnary care" requires that he exercise that
degree of watchfulness and caution which
men of ordinary prudence would under such
circumstances, and that he do not drive with
the same rapidity or exercise only the same
attention which would be allowable on a
smooth and unincumbered way. Jacobs t.
Inhabitants of Bangor, 16 Me. 187, 190, 33
Am. Dec. 652.
Same— Means of preTentIsc aa affeefe-
''Ordinary care," as used in the defini-
tion of negligence as failure to exercise the
ordinary care of prudent men under all the
attending circumstances, does not require
that all possible means for avoiding accident
should be availed of. Stephoison v. Corder,
80 Fac. 938, 939, 71 Kan. 475, 69 L. R. A.
246, 114 Am. St Rep. 500.
"Ordinary care" calls for the use of the
senses to discover approaching danger, and
for a reasonable exercise of Judgment to
avert it A person of "ordinary care" never
will trust himself, or those committed to
his care, to mere chance, where means are
available upon employment of whldi he may
overcome probable danger. Where a section
foreman allowed his men to place hand cars
on the trade in order to go to camp without
warning the men that a train might over^
take them, or taking any precautions to as-
certain if a train was approaching, or to give
warning in case one should approach, when
he knew that a passenger train was due,
and that the sharp curves in the track and
the topographical obstructions made the risk
of being run down very great, his acts show-
ed a failure to exercise "ordinary care.'*
State V. Koonse, 101 S. W. 139, 144, 123 Mo.
App. 655.
Bllslit negllgenoe dlstlBcaisked
Slight negligence is not incompatible
with the exercise of "ordinary care." Malott
V. Schlosser, 119 IlL App. 269, 261.
OBDIHABT OAimON
"Ordinary caution" is such caution as a
person of ordinary prudence would use for
his own protection under the same circum-
stances, in view of the danger to be avoided.
Jansen v. Southern Pac. Co., 89 Pac. 616,
617, 5 CaL App. 12.
OBDIHABT CIBOUlf 8PEOTIOX
The portion of the charge, "Plaintiff was
not bound to inspect the track at the place in
question to ascertain if it was reasonably
safe to be used by him in the performance ji
his duties as hrakeman,'' ^ven after a por-
ORDmARY CLISRK
T89
ORDINARY CURRENT EXPENSES
tion, fhat Chough the tra<^ at the place was
not reasonably safe, plaintiff assamed the risk
from such unsafe condition, if any, of whidi
he had actual knowledge, or would have
learned by the exercise of that ordinary dr-
cnmspection which a prudent and compe-
tent man would have used in the particular
employment; and in an action for injury to
a brakeman by being struck by an engine,
while his foot was caught in an unfilled space
between ties in the track, on evidence that
the unfilled spaces directly causing the In-
Jury were covered and obscured by tall,
thickly-growing grass, making it appear on
casual inspection that the efpaces were filled^
and that plaintiff had never had an opportuni-
ty to be on the track before, and did not know
that there were unfilled spaces there— was
not calculated to confuse and mislead the Ju-
ry; there being a difference between making
a previous critical examination, which the
word "inspection" means, of the track to as-
certain if it was reasonably safe, and using
reasonable care and caution, which is the
meaning of ''ordinary cipcumspection," to ob-
serve what wad open and obvious, to discern
whether it was unsafe. St Louis Southwest-
em R. Co. of Texas v. Ford, 121 S. W. 709,
713, 56 Tex. Civ. App. 521.
OBDINABY OliEBX
There is no such position as that of
"ordinary clerk" known to the charter of the
city and county of San Francisco. The term
is used by the Civil Service Commissioners
to designate an arbitrary class established
by them, from -which various extra clerks al-
lowed to various officers and departments
must be appointed. An appointee, having
taken the examination for ordinary clerks
under a classification established by the Civil
Service Commission, as provided for in arti-
cle 13 of the charter of the city and county
of San Francisco, who was appointed to a
temporary position in the office of the board
of elections under article 11 of the charter,
giving the board a right to appoint such
clerical assistants as might be necessary, and
later to other temporary positions In the
office of the tax collector and auditor, under
article 4 of the charter, providing for the
appointment of extra clerks In such offices,
was merely an extra clerk, whose employ-
ment ended when his services were no longer
required, and on the termination of such em-
ployment the placing of his name on the reg-
ister of eliglbles, according to the relative ex-
cellence of his examination, without regard
to the priority thereof, along with persons
taking the examination after his appoint-
ment to the position in the office of the board
of elections, was not a discharge, in viola-
tion of the provisions of article 13 of the
charter relating to the appointment, term of
employment, and discharge of dvil service
employes. Rodrlgue v» Rogers, 87 Pac. G68,
664, 4 CaL App. 267.
OXDIHABT OOUBflB OF BVMOnBBS
In an action in France ^n a foreign bill
by the indorsee against the drawee, the orig-
inal of which the latter had paid under a
forged indorsement, the court found that the
drawee made such payment in the ordinary
course of business over the counter, and with-
out notice that the original Mils had been
lost, and without opposition or objection to
such payments, and that there was no evi-
dence that the payments were made in bad
faith. Held, that the use of the phrase ''paid
in the ordinary course of business'* construed
with the balance of the finding merely meant
that payment was made tq the holder of the
original drafts against their surrender at the
drawee's bank on a business day, in banking
hours, in the same way it usually paid drafts,
and was insufficient to exclude an inference
of negligence in the drawees, arising from
their failure to detect a variance in the in-
dorsement which was forged. Sessler v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 168 Fed. 744, 760, 85 C.
C. A. 642.
Stock Corporation Law, I 16, which is
entitled 'Toluntary sale of franchise and
property," provides that a stock corporation,
with tiie consent of the holders of two-thirds
of its stock, may convey its property, rights,
privileges, and franchises, or any interest
therein, or any part thereof, to a domestic
corporation engaged in a business of the
same general character, and that, before the
conveyance is made, sudi consent shall be ob-
tained at a meeting of the stockholders. A
stodc corporation havtaig operated a calendar
department and employed salesmen and kept
acooonts for it separate from its other busi-
ness, but doing the printing or lithograph-
ing for such department, sold to a corpora-
tion, organized for the purpose, its business,
assets, good will, and contracts with sales-
men, in all about one-thirteenth part of its
whole business. Held, that the sale was not
an "ordinary business transaction," but a
sale and transfer of a part of its franchise
and property within the meaning of the sec-
tion. In re Tlmmls, 98 N. B. 522, 523, 200 N.
Y. 177.
OBDINABT OOURflE OF LAW
The right to seek relief before the board
of railroad commission is not a remedy in the
^'ordinary course of the law," so as to pre-
vent the issuance of mandamus, under Gen.
St 1901, i 5185, prohibiting such writ, where
the relator has a plain and adequate remedy
under the "ordinary course of the law.'*
I^arabee Flour Mills Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.
Co.. 88 Pac. 72, 78, 74 Kan. 808.
OBBIN ABT ODBWBHT !
Gen. Laws 1909, c. 135, 1 12, requires the
town sergeant of each town annually in April
to make a list of the keepers of dogs in the
town, and return such list to the town clerk
on or before May l8t» ft»r whieh aetovice he
ORDINARY DEBT
790
ORDINARY BXPKNSIB
tBoAy from Che town ttmmmf 90
cents for each dog listed, and section 13 pro-
vides for the killing of nonllcensed dogs and
for the payment of a fee of $2 out of
the town treasury for each dog killed and
buried. Held, that a city's liabiUty for the
salary of chief of police and town sergeant,
and for the fees of the sergeant as dog lister*
under such proyision, constituted an "ordi-
nary current expense" of the town, which, if,
with other like expenses, it was within the
town's limit of current revenues and such
special taxes as it might legally and in good
faith levy therefor, was not the 'incurring
of indebtedness" U\ excess of the limit fixed
by Acts 1886, c 1428; and hence the fact that
the town's debt limit was exceeded was no
defense to an action to enforce liability for
such services. Trainor v. Lee, 8a Atl. 847,
848, 84 R. L 84S.
OBDIHABY DSBT
Where a city purchased fire apparatus
without complying with Const art 11, 1 5, re-
quiring provision for assessment and collec-
tion of a sinking fund so that the provision
was invalid, the city's use of the property so
purchased raised an implied promise to pay
the reasonable rental value thereof and ren-
dered the city liable for r«it, whidi, being
an "ordinary debt," payable out of current
revenues, was not within such constitutional
provision. Fabric Fire Hose Cki. v. City of
Teagne (Tex.) 152 S. W. 506, 508.
OBDINABY DHJOEWOB
"'Ordinary diligence,' like most other
human qualifications or characteristiGS, is a
relative term, to be judged of by the nature
of the subject to which it is directed." Hol-
laday V. Kennard, 12 WaU. [70 U. 8.] 264,
258, 20 L. Ed. 380.
"Ordinary care" and "ordinary dili-
gence" are commonly treated as synonymous
and interchangeable when applied to the
same conduct in cases of injury. Atlanta, K.
& N. Ry. Co. V. Tilson, 82 S. £. 281. 285, 131
Ga.395.
"Ordinary diligence" is such care and
diligence as a man of ordinary prudence
bestows on his own affaira This definition
was given with reference to the care required
of a warehouseman. Southern Ry. Co. v.
Aldredge A Shelton, 38 South. 805, 807, 142
Ala. 368 (citing Moore v. Mayor, etc., of City
of Mobile [Ala.] 1 Stew. 284; Jones v. Hatch-
eU, 14 Ala. 743).
The term "ordinary diligence" contem-
plates that degree of diligence that an ordi-
narily prudent person would use in the trans-
action of his own business under like or sim-
ilar circumstances. Guitar v. Randel (Tex.)
147 S. W. 642, 647.
The terms "ordinary care" and "ordi-
nary diligence" must be understood to import
all the oare^ prudence^ and diUgeaee wUd
the peculiar drcumstances of the case, tiu
conditions and instruments emptoyed, ms&^
ably require, and sn<ft as a ressonablj pro^
dent and careful man would exercise imdeT
like circumstances. Neal v. Wilmington k
N. O. Blectric Ry. Co., 53 AtL 338, 339, 3
Pennewill, 467.
'^Ordinary diligence or care^ requlnd
of a bailee for hire is su<A as would be ex
erdsed by a person of ordinary prndesit
with reference to his own proper^ under ttte
same or like drcumstanceB. Weick t
Dougherty, 90 8. W. 966, 967, 139 Ky. SS.
3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 348.
''Ordinary diligence" is that degree cf
care which every prudent man takes of lib
own property of a similar nature. Sootben
Ry. Go. V. Davis, 65 S. B. 131, 132. 122 Gt
812.
In an action by an employ^ for peraooal
injuries, an instruction defining '^ordln&i?
diligence" as that diligence which eveir pn^
dent man takes under similar droomstaocis
was CfNrrect • Sanders v. Central of Geoigia
Ry. Co., 51 S. B. 728, 123 Ga. 763,
An instruction that one who uses u
much care as to his neighbor's propeitf ^
he does to his own is exercislDg "ordiDai?
diligence" is erroneous, under (31v. Code ^^
i 2898, providing that ordinary diligence is
that care which **every prudent man" ti^
of his own property of a similar oatoit
Brown Store Co. v. Chattahoochee Lumber
Co, 67 8. B. 1043, 1 Ga. App. 600.
••Ordinary diligence" is defined by 0^
Code 1895, | 2898, as -that care which ereu
prudent man takes of his own property of i
similar nature. The absence of such diligeiKf
is termed ordinary neglect" Insurance Ca rf
North America v. Leader, 48 a B. 972, 9n.
121 Ga. 260; Southern Railway Co. ▼• I>»t]&
65 8. B. 131, 132, 132 Ga. 812.
OBDIHABY DOOIUTT
Sheep are domestic animals of **ordiBir7
docility," within the rule that railroads mo^
fence against "all domestic animals of ord^
nary dodUty." Cotton v. Wiscassct. W. *
F. R, Co., 57 AtL 785, 786, 98 Me. 511
OBDINABT EXFiarSSS
Of mvaieipallty
The words •'ordinary county expenses-
used in Civ. Code 1902, | T99, providini ^
an estimate by the board of commissioBeR
of the amount necessary to pay such es^
es, are those to be incurred for the currflj
fiscal year. State ex reL People's Bank «
GreenvUle v. Goodwin, 62 S. B. 1100. m
81 S. C. 419.
The proviso to section 8 of aitide 8 ^
the Constitution, "that this section sbaU i^
be construed to apply to the ordinary *»
necessary expoises authorised by the ^
OBDINART EXPBKSBS
791 ORDINARY PROBATE PROCEEDINGS
eral laws of the state/' may properly be
construed by the Leslslatnre to authorize
the lawmaking body to include within the
term "ordinary and necessary expenses" any
expenditure rendered necessary by casualty
or accident, which has Unpaired or injured
municipal property that is necessary for the
protection of the city against fires, or for
the health and welfare of the city. Hlckey
V. City of Nampa, 124 Pac 280, 281, 22 Idaho,
4L
A purchase by a city of a city hall site
is not an ordinary municipal expense within
the charter authorizing the levying of taxes
for "ordinary municipal expenses,'* and the
cost thereof may not be paid out of fund for
such expenses. Niles Bryant School of Piano
Tuning v. Bailey, 126 N. W. lid, U8, 161
Mich. 103.
OBDIHABY FLOODS
An ordinary flood is one, the repetition
of which, though at uncertain intervals,
might by the exercise of ordinary diligence in
investigating the character and habits of the
stream have been anticipated. Chicago, R.
I. & P. Ry. Co. V. McKone, 127 Pac. 488, 490,
86 OkL 46, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 709; Town of
Jefferson v. Hicks, 102 Pac. 79, 80, 28 Okl.
684, 24 Ll R. A. (N. 8.) 214.
OBDIHABY LAHGUAGE
The notice of injury required by the
factory act is to be written in "ordinary
language"; that is, the party is to use his
own untutored language. Berger v. Metro-
politan Press Printing Co., 104 Pac 617, 619,
55 Wash. 422 (quoting Dresser, Employers'
UabiUty, i 27; citing DriscoU ▼. City of
Fall River, 89 ^. E. 1003, 163 Mass. 105).
OBDIHABY I.OW.WATEB MABK
"Ordinary," in the grant, in 1640, of tide
flats around an island, to the "ordinary low-
water mark," means "mean," in the absence
of usage to the contrary at that time or a
contrary construction by the parties. E3ast
Boston Co. V. Commonwealth, 89 N. E. 236,
237, 203 Mass. 68, 17 Ann. Gas. 146.
OBDIHABY LUOOAOS
See, also, Ordinary Baggage.
**Ordinary luggage*' being confined to
that which la personal to the passenger, and
carried for his use or convenience, it follows
that what is carried for the purposes of busi-
ness, such as merchandise, or the like, or for
larger or ulterior purposes, such as articles
of furniture or household goods, would not
come within the description of "ordinary lug-
gage" unless accepted as such by the car-
rier. Memoranda and papers in the posses-
sion of an agent, but relating exclusively to
the business of his principal, and carried by
him solely for business purposes, are not
baggage, when put by the agent into his
trunk. Yazoo A M. Y. R. Co. r. Georgia
Home Ins. Co., 37 South. 500, 85 Mias. 7, 67
L. R. A. 646, 107 Am. St Rep. 265.
OBDIHABY HEGLEOT
By Civ. Code 1895, S 2898, "ordinary
neglect" is defined as the absence of ordinary
diligence. Brown Store Co. v. Chattahoochee
Lumber Co., 49 S. E. 839, 840, 121 Ga. 809
(citing Macon & W. R Co. v. McConneU, 81
Ga. 133, 76 Am. Dec. 685; Macon A W. R.
Co. V. Davis, 13 Ga. 68; Southern Mut Ins.
Co. V. Hudson, 38 S. B. 964 [2], 113 Ga. 434).
OBDIHABY HBGLIGEHOE
See, also. Ordinary Care.
"Ordinary negligence" is the omission to
exercise ordinary care — that degree of care
generally exercised by an ordinarily prudent
person under like circumstances. Cummings
V. Wichita R. & Light Co., 74 Pac. 1104, 1106,
68 Kan. 218, 1 Ann. Cas. 708.
"Ordinary negligence*' is characterized
by inadvertence, ordinarily present with the
great mass of mankind, and injuries proxi-
mately resulting therefrom to the person or
property of another, and not proximately
contributed to by that other's want of ordi-
nary care, are actionable. Astin v. Chicago,
M. & St P. R. Co., 128 N. W. 265, 268, 143
Wis. 477, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 158.
"Ordinary negligence," as distinguished
from "willful or wanton negligence," is not
actionable if the negligence of the injured
party directly contributed to the result ; will-
ful negligence authorizing an action regard-
less of such contribution. Alger, Smith &
Co. V. Duluth Superior Traction Co., 101 N.
W. 298. 299, 93 Mhm. 314.
Gross and sUsltt nesUgenoe distin-
Snlslied
A cause 01 action sounding in ordinary
negligence, and a cause of action sounding in
gross negligence, are different, as both can-
not characterize a single circumstance of a
person being injured by another. Astin v.
Chicago, M. & St P. R. Co., 128 N. W. 265,
268, 143 Wis. 477, 31 L. R A. <N. S.) 158.
"'Gross negligence' is a relative term.
It is doubtless to be understood as meaning
a greater want of care than as implied by the
term 'ordinary negligence'; but after all it
means the ausence of the care which was
necessary under the circumstances." Ray-
mond V. Portland R. Co., 62 AU. 602, 605, 100
Me. 529, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94 (quoting and
adopting definition in Milwaukee & St. P. R.
Co. V. Arms, 91 U. S. 494, 23 L. Kd. 374).
As aesligenee
See Negligenoa
OBDIHABY PBOBATE PBOCEBDIHQS
Code Civ. Proc | 1616, as amended in
1905, allows executors all necessary expenses
of management and settlement of the estate,
and authorizes any attorney, who has render-
OBDIKABT FKUDKMCB
792
OBDIKABT STATE BUSUTfiSS
ed aeiTloM to an executor, to apply for an al-
lowance of aaltabte compensation out of the
estate. Section 1619 allows administrators,
etc., for fees for their attorneys for ordinary
probate proceedings, the same amounts allow-
ed for their own senrlces by section 1618 as
amended in 1906, with such further allow-
ance aa the court deems reasonable for any
extraordinary serrices, as for litigation nec^
essary for the administrator to prosecute or
defend. Petitioners applied for compensa-
tion from the estate for l^eir senrlces as at
tomeys in opposing a contest of two codicils,
altering legacies giren by the will, and giv-
ing some additional ones. Held th^t, while
counsel fees incurred in opposing a contest
may be charged against the estate, if it goes
to the parties benefited by the litigation, un-
der the circumstances the estate had no in-
terest therein, and the application was prop-
erly denied, sudi expenses being chargeable
to those legatees having a direct interest in
supporting the codicils, and services in pro-
bating the instruments, such as the order ad-
mitting them to probate, etc., were not "ex-
traordinary services,'* but were services ren-
dered in "conducting the 'ordinary probate
proceedings,* '* within section 1619, for which
compensation was allowable only on final ac-
counting. In re Hete*s Estate, 101 Pac 448,
449, 155 OaL 448.
OBDIKABT PBtJDSHCE
"Ordinary prudence" requires a person
to take into consideration the natural and
probable consequences of a given act, and not
such consequences as are remote, speculative,
or merely possible. Dunphy v. St Joseph
Stockyards Co., 95 S. W. 301, 305, 118 Mo.
App. 506.
OBDIKABT BAIKFAX&
"Ordinary rainftills*' are such as are not
extraordinary, and floods which habitually
occur, though at irregular intervals, are not
extraordinary. Miller A Lux v. Madera
Canal A Irrigation Co., 99 Pac. 502, 508, 155
Cal. 69, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 391.
OBDIKABT BBPAIB8
The replacing of a dO£y or rotten round
in a 40-foot extension ladder used in the
business of an electric light company is not
such ordinary repairs as a workman is usu-
ally expected to make, In the absence of proof
that the defective condition of the round was
known to the servant Twombly v. Consoli-
dated Electric Light Co., 57 AU. S6, 87, 98 Me.
353, 64 L. R. A. 551.
The work of rebuilding a factory a large
part of which has been destroyed, is not
"ordinary repairs," but "construction, demoli-
tion, or extraordinary repairs,'* within the
exception of an employers liability policy ex-
cepting injuries to persons occurring in the
oonstructiaD, demolition, or in making ectra-
OTdlnary repairs to atrvctores, IniildiBKL or
plants. Home Mixtuva Guano Go. ▼. Oecu
Accident A Quarantee Corpomtlon, Limited.
of London, Bngland, 176 Ved. 600, 003.
OBDIKABT BISK
l%e failnve of the master to uk proper
eara to provide a reasonably safe plic« ftt
the servant to perform bis woik and t^
famish him with reasonably safe appIiaiMes
is not an ^'ordinary risk of his empiojuKD:' i
with the assumption of which tiie serrut ^
charged unless he knows of such Mat
Smith T. Buffalo Oil Co., 91 S. W. 383. ^1
41 Tex. av. App. 267 (citing MlSBOorl E. k
T. By. Co. of Texas v. Hannig, 43 8. W. 5(K
91 Tex. 360 ; Texas A N. O. R. Go. ▼. BIdu
42 S. W. 971, 91 Tex. 287; St Lcmis S. V
Ry. Co. of Texas v. Smith [Tex.] 63 S. W
1064; Gulf, C. A S. F. B. Co. v. Moore. f>
B. W. 559, 28 Tex. av. App. 603; 1 Sbetr i
R. Ner [4th Ed.] 1 186).
The "ordinary risk** of emidoymeL:
which is assumed by a servant does not b
elude such risks of dangers as a master tooil
by the exercise of ordinary care, discorer n:
prevent. Klofski v. Railroad Supply U
85 N. B>. 274, 278, 235 IlL 146.
OBDIKABT SXnX
The term "ordinary sklU" contempUtes
that degree of skill that an ordinarilj v^
dent person would use in the transactioa i^'
his own business under like or similar cii
cumstances. Guitar v. Randel (Tex.) 147 S.
W. 642, 647.
As regvirad of pfc^ekM
Persons practicing as physddims u<
surgeons are required to possess ordiBi;r
skill in their profession, and to practice tbeir
profession with ordinary skin, which is ths:
degree skill which is ordinarily possessed t^
physicians and surgeons in practice Krufe:
T. McCaughey, 14» 111. App. 440, 444.
"Ordinary care and skill*' on the partu
a physician and surgeon U that degree >i|
care and skill usually exercised and poss^^^
by physicians and surgeons of ordinary stuJ
in similar communltiea. Donls v. WazfonL
100 S. W. 312, 313, 124 Ky. 768» 9 L B. ^
(N. S.) 1090, 14 Ann. Cas. 602.
OBDIKABT STATE BUSOIKS
The State Warehouse Act (LawslSl^P
707), in so far as it provides for an Issoac^'
of bonds and an increase of the pubUc debt.
without first submitting the question to it*
qualified voters, violates Const art 10, f '^
prohibiting an increase in the state d^^"
without the consent of the voters except i^'
the "ordinary" and current business oi ^^
state ; the building of warehouses not beic;
"ordinary" state business, and the bonds d <
being intended to be for a debt of the stss
State ex rel. Lym v. McCown, 75 S. R ^K-
396, 92 8. C. 81.
ORDINARY TAX
793 ORDINARY WEAR AND TEIAR
OBDINA»T TAX
Laws 1907, c. 6S, imposing <hi every in-
sorance company doing business in the state,
except domestic mutual insurance companies,
an annual tax of 2% per cent of tlie gross
amount of premiums recelyed in the state
during the preceding year, etc., when con-
strued in the light of the history of the legis-
lation on the subject, imposes an "occupation
tax^ and not an "ordinary tax" within the
Ck>nstitutioa relating to taxation. Queen
aty Fire Ins. Go. ?. Basfoid, 180 N. W. 44,
47, 27 8. D. 164.
obdhtart tbkaxot
Leases in which i»t>perty is let to single
tenants are Q>oken of as "ordinary tenan-
dee.** La Plante v. La Zear, 68 N. B. 812,
313, 31 Ind. App. 438.
O&DIKAKT THRBABS
The word "ordinary," In a statute pro-
viding for tariff on imported "cotton doth
in which other than the 'ordinary* warp and
filling threads have been introduced in the
process of weaving to form a figure," means
those threads which ordinarily enter into the
construction of the ordinary plain fabric and
which cannot be removed without destroying
its integrity, as disttnguished from "extraor-
dinary threads," whi<A are not an integral
part of the fabric, but are independent
threads introduced to form a figure and for
no other purpose. United States v. Rusch ft
Co., 107 Fed. 028, 625, 88 0. C. A. IfiO.
OBBIXABY
The words "ordinary time," as used in
Revisal 1905, | 2632, imposing a penalty on
a carrier for neglecting to transport within
the ordinary time required for such trans-
portation, mean the regular customary time
within which, by the facilities in general use
for the performance of the duty of carrying
goods, the carriage should be completed.
Jenkins v. £k>uthem Ry. Ca, 09 S. B. 003,
060^ 146 N. 0. 17a
Revisal 1905, | 2032, declares that it
shall be unlawful for any railroad company
to neglect to transport within a reasonable
time any goods received for shipment and
billed to or from any place in the state, un-
less otherwise agreed between the parties,
or unless the same be destroyed, under a pen-
alty. It is further provided that the com-
pany shall be downed to have transported the
goods in a reasonable time if it has done so
within the ordinary time required for such
transportation, and that a delay of two days
at the initial point, and 48 hours at one in-
termediate point for each 100 miles or frac-
tion over which goods are to be transported,
shall be held to be prima fade reasonable^
and a failure to transport within such time
shall be held prima facie unreasonable. The
duty imposed by the statute is but declara-
tory of the eommon law, and the definition ci
reasonable ttme '^as the ordinary time requir-
ed" within whidi an Act is to be d<me is the
regular, customary, and usual time and is
synonymous with "reasonable time," which
means "as soon as the party conveniently
can«" The provision as to the allowance of
time at the initial point and intermediate
points lowers the standard of duty, as it is
not dear that so much time would be given
undor all circumstances. The last sentence In
the statute, "And a failure to transport with-
in sadk time will be held prima fade un-
reasonable," is not very clear, and the words
cannot refer to time which "shall not be
charged," because to do so would be con-
tradictory and destructive of the immedi-
ately preceding sentence. The last sentence
should therefore be referred to the terms "or-
dinary time," thus making the act to read
"a failure to transport within ordinary time
shall be held prima fade unreasonable."
Stone A Go. v. Atlantic Ooast Line Co., 50 S.
E. 932, 984, 144 N. O. 220 (citing Moore,
Carriers, 188; Tiflfany, Sales, 195; Crook v.
Cowan, 04 N. C. 748 ; State v. Patterson, 47
& B. 808, 184 N. C. 612; Ober v. Smith, 78
N. C. 816).
ORDINARY TRAVZX
"Ordinary travel" on a public street in-
dudes the use of a street by bicyde^ and a
bicyde is a vehide of such a nature that it
may be properly used on highways and its
use regulated by the Legislature, and, being
a vehide, its proper place is on the highway
or street, and not on the sidewalk, unless
otherwise provided by statute. Molway v.
City of Chicago, 88 N. E. 485. 486, 239 111.
486, 23 L. R. A. (K. S.) 543, 16 Ann. Cas.
424.
OBDINARy U8S
Where the court instructed that munic-
ipalities are only liable for such defects in
sidewalks as are apparent, or suggested by
appearances, ot disdosed by a test in the
nature of the "ordinary use of such walks,"
it properly explained that by "ordinary use
of such walk" was not meant such as a per-
son walking over the walk with no regard
for the walk would have, but such as a per-
son going over the walk in the ordinary way
that people go over walks, at the time bdiig
mindful of its condition and having particu-
larly in mind, the duty of ascertaining the
condition of the walk with reference to
whether it was safe and fit for public travel.
Hunter v. ViUage of Ithaca, 105 N. W. 9,
10, 141 Mich. 589.
l%e taking of water from a stream for
purposes of irrigation is not an "ordinary or
natural use" within the rule giving riparian
owners the absolute right to such uses.
Bigham Bros. v. Port Arthur Canal A Dock
Co. (Tex.) 91 S. W. 848, 853.
OBDINABY WEAB AHD TEAR
The breaking of a window due to a de-
fect in the construotioa of the hnilding is a
ORDIKART WEAR AND TEAR 7M
ORGANIC AOT
part of the "ordinary wear^ within the ex-
ception to a covenant In a lease to leare the
premises In as good condition as when taken*
^'ordinary wear^ excepted. The term here
used is "ordinary wear/' while the term is
usually "ordinary wear and tear" ; but It Is
doubtful if there Is any distinction between
the two expressions. An exception in ei-
ther form will doubtless api^y more natural-
ly to the gradual deterioration which results
from use, lapse of time, and the operation of
the elementa It has been held, howerer,
and seems to be the accepted doctrine, that
the words "ordinary wear and tear'* will
cover a specific and substantial injury sud-
denly sustained as the result of a structural
defect Drouln v. Wilson, 67 Atl. 826, 827,
80 Vt 835, 18 Ann. Gas. 93 (citing Brown v.
Burrington, 36 Vt 40).
In general, the ordinary reasonable nse
and wear of property by a tenant has rela-
tion to the depreciation in condition of build-
ing or property which it undergoes during
the tenant's occupation, when the tenant, in
the case of a residenoet at least, does nothing
in connection with the use more than to come
and go and perform the acts usually incident
to creating and maintaining conditions for
living in the ordinary way. Taylor v. Gamp-
bell, 106 N. T. Supp. 399, 400, 123 App. Div.
698.
IdTe stoek tHmaported
In an action for damages for injuries to
stock shipped over defendant's road, the term
"ordinary wear and tear excepted," as used
in an instruction that "the law requires a
common carrier who receives stock for trans-
portation to carry and transport the same
from place of shipment to the place of des-
tination in as safe and speedy a way as
possible and to deliver the same in like or-
der and condition as received 'ordinary wear
and tear excepted,' " should be construed to
mean the depreciation in value which re-
sults from the mere transportation itself un-
accompanied by negligence of the carrier.
International & O. N. R. Go. v. Young fTex.)
72 s. w. oa
ORDINARILY
"Ordinarily" means "according to estab-
lished order; methodical; regular; custom-
ary, as the ordinary forms of law or Jus-
tice; common, usuaL" Renew v. State, 120
S. W. 174, 176, 56 Tex. Or. R. 843 (quoting
and adopting definition in Webst Diet).
In an action for injuries to a passenger,
an instruction that plaintiff assumed the
risks "ordinarily" incident to the coupling of
the cars, instead of such risks as were "us-
ually" incident thereto, was not objectiona-
ble; such words b^ng regarded as synony-
mous. St Louis Southwestern R. Go. of Tex-
as V. Morrow <Tex.) 98 S. W. 162» 168.
ORDnrABILT PBUDEirr uam
In a personal injury action by a mr-
ant, the court told the Juiy that it would re-
fer during the charge to **the prudent noii.
and reasonable care" and they would oDder
stand thereby '*the care and prudence ol m
ordinarily careful and prudent man in lil«
drcumstanoes," and would measure pluo-
tiifs conduct by that standard, that cue of a
prudent man under some drcumstanees
might be negligence under others, and theF
should apply the teat with their gen«n!
knowledge of the degree of caze tbat a im
of ordinary prudence would exercise and, ii
directing attention to the question of i)iai]^
tiff's care, told them to consider whether be
exercised the care and prudence ''of an or-
dinarily prudent man and was without faol:
on his part" Held, that the standard of csre
stated as the measure of plalntUTs coDdnt
was too low ; the words "ordinarily pmdeBt
man" suggesting mediocrity of care, if so:
carelessness. Drown y. New England Tele^
phone & Telegraph Go. & GonsoUdated Ugbt
ing Go., 70 AtL 590, 605^ 81 Vt 35&
The term "ordinarily prudent perm" i>
synonymous with the term "person of ordist*
ry care." A charge sulmiitting tbe iasne of ur
sumed risk, whidi uses the term ^'ordinaiij
prudait person," Is sufildent, under the eot-
ute proTlding that the defense shall not be
available where a "person of ordinary can'
would hare continued in the serrice witb i
knowledge of the defect Tftxas 4 P. B. Ca
T. Johnson, 106 & W. 778, 776^ 4B Tex. Ot
App. 135.
OBDIHABILT PURE
"Ordinarily pure and wholesome water
means water reasonably dean and free froa
bacteria or other contamination, renderijigit
unfit for domestic use and dangerous to ifi£
viduals. Peffer t. Pennylvanla Water Co,
70 Ati. 870. 873, 221 Pa. 57a
ORE
See Extra €k>od Ore; Iron Ore; Bout
ing Ore.
As property, see Property.
••Ore" is a metalliferous mineral or roct
especially one which Is of sufllci^t n)^^
be mined. J. M. Ouffey Petroleum Oo- *
Murrel, 58 South. 705, 713, 127 La. 466.
OBE BOA8TEB
"An 'ore roaster* is designed for ex^
ling the sulphur from iron ore prelimio^
to smelting." I>ayiB<k>lby Ore Boaster tj
T. Lackawanna Iron 4 Steel Go, 12S F<^
453.
ORGANIC
OBGANIO AOT
The charter or sUtute by wU<* * ^
nidpal corporation is created is its orgasm
act, and ndther the coiporation oor
m^-
ORaANIO LAW
796
OROAKIZED TSSLBITOBT
fleers can do any act, make any contract, or
incar any liability not authorised thereby, or
by some legislatiTe act applicable thereto.
Wakefield t. Brophy, 122 N. X. Supp. 632,
6H 67 Misc. Rep. 29&
OBOAKIO UkW
Under the constitution dedaiinf that a
freeholder's charter shall be the "organic
law of the dty,* such diarter is properly
termed the local constitution of the city and
fixes the organization of the municipal gov-
ernment In re Pfahler, 88 Pac. 271, 276,
160 Cal. 71, 11 l4 R. A. (N. S.) 1092, 11 Ann.
Oas. Oil.
ORGANIZE
See Ck>unt7 Completely Organised; Daly
Organized and Existing.
•^o organize*' means to arrange or con-
stitute in parts; each having a special func-
tion or relation. Board of Sup'rs of Nor-
folk County V. Duke, 78 S. B. 466, 469, 113
Ya. 94.
Tlie word "organized,** used in relation
to a school board, might, interpreted in its
limited sense, be held to mean merely the
election of ofiloers for the board, but, inter-
preted in a broader sense, the word means:
Erected, established, constituted, composed,
and formed as to its constituent parts. Gope-
lin V. Board of School Directors of City of
Harrisburg, 64 Ati. 6422, 544, 646, 216 Pa.
868.
An indictment charging embezzlement by
an ofllcer of the city was not objectionable
in failing to allege that the money in ques-
tion belonged to an '^organized city." The
use of the word "or^nized" in the statute
qualifies the word "dty" and is mere sur-
plusage, since a dty must be organized to be
a dty, a distinct entity capable of owning
property susceptible of embezzlement Bode
V. State, 113 N. W. 996, 997, 80 Neb. 74.
Oorporatioiis
A corporation created by spedal charter
is fu.lly "organized," within Pub. St 1882, c.
106, 8 9, now Rev. Laws, c. 109, § 18, so as to
transfer the franchise from the incorporators
to the corporation, when the first meeting has
been called, the act of Incorporation accepted,
officers elected, by-laws for future meetings
adopted, and stock subscriptions accepted;
and thereafter the affairs of the corporation
are subject to the control of the stockhold-
ers, even if only a small part of the stock
has been subscribed for and accepted, and al-
though no payments have been made there-
on; no call for payments having been made.
Roosevelt v. Hamblin, 86 N. B. 98, 100, 199
Mass. 127, 18 U R. A. (N. S.) 748.
Real estate trusts created by deed for
the purchasing, improving, holding, or selling
of lands and buildingB, and for the benefit
nf the shareholders, which do not derive any
benefit from and are not "organized" under
any statute of the state, and which by the(r
terms end with lives in being and 21 years
thereafter, are not subject to the exdse tax
imposed by Act Aug. 6, 1909, c. 6, S 38, 36
Stat 112, on the doing of business by cor-
porations. Joint-stock companies, or associa-
tions "organized" under the laws of the
United States, or of any state or territory.
Eliot ▼. Freeman, 81 Sup^ Ct 860, 361, 220
U. 8. 178, 66 L. Ed. 424.
OBGAHIZATIOir
See Color of Apparent Organization; La-
bor Organization.
The term "organization" implies a recog-
nition of order, and an obedience to duly eon-
stituted authority. State ex rel. Ck>ok v.
Houser, 100 N. W. 964, 980, 122 Wis. 634.
As used in Code, tit 9, c. 9, S 1833, pro-
viding that mutual benefit associations shall
not employ paid agents in solidtlng and pro-
curing members, except in the "organiza-
tion" of subordinate bodies, the word "organi-
zation" refers to subordinate bodies, and
not that of the association itself. First Nat
Bank of Marsh alltown v. Church Federation
of America, 106 N. W. 678, 680, 129 Iowa,
268.
OBGAHIZATIOH OF IXEOTOB8
In Const Amend. 1908, art 2, } 2^,
which provides that the Legislature may en-
act laws as to the election of delegates to
conventions of political parties, and shall en-
act laws providing for the direct nomination
of candidates for public office by electors,
political parties, or organizations of electors
without conventions, at elections to be known
as "primary elections," the term "political
parties" is intended to embrace those which
had participated In a struggle at the polls
for political ascendancy, and political "or-
ganizations of electors" is intended to include
new parties which had not partldpated in
prior elections, organized to advance some
principle or measure of public policy. Sodal-
ist Party v. Uhl, 103 Pac. 181, 186^ 165 Cal.
776.
OBOAKIZATIOir OF MII.ITIA
The word "organization" as used in Act
Cong. May 27, 1908, c. 204, that the organiza-
tion, armament, and discipline of the organiz-
ed militia in the several states shall be the
same as that which Is now or may hereafter
be prescribed for the regular army of the
United States, does not relate to or include
the enlistment of a soldier, but relates to the
distribution of the personnel of the army or
militia into units. A<2ker v. Bell, 67 South.
356, 358, 62 Fla. 108, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 454,
Ann. Cas. 1913C, 1269.
OBOAIIIZED TERRITORY
"Organized territories" have reference
exdusively to that system of organized gov-
emmenta long existing within, the United
OROAKIZED TOWN
7M
ORIOIKAIi ▲MIWEB
Btates, by which oertela regions of the eoon-
try haye been erected into dvU goTemmente.
Tbeir powers, ezecntlTe, legislatite^ and Judi-
cial, are conferred npon them by act of Oon-
grees, and their legislative acts are subject to
the disapproval of the Oongress of the United
States; they are not in a sense independent
governments, yet they exercise nearly all the
powers of governments under what are gen-
erally called organic acts, passed by Oon-
gress, conferring such powers on them. More
briefly, "organised territory" has been defined
as an "inchoate state." Porto Rico, though
it became by the Treaty of Paris a "territory"
of tbe United States, did not become an "or-
ganised territory" in the technical sense of
the words so as authorised extradition from
a state or territory of the United States to
Porto Bico. In xe Kopel, 148 IM. 506, 007
(citing De lima v. Bidwell, 21 Sup. Gt 743,
182 U. S. 1, 46 L. Ed. 1041; In re Lane, 10
Sup. Ct 700, 136 U. 8. 447, 84 L. Bd. 219;
Bx parte Morgan, 20 FM. 80(9.
OBOAXIZXD TOWV
An incorporated village is an ''organized
town" within the statute requiring a dupli-
cate of the auditor's notice of the meedng
of the county board of commissioners to pass
on the petition of the Judge of the county
seat to be posted, 10 days before such meet-
ing, in a public place in ea<di organlced town
of the county. Tucker v. Board of Gom'rs
of Lincoln Coxmtj, 97 N. W. 103, 104» 90
Minn. 406.
ORGANZINE
Silk "organzine^** damaged in dyeing, is
not by reason of the damage removed from
the provision for "organzine," in Tariff Act
July 24, 1897, c. U, 1 1, Schedule L, par. 386,
30 Stat 186, and is classifiable as such,
rather than as "silk wasted' under section 2,
Free List, par. 661, 30 SUt 201. Cohen v.
United SUtes, 180 Fed. 634.
ORIFICE
A contract to furnish water for public
purposes contained this dause: "Said first
party agrees to furnish water at its mains
without extra charge, for the following mu-
nicipal purposes: ^ • ^ For eighteen (18)
taps or faucets in computing which each
'orifice' beyond the main shall be counted as
one 'tap,' exo^ that in the town hall and
in schoolhouses one faucet may be connected
with all the water-closets and urinals in
any one building." In addition to the water
charged in the account annexed, plaintiff has
for many years furnished without charge
water for the dty hall with IS separate taps
or faucets, for the city farm with 6 faucets,
and for the dty farm stable with 1 faucet;
each building being connected with the main
by one service pipe. The plumbing for each
water-doset and for the urinal in the town
hall is cBtiiely ssparate and distiaet (ne
that of eadi ether. Held, that each of tbe«
faucets was an "orifice^' beycmd the kiie
and must be counted as one "tap." Po^lk
Works Co. V. City of (M Town, 66 AtL %
724, 102 Me. 806.
ORIGIN
See Domicile of Origin.
ORIGINAL
See Triplicate OtlginaL
Where two copies of a letter ai« vritta
exactly alike by the same writer, od« &'
which is desired to be mailed and tbe otiiff
retained, the one has not become the '^•
inal" and the other a copy by whateTcr e^r
deuce the accuracy of the copy is estabiisbel
so that a typewritten carbon copy of a leoer
mailed is not a duplicate original, so as t?
be admissible in evidence without acconntiu
for the original. McDonald v. Hanks, 113 i
W. 604, 607, 62 Tex. Ov. App. 140.
OBienrAX. AMOim ni ooitbo-
Under Const art 4, | 4, proTidisf tin:
the Supreme Court shall not have JariaiiflK<
of actions for the recovery of money vbr:
the ''original amount in controversy" dwsiM(
exceed f200, the amount in contioversT i-
the amount of the prindpal sum saed K'
with intersst to the conunenoemeDt of tbe
action, and not with interest to tbe date c^
the trial, since the obvious meaning and po:
pose of the word "original" is to ttmit tiv
amount to the time when the matter tK
originates as a controversy in cosrt Ins^
V. Wm. P. Harper k Son, 128 Pac 07& ^
71 Wash. 286.
Under Const art 4, | 4, and BalUc^er^
Ann. Codes k St S 4650, providing thit '^
appellate jurisdiction of the Sspreme Orf>
shall not extend to dvfl actioiifl at law fc*
the recovery of money where tbe "ori^^
amount in controversy does not exceed £^^
the amount in controversy to wblcb tlie >>'
pellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Coartei
tends is that which was in actual dlspotetj
fore the action was brought, and does not ^'
elude attorney's fees which are merely i£-
dental to the suit ; the word "original" dk*^ i
ing "pertaining to the origin or begii^^ |
preceding all others; first in order; pr^;
itive; pristine." Fidelity k Deposit Cf ;
Maiyland v. Faben, 08 Pac 764, 1^'^
Wash. 308.
ORIOnrAX. AK8WEB
A pleading which in its sobstanceb*
direct and full reply to the cause of af^
set up in the plainUlTs petition sod '^*
tains, among other matter, a sworn d
of partnership of the deftedsnti, akoold- 1^
der the rules of pleading, be denomiottedf^
ther an "origlaal*' or «*amended" «Q^
OBietlKAL AITOiXCATION
797
ORIOINAIi DISTKIOT
And Is not a '"tnppUineiitKl aniwtr/' Gliloa-
go, R. I. ft T. R. Ckx ▼. HftUnll, 98 8. W. 16^
96 Ota. 244.
obiohtaXi appuoatxom
The "original application," aa used in
Rev. St. 8 4897, providing that a oecond ap-
plication may be made within twe years aft-
er t&e allowance of original application,
means the first ai^Uoation. Weston Elec-
trical Instroment Ck>. v. Empire Electrical
Instmment Ck>., 131 Fed. 90, 91.
ORIOnr Ati AProOPRIATIOM
Where the owner of certain land had
nsed water from a main irrigation ditch
throngh a lateral since S^tember 8, 1888,
when tile right so to do was decreed to her
by a void probate decree, such use constitut-
ed an "original appropriation" as of that
date. Bunerdick ▼. Hersmeyer, 81 Pac. 384,
335, 82 Mont 641.
OBIOHTAX. OOHSTBirOTXOB
Until property once bears specifically
the cost of building a pavement abutting it
done on the order of the council of the dty,
or by the city's express permission, inc&cated
by act of its legislative body, there has not
been an original construction of such im-
provement within a statute allowing the dty
to order the original construction of such
improvement at the cost of the abutting own-
ers. Gullfoyle's Ex'r v. City of Maysville,
112 8. W. 006, 129 Ky. 682.
Where a portion of an old turnpike
road, by the extension of the limits of a city,
was included within, and became a public
way of, the dty, and, as such, had a few
repairs made on it, tiie regrading and paving
of the road was an "original construction"
of the street, within Ky. St 1894, | 2833,
making lot owners liable for the costs of the
"original construction," and the dty liable
for costs of ^reconstruction," of streets. Mc-
Henry v. Selvage, 36 8. W. MS, 99 Ky. 232.
OBIOnr AI. GOHTRAOT
See Contract to Answer for Default of
Another.
OBXeiHAIi OailTRAOTOB
An '^original contractor" within Mechan-
ics' Lien Law is one, who, for a Hixed price,
agrees to perform certain work, and does
not indude persons doing carpentry work,
etc., by the day. Van Horn Trading Co. v.
Day (Tex.) 148 8. W. 1129, 1130.
Every person who deals dlreetiy with
the owner, and who, in pursuance of a con-
tract with him, perfenns labor or furnishes
material, 1m an original contraetor witiiin
Compu Laws 1897, | 2221, giving every origi-
nal contradtor a Itm. Qsay v. New Mexico
Pudle Stoma Co.* 110 JBae. 606, e04» 16 N. M.
478.
Under L. O. L. | 7420, making it the
duty of every original contractor to file his
lien wlthlB 00 days from the completion of
his contract, and of every mechanic or other
person to file within 30 days, one engaged
merely to work for an indefinite time, under
the direction of the lessee of a house, is a
mere ^'laborer," whose rights to a Uen would
ezplie within 30 days from his last day of
work; but one engaged under a direct con-
tract with the owner to fsmidi labor or la-
bor and materials is an "original contrac-
tor," though the contract be implied. Ber-
nard V. Hassan, 118 Pac. 201, 60 Or. 62.
Where plaintiff contracted with a lessee
to raise a number of old buildings above the
street level and remodel them, and "furnish
all of the necessary labor and material to be
used to fully complete the work," plaintiff to
receive the actual cost of the materials and
labor, plus 10 per cent, and the reasonable
value of the work, to be determined by the
amount of work and labor done when it was
completed, it was held that the labor to be
performed was not merely incidental to the
furnishing of the materials, and hence plain-
tiff was an "original contractor" within the
meaning of the statute, and not a material-
man, and was not entitied to a mechanic's
lien where the contract was not in writing
and filed with the county recorder as the
statute (Code Oiv. Proc. i 1183) requires.
Peterson v. Frelermuth, 121 Pac. 299, 301, 17
Gal. App. 609.
Materialman
A party furnishing the material for a
building is an original contractor, within
Rev. St 1899, | 4207, requiring an original
contractor to file his lien account within six
months after the Indebtedness shall have
accrued. B. R. Darlington Lumber Co. v.
James T. Smith Bldg. Co., 114 8. W. 77, 78,
134 Mo. App. 316.
ORIOnrAX. OOBT
In determining what is a fair and rea-
sonable price to be paid by a city for a wa-
terworks system at the termination of a
franchise to a private company, is not to be
determined by the "original cost" of the
plant, but by its present value, and "original
cost" and "present value" are not equivalent
terms. Galena Water Co. v. City of Galena.
87 Pac. 786, 737, 74 Kan. 644 (citing National
Waterworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. 863,
10 C. 0. A. 663, 27 L. R. A. 827; Town of
Bristol V. Bristol & Warren Waterworks, 49
Ati. 974, 23 R. I. 274).
Omom AX. DISTRICT
Code Supp. 1907, | 1989a23, provides
that if any person owns lands within a
drainage district which has been assessed for
benefits, and which is separated from the
4itidi by the land of others, and shaU desire
to drain his land across the land «f aach oth-
ORIGIKAL BNTRIBB
798
ORiaiKAX^ PACSAQB
era Into th« diteh, and shall be unable to
agree on the terms on which be may eoter
on their lands and constmct sndi ditch, he
may file a petition, asking the board of au-
per^laors to establish a snbdistrict within
the limits of the original district to seenre
more complete drainage, describing the lands
to be affected, and that all other i»oceedings
shall be the same as provided for the estab-
lishment of original districts. By Acts 38d
Gen. Assem. c. 118, | 22, it was provided that
additional lands within any district wliidi
were benefited by an improvement might be
included therein. Held, that the terms "sub-
diatrict'* and "original district'* in secUon
1989a23 were used in contradistinction to
each other, the term "original district" not
having been used in the earlier statute in
contradistinction to the annexed territory
provided for by section 1989a54, as added by
Acts 83d Gen. Assem. c. 118, i 22; and hence
the phrase "within the limits of the original
district" in section 1980a23 must be deemed
as applicable to annexed territory as to the
lands originally included in the district, so
that it is not necessary to the annexation of
territory to a district that it shall have been
within the original territory. Bird v. Board
of Sup'rs of Harrison County, 135 N. W. 681,
584, 154 Iowa, 692.
ORIGIHAXi ENTBXES
See Book of Original Entries.
ORIOIKAZ. mPBOVEXEXT
The construction for the first time of
sewer is an "original improvement" with-
in Ky. St 1903, i 3100, providing that no
error in the proceedings of the general coun-
cil shall exempt from payment after the
work is done, as required by the ordinance
or contract, but that no ordinance for any
original improvements mentioned in the act
shall pass both branches of the general coun-
cil at the same meeting, and at least two
weeks shall intervene between its passage
in the two branches. Thomas v. Woods, 108
S. W. 878, 879, 128 Ky. 565.
OBIGIKAZ. IK STRUMZUrr
Where a declaration of trust is made in
duplicate by the ^ame impression of the type-
writer, and signed at the same time, each
party taking one, either is admissible as an
originaL First Nat Bank of Bandon ▼.
Jamieson, 128 Pac 433, 63 Or. 694.
oRionrAi. jVRisDicnoH
The phrase "original Jurisdiction" means
the power to entertain cases in the first in-
stance as distinguished from appelate juris-
diction, and does not mean exclusive Juris-
diction. A court of original Jurisdiction is
one in which an action has its origin. Burks
V. Walker, 109 Pac. 544, 545, 25 Okl. 353.
The "jurisdiction" to consider causes de
novo^ on appeal, and to decide them on the
law and tiis crideooe sooordlng to flie rigkt
of the oase^ Independent of the nliogi uA
jndgm^t of the lower court, is origiiul aod
not appelUite. In re Bumette, 85 Pic ^
577, 73 Kan. dOO.
OBIGIHAX. UABIUTT
The words "original UaMUty,** wltblii
y. 8. 1188> providing that, if execution on i
judgmoit obtained against an assodation id
retomed unsati8fled« a suit for tbe aiDoaat
unpaid may be brought against any or til of
the associates on their "original Uabilitr;
have reference to the liability canseqaeDt on
membership in the association at the time of
the creation of the liability on which tk
judgment was recovered, and persons who&e
membership had ceased whoi the liabiliq;
merged in the judgm^it or persons wb(»
membership did not commence until sai^
quent thereto were not respcmslble in sop-
plementary proceedings under tiie sectluD.
F. R. Patch Mfg. Go. v. Capeless, 63 Atl 93S
940. 79 Vt 1.
OBIOIKAZ. X.OGATOB
The "original locator** of mining gronsd
is a discoverer of the mineral theielD m
tained. Zenes v. Yanina, 134 Fed. 610, 61i
OBIOnrAX. OBLXGATIOH
Under Bev. Civ. Code, | 1973, makisgt
promise to answer for another's obligstioB
an "original obligation," where the promise
is made by one wlio has received piopem
upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant u-
such promise, etc., an agrement to paj is^
other's account is an original contract, and
not a guaranty, where the debtor has turcei
his bills receivable, etc, to the promisor, ^a
his agreement to pay the debtor's debc&
Grimsrud Shoe Co. v. Jackson, 115 K. W
656, 659, 22 S. D. 114.
Under the provisions of subdlrision 1 1
6010, Rev. St 1687, a promise to answa for
the obligation of another is deemed an ''on^
inal obligation" of the promisor, and need
not be in writing, where the promise is f<|f
an antecedent obligation of another, tJ^ ^
made upon the consideration that the parti
receiving it cancels the antecedent obligatitii
and accepts the new promise as a sobsilR^
therefor. McCallum v, McClarren, 96 P»t
200, 201, 15 Idaho, 374.
OBIGHTAX. PACKAGE
An "original package** is defined as i
bundle put up for transportation or coikb^t
clal handling, and usually consists of a n"^'
ber of things bound together conyenieDt f^"
handling. It is again defined to he the csit
which the carrier receives, transmits, and ^
livers as an article of commerce, and a^is
as that package wliich is d^vered by tbe
Importer to the carrier at the initial point (|
shipment in the emot condition in wiiicb it
was shipped. If sold. It must be in tbe fi^
ORiaiKAL. PACKAGE
799
ORiaiNAL PACKAGE
i shipped or receiyed, for, if tbe package be
roken after such delivery. It by that act
lone becomes a part of the common mass
f property within the state, and is subject to
\e laws of that state, enacted in virtue of Its
jllce power. State v. Eckenrod, 127 N. W.
>, 58, 148 Iowa, 173.
The term "original packages," as used in
aws Kan. 1907, c. 250, providing that it
lall be unlawfol to sen, offer for sale, or
eliver for nse at any coal mine or mine
i the state, powder in any manner except in
rlginal padEages, containing 12^ pounds of
owder, etc, do not necessarily have the
ime meaning aa used in decisions of the
Hleral Supreme Court, so as to make the
:atute void as designed to prohibit importa-
ons of black powder from other states, the
ct not dealing with importations, special or
^neral, but only with sales within the state,
t a spediied place, and delivery at such place
f the powder sold in other than the pre-
:ribed quantity and in a prescribed package.
Williams v. Walsh, 32 Sup. Ct 137, 139, 222
f. S. 415, 56 li. Ed. 253.
"The doctrine [of 'original package'] has
0 application where the manufacturer puts
p the package with the express intent of
rading the laws of another state, and is
nabled to carry out his purpose by the
iicile agency of an express company and
lie connivance of his consignee.*' Crlgler v.
Jommonwealth, 87 S. W. 276, 279, 120 Ky.
12 (quoting and approving Austin v. Tennes-
ee, 21 Sup. Ct 132, 179 U. S. 343, 45 L. Ed.
24).
Each separate bottle shipped into the
tate by a manufacturer to a local dealer
nder a contract by the terms of which the
greed prices were per cask containing 10
ozen bottles, and per case containing 6 dozen
ottles, cannot be considered an original pack-
ge, so as to save the local sales from the
iterdiction of Laws Miss. 1908, c. 115, pro-
Ibitiug sales of malt liquors. Purity Ex-
ract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 33 Sup. Ct 44,
5, 226 U. 8. 192, 57 L. Ed. 184.
An original package as governed by the
iterstate commerce law is one delivered by
le importer to the carrier at the initial point
f shipment, and retains its form and con-
mts until rec^ved by the consignee in the
une condition as when shipped, and if up-
Q arriving at Its destination in a sister state
le package is broken, and its contents in
mailer units offered for sale, entering into
le retail commerce of tbe state the distinc-
ve quality of interstate commerce is lost,
Dd the goods become at once subject to
:ate laws. Ehc parte Agnew, 131 N. W. 817,
19, 89 Neb. 306, 36 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 886, Ann.
'as. 1912C, 676; Ex parte King, 131 N. W.
20, 89 Neb. 298.
Where goods are packed in a case by the
Upper in another state^ and are shipped in-
to the state, the "original package" was the
case in which the goods were packed and
shipped into the state, and when the case
was opened for the sale and delivery of tbe
separate packages, and they were removed
therefrom, such packages lost their distinc-
tive character of articles of interstate trans-
portation, and became a part of the taxable
property of the state. Parks Bros. & Co. v.
Nez Perce County, 89 Pac. 949, 951, 13 Idaho,
29S, 121 Am. St Rep. 261, 12 Ann. Cas.. 1113.
Where a liquid in casks is shipped in In*
terstate commerce in car load lots, the cask
and not the car is the ''original package"
within the meaning of Food & Drugs Act
June 30, 1906, c. 3915, { 10, 34 Stat 771,
which authorizes the seizure and forfeiture
for adulteration or misbranding of articles
so shipped while remaining in "original un-
broken packages." United States v. Sixty-
Five Casks Liquid Extracts, 170 Fed. 449,
454 (citing 6 Words and Phrases, p. 5059;.
Where the manufacturer of whisky re-
ceived a barrel of his product from a govern-
ment warehouse after paying tbe tax, hav-
ing the barrel stamped to show the pajment
and receiving stamps to be aflixed on each
five gallons thereof when transferred to kegs
of that capacity, he was uot required to sell
the whole barrel in one package to avoid
payment of a license, but could divide it in-
to five-gallon kegs for sale, and when stamp-
ed the kegs were "original packages contain-
ing not less than five gallons" within the
statute authorizing the sale of whisky by the
manufacturer thereof in that manner without
license. Bunch v. State, 114 S. W. 239, 88
Ark. 230.
SnbdiTisioiui of paokaffes
'The term 'original packages' Is not de-
fined by any statute, and is simply a conven-
ient form of expression adopted by Chief
Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat [26 U. S.] 419, 6 L. Ed. 678, to indicate
that a license tax could not be exacted of
an importer of goods from a foreign country
who disposes of such goods in the form in
which they were imported. It Is not denied
that, in the changed and changing conditions
of commerce between the states, packages
in which shipments may be made from one
state to another may be smaller than those
'bales, hogsheads, barrels, or tierces,' to
which the term was originally applied by
Chief Justice Marshall, but, whatever the
form or size employed, there must be a rec-
ognition of the fact that the transaction is
a bona fide one, and that the usual methods
of interstate shipment have not been depart-
ed from for the purpose of evading tlie police
laws of the states." The tax imposed on
cigarette selling by Code Iowa, f 5007, is not
an invalid regulation of commerce as applied
to sales at retail of packages of ten cigarettes
in small pasteboard boxes, sealed, and stamp-
ed with the revenue stamp, which had been
ORIGINAL PROMISB
800 ORIGINAL SPtOLAL PROCSEDINa
shipped loose to the retailer from another
state by an express company which merely
issued a receipt in duplicate, showing the
number of packages and the name of the
consignee, the packages not being separately
or otherwise addressed, since such a box can
in no just sense be considered an "original
package." Cook ▼. Marshall County, Iowa,
26 Sup. Ct 283, 286, 196 U. 6. 261, 49 L. Bd.
47L
OBIOm AX. FBOmSB
An obligation to answer for the debt, de-
fault, or miscarriage of another is original
and valid, though in parol, if made at the
time or before a debt is created, where credit
is given solely to the promisor; or where
credit is given on the promises of both, as
principals and Jointly liable, and not on the
promise of one, as surety for the other; or
a promise, made after the debt is created,
when, by reason of the promise, the original
debtor is released ; or if it is a promise to
pay out of funds placed in the hands of the
promisor by the debtor ; or if it be a promise
based on a new consideration of benefit or
harm passing between the promisor and the
creditor. Where there is no benefit to one
promising to answer for the debt of another,
and the promise does not create an original
obligation, but is a collateral promise, merely
superadded to the promise of another to pay
the debt, the original promisor remaining
liable, the collateral promisor is not liable,
unless there is a writing, whether the prom-
ise is made when the debt is created or not
Peele ▼. Powell, 78 S. B. 234, 236, 156 N. 0.
663.
A promise made at the time or before a
debt is created, and where credit is given
solely to the promisor or to both promisors
as principals, or a promise based on a new
consideration passing between the promisor
and the creditor, or a promise for the bene-
fit of the promisor where he has a personal
and pecuniary interest in the transaction in
which a third party is the original obligor,
is an "original promise," which is not with-
in the statute of frauds, but a promise not
creating an original obligation and merely
superadded to the promise of another who re-
mains liable, to pay such debt, is a collateral
promise required by the statute to be in writ-
ing and signed, whether made at the time the
debt was created or afterwards. Whitehurst
V. Padgett, 73 S. E. 240, 241, 167 N. a 424.
Where the defendant bought uncompleted
houses, the plumbing in which plaintiffs had
contracted with her vendors to do, and which
they had partly done, her promise that, if
they would hurry up the work so that the
buildings could be rented, she would pay
them, not only for the work of completion,
but for what they had done for her vendors,
is an "original promise" on a new and sufll-
dent consideration, and eo not within the
statute of frauds. Breen ▼. Isaacs, 96 N. T.
Supp. 741, 49 Misc. Rep. 127.
Where defendant, who was the owner of
certain premises, promised that, if plaintiff
would refrain from filing a lien thereon for
materials delivered to a contractor and would
continue to furnish sand for the buildings
being erected, def^dant would pay the debt
owing by the contractor to plaintiif, defend-
ant's agreement wAs an original promiae
based on a new consideration, and was not,
therefore^ within the statute of frandsi
Scbnaufer ▼. Ahr, 108 N. Y. Supp. 195, 198»
63 Misc. Rep. 29a
A promise to pay the debt of another in
consideration that the creditors release the
debtor and accept the promise instead thereof
is an original promise which is not required
to be in writing under Rev. St 1887, | 6010.
subd. 3, making a promise for an antecedent
obligation of another in consideration that
the party receiving it cancel the antecedoit
obligation and accept the new promise as a
substitute therefor an original promise. Mc-
Oallum V. McClarren, 98 Pac 200, 201, 16
Idaho, 874.
OBIGIKAZ. BECOBB
It was complainant's custom in operating
a lumber yard, on receiving an order, to write
the substance on a small order blaxik, which
was given to a loader, who put the material
on a wagon, and returned the slip to the yard
clerk, who then made three "original sUpe"
on an automatic register, showing the date,
names, quantity, price, etc. In filling out
the blanks the machine made three exact cop-
ies of the slips by one impression, and au-
tomatically numbered them. One of the slips
was given to the driver, who delivered the
lumber, and the other two and the original
written memorandum retained by plalntifr.
Held, that the original written memorandum
was a mere shop book entry, and not ordi-
narily admissible, but that one of such "orig-
inal slips" retained by plaintiff in its oflElce
was admissible as the original record. Fed-
eral Union Surety Co. r. Indiana Lumber k
Mfg. Oo^ 96 N. B. 1104, U06, 176 Ind. 328.
OBIGIKAX. SPECIAL FBOOEEDIHO
While a criminal contempt proceeding for
violating an order enjoining accused from
maintaining a liquor nuisance in which a
warrant of attachment was issued is an "orig-
inal apedal proceeding" under Bev. Codes
1906, 1 7666, providing that, if an attachment
la issued in contempt proceedings, it shall be
deemed an original special proceeding by the
state against accused, it is not, strictly peak-
ing, an independent proceeding, as it grows
out of and is, to a certain extent, connected
with the main action and is dependent for its
foundation upon the proceedings in the main
action and the violation of the Injunctlonal
order therein issued. Stats r. Helser, 127 N.
W. 72, 76. 20 N. D. 867.
ORIGINAL SUIT
801
ORNAMENT
oRioiNAX. mm
A proceeding under Rev. St. 1885; c 17>
tit. 30, art 1375, authorizing a new trial
for good caiiae shown, apon'd^endant^s appli-
cation, whne. Judgment was lendeiDed against
him on semloe by publication without af)*
pearance^ is not an "original suit,'' iHit a
^'continuation of the form^ suit" Uence^
tlie order vacating the ori^nal judgment is
as interlocutory order from which no appeal
Ue& WoU v. Sahm, 120 S. W. Uli, 1117,
56 Tex. GiT. App. 564.
ORIGIKAI< SUM
The phrase "original sum«" as used in St
1909, c. 490, pt. 2, I 59, which requires a per-
son redeeming land sold for taxes to pay the
original sum, with interest and other duirges,
means the amount paid at tax sale; hence,
where a purchaser of a tract of land at a tax
sale has subdiyided it by his own deed before
the time for redemption had expired, in such
a way that his grantee owned the tax title to
a part of the land and plaintiff the equity of
redemption, the right to redeem depends upon
plaintiff's paying the whole sum paid for the
tax deed. McNeil v. O'Brien, 91 N. B. 138,
140, 204 Mass. 594.
OBXOINAI< mrDEBTAKIN O
If no other person is liable for the same
debt for which the undertaking is made, al-
though another person may be liable for a
distinct debt which is the measure of the oue
in question, the undertaking is an original
one. Jolley v. Walker's Adm'rs, 26 Ala. 690,
702.
Where a tenant became sick after plant-
ing the crop, and defendant bought the crop
from him and agreed to pay the lessor the
rent due, and the lessor accepted defend-
ant as his tenant, the agreement to pay
the rent was an "original undertaking," not
required to be in writing under the statute
of frauds. Pylant v. Webb, 58 S. B. 329, 2 Ga.
App. 171.
"VVTiere relators furnished supplies, labor,
and materials to a subcontractor for the con-
struction of a highway, and treated the latter
as their debtor "until after he absconded, the
undertaking of the contractors, if any, to liq-
uidate such indebtedness, was not an "orig-
inal undertaking," but a contract to answer
for the default of another, within the stat-
ute of frauds. Millef v'. State ex rel. Prather,
74 N* B. 260, 261, 36 Ind. App. 379.
OaiOIHAL WIPTH .
The* words ''original -width," as used In
Bums' Ann. St 1908, § 7663, creating a high^
way by 20 years' user, bpt declaring that all
highways previously laid out according to.
Uiw, or used as such, for 20 years or moi^re*
shall continue as located and as of their orig-
inal width respectively until changed ac-
cording to law,; related to the width of the
liighway when the proceeding was begun to
8WDS.& P.2n Seb.— 51
ascertain and record it and not to a possi- .
bly wi^ei:or narrower way at son^e remote or
recent period. Pitser v. McCreery, 89 N. B.
317. 318, 319, 172 Ind. 663. ,
ORIGINAL WRIT
See Scire Facias.
OBKlnrAXiLY fiXEROISBD BT CBAH-
CERTCMItrEtV
See Jurisdiction Originally Bxerdsed by
Chancery Court
Tike words. "originating" and "arising,"
as used In the section of the Gonatitntion
relating to the appellate jurisdictioix of the
Supreme Court and the circuit oaurt reler
to cases which the circuit and county courts,
respectively, exercise original Jurisdiction of
and determine. Mugge v. Warnell Lumber
& Veneer Co., 50 South. 645, 646, 58 Fla. 318.
OBIOnrATlNO CAUSE
The initial and moving or "originating
cause" is to be understood as meaning the
surrounding conditions in which the negli-
gence of defendant operated as the efficient
cause of the injurious consequences. Winchel
V. Goodyear, 105 N. W. 824, 827, 126 Wis. 271.
OBXOIHATiko WITHIN TEHICIiS
Where an accident to an automobile re-
sulted in the leakage of gasoline from the
tank, and Are was communicated to the gaso-
line, which had escaped from burning lamps
affliced to the outside of the vehicle, the Are
loss on the vehicle was not one "originating
within the vehicle," within a clause of a flre
policy exempting the insurer from liability
for fire so originating. Preston v. Mtna. Ins.
Co., 103 N. Y. Supp. 638, 639, 118 App. Dlv.
784; Same v. Union Assur. Soc, 103 N, T.
Supp. 640, 641, 118 App. Dlv. 788.
ORNAMENT
Personal oraamehts as goods and cihatr
tels, see (Toods.
A watch, chain, purse, or rosary, being
each an article of use, and not worn for orna-
ment, is not a "Jewel" or "ornament,** within
the statute relieving an innkeeper ffom lia-
bility for loss of money, Jewels, or ornaments,
where he provides a safe, posts notice there^
of, and the guest neglects to deposit the same
in the safe. Jones v. Hotel Latham Co., 115
N. Y. Supp. 1084, 1085, 02 Misc.- Rep. 620.
.Watoh . '."'
A watqh and^foi) i^re embraced in the
terms "jewels" and, "ornaments," as used in
Act 1879, p. 185^ c. 145, relating to the lia-
bility of the proprietor of a hotel for the
keeping of any Jisweis and ornaments be-
loxkging to a guest Mr. Webster defines the
word "Jewel" as an ornament of dress, usu-
, ally made of a precloua metal, having enamel
or precious stones as a part of its design;
ORNAMENTAL FEATHERS
802
ORPHAN
but we are of the opinion that It was nsed
by the Legislature in the common meaning
attributed to it as an ornament or nsefol ar-
ticle of yalue, and embraces a watch used for
a timekeeper or dironometer, and in whldi
precious stones may or may not form a part
The fob is evidently an article kept and worn
both for use and ornament Rains v. Max-
w^ HoBse Co., 70 8. W* U4. HI, 112 Tttin.
219, 04 L R. A. 470, 2 Ami. Gat. 4S&
OKN AKEHTAX. FEATHERS
Peacock feathers in a crude condition,
osed in that state for ornamental purposes,
are dutiable under the provision in paragraph
425, Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, 1 1, Sched-
ule N, 30 SUt 101, for "ornamental feath-
ers," and not under that in the same para-
graph for *^eathers crude." George Silva
& Co. y. United States, 127 Fed. 781.
Crude ostrich feathers, which In that
condition are never used for ornamental pur-
poses, but need to be dressed and otherwise
manufactured before becoming suitable for
such use, are dutiable as "feathers • • ^
crude,** and not as "ornamental feathers,**
under the Tariff Act Brodie v. United
States, 135 Fed. 914, 915; Spero v. Same, 135
Fed. 915, 910.
OKN AMEHTAX. nXTVHSS
An electric chandelier, annunciator, and
like contrivances or devices attached to the
celling or walls of a house by a tenant, at his
own expense and for his personal comfort
and convenience, come within the legal defini-
tion of "domestic or ornamental fixtures"
when so placed that they can be readily de-
tached without injury to the premises. In
the absence of any understanding to the con-
trary, such fixtures may be removed by the
tenant at any time during his term or occu-
pancy, and even thereafter, if he be deprived
of the oppoitunlty to remove them by a
wrongful retaking of possession of the prem-
ises by the landlord. Not being annexed to
the rented structure with any view to their
becoming permanently attached thereto as a
part of the realty, t|iey do not lose their iden-
tity as chattels, and a possessory warrant
will lie to recover them from a landlord who
wrongfully withholds possession thereof from
the tenant Raymond v. Strickland, 52 S. B.
619, 020, 124 Ga. 504, 3 U R. A. (N. S.) 09.
OBHAMENTAL LEAVES
Bleached or dyed grasses that are intend-
ed for ornamental or decorative purposes are
classible as "ornamental • • • leaves
• • • not specially provided for," under
TarifT Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, | 1, Schedule
N, par. 425, 30 Stat 191. And so sire palm
leaves that have been subjected to a process
of painting, etc, to give them their natural
appearance and to prevent decomposition.
And also wreaths and crosses mounted on
wire frames. United States v. H. Bayersdorf-
er ft Ca, 175 Fed. 959, 900, 99 G. C. A. 4r<
See, also, Bayersdorfer ft Go. v. United
States, 171 Fed. 280.
OBVAKEHTAX. FBOJEOrXOXS
As used In m dty oidlnanee, aathoiiaii;
the lasttance of permits to coastriKt '^om
mental pxojeetiona** beyond the Imfldhig Jm,
included all deoormtiw pro jecdoiis on tbe Hue
of a buildtng beyond the bniUBBS Uw ia tb»
nature of porehes, arches, portleoa, pedesttln
free standing statuary colnmns, and iiilkR
erected entirely for the enhancement of ^
beauty of the building from an artistic sos^
point McMillan v. Klaw ft Erlauger Ccisi
Go., 95 N. T. Supp. 365, 307, 107 Appi Irj
OBVAXEHTAX. 8TOHSS
In construing the provision in pangnii
435, Schedule N, 1 1, Tarilf Act July 2i IS^
a 11, 30 Stat 192, for Imitation predoi?
stones not "ornamented or decorated,'' h&i
as to stones which have been incmsted, ^
in which the incrustations are a part of tiip
imitation, that they are not ornamented o?
decorated within the meaning of said pro^
sion. United States v. R. F. Downing & Cc.
144 F^ 1022, 73 G. a A. 42; Id., 139 Fed
155.
ORHAXEHTS AHB
See Other.
OTHER ABTICLES
ORPHAN
"Orphans,'* as used in a certificate of a
mutual benefit association, providing for pa:
ment to the family, "orphans," or dep«H]t£^
of the member, as he might direct, represe^^
ed the children of the family after the dein
of father and mother. Klee v. Elee, 98 >
T. Supp. 588, 590, 47 Misc. Rep. lOL
'^Orphans,*' as used In the rules of a
association providing that upon the death ci
a member the society would pay to the ^^
ower or orphans of the deceased memleri
certain sum, is Intended in the sense of **cliil
dren** and not in the strict legal sense .'
orphans. Fischer ▼. Malchow, 101 N. W. &J^
003, 93 Minn. 390.
Where a benevolent assodation^s charter
provided for the paymait of benefits to "«?*
phans," such term would not be limited tv
persons who were oiphaas la a strict sense.
embracing those only related by caDsaogsiB^
ity, but would be construed in the sense ^
children. Berdan v. Milwaukee Mat life
Ins. Co., 90 N. W. 411, 413. 130 Mich. 396. 4
Ann.Caa.832.
A bequest for the education of •'orpbass
or poor children" means orphans without €*•
tate to pay fOr such education and childres
whose parents are living but are too poor to
pay for it. Crow ex rel. Jones v. Clay Coea-
ty, 95 8. W. 309, 879, 190 Mo. 231
ORPHAN ASYLUM
803
OTHER
OBPHAK ABTXilTM-OBPHAini' HOME
— ORFHAHAOE
As charity, see Charity.
As public charity, see Public Charity.
Lezicographera are not unanlmoos, but
lean toward a meaning for "orphanage" or
"oiphan asylum" suggesting destitution of
those reUeyed, rather than a profit-seeking
enteiprlse. Standard Diet "Orphanage^"
"^An institution for the care of destitute <»-
plians; oxphan asylum." 0»it Diet "Or-
phanage." "An institution or home for or-
phans; orphan asylum; an asylum or home
fdr destitute orphan children." Webst Diet
'^Orphanage." "An institution or asylum for
the care of orphans." Id. "Asylum." "An
institution for the protection or relief of some
dasB of destitute^ unfortunate, or afflicted
persons." Baker t. Btate^ 97 N. W. 660^ 5«9,
130 Yna. 185.
ORTHOPEDIST
As physidan, see Physician.
OSTENSIBLE
OSTEHfllBXiE AOEKOT
An agency Is "ostensible^ when the prin-
cipal intentionally or by want of ordinary
care causes a third person to believe another
to be his agent who is not really employed by
Mm. Weidenaar y. New York life Ins. Co.,
94 Pac. 1, 6, 36 Mont 592.
OSTEHSIBXiE AUTHOBXTT
"Ostensible authority" of an agent is
such as a principal intentionally or by want
of ordinary care causes or allows a third per-
son to belieye the agent to possess. Weide-
naar T. New York Ufe Ins. Co., 94 Fac« 1, 7,
86 Mont 692 (citing Civ. Code, | 860S). But
a colleetor vt a loelil lodge of a mutual ben-
efit society, consisting of a grand lodge and
8ubf»dinate local lodges, empowered to act
as superintendent of the society in the state
in the institution of new lodges, has no au-
thority to walTs delinquency of a m^nbor
in a locsl lodge or iscelTe current dues from
one wha has ceased to be a member of the
society. Kemiedy y. The Grand Fraternity,
92 Pac 971, 977, 36 Mont 826, 25 Ia B. A.
<N. a) 78. dr. Code CaL | 2817, gires the
same definition. And so, where certificates of
stock owned by piaintiff were indorsed in
blank without knowledge by his brother in
plaintiff's DE^e, and hypothecated to se<iure
a debt of the brother, and plaintiff, being In-
fjormed by the secretary of the corporation,
said it was all right, the plaintiff could not
as against an innocent purchaser from the
pledgee dispute the brother^s authority to
transfer the stock. Dover r. Pittsburg Oil
Co., 77 Pac. 406, 406, 148 CaL 601.
osTzarsiBUS fabtiveb
GIt. Code Oa« 1910, | 8167, declares that
"an 'ostensible partner' is one whose name
appears to the world as such, and he is
bound, though he have no interest in the
firm.'* E(e is liable as a partner only to
those persons who have acted on the faith of
the truth of the appearance. American Cot-
ton College ▼. Atlantic Newspaper Union, 74
S. XL 1084, 1085, 188 Oa. 147.
OSTEOPATH
As i^iyslGlan, see Physician.
As practicing ^nedidne, see Practice of
MediehM.
08TBOFATHT
See Practice of Medicine, Surgery, and
Osteopathy.
As practice of medicine, see Practice of
Medicine.
'•Osteopathy^ is a method of treating
diseases of the human body without the use
of drugs, by means of manipulation applied
to various nerre centers, chiefly those along
the spine, with a view to inducing free cir-
culation of the blood and lymph, and an equal
distribution of the nerve forces. Special at-
tention is given to the readjustment of any
bones, muscles, or ligaments not in the nor-
mal position. State v. Johnson, 114 Pac 300,
892, 84 Kan. 411, 41 Ii. B.' A. (N. S.) 5»9
(quoting 6 Words and Phrases, p. 6070) . It is
that method of the healing art accomplished
by a system of rubbing or kneading the body.
State V. Marble, 73 N. E. 1063, 1064, 72 Ohio
St 21, 70 L. B. A. 835, 106 Am. St Rep. 570,
2 Ann. Cas. 898. See, also, Ex ];»irte Collins,
121 S. W. 501, 503, 57 Tex. Cr. B. 2 ; Llgon v.
State, 39 South. 662, 663, 145 Ala. 659; Ben-
nett V. Ware, 61 S. B. 548, 549, 4 Ga. App.
293 (quoting State v. Uffrlng, 55 N. E. 168,
61 Ohio St 39, 46 L. B. A. 334, 76 Am. St
Bep. 358; Kelson v. State Board of Health,
57 S. W. 501, 108 Ky. 769, 50 L. B. A. 383;
State V. McEnight, 42 S. E. 680, 131 N. C 717,
59 Lu B. A. 187).
OSTRICH FEATHERS
Not -dutiable as ornamental feathers, see
Ornamental' Feathers.
OTHER
See All Other; Another; Any Other;
Every Other; No' Other; Some Other;
With Every Other Person.
Pen. Code 1901, § 172, declares that
"murdep" is the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought Such malice
is express or implied. Section 173 declares
that all murder perpetrated by poison or by
any other kind of willful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated killing, or whlchr is committed in
OTHEB
804
OTHEB
the perpetration of oortain crtoiM, U nmrder
in the first degree, and all other kinds of
murder are in the second degree. Held, that
the word "other'* In section 173 was used to
supply the sense of addition to the enumera-
tion ; and hence an instructldn that It was not
essential to a verdict of murder tn the first
degree by poison that there should be proof
that defendant administered the poison to
decedent with a specific intent to kill him was
proper; malice being implied. Eytinge t.
Territory, 100 Paa 448, 440, 12 Aril. 181.
Asdlffemt
The natural, lumal, and normal mie of
the word "other" is to Indieate Adlflering
from or an addition to the ttdng o^ things
immediately in contemplation. De Loach &
Co. T. iEtna Ins. CkK, 82 d. B. 478, 474, 4
Ga. App. 740.
As ejiudem Kemeria
"Where a statute or other document
enumerates several classes of persons or
things, and immediately following, and class-
ed with such enumeration, the clause embrac-
es 'other' persons or things, the word 'other'
wUl generally be read as 'other such like,'
so that persons or things thereifi comprised
may be read as ejusdem generla with, and
not of a quality superior to or different from,
those specifically enumerated." Standard
OU Go. ▼: Swanson, 49 8. E. 262, 268, 121 Ga.
412 (dting Sanders v. State, 12 S. B. 1058,. 86
Qtu 717 ; St Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. ▼.
Penman, 151 Fed. 961, 969, 81 C. O. A. 151).
The rule that where a statute enumer-
ates several, classes of persons or things^ and
immediately following and classed with such
enumeration the clause embraces "other"
persons or things, the word "other" will be
read as "other such like," so that^ the per-
sons or things comprised may be' read as
ejusdem generis with, and not of a quality
superior to, or different from, those specific-
ally enumerated, does not apply, where the
Intention of the Legislature is clear and
there is no room for construction. Vassey
V. Spake, 65 S. E. 825, 826, 83 S. G. 566.
"When general words follow an enumer-
ation of particular cases, they apply only to
cases of the same kind as those ex^essly
mentioned, or, stated in diffevent language,
'the word "other," following an enumeration
of i^articulars, embraces enumerated par^e-
ulars of like nature only, unless a btohder
sense is obviously intended.' " .Chicago
Union Traction Co.. v. Chicago, 65 N. E. 451,
460, 199 111. 4S4, 59 Ia R. A. 631 (quoting
an4 adopting Union County v. Ussery, 35 N.
E. 618, 147 111. 204; and citing and adopting
Misch V. Russell, 26 N. E. 528, 136 111. 22,
12 L. a A. 125; First Nat. Bank of Joliet
V. Adam, ^8 N. B. 955, 138 IlL 483 ; Ritchie
V. People, 40 N. B. 454, 155 tlL 98, 29 L. R.
A. 79, 46 Am. St Rep. 31b).
Otfc^r acetdamtal or aatml mmau
Testator recited that having in mind t^
many catastrophes resulting from the actlva
of the elements, and the great anfferins^ At^
caused by the destruction of life and prn>
erty by storms, floods, fires, aad otiier sd-
dental and natural causes, etc, be <^sr^
the remainder of hia estate to tmstcfs to
invest and pay the income for tbe ehtr-
itable purpose of relieving the waots. ^
tress, and suffertag arlsfng from sodi aef
es, and for the purpose of aidiii? snda p^f
sons as the trustees deemed adTisaHe ^
were victims of such acddenti and catifrnh
phes, and enjolnliig the trmtees to seled
subjects worthy of assistance, and to use t^
fund for the greatest possible benefit to nf-
ferlng humanity. In determhihi; vbetber
there was a snfflclMitly definite desdinadn
of beneficiaries, the court said: "Csn It k
doubted that the tesUtor intended by &
word "such* to limit the relief to snfferci
from some causes, accidents, or cetafttropbei
as distinguished from others not witMn bis
mental category? We think not Certaiiij
he intended that some causes, some acdd^:^
and catastrophes, should be exclnded fp)=
those whose victims were to he tbe gubjMs
of the annual expenditures of the Income '
this fund. If so, tiien is it not possible f(^
the court to find some line of differentiati a
which was in the mind of the testator, ^^
suffidept certainty and definiteness to mtl'i
it to decide, in any concrete instance of ti
pendlture or proposed expenditure, whe>r
it is authorized? We are convinced ttat ^
is possible. Obviously the purchase of t^^
for the hom^ess victims of the New Bi^-
mond cyclone' would be justified. We tti:i
it equally obvious that expendltnre to ui
the cure of consumptives or inebriates voaJ
be forbidden to the trustees. Whether fan
ine sufCeiers of a dreuth-stridcai re^ic:
might be relieved, would perhaps be a qve^
tion of BBore doubt than either of the c^
two, for they would not he videos of stom
fire, or flood. The inquiry, thereft>re, weaH
be whether drootti would bea'oatiuala^
so similar in eharacter or results to tl>»
specified that We must conolude that tbe t^
tator had it in mind in enlarging ttefe|
otherwise limited by the three expi«»
causes. We must presume tiiat he In^ ^
mind a class of causes illustrated hj ^
three named, thou^ not strictly ixxi&s^ "
them, but Similar enough to be wltMfl ^
same general conception of posslUe sofferitt
which he desired to relieve. Such \»^^
avoidable force and slgniflcance of the »oj^
used." Kronrfiage v. Variell, 97 N. W. ^
929, 120 Wis. 161.
OtlLer action
." 'Other action' pending is agoodpJ«'°
bar to a popular action, or a qui tam ac"^
for a penalty, because, by bringing li^ ^'
suit, the plaintlH in It is entiUed eiciusi'^
OTHER
805
OTHER
ly to the penalty, and consequently no other
E)erson can ever have any right." **It Is well
^own that a man cannot bring a second
lotion for the same canse for which he has
I prior actiiHi pending. The same rale ap-
)lles to qui tarn actions where the plaintiffs
ire different. If the canse of action is the
«me." B. F. Johnson Pub. Co. y. Oommon-
ffealth (Ky.) 97 S. W. 749, 750 (quoting An-
lerson v. Barry, 2 J. J. Marsh. [26 Ky.] 266 ;
Commonwealth v. Churchill, 6 Mass. 174).
Other actionable injury
Code Civ. Proc. S 549, authorizes the ar-
rest of defendant in an action for damages
for "personal injury.*' By section 3343, subd.
), '"personal injury" Is defined as including
issault, battery, false imprisonment, or "oth-
jr actionable injury to the person." Held,
:hat the words "other actionable injury to the
person" mean other actions like to assault,
)r, in other words, an action in which ^efend-
int was himself at fault, and hence the stat-
ate does not authorize the arrest of defendant
IX an action for negligence or assault where
:he act causing the injury was that of his
servant, but which Is Imputed to be his act,
though not authorized by him. Davids y.
Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 92 N. T. Supp. 220,
122, 45 Misc. Rep. 208.
Other aets
The "other act" referred to In B. & 0.
uomp. § 549,^ subd. 4, providing that, where a
party in good faith gives due notice of an
ippeal, and thereafter omits, through mis-
take, to do any other act necessary to per-
fect the appeal, the court may permit an
imendment or performance of such act, Is
the filing of an undertaking on appeal, an
amission to do which through mistake may be
supplied on application therefor. Hanley t.
Stewart, 102 Pac. 2, 64 Or. 38.
Other acent
Rev. St 1898, § 2948, as amended by
Laws 1899, c. 61, p. 74, and Laws 1906, c 106,
p. 126 providing that service of summons on
I foreign corporation must be by delivering a
copy to an officer "or other agent having the
management, direction or control of any prop-
erty of such corporation," does not authorize
service on a person unconnected with th?
business for which the corporation was or-
ganized, and not having under his control
any property, related to such business, but
«vho, while temporarily In the state on his
own business, Is intrusted by the vice pres-
ident of a foreign corporation with a bill for
collection. The phrase "other agent" must
be given a restricted meaning, and must be
held to mean a person who is In some way
connected with the business of the corpora-
tion for which It was created, or has under
his control any property In some way re-
lated with such business. In other words,
the "other agent" must possess some of ^e
powers possessed by the persons named Im-
mediately preceding the phrase "or other
agent" Honerine Min. & Mill Co. v. Tal-:
lerday Steel Pipe & Tank Co., 88 Pac. 9, 11,
81 Utah, 326.
Other anmseinents
As used in Pen. Code 1896, art. 199, pro-
hibiting merchants, grocers, or traders In
any business whatsoever, or the proprietor
of any public place of amusement, to barter
or permit his place of business or of public
amusement to be opened on Sunday, and fur-
ther providing that the term public amuse-
ment shall be construed to mean drcuses,
theaters, and such ^'other amusements" for
which admission fee is charged, the phrase
"other amusements" refers to amusements of
like or similar diaracter of those expressly
named in the statute, and does not include
the game of baseball. Ex parte Roquemore,
131 8. W. 1101, 1103, 60 Tex. Cr. R. 282, 32
L. R. A. (N. 3.) 1186. And, while a moving
picture show is not a theater, it falls within
the prohibition of the statute as one of "such
other amusements" prohibited. Bx parte
Ungenfelter, 142 S. W. 656, 657, 64 Tex. Cr.
R. 80.
In Code Ann. St. 1903, | 8663, conferring
power to license, tax, suppress, regulate
and prohibit, theatrical and other exhibi-
tions and shows, and "other amusements,"
the words "other amusements" must be con-
strued in the light of the purpose of the
section and must be limited to amusements
of the kind and character named in the sec-
tion. They could not be extended to include
private amusements which are in themselves
harmless, and therefore an ordinance prohib-
iting the keeping of card tables for sale in a
place of business or making it unlawful to
permit card playing in and under all cir-
cumstances in places of business, or adjacent
thereto, is unauthorized. £7x parte Sapp, 113
N. W. 261, 79 Neb. 781, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.)
441.
Other animal
The words "or other animal," In New
York Sanitary Code, § 195, providing that no
person owning a stable or other premises
shall keep therein any dog or other animal
which shall by noise disturb any person in
the vicinity, applies to animals ejus Jem gen-
eris, and does not apply to horses kept in
stables. People v. Edelstein, 86 N. Y.' Supp.
861, 91 App. Dlv. 447..
The words "other animals," as used In
a contract for the shipment of live stock that
the value for which the carrier should be lia-
ble in case of loss should not exceed for a
horse or mule $100, cattle $30 each, other
animals at $6 each, include hogs. Nashville,
C. & St L. R. Co. V. Stone & Haslett, 79 S.
W. 1031, 1038, 112 Tenn. 348, 106 Am. St.
Rep. 956.
Under Laws 1906, p. 113, i 16, subd. 16,
authorizing cities and villages to pass ordi-
OTHSB
806
OTHEB
nances regnlatlAc the ruining at large of cat^
tie, hogs, mnlea, sheep, goatt, doge, and oth-
er animals, they may imiss ordinances to pre-
sent the ninning at large of horses within
the corporate limits; the phrase "other an-
imals'* being broad enough to include horses
and all other animals. Beet ▼. Broadhead,
108 Pac. 883, 830, 18 Idaho, 11.
atkw avtielee
Qelatln spangles strung on cord, and
used In making trimmings or ornaments for
wearing apparel, are eluadem generis with
the articles enumerated in Tariff Act July
24, 1887, a U, I 1, Schedule N, par. 408, 80
Stat 189, proTldlng for "ornaments, trim-
mings and other articles" composed of gela-
tin spangles, and arc dutiable under that
proTision, rather than under paragraph 460
(80 Stat 193) relating to "manufactures of
• * ^ gelatin." O. Hirsch's Sons ▼. Unit-
ed States, 141 Fed. 380, 881 ; Hirsch ▼. Unit-
ed States, 145 Fed. 1022, 74 G. C. A. 681.
In Rev. Laws Mass. c. 196, | 14, which
giyes a lien on a vessel tor money due for
"proyisions, stores, or other articles furnish-
ed for or on account of such vessei" by ylrtue
of a contract, express or implied, with the
owner, the words "other articles" Include
only sudi articles in the nature of provisions
and stores as might be necessaries for the
vessel in the sense of the maritime law. The
SateUite, 188 Fed. 717, 719.
Bead fringes, whldi consist of beads
strung on a cord or webbing and are used to
decorate lamps as trimmings and shades, are
not removed by the doctrine of ejusdem gen-
eris from the provision for "ornaments, trim-
mings, and other articles * * * in part
of beads," in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11,
I 1, Schedule N, par. 408, 30 Stat 189. Hoi-
comb & Co. V. United States, 180 Fed. 796,
796.
"Spangled hat crowns" are, in a gener-
al way, of the same character as the class
of materials considered under the provision
In the Tariff Act for fabrics, wearing ap-
parel, trimmings, etc., including "other arti-
cles • • • composed wholly or in part"
of gelatin spangles, and are dutiable under
said provision for "articles," rather than
as manufactures of gelatin. Louis Metzger
& Ck>. V. United States, 141 Fed. 381, 882.
Otker iMdlee
The statute defining the crime of embes-
Blement by "any carrier or other bailee" is
not confined to bailees of the class "carriers,"
but embraces all bailees. Faggard v. StatCi
104 Pac. 930, 931, 3 Okl. Cr. 159.
The word "bailee," used in its broad
sense, Includes every person to whom the
possession of personal property is delivered
by another. The words "other bailee," as
used in Pen. Code Ga. 1896, | 191, providing
that any factor, commission merchant, ware-
house keeper, etc., or any "other bailee,"
who Shan fraudulently convert tnyUdng of
value intrusted to him, shall be gniltf of i
felony, are equivalent to tlie words "othe
Uke bailee," and it is necessary that the dar
acter of the relation be a more fldadur ooe
tlian that arising from a mere loan for the
benefit of the borrower. Bice v. State, 64 S.
B. 676, 6 Oa. App. 160 (citing Sanders t.
State, 12 8. B. 1068, 86 Ga. 718; CodjT.
States 28 8. B. 106, lOO'Ga. 109).
A person hiring a horse and \mggj froc
the owner for one day contracts to retnit
the property at the end of such period, aodls
a "bailee" within Klrhy's Dig. 1 1S39, prorid^
ing that any carrier or other bailee who steO
embeszle or convert to his own ude propeit?
in his possession as bailee shall be gnUtr cf
larceny; the term "bailee" in that seetioo
not being limited by the rule of ejnsd^
generis to bailees of the graeric class of car-
riers, but embracing all bailees. Tally r.
State, 160 8. W. 110, Ul, 106 Ark. 28.
Otker
Slot machines where the chances are ot
equal, with the dianoes in favor of the lu-
dilne^ are "other banking games'* ffUlea
Laws 1907, p. 26, c 6i, i 1, making it onlflv
ful to operate any banking games of cbaoee
such as faro, monte, etc, or any other bao^
ing games. Territory v. Jones, 99 Pac 3&
342, 14 N. M. 679, 20 K B. A. (N. S.) 239. ^1'
Ann. Gas. 128.
Other bovato mAterial
The enumeration in paragraph 11, Tsri^
Act July 24, 1807, c. 11, | 1, Schednlel^
Stat 162, of "other borate material,'' K&r>
only to borate materials found in nature i:
a raw condition, such as the "borates of liae
or soda" Included in the same proTisioDt u^^
does not embrace borate of maopuies or
bormangan, which is a manuf actored artic^
made from manganese and borataB of Uoiet'''
soda, and which is held to be dullahle u i
chemical compound or salt xaaAer ptraini^
8 of said act, | 1, Schedule A, 80 Stat 15:^
Hempstead v. Thomas, 129 Fed. 907, ifl^^
O. a A. 889.
Other buildias
An awning in front of a building eitec^
ing 13 feet from the house line to the cor^
supported by five posts and covered with*
roof of transparent glass, is not covered bJ
the words "dwelling house or other buildinc^
in a deed providing that the front line «^^
any messuages, dwelling houses, or otbtf
buildings shall recede eight feet from it-
street line. Olcptt V. Sheppard, Knapp 4 C<'
89 N. Y. Supp. 201, 202. 96 App. Dir. 28L
Burns' Ann. St 1901, { 8541, saixl i
authorises municipal corporations to dii^
the location of tallow chandltfies, sosp^^
tories, and other buildings and to probil^ /^
erection of such buUdlngs, or the cootlDi^
ance of noxious trades th^^ein. Snbdin^
11 authorizes such corporations to dir«^">'
OTHBB
807
OTHER
location of markets or slaiigbterlioiiBes, and
to regnlate tlie same, and glyes them juito-
diction f6r that purpose for two mllea in all
directlonB from the dty Umits, Held, that
the express mention of slaosbterbonaes In
subdivision 11 predndes the eactension of the
power of prohibition contained in sabdivlsion
4, 80 as to include slaughtertionses within
the general designation of "other bnildings
and stractnres." C^ty of Blkhart ▼. Lip-
Bddtz, 74 N. B. 628, 529, 164 Ind. 671.
The phrase "wharf or place of storage,
or in any warehouse, mill, store or other
building,'* in Hurd's Rev. St 1906, c. 88, I
124, providing that whoever fraudulently ut-
ters any receipt or other written evidence of
the delivery or deposit of any grain, floor,
pork, etc., on any wharf or place of storage,
or in any ^warehouse, mill, store or other
building, when the quantity specified has not
In tnct been delivered or d^ioslted, shall be
imprisoned, do not limit the operation of the
section, or of section 1J26, providing that who-
ever, having given any such recdpt, shall
sell or in any manner remove from the place
of storage any such property, without the
consent of the holder of the receipt, shall be
Imprisoned, to buildings alone in which goods
are received in store for hire, but the words
extend to all buildings in which goods are
stored, whether for hire or otherwise, and
hence one who, being the owner of an eleva-
tor, and having issued a receipt for grain
therein also owned by him, thereafter remov-
ed the same without the consent of the hold-
er, violated section 126. McReynolds v. Peo-
ple, 82 N. E. 945, 947, 230 HL 623.
Other oases
Rev. St 1899, | 2982, provides that no pe-
tition for review of any judgment for divorce
shall be allowed, but there may be review
of any order or judgment touching the alimo-
ny and maintenance of the wife, and the
care, custody, and maintenance of the chil-
dren, or any of them, as in "other cases."
Held, that the phrase "as In other cases"
refers to a petition for review, the sole mat-
ter with which the section is concerned, and
not to a writ of error, and the section means
that there shall not be a petition for review
of a divorce judgment, but may be a petition
for review of the alimony and custody of
children, as in ordinary cases where the peti-
tion may be had under sections 777-783. El-
Uott V. EUlott, 115 8. W. 486, 487, 135 Mo.
App. 42.
Otber easualty
" 'Other' is frequently used in an unre-
stricted sense— not limited by the rule ejus-
dem generis." As used in McClain's Code, |
1685, authorizing domestic insurance compa-
nies to insure houses, buildings and all other
kinds of property against loss or damage by
fire or other casualty, the words "other casu-
altar Induda other risks than those already
mentioned In the specific reference to loss or
damage by fire. Baskent* Mut Casualty Oo.
V. First Nat Bank of Council Bloflb, 108 N.
W. 1046, 1048, 131 Iowa, 456 (citing Flower
V, Witkovsky, 87 N. W. 80^ 69 Mich, 371;
People V. Stone [N. Y.] 9 Wend. 182; Hall v.
States 4 N. W. 1068, 48 Wis. 689).
Other eavses
The words "other causes," as used in a
contract of sale of a specified number of cars
daily of furnace coke during a specified peri-
od of time, subject to strikes, accidents, or
other eauses» relate to shortage of cars, and
hence a shortage of cars is a legal excuse
for nondelivery. Hatfield v. Thomas Iron
Co., 67 AtL 950, 963» 206 Pa. 478.
Defendant contracted to use natural gas
from plaintiffs' wells for a spedfled time at
spedfled prices, the contract providing that,
if by reason of fire, explosion, or other cause
defendant's factory should be closed down,
plaintiffs might during the time dispose of
gas elsewhere, and, if the nonuse extended
over a month, plaintiffs should have the right
to cancel the contract Held, that the words
"other cause," following "fire and explosion,"
should be construed to mean other cause
similar to fire or explosion under the rule of
ejusdem generis, and did not therefore enti-
tle defendant to shut down his factory for
any cause whatsoever without a liability for
breach of such contract Hickman v. Cabot,
183 Fed. 747, 749. 106 a C. A. 183.
Const Ely. 1 192, provides that a corpora-
tion shall not hold any real estate accept such
as may be necessary for carrying on its legit-
imate business, for a longer period than five
years, under pi&nalty of escheat Ky. St
1903, I 567, contains the same provisions.
Ky. St 1903, I 2971, being a part of the laws
relating to the government of cities of the
first class, provides that so much real, per-
sonal, or mixed property in the city which,
from alienage, defect of heirs, failure of kin-
dred, or other causes, shall es<*heat to the
commonwealth shall vest in the board for the
benefit of the schools, and that the board
may, in the name of the commonwealth, sue
for and recover the same. Held, that the
Legislature intended by the use of the words
"other causes'* In section 2971 to provide for
the recovery of escheats by school boards
happening upon events of a different class
than those specifically mentioned in the sec-
tion, hence the board might sue to recover
land escheated by a corporation under Const.
S 192, and Ky. St 1903, § 567. Common-
wealth, for Use of LoulsvlUe School Board,
V. Chicago, St Ii. & N. O. R. Co., 99 S. W.
596, 599, 124 Ky. 497.
While the extent of Indulgence by a
court in allowing supplemental affidavits of
defense Is larg^ In Its discretion, such in-
dulgence cannot be extended after a case has
been finally passed upon by an appellate
OTHEB
808
OTHER
court, except tor legal or equitable reasons
of which defendant conld not have ayalled
himself when his original affidavit of defense
was filed, and un^er Act March 18, 1874 (P.
L. 64), providing that Judgment should be
entered for plaintiff where the refusal of
judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of
defense has been reversed by the appellate
court, unless "other legal or equitable causes"
Shan be shown, means a defense which did
not exist when the affidavit of defense was
filed, and, where an original affidavit of de-
fense setting forth that an assignment sued
upon was void as contravening the federal
bankruptcy law was held good by the lower
court, but upon appeal was held insuffici^it,
a supplemental affidavit setting up that the
assignment was void under the state assign-
ment acts of March 24, 1818 (P. L. 285), and
AprU 17, 1843 (P. L. 273), could not be filed
after return of the record and motion by
plaintiffs for judgment Wood v. Kerke-
slager, 76 Atl. 425, 426, 227 Pa. 636; Third
Nat Bank v. Same, 76 AtL 427, 227 Pa. 542.
Otker el&ildren
In a statute providing that a wife shall
be entitled to one-half of the estate of her
deceased husband "if there was no 'other*
heirs, and an heir's part if there should be
'other' heirs, in all cases where there 1b no
will," the word "heirs" is used in the sense
of "children," and the use of the word "oth-
er" before "children" was intended to in-
clude grandchildren or descendents of any
child living at the death of the intestate.
De Graffenreid v. Iowa Land k Trust Co., d5
Pac. 624, 640, 20 Okl. 687.
Other elrcn m stanoes
The "other circumstances'* referred to in
Code av. Proc. f| 872, 882, requiring that
the affidavit to take the testimony of a wit-
ness shall show that the witness is about to
depart from the state or is sick, or that some
other special circumstances exist requiring
Ills examination in advance, means such as
will make the presence and evidence of the
witness at the trial doubtful and uncertain
as bearing on the probability of his future
attendance. W. P. Davis Mach. Go. v. Rob-
inson, 85 N. X. Supp. 574, 575, 42 Misc. Rep.
52.
Other elalst
Where plaintiff and defendant's testator
arrived at a settlement as to their controversy
and as to certain claims by plaintiff against
the testator, and the latter made provision
for plaintiff in his last will, and agreed never
to revoke or modify the will, so as to defeat
plaintiff's rights therein, and plaintiff agreed
that upon faithful execution by the testator
of the covenants to be performed by him she
would release him "from all other and fur-
ther claims, demands, and causes of action
of every kind," and that thereupon she would
take "no action at law or in equity to en-
fone any suefa other or further daiffl," the
word "other," in such a contract, pliiDtil
having but one claim against the testator.
must be taken in the sense of "additional,'
so that the meaning would be that, opoa the
transtor to i^aintiff of the portion o( the
estate devised to her by the will, sbe would
take such portion in full payment of her
daim, and make no further or additionil
claim on the same indebtedness or cause of
action. Colt v. O'Connor, 109 N. Y. Snpr-
689, 694, 69 Misc. Rep. 83.
Other eempeBaatlom
The words "other oompensation," as wA
in Hurd's Bev. St 1906, e 24, i 8a, proTidiai
that if the salary, fees, or other compen^
tion of certain city oflioers has been ooce
fixed, such fees or oompensatioa sball M
be increased or dimlnisfaed, to take effect
during the term tor liiiich any such officer
was elected or appointed, ii broad enoosb
to include allowances made for Uie paym^it
of assistants and office expenses. CltyofC3u
cage V. Wolf, 77 N. B. 414r-418, 221 IlL 15-
Other eorporatioas
Const 1901, i 235, providing that wm'^
U>al and other corporations invested with the
power of eminent domain shall make compen-
sation for property taken, "injured," or de
stroyed by the construction of their works.
highways, or improvements, includes witlib
the term "other corporations" counti^ ^
as to make a county liable for damages t.
premises due to a change In the grade of i
road, whereby the premises were left at i
considerable distance above the road on s
perpendicular embankment Dallas Comity
V. Dillard, 47 South. 135, 136^ 156 ila. 351
18 L. B. A. (N. 8.) 884.
OtKer eevntrr
The PhlUpplne Islands are not "anotbtf
country" within the meaning of artlde 8 d
the Cuban Treaty, providing that the raM
therein granted shall continue preferential ii
respect to like imports from "other coafr
tries." Faber v. United States, 31 Sup. Cl
659, 660, 221 U. S. 649, 55 L. Ed. &t
OtlaeY oovnty buUdinca
Shannon's Code, § 6045, subsec. 11 »
thorlzes the expenditure of tiie general fna^
of a county by the county Judge for bafldic^
repairing, and taking care of courtbouses^
jails, and "other county buUdlngs.*' Heli
that the words "other county buildings."*-*
so used, under the rule of ^usdem geoeii^
meant county buildings of the same Mtu^f
and kind as courthouses and jails, and <&-
not include schoolhouses and buildings ii*-|
for school purposes. State ex rel. Da*^-
County Board of Education v. Pollard, 13^^
W. 427, 429, 430, 124 Tenn. 127.
Ky. St 1908, I 3948, provides that U«
"jailer of each county ahaU be superioteiid^^
of the public square^ eourthouse^ derk's or
OTHER
OTHER
flee. Jail, stray-p^i and other public county
tnilldlngs at tbe seat of Justice.** Sectton 366
requires the jailer to furnish fuel, lights; and
water to the circuit court rooms, and allows
him $2 a day therefor, to be paid out of the
state treasury. Section 1749 provides against
the allowance of a fee bill for any ex officio
services. Held that the duty and expense of
maintaining, lighting, heating, and Janitor's
service for an armory erected at the seat of
justice by the fiscal court at the expense of the
county was not intended to be borne by the
county Jailer ; the words "other county build-
ings" referring only to buildings of the same
class as those specifically mentioned In the
section. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v.
Pflanz, 104 S. W. 1002, 1003, 127 Ky. 8.
Otlier
Const, art 7, f 1, as amended in 1881,
providing that the Judicial power of the state
should be vested in the Supreme Court, in
drcuit courts, and in such "other courts" as
the General Assembly might establish, au-
thorized the Legislature by Acts 1007, p. 7,
c. 5, to create a superior court Within a
district composed of two counties with the
same Jurlsdictiop as circuit courts were then
empowered to exercise. Board of Corners of
Elkhart County v, Albright, 81 N. B. 679, 580,
168 lud. 5&4; Mumaw v. Turner, 81 N. E.
721, 169 Ind. 701.
Other eropt
The words "other crops," in Sess. Laws
1899, p. 176, c. 17, art. 1, § 5, providing for
the Insurance of grain in bins and stacks,
"growing wheat, rye, barley, flax, oats, and
other crops" include growing cotton. State
Mut. Ins. Co. V. Clevenger, 87 Pac. 583, 17
Okl. 49.
(Hhmr cUaasM
The actual damagea from failure to un-
load a passenger's baggage at the proper sta-
tion does not oonstitote "other element of re-
coverable damages" within the rule that men-
tal suHering, without physical injury or other
element of recoverable damages, cannot be
made the subject of an independent action,
though the act complained of was willful.
Chicago, K. I. & P. R. Co. v. Moss, 116 S. W.
192, 89 Ark. 187.
Other deadly iraapon
"Where a statute, in defining a crime
committed by use of weapons, mentions cer-
tain weapons *or other deadly weapon,' it is
held that those named in the statute need
not be described as deadly weapons; but, if
another than those named in the statute is
relied upon as coming within the term 'other
deadly weapon,' It must be so averred as to
bring It within that designation." State v.
Spigener, 50 South. 977, 96 Miss. 597 (quoting
State V. Taylor, 93 Pac. 252, 50 Or. 449).
A pistol used In striking another is a
deadly weapon, within Ky. St I 1166, pro-
viding for the punishment of any one who
shall willfully and maliciously ''strike*' an-
other with a knife, sword, or "other deadly
weapon," with intent to kill. Riggs v. Com-
monwealth (Ky.) 38 S. W. 413, 414.
Otber defeets
A contract for a newly patented machine
contained several specific warranties, and
after them a general clause which provided
that, if there were any *'other defects" vrha.i-
ever, the contract should be void. Held, that
the words "other defects" referred to defects
in the patent and not in the machine itself.
Vaughan v. Porter, 16 Vt. 266, 270.
Othev defense
The term "or other defense," in Rev. St.
1899, S 4488, declaring that In actions on as-
signed accounts defendant shall be allowed
every Just set-off "or other defense" which
existed in his favor at the time of his being
notified of such assignment. Is used in a re-
strictive sense and must be a defense to the
demand itself, not a set-off or counterclaim.
Scarritt Estate Co. v. J. F. Schmelser & Sons
Arms Co., 86 S. W. 489, 490, 110 Mo. App. 406.
Otber demands
Rev. Code 1852, c. 89, } 25, fixing the
order In which executors or administrators
shall pay demands against decedent, does not
mention taxes, though the last clause pro-
vides for payment of "other demands." Held,
that though the statute does not mention tax-
es, in view of the intention to include all
legal claims against the estate, taxes will be
deemed to come under the class designated
"other demands" to be paid after Judgments.
Dayett v. WilUts, 74 Atl. 6^, 601, 9 Del. Ch.
424.
Other disability
The nondeclaratlon of the result of an
election for Governor is not a disability of
the Governor such as Is meant by Const. S
16, art. 7, providing that. In case of the death,
conviction on Impeachment, failure to quali-
fy, resignation, or "other disability" of the
Governor, the president of the Senate shall
act as Governor until the vacancy Is filled
or the disability removed. It is simply non-
action or Incomplete action by the agencies
of the law assigned to vest the title in the
candidate. It is not like Insanity. Convic-
tion of the oflScer for crime, continued ab-
sence, or other disability connected with the
person of the Governor, death, conviction on
Impeachment, failure to qualify, or resigna-
tion would produce a vacancy, and it would
seem that the language "or other disability"
means something of a different character
from those cases named — something attach-
ing to the person of the Governor and dis-
abling him ; and this construction seems con-
firmed by the after language of the section,
providing that "the president of the Senate
shall act as Governor until the vacancy is
filled or the disability is removed," thus us-
OTHBB
810
OTHEB
inf tiM word! ''▼mcanar" and "^dlaabiUtr" m
iiMmnIng dlfferant thlngg; ''▼acanejr'* nter-
ring to dMtli, oonTiottoD, faUIng to qualify,
and resignation, bnt '"dtsablUty" referring to
something relating to tbe person, and for tbe
time being disabling him, notwithstanding
the use of the word "other.^ Oarr t. Wilson,
9 S. BL 81, 30, 82 W. Va. 419, 8 L. B. A. 64.
Other dispositlma
A will gare testator's granddangbter a
life estate, proTided on her death the prop-
erty should be divided among her living chil-
dren and the heirs of any who should hare
died, authorized her on the eldest becoming
of age to alienate and dispose of the remain-
der over in favor of such child or children,
and empowered her in esse she left no chil-
dren or descendants to dispose of the prop-
erty by wilL A codicil provided in case the
granddaughter should die without children
or descendants, and making no will or "other
disposition of the property," the remainder
over should go to testator's nephew by mar-
riage. Held that, by the words "other dispo-
sition," the codicil did not recognise a right
in the granddaughter to make disposition of
the property generally, but only as provided
in the will, and so did not change her quali-
fied title to an absolute title. I4chter v.
Thiers, 121 N. W. 153, 139 Wis. 481.
Other domestio pwposes
The right to cut timber from public
mineral lands, subject to mineral entry only,
for building, agricultural, mining, or other
domestic purposes, given to any bona fide
resident of certain states and territories by
Act June 3, 1878, a 160, 20 Stat 88, extends
to all such lands in the state or territory,
without limitation to any local subdivision.
Under such statute, a resident of Montana,
where he observes the regulations made by
the Secretary of the Interior for the pro-
tection of undergrowth, etc., may lawfully
cut timber for firewood from public mineral
lands within the state, and ship the same to
any part of the state for sale and use there
in households, hoisting works in mines, smel-
ters, or other local purposes, all of which are
domestic purposes within the meaning of the
statute. United States v. Edgar, 140 Fed.
665, 659.
OtkMr duties
Tbe general words "other duties," in
Const art 13, I 11, requiring that the board
of equalization shall perform such other du-
ties as may be required by law, must be
restricted to mean other duties of general
character, with duties indicated in the previ-
ous provision to be performed by the board.
State V. Eldredge^ 76 Pac 337, 340, 27 Utah,
477.
The use of the word "other," in Snyder's
Const p. 203, art 6, f 31, i^ovlding that the
board of agriculture diaU be the board of
regents and shall discharge such "other" du-
ties as may be provided by law, dorlr tt
dieates that the framers of the Cotutitstkn
had in mind that certain duties would f<H^
low tiie creation of the board. ThtpP^Oook
Const Co., 106 Pac 667, 669, 24 OU. 8Nl
Otker «weUeM
Liquor Tax Law, Laws 190S, pi 1132, c
486, i 31, subd. "k," defines a hotd u t boibt
ing regularly kept open for the accommodi
tion of all able to pay for tiieir enteitiiiK
ment and who, without any stipoUted b-
gagement as to the duration of their stay, ir
as to compensation, are supplied with Deals.
lodging, and attention, and in which tbe only
"other dwellers" are the UmSlj and sm
ants of the hotel keeper. Held tfait, wbe»
a building contained rooms of the litt mi
nmnber required by the statute which vm
kept open and free tor the aooommoditki
of transient "guests'* who mi^t apply, per
sons who occupied some of su<di roons m
tinnously at a stipulated weekly or mcotbiy
rental should be regarded as "guests*' aodiKK
"other dwdlers** within sudi statate; Oe
wor^B "other dweUers" being limited to per
sons other than "guests" of any chancter, t?
wit, those who are in the hotel under a stipo
lated engagement or without anyengagenect
CulUnan v. Clark, 93 N. Y. Sopp. 256. 2^
46 Misc. Rep. 18a
Otker employte
Under subdivision 7. I 1617, PoL Code
authorizing boards of education and tni5-
tees of school districts to employ teadter^
"also to employ janitors and other employ^
of the schools, and to fix and order paid
their compensation," the words "Janltora ud
other employes of the schools" refer to pei
sons employed in and about the schools and
buildings, in the actual carrying oat and
maintenance of Uie sdiooto themstiTeB, aod
cannot by any reasonable oonstmctioD k
held to include a person rendering legal serr-
ices to the board of education or board of
trustees. Denman v. Webster, 7B Pac. 13%
188 CaL 452.
•
Otber employmeat
By "other employment," as used in tbe
rule making it the duty of a serrant ^
charged in violation of a contract of hii^
to seek "other employment," is meant eit
ployment of a character such as that ic
wliich he was onployed, or not of a dor
menial kind. Cooper v. Stronge & Waoer
Co., 126 N. W. 641, 111 Minn. 177, 27 L R A
(N. 8.) 1011, 20 Ann. Ca& 66S.
Otlaer entertainment
Greater New York Charter. Laws ISS*
p. 622, c 378, i 1481, after prohibiting cer
tain specified amusements on Sunday, P^
hibited "any other entertainment of ttf
stage." Held, that the word "other" as *'
used was unrestrictedly comprehoisive and
embraced every other sort or kind of eot?
tainment whetlier ejuadem generis with tte
OTHEB
811
OTHEB
dass enmuerated . or not. In re Hammer-
slelii, 106 N. Y. Supp. 197, 196, 57 MIm. Bep.
S2.
Other •qaivaleM
The law does not require the "other
equiralent drcnmstances" referred to in
P^. Code 1896, I 66, making it a necessary
element of volnntary manslaughter that there
be an assault upon the person killing, or an
attempt t6 commit a serious personal injury,
or other equivalent circumstances to Justify
the ezdtement of passion and to exclude all
idea of deliberation or malice, to be in the
nature of an assault, or an attempt to com-
mit a serious personal injury; but the cir-
cumstances referred to must be such as would
as much exclude all doubt of deliberation or
noaliee and Justify the excitement of passion
as would an assault, or attempt to commit a
serious personal injury. Battle t. State, 66
8. B. 862, 884, 188 Ga. 162.
VThere there was evidence that the de-
ceased had been guilty of frequent sexual
intercourse with the wife of the accused, and
knowledge of that fiact had been brought
home to the accused before the killing, and
after such knowledge the accused came upon
the deceased, and, in a conversation with
him in reference to the illicit relaticms, th^
passions of the accused were aroused, it was
a question for the Jury to determine whether
the sight of the deceased and the conversa-
tion which then ensued constituted "other
equivalent circumstances to Justify the ex-
citement of passion, and to exclude all idea
of deliberation or malice, either express or
implied"; and a charge to the effect that if
the Jury believed that the dreumstances at
that time were sudb as to arouse in ttie mind
of accused that passion supposed to be irre-
sistible, and he shot and kiUed under those
drcnmstances, it would not be murder, but
voluntary manslaughter, is substantially a
correct statement of the law. The law does
not require the ^other equivalent drcum*
stances," referred to in section 66, Pen. Oode
1910, to be in the nature of an assault, or an
attempt to commit a serious personal injury,
by the deceased; but the circumstances there-
in referred to must be, in the opinion of the
jury, the equivalent of an assault, or of an
attempt to commit a serious personal injury
on the slayer, in Justifying the exdt^nent of
passion and excluding all idea of delll)eration
or malice. Land v. State, 76 S. B. 78, 11 Ga.
App. 761 (citing Battie v. State, 66 S. B. 382,
188 Ga. 186).
Other estate
A Judgment creditor expressly released
his lien on certain described real estate of his
debtor that it mii^t be conveyed to a mort-
gagee, the debtor having a right to reconvey-
ance on payment of the mortgage debt at any
time before the property should be sold by
the mortgagee. The release^ however, pro-
vided that it should not affect the creditors'
Uen on the other estate of the debtor. Held,
that on a sale of the property free from Uena
by the mortgagee and the debtor's trustee in
l>ankruptcy, realizing a sum more than suffi-
cient to pay the mortgage debt, such surplus
did not constitute "other e^tate^ within the
meaning of the release, and that the Judg-
ment creditor had no claim thereto. In re
OuUen, 176 Fed. 468, 4M.
Other evideaoe
A disclosure or statement by the com-
plainant, which depends wholly upon her
veracity, is not ''other evidence^' in support
of her version of the affair, within the^ mean-
ing of Pen. Code, I 288, providing that no
conviction can be had for abduction, compul-
sory marriage, rape, or defilement, upon the
testimony of the female abducted, compel-
led, or defiled, unsupported by "other evi-
dence." People V. Green, 92 N. Y. Silpp. 608,
611, 108 App. Div. 79 (citing People v. Page,
66 N. B. 760, 162 N. Y. 272).
Books of account, which lieing shown to
conform tp the requirements of Ck)mp. Laws
1897, i 8031, are admissible in evidence,
when so admitted in a suit against an ad-
ministrator, may constitute "other material
evidence," corroborating the claimant as re-
quired by section 8021. Radcliffe v. Chaves,
no Pac. 699, 701, 16 N. M. 268.
Oilier evidenee of ladebtedaess
See, also, Bvidence of Indebtedness.
The warehouse receipts authorized to be
issued under the State Warehouse Act (Laws
1912, p. 707) are not "scrip, certificates or
other evidence of state indebtedness" within
the meaning of Const, art 10, f 7, restrict-
ing the issuance of such paper. State ex rel.
LyoD V. McCown, 76 8. B. 892, 396, 92 S. O.
81.
Wilson's Rev. ft Ann. St 1908, S 2408,
provides that it shall be unlawful for any
public officer either directly or indirectly to
buy, barter for, or otherwise engage in any
manner in the purchase of any bonds, war-
rants, or any other evidence of indebtedness
against the territory, any subdivision thereof,
or municipality therein, of which he is an
officer. Held, that the words "other evidence
of indebtedness," under the rule ejusdem
generis, applies only to bonds, warrants, and
other evidence of indebtedness of that char-
acter, and did not prevent a county com-
missioner from advancing, on the credit of
the county, mon^ with which to employ a
chain bearer in the survey of a road. Ticer
V. State ex rel. Holt, 128 Pac. 493, 496^ 35
OkL 1.
Public Service Commissions Law (Laws
1907, c. 429) S 66, provides that any raUroad
corporation may issue stock, bonds, notes, or
other evidence of indebtedness, payable at
periods of more than 12 months after date,
when necessary for certain enumerated pur-
poses, provided it shall secure from the Pub*
OTHEB
812
OTHEB
he SerHee Commlsslan an order autborlzlng
8udi Issue. The vice presidents of several
railroad companies calling themselTes In
combination the "New York Central lines,**
parties of tbe first part, altered Into an
agreement with a trust company, designated
as trustee, and the six railroad companies
designated as parties of the third part, by
which the parties of the first part sold cer-
tain rolling stock to the trust company, and
the trust company rented the same to the
several railroad companies; such companies
issuing certificates to tbe trust company to
the amount of the purchase price of the
equipment, payable In installments, and
denominated as rent The trust company
was not to be liable on the certificates in any
event Held that, while the words "other
evidence of indebtedness" as used in the
statute refer to obligations of like character
with stock, bonds, and notes, tbe trust cer-
tificates were substantially obligations of
that character, and hence the issuance of
the same must be sanctioned by the Public
Service Commission. People v. New York
Cent & H. R, R. Co., 123 N. Y. Supp. 125,
127, 138 App. Div. 601.
Otker ezhiUttion
Where, under Sayles' Ann. Civ. St 189T,
art 5049, subd. 23, Imposing a license tax on
"circuses and other exhibitions," a Wild
West show is not a circus, it cannot be held
as "another exhibition," as, In construing
laws Imposing burdens of taxation, nothing
should be left to Inference. State t. Cody
(Tex.) 120 8. W. 267, 269.
Otker eai^eases
Charter of the City of St Louts, art 5, f
14, provides that no money shall be expend-
ed except by ordinance, the provisions of
which shall be specific and definite. An ap-
propriation ordinance provided for "publish-
ing proceedings, printing, stationery, ofllce
expenses, furniture, rent of telephone and
other expenses of house of delegates.'* Held,
that the term "other expenses" means ex-
penses of tbe character theretofore mention-
ed in that clause of the appropriation act,
and does not include an appropriation for
expenses Incurred by a committee appointed
by a resolution of the house of delegates to
investigate tax returns. State ex reL Gavi-
gan V. Dierkes, 113 S. W. 1077, 1081, 214 Mo.
578; State ex rel. Barrett v. Same^ 113 S.
W. 1081, 214 Mo. 592.
Ky. St 1909, f 4464, provides for an elec:
tion upon the question of levying a tax to
maintain a graded common school and for
Erecting or repairing suitable buildings
therefor, if necessary. Section 4481 (section
5758) makes It the duty of the district trus-
tees to provide funds for purchasing suitable
buildings, or for erecting or repairing them,
and for other expenses needful in conducting
a good graded common school, and permits
them to me audi part of the proceedi of Oe
tax as they may deem necessary. Held, tUt
the phrase "and tor other eTpensew needlul
in conducting a good graded common sehrjcr
implies the power to rent a suitable boildiiiK
temporarily and until one can be secared or
built by the trustees, and a petition JEor tbe
election, reciting that t^e proposed tax vy
to be used for the purpose of maint&ini&g i
graded common school and for tbe erecting
purchasing, leasing, and repairing of soitalk
buUdlnga therefor if necessary, was no ntuie
than the two sections of the statute xathvi-
ized, meaning that the trustees were to t^
a building if they could, and, if not, to bnj i
lot and built a house, to repair any boildiLi
bought or built by them, and in tbe utm-
time, to lease a suitable building for tbe con-
tinuation of the school, and did not md«:
the petition insufilclent Jeffries v. Board o'
Trustees of Columbia Graded Common School.
122 S. W. 813, 817, 135 Ky. 48a
Oilier •zplodTa
Blasting powder, although it may ^ >
less dangerous explosive than dynamite or
gunpowder, is none the less buinded Id tlie
words, "or other explosives," as uaed in «
condition avoiding a policy of fire insunmee
if there be kept, used, or allowed on tbe
premises, benzine^ benzole, dynamite, ether,
fireworks, gasoline, Greek fire, gunpowder.
naphtha* nitroglycerin, or other explodrei
Penman v. St Paul Fire & Marin^ Ins. Co.
30 Sup. Ct 312, 313, 216 U. S. 311, 54 L EiL
4d3.
A proTlsion of a fire insurance polkT.
making it void if, without permlssioo i£^
dorsed thereon, there should be kept or &>
lowed on the insured premises "benzine, i-^-
loie, dynamite, ether, fireworks, gasoline.
Greek fire, gunpowder exceeding tweo?
five pounds in quantity, nai^tba, nitrugiK
erin or other explosives, phosE^ms or i^
troleom or any of its products of greater b
flammabUity than kerosene oil of tbe loitf^
States itandaidt" must be OQUBtmed to is-
elude blasting powder by the words "c.her
explosives," in the absmoe of evidence sbcv
Ing that it is of less explosive force thau aay
one of the substances 'enumerated, and ther^
fore not in the same class. St Paul Fiiei
Marine Ins. Co. v. Penman, 151 Fed. 961
963, 81 C. C. A. 151.
Otl&er gaublins deviee, bank, table, tf
itiaoliine
It was held in Commonwealth t. K^^^
merer (Ky.) 13 S. W. 108, under a statnf
providing that ♦'whoever • ♦ ♦ sliall *:
up, carry on or conduct • • • a i^eih'
bank, faro bank, or other machine or cc*
trivanoe used in betting," etc, **8haU be ^
ed," etc, that "oontz," which is played vii*
dice on a table or other surface, was c"^
within the meaning ^t "other machine or
contrivance." White ▼» States T6 N. E. ^
555, 37 Ind. App. 95.
OTHER
813
OTHER
Oilier ffood and Taliutble oonsideratlon
Where an instrument of advice had a
D si deration at $1 and other good and valu-
lie consideration, the term "other good
id valuable consideration" means nothing,
td would be given no weight in the absence
evidence explaining the nature and char-
ter of that consideration. Where K. takes
deed from M. to all his interest in a min-
g claim, which is aU the property of M.
this state, fior a consideration ^of $1, and
ther good and valuable consideration,"
tilch latt^ ^Dsideration is not explained,
id at the time of such transfer K. has
»tice that bis grantor is heavily indebted in
is state, and has avoided personal service
process, and haa allowed a judgment in
m entered against him for over $50,000,
id has been trying to buy up such claims
one-fifth their face, value, and that he is
)t meeting his obligatioas in due course of
isiuess, and that he has no other property
the state out of which such indebtedness
n be made, and during the meanwhile K,
id occupied a close confidential relation
Ith M^ under such circumstances, held,
lat K. cannot restrain an execution sale of
ich property to pay creditors on the theory
tat he is an innocent purchaser for a valu-
)le consideration. California Consol. Min.
0. V. Manley, 8X Pac. 50-52, 10 Idaho, 786.
Otlier ffood autterial
Vitrified brick is "other good material,"
ithln Acts 1904, p. 225, c. 225, I 4, providing
lat the specifications of material to be used
I the consrtruction of public roads shall re-
Jire the construction "of a macadamized or
t a telford or of other stone, or of a road
)Dstructed of gravel or of other good ma-
;rial." Anne Arundel County Com'rs ▼.
nited Ry. * Electric Co., 72 Atl. 542, 547,
)9 Md. 377.
Other soods of same owner
Laws 1902, p. 1776, c. 608, | 2, gives a
arehousemau a lien on goods stored for
:orage charges, etc., on such goods or "oth-
r goods belonging to the same owner."
ield^ that the words "other goods belonging
) the same owner" should be restricted to
ctual, as distinguished frpm apparent, own-
rshlp due to possesion, so that where sell-
ig agents, in possessiofi. of goods belonging
> plaintiffs, stored the goods with other
oods belonging to such agents, the ware-
ouseman was not entitled to a lien on plain-
ils' goods for the storage charges on' the
oods belonging . to the agents. . Schwab v.
►atman, 106 N. Y. Suihpl 741, 747, 56 Misc.
^ep. 393.
Other ffOTemlng autliorlty
The words "or other governing authorl-
F," used in Const, art 290, in designating
he authority whose consent would have to
e obtained by riparian owners desiring to
olid wharves on their front, refer not nec-
essarily to town councils which, in certain
communities, are designated by other names,
but to whatever body or functionary is vest-
ed by the Legislature with authority over' the
river front at the time the consent is solitit-
ed. State ex rel. IlUnois Cent R. Co. vi
Board of Levee Com'rs of Orleans Levee
Dist, 38 South. 385, 396, 109 La. 403.
Otber grievanees
A lease limiting the liability of the ten-
ant respecting orders of a city department
to those issued for the correction, preven-
tion, and abatement of "nuisances" or "other
grievances" does not render the tenant lia-
ble for the cost of a I9re escape, as the words '
are to be taken in their natural and usual
sense. The absence of a fire escape is not a
'^nuisance," as that word is commonly, used,
and. the more generic words "other griev-
ances" do not extend the plaintifhi liability
so fiar as to ^render him liable for the cost
of the fire escape. ^Kalman v. Cox, 92 N. T.
Supp. 816, 46 Misc. R^. 589.
dtlier indebtedness
Xbe Legislature, in 1900, after having
made specific appropriation for payment of
lijterest for the ensuing two years on certain
designated debts of the state, appropriated a
specific sum for each of the years 1900 and
1901 for the payment of interest on "other
state indebtedness." H^ld, that such "other
staite indebtedness" included state bonds is-
sued as provided by Acts 1896, p. 27, c 34,
and disclosed a legislative intention that
such bonds should remain outstanding and
interest-bearing for the whole of the year
1901. Colbert v. State, 39 South. 65, 66, 86
Miss. 769.
A provision of the articles of incorpora-
tion that a building and loan association
shall have a lien upon the shares of each
shareholder for any sum due it for subscrip-
tion, money loaned, or any "other indebted-
ness due from the shareholder" did not give
a lien for the amount of defalcation upon
stock held by a defaulting officer; the
phrase quoted having reference only to in-
debtedness as a shareholder. Jewell v. Nuhn
(Iowa) 138 N. W. 457, 458.
Other industry
A cotton gin is embraced within the term
"other Industry," as used in Const, art 9, f 33,
which provides that any person owning or
operating a coal, lead, iron, or zinc mine, or
any sawmill, grain ^levator, or. other indus-
try, when the Corporation, Commission shall
reasonably determine that the amount of
business is sufficient to' justify it, near or
within a^ reasOnal;>le distance of any railroad,
may, at the expense of ^uch person, build
and ke€;p in repair a switch leading from the
railroad to such mine, etc., or other industry,
the railroad being required to furnish the
switch' stand and frog and .other necessary
materials for making connections with the
OTHEB
814
OTHEB
Bide trai^. 8t Louis & S. F. R. Co. t. Zalon-
dek, 116 Pac 867, 8G9» 28 Okl. 746.
Other ImtosUailBC U^tton
The pbraee "other intoxlcetliig Uqnon/'
in Lews 1906, p. 86, c 21, u^ing the words,
spiritaoos, linoiiB, malt or **other Intozicatr
log Uquors" in reference to local option.elec-
tlons, does not add anything to the legal
effect of the statute, and the act Is equlTa-
lent to Oonst. I 61, and Ky. 8t 1003, I 2554,
relating to local option elections, and using
the words, spirituous, yinous, or malt liquors.
O'Neal y. Minary, 101 8. W. 861. 954, 125
Ky. 671.
Otkev JvdIeUl
Oonst art 6, enumemtes yailous Judicial
officers, including judges of the Court of Ap-
peals, justices of the Supreme Court, county
Judges, surrogates, and justices of the peace,
and authoriBes the election of district ooort
justices and the establishment of infMor
local courts, and section' 11 authorises the
removal of judges of the Court of Appeals
and Supreme Court justices by concurrent
resolution of both legislative houses, and pro-
vides that "all other judicial officers except
justices of the peace and judges or justices
of inferior courts not of record may be re-
moved by the Senate," on the Governor's
recommendation, for cause and after hear-
ing. Held, that the Court of Claims was not
included within the words "all other judicial
officers**; they referring to judicial officers
expressly named in the Constitution or those
which it authorized the Legislature to create,
so that the judges of that court could be re-
moved summarily without hearing by the
abolition of their offices^ People ex rel.
Swift V. Luce, 133 N. T. Supp. 9, 15, 74 Idsc
Rep. 551.
OtKer lands
The phrase "owner of other lands," used
in Rev. av. St 1897, art 4218fff, permitting
owners of other lands contiguous to school
lands, or within a radius of five miles there-
of, to buy such school lands, which article
is a part of the act of 1897 which permitted
a settler to buy four sections of school land
in all, provided not more than two were
classed as agricultural lands, does not in-
clude the owner of a lot or lots in town, but
applies only to persons engaged in agricultur-
al or stock raising pursuits. Conn v. Terrell,
80 S. W. 608, 609, 97 Tex. 578.
A testator executed his will in 1885,
which was probated in 1896. The substance
of so much of the instrument as is here
material was: Separate parcels of described
realty were devised, respectively, to the three
daughters of the testator, Lavinla, Josephine,
and Emma, and to his son George, in items
1, 3, 6, and 8. EacA of such devises was for
and during the life of the devisee, with re-
mainder to the (fhild or children of the re-
spective devisee living at the time of the
death of the devisee. In item 6 certain otber
described realty was devised to Josrpbioe.
and to Emma, 'In trust for Lodndi Y.
• • • said Joephine • • • to hit?
and to hold the property in this Item be-
queathed to her for and during ber mtinl
life, and at her death to her ebOdrai Uric*
at the time of* her death. And the saij
Emma * ^ ^ to have and to hold the
property in this item bequeathed to ber »
trustee for my daughter, said Lodsda v.
• • • in trust for the use, benefit ird
behoof of the said Ludnda V., • • * (>?
and during her natural life, and atherdeitt
to her children living at the time of her
death.** In item 7 certain other described
realty was devised to Emma, in trust *to aid
for my daughter said Ludnda Y., * * '
for and during her natural life, then V> rt?.
in and become the property of the diUdrsi of
the said Ludnda V. • • • Uvtag it te
death.** Item 10 was as follows: "I m
devise and bequeath to my said dtii^»
Lavinla, • ♦ ♦ Josephine, • • • Es^
ma, • • • in trust for Ludndt Y.
• • • Emma, • • • and to my sa
George, • • • all my other lands k: j
hereinbefore disposed of, of whldi I may &
seised and possessed, for and during tbei:
natural lives, and at their deaths to their rr
spective children living at the time of tiieJ
death, to be divided among my said cbildrezu
share and share alike. Item 13 was tf <o^
lows: "Having fully provided for mj ^
ceased daughter Boxy Ann, • • * i3
her lifetime, and having advanced to ber is
lands and money a portion equal to the ^"^
given to each of my said children in this wu
I make no provision or bequest to her di
dren.** The testator died seised and p(^
sessed in fee of other lands than those ss^
dflcally devised in items 1« S, 5. e, 7. aod ^
of the will, which others were subject to ^
provisions of item 10, and which, after tbe
death of the testator, were partitioned t
kind among the diildren of the testtt^'
named in item 10 of the wilL Lndadi ^
subsequently died unmarried and witbt^
children. Held, item 10, in which was if-
vised only aU "other lands" of whlcfa ^
testator might die seised and possessed "i^
hereinbefore disposed of,*' did not purport t
dispose of, nor dispose ot any of the Iis^
previouflty devised to Ludnda V. in itecs^
and 7, nor any reversionary interest thereti
Lane v. Patterson, 76 S. B. 47, 13S Ga. na
Otker lUUUtlMi
Act AprU 28, 1876 (P. L. 63), providitf
that members of beneficial assodatioos sbiS
not be individually liable for the paymeot ci
periodical or funeral benefits or other UabJ^-
ities of the association, and the sums M ^
payable out of the treasury, by the *oi*
-other Uabilitiear meaUs all liabilities vj^
erly chargeable to the treasury of the society
and contemplates obligaaons in additloo tii
OTHEB
815
OTHBB
funeral ezpenaes or death benefits. Wolfe t.
Limestone GouncU No. 373, Order of Inde-
pendent Americans, 82 AtL 499, 601, 233 Pa.
357.
Oili^ UwfiU expMuws
OUigoni In a bond given by them to a
third person at the request, for the benefit
of, and on the agreement of defendant and
others to be responsible for th^ share, exe-
cuted a declaration of trust reciting that the
obligors held land in trust for defendant and
the other beneficiaries, and that on demand
each of the beneficiaries would pay his pro-
portion of any interest charged, taxes, assess-
noents, or "other lawful expense of said
trust" HUd, that the quoted words tn the
declaration of trust included any sum paid
by the obligors cm the bond, if iwid in good
faith, pursuant to a reasonable settlement of
their liability thereon. Cunniff v. McDonell,
81 N. B. 879, 880, 196 Biass. 7.
OtIi«r Un
The holder of an invalid tax deed in
possession of the real estate brought an ac-
tion to quiet his title. The tax deed was
beld void as a muniment of title, but the lien
of the taxes was preserved, and the land was
ordered sold and was sold, to satisfy it
Held, the redemption act (chapter 109, p.
188» Laws 1898), which provides that the act
Shan apply to all sales under foreclosure of
mortgage, mechanics' lien, or *V)ther lien,"
whether special or general, has no applica-
tion to such a sale, and neither the defendant
owner nor the holder of a mortgage lien has
any right to redeem therefrom. The "other
liens," general or special, to which the act
makes reference, are those arising firom obli-
gations created in or connected with deal-
ings between private parties. Davidson v.
Plummer, 92 Pac. 706, 706, 76 Kan. 462.
The operation of Const art 6, | 15, de-
daring that the annual assessment for taxes
made on landed property shall be a special
lien thereon, and that the land shall be sub-
ject to sale for the payment of taxes and pen-
alties, whereby landed property, whether
homestead or not, is subject to a sale for tax-
es and for penalties accruing on account of a
delinquency, is not limited by article 16, { 50,
protecting the homestead against forced sale,
and providing that no mortgage, deed of
trust, or other lien on the homestead shall be
valid; the words "other lien'' including only
such Uens as are created by contract by hus-
band and wife. City of San Antonio v. Toep-
perwein, 133 S. W. 416, 417, 104 Tex. 43.
Pub. Bt 1901, c. 246, I 28, provides that
If a trustee is adjudged chargeable for any
personal property subject to mortgage,
pledge, or other lien, the court may appoint
a receiver and dispose of it» if more can be
obtained for it than the claims upon It Sec-
tion 29 provides that if a trustee is adjudged
chargeable for any promissory note^ or other
security for payment of money, or any chose
in action upon which execution caimot be
levied, the court may appoint a receiver to
collect ft Sectiofh 80 provides that the trus-
tee may be adjudged trustee for the value of
any n6te, diose In action, etc., which he re-
fuses to deliver to the receiver, pursuant' to
the court's order. Section 81 requires a trus-
tee adjudged chargeable to retain the sum or
article other than that for which a receiver
is appointed, for which he is so charged, until
demanded of him upon execution issued, or
the suit is otherwise terminated, and, by
section 32, the proceeds of property in the
hands of a receiver, for which the trustee
was charged, shall be applied under the
court's direction after paying costs, charges,
and prior liens, in satisfaction of the Judg-
m^it, and any surplus shall be paid to de-
fendant The trustee held a check payable
to himself and defendant, who transferred
his interest therein to claimant, after service
of the writ with claimant's knowledge. Held,
that the check held by the trustee was a
chose in action, and his possession thereof is
aptly described by the term *'otber Uen,'* used
in the statute, even though defendant did not
indorse the check to him for collection, so
that the trustee was chargeable therefor, and
a receiver was properly appointed to collect
it Musgrove v. Goss, 72 Atl. 371, 373, 75 N.
H. 208 (citing Mitdiell v. Qreen, 62 N. H.
588, 590).
Other maohinery
A policy describing the insured property
as a frame building "while occupied as a
flour and roller mill," and the fixed and mov-
able machinery, pipes, belting, pulleys, shaft-
ing, roller mills, and appurtenances, smut
mill and appurtenances, purifiers, blowers,
dusters, tools, etc., *'and such other machin-
ery not more hazardous as is usual to roller
mills" will be held to include machinery used
in the manufacture of meal, bran, and other
feed products, where not to do so would ren-
der the policy void from its execution. Cap-
ital Fire Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 109 Pac 536, 537,
26 Okl. 286.
By "other machinery," in a statute using
the term "mill and other machinery," ma-
chinery that is appurtenant to the mill prop-
er is meant Southwest Missouri Light Co.
V. Scheurich, 73 S. W. 496, 498, 174 Mo. 235.
Other matter or tMaa
The general words '^r other matter or
thing," in Rev. St I 1782, prohibiting a Unit-
ed States senator from receiving compensa-
tion for rendering services to any person in
relation to any proceeding, contract etc., or
other matter or thing in which the United
States is a partyK were intended to cover
kindred subje<?ts, like preliminary examina-
tions and inquiries necessary to enable the
government, acting through one of its depart-
ments, to determine whether a. proceeding
should be instituted, a charge or accusation
OTHEB
816
OTHEB
made or an arreat ordered* or whether a con-
tract or claf m should be knade. United States
T. Burton, 181 Fed. te2, 556.
An order appointing an attorn^ to act
for the coantj attomty In a cane petove the
grand jury wherein the county attornco^ was
under diaablUty by reason of interest, and
also to act as county attorney in "another
matter/' and fixing the compensatlont was
invalid, as it would be assumed that the pay-
ment included services In "another matter**
which was beyond the court*s jurisdiction.
SUte y. Miller, ;LOe N. W. 10S7, 1089. 132
Iowa, 587.
Otber meaaa
The i>hrase ''by mechanical or other
means/' as used in the statute making: it a
misdemeanor for any person, not Mcensed, to
record or register, by mechanical or other
means, bets or wagers on trials of speed, etc.,
embraces something outside the mechanical
class, and covers the registration of such beta
by means of the initials or private marks of
the parties written on cards. State v. Vil*
lines, 81 S. W. 212, 218, 107 Mo. App. 5»3.
The words "other means," as used In
Gen. St. Kan. 1901, f 1249, cL 23, enumerat-
ing some of the purposes for which corpo-
rations may be formed, among which being
the manufacture and supply .of gas or the
suj^ly of light, or heat to the public by fny
other means, are broad enough to Include
natural gas, although when the act was pass-
ed the use of natural ga^ may not haVe been
within the contemplation of the Legislature.
Compton V. People's Gas Co., 89 Pac. 1039,
1040, 75 Kan. 57?, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 787.
In Ck)mp. Laws, | 504, relating to allow-
ance of alimony pendente lite, and providing
.that such orders may be enforced and made
effectual by attachment, commitment, and by
requiring security for obedience thereto, or
by "other means according to the .usages of
courts," the words "other means according
to the usages of courts" would not support
the authority of the court to order an exe-
cution to issue; enforcement of Interlocu-
tory orders for payment of money by exe-
cution does not appear to be' according to
the usages of courts and can be resorted to
only where the statutes speclflcally so pro-
vide, and the only provision for execution in
our dvll procedure is after final judgment
Kapp V. Seventh Judicial Diat. Oooit, 107
Pac. 95, 96, 32 Nev. 264, Ann. Oas. 1912D, 177.
Otber meokanlcal oontriTancea
See Vehicles and Other Mechanical Ck)n-
trlvances.
Oilier aterekaadiae
Paragraph 8 of section 2 of the general
tax act of 1902 (Acts 1902, p. 21), imposhig a
special tax upon traveling venders "of patent
or proprietary medicines, special nostrums,
jewelry, paper, soap, or other mekchandise,"
does not embrace Tmders of merdusd&«
not ejusdem generis with the artides fs:prv>^
ly enumerated. Standard OD Co. r. Swa:
son, 49 8. a 262, 263, 121 Ga. 412.
Otker mlMMl
The words *ottier miners]^ or 'other
valuable minerala" taken In tbe broideA
aenae would Indnde petroieam oil; tnt S
the parttes did not Intend timi tbe tltk to
petroleum and gas sbonld pan, Am title r&
mains in the owner of tbe fee. A dcedpsr
porting to convey aU mlnetals uoderlriBs '^
scribed land does not eoamf tbe utut.
gaa tlierevnder, where tbe paxtiei do ooteii-
template a conveyance tbereot McKhoers
Heirs T. Central Keatncky Natand Gu C«,
120 S. W. 314, 316, 134 Ky. 239. 30 An
Gaa. 964 (<|aotlng and adopthig d^liiitiai t
Donahue, Petroleum ft Gaa, p. 220).
Oilier mlaeral sHlMtaaices
Pure Food and Drug Act June 30. M
c. 3915, 34 Stat 768, is entiUed "An act^t
preventing the manufacture, sale or m>
portation of adulterated or misbriDdel *i
poisonous or deleterloaa foods, dmgs, wi
cinea and Uqnora," and section 7 pror;<)R
that an artkde ahall be deemed adolten:^.
In the case of confectionery, if it cooiii:*
terra alba, barytes, talc, chrome jellow. '.
other mineral subatancea or p(risoooiL< ec -
or flavor, or othw ingredient deteterioos *
detrlmeotal to health. Held that slixs ^
purpose e# the act waa to protect tiie ]c
chaser of food pvoducta from having infer;?
and dlfferait articles passed, off on Me::
plaee of those he desired, and to iffoten '^^
from In^ry by prohibiting the additi'>Q '
foods of snhAtances poisonous or deleten.^
to health, the words "other mineral c</
stancea," nndes the doctrine of ^xisdm k
erl8» Included other mineral substaoces ^^■'
are deleteriflua . or detrimental to bMltb •
the same nature as those spedfioall^ i^
scribed pr^edlng such words, and hence i-
not include a thin coating of pure silver ^^•
ering candy, used principally by conferti
ers for decorative purposes, and not deleft-
ous or detrimental to health. French Si:'^
Dragee Co. v. United States, 179 Fed. S:l
827, 103 C. C. A. 316.
Oilier meaejed aapital
See Moneyed CapltaL
Otk«r anaiaiyalitlea
The phrase, "other municipalities," ^
talned in the title and body of P. L. 19^^'
13, relative to official oaths of oificcn elef-;
or appointed in towns, townships, and ''^'^■
municipalities'* of the stabe, is sufficiently*
scrlptlve ef cities to Include them. Lod^'-
V. Dallaa, 81 Aa 489» 490, 82 N. J. Uv. ^
The enactment of laws providing f^'f/-
creotlon of municipal and public corportti^^
is within the inherent legislative pov^^* ^-^
Laws 1911, c. 92, authoriring the estab^
ment of port districts, and providing ^^ ^*
OTHER
817
OTHER
development of a system of harbor improve-
ments and terminal facilities, and tbe method
of payment therefor, with defined p^>wers to
be exercised l^y a board of commissioners,
is constltntional, there being no constitutional
provision in terms prohibiting the creation of
other municipal corporations than counties,
cities, towns, and school districts, specifically
recognised as municipal corporations ; Const,
art. 11, 1 4, which requires the Legislature to
establish a system of XH>unty government, and
Const, art U, | 10, which declares that mu-
nicipal corpcrationB shall not be created by
special laws, being only declarations of man-
datory duty placed upon the Legislature's in-
herent powers, and the words *'other munioi-
pel corporations," as used in Const art 8,
f 6, limiting the rate of indebtedness of
counties, cities, towns, and school districts,
and other municipal corporations, hairing ref-
erence to others than those specifically nam-
ed. Paine v. Port of Seattle, 126 Pac. 628,
630, 631, 70 Wash. 2M.
Other necessaries
Under Rev. St 1900, I 4065, requiring
tbe necessary expense incurred by the pro-
bate court for books, furniture, and other
necessaries, to be paid b^ tbe county, a pro-
bate judge was entitled to recover from tbe
county the expense of a janitor, in his office,
and for telephone service r the latter coming
within the term "other necessaries." Motley
V. Pike County, 135 fi. W. 39,. 40, 233 Mo. 42.
Other neeessart^ eKpeasea
Acts 1875, p. 68, c. 24, provides that the
trustees of the several townships, towns; and
cities shall have the power to levy a special
tax in their respective townships, towns, and
cities for the construction, renting, or repair-
ing of schoolhouses, for providing furniture,
school apparatus, and fuel therefor, and f6r
the payment of other necessary expenses of
the school, etc. Held, that t,he clause for the
payment of "other necessary expenses" of the
school did not authorize the levying of a tax
to provide free transportatlen for the pupils
of a consolidated school district tg and from
the school. State v. Jadcson, 81 N.'.£.,62, 64,
168 Ind. 384 (citing Honey Greek School Tp.
v. Barnes, 21 N. B. 747, 119 Ind. 213; First
Nat Bank of Marion v. Adams School Tp.,
46 K. E. 832, 17 Ind. App. 375; School City
of Rushville v. Hays, 70 1^. B. 134, 162 Ind.
103).
Other notes olrculatiiMC ai money
As used in Kirhy*s Dig. $ 1814, making it
a felony for a cashier of an insolvent bank to
receive on deposit bank blUs'or mtee, United
States Treasury notes, or "other notes, bllls>
or drafts, circulating as money or curren-
cy," the quoted phrase refers to notes, bills,
or drafts^ other than United States Treas-
ury notes and natiohal bank notes, which
pass from hhnd t^ hand ; that is, such as are
payable to bearer or are properly indorsed
3 Wds.& P.2d Sta.— 52
by the payee so that the legal title may
pass by delt^^ery. ' State t. Smith, 120 S. W.
ISe, 157, 01 Ark. 1.
btl&er nniiU^noe
Where a deed provided that the grantor
should not put upon the premises ''any build-
ings, timber, trees or other nuisances*,** the
words **other nuisances*' will not include ex-
cavations unless it appears from the whole
instrument that such was the Intention.
CrosiB V. Frost, 23 Ati;m«, 64 Vt. 179, 1«2.
Other obligation hj whipl& delit U se-
cured
The phrase ''other obligation by.w^ch^
debt ia secured," as used in Const art 13, §
4, providing that a mortgage^ deed of trust,
contract, or other obligation by which a debt
is secured shall, for the purpose of hssess-
ment or taxation, be deemed an Interest in
the property thereby affected, does^ not in-
clude a collateral security, or credits by loan
on personalty. Bank of Willows v. Glenn
County. 101 Pac. 13, 14, 155 Cal. 352.
The term "contract or other obl^atlon,"
in Const art. 13, S 4, providing that a mort-
gage, deed of trust, or other obligation by
which a deed is secured shall for tbe pur-
pose of taxation be treated as an interest in
property, were Inserted to cover any and all
possible contracts of Hen npon realty which
the ingenuity of lawyers might attempt to
devise to evade the constitutional t^ulre-
ment. Bank of Woodland v. Pierce, 77 Pac.
1012. 1013, 144 Cal. 434.
Otliev^ oeenpttHoa
Under charter authority to a city to reg-
ulate and prescribe the compensation of hack-
men, cabmen, omnibus drivers, and all "oth-
ers pursuing a like occupation,*' the city can
limit the rate of fare to be charged by street
railway companies, inasmuch as the ]^ase
^'Others pursuing a like occupation," when
consttued ejusdem generis, Includes rstreet
x'allway companies. Chicago Union Traction
CO. V. Chicago, 65 N. E. 451, 460, 199 111.
484, 59 L. R. A. 631 (dUng and adopting
Union County T. Ussery, 35 N. £. 618, 147
111. 204; Misch v. Russell, 26 N. B. 528^ 136
tU. 22, 12 L. R. A. 126 ; First Nat Bank of
Joll^t V. Adam, 28 N. B. 955, 138 111. 483 ;
Ritchie v. People, 40 N. B. 454, 155 111. 96,
20 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St Rep. 315).
Other ofFenses
See Assault to Commit Other Offense.
Other oflleere
The words, "other officer," as used In the
statute covering bribery (Rev. St | 6000),
must be extended to Include members of the
council of a municipality. Amiindson y.
SUte, 28 Ohio Cir. Ct R. 655, 656.
The words "other officers," in Rer. Code,
1852, as amended to 1893, p. 697, a 92, | 2,
authoiitslng the judges of the Superior Court
to punish the contempt, omissions, n^lects.
OTHEB
818
OTHEB
and defiittlto of Joaticet of tbo poaoe, sboriAi,
coroners, clerks and "otber offloers" within
the state, include the office of alderman. Test-
ed with Jurisdiction to administer the crim-
inal law. In re TuU (Del.) 78 AtL 299, 800,
2 Boyce, 126.
The words "other officers," as nsed In
Oonst art 8, i 8, making it the duty of the
two houses of the General Assembly after
organization at request of either house to
Join in grand committee for the purpose of
electing other officers, undoubtedly meant
such officers as by special direction of the
Ck)n8titution or by law were to be elected by
the General Assembly. In re Decision of
Justices, 69 AtL 565, 666, 28 R. I. 607.
A "solicitor of business*' is not within
the clause "and other officers," in Rev. St
U. 8. } 5136, giving a national bank power to
appoint a president vice president, cashier,
and other officers, and dismiss such officers
at pleasure; but under subdivisions 8 and 7
of said section, empowering such a bank
to make contracts and to exercise, by duly
authorized "officers" or agents, all such inci-
dental powers as shall be necessary to carry
on the banking business. It may employ a
solicitor of business for a year. Case v. First
Nat Bank of Brooklyn, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1119,
1120, 50 Misc. Rep. 269.
As used in Code Civ. Proc. 1 1986, subd.
3, as amended by St 1907, p. 730, c. 391, f
1, providing that a subpoena to require at-
tendance out of court before a Judge, Justice,
or other officer authorized to administer
oaths or take testimony in any matter under
the laws, is to be issued by the Judge, Justice,
or other officer before whom att^idance is
required, and if the subpoena is Issued to re-
quire attendance before a commissioner or
other officer upon the taking of a deposition,
it must be issued by the clerk of the superior
court of the county wherein the attendance
is required, upon the order of such court or a
Judge th^eof, the term "other officer" means
any one authorized to administer oaths or
take testimony, eta, and includes a notary
public, in view of PoL Code, I 794, provid-
ing that it is the duty of notaries public to
take depositions and affidavits and administer
oaths in all matters to be used before any
court etc., and it was proper for a Judge of
the superior court of S. county to order the
clerk to issue a subpoena requiring a witness
residing therein to attend before a notary in
the county to give his deposition, and for the
clerk to issue such subpoena. In re Scott
96 Paa 385, 387, 8 CaL App. 12.
In Const f 160, expressly making two
years the term of office of city legislative
boards generally, and in the next clause
prescribing the manner of Meeting such
boards in cities of the first and second class,
and in the succeeding clause providing that
"other officers" of towns or cities, if elected
by the voters thereof; shall hold office for
"four years, and until their snconson s&£ll
be qualified," the provtsion as to tbe tenb
of oflloe of "other officersT' was idainly ei-
chialTe of the provisions as to the tenos of
city legislative boards, and was not open tc
construction. HcDermott v. Dty of Loois-
vlUe, 32 S. W. 264, 265, 98 Ky. 50.
Since 1886 there has been in MisBooiii
separate statute limiting the time vitUii
which actions against constables nut be
commenced (Rer. St 1835, p. 116, i 4), vMdi
limitation was in 1889 sKteaded iim t«o to
three years (Ber. St 1889, f 2377; Rer. SL
1899, i 882). Ibe term "or otber ofBcet:
used in Rev. St 1899, I 4274, limitiDS k^
tioQB against a dieriff, coroner, or otber of
fleer to three years after accrual of aise.
was not in the original act of 1848 (Acts
1848-49, p. 79, I 5), which r^ted only toi
dierilf or a coroner; the words being insBted
in the revision of 1866 (Rev. St 18S5, p. Wk
c 103, art. 2, I 4), In which revisiOD tten
was a separate statute of llmitatioiis of trc
years as to constables (Rev. St 1S55, p. SIT.
c. 29, i 6). Held, that the term "or other ef
fleer," in section 4274, applies to a tretsonf
of a school district and bars a drll a^
tion against him and his sureties on Ms of
flcial bond, if not brought within the tlse
limited. State ex reL School District of Se
dalia V. Barter, 87 S. W. 941, 9H 188 M»
516.
The term "oth^ officers," as nsed in I^
Act Mich. 1907, No. 461, p. 862, wbicb nale^
it the duty of a certain county treasoref
and all "other officers" of the county bariie
county funds in their possession or nv^
their control to deposit them in depositaries
designated by the board of supervisors, may
include deputies of the treasurer and peisoi^
appointed under Comp. Laws, | 3527, to p^
form the duties of treasurer but wbo trr
not designated as "treasurer." Gratiot Cm
ty V. Munson, 122 N. W. 117, 11* 157 Midi
505.
Otber
In Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c IX I ^
Schedule Q, par. 258, 30 Stat 171, rating :^
sardines "in bottles, jars, thi boxes, or cm
of various small sizes not exceeding 70 c^'
inches, also "in othor packages," the dodrii^
of nosdtur a socils is not to be so applied t'
to limit the Utter phrase to packages of >
retail size, and thus exclude sardines in laif^
tins dealt in at wholesale. Strohmeftf^
Arpe CJo. v. United States, 178 Fed. 268, lOi
0. C. A. 400.
Otliev paper
The words "other paper," as wed it
Kirby's Dig. | 3490, aUowing the deii of »k
circuit court 10 cento each "for ma ^
plaint, answer, reply, petition, den»iner.»
fldavit or 'other paper* " in a cause is ag^
eral term, but according to the old and s^
tied rule of stotutory construction most »
confined in ito meaning to that dass of P*^
OTHEB
819
OTHER
pen to which the preceding words belong.
Hempstead County t. Harkness, 84 8. W. 7d9,
73 Ark. 600 (citing BastetH Arkansas Hedge-
Fence Co. T. Tanner; 53 S. W. 88^ 67 Ark.
156; Matthews ▼. KimbaU, 66 S. W. 661, 69
S. W. 547, 70 Ark. 451; Sedg. St & Cotost
Law r2d Od.] pp. 360, 361 ; Bnd. Interp. St
§1 400-407; Suth. St Const 268-276; State
▼. Blackburn, 83 S. W. 529, 61 Ark. 407).
In a statute laying tariff on imported
"paper hangings and paper for screens or for
fire boards and all 'other paper^ not specific-
ally provided for in this act** there is no
reason to suppose the words ''other papei*'
were used with any different meaning from
that given it in a former act in which the
words were used in a like association, and
therefore plain paper stamped by single oper-^
ation into shapes with lace-like effects to be
used on the tops of packages of candy, fruit,
etc or under finger bowls, was dutiable as
"paper," rather than as "manufactures of
paper." Hamilton t. United States, 167 Fed.
796, 798, 93 C. C. A. 186.
Other party
The term "other parties," as used in
Code Civ. Proa Cal. I 389, providing that
when a complete determination of a contro*
versy cannot be had without the presence of
other parties court must then order them to
be brought in, etc., means persons whose
presence is essential to the complete determi-
nation of a controversy between parties who
were already before the court Alpers v.
Bliss, 79 Pac 171, 173, 145 Cal. 565.
Rev. St 1899, f 4652, providing that in
actions where one of the original parties to
the contract tn issue and on trial is dead the
other party to such contract cannot testify in
his own favor, means by the "other party"
one who is a party to the suit, as well as to
the contract Jackson v. Smith, 123 S. W.
1026, 1028, 139 Mo. App. 691.
A decedent's executrix, in a suit to en-
force subrogation to the rights of a mort-
gagee in certain land as against an heir of
decedent by his first wife; was not disqualified
to testity as the "oth^ party*' to any con*
tract or catuse of action in issue, under P. S.
1589, though she might benefit by a successful
terminaticm of the Utigation by force of the
decedent's wllL wader's Bx'r v. Wilder, 72
Aa 203, 206, 82 Vt 123.
Notice of applioatton by a landholder for
the appointment of commissioners to review
the assessment o^ damages to his land, by
laying out a road over tlie same, must be
given to the township committee, and not to
the applicants. The town committee are
"the other party" referred to In the act of
Biarch 1, 1860. Inhabitants of Hopewell Tp.
V. Welling, 24 N. J. Law, 127, 128.
Other pemuutent flxtures
"Other permanent fixtures," as used in
a policy providing that the insurer should not ,
be liable, unless liability waa spedflcally as-
sumed, for loss of store or office furniture or
fixtures, and describijig the property insured
as a building Including gas, steam, and war
ter pipes and all otiter permanent fixtures
contained therein,' did not cover or include
counters, shelving, and office fixtures in the
building which might be removed without
injury to the building. Banyer v. Albany
In^ Co., 83 N. Y. Supp. 65, 85 App. Div. 122.
Other persons
Under Rev. St f 6480, Act June 8, 1872,
C. 835, 17 Stat. 823, as amended by Act March
2, 1889, c. 893, § 1, 25 Stat 873, providing
that if any person having devised or intend-
ing to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, to be effected by either <q;»ening or in-
tending to open correspondence or communi-
cation with any person, whether resident
within or outside the United States, by means
of the post office establishment of the Unit-
ed States, or by Inciting such "other person"
or any person to open communication with
the person so. devising or intending; shall,
In and for executing such scheme or artifice,
or attempting so to do, mall any letter or
receive any letter from the mail, he shall,
upon conviction, be punishable by a fine or
imprisonment, or both. The clause, or by In-
<];lt(ng such "other person" or any person to
open communication with the person so de-
vising or intending, clearly indicates that the
person mentioned in the preceding clause
with whom the devisor opened or intends to
open correspondence is to be such "other per-
son" and not himself. Erbaugh v. United
States, 173 Fed. 433, 434, 97 C. C. A. 663.
An employ^ in the customs service of the
United States who makes and returns false
weights in connection with an entry of im-
ported merchandise is comprehended by the
words ''other person" in tbe provisions of the
customs administration act (Act June 10,
1890, c. 407, § 1, 26 Stat 131), for the for-
feiture of goods or their value where "any
owner, Importer, consignee, agent, or other
person" shall make an entry by means of
false and fraudulent practices, or shall be
guilty of any unlawful act or omission where-
by the United States is deprived of the law-
ful duties, and for the punishment of such
person by fine or Imprisonment or both.
United States v. Mescall, 80 Sup. Ct 19, 20,
215 U. 8. 26, 54 L. Bd. 77.
As used in General Tax Act 1905, § 2,
par. 28 (Acts 1905, p. 30), which levies a spe-
cial tax upon each brewing company for each
plant or brewery in the state and "upon all
other persons, firms, and corporations who
are engaged in the sale of beer, whether on
consignment or otherwise • • • for each
place of business including all other per-
sons, corporations, or agencies maintaining
storage depots in this state," etc., the word
"other" following the word "including" was
not Intended to contrast the persons, corpo-
OTHEB
820
OTHER
rations, and agenqles enuinerated after It
with the peraatu, flrmg, or coiporations Just
previously enumerated* The phrase *'aU oth-
er persons" haa the same meaning as the
identical words "all other persons" earlier
in the paragraph. Whittlesey t. Acme Brew-
ing Go.« 06 8. B. 290, 800, 127 Ga. 20a
As used in Laws 1903, p. 141, c. 93, im-
posing a penalty on an officer of a corpora-
tion who makes exaggerated reports "to the
stockholders or to other persons dealing with
such corporation," the comprehensive class
"stockholden or other persons" includes all
persons dealing with corporations. State t.
Merchant, 92 Pac. 890, 891, 48 Wash. 69.
. The words "or other," in St 1898, f
1165, provldil^g that the owner or occupant
of any land sold for taxes "or other" person
may at any time within three yeara from the
date of the certificate of sale redeem the
same or any part thereof or interest therein,
must be given such construction as will en-
able those whose rights will be directly
prejudiced by absolutism of a tax title to ra^
deem, though they be neither ownen nor oc-
cupants, and a minor is entitled to redeem
from a tax sale, and he has such an interest
after executing and delivering a warranty
deed as entitles him to redeem. Hoffman ▼.
Peterson, 102 N. W. 4T, 48, 123 Wis. 632.
Rev. St I 725, which gives to federal
courts power to punish as contempts dis-
obedience or resistance by officers, "or by
any party, juror, witness, or *other. person,*
to any lawful writ, process, rule, decree or
command of the said courts," extends the
power of such court to enforce its decrees to
persons oth^r than those made parties by
name; and it is the settled rule thereunder
that, to render a person amenable to an In-
junction, it is neither necessary that he
should have been a party to the suit nor have
been actually served with a copy of the in-
jimction, so long as he appears to have had
actual notice. Employers* Teaming Co. v.
Teamsters' Joint CJoundl, 141 Fed. 679, 681.
The words "other person," in Wilson's
Rev. & Ann. St 1903, § 2774, providing that
every transfer of property with intent to
delay or defraud any creditor or "other per-
son" of his demands is void against all cred-
itors, includes a wife, and, where a husband
by cruel treatment compels the wife to leave
him and bring an action for divdrce and
alimony, she is a quasi creditor In relation
to the alimony which the law awards her,
and a transfer by the husband of property
with intent to defraud the wife Is void as
against her. Bennett v. Bennett, 81 Pac.
632, 637, 15 Okl. 286, 70 L. R. A. 864.
The words "other person," in Mills' Ann.
St i 2564, providing if "any officer or other
person," by virtue of any execution, shall
take or seize property exempted from levy ^
and saie^ such officer or person shall be lia-
ble for three times the value of the property,
includes an execution creditor, who autb t-
ins or knowingly ratifies the act of an o&
ear In sdeing under execution and gelliBi
exempt property of the judgment deUuL
Seerie v. Brewer, 90 Pac 508, 609, 40 Coio.
200, 122 Adl St. Rep. 1065.
In Rev. St f 1166, authorizfaig the o^
er, occupant, or other person to redeem laa!
sold for taxes, the words *'or other peisof
do not eoabraoe other persons having do i&-
tereet whatever in the land. Butledge t.
Price Co^ 27 N. W. 819, 920, 66 Wi& 35.
All noncombatants except the wives aod
children of military and civil oflkers vei*
embraced in the words "other persons" in i
contract with the United States for tbe
transportation to Spain at tiie cabin rate of
Spanish military and dvll ofiicers in tbe
Philippine Islands, and at the steerage rate
of such, other persons as might be desi;
nated by the Secretary of War. J. M. Celal^
los & Oo. ▼. United States, 29 Sop. a 583.
988, 214 U. S. 47, 68 L. Ed. 904.
In Act Aug. 18, 1907 (Acts 1907, p. TTIk
regulating the issuance of prescriptloDs for
intoxicating liquors by licensed physicUi]^
or other persons, the words "other pcraoi^"
apply to a licensed physician, or one not li^
censed who assumed to practice mediciaa
and therefore, whether die physician wb^<se
name was signed to tbe prescription by d^
fendant was a licensed physician or not L'
he practiced such profession, he was withi:
the terms of the act McAllister v. SUte, 41
South. 161, 163, 156 Ala. 122.
The term "other persons," as naed is
Act 1901 (23 St at Large, p. 754), proridins
that the term public officer shall include aii
officers of the state, and other persons vbo«
duUes are defined by law, in its Uteral me&£
ing would include guardians, admlnlstntans
and other trustees, and it could not bare
been the intration of the Legislature to ^
dude such persons in the definition of po^
Uc officers. The intention probably was ti?
Include in the definition all persons wtaoae
public duties are defined by law sndi &$
poorhouse superintendenta Sanders t. Bel^
ue, 58 S. B. 762; 764, 78 S. C. 17L
Laws 1S91, a 114. f 1 (Gen. St 1909 1
4643), providing that eight hours shall ei«-
stitute a day's work for all laborers or oth^*
persons emi^yed by any city, applies to ^
eiiglneers^dnd firemen wlio operate the water
and electric tplant of the city of Ottt«i
State ▼. City of Ottawtt*' 113 Pac 391, 396.
84 Kan. 100.
The words "otljer persons,* ts osed is
Gen. St 1901, c. 38, S 3, subd. 8. pro«
that every person residing in tbAs state an^
being the head of a family shall hare exeffl^
from seizure and sale upon any attacfameBL
execution, or other process, the following J^
tides of personal property: The]
OTIIEB
821
OTHER
«ols and implements of any mecbanlo, miner,
: "other person" used and kept In stock
)T the purpose of cariTing on his trade or
jsiness, means other persons obliged to use
w)ls or implements to carry on their. trades
: business in the same way that a mechan-
or miner requires tools or implements to
irry on his trade or buslnesa Williams v.
incent, 79 Pac. 121, 122, 70 Kan. 685, 68 U
. A. 634, 109 Am. St Bep. 469.
A person residing In the sttite who Is the
ead of a family, and whose principal busi-
ess is the mnning of a tiiresbing machine,
I inclnded in the i^rase, "or other person,"
3 used in the statutes of Kansas relating to
cemptlon of tools. Jackman ▼. Lambert-
>n, 80 Pac. 55, 66, 71 Kan. 188.
The words "other person or persons," a6
sed In Bums' Ann. St. 1908, § 8346. mak-
ig it unlawful for any railroad, or any com-
lon carriers or agent thereof, or any dray-
lan, or other person or persons, to ship, re-
eire, transport, carry, or handle intozicat-
ig liquors under false or fictitious names or
Itles, within the state, include all indiyldu-
Is, though they are not engaged in the busi-
ess of a common carrier, so that an afflda-
it charging violation of the statute was not
Qsufficient for failing to allege that defend-
Dts or either of them was either a railroad,
ommon carrier, or agent thereof, or person
ngaged in transportation business or any
»usiness of like kind or character. State v.
)ecker, 89 N. E. 316, 317, 172 Ind. 614.
The clause "other person having the le-
;al care and control of any infant," in Rev.
>t 1899, 1 1857, punishing any master or mis-
ress of an apprentice, or ''other person hav-
ng the legal care and control of amy infant,"
rho shall unlawfully assault such apprentice
>r infant, Is modified by the context, and has
elation to the preceding words "master
' * * of an apprentice," and this refers to
I different kind of relat&onahip from that
)f parent and child, and where one who
idopted a child by a deed of adoption, as au-
horized by section 5248, providing that from
:be time of filing a deed of adoption a child
idopted shall have the same rights for sup-
port and propier treatment as any child has
>y law commits an assault and battery on
iie child, the prosecution must be brought
jnder section 1850, fixing the punishment for
my one who shall assault another under
such circumstances, as not to constitute any
3ther offense, instead of under section 1857.
State V. Koonse, 101 S. W. 139, 141, 123 Mo.
/^pp. 655.
Same— As ejwsdem generis
In St 1898, § 2320, providing that con-
veyances made with the intent to hinder, de-
lay, or defraud creditoils, "or other persons,"
of their lawful actions or demands, shall be
void as against sneh person, the words "oth-
er persons" refer to persons of the same gen-
era] class having rights of action which may
be hindered by conyeyance.^-Oorry v. Shear,
128 N. W. 892, 894^ 144 Wis. 185, Ann. Ca&
1912A, U54.
The words "and any other persons," as
used in Laws 1897, p. 326, c. 112, { 1, giving
cities power to construct and operate water-
works to supply the inhabitants thereof and
any other persons with water, does not in-
clude other municipalities. The words must
be construed according to th^,rule of ejusdem
generis. The specific words in the statute
referred to that class of persons who are In-
habitants of the city (that Is to say, persond
who are habitually and regularly within the
corporate limits) ; and the , general words
following can have no broader application
than to persons within the corporate limits,
such as transient persona. Farwell v. City
of Seattle, 86 Pac. 217, 218, 43 Wa^h. 141, 10
Ann. Gas. 130.
Oilier person lateyested
The purchaser of the intexiest of an heir
to land owned by decedent is not enticed to
apply for a sale thereof for the payment of
debts, under Bev. St 1899, | 150, providing
that such application may.be made by any
"creditor or other person Uiterested in the
estate." The term "other person Interested
in the estate" contemplates persons who have
an interest (n the distribution of the estate
or ^ho.have a. right to partlcipa^ in such
distribution, such as an heir or one who is
made the legatee by will or the guardian or
creditor of one of the heirs of the estate or
other persons who may be entitled to a dis-
tributive share of the estate. The puichase
of the Interest of two children of deceased in
land which descended to them falls far short
of creating any "interest in the estate," as
contemplated by the statute. Stark v. Kirch-
graber. 85 S. W. 868, 871, 186 Mo. 633, .105
Am. St Rg!^ 629.
Other peitooiial efleeta or property
The phrase "other personal property" in
the iron-safe clause of a fire policy, requiring
that the clause shall be comi^led with If the
insurance covers merchandise or otlier per-
sonal property, means articles in the nature
of merchandise, and does not inclode ordi-
nary store fixtures such as show cases, iron
safes, etc. American Ins. Go. v. Bagley, 65
S. E. 787, 6 Ga. App. 736.
Where a statute exempted stocks and
other personal property from taxation In
certain circumstances, the use of the word
"other" Is a clear Indication that the Legis-
lature regarded stocks as included within
the description of personal estate. Trenton
V. Standard Fire Ins. Go., 68 ^tL 1111, 1112,
76 N. J. Law, 79.
The word "other," as used in a provision
of a tax law relating to the taxation of "roll-
ing stock and other personal property,"
means other than located ; 1. e., the unlocat-
ed personalty or personalty of like nature
OTHEB
822
OTHBB
with rolling stock. Greene County t. Wright,
04 S. £. 901, 954, 126 GkL. 004 (citing Ck>liim-
bus Southern Rj* Oue^ 10 8. B. 298, 89 Ga.
674).
Oikev pUm«
In constmlng Rer. St 1899, | 1806,
which makes it an offense for any father or
mother or any other person to whom a child
under the age of six years has been confided
to "expose such child in a street, field, or
other place with intent wholly to abandon
it," the rule of ejusdem generis does not ap-
ply, and "other places" will not be limited In
Its meaning to places like a street or field;
and therefore an indictment chargi